Prohibition of Child Marriage Act Is A Secular Law and Would Prevail Over Personal Laws of Parties Gujarat HC

HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
FIR/ORDER) NO. 8290 of 2015
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

==========================================================
Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to

see the judgment ?
To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the

judgment ?
Whether this case involves a substantial question of law

as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or
any order made thereunder ?
YES
YES
NO
NO
Circulate to all Judicial Officers of the State.
==========================================================
YUNUSBHAI USMANBHAI SHAIKH....Applicant(s)

Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & 1....Respondent(s)
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR. SOEB R. BHOHARIA, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1
VALIMOHAMMED PATHAN, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1
HCLS COMMITTEE, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MADANSINGH O BAROD, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR KL PANDYA, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

Date : 23/09/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
Page 1 of 61
Page 1 of 61
Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
1.
CAV JUDGMENT
Rule.Mr.K.L.Pandya,the learnedAdditional PublicProsecutor
waivedtheserviceofnoticeofruleforandonbehalfoftherespondent
No.1.TherespondentNo.2theoriginalfirstinformantalthoughserved
withthenoticeissuedbythisCourtdated23.06.2015yethaschosennot
toappearbeforethisCourtandopposethisapplicationeitherinperson
orthroughanadvocate.
2.
By this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure,1973,theapplicanttheoriginalaccusedseekstoinvokethe
inherent powers of this Court, praying for quashing of the First
Information Report bearing C.R. No.I38 of 2014 registered with the
Gayakwad Haveli Police Station, District: Ahmedabad for the offence
punishableunderSections363and366oftheIndianPenalCode(for
short,'theI.P.C.')andalsofortheoffencepunishableunderSection18
ofthePreventionofChildrenfromSexualOffencesAct(forshort,'the
POCSOAct').
3.
Thefactsgivingrisetothispetitionmaybesummarizedasunder:
3.1 The respondent No.2 is a resident of Ahmedabad. He has two

daughters,namely,Namiraaged16yearsand4months,andTahejib
aged 10 years. At the time when the First Information Report was
lodged,theelderdaughterofthefirstinformant,namely,Namirawas
studyinginstandard11th.IntheFirstInformationReport,ithasbeen
Page 2 of 61
Page 2 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
statedthathisdaughterNamirawasinlovewiththeapplicantherein.It
isfurtherstatedthatthefamilymembersusedtopersuadeNamirato
discontinuetherelationswiththeapplicantaccused.Itisfurtherstated
thatfriendsandrelativeshadalsotriedtopersuadeNamiranottokeep
anyrelationswiththeapplicantaccused.IthasbeenallegedintheF.I.R.
thaton17.04.2015inthenighthours,theapplicantaccusedenticedthe
daughterofthefirstinformant,namely,Namiraandkidnappedherfrom
thelawfulguardianshipofthefirstinformant.Itisallegedthatonthe
dateofthelodgingoftheF.I.R.,Namirawasaminor.
4.
Theapplicantaccusedhascomeupwiththisapplication,praying
forquashingoftheF.I.R.,mainlyonthefollowinggrounds:
(1)
Thefirstinformant,asfatherofNamira,hasadmittedinsomany
wordsintheFirstInformationReportthathisdaughterwasinlovewith
theapplicantaccused.
(2)
Thefirstinformanthasalsodeclaredtheageofhisdaughteras16
yearsand4monthsonthedatewhentheoffenceisallegedtohavebeen
committed.
(3)
Accordingtotheapplicantaccused,Namirahadleftherparental
homeonherownfreewillandvolitionanddecidedtogetmarriedwith
theapplicantaccused.Accordingly,theNikahwasperformed,andason
today,theapplicantaccusedandNamiraareresidingtogetheraslawful
weddedhusbandandwife.
Page 3 of 61
Page 3 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
(4)
CAV JUDGMENT
TheapplicantaccusedandNamiraaregovernedbytheirPersonal
Lawi.e.theMohammedanLaw.AMuslimgirl,whoisabove15yearsof
ageorhasattainedpuberty,isatlibertytomarryevenifthereisno
consentfromtheparents.
(5)
Article251oftheMohammedanLawdealswiththecapacityfor
marriage.
(6)
Article348dealswiththeageofmajority.
(7)
Accordingtotheapplicantaccused,nooffencecouldbesaidto
havebeencommittedinviewofthedecisionofthisCourtinthecaseof
Mujamil Abdulsattar Mansuri vs. State of Gujarat (Criminal
MiscellaneousApplicationNo.19811of2013decidedon01.12.2014).
(8)
Mr. Soeb R. Bhoharia, the learned counsel appearing for the
applicant accused submitted that even if the entire case of the first
informantisacceptedastrue,noneoftheingredientstoconstitutethe
offenceofkidnappingarespeltout.
(9)
HesubmittedrelyingonthedecisionofthisCourtinthecaseof
Mujamil(supra)thatthecontinuationoftheinvestigationbythepolice
wouldbenothing,butanabuseoftheprocessoflaw.
5.
Ontheotherhand,thisapplicationhasbeenvehementlyopposed
byMr.Pandya,thelearnedAdditionalPublicProsecutorappearingfor
therespondentStateofGujarat.Hepointedoutthatinthedecisionof
thisCourtreferredtoaboveandwhichhasbeenstronglyreliedupon,
Page 4 of 61
Page 4 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
theprovisionsoftheIndianMajorityActwerelookedintoindetails,but
thereisnoreferenceoftheeffectoftheprovisionsoftheProhibitionof
ChildMarriageAct,2006(forshort,theP.C.M.Act,2006).Mr.Pandya
submittedthatthedecisionofthisCourtinthecaseofMujamil(supra)
needs to be relooked in light of the conflict between the Personal
MuslimLawandtheprovisionsoftheProhibitionofChildMarriageAct,
2006.
6.
HesubmittedthattheProhibitionofChildMarriageAct,2006isa
specialActanditdoesnotdistinguishbetweentheaccusedaccordingto
his community. A Muslim boy or any other person of the Muslim
community is covered by the provisions of the Prohibition of Child
MarriageAct,2006.HesubmittedthattheP.C.M.Acthastheapplication
for all the people belonging to all religions and regions. The only
exception made is in the case of State of Jammu and Kashmir. He
brought tomynotice the provisions containedin Section 1(2)of the
P.C.M.Act,2006,whichreadsasunder:
1.
Shorttitle,extentandcommencement
(1)...
...
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and
Kashmir;anditappliesalsotoallcitizenswithoutandbeyondIndia;
ProvidedthatnothingcontainedinthisActshallapplytotheRenoncants
oftheUnionterritoryofPendicherry.
7.
Mr.Pandya submitted that the consequencesofcommitting the

Page 5 of 61
Page 5 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
offenceundertheP.C.M.Actcannotbeavoidedonthegroundofthe
offenderbelongingtoaparticularreligion.
8.
Hesubmittedthatthestatutecanalwaysextinguishthecustomary
lawandthecustomaryright.Mr.Pandyareliedonthedecisionofthe
SupremeCourtinthecaseofShabanaBanov.ImranKhan,reportedin
(2009)12SCC62,whereinitwasheldthatadivorcedMuslimwoman
isentitledtoclaimthe maintenancefromherhusbandunderSection
125oftheCodeofCriminalProcedureevenaftertheexpiryoftheIddat
periodsolongasshedoesnotremarry.Justbecauseherpersonallaw
providesfortheawardofthemaintenanceonlyduringtheIddatperiod,
themaintenancecannotberestrictedtotheIddatperiodonly.
9.
He submitted that considering the above, the decision of this
Courtinthecaseof Mujamil(supra) isnotagoodlaw.Hesubmitted

thatwhatispermittedornotprohibitedbyareligiondoesnotbecomea
religiouspracticeorapositivetenetofareligion.Mr.Pandyaseverely
criticizedthePersonalMuslimLawwhichpermitsaMuslimgirlhaving
attained the age of 15 or puberty to get married even without the
consentofherparents.Hesubmittedthattheobjectbehindenactingthe
P.C.M. Act was to curb the menace of child marriage; which is still
prevalent in this Country. He submitted that the marriage of the
applicantaccusedwithNamiraisinviolation ofthe provisionsofthe
Page 6 of 61
Page 6 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
P.C.M.Act,2006,inasmuchasNamiraisminorbeingbelowtheageof
18years.HesubmittedthatNamiramighthavefalleninlovewiththe
applicantaccused,whois12yearseldertoher,withoutunderstanding
theimplicationofsuchmarriage.HesubmittedthatNamiracouldnotbe
saidtobepsychologicallyorphysicallyfittogetmarried.Hesubmitted
thatconsentofNamiraishardlyofanyconsequencesofarastheP.C.M.
Actisconcerned.
10.
Insuchcircumstances,referredtoabove,Mr.Pandya,thelearned
Additional Public Prosecutor prays that the First Information Report

shouldnotbequashedandthepoliceshouldbepermittedtocomplete
theinvestigation.Hesubmittedthatthepolicehasalsooverlookedthe
provisions of the P.C.M. Act, 2006 while registering the F.I.R. He
submittedthatthePolicemayhavebeenguidedbythedictumoflaw
laiddownbythisCourtinthecaseof Mujamil(supra)that aMuslim
girlhavingattainedtheageof15orhavingattainedthepubertycan
marryevenwithouttheconsentofherparents.
11.
12.
Hesubmittedthatthisapplicationdeservestoberejected.
ANALYSIS:
Havingheardthelearnedcounselappearingforthepartiesand
having gone through the materials on record, the following three

questionsfallformyconsideration:
Page 7 of 61
Page 7 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
(1)
CAV JUDGMENT
WhetherthedecisionofthisCourtinthecaseofMujamil(supra)
laysdownthecorrectpropositionoflawsofarastherightofaMuslim
girl to get married at the age of 15 or having attained puberty is
concernedvisvistheprovisionsoftheP.C.M.Act,2006.
(2)
WhethertheMuslimPersonalLaw(Shariat)ApplicationAct,1937
wouldprevailovertheP.C.M.Act,2006.
(3)
EveniftheMuslimgirlisaconsentingpartywhethertheoffence
couldbesaidtohavebeencommittedundertheP.C.M.Act,2006,ifshe
getsmarriedbeingaminorintermsoftheP.C.M.Act,2006.
13.
BeforeIproceedtoconsiderthequestionsframedabove,Ideemit
necessarytolookintothedecisionofthisCourtinthecaseofMujamil
(supra).InthecaseofMujamil(supra),thefactswerealmostidentical.
Mujamil had an affair with a girl, namely, Reshambanu aged 17.
Reshambanu one day left her parental home and got married with
Mujamil.TheygotmarriedbyperformingNikahattheAjmerSharif.The
fatherofReshambanulodgedareportinthatregardallegingtheoffence
of kidnapping by Mujamil of his daughter. It was argued before this
CourtthatReshambanubeingaMuslimgirlwaswithinherrightunder
thePersonalMuslimLawtogetmarriedsinceshehadcrossedtheageof
15.ItwasalsoarguedthatReshambanuwasinlovewithMujamiland
Page 8 of 61
Page 8 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
hadleftherparentalhomeonherownfreewillandvolition.
14.
This Court considered the provisions of the Mohammedan Law
andalsothedecisionoftheDivisionBenchofthePatnaHighCourtin
this regard. This Court also considered one another decision of this
Court in the case of AlimamadMershaShaikh vs.State ofGujarat,
2006(3)GLR2472.TakingintoconsiderationthePersonalMuslimLaw
andthecaselaw,itwasheldbythisCourtasunder:
12. Article 251 of the Mohammedan Law deals with capacity for
marriage.Itreadsasunder:
251.Capacityformarriage.(1)EveryMahomedanofa
soundmind,whohasattainedpuberty,mayenterintoa
contractofmarriage.(2)Lunaticsandminorswhohave
not attained puberty may be validly contracted in
marriagebytheirrespectiveguardians,(3)Amarriage
ofaMahomedanwhoisofsoundmindandhasattained
puberty, is void, if it is brought about without his
consent.
Explanation Puberty is presumed, in the absence of
evidence,oncompletionoftheageoffifteenyears.
ThisprovisionclearlyshowsthateveryMahomedanwho
has attained puberty, is capable to validly contract
marriage. The explanation of puberty is presumed, in
the absence of evidence, on completion of the age of
fifteen years. Therefore, every Mahomedan who has
attainedpubertycanenterintoacontractofmarriage
evenifthereisnoconsentoftheparentsorguardians.
Furtherinabsenceofevidence,pubertycanbepresumed
oncompletionoftheageoffifteenyears.
13.Article348dealswiththeageofmajority.Itreadsasunder:
348.Ageofmajority.InthisChapter,minormeansa
personwhohasnotcompletedtheageofeighteenyears.
Page 9 of 61
Page 9 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
14.Itshowsthatapersonwhohasnotcompleted18yearsofageisa
minor.However,inthecommentaryonthetextbookMulla,Principlesof
MahomedanLaw,19thEdition,byM.Hidayatullah,itisstatedasunder:
Age of majority under the Mahomedan Law.
AccordingtotheIslamiclaw,theminorityofamaleor
female terminates when he or she attains puberty.
AmongtheHanafisandtheShia,pubertyispresumed
on the completion of the fifteenth year. Under the
Indian Majority Act(s.3), minority cases on the
completionoftheeighteenthyear,unlessaguardianof
thepersonorpropertyorbothoftheminorhasbeenor
shallbeappointed before theminor hasattained the
ageofeighteenyears,orthepropertyoftheminoris
under the superintendence of a Court of Wards, in
whichcasetheageofminorityisprolongeduntilthe
minor has completed the age of twentyone years.
Under the Mahomedan Law any person who has
attained puberty is entitled to act in all matters
affectinghisorherstatusorhisorherproperty. But
that law has been materially altered by the Indian
Majority Act, and the only matters in which a
Mahomedanisnowentitledtoactonattainingtheage
offifteenyearsare(1)marriage,(2)dower and(3)
divorce. In all other matters his minority continues
until the completion atleast ofeighteen years. Until
thentheCourthaspowertoappointaguardianofhis
personorpropertyorbothunder theGuardians and
WardsAct.
15. Thus, from the above, it is clear that when a person has attained
puberty,whenheorshehaswillinglycontractedthemarriage,itisavalid
marriageundertheMohammedanLaw.
16.ImayquotewithprofitaDivisionBenchdecisioninthecaseofMohd.
IdrisVs.StateofBihar,1980,CriminalLawJournal,764.
17.TheDivisionBenchofthePatnaHighCourthasobservedasunder:
5.Sofarasthefactumofmarriageisconcerned,Imay
sayatthe outset that inthe instant case ithasnot
been disputed at any stage. From the order of the
learned Sessions Judge, it does not appear that the
petitioner disputed the factum of marriage. His only
assertion since the very beginning was that she is
below 15 years of age, and, as such, she could not
Page 10 of 61
Page 10 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
marry without the consent of her guardian. Even

