Caple 1

Nuclear Weapons and Irans Security Dilemma

The world should not worry about Iran getting nuclear weapons.
Iranian leaders own desire to survive will prevent them from using
them. A secure Iran will be a less aggressive Iran, and Irans
neighbors and adversaries will benefit. The US and Israel will have
to give up on any ideas they may have about attacking Iran. Irans
leaders will know this. Absent that constant threat, they can
moderate their international behavior. In this way, Irans possession
of nuclear weapons is likely to stabilize the situation, not
destabilize it. For example with Irans security guaranteed by
nuclear weapons, it can focus less on supporting terrorists like
Hezbollah and proxy regimes such as that of Assad in Syria.

Since the World War II era, nuclear proliferation has been a crucial topic of debate in the
realm of international politics. While only two nuclear weapons have ever been employed, they
remain a vital concern in the topic of international security and power. In the quotation, the
author utilizes the realists balance of power theory to communicate the position that the
proliferation of nuclear weapons to Iran will make the world more stable. The author argues that
there is stability in balance of nuclear proliferation and war is more likely to occur as the U.S.
and Israel seek to dominate Iran. However, the authors argument is not compelling, because of
the myriad of negative effects that Iran gaining nuclear weapons could cause. For instance, there
is significant risk in the possibility that Iran could use nuclear weapons for political power and
military dominance. This could trigger a nuclear arms race, leading to a security dilemma in the
Middle East. Furthermore, the argument is not convincing because of the self-interest of states
driven by the zero-sum game, the role that interests and identities play in international politics,
and the mechanism of arms control asserted over nuclear weapons.
The authors argument is inspired by the realist paradigm and is associated with the
balance of power theory and Kenneth Waltzs theory of crisis stability. The balance of power

Caple 2
theory states that stability occurs when there is a relatively even distribution of power between
the most powerful states (the so-called great-powers). While the definition of power is
debatable, most realists argue that relative power is primarily derived from military power whose
source is economic power. The validity of Iran being a great power in the international arena is
in question, which is an essential assumption of the balance of power theory. However, if Iran
gains nuclear weapons, they will consequently gain military power which could be used as
leverage for political power. The balance of power theory claims war will occur when a state
pursues power to amplify its own power or prevent another state from becoming too powerful.
Hence, Iran could initiate war to gain more power. Realists prescribe that governments pursue
increased power and that they be especially sensitive to losses in power (DAnieri 67-69, 72).
Governments in the U.S. and Israel will continue to pursue power and will perceive Irans gain of
nuclear weapons as a loss of power. Therefore, the U.S. and Israel will prevent Iran from
obtaining nuclear weapons causing international instability.
In addition to the balance of power theory, Kenneth Waltzs theorizes that the
proliferation of nuclear weapons will make the world more, rather than less, safe because
nuclear weapons are a means of deterrence, thus nuclear weapons increase stability. However,
there are many assumptions behind Waltzs theory. Primarily, if nuclear weapons lead to
deterrence, one must assume the leaders are rational. Secondly, the theory assumes that leaders
have effective control over their militaries. In addition, it assumes that governments will not be
toppled by radical groupssuch as terrorists or [those] with extreme ideologies that might
motivate use of nuclear weapons and that governments will have the necessary defense
mechanisms to protect their nuclear weapons against theft, terrorism, and corruption (DAnieri
221-222). The author mentions the threat of terrorists in Iran as central actors when referring to

Caple 3
Hezbollah and proxy regimes such as that of Assad in Syria. However, realists view the state
as the main and only actor. The author undermines his realist argument by mentioning a nonstate actor, further undermining the assumption that Iran has a stable government not influenced
by terrorism or corruption.
Furthermore, crisis stability assumes that states have a mutual confidence in a secure
second-strike capability. Consequently, if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, Israel would
find it easier to launch a preemptive attack on Iran to eliminate its nuclear weapons with a first
strike, instead of waiting for Iran to gain enough nuclear weapons to successfully employ a
deterrent strategy. Iran would then face a use em or lose em dilemma which would result in
the spread of nuclear weapons and the temptation to wage preventive war (DAnieri 221-222).
The realist paradigm views the world as a dangerous place where states compete in a selfhelp system. However, when the author states that Irans neighbors and adversaries will benefit
from Iran gaining nuclear powers, this undermines the realist theory because states compete for
military dominance and view international politics as a zero-sum game where only one state can
gain at the expense of another (DAnieri 76). Thus, states will view Irans gain as their loss,
either initiating an arms race in the Middle East or powerful countries, such as the U.S., will take
pre-emptive measures to minimize their potential loss.
In contrast to the balance of power theory, which concentrates on survival and defense,
the realist hegemonic stability theory argues that stability results from unipolarity, in which
one dominant state ensures some degree of order in the system. The hegemonic theory focuses
on security and offense, and reasons that the chances of states going to war increase as the
situation moves toward equality (DAnieri 69-70). While the balance of power theory and the

