Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 2014 Oikeiosis

    Uploaded by

    mikadika
    35 views15 pages
    useful

    Original Title

    2014_Oikeiosis

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document
    useful

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    35 views15 pages

    2014 Oikeiosis

    Uploaded by

    mikadika
    useful

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 15
    295 Jean-Baptiste GounNAT (5) Panétius deux vert vertu —— = — se a — — veri orig vert pratique ected 5 soci gamtboretviguee ordre messre lortuon one aeGevie dans es es ona clini eteegaaea, atce courage temperance Jean-Baptiste GouRINAT CNRS.Centre Léon Robin Unity and the good: Platonists against oixelcous L Introduction ‘A ot has been said about the debt that post-Hellenistic Platonism owes to Aristotle and Stoics, especially in the area of ethics. In this ‘paper, [ want by contrast to focus on an important feature of Peripatetic and Stoies ethics which is conspicuously absent from Platonism: the theory of olzelwais, This absence is relevant to the question of the nity of the virtues because, as [ hope to show, it is explained by debate over how moral value is grounded. For one of the roles that ooixetoois plays for the empiricist schools is to provide the materials from which moral agents are supposed to derive their understanding of ‘what is “good” — indeed the very concept of “good” itself. But Platon- ists have reasons oftheir own to doubt that tis capable of playing such «role. Even were it possible to develop 2 concept of the good through one’s experience of olxeloois, it would, they argue, be a subjective and unstable guide for action. Instead, then, Platonists appeal to the form of the good as grounding for ethical value, But in doing so, they ‘Provide the basis for a doctrine of the unity of the virtues which is quite distinctive: certainly (and deliberetely) unlike the position of the Stoics| ‘and Peripatetics with which it tends to be compared simply because it shares similar language. According to Platonists, the virtues become unified ~ that is, to be precise, inseparable and interntailing’ — {rough their common relationship withthe form of the good. + Inseparable (@x@quato): Alcixous, Didaskalitos 29, 183.15-16. Inter- ‘entailing (AvearohouGetv / inter se connexas): see Alcinous, Didaskalikas 29, 183.3; cf, Anon. In Theaetetum col. AO -x.2; Apuleius, On Plato 2.6, 298 George Bovs-SroNes Il. Olxeteams and the concept of “good” Otxeiwors is offered, most famously by the Stoies, but by other ‘empiricist schools as well, asthe mechanism by which animal impulse is explained?, As soon as they are born, we are told, animals identify With, or have @ sense of “ownership” of, their own constitutions, and this leads them to have pro- (and anti-) atiuudes towards things in the ‘world, namely just those things that promote (or harm) the well-being ‘of these constitutions. ‘As long as the theory relates to the explanation of animal (or, in 2 The other empiticists relevant here ate the Poripatetics (evidence in RAW. Sharples, Peripatetic Philosophy 200 BC to AD 200: An Iuraducton and Callecion of Sources in Translation, Cambridge, 2010, esp. ch. 1S and 17) and Antiochus (ge Cicero, De Fnibus V). In what follows, sal focus mainly on the Stoics since we have the best evidence for them (cf. A.A. Long and DN. Sedley, The Hellenic Philosophers, Cambridge, 1987, section 57). Differences inthe treiment of olxefw between the thee schools are mostly peripheral to my question (ough it wil be weful 10 appeal to the Peripatetic evidence from tine 10 time). Relevant secondary literture on the Stoics includes T. Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiass: Moral Develop- tment andi Social Ineracion tnt Early Stoic Philosophy, Aathas, 1990, ad 'M. Schofield, “Two Stic approaches to uation A. Laks and M. Schofield (et), Justice and Generosity. Studies in Helienstic Social and Political Theory, Cambridge, 1995, p. 191-212. For the Pripatetis, Antiochus, and the relationship of their systems to that of the Stois, sec variously 1, Gérgemanns, “Oiteiasis in Asius Didymus”, in W.W. Fonteabangh (ed, On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Arius Diéymus, Now Brunswick/London, 1983, . 