before this Court in the writ application there is no
assertionthatinfacttherehasbeennomarriage.This
aspectofthematterhasbeenconsideredbyaBenchin
the case of Mst. Bashiran V/s. Mohammad Hussain
[AIR 1941 Oudh 284] wherein it was
observed: .........It is well settled that the Indian
MajorityActwhichfixestheageof18years,atwhich
a minor becomes a major, exempt marriage and
divorce.TheresultwillbethatrespondentNo.5onthe
relevantdatemaybeminorundertheIndianMajority
Act,orwithinthemeaningofSec.361oftheIndian
Penal Code, but certainly she could have married
without the consent of her natural guardian. The
necessarycorollarytothiswillbethatwhatevermay
bethefateofthecriminalcase,whichhasbeenlodged
bythepetitionerforprosecutingrespondentNo.4for
kidnapping,afterthemarriage,respondentNo.4will
bedeemedtobethehusband,andassuch,entitledto
livewithrespondentNo.5.Insuchasituation,inmy
opinion,learnedSessionsJudgehasnotcommittedany
error in directing the release of respondent No. 5
sayingthatshewasatlibertytolivewithrespondent
No.4whomsheclaimstohavemarried.
18.TheBenchhasfurtherobservedasunder:
6. I have not been able to appreciate under what
provision of law respondent No. 5 was taken in
custodybecausesheisnotallegedtohavecommitted
any offence, and, as such, her detention in custody
waswithoutanyauthorityinlaw.Weareinformed
that even today she has been kept in Bihar State
[North] CareHome,PatnaCity6under someorder
passed either by the learned Magistrate or by the
SessionsJudgesubsequently.Assheisnotanaccused
inanycasethereisnojustificationfordetainingher
inanyCareHome.Sheshouldbeallowedtogowith
respondentNo.4asdirectedbythelearnedSessions
Judge.
19. The aforesaid observations, in my view, completely support the
submission advanced by Mr. Patel, the learned advocate appearing on
behalf of the applicant. The sumtotal of the aforesaid discussion of
Articles251and348oftheMohammedanLawisthatforthepurposeof
contractingmarriage,apersonisconsideredtobemajorwhenheorshe
attainspubertyandsuchpersoncancontractmarriageevenwithoutthe
Page 11 of 61
Page 11 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
consentoftheguardian,ifheorsheisofsoundmindandnotalunatic.
20.Inabsenceofanyevidence,pubertycanbeassumedoncompletionof
the age of 15 years. (See Alimamad Mersha Shaikh Vs. State of
Gujart,2006(3)GLR2472.
21.However,theissuedoesnotconcludeoverhere.Nodoubt,accordingto
theMohammedanLaw,theoccurrenceofpubertyorattaining15yearsof
agedetermines minorityoftherightofthe girltocontract amarriage
without the consent of the parents, but in my opinion, for the present
purposei.e.sofarasSections360and366oftheIndianPenalCodeare
concerned,regardmustbeonlytothedefinitionofminorityunderSection
3oftheIndianMajorityAct9of1875.
22. Let me look into the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, more
particularlytheobjectsandreasons:
INTRODUCTION
DuringtheBrithishregimethemassofpersonsdemiciledin
India were roughly divided into (I) Hindus, (ii)
Muhammadans, (iii) European Brithish Subjects and (iv)
personstowhomtheIndianSuccessionActapplied.Theages
at which persons belonging to these classes attain their
majorityweredifferentaccordingtothethenprevalentlaws.
Inthehighlyimportantmatteroftheageatwhichpersons
canenterintobindingcontractswithothersandundertake
responsibilitiesasmajors,thelawofthecountrywasmost
confusedanduncertain.Toremedythis,theIndianMajority
BillwasintroducedintheLegislature.
STATEMENTOFOBJECTSANDREASONS
Themassofpersonsdemiciledinthiscountrymayroughly
be divided into (1) Hindus, (2) Muhammadans,(3)
EuropeanBrithishsubjects,(4)personstowhomtheIndian
SuccessionActapplies.
In the present state of law, the ages at which persons
belongingtotheseclassesrespectivelyattaintheirmajority
maybestatedasfollows:
1.BytheHindusastras,exceptthoseprevailinginBengal,
the end ofthe sixteenth year is the limit of minority, in
Bengal the end of the fifteenth year is deemed to be the
limitofminority,accordingtotheHindulawasunderstood
there.
ByBengalRegulationXXVIof1973andMadrasRegulation
V of 1804, the minority of Hindu proprietors of estates
paying revenue to Government was extended, in case of
Page 12 of 61
Page 12 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
suchpersonsineachpresidencyrespectively,totheendof
theeighteenthyear.
ByActs XLof1858 and XXof1864, forthecare ofthe
personsandpropertyofminorsinthePresidencyofFort
William in Bengal and in the Presidency of Bombay,
respectively,itwasenactedthat,forthepurposesofthose
Act,everypersonshouldbedeemedtobeaminorwhohad
not attained the age ofeighteen years. European British
subjects are excluded from the purview of the Acts. The
effectofthoseActs clearlywas,forthepurposesofthose
Acts,toaltertheHindulawastotheageofmajorityinthe
casesofpersonstowhomtheActsapplied,andincourseof
timethequestionwasraisedintheCalcuttaHighCourtas
to whether the Acts did not similarly affect the age of
majority of Hindus subject to the ordinary original
jurisdiction of that Court, and was decided in the
affirmative. This opinion was not, however, accepted by
otherJudgesofthesameCourtbeforewhomthequestion
aroseandthematterhavingbeenbyoneofthemexpressed
to be in a complicated and unsatisfactory state was the
other day referred to a Full Bench of the Court, which
decided that a Hindu resident in Calcutta, who had no
propertyinthemofussil,attained hisageofmajorityon
the completion of his fifteen year, and refrained from
deciding what was the effect of the Acts upon persons
resident in Calcutta and possessed of property in the
mofussil.
InBombayithasbeendecidedthat,notwithstandingAct
XXof1864,aHinduresidentinthemofussilcameofage
onattainingsixteenyears,soastobeabletoprosecutea
claimbysuit.
InacasewhichcamebeforethelateSadrDiwaniAdalatof
Bengal, it was held that, according to the Jain law,
majoritybeginsonthecompletionofsixteenyears.
2.ByMuhammadanlaw,theendofthefifteenthyear,or
the attainment of puberty, is the age of majority; but
Muhammadansare,equallywithHindusandotherBritish
subjects in this country not being Europeans affected by
theRegulationsandActsalreadynoticed.
3.EuropeanBritishsubjectsnotdomiciledinthiscountry
comeofageattwentyone,andithasbeenheldthatthey
and theirlegitimate descendants, eventhough domiciled
in this country, do the same, so far as regards their
capacitytocontract.Thisopinionhasbeenquestionedin
Page 13 of 61
Page 13 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
arecentcase.
4.TheclassofpersonstowhomtheIndianSuccessionAct
appliesincludesEuropeansbybirthordescentdomiciled
in British India, East Indians or Eurasians, Jews,
Armenians, Parsis and Native Christians. The Indian
SuccessionActdefinesaminortobeapersonwhohasnot
completedtheageofeighteenyears,anddefines'majority'
tobethestatusofsuchaperson.InthecaseofRollov.
Smith,[(1867)IBengLR(OC)10],alreadyreferredto,
Mr, Justice Markby said that it would be carrying
implicationmuchtoofartosuppose thatthisdefinition
wasintendedbytheLegislatureasanalterationoftheage
ofmajorityforallpurposes;andheldthatapersonofone
oftheclassestowhomtheActappliesdidnotattainhis
majority,soastohavethefullcapacitytocontract,until
he attained the age of twentyone. In the later case of
Archur v.Watkins [(1872)8 Beng LR372], Mr.Justice
Pheartreatedthequestionasstillanopenone,andheld
that,bytheprovisionsofActXLof1858,apersonofone
oftheclassestowhomtheIndianSuccessionActapplies
attainedtheageofmajority,forallpurposesofcontract,
ateighteen years, The ground ofthisdecision sofaras
regardstheeffectofActXLof1858,wasoverruledinthe
subsequent decision of the Full Bench in Mullick v.
Mullick; and the law respecting the age of majority of
personsinthisclass,is,perhaps,inamoreunsatisfactory
state than even that relating to persons in the other
classes.
Such being, briefly, the present state of the law, it is
obviousthat,inthehighlyimportantmatteroftheageat
which persons can enter into binding contracts with
othersandundertakeresponsibilitiesasmajors;thelaw
ofthiscountryismostconfusedanduncertain.Toremedy
this the present Bill has been drawn. The alteration
proposedbyitintheHinduandMuhammadanlaws,in
casesnowgovernedonthispointbythoselaws,isnotone
which affects any principle of those laws touching the
religionorconscienceofthosepersonswhoaresubjectto
them.Thechangehas,already,inpart,beenmadebythe
RegulationsandActsabovementioned;andnoobjection
haseverbeenmadetothechangethuseffected.
Toavoid,however,thepossibilityofanymistakeonthis
Page 14 of 61
Page 14 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
point,itisexpresslyprovidedintheBillthatitisnotto
affect the capacity of any person to act in matters
connected with marriage, dower, divorce and adoption.
By their own laws Muhammadans and Hindus are
empoweredtoactinthesemattersatanearlieragethan
that here fixed as the age of majority, and it is not
intendedtointerferewiththeircapacityintheserespects.
TheBillalsoprovidesthatitshallnotaffectthereligion
orreligiousritesandusagesofanyclassofHerMajesty's
subjects or the capacity of any person who, before the
commencement oftheproposed Act,shallhaveattained
majorityunderthelawapplicabletohim.
It has been thought advisable to extend the Act to all
persons,includingEuropeanBritishsubjectsdomiciledin
BritishIndia.WereEuropeanBritishsubjectsexcludedin
all cases, it would be necessary for all persons dealing
with them to ascertain whether they came within the
legaldefinitionoftheterm,anenquiryoftendifficult,and
which would be most embarrassing were the exception
extended,asinRollov.Smith[(1867)1BengLR(OC)
10], to all legitimate descendants, however remote,
domiciled inBritishIndia,ofEuropean Britishsubjects.
Thefourthsectionstatesthelawasitnowstands.
THEMAJORITYACT,1875
(ActNo.9of1875)
[2ndMarch,1875]
AnActtoamendthelawrespectingtheageofmajority.
WHEREAS,inthecaseofpersonsdomiciledinIndiaitis
expedient to specify the age of majority; It is hereby
enactedasfollows:
SECTION1:Shorttitle
ThisActmaybecalledthe1[***]MajorityAct,1875.
Localextent. 2 ItextendstothewholeofIndia3 [except
theStateofJammuandKashmir];
Commencement and operation. and it shall come into
force and have effect only on the expiration of three
monthsfromthepassingthereof.
SECTION2:Savings
.Nothinghereincontainedshallaffect
Page 15 of 61
Page 15 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
(a) the capacity of any person to act in the following

matters (namely) marriage, dower, divorce and
adoption;
(b)thereligionorreligiousritesandusagesofanyclass
of4[citizensofIndia];or
(c)thecapacityofanypersonwhobeforethisActcomes
intoforcehasattainedmajorityunderthelawapplicable
tohim.
SECTION3:AgeofmajorityofpersonsdomiciledinIndia
(1)Everypersondomiciled inIndiashallattaintheageof
majorityonhiscompletingtheageofeighteenyearsandnot
before.
(2)Incomputingtheageofanyperson,thedayonwhichhe
wasbornistobeincludedasawholedayandheshallbe
deemed to have attained majority at the beginning of the
eighteenthanniversaryofthatday.".]
SECTION4:Ageofmajorityhowcomputed
.Incomputingtheageofanyperson,thedayonwhichhe
wasbornistobeincludedasawholeday,andheshallbe
deemedtohaveattainedmajority,ifhefallswithinthefirst
paragraphof section3 ,atthebeginningofthetwentyfirst
anniversary of that day, and if he falls within the second
paragraph of section 3 ,atthe beginning ofthe eighteenth
anniversaryofthatday.
Illustration
(a)ZisborninIndiaonthefirstdayofJanuary,1850,
andhasanIndiandomicile.Aguardianofhispersonis
appointedbyaCourtofJustice.Zattainsmajorityat
thefirstmomentofthefirstdayofJanuary,1871.
(b) Z is born in India on the twentyninth day of
February, 1852, and has an Indian domicile. A
guardian of his property is appointed by a Court of
Justice. Zattains majority atthe first moment ofthe
twentyeighthdayofFebruary,1873.
(c) Z is born on the first day of January, 1850. He
acquiresadomicileinIndia.Noguardianisappointed
ofhispersonorpropertybyanyCourtofJustice,noris
he under the jurisdiction of any Court of Wards. Z
attainsmajorityatthefirstmomentofthefirstdayof
January,1868.
Page 16 of 61
Page 16 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
23. IshallnowlookintotheprovisionsoftheSections361,363and
366oftheIndianPenalCode.
361.Kidnappingfromlawfulguardianship. Whoever
takesorenticesanyminorunder[sixteen]yearsofageifa
male,orunder[eighteen]yearsofageifafemale,orany
personofunsoundmind,outofthekeepingofthelawful
guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind,
without the consent ofsuch guardian, issaidtokidnap
suchminororpersonfromlawfulguardianship.
Explanation. The words lawful guardian in this section
include any person lawfully entrusted with the care or
custodyofsuchminororotherperson.
Exception.Thissectiondoesnotextendtotheactofany
personwhoingoodfaithbelieveshimselftobethefather
of an illegitimate child, or who in good faith believes
himself to be entitled to lawful custody of such child,
unlesssuchactiscommittedforanimmoralorunlawful
purpose.
363.Punishmentforkidnapping.Whoeverkidnapsany
personfrom[India]orfromlawfulguardianship,shallbe
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
termwhichmayextendtosevenyears,andshallalsobe
liabletofine.
366. Kidnapping,abducting or inducing womanto
compelhermarriage,etc.Whoeverkidnapsorabducts
any woman withintent that she may be compelled, or
knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to
marryanypersonagainstherwill,orinorderthatshe
maybeforcedorseducedtoillicitintercourse,orknowing
ittobelikelythatshewillbeforcedorseducedtoillicit
intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten
years,andshallalsobeliabletofine;[andwhoever,by
meansofcriminalintimidationasdefinedinthisCodeor
ofabuseofauthorityoranyothermethodofcompulsion,
inducesanywomantogofromanyplacewithintentthat
shemaybe,orknowingthatitislikelythatshewillbe,
forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another
personshallbepunishableasaforesaid.
26.Iamoftheviewthatsofarastheoffence undertheIndianPenal
Page 17 of 61
Page 17 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
Codeisconcernedi.e.oftheoffenceunderSection361,thegirlcouldbe
termedasaminor,althoughundertheMohammedanLawshemayhavea
righttocontractthemarriageonattaining15yearsofageorpuberty,as
thecasemaybe,withouttheconsentofherparents.Totaketheviewthat
thepartieswouldbesolelygovernedbytheprovisionsofthepersonallaw
ignoring the provisions of the Indian Majority Act would be extremely
dangerous.Inagivencase,amuslimgirlmightattainpubertyevenatthe
ageof12or13, insuchcircumstances, itcannot besaidthatsheisa
majorand,therefore,nooffenceofkidnappingasdefinedunderSection
361oftheIndianPenalCodeiscommitted.
27.Thisbringsmetothequestion,whetheranoffenceunderSection363
couldbespeltoutinthebackgroundoftheinstantcase.
28. Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code contemplates two kinds of
kidnapping(a) kidnapping from India and (b) kidnapping from lawful
guardianship.Wearenotconcernedwiththeoffenceofkidnappingfrom
India.Section 361 defines kidnapping fromthelawful guardianship. It
provides as follows:Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen
yearsofageifamale,orundereighteenyearsofageifafemale,orany
personofunsoundmindoutofthekeepingofthelawfulguardianofsuch
minororpersonofunsoundmind,withouttheconsentofsuchguardian,
issaidtokidnapsuchminororpersonfromlawfulguardianship. some
observationswouldnotbeoutofplace.Inordertocomewithinthemis
chiefofthatsectiontheaccusedmusthaveeithertakenawaytheminor
girlormusthaveenticedtheminorgirloutofthekeepingofherlawful
guardian without the consent of such guardian. The two expressions
takingandenticingevidentlyhavetwodifferentconnotations.Butboth
theexpressionscallforsomepositivestephavingtakenbytheaccusedto
removethegirlfromthelawfulcustodyofherguardians.Neitherofthe
Sections wouldhaveanyapplicationifthegirlhas,ofherownaccord,
come out of the custody or come out of the keeping of her lawful
guardiansandifitisthereafterthattheaccusedhadgonewithherto
someplace.Toillustrate,theaccusedmaygotothehouseofthegirland
mayliftherfromherhouse.Henodoubtcommitstheactofkidnapping.
Butifthegirlisoftheageofunderstanding andhasleftherparental
home of her own accord and meets some person and requests him to
accompanyhertosomeplaceforhersafety,thepersonaccompanyingthe
girlisnotguiltyofkidnappingher.Theremaybecasesinwhichthegirl
mightleavethecustodyofherguardianandmightinfactgotoathird
personandprevailuponhimtotakehertosomedistantplace.Insuch
casesevenifthepersonknewthatthegirlisaminorgirlandknewthe
namesofherparents,stillifhehasnotinitiatedthegirl'scomingoutof
the house, mere passive acquiescence on his part evidenced by his
accompanyingthegirltoplaceswouldnotnecessarilyspelltheoffenceof
kidnapping on his part. It cannot be said in such cases that it is the
Page 18 of 61
Page 18 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
accusedwhohastakenawaythegirlfromoutofherparents'custody.If
anyauthorityisnecessaryforthispropositionthesameistobefoundin
thejudgmentoftheSupremeCourtinthecaseofS.Varadarajanv.State
ofMadras,AIR1965SC942:(1965(2)Cri.LJ33).Inthatcasethegirl
whohadreachedthestateofunderstandinghadcandidlyadmittedthat
onthemorning ofOctober 1st sheherselftelephoned totheaccused to
meetherinhiscaratacertainplace,wentuptothatplaceandfinding
himwaitinginthecargotintothatcarofherownaccord.Thisiswhat
theSupremeCourtheldfurtherinthatcaseinthiscontextatpage36of
CriLJ;???...
Further,Savitrihasstatedthatshehaddecidedtomarry
the appellant. There isnosuggestion thattheappellant
took her to the SubRegistrar's Office and got the
agreementofmarriageregisteredthere(thinkingthatthis
was sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by
force or blandishments or anything like that. On the
otherhandtheevidenceofthegirlleavesnodoubtthat
the insistence of marriage came from her side. The
appellant,bycomplyingwithherwishescanbynostretch
of imagination be said to have taken her put of the
keeping ofherlawfulguardian.Aftertheregistrationof
theagreementboththeappellantandSavitrilivedasman
and wife and visited different places. There is no
suggestioninSavitri'sevidence,who,itmayhementioned
hadattainedtheageofdiscretionandwasonthevergeof
attainingmajoritythatshewasmadebytheappellantto
accompanyhimbyadministeringanythreattoherorby
any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the
appellantallalongisquiteconsistentwithSavitri'sown
desiretohethewifeoftheappellantinwhichthedesireof
accompanying him wherever he went was of course
implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing from
whichaninferencecouldbedrawnthattheappellanthad
beenguiltyoftakingawaySavitrioutofthekeepingof
her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law
didnotcastuponhimthedutyoftakingherbacktoher
father's house or even of telling her not to accompany
him.....
29. The position in the instant case is not materially different. In the
instant case, Reshambanu isadmitting insomanywords thatshehad
accompaniedtheapplicantonherownfreewillandvolitionandsinceshe
was in love with the applicant and the applicant also loved her, they
decidedtogetmarriedand,accordingly,gotmarriedattheAjmerSharif.
30. In my view no case is made out to even prima facie show that
Page 19 of 61
Page 19 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
Reshambanuhadreceivedapromiseorassuranceoranytemptingoffer
fromtheapplicantbyvirtueofwhichshewasforcedtoleaveherparental
home.Thereis,thus,nothingtoevenprimafacieshowtotheCourtthe
takingofthegirlbytheaccused,theevidenceabouthisenticingheraway
isequallyabsent.Ifthisisso,thereisnokidnappingofthegirlandhence
thequestionforapplicationofSection363oftheIndianPenalCodedoes
notarise.
31.Inmyview,whennooffenceisconstituted,thePoliceshouldnotbe
allowedtocontinue withtheinvestigation.Asontoday,Reshambanuis
happily residing at her matrimonial home with her husband i.e. the
accusedbeforeme.
15.
Mr. Pandya, is quite right in submitting that in the case of
Mujamil(supra), referredtoabove,thisCourthadnotconsideredthe
effect of the P.C.M. Act, 2006. Having regard to the importance and
seriousnessoftheissue,whichhasfallenformyconsideration,Ideemit
necessarytofirstlookintotheprovisionsoftheP.C.M.Act,2006andin
itsobjects.
16.
TheStatementofObjectsandReasonsoftheP.C.M.Act,2006,
readsasfollows:
1) TheChildMarriageRestraintAct,1929wasenactedwithaviewto
restraining solemnisation of child marriages. The Act was subsequently
amendedin1949and1978inorder,interalia,toraisetheagelimitof
themaleandfemalepersonsforthepurposeofmarriage.TheAct,though
restrainssolemnisationofchildmarriagesyetitdoesnotdeclarethemto
be void or invalid. The solemnisation of child marriage is punishable
undertheAct.
2)TherehasbeenagrowingdemandformakingtheprovisionsoftheAct
more effective and the punishment thereunder more stringent so as to
eradicateoreffectivelypreventtheevilpracticeofsolemnisationofchild
marriagesinthecountry.Thiswillenhancethehealthofchildrenandthe
status of women. The National Commission for women in its Annual
Reportfortheyear199596recommended thattheGovernment should
Page 20 of 61
Page 20 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
appoint Child Marriage Prevention Officers immediately. It further