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hegemonic stability theory both have ample historical evidence, the application of the theories to
Irans procurement of nuclear weapons remains in question. The author predicts security between
Iran, Israel, and the U.S as a result of Iran possessing nuclear weapons because there is balance
in stability. The balance of power theorys greatest historical application was the Cold War which
dominated world politics from 1946 to 1991. However, for almost fifty years, the constant threat
of a nuclear war loomed over the world and spurred a nuclear arms race while the potential threat
of an unimaginable death toll spread worldwide fear. When the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in
1962, tension climaxed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Hostilities were so high at one
point, U.S. President John F. Kennedy estimated the chances of nuclear war at one out of
three (DAnieri 44-45). While the balance in power was evident in the Cold War, the
situation included great danger, high tension, and a nuclear arms race. After World War II, the
U.S. and the Soviet Unions differences, most notably their visions of a postwar Europe, drove
the allied nations into an ideological conflict (WW II: Behind Closed Doors). However, the
political ideological differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, contrast the hostile
religious and cultural relations between Israel and Iran.
Moreover, the authors argument isnt compelling because of the role interests, identities,
and norms play in international politics. Constructivists assert that the identity of a country, and
whether it is perceived as a friend or an enemy, is as important as material considerations
(such as the number of weapons it possesses) in determining whether the country is seen as a
threat or not (DAnieri 95). Since the U.S. and Israel do not view Iran as a friend, these states
will undermine the potential for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons because they perceive Iran as a
threat. The identity of states also plays a major role in how states perceive each other. A
fundamental conflict exists in the shared identities and norms between Iran, Israel and the U.S.

Caple 5
According to the CIAs online World Factbook, seventy-five percent of Israel practices Judaism,
while ninety-eight percent of Iran practices Islam, which produces high levels of religious
disagreement and cultural tension.
A vital component of international politics is managing the security dilemma. This
includes arms control which aims to make war less likely and less destructive through nuclear
non-proliferation. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in 1968, is a
signed agreement that countries without nuclear weapons would refrain from getting them which
provides accountability in order to maintain the status quo. This agreement prevents proliferation
among states that do not want nuclear weapons, but feel threatened that other states are obtaining
them. However, this treaty does not prevent proliferation by states who are not satisfied with the
status quo, such as Iran. Irans insistence on possessing nuclear weapons is explained by the
prospect theory. The theory asserts that how a state perceives its options is influenced by whether
a particular outcome is seen as a gain or a loss. Therefore, states are much more willing to take
risks to avoid loss than to achieve a gain. If Iran perceives itself in a losses frame, it will be
more willing to take excessive risks in order to procure nuclear weapons. The prospect theory
also explains why Iran may refuse to be coerced by larger, more powerful actors. Iran will want
to protect its right to nuclear weapons because small states are highly sensitive to loss and may
be willing to accept higher-than-normal risks of going to war (DAnieri 170-171).
In conclusion, there remains worldwide skepticism, and active prevention, of Iran gaining
nuclear weapons. President Barrack Obama explains that if Iran were to acquire nuclear
weapons, it would threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of Gulf nations, and the
stability of the global economy. It risks triggering a nuclear-arms race in the region, and the
unraveling of the non-proliferation treaty. The stakes of Iran attaining nuclear weapons, the

Caple 6
limits of the authors argument, and the theories of international politics do not provide
compelling evidence that Iran should have access to nuclear power.

Caple 7
Works Cited
D'Anieri, Paul J. International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs. 2nd ed. Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010. Print.
United Sates. Central Intelligence Agency. Middle East: Iran. N.p.: n.p., 13 Nov. 2012. The
World Factbook. Web. 07 Dec. 2012.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Middle East: Israel. N.p.: n.p., 20 Nov. 2012. The
World Factbook. Web. 07 Dec. 2012.
United States. The White House. Office of the Press Secretary.The White House. By President
Barrack Obama. N.p., 25 Sept. 2012. Web. 07 Dec. 2012.
"WW II: Behind Closed Doors." PBS. PBS, n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2012.