163-89 esp. 166.8 fora eview of earlier dscos- sion); G. Tsou, Aniochus and Peripatetic ihict, dss, Cambridge, 2010 The theory of olxelomis is pointedly absent from the one major empiricist school remaining: Epicureanism. In terms of my question, this could be because Fpicureans are reduetonists about moral vale: for therm, “good” i a synonym fr pleasurable, so there is nothing o be explained in our acquisition ofthe concept. On the exceptional appearance of oinefnng in Hermarchus, see PA. Vander Wacrdt, “Hermarchus and the Epicurean genealogy of Ina Dransacion of he American Phill Asciton, 18 (88. p.87-106, ‘UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIOSIE. 299 ‘general, non-rational) impulse, there is nothing init for Platonists to ‘object to, Indeed, there is plenty of evidence that this is precisely the ‘mechanism for non-rational impulse that they assume, Eudorus of ‘Alexandria associates a theory of obteloars with the non-rational {impulses towards what he calls the dmoveAc’; Taurus uses the Ian- guage of oixeloors to understand impulses directed towards the care and comfort of the body (I7T Gio’ = Aulus Gellius, Artic Nights 125.7), and so, T argue, does Apuleius (On Plaio 2.2: see discussion below), Plutarch’s talk of Love as an “appropriative power for what is beautiful” (BGvayus [.-] olxeumish meds %O naRbY: Amatorius 16, 759) might be relevant here toot. Alcinous does not make a direct appeal to olxel«oxg as an explanation of impulse, but it is presumably not coincidence that he derives the appetitive part ofthe embodied soul ‘from an archetypal “appropriative power” (clnewrxi) S6vajuc: Didaskalikos 25, 178.42, 44)8. Even the anonymous commentator on > Stobscus, Belogce 17 3c, p. 47.1248. follow the general assumption tat Endors ifthe source on which Arius Didymus here relies: f. W. Meller, “Philo von Alexandria ued der Bepian des kaiserzeichon Pltonismus", in K. Fisch (el), Parasia. Studien zur Philosophie Platons und cur Prob lemgeschichre des Platonismus, Frankfurt, 1965,p. 199-218 esp.215-14.1 am Jess clear sbout the extent to which itis appropiate to call Budorus a “Platon- iat: he is consistently refered to as en "Academic" in our evidence, which includes Arius when he introduces him in the ran-up to the present passage (Belogae 1172, p.42.7). Buin tis matter atleast his postion converges with that of self-dfining Patoniss “Gf. Frazier, "Bros, Asts et Aphrodite dans "Erotik, Une reconsidéra- tion de la époate & Pemptidés (ch. 13-18)", in JR. Faeira, L, van de Stoct aud M. do Cu Falho (eds), Philosophy in Society: Virtues ond Values in Plutarch, Leuven/Coimbra, 2008, p. 117-35. Pato, Tinacus 42a is one pos sible proof tox forthe identification sugested here between Love (Ero) and the appetiive pat ofthe soul. Remarkably, Alcinous attributes this “appropriate power” othe souls of the gods es well (178.39-40)— perhaps, as Jon Dillon suggests onthe basis of the suggestion in the Phaedras that rods as wel a men heve mul-patite souls (he Middle Platonists 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, Landon, 1977, 292). But note that this “power” i aot the immediate motor of action (as Plutrch’s 300 George Boys Sox the Theaetenus, who has well-known objections to the use of oleto- ‘ig in ethics, atthe same time makes statements in his own voice that show that he accepts olef«ous as a mechanism for explaining bebav- ‘out’, But this is the point: where Platonists pert company with the Stoics and others is in the further cleim made by the latter that ‘olzetiarg not only explains animal impulse but, in vttue of doing so, constitutes the starting-point for an understanding of ethics’. As Hierocles put it in the opening line of his Exposition of Ethics, “The colvexauc Bias is). Thi i clear from the fact that it only realised as “appetite” after a change subsequent 1 embodiment (urvé xO évomuerte Ofhvar lov wevaBokiy RopPérvouat, wey obxeuorach eg wd émtoun- ‘nudy 0): 178.4344; presumably, then, itis a merely latent capacity in the rods). 1G. Milhaven (Der Auftig der Seele bei Albus, dist, Munich, 1962, . 50) sees characerisically Stoic vocabulary in Aleinous' use of the term oixelog elsewhere, as what is “proper” or “natural” (e.g. a! Didaskalikos 4, 156.18-9, where the term diAA6v@10s appears as well). But this may be mislead ing itaken wo be further gesture wards the theory of olzetens. Although it is true thatthe tem is used by Alcinous to characterise tires for which we sive, its never used to explain noo-rational impulse, let alone to suggest any lnk or continuity between rational jadgemeats and non-ational dives. ‘For the criticism, see further below. The positive claim ke makes is that there isa difference between olteliois 0 the sense of seltidentifcaion or ‘ownership one fels towards, i the fst place, one's constuion (he call this olxeloars xndenovext): col. vii. 28), and the consequent oixelaois onc feels ‘towards those things that will promote its well-being (olneimors algerixh: col. vii.32). Cf. on this M. Bonazzi, “The commentary es po‘emical tool: The snonymous commentator on the’ Theaeietus agsinst the Stoics", Laval théologique et philosophique, 64 (2008), p. 597-605, ap. 59.9. 