recommendedthat(i)thepunishmentprovidedundertheActshouldbe
mademorestringent;(ii)marriagesperformedincontraventionoftheAct
shouldbemadevoid;and(iii)theoffencesundertheActshouldbemade
cognizable.
3)TheNationalHumanRightsCommissionundertook acomprehensive
reviewoftheexistingActandmaderecommendationsforcomprehensive
amendments therein vide its Annual Report 20012002. The Central
Government,afterconsultingtheStateGovernmentsandUnionTerritory
AdministrationsontherecommendationsoftheNationalCommissionfor
Women and the National Human Rights Commission, had decided to
accept almost all the recommendations and give effect to them by
repealingandreenactingtheChildMarriageRestraintAct,1929.
17.
ThestatutoryprovisionsoftheP.C.M.Actwhichhavebearingon
thisissuemaybetakennoteofinthefirstinstance.
ProhibitionofChildMarriageAct2006.
Section2Definition
InthisAct,unlessthecontextotherwiserequires,
(a)"child"meansapersonwho,ifamale,hasnotcompletedtwentyone
yearsofage,andifafemale,hasnotcompletedeighteenyearsofage;
(b)"childmarriage"meansamarriagetowhicheitherofthecontracting
partiesisachild;
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx
(f)"minor"meansapersonwho,undertheprovisionsoftheMajorityAct,
1875(9of1875)istobedeemedtohaveattainedhismajority.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx
3.Childmarriagestobevoidableattheoptionofcontractingparty
beingachild.(1) Every child marriage, whether solemnised before or
afterthecommencementofthisAct,shallbevoidableattheoptionofthe
contractingpartywhowasachildatthetimeofthemarriage:
Provided that a petition for annulling a child marriage by a decree of
Page 21 of 61
Page 21 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
nullitymaybefiledinthedistrictcourtonlybyacontractingpartytothe
marriagewhowasachildatthetimeofthemarriage.
(2)Ifatthetimeoffilingapetition,thepetitionerisaminor,thepetition
maybefiledthroughhisorherguardianornextfriendalongwiththe
ChildMarriageProhibitionOfficer.
(3)Thepetitionunderthissectionmaybefiledatanytimebutbeforethe
childfilingthepetitioncompletestwoyearsofattainingmajority.
(4)Whilegrantingadecreeofnullityunderthissection,thedistrictcourt
shallmakeanorderdirectingboththepartiestothemarriageandtheir
parentsortheirguardianstoreturntotheotherparty,hisorherparents
orguardian, asthecasemaybe,themoney, valuables, ornaments and
othergiftsreceivedontheoccasionofthemarriagebythemfromtheother
side,oranamountequaltothevalueofsuchvaluables,ornaments,other
giftsandmoney:
Provided that no order under this section shall be passed unless the
concerned parties have been given notices to appear before the district
courtandshowcausewhysuchordershouldnotbepassed.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
9.Punishmentformaleadultmarryingachild. Whoever,beinga
maleadultaboveeighteenyearsofage,contractsachildmarriageshallbe
punishablewithrigorousimprisonmentwhichmayextendtotwoyearsor
withfinewhichmayextendtoonelakhrupeesorwithboth.
10. Punishment for solemnising a child marriage. Whoever
performs, conducts or directs or abets any child marriage shall be
punishable withrigorous imprisonment whichmay extend totwoyears
andshallbeliabletofinewhichmayextendtoonelakhrupeesunlesshe
provesthathehadreasonstobelievethatthemarriagewasnotachild
marriage.
11.Punishmentforpromotingorpermittingsolemnisationofchild
marriages. (1)Whereaschildcontractsachildmarriage,anyperson
havingchargeofthechild,whetherasparentorguardianoranyother
personorinanyothercapacity,lawfulorunlawful,includinganymember
ofanorganizationorassociationofpersonwhodoesanyacttopromote
themarriageorpermitsittobesolemnised,ornegligentlyfailstoprevent
itfrombeingsolemnised,includingattendingorparticipatinginachild
marriage, shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment which may
extendtotwoyearsandshallalsobeliabletofinewhichmayextendupto
Page 22 of 61
Page 22 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
onelakhrupees:
Providedthatnowomanshallbepunishablewithimprisonment.
(2)Forthepurposeofthissection,itshallbepresumed,unlessanduntil
the contrary is proved, that where a minor child has contracted a
marriage, thepersonhaving chargeofsuchminor childhasnegligently
failedtopreventthemarriagefrombeingsolemnised.
12.Marriageofaminorchildtobevoidincertaincircumstances.
Whereachild,beingaminor
(a)istakenorenticedoutofthekeepingofthelawfulguardian;or
(b) byforce compelled, orbyany deceitful means induced togo
fromanyplace;or
(c)issoldforthepurposeofmarriage;andmadetogothrougha
formofmarriageoriftheminorismarriedafterwhichtheminor
issoldortraffickedorusedforimmoralpurposes,
suchmarriageshallbenullandvoid.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
15. Offences to be cognizable and non bailable Notwithstanding
anythingcontainedintheCodeofCriminalProcedure,1973(2of1974),
anoffencepunishableunderthisActshallbecognizableandnonbailable.
16.ChildMarriageProhibitionOfficers.(1)TheStateGovernment
shall,bynotificationintheOfficialGazette,appointforthewholeState,
orsuchpartthereofasmaybespecifiedinthatnotification,anofficeror
officers to be known as the Child Marriage Prohibition Officer having
jurisdictionovertheareaorareasspecifiedinthenotification.
(2)TheStateGovernmentmayalsorequestarespectablememberofthe
localitywitharecordofsocialserviceoranofficeroftheGramPanchayat
or Municipality or an officer of the Government or any public sector
undertakingoranofficebearerofanynongovernmentalorganizationto
assisttheChildMarriageProhibitionOfficerandsuchmember,officeror
officebearer,asthecasemaybe,shallbeboundtoactaccordingly.
(3)ItshallbethedutyoftheChildMarriageProhibitionOfficer
(a) to prevent solemnisation of child marriages by taking such
actionashemaydeemfit;
Page 23 of 61
Page 23 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
(b) to collect evidence for the effective prosecution of persons

contraveningtheprovisionsofthisAct;
(c)toadviseeitherindividualcasesorcounseltheresidentsofthe
localitygenerallynottoindulgeinpromoting,helping,aidingor
allowingthesolemnisationofchildmarriages;
(d) to create awareness of the evil which results from child
marriages;
(e)tosensitizethecommunityontheissueofchildmarriages;
(f) to furnish such periodical returns and statistics as the State
Governmentmaydirect;and
(g)todischargesuchotherfunctionsanddutiesasmaybeassigned
tohimbytheStateGovernment.
(3) The State Government may, bynotification in the Official Gazette,
subject to such conditions and limitations, invest the Child Marriage
ProhibitionOfficerwithsuchpowersofapoliceofficerasmaybespecified
in the notification and the Child Marriage Prohibition Officer shall
exercisesuchpowerssubjecttosuchconditionsandlimitations,asmaybe
specifiedinthenotification.
(4)TheChildMarriageProhibitionOfficershallhavethepowertomove
theCourtforanorderundersections4,5and13andalongwiththechild
undersection3.
18.
IshallnowlookintotheSection2oftheMuslimPersonalLaw
(Shariat)ApplicationAct,1937,whichisextractedhereinbelow:
2.
Application of Personal Law to Muslims Notwithstanding any
customsorusagetothecontrary,inallquestions(savequestionsrelating
toagriculturalland) regarding interstate succession, specialpropertyof
females,includingpersonalpropertyinheritedorobtainedundercontract
orgiftoranyotherprovisionofPersonalLaw,marriage,dissolutionof
marriage, including talaq, ila zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat,
maintenance,dower,guardianship,gifts,trustsandtrustproperties,and
wakfs(otherthancharitiesandcharitableinstitutionsandcharitableand
religious,endowments)theruleofdecisionincaseswherethepartiesare
MuslimsshallbetheMuslimPersonalLaw(Shariat).
Page 24 of 61
Page 24 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
19.
CAV JUDGMENT
Section2(a)oftheP.C.M.Act,2006definesthechildmeansa
personwho,ifamale,hasnotcompletedtwentyoneyearsofage,andif
afemale,hasnotcompletedeighteenyearsofage.
20.
The argument before me and accepted in the case of Mujamil
(supra) is that the prescription of the marriageable age has no

applicationforthegirlsbelongingtotheMohammedancommunity,as
theyaregovernedbytheMuslimPersonalLaw(Shariat)ApplicationAct,
1937,theprovisionsofwhich,areextractedhereinabove.
21.
IfindalotofmeritandsubstanceintheargumentsofMr.Pandya,
the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that a statute can always

extinguishthecustomarylawandthecustomaryrights.Inthisregard,I
mayquoteparas441to443ofHalsburyLawofEnglandofIVEdition.
Theyareextractedhereinbelow:
441. Abolitiononlybystatute.Customs,beingineffectlocalcommon
law within the locality where it exists, can only be abolished or
extinguished byActofParliament. AnActofParliament mayabolisha
custom either by express provision or by the use of words which are
inconsistentwiththecontinuedexistenceofthecustom.
442. Statusrepugnanttocustom.Asageneralrule,iftheprovisionsof
an Act of Parliament are repugnant to the continued existence of the
custom,thecustomwillbetreatedasabrogatedanddestroyed,although
theActdoesnotactuallyextinguishthecustombyexpresswords.Although
thequestionwhetherthecustomsisdestroyedornothasbeensaidtoturn
onthequestionwhetherthestatuteisanaffirmativeoranegativestatute,
thisdistinctionappearstobemerelyoneofthefactorstobeconsideredin
thisrule,noonecanallegeacustomagainstanActofParliament,unless
thecustombesavedorpreservedbyanotherofActofParliament.
Page 25 of 61
Page 25 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
443. Effectofconfirmationbystatute.WhereanActofParliamenthas,
accordingtoitstrueconstruction,embracedandconfirmedarightwhich
has previously existed by custom, that right becomes henceforward a
statutoryrightandthelowertitlebycustomismergedinandextinguished
bythehighertitlederivedfromtheActofParliament,unlesstheActof
Parliamentmerelyintendedtoconfirmtherightasacustom.Wherethe
customhasbeensoextinguished,theoldrightsdonotremerge onthe
repeatoftheActor,itseems,attheterminationoratemporaryAct.It
appearsthatthecustomwouldnotbeaffectedbytherepealoftheActif
theActmerelyconfirmedandrecognisedthecustom.
An Act of Parliament which recognises the existence and validity of a
custommaynotoperatetocreatenewstatutoryrightsinfavourofthe
persons orclasses ofpersons who mightformerlyhave benefited bythe
custom. Such a statute may merely have the effect of sanctioning the
validity ofthe custom asacustom, without merging the custom inthe
highertitlebystatute.ThussomeoldcustomsinLondonhavenotonly
hadtheforceofacustom,butalsohavebeensupportedandjustifiedby
authorityofParliament.
Indetermining howfaranActofParliament haseffected rightsofthis
kind,thewholeActmustbeconsideredtoseewhethertherightsgivenby
theActareintendedtosupersedetherightswhichpreviouslyexisted.
22.
The Supreme Court in the case of Radhakishan Laxminarayan
Toshniwalvs.ShridharRamchandraAlshiAndothers,1960AIR(SC)
1368heldthatthetransferofproperty,wheretheTransferofProperty
Act applies, has to be under the provisions of the said Act only; the
MohammedanLawoftransferofpropertycannotoverridethestatutory
law.TheCourttooktheviewthatwherevertheTransferofPropertyAct
isinforce,theMohammedanLaworanyothertransferlawwouldnot
beapplicabletothetransferofproperties.
23.
The general rule, as enshrined in the maxims generalia
specialibusnonderogantandgeneralibusspecialiederogant,isthata
Page 26 of 61
Page 26 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
speciallawprevailsoverthegenerallawcoveringthesamesubject.
24.
InthecaseofJKCottonSpinningandWeavingMillsCo.Ltdvs.
StateofUttarPradesh&Ors.1961AIR(SC)1170 theirlordshipshas
heldaviewthatifthereisaspecialenactmentonthesubjectthensuch
an enactment shall prevail as against the general principles. It was
observedbytheirlordshipsasunder:
conflict between specific provision and general provision
SpecificprovisionprevailsovergeneralprovisionGeneralprovision
appliedonlytosuchcaseswhicharenotcoveredbyspecialprovision
Ruleappliestoresolveconflictbetweendifferentprovisionsindifferent
statutesaswellasinsamestatute.
InPrettyvs.Solly,185953ER1032quotedinCraiesonStatute
LawatP.206,6thEd.)Romelly,M.R.,mentionedtherulethus:
theruleisthatwheneverthereisaparticularenactmentanda
generalenactmentinthesamestatuteandthelatter,takeninitsmost
comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular
enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be
takentoaffectonlytheotherpartsofthestatutetowhichitmay
properlyapply.
25.
ADivisionBenchoftheRajasthanHighCourtinthecaseofM/s.
SurajmalRoopchand&Co.Kotavs.StateofRajasthan, 1965RajLW
429observedasunder:
themaximGeneraliaSpeciabusNenderogantis,therefore,attracted
andwhenaspeciallawisfoundinconsistentwithorrepugnanttothe
subsequentlawofgeneralnaturewhichisnotconfinedtothesubject
matterofthespecialAct,andwherethereisnoexpressindicationof
thelegislaturethatthespeciallawwillgivewaytothegenerallawthe
provisionsofthespeciallawwillholdthefield.Similarlyinthecaseof
Page 27 of 61
Page 27 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
Pannalav.BalbirSingh&Ors.1969WLN(Raj)284,ithasbeen
heldasunder:Wherethereisaconflictbetweenaspecialprovision
andageneralprovision,thespecialprovisionprevailsoverthegeneral
provisionsand the latter appliesonly to such cases whicharenot
coveredbythespecialprovisions.
26.
Thesameprinciplewouldapplyeveninacasewherethereisa
conflictbetweenanyspeciallawwithpersonallaw.
27.
AlearnedSingleJudgeoftheKarnatakaHighCourtinthecaseof
SeemaBegaumvs.StateofKarnataka(WritPetitionCaseNo.75889of
2013 decided on 26.02.2013) had the occasion to consider this very
issueandhavinggonethroughtheentiredecision,Ifindtheviewtaken
byHisLordshipoftheKarnatakaHighCourtquitecommendableandI
propose to follow the same. The learned Single Judge made the
followingobservations:
[20] An operative Act is the expression of the will of sovereign
legislature;itoverridestheconsistentprovisionsoftheexistingpersonal
law.Thepersonalawhastosubmittothestatutelaw.Thepersonallaw
cannotberepugnant,contrariantorderogatorytothestatute.
[21] When a later statute makes a contrary provision to the earlier
statute, ithastobetakenthattheParliamenthasintended theearlier
statutetoberepealed,thoughitmaynothavesaidsoexpressly.Thesame
is in accordance with the maxim leges posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant.(laterlawsabrogateearliercontrarylaws).
[22] the statement ofobjects and reasons can beused for thelimited
purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of
affairsleadinguptothelegislation.Referencetothestatementofobjects
andreasons ispermissible tounderstand thesurrounding circumstances
whichrendertheremedyingoftheevilaparamountrequirement.
[23]
TheprimereasonforbringingintheP.C.M.Actistheprohibition
Page 28 of 61
Page 28 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
of the solemnization of the child marriage. When the prescribed