7 The notable exception is Philo of Alexandria; he places the notion of ‘olvelas atthe heart of his this. But he does so by an act of redefinition ‘which can be mest cleerly understood inthe light of whet I shall argu isthe ‘anti-empiricist tine of thought that this paper traces in (otber) Platonists. As we shall see, they say that olze oe is restricted to the impulsesaf the body, and contrast his wit an inpolse to ethical val which i fouud ia ssiiation to 0d. Philo, onthe oter hand, says that obzsaig in is true form i identical with “assinilation to god", and contrasts it with a degenerate form of ‘UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIQ2I: 301 best starting point for an exposition of ethics is an account of the pri- ‘mary appropriate thing (olxeiov) for an animal.” Balbus begins his account of Stoic ethics in Cicero's De Finibus (at I 16) with the same thought, and it might be possible to infer that it is how Crysippus began his own work On Ends as well (a similar formula is quoted from book I of that work at Diogenes Latitius VII 85)°, And it is the ‘emphatic priority of the topic in Stoic ethics, not only its distinctive vocabulary, that makes its exclusion from Platonist ethics so striking. Evidently, it played a role for the Stoics in linking thought about human morality with an analysis of non-rational impulse which Platonists consciously wanted to avoid. Its, to start with at least, easy enough to see wihy the Stoies might have thought that obvelno1c could be extended from the explanation of non-rational impulse to a theory of ethics. Presumably they understood the choices made by mature ethical beings as a kind of refinement of the pro-atttudes which motivate the snimal or the child. As they putt: reason “supervenes as the craftsman of impulse” (Diogenes Laértius ‘VIL 86), But what we seck as rational adults is still intimately tied to ‘our view of what we are (namely, now, as it happens, rational). To this extent, oixelaac remains the natural framework for thinking about ‘human behaviour. If there were nothing else to it, it would still be difficult to see why Platonists would resile from the theory in the way that they do. But as cobxelooig which is directed towards the body. So in fact he is in substantial agreement with the majority of Platonists (end in polemical contrast to the Sto- ‘cs, viz. in contrasting the impulse tothe good with that towards one's physi- ‘cal nature. He differs only in the way that he remodels the language of ‘obxsiqons forthe ethical impulse rather than leaving it withthe body. CF. eg. De Posteritate 12.2-T; 1354-6; 157.1-4; and De Gigantibus 29.12 forthe idea that olxetwou; towards the body isa sinful perversion. * CF. also Piso in his accoant of Antiochean ethics (Cicero, De Finibus ¥ 23-28): hine capiamus exoraium. Plutarch also remarks on the pervasive appeal to olxelaats by Chrysippus: *in every book of physics, by God, and ethics” (Stoic Se Contradictions 12, 1038B). 302 George Bovs-Sroxes the Stoics themselves realised, there was another, more difficult, job to be done as well. For not only do we seek different things when we become rational creatures, we seek them under a particular description. ‘Unlike animals and csildren, the end-directed choices made by rational creatures are made with a view to what is “good”. Indeed, their being ‘made with a view to what is good is what brings them into the sphere of ethics - and defines us (mature human beings) as ethical agents. And the Stoics seem to have appealed to oixefworg in this context as well ‘The reason for the appeal is thatthe Stoics believed that ell concepts imustbe based on einpisical experience; but obtetnats is the only mech- anism by which we have had any experience of end-directed attitudes (pro- or anti) at all. So it is a natural conclusion for them that ‘olxeloo.s must have some role to play in an account of our develop- ‘ment of the concept of the “good”. In short: the study of animal impulse ‘underpins the study of human ethics because a person's concept of the ‘good is extruded trom their experience of pro-attitudes which ‘olneloons explains®. Here, of course is where Platonists have their grounds for objec- tion. Platonists, as it happens, deny in general that empiricism of whatever sort provides an adequate explanation for how concepts are formed. They argue, for example, thet the infinite diversity of experience that we are presented makes it impossible that we should form well-grounded concepts which accurately and objectively represent the structure ofthe natural world! But they are especially $ For the question raised by the Stoicsthemssives of how we acquire a concept ofthe “good”, see in general M. rede, “Oa the Stic conception of the good”, in K lerodickonou (ed), Topics in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford, 1999, p. 71-94; and B. Inwood, “Geting to goodness, in his Reading Seneca. Stoic PPhilasophy at Rome, Oxford, 2005, p. 271-301 10 Cy, discussion in LP. Schrenk, “A Middle Platonic reading of Plato's theory of recollection”, Ancient Philosophy, 11 (1991), p. 103-10 (though Seivenk assumes tha he Patniss have ony Aristotle in view); also my own. “Alehious, Didaskalitos 4: In defence of dogmatism”, in M. Benazzi snd YV. Cellupica (ed), Lreditaplotonica. Seu sul platnismo da Arcesilao a ‘Proclo, Napoli, 2005, . 201-34, esp. 216-22. UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIGETE 303 scathing about the possibility of an empirically-based concept of ‘good’. This is how Numenius put it in his lost work On the Good (ff. 2.17 des Places) ‘We can apprehend bodies by induction from similar things an from te distinctive marks shee by things tat ae jutapone, But thre i no way ofapprebending the pod from something juxtaposed witht a from some perceptible thing that is similar to i (Le ev ov cxouure: hae hyiv Eto envaivonevors fe te uolow dd ve sav #y tolg sagaxeyivois pogiandci Evove0 TeyOOOY BF observes dx angaxeydvou obd€ od dud Solo aloBrwo dow )aetv.) Another approech is needed. Imagine someone sitting at the top of lokout: be catches quick glimpee of x small fishing boat = ‘one of those light skiffs, alone, in solitude, caught between waves — fd be recognises it. So must one retreat far fom the objets of per ‘ception fo joi alone wit the good which lone. ‘The Stoics could give an answer of sorts to Numenius’ immediate point: they think that all qualities are corporeal and therefore percepti- ble. This includes the virtues ~ and it is in terms of virtue that the Stoics define the “good”. Bu: they have another difficult of their own, which effectively commits them nonetheless to the position that the virtues are never perceived: forthe Stoics notoriously think that virta- ‘ous people ate vanishingly rare. Itis almost certain, for example, that ‘no human being alive has ever witnessed so much as a single instance of human virtue, and so @ single instance of human goodness, let alone ‘enough cases to underpin the formation of a concept. Since goodness is not a quality reducible to any other (for example to a property which 1 Bg. SVP IL 587: “The good is virtue, or what partakes in vstue”; of Fpictets, Distertariones It 19.13; and slightly more expansive discussions st Diogenes Leértius VII 94 (= SVF II 76) and Sextus Empiricus, Adversu Mathematicos TX 25-27. Chrysippus is quoted as saying in so many words thatthe vires are perceptible (Ptarch, Stoic Self Contradictions 19, 142E-F, from Chip” On te End Yook 1: of ako the dansion at Sncen, ers 304 George Bovs-Stoxes, ‘we do regularly encounter, such as the congenial or the useful)", direct ‘experience is altogether ruled out as the means by which human beings regularly form a concept of the good’. ‘Luckily, however, there is another possibility. For concepts do not have to be the immediate products of direct experience: their range is ‘expanded by second-order operations we perform on concepts that are s0 acquired: as for example when we acquire the concept of & ‘centaur by combining concepts acquired by experience of horses and men (namely the concepts “horse” and “‘man”). In the case of the ‘200d, the Stoics tell us that we acquite it by analogy (Cicero, De Finibus W133): Concepts arse in the soul, when we grasp something by experience of it, or by combination, or similarity, or analogy (collatione rationis) ‘This fourth operation, the last in my lst, gave us the concept of “good”. When the soul ascends by analogy from those things which are according to nature, it arrives atthe concept of good. ‘This slightly compressed explanation builds, as it happens, on something that Cicero had already told us, in the course of deseribing the development of impulse inthe human being (De Finibus MU 21): ‘A man’s sense of appropriations frst ofall to those things which are according to nature. But as soon as he acquires intelligence ~ or, rather, concepts: what they call Bvvouat ~ he sees the order in the things he "8 ee Cicero, De Fiibus TL 34: hoe autem