marriageableageofthegirlis18years,thisCourtcannotbecalledupon
toissuethesoughtdeclarationthattheprovisionsoftheP.C.M.Actare
notapplicableforthepetitioner,asshebelongstoMuslimcommunity.The
Courts have the power coupled with the duty to prevent and not to
promotethechildmarriages.ThisCourtcannotandwouldnotpassan
orderbyvirtueofwhichlittlegirlsbecomechildbrides.
[24] ItisalsoprofitabletorefertoSection13oftheP.C.M.Act,which
empowertheCourtstoissueinjunctionsprohibitingthesolemnizationof
marriagesincontraventionofthesaidAct.Section13(1)readsasfollows:
13.Powerofcourttoissueinjunctionprohibitingchildmarriages.
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this
Act,if,onanapplicationoftheChildMarriageProhibitionOfficer
oronreceiptofinformationthoughtcomplaintorotherwisefrom
any person, a Judicial Magistrate of the first class or a
Metropolitan Magistrate is satisfied that a child marriage in
contravention of this Act has been arranged or is about to be
solemnised,suchMagistrateshallissueaninjunctionagainstany
personincludingamemberofanorganizationoranassociationof
personsprohibitingsuchmarriage.
[25] When there islegislative banonthe child marriages, the Courts
cannotgooutoftheirwaytohelpthepromotersofchildmarriages.
[26] TheCourtswillprefertheconstruction,whichadvancestheobject
ratherthantheonewhichattemptstofindsomewayofcircumventingit.
It is the duty of the Courts not to facilitate the circumvention of the
parliamentaryintent.
[27] AsheldbytheApexCourtinthecaseofRadhakishan,whenthe
statutory lawhascommenced togovern aparticular field, thepersonal
lawbecomesinapplicable.Reiteratingthisviewinthesubsequentcaseof
KumarGonsusab,theHonbleSupremeCourthasheldthatthepersonlaw
dealingwiththetransferofpropertycannotoverridetheprovisionsofthe
TransferofPropertyAct.
[28] In the case of Shabana Bano, it was contended that under the
provisionsofMuslimWomen(ProtectionofRightsOnDivorce)Act,1986,
the divorced wife isnot entitled tomaintenance after the expiryofthe
iddatperiod. Not accepting thiscontention, the Honble Supreme Court
haslaudablyheldasfollows:
TheappellantspetitionunderSection125oftheCr.P.C.wouldbe
maintainablebeforetheFamilyCourtaslongastheappellantdoes
not remarry. The amount of maintenance to be awarded under
Page 29 of 61
Page 29 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
Section125oftheCr.P.C.cannotberestrictedfortheiddatperiod
only.
[29] InthecaseofMollyJoseph,theApexCourthascategoricallyheld
thatwhentheLegislatureenactsthelawinrespectofthepersonallawofa
group of persons following a particular religion, then such statutory
provisions would prevail over and override any personal law, usage or
customprevailingbeforethecomingintoforceofsuchAct.
[30] InthecaseofSmt.Parayankandiyal,theApexCourthasnegatived
thesubmissionsthatapersoncanbepermittedtoacquireasecondwife
duringthelifetimeofthefirstwifeandduringthesubsistenceofthefirst
marriage, just because the second marriage was customarily permitted
undercertaincircumstancesandforsomepurposesintheeraofpreHindu
MarriageAct,1955.
[31] On the conspectus reading of paras 441, 442 and 443 of the
Halsburys Laws of England, the contents of which are extracted
hereinabove, it becomes clear that the customs stands abrogated or
destroyed,ifitisrunningcontrarytothestatutoryprovisions,unlessthe
customissavedorpreservedbyastatute.Thepreviouslyexistingrightsdo
notreemerge,astheyaresupersededbythestatute.
[32] As the codified law prevails over all other laws, be they are
ecclesiastical, personal or customary, the rights which the Muslim girls
hadunderMuslimPersonalLaw(Shariat)ApplicationAct,1937donot
remainaliveonthecommencementoftheP.C.M.Act.
[33] TherecanbenodisputewithwhatPatnaandDelhiHighCourts
havesaid,Butthen,inboththecases,theCourtswereconfrontedwitha
situationwherethechildmarriagehadalreadytakenplace.Butthesaid
decisionscannotbeusedtodemandthataMohammedangirlbepermitted
tomarrybeforesheattainedtheageof18years.
[34] The issue can be examined with reference to the territorial
dimensionoftheP.C.M.Act.ThattheP.C.M.Acthastheapplicationfor
thepeopleofallStatesandUnionTerritoriesofIndiaexcepttheStateof
JammuandKashmirisspeltoutintheP.C.M.Actitself.Section1(2)of
the P.C.M. Act, the provisions of which are extracted supra, makes it
sternlyclearthatitappliestoallthecitizensofIndia,whethertheyarein
IndiaoroutsideIndia.TheonlyexceptionsmadeareinrespectofStateof
JammuandKashmirandrenocantsoftheUnionTerritoryofPondicherry.
Therefore, no Indian citizens on the ground of his belonging to a
particularreligion,canclaimimmunityfromtheapplicationoftheP.C.M.
Act.TheLegislaturehasnotleftanythingtoimplicationorinterpretation
asfarastheapplicationofP.C.M.Actisconcerned.
Page 30 of 61
Page 30 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
[35] Thechildhoodofapersonisprecious.Onthechildattainingthe
age of majority, anything may be given to it like the job, house,
husband/wife; but what cannot be got back is its precious childhood.
Whatisthereforeofparamountimportanceisthatthechildshouldfully
enjoyhis/herchildhoodbeforeenteringthewedlock.Moreoftenthannot,
itisthegirlshaplychildhoodthatwouldensureahappywifehoodand
happy motherhood. Inwhatever for itis,the child marriage isagross
violationofhumanrightsofagirlorboy.Foralltheaforesaidreasons,I
dismissthispetition.Noorderastocosts.
28.
ADivisionBenchoftheMadrasHighCourt(MaduraiBench)in
thecaseof M.MohamedAbbasvs.TheChiefSecretary,Government
of Tamil Nadu (Writ Petition (MD) No.3133 of 2015 decided on
31.03.2015)hadalsotheoccasiontoconsiderthisissue.Theverysame
argumentswerecanvassedbeforetheDivisionBench.Variouscaselaws
werecitedinsupportofthesubmissionsthattheMuslimsaregoverned
bytheMohammedanLaw,beingtheirpersonallaw,sofarasmarriage,
divorceandothermatrimonialrightswereconcerned.Itwassubmitted
thataMuslimgirlisentitledtomarryonattainingherpubertyorafter
the age of 15 years, for which, even the consent of her parents or
guardian is not required. It was also argued before the Bench that
invokingtheprovisionspertainingtotheP.C.M.Actwasimproperand
illegal so far as Muslims were concerned. It was argued that the
provisionsoftheProhibitionofChildMarriageAct,2006stipulatingthe
minimum age limit as 18 years, so far as, any Muslim girl was
concerned, to be avoided. The case before the Division Bench of the
MadrasHighCourtwasfiledasProbonopublico,seekinganorderin
Page 31 of 61
Page 31 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
the nature of writ of mandamus or any other writ, forbearing the

respondents from interfering with any marriage being solemnized
accordingtotheMuslimPersonalLaw,byinvokingtheprovisionsofthe
Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The Division Bench, while
dismissingthewritpetition,madethefollowingobservations:
10. Itiswellsettledthatcustom,Rulesorbyelawscannotoverrideany
statuteorActenactedbylegislature.EventheenactedlaworActshouldbe
withinthepurviewoftheConstitutionalmandate,otherwise,asperArticle
13(2),thelawmadeincontraventionofPartIIIoftheConstitutionorto
theextentofthecontraventionofsuchlawbedeclaredvoid.Similarly,the
State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the
Fundamental Rights,guaranteedunderPartIIIoftheConstitution.Itis
well settled that usage in a long run becomes custom and custom is
acceptedasasourceoflaw,however,customcannotoverridethestatute.
EvenasperArticle13(3)(a),"laws"includesanyOrdinance,order,bye
law,rule,regulation,notification,customorusagehavingtheforceoflaw,
inthe territoryofIndia. When there ispossibilityforconflicting views,
whileinterpretingtwodifferentArticlesoftheConstitution,theCourthas
toadoptthelegalprincipleofharmoniousconstruction.
11. Learned Additional AdvocateGeneral, contended that the relief
soughtforinthewritpetitionisnotlegallysustainableandinsupportof
hisarguments,hereliedonMohd.AhmedKhanvs.ShahBanoBegumand
others,reportedinAIR1985SC945andotherdecisions.Inthedecision
reportedinAIR1985SC945,whiledecidingtheConstitutionalvalidityof
Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so far as muslims are
concerned, a Five Judge Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court
categoricallyheldthatthesaidprovisionisapplicabletoallthepeoplein
theterritoryofIndia,irrespectiveoftheirreligion.Itwasalsofoundinthe
decisionthatMulla'sMahomedanLaw(18theedition);Tyabji'sMuslim
law (4th edition) are inadequate to establish the proposition that a
Muslimhusbandisnotunderanobligationtoprovidemaintenancetohis
divorcedwife,whohasnorperformedanyremarriage,afterthedivorce
and unable to maintain herself. Section 125Cr.P.C, deals with any
husband,whopossesssufficientmeansbutneglectsorrefusestomaintain
hiswife,includingadivorcedwife,whoisunabletomaintainherself.It
wasarguedonthesideofthepetitionerthattheMuslimPersonalLaw,
limitsthehusband'sliabilitytoprovidemaintenanceforthedivorcedwife
tilltheperiodofiddat,whichdoesnotcontemplate orcountenance the
situationenvisagedbySection125Cr.P.Candamuslimhusband,asper
his personal law, is not under an obligation to provide provide
Page 32 of 61
Page 32 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
maintenance,beyondtheperiodofiddat,tohisdivorcedwife,evenifsheis
unabletomaintainherself.
12. However, Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically ruled that
Section125Cr.P.C,providesforpaymentofmaintenancetoawifeeven
afterdivorce,ifsheremainswithoutanyremarriagewithanotherperson
and hence, she is entitled to claim maintenance from her husband,
irrespective of her religion. Mr. K.Chellapandian, learned Additional
AdvocateGeneralarguedthattheHon'bleSupremeCourthasruledthat
statutorylawprevailsoverpersonallawofanyparties,asitisawelfare
legislation with a noble object of providing financial assistance to any
divorced wife, who is unable to maintain herself, irrespective of any
religion.
13. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Javed and
others vs. StateofHaryanaandothers,reportedin(2003)8SCC
369, learned Additional AdvocateGeneral submitted that personal law
doesnotprevailoverthegenerallaw,asheldbytheHon'bleApexCourt.
WhileinterpretingthescopeofArticle25oftheConstitution,theSupreme
Courthasheldasfollows:
"42.ItwasthensubmittedthatthepersonallawofMuslims
permitsperformanceofmarriageswithfourwomen,obviouslyfor
the purpose of procreating children and any restriction thereon
wouldbeviolativeoftherighttofreedomofreligionenshrinedin
Article25oftheConstitution.TherelevantpartofArticle25reads
asunder:
"25.Freedomofconscienceandfreeprofession,practiceand
propagationofreligion.(1)Subjecttopublicorder,moralityand
health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are
equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to
profess,practiseandpropagatereligion.
(2)Nothinginthisarticleshallaffecttheoperationofanyexisting
laworpreventtheStatefrommakinganylaw
(a)regulating or restricting any economic, financial,
political or other secular activity which may be associated with
religiouspractice;
(b)providingforsocialwelfareandreformorthethrowing
open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all
classesandsectionsofHindus."
14. In Mohd.Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum and others,
reportedinAIR1985SC945,ithasbeenheldbyaConstitutionBench
Page 33 of 61
Page 33 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
of the Apex Court that a muslim husband is also bound to pay