ipsum Bonu non accessione neque crescendo at cum ceteris comparando, sed propia vi sua et sentinus et appellars borum. * i texts late enough for it to be possible that they could beve the Paton ist theory of recollection in mind, this point is tured to satirical advantage in pointed reaarks about the “good” not being the sort of thing one might bump Into. Se for example Seneca, Letrs 1204 (-Certain people wh say that we happen upon the concept something that is impossibie: to bump into the form ofa virwe ty chance!) of Alexander, Mantssa 18, 152-27-29 (cig yevo- évous &bivarov 200 ddr dryabot dredaryty Toye), * Coneliaria, Cicero's tanslation of olacivas. UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIQ2D: 303 has to do, and (soto speak) the harmony, and be values this much more ‘than all those things whicl he formerly cared for. And on the basis of ‘thought snd reflection he draws inferences in such a way that that supreme good for human being, which is praised and sought for itself, gets to be fimnly established in him, So the idea seems to be that, as we acquire rationality, we reflect on ‘what itis that atracts us to those things towards which we experience olwetavi, and understand that it has to do with the fact that they pre- serve and promote our own natures, that is as human beings. But this is ‘where analogy comes into play: from the concept of what promotes ‘our own natures. we can infer to ¢ new concept (2) of what promotes nature in general: (AL) primary objects of impulse : human nature : : x > nature as, a whole. ‘The quality, x, to which this aew concepts corresponds ~ call it “good” ~ will be absolutely desirsble, both in the sense that itis not desirable only relative to some paricular individual or set of individu- als (es for example the primary objects of human impulse ae desirable only relative to human beings), butalso in the sense that itis the source of all value. (The primary objects of human impulse are understood to be desirable insofar as they are natural, and only derivatively insofar as they are human.) As the ultimate end, then, “conformity to nature” is whet we call virtue, or the “good”, One thing to note about the argument as we find it in Cicero is that it seems to rely heavily on the idea that we will, as we become rational, recognise that olxetaoic orients us towards “things in accordance with nature”. Not everyone agrees that this isthe ease, however. Many Peri- patetics, for example, think that ou: primary impulse is towards pleas- 1 Cf. T. Engberg Pedersen, op. c., ch. IV, with which my reading of Cicero, De Findus 121 coincides at kat insofar as it argues tha an “objec- tive” point of view in ethics is derived from subjective experience. 306 George Boys-Srowss ure (as the “apparent good”). The analogy they appeal to therefore takes a different form (ap. Stobaeus, Eclogae 117.13, p. 1242-13)" For ifthe health ofthe body is chosen for itself, so much more is the health of the soul. But the health ofthe sou! is temperance, which frees 1s from the violence of the pussions. And if bodily strength is « good thing, so rouch more is peychological strength chosen for itself and. good, But the strength of the soul is courage and endurance, which ‘make souls robust. So courage and endurance would be chosen for themselves. By analogy, if bodily beauty s chosen for itself, x0 100 is beauty ofthe soul chosen for itself. But the beauty of the soul is jus- tice, which makes us "beautiful and never uajust”. In other words: (A2) health / strength / beauty : body ::.2/b /.¢: soul where a,b, and c are the new concepts to which we apply the names “temperance”, “‘courage”, and “justice”, respectively. Or in general (one can presumably infer): (A2), physical excellence : body :: x: soul where xis virtue, as before. ‘As it happens, the Peripatetic version of the analogy, A2, has an advantage over A1 which the Stoics themselves may have come to see. For even assuming thet the Stoies are right that otve(oic is in the frst place to one’s “nature”, it does not, of course, follow that the subject of '6 This analogy would be the more readily available to the Peripatetics insofar as they recognise, as B. Inwood has argued, a greater distinction between soul and body (such that, for example, ethical development might involve reorienting oixeliwats from the Tater to the forme): see “Hierocles: ‘Theory and argument in the second century AD”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2(1984),p. 151-83, a p. 176-7 (and f- his “Getting to goodness", art. cit, for the “Plaionising” tone of Seneca, Leer 120 where, as I shall shortly