maintenancetohiswife,asperSection125Cr.P.Candcannotraiseany
defenceundertheMuslimpersonallaw.Inthedecision,thelegalquestion
was: when the personal law makes a provision for maintenance to a
divorcedwife,whethertheprovisionformaintenanceunderSection125
Cr.P.C, would run in conflict with the personal law. The Constitution
BenchoftheHon'bleSupremeCourthaslaiddowntwoprinciples;firstly,
the two provisions operate in different fields and therefore there is no
conflict,andsecondly,evenifthereisaconflictitshouldbesetatrestby
holding thatthestatutorylawwillprevailoverthepersonallawofthe
parties,incasesbothareinconflicttoeachother.
15. In Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India ? (1995) 3 SCC 635, the
SupremeCourtheldthatpolygamycanbesupersededbytheStatejustas
itcanprohibithumansacrifice orthepractice ofsatiintheinterestof
public order. The personal law operates under the authority of the
legislationandnotunderanyreligionand,therefore,thepersonallawcan
alwaysbesupersededorsupplementedbylegislation.
16. Mr. W.Peter Ramesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the
petitionersubmittedthatminorityrightsarebeingtakenawaybywayof
interference inthe personal Mahomedan law. According tohim, as per
PrinciplesofMulla'sMohammedLaw,Edition9,onattainingpubertyor
attheageof15,amuslimgirlisentitledtoenterintoamaritalcontract
withamalemember,forwhichevenconsentofherparentsorguardianis
notrequiredandfurtherhecontendedthat'majority'underMahomedan
Lawforagirlis,onherattainingpubertyorattainingtheageof15.
17. ItiswellsettledthataspercivillawsinIndia,onecouldbeamajor
onlyonattainingtheageof18years,irrespectiveofanyreligionandfor
thepurposeofmarriage,agirlattainingtheageof18yearsandaboy
attaining 21 years of age are one of the eligible conditions. The
Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 says"child"means aperson
who,ifamale,hasnotcompletedtwentyoneyearofage,andifafemale,
notcompletedeighteenyearsofage.
18. The short question involved in the writ petition, is whether the
minimumagelimitfixedas18yearsforagirlandpreventingmuslimgirls
before attaining the age of 18 years under the Prohibition of Child
Marriage Act, 2006 isviolating the Constitutional mandate, inview of
Mahomedan Personal Law, which permits a girl to marry either on
attainingpubertyorcompleting15years.
19. Themainissueinvolvedinthewritpetitionrelatestothevalidity
andthelegalbarofmarriagebeingperformedforanymuslimgirlbelow
theageof18years,inviewofProhibitionofChildMarriageAct,2006.
TheobjectoftheProhibitionofChildMarriageAct,2006,asstatedinthe
Page 34 of 61
Page 34 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
Actistoenhancethehealthofchildrenandthestatusofwomeninthe
society, hence, marriage should not be performed below the age of 18
yearsforagirlchild.Consideringthematurityofmindrequiredforthe
brideandthebridegroominunderstandingtheirmaritallife,theirhealth
factorandalsotheirrighttohavepropereducationandempowerment,
theagelimithasbeenfixedforagirlas18years.Itwasarguedbythe
learned Additional AdvocateGeneral, that permitting to perform the
marriageofagirlimmediatelyafterattainingpubertyorattheageof15
wouldnotbearightofanymuslimtofilePIL,sincetherightofthebride
and the bride groom should be paramount. Hence, the provisions of
ProhibitionofChildMarriageAct,2006cannotbeconstrued,asitaffects
therightsofamuslimgirl.Whiledecidingtheagefactorofagirlandboy,
whoarebrideandbridegroominamarriage,theCourtcannotignorethe
laudableobjectoftheAct,whichconsidersmainlythewelfareofthebride
andbridegroom.
20. Therefore,performingmarriageofagirlbelow18yearswouldnot
be a religious right as contemplated under Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution of India. The Court has to consider, whether performing
marriageofagirlbelow18yearswouldbeforthewelfareofthegirlor
brideinthemarriage.Mr.W.PeterRameshkumar,learnedcounselforthe
petitioner submitted that though Shariat Law permits polygamy,
permitting muslim male to have number of wives, as per the normal,
practice, every muslim male member is having only one wife and the
counsel further submitted that even after marriage, there could be
possibilityforamuslimgirltocontinueherstudies.However,wearenot
inclinedtoaccepttheview,sinceitwouldnotbeareasonableopportunity,
thatisavailabletoagirlbelongstootherreligions.Whileinterpretingthe
Fundamental Rights,Courtsareconsidering DirectivePrinciplesofState
PolicyandvariousInternationalConventions,towhichIndiaisaparty.
InternationalConventions,relatingtowomenandchildrenemphasisfor
gender equality and gender justice and accordingly, education and
empowerment of a women are mandatory, in any civilized society. In
public appointments, election to local bodies, 1/3 reservation is being
providedforwomeninourcountrytomaintaingenderequality,inviewof
theprovisionsofCEDAW.InordertoimplementthemandateofArticles
14and15andalso'CEDAW',providingopportunitytoallthegirlchildren
for proper education, irrespective of any religion is a prerequisite,
otherwisetheywillbethelosersinthesociety.EventheCourtcantakea
judicialnoticethatalleducatedpeople,havinghigherstratainthesociety
usedtoperformmarriagefortheirdaughter,onlyafterattainingtheage
ofbelow 18 years. Only uneducated poor people living inremote rural
areasandtribalareas,areindulging inchildmarriages,detrimental to
thewelfareofthegirlchild.
21. Therefore,weareoftheviewthatanyclaimtoperformmarriageof
agirllessthan18yearswouldnotbeforthewelfareofthegirlchildbut,
Page 35 of 61
Page 35 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
suchmarriagewouldbeagainsttheinterestofthegirl,wherebyeducation
andempowermentofthegirlisbeingdeniedunreasonably.InSaifuddin
Saheb case (supra), it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that a
divorced muslim woman is also entitled to get maintenance from his
husbandlikeanyotherdivorcedwifeofotherreligion,inviewofSection
125oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure.SuchinterpretationoftheHon'ble
Supreme Court has properly protected any helpless divorced muslim
woman,whichcannotbeconsideredasaviewagainstmuslims.Judicial
wisdom in the landmark decision has ruled that a muslim woman is
equallyentitledtogetrightslikeanyotherwomanofotherreligions.In
the same way, Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 would enable
muslimgirlstogetpropereducation,empowermentandalsoopportunity
ofunderstandingtoleadpropermaritallifelikeothergirls,whichcannot
be considered as an Act by implementing the Act against Muslim
Communityingeneral.Providingeducationandempowermenttoanygirl
childwillcertainlystrengthenthesociety,whichwouldnotbedetrimental
toanyreligion.
22. While deciding harmonious construction, incase ofpossibility of
conflicting views pertaining todifferent Articles ofthe Constitution, the
Court has to consider the prime object of the Articles towards the
harmoniousconstruction.Intheinstantcase,theCourthastoconsiderthe
mandateofArticles25,26withreferencetoArticles14,15and21ofthe
Constitution. Article 14, 15(1) and 16 prohibits discrimination. There
shallbenodiscrimination, solelybasedonthegroundofreligion,race,
caste,sex,placeofbirth.However,Article15(3)emphasisesthatifthereis
anyconcessionorbenefitinfavourofwomenandchildren,thatwouldnot
beadiscriminationandifitisinfavourofthemalemembers,thatwould
beadiscrimination,violativeofArticles14and15.Article21hasbeen
interpretedbytheHon'bleSupremeCourtsoastomaintainpropersocial
justice, accordingly, righttolife andpersonalliberty,guaranteed under
Article 21 emphasize for decent living, which should be available to
everyone,includingmuslimgirls,todecidetheirfuturebygettingproper
educationandempowermentandalsotodecidetheirmaritallife.Hence,
merelyreferringArticles25and29,theConstitutionalsafeguardsgiven
underArticles14,15(3),16and21cannotbetakenaway,astheprime
objectiveistowardsgenderequality.
23. WhentheWorldcommunityisconsideredasaglobalvillageinthe
modernsocietyandtheConstitutionemphasisesequalrightformenand
women, legitimate right of education and empowerment should not be
deniedforanygirl.ItisalsorelevanttonotethatShariatLaw,neversays
thatmarriageshouldbeperformedforagirlbeforesheattainstheageof
18years.InoldendaysHinduswerealsoaccepting'BalyaVivaha'orChild
marriage,whichisprohibitedundertheprohibitionofChildMarriageAct.
Hence,theActisnotagainstmuslimreligionandthattheProhibitionof
Child Marriage Act, 2006 would not be detrimental to the muslim
Page 36 of 61
Page 36 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
community.
24.
Havingconsideredthefactsandcircumstancesasdiscussedabove,
weholdthattheprovisionsofProhibitionofChildMarriageAct,2006are
innowayagainstthereligiousrightsguaranteedunderArticles25and29
oftheConstitutionofIndia.Infact,thesameisinfavourofallthegirl
childreningettingpropereducationandempowermentandequalstatus
asthatofmenintheSociety,asguaranteedunderArticles14,15,16and
21oftheConstitution.Therefore,thewritpetitionisliabletobedismissed
asnotlegallysustainable.
25. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. The interim order
passed,whilehandingovertheminorgirlMs.AyshaBanutoherparents,
ontheundertaking givenbyherfather nottoperform marriage ofthe
minorgirluntilfurtherorderstobepassedinthewritpetitionismade
absolute. Itismade clear thatitisopen tothe minor Aysha Banu to
solemnize hermarriageindependentlyoraccordingtothewishesofher
parentsonattainingmajority.
29.
Thus, having given my thoughtful consideration to the issue in
hand,Ihavenodoubtinmymindthatthepropositionoflawexplained
inthecaseof Mujamil(supra) totheextentittakestheviewthata
Muslimgirlhavingattainedtheageof15orhavingattainedthepuberty
hasarighttomarryevenwithouttheconsentofherparentsisnota
correctstatementoflaworlegalproposition.
30.
In AmniderKaurandAnr. v. StateofPunjabandOrs., 2010
Crl.L.J.1154decidedbythePunjabandHaryanaHighCourt,theSingle
Judge of the said Court has taken a view that having regard to the
provisions of Section 12 of the PCM Act, marriage with a minor girl
wouldbevoid.Aperusalofthisjudgmentwouldshowthatthelearned
Page 37 of 61
Page 37 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
Judge has proceeded almost on same lines as taken by the Division