shew, Senoca adopts this analogy). UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIOSIS 307 the experience will recognise the fact 2s rationality dawns”, Indeed, the ‘existence of debate over the proper abject of olvefaxaic shows both sides of the argument that rational introspection cannot be relied on to get this ‘question right. (The point, of course, is that merely to think that i is, for ‘example, pleasure towards which your impulses had been directed is enough to stall the analogy set out as A1, whatever the truth of the mat- ter) This may be why itis that it isthe “Peripatetic” approach (A2) that Seneca, atleast, ends up adopting (Letters 120.5; cf. 106. ‘What tis “analogy” i, shall say. We knew the health of the body: from this we reasoned that there i also a “health” of te soul, We knew the strength of the body: from this we inferred that there is also robust- ness of soul But A2 in its turn has a weakness, at least when considered as a psychological mechanism for generating the new concept: why should ‘we think that there is anything at al that stands in relation to the soul as healt, strength, and beauty do to the body? This question does not arise in A1, because the crucial terms on Which Al relies ("good” and “natural-for-me”) stand in a relationship which is explanatory as well 1s analogical. The “good” accounts for the value of what is “natural- for-me”, and one can see why someone who has experienced the latter ‘might go searching for the former. But there does not seers to be any- thing about our experience of bodily health, strength, and beauty ‘hich could explain why someone might find it necessary to posit psy- chological analogues. (And not just someone, in fact, but everyone.) Seneca, then, develops an additional line of thought which comple- ments the analogy properly speaking, and is presumably meant to act as a sort of psychological catalyst for it: 1 CF.G. Suiker’s concern thatthe Stoic argument "bogs the question by simply assuming that accordance with nature isthe standard” for anman good: “The role of eikeisis in Stocs ethics", Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 1.(1983), p 145-67, atp. 158 (emphasis orginal). 1 This passage is not clearly marked 2s a new line of thought (it follows 308 George Boys-ST0NES Kind sots have sometimes stunned us, and humane sets and acts of endurance, We started to admire them as if they were perfect. Tuere ‘were many vices underpinning them, but they were hidden by the sur- face sheen of the conspicuous action: we overlooked them... ‘The idea seems to be that quite apart from the empirical experience cof ousselves which underpins AL, we have empirical experience of other people which makes us think that there is something there to be ‘explained. To be sure, we do not sce virtuous action (for the reasons ‘oullined above). But we do see people behaving in ways which seem to ptivilege the integrity of the mind over that of the body — and what is ‘more, we find ourselves admiring them. Seneca’s examples include Fabricius, who could not be bribed by any amount of money (120.6), and Horatius Cocles, who endangered himself to save his country (120-7). Examples like this, Isuggest, are meant to act asthe trigger for us to make the analogical move from our experiences of physical well- being to concepts of psychological excellences the trigger, and the ‘occasion for further reflection on the content of those concepts” jmmediately onthe last that I quoted), and Inwood for one sees the appeal to ‘examples a8 part of the analogy itself, This leas him to construe the whole as follows: as bodily sirength helps us with the notion of mental strength, 50 ‘observation of admirable deeds helps generate the notion of complete virtue (Getting to goodness”, art cit, p. 285). But this cannot be right for one very simple reaton, which is that it looks tothe analogy for help in understanding the means by wihich we might each a concept ofthe good (namely by looking to admirable deeds, and then... what, exactly?), But the whole point was ‘always supposed to be tbat the analogy is itself the means, The parallel at Lei- ters 1065 is further support for the idea thatthe analogy between the virtues of Dody and soul is meant to be self-contained — the observation of admirable ‘deeds in others being 2 strictly complementary line of thought. 9 Since the question raised inthis leter is not just about the concept of ‘200d, but the concept ofthe honourable (uahov, honestim) as wel, there isan alternative way of understanding the relationship between the original analogy ‘rom body to soul) and the examples of praiseworthy conduct that follow. It ‘could be that, while the analogy isthe basis for our concept ofthe good, reflec- tion on the acts that we admire and praise (obstupefecerant (..J mirar [.] UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIODIZ 309 UL. Assimilation to god [By means such as these, then, the Stoics and others aimed to build the framework for our thinking as ethical agents from the material pro- vided by olxetooic. Needless to say, however, Platonists were still not impressed. Even if they conceded tothe empiriistsa successful mech- anism for concept-formation, and even if they conceded that it could bbe used to generate some concept of the good ~ they sill have one objection, and it is essentially the objection we find in a famous pas- sage of the anonymous Theacterus commentary (col. v.18-42): We feel oixelons to those similar 10 us: he [Socrates] feels more ‘olxelaorg to his own citizens. For olnetics is more and less intense. If those who introduce justice from olwetaxnc” say that one has en ‘audand) strictly concems the basis of our concept af the “honourable”. (That the honourable and the good are different, albeit inseparable, qualities, is soured at 120.1.) 2° Ts sometimes assumed that Anon. has the Stoics in mind, and indeed the Stoics are the explicit object of attack in the course ofthe discussion (cal. ‘vi20 - vill), But the Stoics only come in here as part of an embedded argu- ment taken “from the Academy”, which attacks them on the question of ‘whether justice is compatible with an ethics premised on unequal olslavang — ‘not whether jastice is to be derived from obvetaons. In fact, our evidence for the Stoics on this question is inconsistent (pace e.g. M. Schofield, art. cit, 1p-193;G. Striker, art cit. 146 with n, 5). There are texts that make olxeloots {he principle of justice in so many words: e.g. Plutarch, De Sollerta Anima: {ium 4, 9624. But a number which ae often alleged to do 0 infact say some- thing ese. (The present passage is a casein point; another locus classicus, Pot- hyry, De Abstinentia Il 19 = SVF 1 197, does indeed credit Zeno with the idea that olxe(sors is the principle of justice, but only in the sense that a capacity for obueiwons defines membership of the moral community, notin the sense thatt leads its possessor tothe virtue of justice; Cicero, De Finibus M1 62-68 talks about community and philanthropia, not justice as suck; &c.) Most of our evidence says that the Stoics derived justice from wissom: cf. esp. Cicero, De Finibus IH 23-25; Plutarch, Stoic Contradictions 7, 1034D; Seneca, Letiers 121.14. may be, of course, that there were diferent views onthe issue within 310 George Bovs-S10NE cequil sense of olxeiqoug towards oneself and the farthest Mysiaa, thes thesis preserves justice: but itis not agreed that iis equal, fortis Js contrary to what is obvious and to co-perception (cuvaio®noW). For olzelavoug towards oneself is natural and aoa-rational while that ‘towards one’s neighbours i also natural, but net non-rational... In shor: olxeloois is not capable of underwriting a well-founded sense of objective valve. (it cannot do this for justice, chen a fortiori it cannot do it for virtue in general, or for the “good”.) “And this,” he ‘goes on to say, “is why Plato did not introduce justice from oael@os, ‘ut from ‘assimilation to god! (polars eG), a8 we shall show" (col viil4-20). tis true, of course, that advocates of olvelaois as the basis for ethics can argue that one comes to identify the well-being of others as part of one’s own well-being. Even animals view their own offspring in this light: and human beings regularly exind their sense of olxelqorg much more widely to encompass more remote members of {amily and community. This extension of olxeleans presumably goes hand in hand with one's self-discovery as a rational being: a being, that is, capable of appreciating the wider and ulkimately the cosmic context of one’s actions. Indeed, the Stoics may have thought that there is nothing to stop oleiwas extending to the point where it embraces the ‘entire community of rational beings. A famous fragment of Hierocles (ap. Stobaeus, Florilegium IV 27.23) recommencs that we aim for just this, and I suspect that it is what is inthe minds af those philosophers who “derived justice from olvelinig’. If such an ideal could be the Stos. In any case, there were otber philosophers who certinly did derive Justice from olxekoorg, and whom Anon. might have had in mind as well or instead: notably Antiochus of Ascalon (see Cicero, De Finibus V 65-66). See also discussion at G, Bastianini and D.N. Sedley, “Commentarium in Platonis. ‘Theacietam”, Corpus dei Papiri Filasofici Greci e Latint ii, Firenze, 1995, p. 227-562, atp. 492. 