Bench of the Madras High Court, which is clear from the following
passagesofthisjudgment:
14.Inthiscasethefactsarenotindispute.PetitionerNo.1wasaminor
girlbeing16yearsand2monthsofageatthetimeofallegedmarriage.
AccordingtoSection3ofTheMajorityAct,1875everypersondomiciled
in India shall attain the age of majority on his completing the age of
eighteenyearsandnotbefore.AccordingtoSection2(f)oftheAct"minor"
meansapersonwho,undertheprovisionsoftheMajorityAct,1875(9of
1875) istobedeemed not tohave attained his majority. According to
Section2(a)oftheAct,"child"meansaperson,who,ifamale,hasnot
completed twentyone years ofage, and ifafemale, has not completed
eighteen years of age and according to Section 2(b) of the Act, "child
marriage"meansamarriagetowhicheitherofthecontractingpartiesisa
child.ThenaccordingtoSection12(a),themarriageofpetitionerNo.1
which falls within the definition of child and within the definition of
minorbeingtheageof16yearsand2monthswhohasbeenenticedaway
outofthekeepingofthelawfulguardiancannotcontractthemarriage
andhermarriageshallbenullandvoid.
15.Inviewofthoseprovisions,Ihavenootherchoicebuttoholdthat
marriage of petitioners No. 1 and 2 which is alleged to have been
performed on 21.10.2009 as per Marriage Certificate (Annexure P1
undated)asvoidmarriageandnone ofthejudgmentswhichhavebeen
citedbythelearnedCounselforthepetitionersinsupportoftheircase,is
applicabletothefactsandcircumstancesofthepresentcasebecauseinthe
caseofRaviKumar(supra),theDivisionBenchhadconsideredonlythe
provisionsofSections5and18oftheActof1955toobservethatincase
ofviolationofSection5(iii)oftheActof1955,thepunishmentisonly15
days simple imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1000/ or both but the
marriageisnotillegalorvoid.However,muchwaterhasflownthereafter
andnowforthecontravention ofSection 5(iii)oftheActof1955, the
punishmentunderSection18(a)hasbeenenhancedto2years,rigorous
imprisonmentand/orwithfineuptooflacorwithboth.Moreover,the
caseofRaviKumar(supra)wasdecidedon5.10.2005.Atthattime,the
ActwasnotinforceasitdidnotreceivetheassentofPresidentofIndia
andhasbeennotifiedw.e.f1.11.2007.Therefore,thelearnedCounselfor
thepetitionerscannottaketheadvantageoftheobservationsmadeinthe
caseofRaviKumar(supra).InsofarasthecaseofRidhwanaandanother
(supra)isconcerned,inthatcasealsothisCourthadprimafaciefound
thatthereisevidencecollectedbythepolicethatgirlwasmorethan18
years of age but still while parting with the judgment for the sake of
argument,itwasdecidedthatevenifgirlis16yearsand2monthsage
Page 38 of 61
Page 38 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
andhasmarriedwithherownsweetwill,nooffenceissaidtohavebeen
committed.ThisCourthadnooccasiontorefertotheprovisionsofSection
12 of the Act. Therefore, the ratio laid down in these cases is not
applicable.ThecaseofLataSingh(2006Crl.LJ3309)(supra)itselftalks
aboutthepersonswhoweremajoratthattimewhentheygotmarriedand
onthatpremise,itwasheldthatifthepersonsaremajorandhavegot
marriedontheirown,theirlifeandlibertyshouldnotbethreatenedby
thepersonswhoareagainsttheirmarriage.Hence,thesaidjudgmentis
alsoofnohelptothepresentpetitioners.InthecaseofPardeepKumar
Singh(supra)thisCourthadlaiddownasmanyasninedirectionsbutin
noneofthedirectionsithasbeenprovidedthatifthegirlisminorandhas
beenenticed awayforthepurpose ofmarriage byalleged husband, the
saidmarriageisvalid.Hence,IhavefoundthatprovisionsofSection12of
theActwouldapplywithfullrigourinthepresentcaseandthemarriage
whichhasbeensolemnisedbypetitionerNo.2withpetitionerNo.l,whois
childandaminor,isunsustainableintheeyesoflawandisthus,declared
asvoid.
16.Thesecondquestioninvolvedinthiscaseisthatwhetherthepersons,
whohaveperformedthemarriagearealsoliableforpunishment.Inthis
regard Sections 10and11oftheActprovides forpunishment forsuch
personsandSection15oftheActprovidesthatnotwithstandinganything
contained intheCodeofCriminalProcedure, 1973, anoffence shallbe
cognizable and nonbailable. Therefore, Ihold thattheperson who has
performedorabettedthechildmarriageofpetitionerNo.1,isalsoequally
liableandforthatpurpose,IdirecttheStatetotakeappropriateactionby
lodging the case against the persons who are responsible for the
performance ofthechildmarriage inthepresentcase.Inrespectofthe
thirdquestion,thepetitionerscannotbeallowedtotakethebenefitofthe
constitutionalremedyofprotectionoftheirlifeandlibertyonthepretext
oftheirvoidmarriage.ThelifeandlibertyofpetitionersNo.1and2is
onlyendangeredandisbeingthreatenedbyrespondentNo.4solongtheir
marriagelegallysubsistsbutoncetheirmarriageisdeclaredtobevoid,
thereisnothreatlefttotheirlifeandliberty.Moreover,suchacasewhere
theallegationagainstthehusbandisofenticingawayminorgirlfromthe
lawfulkeepingofguardian/parentsandacasehasbeenregisteredunder
Sections363/366AIPC,noprotectionunderSection482Cr.P.C.canbe
grantedbythisCourtbecauseinthateventualitypoliceprotectionhasto
begrantedtoafugitiveoflaw.
31.
TheobjectbehindenactingtheP.C.M.Actwastocurbthemenace
ofchildmarriages,whichisstillprevalentinthiscountryandismost
commonamongtheMuslimcommunityandinruralareas.ADivision
Page 39 of 61
Page 39 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Association for Social
Justice and Research vs. Union of India and others (Writ Petition
(Criminal) No.535 of 2010 decided on 13.05.2010) took note of this
menace,interalia,pointingoutasunder:
6.Sociologistsevenarguethatforvarietyofreasons,childmarriagesare
prevalentinmanypartsofthiscountryandtherealityismorecomplex
than what it seems to be. The surprising thing is that almost all
communities where thispractice isprevalent arewell aware ofthefact
thatmarryingchildisillegal,nay,itisevenpunishable under thelaw.
NGOsaswellastheGovernmentagencieshavebeenworkingfordecades
torootoutthisevil.Yet,therealityisthattheevilcontinuestosurvive.
Again, sociologists attribute these phenomenon of child marriage to a
variety of reasons. The foremost amongst these reasons are poverty,
culture,traditionandvaluesbasedonpatriarchalnorms.Otherreasons
are: lowlevel of education of girls, lower status given to the girls and
consideringthemasfinancialburdenandsocialcustomsandtraditions.In
many cases, the mixture ofthese causes results inthe imprisonment of
childreninmarriagewithouttheirconsent.
7. The present case is a telling example, which proves the sociologists
correct.
8. It cannot be disputed that the aforesaid marriage is in violation of
provisions ofthe Prohibition ofChild Marriage Act, 2006 inasmuch as
Chandni isminor andinbelowtheageof18years.Atthesame time,
marriage is not void under civil law. The circumstances under which
ChandniismarriedtoYashpalarenarratedaboveandpresumablyunder
these forced circumstances, economic or otherwise, Vijay Pal decided to
marryChandnitoYashpalevenwhenshewaslessthan18years.Beasit
may, since Vijay Pal and Yashpal are already arrested and FIR is also
registeredagainstthem,insofarasthataspectisconcerned,lawwilltake
itsowncourse.
9.The purpose and rationale behind the Prohibition ofChild Marriage
Act,2006isthatthereshouldnotbeamarriageofachildatatenderage
ashe/sheisneitherpsychologicallynorphysicallyfittogetmarried.There
couldbevariouspsychologicalandother implications ofsuchmarriage,
particularlyifthechildhappenstobeagirl.Inactuality,childmarriageis
aviolationofhumanrights,compromisingthedevelopmentofgirlsand
often resulting in early pregnancy and social isolation, with little
educationandpoorvocationaltrainingreinforcingthegenderednatureof
Page 40 of 61
Page 40 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
poverty.Youngmarriedgirlsareaunique,thoughofteninvisible,group.
Requiredtoperformheavyamountsofdomesticwork,underpressureto
demonstrate fertility, and responsible for raising children while still
children themselves, married girls and child mothers face constrained
decisionmakingandreducedlifechoices.Boysarealsoaffectedbychild
marriagebuttheissueimpactsgirlsinfarlargernumbersandwithmore
intensity.Whereagirlliveswithamanandtakesontheroleofcaregiver
forhim,theassumptionisoftenthatshehasbecome anadultwoman,
evenifshehasnotyetreachedtheageof18.Someoftheilleffectsofchild
marriagecanbesummarizedasunder:
(i)Girlswhogetmarriedatanearlyageareoftenmoresusceptible
to the health risks associated with early sexual initiation and
childbearing,includingHIVandobstetricfistula.
(ii) Young girls who lack status, power and maturity are often
subjectedtodomesticviolence,sexualabuseandsocialisolation.
(iii)Earlymarriagealmostalwaysdeprivesgirlsoftheireducation
ormeaningfulwork,whichcontributestopersistentpoverty.
(iv) Child Marriage perpetuates an unrelenting cycle of gender
inequality,sicknessandpoverty.
(v)Getting thegirlsmarried atanearlyagewhentheyarenot
physically mature, leads to highest rates of maternal and child
mortality.
Young mothers face higher risks during pregnancies including
complications such as heavy bleeding, fistula, infection, anaemia, and
eclampsiawhichcontributetohighermortalityratesofbothmotherand
child.Atayoung ageagirlhasnotdeveloped fullyandherbodymay
strainundertheeffortofchildbirth,whichcanresultinobstructedlabour
and obstetric fistula. Obstetric fistula can also be caused by the early
sexual relations associated with child marriage, which take place
sometimes even before menarche. Child marriage also has considerable
implicationsforthesocialdevelopmentofchildbridges,intermsoflow
levels of education, poor health and lack of agency and personal
autonomy.TheForumonMarriageandtheRightsofWomenandGirls
explainsthatwheretheseelementsarelinkedwithgenderinequitiesand
biasesforthemajorityofyoung girlstheirsocializationwhichgrooms
themtobemothersandsubmissivewives,limitstheirdevelopmenttoonly
reproductiveroles.Alackofeducationalsomeansthatyoungbridesoften
lack knowledge about sexual relations, their bodies and reproduction,
exacerbatedbytheculturalsilencesurroundingthesesubjects.Thisdenies
the girl the ability to make informed decisions about sexual relations,
Page 41 of 61
Page 41 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
planningafamily,andherhealth,yetanotherexampleoftheirlivesin
whichtheyhavenocontrol.Womenwhomarryearlyaremorelikelyto
sufferabuseandviolence,withinevitablepsychologicalaswellasphysical
consequences.Studiesindicatethatwomenwhomarryatyoungagesare
morelikelytobelievethatitissometimesacceptableforahusbandtobeat
his wife, and are therefore more likely to experience domestic violence
themselves.Violentbehaviourcantaketheformofphysicalharm,physical
harm,psychologicalattacks,threateningbehaviourandforcedsexualacts
includingrape.Abuseissometimesperpetratedbythehusbandsfamilyas
wellasthehusbandhimself,andgirlsthatenterfamiliesasabrideoften
become domestic slaves for the inlaws. Early marriage has also been
linkedtowifeabandonmentandincreasedlevelsofdivorceorseparation
andchildbridesalsofacetheriskofbeingwidowedbytheirhusbandswho
areoftenconsiderablyolder.Intheseinstances,thewifeislikelytosuffer
additional discrimination as in many cultures divorced, abandoned or
widowedwomensufferalossofstatus,andmaybeostracizedbysociety
anddeniedpropertyrights.
10. The Prohibition ofChild Marriage Act hasbeenenacted keeping in
viewtheaforesaidconsiderationsinmind.
32.
AFullBenchoftheDelhiHighCourtinthecaseof Lajadevivs.
State,reportedin2013CriminalLawJournal3458hasdealtwiththis
aspectatlength.HisLordshipA.K.Sikri,J.(asHisLordshipthenwas)
madethefollowingobservations:
26. Thus, child marriage is such a social evil which has the
potentialitiesofdangerstothelifeandhealthofafemalechildandplays
havoc in their lives, who cannot withstand the stress and strains of
marriedlifeanditleadstoearlydeathsofsuchminormothers.Italso
reflects the chauvinistic attribute of the Indian society. This menace is
depicted in the following lines from a song sung during marriages in
Rajasthan:
"Choti si umariya main parnanaya o babosa, kain main tharoo kario
kusoor"
"Ohfatherwhyhadyougivenmeoffinthemarriageatsuchatenderage,
forwhatsindidIcommit."
27.Theselinesitselfsymbolizethemixedpainofleavingthefather'shouse
andatthesametimetheanguishastowhywasshebeingmarriedoffat
such atender age. Such situation is unprecedented and the inner pain
Page 42 of 61
Page 42 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
unimaginable.Theword'ChildMarriage'isitselfcontradictoryinitselfas
onewouldwonderhowmarriageandchildcouldgotogether.
28.Whenwelookintothematter,keepinginviewtheaforesaiddisastrous
consequencesofthechildmarriage,whichiseventreatedasviolationof
humanrights,includingrighttoleadalifeoffreedomanddignity,the
veryfirstthingwhichcomesinmindisthatthemenaceofchildmarriage
needstobecurbed.Eventhelegislativethinkingisinthesamedirection.
However, aswould beseen hereafter, thelegislature hasstillnotmade
adequateandeffectiveprovisionsinthelawstomakesuchamarriageas
void.
29.Wewouldliketomentionthatchildmarriageexistedhistoricallyin
Indiaandoveraperiodoftimeitwasperceivedtobeawrongfulpractice.
The legislature stepped in more than 80 years ago when the CMRA
(popularly known as the Sarda Act) was enacted with the objective of
eliminating thepracticeofchildmarriage.Itforbade themarriage ofa
malewithlessthan21yearsandfemalewithlessthan18yearsofage.
However,thepenalprovisionsoftheSardaActdidnotinvalidatetheeffect
ofmarriage. Itlaiddown punishment formale adultbelowtwenty one
years of age and for male adult above twenty one years of age who
contracted a child marriage and also for the person, who performed,
conducted ordirectedachildmarriage.Someamendmentswerecarried
outinthisActbutitwasfeltthatitwasnotservinganypurpose.Itisfor
thisreasonthatin2006,theProhibitionofChildMarriageActwaspassed
bytheParliamentwhichisbeforeusinthepresentform.TheStatementof
ObjectsandReasonsofthePCMAct,2006havebeenquotedabove.The
salientfeaturesoftheBill,whichculminateintheenactmentofthePCM
Act,2006areasfollows:
"(i) To make a provisions to declare child marriage as voidable atthe
optionofthecontractingpartytothemarriage,whowasachild.
(ii)Toprovideaprovisionrequiringthehusbandor,ifheisaminorat
thematerialtime,hisguardiantopaymaintenancetotheminorgirluntil
herremarriage.
(iii) To make aprovision for the custody and maintenance of children
bornofchildmarriages.
(iv)Toprovidethatnotwithstandingachildmarriagehasbeenannulled
byadecree ofnullityundertheproposed section3,everychildbornof
suchmarriage,whetherbeforeorafterthecommencementoftheproposed
legislation,shallbelegitimateforallpurposes.
(v)ToempowerthedistrictCourttoaddto,modifyorrevokeanyorder
relating tomaintenance ofthe female petitioner and her residence and
custodyormaintenanceofchildren,etc.
Page 43 of 61
Page 43 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
(vi) To make a provision for declaring the child marriage as void in

certaincircumstances.
(vii)ToempowertheCourtstoissueinjunctionprohibitingsolemnsation
ofmarriagesincontraventionoftheprovisionsoftheproposedlegislation.
(viii)Tomaketheoffencesundertheproposedlegislationtobecognizable
forthepurposesofinvestigationandforotherpurposes.
(ix)ToprovideforappointmentofChildMarriagePreventionOfficersby
theStateGovernments.
(x) To empowers the State Governments to make rules for effective
administrationofthelegislation."
30. AglancethroughthemainprovisionsofthePCMAct,2006brings
outthefollowingschemeoftheAct:
Section 2(a) ofPCM Act defines "child" and Section 2(b) defines "child
marriage". The legislature has, however, taken care to define "minor"
separatelyinS.2(f),asapersonwhoundertheprovisionsoftheMajority
Act,1875isdeemedtohavenotattainedtheageofmajority.
Section3ofthePCMActrelatestochildmarriages.Itspecificallystates
thatachildmarriageshallbevoidableattheoptionofthecontracting
partytothemarriage,whowasachildatthetimeofmarriage.Theterm
"child" in S. 2(a) means a person who, if a male, has not completed
twentyoneyearsofage,andifafemale,hasnotcompletedeighteenyears
of age. A voidable marriage does not become void on its own or
immediately when the option is exercised. It requires a decree on
adjudication issued by the district Court. The said decree can be only
passedonapetitionbyacontractingpartytothemarriagewhowasa
childatthetimeofthemarriage.Thepetitionhastobefiledbeforeor
withintwoyearsofattaining"majority"(i.e.majorityasdefinedinthe
MajorityAct,1875).Subsec.(2)toS.3statesthatthepetitioncanbe
movedthroughaguardianornextfriendalongwiththeChildMarriage
ProhibitionOfficer.Theuseoftheterm"guardian"inS.3(2)doescause
confusion andisambiguous. Ahusband under theHinduMinorityand
Guardianship Act, 1956 isthe guardian oftheminor wife (see Section
6(c)).Obviously,thehusband,insuchasituation,willnotandcannotact
asaguardianandmoveapetitiononbehalfofhisminorwife."Guardian"
in this case will mean the natural father or the mother of the girl.
Fortunately,thelegislaturehaspermittedthenextfriendtoalsomovean
applicationforannulmentofmarriage.Subsection(4)toSection3ofthe
PCMActstatesthatbeforepassingsuchanordernoticesarerequiredtobe
issued by the District Judge to the parties concerned. Subsection (4)
protectsafemalechild,whowasmarried,andstipulatesthatthedistrict
Page 44 of 61
Page 44 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
Courtcanpassaninterimorfinalorderdirectingpaymentofmaintenance
to her. In case the male contracting party is a minor, his parent or
guardianisliabletopaymaintenance.
Section 3 of the PCM Act has to contrasted with "void" marriages
mentionedinSection12ofthesameAct.Voidmarriagesarenullandvoid
ab initio and accordingly are treated as different and not similar to
voidable child marriages. As per Section 12, in three circumstances, a
marriageofaminorchildistobetreatedasvoid.Werecordthatsub
section(2)toSection 3willnotapplyincaseofa"child" afterhehas
attained majority, for he or she thereafter do not have any lawful
guardian.
Section13(2)(iv)ofHMAgivestherighttoawifetofileapetitionfor
dissolutionofhermarriagebyadecreeofdivorceunderthesaidAct.The
said provision was introduced with effect from 27th May, 1976. It
stipulatesthataHinduwifecanfileapetitionfordivorceifthemarriage
is solemnized before she had attained the age of 15 years and she
repudiatesthemarriagebeforesheattainstheageof18years.Thesaid
right of the Hindu females to ask for divorce, does not mean that a
petition before thedistrictCourtcannot befiled under Section 3ofthe
PCM Act. PCM Act as noticed above is a secular law and is a latter
enactment, whichspecificallydealswiththeproblemofchildmarriages.
Religionofthecontractingpartydoesnotmatter.PCMActbeinga"special
Act"andbeingasubsequentlegislation,tothisextentandincasethereis
anyconflict,willoverridetheprovisionsofHMAActorforthatmatterany
personallaw.However,thisshouldnotbeinterpretedthatwehaveheld
thatapetitionfordissolutionofmarriageunderSection13(2)(iv)isnot
maintainable. Both provisions i.e. Section 13(2) (iv) and Section 3
operate,applyandhavetheirownconsequences.Thesearetwoconcurrent
provisions,whichcanbeinvokedbythe"parties"satisfyingtheconditions
stipulatedinthetwosections.
As noticed below, a Division Bench of this Court in W. P. (Cri.)
1003/2010decidedon1182010JitenderKumarSharmav.Stateand
another,hasbeenheldthatPCMActisasecularlaw.Onthisaspectwe
respectfullyagreewiththeviewthatPCMActisasecularlaw.Decisionof
theFullBenchofMadrasHighCourtinT.Sivakumarv.TheInspectorof
Police(supra)alsoacceptsthesaidposition.
31. Wehavealreadyreproduced Sections 2(a), 9,12and15ofthis
Act.Itiscleartherefromthatmarriageofaminorchildistreatedasvoid
onlyunderthecircumstancesmentionedinSection12.Otherwise,thisAct
doesnotmakethemarriageofthechildvoidbutvoidableattheoptionof
thepartiestoanunderagemarriagewhichoptioncanbeexercisedwithin
the stipulated time. It is intriguing that the legislature accepted the
menace of child marriage. It even accepted that the child marriage is
Page 45 of 61
Page 45 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
violationofhumanrights.Thelegislatureevenmadethechildmarriagea
punishable offence by incorporating provision for prosecution and
imprisonment of certain persons. At the same time, except in certain
circumstancescontemplatingunderSection12oftheAct,themarriageis
treated as voidable. The interplay of this Act with other enactments
compoundsthisanomalyandcommentsonsuchanomaliesarestatedin
detailattheappropriatestage.Atpresentweconfineourselvestotheissue
athandasthestatusofthechildmarriageneedstobedeterminedonthe
basisofstatutoryprovisions,whichexistsasofnow.Aspointedoutabove,
undertheHinduMarriageAct,childmarriageisstilltreatedasvalidand
not a void marriage. It is personal law, in codified form, governing
Hindus.Ontheotherhand,PCMAct,whichisasecularlaw,treatsthis
marriageasvoidableexceptthoseeventswhicharecoveredbySection12
ofthePCMAct.Inneitheroftheaforesaidstatutesthechildmarriageis
treated as void ab initio or nullity. Therefore, we cannot hold child
marriage as a nullity or void. The next question that follows is as to
whethertheprovisionsofpersonallaw,i.e.,HinduMarriageActshouldbe
appliedtodeclaresuchamarriageasvalidortheprovisionsofPCMAct
wouldprevailovertheHMAct.
32. It is disteressing to note that the Indian Penal Code, 1860
acquiesceschildmarriage.TheexceptiontoSection375 specificallylays
downthatsexualintercourseofmanwithhisownwife,thewifenotbeing
under fifteen years ofageisnotrape,thusruling outthepossibilityof
marital rape when the age ofwife isabove fifteen years. On the other
hand,ifthegirlisnotthewifeoftheman,butisbelowsixteen,thenthe
sexualintercourseevenwiththeconsentofthegirlamountstorape?Itis
rathershockingtonotethespecificrelaxationisgiventoahusbandwho
rapes his wife, when she happens to be between 1516 years. This
provision in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is a specific illustration of
legislativeendorsementandsanctiontochildmarriages.Thusbykeepinga
lowerageofconsentformaritalintercourse,itseemsthatthelegislature
haslegitimized theconcept ofchild marriage. The Indian Majority Act,
1875laysdowneighteenyearsastheageofmajoritybutthenonobstante
clause (notwithstanding anything contrary) excludes marriage, divorce,
dowerandadoptionfromtheoperationoftheActwiththeresultthatthe
age of majority of an individual in these matters is governed by the
personallawtowhichheisasubject.Thissavingclausesilentlyapproves
ofthechildmarriagewhichisinaccordancewiththepersonallawand
customs of the religion. It is to be specifically noted that the other
legislationsliketheIndianPenalCodeandIndianMajorityActarepre
independencelegislationswhereastheHinduMinorityandGuardianship
Actisoneenactedinthepostindependentera.Anotherpostindependent
socialwelfarelegislation,theDowryProhibitionAct,1961alsocontains
provisions which give implied validity to minor's marriages. The words
'whenthewomanwasminor'usedinSection6(1)(c)reflectstheimplied
legislative acceptance of the child marriage. Criminal Procedure Code,
Page 46 of 61
Page 46 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
1973 also contains a provision which incorporates the legislative

endorsement of Child Marriage. The Code makes it obligatory for the
fatheroftheminormarriedfemalechildtoprovidemaintenancetoherin
caseherhusbandlackssufficientmeanstomaintainher.
33. The insertion of option of dissolution of marriage by a female
under Section 13(2)(iv) to the Hindu Marriage Act through an
amendmentin1976indicatesthesilentacceptanceofchildmarriages.The
optionofpubertyprovidesaspecialgroundfordivorceforagirlwhogets
married before attaining fifteen years of age and who repudiates the
marriagebetween1518years.
34. Legislative endorsement and acceptance which confers validity to
minor'smarriageinotherstatutesdefinitelydestroystheverypurposeand
objectofthePCMActtorestrainandtopreventthesolemnizationofChild
Marriage.Theseprovisionscontaininglegalvalidityprovideanassurance
totheparentsandguardiansthatthelegalrightsofthemarriedminors
aresecured.Theacceptanceandacknowledgmentofsuchlegalrightsitself
andprovidingavalidityofChildMarriagedefeatsthelegislativeintention
tocurbthesocialevilofChildMarriage.
35. Thus,evenafterthepassingofthenewActi.e.theProhibitionof
ChildMarriageAct2006, certainloopholesstillremain,thelegislations
areweakastheydonotactuallyprohibitchildmarriage.Itcanbesaid
thatthoughthepractice ofchild marriage hasbeendiscouraged bythe
legislationsbutithasnotbeencompletelybanned.
36. Mr. Deep Ray of NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad has
pointed outthefollowing three loopholes inhisarticle "Child Marriage
andtheLaw".Firstly,ChildMarriagesaremadevoidableattheoptionat
thepartiesbutnotcompletelyvoid.ThatmeansChildMarriagesarestill
lawful.Makingsuchmarriagesvoidabledoes'treallyhelpmatterinmost
cases as girls on attaining majority don't have the agency or adequate
supportfromtheirfamiliestoapproachtheCourtandgoforannulmentof
the marriage. The reason behind not making such marriages void
probably is that child marriages, once solemnized and consummated
makesitverydifficult,ifnotimpossibleforgirlstodenyandstepoutof
thosemarriages.Therefore,itisinkeepingwiththesocialrealitythatsuch
marriagesarenotdeclaredvoid.Ifthesocialrealitylargelyremainsthe
same, the likelihood that young girls will now choose to nullify their
marriages,whichwouldprobablybeconsummatedbythetimesheattains
maturityanddecidestoapproachtheCourts,seemsveryunlikely.
37. Secondly,theapplicabilityofProhibitionofChildMarriageAct,on
variousmarriagesofdifferentcommunitiesandreligionisunclear.Social
customs and personal laws of different religious group in India allows
marriageofminorgirlsandtheProhibitionofChildMarriageAct,2006
Page 47 of 61
Page 47 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
doesnotmentionwhetheritprohibitalltheunderagemarriagesthatare
sanctionedbyreligiouslaws.
38. Thirdly, registration of marriages has still not been made
compulsory.Compulsoryregistrationmandatesthattheageofthegirland
theboygettingmarriedhavetobementioned.Ifimplementedproperly,it
woulddiscourageparentsfrommarryingofftheirminorchildrensincea
written document of their ages would prove the illegality of such
marriages. This would probably be able to tackle the sensitive issue of
minormarriagesupheldbypersonallaws.
39. Asheldabove,PCMAct,2006doesnotrendersuchamarriageas
void butonly declares itas voidable, though itleads toananomalous
situationwhereontheonehandchildmarriageistreatedasoffencewhich
ispunishableunderlawandontheotherhand,itstilltreatsthismarriage
asvalid,i.e.,voidabletillitisdeclaredasvoid.Wewouldalsohastento
add that there is no challenge to the validity of the provisions and
therefore, declaration bythe legislature ofsuch amarriage asvoidable
evenwhenitistreatedasviolationofhumanrightsandalsopunishable
as criminal offence as proper or not, cannot be gone into in these
proceedings. The remedy lies with the legislature which should take
adequate steps by not only incorporating changes under the PCM Act,
2006 but also corresponding amendments in various other laws noted
above.Inthisbehalf,wewouldliketopointoutthattheLawCommission
hasmadecertainrecommendationstoimprovethelawsrelatedtochild
marriage.
40.
Be as itmay, having regard tothe legal/statutory position that
stands as of now leaves us to answer first part of question No.1 by
concluding that the marriage contracted with afemale of less than 18
yearsoramaleoflessthan21yearswouldnotbeavoidmarriagebut
voidable one, which would become valid if no steps are taken by such
"child"withinthemeaningofSection2(a)ofthePCMAct,2002under
Section3ofthesaidActseekingdeclarationofthismarriageasvoid.
32.1 HisLordshipalsoconsideredthequestionwhetheraminorcanbe
saidtohavereachedtheageofdiscretionandtherebywalkawayfrom
thelawfulguardianshipoftheparentsandrefusetogointheircustody.
Whileansweringthesaidquestion,HisLordshipobservedasunder:
42.Weareoftheopinionthatsimplybecausethemarriageisnotvoid,it
shouldautomaticallyfollowthatthehusbandisentitledtothecustodyof
Page 48 of 61
Page 48 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
theminorgirl.Wehavealreadynotedindetailtheseriousreprecussionsof
childmarriage.Someoftheilleffects ofthechildmarriageweretaken
noteofinthecaseofAssociationforSocialJusticeandResearchv.Union
ofIndiaandothers(supra),someofwhicharereproducedagain:
(i)Girlswhogetmarriedatanearlyageareoftenmoresusceptibletothe
health risks associated with early sexual initiation and childbearing,
includingHIVandobstetricfistula.
(ii)Younggirlswholackstatus,powerandmaturityareoftensubjectedto
domesticviolence,sexualabuseandsocialisolation.
(iii) Early marriage almost always deprives girls of their education or
meaningfulwork,whichcontributestopersistentpoverty.
(iv)ChildMarriageperpetuatesanunrelentingcycleofgenderinequality,
sicknessandpoverty.
(v)Gettingthegirlsmarriedatanearlyagewhentheyarenotphysically
mature,leadstohighestratesofmaternalandchildmortality.
Young mothers face higher risks during pregnancies including
complications such as heavy bleeding, fistula, infection, anaemia, and
eclampsiawhichcontributetohighermortalityratesofbothmotherand
child.Atayoung ageagirlhasnotdeveloped fullyandherbodymay
strainundertheeffortofchildbirth,whichcanresultinobstructedlabour
and obstetric fistula. Obstertric fistula can also be caused by the early
sexual relations associated with child marriage, which take place
sometimes even before menarche. Child marriage also has considerable
implicationsforthesocialdevelopmentofchildbridges,intermsoflow
levels of education, poor health and lack of agency and personal
autonomy.TheForumonMarriageandtheRightsofWomenandGirls
explainsthat'wheretheseelementsarelinkedwithgenderinequitiesand
biasesforthemajorityofyounggirls....theirsocializationwhichgrooms
themtobemothersandsubmissivewives,limitstheirdevelopmenttoonly
reproductiveroles.Alackofeducationalsomeansthatyoungbridesoften
lack knowledge about sexual relations, their bodies and reproduction,
exacerbatedbytheculturalsilencesurroundingthesesubjects.Thisdenies
the girl the ability to make informed decisions about sexual relations,
planningafamily,andherhealth,yetanotherexampleoftheirlivesin
whichtheyhavenocontrol.
43.Section6oftheHinduMinorityandGuardianshipAct,1956,reads:
"6.NaturalguardiansofaHinduminor.Thenaturalguardianof
aHinduminor,inrespectoftheminor'spersonaswellasinrespect
oftheminor'sproperty(excludinghisorherundividedinterestin
Page 49 of 61
Page 49 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
jointfamilyproperty),are
(a)Inthecaseofaboyoranunmarriedgirlthefather,andafter
him,themother:providedthatthecustodyofaminorwhohasnot
completedtheageoffiveyearsshallordinarilybewiththemother;
(b)Incaseofanillegitimateboyoranillegitimateunmarriedgirl
themother,andafterher,thefather;
(c)Inthecaseofmarriedgirlthehusband:
Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as the natural
guardianofaminorundertheprovisionsofthissection
(a)IfhehasceasedtobeaHindu,or
(b) If he has completely and finally renounced the world by
becomingahermit(vanaprastha)oranascetic(yatiorsanyasi).
Explanation.Inthissection,theexpression"father"and"mother"
donotincludeastepfatherandastepmother."
44.Itwasstatedthatinthecaseofaminormarriedgirl,thehusbandis
theguardianandincaseofunmarriedminorgirlfatherorthemother,is
herguardian. Itwasaccordinglysubmitted thatthehusband, evenifa
minor,wouldbetheguardianofhiswife.Fortunately,thisargumenthas
to be rejected. The overriding and compelling consideration governing
custodyofguardianshipofthechildisthechild'swelfareandclaimtothe
status as a guardian under the said section is not a right. This was
declaredlong backin1973 inRosyJacob v.JacobChakramakkal, AIR
1973SC2090.
45.WemayalsoreferSection13oftheMinorityandGuardianshipAct,
1956,whichreads:
"13.Welfareofminortobeparamountconsideration.(1)Inthe
appointmentofdeclarationofanypersonasguardianofaHindu
minorbyaCourt,thewelfareoftheminorshallbetheparamount
consideration.
(2)Nopersonshallbeentitledtotheguardianshipbyvirtueofthe
provisions of this Act or of any law relating to guardianship in
marriageamongHindus,iftheCourtisofopinionthathisorher
guardianshipwillnotbeforthewelfareoftheminor."
Thesaidsectionhasbeeninterpretedandithasbeenrepeatedlyheldthat
whiledecidingthequestionofcustodyofaminorchild,itistheinterestof
thechild,whichisparamountandimportant.(SeeKumarV.Jahgirdarv.
ChetanaK.Ramatheertha,AIR2001SC2179andAIR2004SC1525).
46. In such circumstances, allowing the husband to consummate a
Page 50 of 61
Page 50 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
marriagemaynotbeappropriatemoresowhenthepurposeandrationale
behindthePCMAct,2006isthatthereshouldbeamarriageofachildat
atender age ashe or she isnot psychologically or medically fittoget
married.Thereisanotherimportantaspectwhichistobeborneinmind.
Suchamarriage,afterall,isvoidableandthegirlchildstillhasrightto
approach the Court seeking to exercise her option to get the marriage
declaredasvoidtillsheattainstheageof20years.Howshewouldbeable
to exercise her right if in the meantime because the marriage is
consummatedwhensheisnoteveninapositiontogiveconsentwhichalso
could leadtopregnancy and child bearing. Such marriages, iftheyare
madelegallyenforceablewillhavedeleteriouseffectandshallnotprevent
anyonefromenteringintosuchmarriages.Consentofagirlorboybelow
theageof16yearsinmostcasesafigmentofimaginationisananomaly
andamirageand,willactasacoverupbythosewhoareeconomically
and/or socially powerful to pulverize the muted meek into submission.
Thesearetheconsiderationswhicharetobekeptinmindwhiledeciding
astowhethercustodyistobegiventothehusbandornot.Therewouldbe
manyotherfactorswhichtheCourtwillhavetokeepinmind,particularly
inthosecaseswherethegirl,thoughminor,elopedwiththeboy(whether
beloworabove21yearsofage)andshedoesnotwanttogobacktoher
parents. Question may arise as to whether in such circumstances, the
custodycanbegiventotheparentsofthehusbandwithcertainconditions,
including the condition that husband would not be allowed to
consummatethemarriage.Thus,weareoftheopinionthattherecannot
be a straight forward answer to the second part of this question and
depending upon the circumstances the Court will have to decide in an
appropriatemannerastowhomthecustodyofthesaidgirlchildistobe
given.
33.
I may clarify that the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court was
concerned with the P.C.M. Act, 2006 in conjunction with the Hindu
MarriageAct.However,theobservationsmadebytheFullBenchofthe
DelhiHighCourtgototherootofthematterandareaptforthepurpose
ofdecidingthepresentcase.
34.
ThelastquestionwhichtheFullBenchconsideredwaswhether
the F.I.R. under Sections 363 of the IPC or 376 of the IPC could be
quashed on the basis of the statement of such minor that she had
Page 51 of 61
Page 51 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
contractedthemarriageofherown.Answeringthesaidquestion,His
Lordshipobservedasunder:
47. ThisbringsustotheanomalywithandintheIndianPenalCode.
Consentbelowtheageof16yearsisimmaterial,exceptwhentherapeis
committedbyamalewhoismarriedtothegirl.Section376,IPCdoesnot
treattherapecommittedbyahusbandonhiswifeabovetheageof15
yearsasanoffence.Thiscertainlyrequiresarelook.Thisprovisionisnot
in consonance with the PCM Act. Section 376, IPC is required to be
rationalizedandamendedinconsonancewiththePCMAct,anditmaybe
difficulttoimplementandeffectivelyenforcethePCMActotherwise.The
questionofageofconsentforthepurposeofIndianPenalCodeisalarger
issue, and not being a subject matter of the reference, has not been
examinedbyus.
48.Weoftencomeacrosscaseswheregirlandboyelopeandgetmarried
in spite of the opposition from the family or parents. Very often these
marriages are interreligion, intercaste and take place in spite of
formidable and fervid opposition due todeepseated social and cultural
prejudices.However,boththeboyandgirlareinloveanddefythesociety
and their parents. In such cases, the Courts face a dilemma and a
predicamentastowhattodo.Thisquestionisnoteasytoanswer.Wefeel
thatnostraightjacketformulaoranswercanbegiven.Itdependsupon
thefactsandcircumstancesofeachcase.Thedecisionwilllargelydepend
upontheinterestoftheboyandthegirl,theirlevelofunderstandingand
maturity,whethertheyunderstandtheconsequences,etc.Theattitudeof
thefamiliesorparentshastobetakennoteof,eitherasanaffirmativeor
anegativefactor indetermining anddecidingwhether thegirlandboy
shouldbepermittedtostaytogetherorifthegirlshouldbedirectedtolive
withherparents.Probablythelastdirectionmaybelegallyjustified,but
forsoundandgoodreasons,theCourthasoption(s)toorderotherwise.
Wemaynotethatinmanycases,suchgirlsseverelyopposeandobjectto
theirstayinginspecialhomes,wheretheyarenotallowedtomeettheboy
or their parents. The stay in the said special homes cannot be unduly
prolongedasitvirtuallyamountstoconfinement,ordetention.Thegirl,if
mature, cannot and should not be denied her freedom and her wishes
should notgetnegatedasifshehasnovoiceandherwishesareofno
consequence.TheCourtwhiledeciding,shouldalsokeepinmindthatsuch
marriagesarevoidableandthegirlhastherighttoapproachtheCourt
underSection3ofthePCMActtogetthemarriagedeclaredvoidtillshe
attainstheageof20years.Consummationofmarriagemayhaveitsown
consequences.
49.
Incasethegirlisbelow16years,theanswerisobviousthatthe
consentdoesnotmatter.OffenceunderSection376,IPCismadeout.The
Page 52 of 61
Page 52 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
chargesheetcannotbequashedonthegroundthatshewasaconsenting
party.However,therecanbespecialorexceptionalcircumstanceswhich
may require consideration, in cases where the girl even after attaining
majorityaffirmsandreiteratesherconsent.
50.Consummation,withthewifebelowtheageof15years,isanoffence
underSection375.Noexceptioncanbemadetothesaidconstitutional
mandateandthesamehastobestrictlyanddiligentlyenforced.Consent
insuchcasesiscompletelyimmaterial,forconsentatsuchayoungageis
difficulttoconceiveandaccept.Itmakesnodifferencewhetherthegirlis
marriedornot.Personallawapplicabletothepartiesisalsoimmaterial.
51.Ifthegirlismorethan16years,andthegirlmakesastatementthat
shewentwithherconsentandthestatementandconsentiswithoutany
force, coercion orundue influence, thestatement could beaccepted and
CourtwillbewithinitspowertoquashtheproceedingsunderSection363
or376,IPC.Hereagainnostraightjacketformulacanbeapplied.The
Courthastobecautious,forthegirlhasrighttogetthemarriagenullified
under Section 3ofthe PCM Act. Attending circumstances including the
maturityandunderstandingofthegirl,socialbackgroundofgirl,ageof
thegirlandboyetc.havetobetakenintoconsideration.
35.
Thus,inmyview,theargumentsofthelearnedcounselappearing
fortheapplicantaccusedthatthePersonalLawwouldprevailoverthe
P.C.M.Act,2006cannotbecountenancedandisrejected.Tothatextent,
thedictumoflawlaiddowninMujamil(supra)isnotagoodlaw.
36.
TheArticle44oftheConstitutionofIndiastates:
Thestateshallendeavourtosecureforthecitizensauniformcivil
codethroughouttheterritoryofIndia.
36.1 No doubt, Article 44 is in the Directive Principles, and not the

FundamentalRightsofourConstitution,butArticle37states:
TheprovisionscontainedinthisPartshallnotbeenforceablein
any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless
fundamentalinthegovernanceofthecountryanditshallbethedutyof
theStatetoapplytheseprinciplesinmakinglaws.
Page 53 of 61
Page 53 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
The Constitution was made in 1950, and 64 years have passed

sinceitwaspromulgated,butArticle44hastillnowbeentotallyignored.
37.
JusticeMarkandeyKatju(asHisLordshipthenwas)inoneofhis
articlesobservedthus:
Itcanbeseen thatmuch ofthe Muslim personallawistotally
outdatedandinhuman,butitisnotallowedtobechangedduetovote
bankpolitics.
IsubmitthatthosewhohavenotallowedchangesintheMuslim
personal law have done a great disservice to Muslim. Retaining the
outdatedpersonallawhascontributedtokeepingMuslimsbackward.
Law has to change with changes in society. To insist that laws
made1500yearsagomustcontinueinthe21st centuryistotallystupid
andunrealistic.
Amongthecommentstomypreviouspost(regardinguniformcivil
code)wasacommentthatiftheMuslimLawwasamendedbyParliament
itwillviolatethefundamentalrightofMuslimstopracticetheirreligion.
To my mind this is a specious argument. The Hindu Law was
drasticallyamendedbyParliamentin1955,butthatdidnotviolatethe
rightofHindustopracticetheirreligion.MoreovermuchofMuslimlaw
hasalreadybeenamendedandauniformlawmadeforall.Forinstance,
theMuslimcriminallawhasbeenreplacedbytheIndianPenalCodeand
CriminalProcedureCodeahundredyearsago.Nowpeoplecannotstonea
persontodeathforadultery,aswaspermittedbyMuslimlaw.Infactit
willamounttomurderundersection302I.P.C.ByabolishingtheMuslim
CriminallawhavetheMuslims inIndiabeendeprivedoftheirrightto
practicetheirreligion?ThelandlawsinruralIndiaarealsocommonto
bothHindusandMuslims,e.g.theU.P.ZamindariAbolitionAct,1951,
andtothatextenttheMuslimlawhasbeenabolished.Hasthatdeniedto
the Muslims the righttopractice their religion? Similarly, ifthere isa
common civilcode Muslims willnot inany waybedenied the right to
practicetheirreligion.
Lawreflectssocialrelationsinasocietyataparticularstageofits
historicaldevelopment. Muslim law, like theold(non statutory) Hindu
law,wasalawmadeinthemiddleagesinfeudalsociety.Obviouslythat
lawisoutdatedinmodernsociety.Forinstance,infeudalsociety,women
were regarded as inferior tomen. Hence the law discriminated against
them.Thus,whileaMuslimmalecanmarryfourwives,aMuslimfemale
Page 54 of 61
Page 54 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
can marry only one husband. A Muslim husband can divorce his wife
withoutgoingtocourtandwithoutgivinganyreason,butaMuslimwife
whowantsadivorcehastofileapetitioninCourt6,andpleadandprove
oneofthegroundsmentionedinsection2oftheDissolutionofMuslim
MarriagesAct,1939. Thatpetitionmaytakeyearstodecide.AMuslim
daughter gets only half what the son inherits. Many more examples of
discriminationagainstwomeninMuslimLawcanbegiven.
The modern age is the age of equality. Monogamy represents
equality between men and women. The Muslim law, being a law of
medievalsociety,istotallyoutdatedinthemodernage,andneedstobe
drasticallyamended.
Inallmoderncountriesthereisonelawforallcommunities.The
Muslimlawwasnotallowedtobeamendedbycertainbigotedpeopleand
forvotebankpolitics,andthisrefusaltomodernizeMuslimlaworenacta
commoncivilcodehascontributedtokeepingMuslimsbackwardinour
country,andhasthusdonegreatharmtoMuslims.
38.
Thelastquestionthatfallsformyconsiderationiswhether the
applicant could be said to have been committed any offence of

kidnappingpunishableunderSections363and366oftheIPCincluding
Section18ofthePOCSOAct.
39.
At the cost of repetition, I may state that the marriage of the
applicantwithNamiraisnotindispute.Thefirstinformantasfatherof
Namiraseemstohaveresignedtothefactthathehaslosthisdaughter.
Thisisthereasonperhapswhyhehasnotthoughtfittoappearbefore
the Court and say something as regards this application filed by the
applicantforquashingoftheF.I.R.Thefatherwoulddefinitelybefeeling
verybadashisfeelingsarehurt.Thefathermusthavetoileddayand
night to take care of his family, more particularly, his two minor
daughters. One day, the father finds that the daughter has left the
Page 55 of 61
Page 55 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
parentalhomeandhasgotmarriedwithamanwhois12yearselderto
her.This,inmyview,isnothing,butthelackofmaturity,understanding
andeducationonthepartofthegirl.Sixteenyearsisnotanagefora
girltogetmarried.Atthisage,probably,agirlwouldnotevenclearher
S.S.C.Exam.Attimes,Ifailtounderstandthathowshewouldbeableto
goaheadinlife.Mostofthetime,unfortunately,thistypeofmarriages
fail,andoneday,thegirlwouldcomebacktoherparents.Bythattime,
it is too late in her life to realize her mistake as it would be very
difficultyfortheparentstogetheragainsettledinlife.
40.
Keepingtheaboveinmind,itcanbesaidthatthosewhohavenot
allowedtochangetheMuslimPersonalLawhavedoneagreatdisservice
tothecommunity.Atthesametime,itisalsotruethatasthesocial
conditionintheNationandthroughouttheworldcontinuestochange,
therealityoflifeis,thatevenwithoutacodeonpersonallawofMuslim
insofarasthemarriageisconcerned,thechildmarriageisgoinginto
oblivion. Education, changing pattern of the family structure, the
structure of the family in the context of reality of the world, and
economicnecessities areontheirownprecipitating thesituation.The
members of the community have realized the evil consequences of
gettingaMuslimgirlmarriedatatenderedageof16or17years.
41.
As observed by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court, noted
Page 56 of 61
Page 56 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
above, that if the girl is more than 16 years, and the girl makes a
statementthatshewentwithherconsentandthestatementandconsent
iswithoutanyforce,coercionorundueinfluence,thestatementcould
be accepted and the Court would be within its power to quash the
proceedingsoftheoffencepunishableunderSections363or376ofthe
I.P.C.
42.
TheSection3oftheP.C.M.Act,2006doesnotmakethemarriage
asvoidmarriage,butmakesitvoidableattheoptionofthecontracting
party being a child at the time of the marriage. However, Section 9
provides forpunishmentforamaleadultabout18yearsofagewho
contractsachildmarriage.Themarriageofaminorchildwouldbevoid
only in the circumstance as explained under Section 12 of the Act.
Section 15 has made the offence under the P.C.M. Act, 2006, both
cognizableandnonbailable.
43.
Section363oftheIndianPenalCodecontemplatestwokindsof
kidnapping(a)kidnapping fromIndia and(b)kidnappingfromlawful

guardianship.Iamnotconcernedwiththeoffenceofkidnappingfrom
India.Section361defineskidnappingfromthelawfulguardianship.It
providesasfollows:Whoevertakesorenticesanyminorundersixteen
yearsofageifamale,orundereighteenyearsofageifafemale,orany
personofunsoundmindoutofthekeepingofthelawfulguardianof
Page 57 of 61
Page 57 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such

guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful
guardianship.Someobservationswouldnotbeoutofplace.Inorderto
comewithinthemischiefofthatsectiontheaccusedmusthaveeither
takenawaytheminorgirlormusthaveenticedtheminorgirloutofthe
keepingofherlawfulguardianwithouttheconsentofsuchguardian.
The two expressions taking andenticing evidently have two different
connotations.Butboththeexpressionscallforsomepositivestephaving
takenbytheaccusedtoremovethegirlfromthelawfulcustodyofher
guardians.NeitheroftheSectionswouldhaveanyapplicationifthegirl
has,ofherown accord,comeoutofthe custodyorcomeoutofthe
keepingofherlawfulguardiansandifitisthereafterthattheaccused
hadgonewithhertosomeplace.Toillustrate,theaccusedmaygoto
the house of the girl and may lift her from her house. He no doubt
commits the act of kidnapping. But if the girl is of the age of
understandingandhasleftherparentalhomeofherownaccordand
meetssomepersonandrequestshimtoaccompanyhertosomeplacefor
hersafety,thepersonaccompanyingthegirlisnotguiltyofkidnapping
her.Theremaybecasesinwhichthegirlmightleavethecustodyofher
guardianandmightinfactgotoathirdpersonandprevailuponhimto
takehertosomedistantplace.Insuchcasesevenifthepersonknew
thatthegirlisaminorgirlandknewthenamesofherparents,stillifhe
Page 58 of 61
Page 58 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
hasnotinitiatedthe girl'scoming outofthe house,merepassive ac

quiescenceonhispartevidencedbyhisaccompanyingthegirltoplaces
would not necessarily spell the offence of kidnapping on his part. It
cannotbesaidinsuchcasesthatitistheaccusedwhohastakenaway
thegirlfromoutofherparents'custody.Ifanyauthorityisnecessaryfor
thispropositionthesameistobefoundinthejudgmentoftheSupreme
CourtinthecaseofS.Varadarajanv.StateofMadras,AIR1965SC942:
(1965(2)Cri.LJ33).Inthatcasethegirlwhohadreachedthestateof
understandinghadcandidlyadmittedthatonthemorningofOctober1st
sheherselftelephonedtotheaccusedtomeetherinhiscaratacertain
place,wentuptothatplaceandfindinghimwaitinginthecargotinto
thatcarofherownaccord.ThisiswhattheSupremeCourtheldfurther
inthatcaseinthiscontextatpage36ofCriLJ;???...
Further,Savitrihasstatedthatshehaddecidedtomarry
theappellant.Thereisnosuggestionthattheappellanttook
hertotheSubRegistrar'sOfficeandgottheagreementof
marriageregisteredthere(thinkingthatthiswassufficient
in law to make them man and wife) by force or
blandishmentsoranythinglikethat.Ontheotherhandthe
evidenceofthegirlleavesnodoubtthattheinsistenceof
marriagecamefromherside.Theappellant,bycomplying
withherwishescanbynostretchofimaginationbesaidto
havetakenherputofthekeepingofherlawfulguardian.
Aftertheregistrationoftheagreementboththeappellant
and Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different
places.ThereisnosuggestioninSavitri'sevidence,who,it
mayhementionedhadattainedtheageofdiscretionand
wasonthevergeofattainingmajoritythatshewasmade
bytheappellanttoaccompanyhimbyadministeringany
threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her
Page 59 of 61
Page 59 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent

withSavitri'sowndesiretohethewifeoftheappellantin
whichthedesireofaccompanyinghimwhereverhewent
was of course implicit. In these circumstances we find
nothingfromwhichaninferencecouldbedrawnthatthe
appellanthadbeenguiltyoftakingawaySavitrioutofthe
keepingofherfather.Shewillinglyaccompaniedhimand
thelawdidnotcastuponhimthedutyoftakingherbackto
herfather'shouseorevenoftellinghernottoaccompany
him.....
44.
Thepositionintheinstantcaseisnotmateriallydifferent.Inthe
instant case, Namira is admitting in so many words that she had

accompaniedtheapplicantonherownfreewillandvolitionandsince
shewasinlovewiththeapplicantandtheapplicantalsolovedher,they
decidedtogetmarried.
45.
In myview nocase is made outtoeven primafacie showthat
Namirahadreceivedapromiseorassuranceoranytemptingofferfrom
theapplicantbyvirtueofwhichshewasforcedtoleaveherparental
home.Thereis,thus,nothingtoevenprimafacieshowtotheCourtthe
thetakingofthegirlbytheaccused,theevidenceabouthisenticing
herawayisequallyabsent.Ifthisisso,thereisnokidnappingofthegirl
andhencethequestionforapplicationofSection363oftheIndianPenal
Codedoesnotarise.
46.
Inviewoftheabove,nocaseismadeoutsofarastheoffence
underSections363and376oftheI.P.C.,includingSection18ofthe
Page 60 of 61
Page 60 of 61
HC-NIC
R/CR.MA/8290/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
POCSO Act, 2012 is concerned. To that extent, the F.I.R. could be

quashedandisherebyorderedtobequashed.However,thepoliceshall
look into the matter from the point of view of the provisions of the
ProhibitionofChildMarriageAct,2006andfileanappropriatereport
beforethetrialCourttoaddtheprovisionsoftheP.C.M.Act,2006inthe
F.I.R. After filing such report, the police shall proceed further in
accordancewithlawandcompletetheinvestigation.Thepolice,while
investigating the F.I.R.shallkeep inmindSections 10and11of the
P.C.M.Act,2006.Inthecourseoftheinvestigation,ifitisfoundoutthat
aparticularpersonhadperformed,conducted,directedorabettedthe
marriage(Nikah)ofNamira,thenaccordingtoSection10,suchperson
wouldbeanaccused.
47.
Withtheabove,thispetitionisdisposedof.
(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.)
chandresh
Page 61 of 61
Page 61 of 61

Prohibition of Child Marriage Act Is A Secular Law and Would Prevail Over Personal Laws of Parties Gujarat HC

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Prohibition of Child Marriage Act Is A Secular Law and Would Prevail Over Personal Laws of Parties Gujarat HC

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

HC-NIC

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to

To be referred to the Reporter or not ?

Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the

Whether this case involves a substantial question of law

Circulate to all Judicial Officers of the State.

YUNUSBHAI USMANBHAI SHAIKH....Applicant(s)

CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Rule.Mr.K.L.Pandya,the learnedAdditional PublicProsecutor

By this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

3.1 The respondent No.2 is a resident of Ahmedabad. He has two

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Mr. Soeb R. Bhoharia, the learned counsel appearing for the

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Mr.Pandya submitted that the consequencesofcommitting the

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

He submitted that considering the above, the decision of this

Courtinthecaseof Mujamil(supra) isnotagoodlaw.Hesubmitted

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Additional Public Prosecutor prays that the First Information Report

having gone through the materials on record, the following three

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

This Court considered the provisions of the Mohammedan Law

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

marry without the consent of her guardian. Even

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

(a) the capacity of any person to act in the following

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Mr. Pandya, is quite right in submitting that in the case of

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

appoint Child Marriage Prevention Officers immediately. It further

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

(b) to collect evidence for the effective prosecution of persons

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

The argument before me and accepted in the case of Mujamil

(supra) is that the prescription of the marriageable age has no

the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that a statute can always

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

The Supreme Court in the case of Radhakishan Laxminarayan

The general rule, as enshrined in the maxims generalia

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

of the solemnization of the child marriage. When the prescribed

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

Created On Thu Sep 24 21:11:40 IST 2015

the nature of writ of mandamus or any other writ, forbearing the