21 For Perpetetics, of. Stobsews, Kclogae 117.13,p. 119.22 - 120:3; for the ‘Stoies,esp-Chrysippus cited st Plutarch, Stoic Sel-Contradictions 12, 10388. 2 Gf A.A. Long and DN. Sedley, op. city I, p. 353 (though they saggest UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIQEIS 311 achieved, if one’s every decision could be based on a sense of self- ‘concem that coincides exactly with concern for the cosmos, then the worries about subjectivity would clearly disappear®®. Anon. in fact concedes just this. But, as he says, such an ideal is simply not possible: it is absurd to think that I can identify with "the farthest Mysian” and act in such a way that takes equitable stock of their needs. ‘There is another trace of this objection to be found, I think, ina passage of Apuleius’ On Plato (2.2 (221-2]), where he tackles the ‘meaning of “good”: ‘The fire good is that which is rue and divine, best and lovable and sirable, whose beauty rational minds seek, impelled as a matter of ‘ature towards its heat, And because not all can attain it, or have the ability to stain the first good, they are borne towards that which is of ‘men, which is second (good) nat coramon to many nor the same 10 all" For the appetite and dosir to do something is aroused either by the tuve good or by that which seems good. + unde natura duce cognatio ‘quaedam est cum bonis ei anime partionis quae curation’ consent. It is clear that the drive we have towards the “true good” is, as it is in Alcinous too, one which is fulfilled within the context of assimila- tion to god ~ that is to say, assimilation to god is desirable for us pre~ cisely insofar as it is the stato in which we achieve contemplation of the good. But what is the second drive, the one to the “seeming thatthe idea of an equal sense of obetnag towards others and oneself was not ended byte Siok); B nvod, iro, Teor and rumen a. cit, p. 181-2. cy. Bpictes, Distertaiones 1911-15: although we at for ourselves, ‘we ceaot achieve our own good without achieving the common good, 2 follow 1. Beaujeu here (the editor ofthe 1973 Budé tex), reading ad id feruntur quod hominum est, secundum nec commune multis est nec {auod) omnibus smilter bon. C. Moreschini in the latest ext he Teubner of 1991) read. ad id feruntur quod haminur est. ecunduon nec commune Imes ex nec [quod] omnibus silter bom. See esp Didashaltos 27, 179.39-42 (xd weveorfuécegov dy006y(.] 312 George Bovs-SroNes good” which is “of men”? Although the lat lin inthis passage is evi- denily corrupt (which is why I left it untranslated), and although this is something that has been badly obscured by two centuries of editorial intervention®, the text as transmitted is pregnant with the language of olnetooig. We have nature (natura) and kinship (cognatio), and the {dea of care (cura | curario}". Given this, it may not be too fanciful to think that the verb, con-sentio, is meant here as a calque on ovy- ‘auoDévonat - a term which refers to the way in which animals per- ceive the world in relation to themselves, something which is of central ‘importance to the mechanics of olxeiwous*. So it would be possible to imagine that something like the following ley behind the text that we have (a reading which has the additional advantage of expressing a ‘meaningful inference from the claim that we are also attracted to the ‘goods of the body): tsiBero dv xh émarfyn xa Oeigig v08 apcirov dyaBob, 5x2e Beby te xa ‘vodw Toy mO@TOV MOTAyOge%CoL dv Uc). The following chapter infers that ssinlation to god is our “end” from this consideration (olgxtzow duGhouBov ‘80g #€Bet0 Spotnow Bed nares 18 duvatby: 28, 181.19-20). 1 All editors known to me have followed Oudenomp to read something like: unde natura duce cognatio quaedam est cwn bonis ei animae portion, (quae cum ratione consentit Fence there is by nature some relationship with {foods in that part of the soul that agrees with reason”). Bu this reconstruction fs as problematic in sense asthe tradition isin language. What i “het part of the soul Which agrees with reason”, for example? And how docs any of this follow from what went before (ef nde)? 2 Gf. eg, Seneca, Leters 121.17: si omnia propter curam mei facto, ante ona est mei czas 2 CF. esp. Hiccocles, Ethical Principles col. i.55 -i13 with B. Inwood, “Hlicroclee: Theory and argument”, art. cit, and my own “Physiognoaxy in ancient philosophy”, in S. Swain otal Seeing the Face, Seeing the Sox!, (Oxford, 2007, p. 19.124, ap. 845. (Note too the presence of the word at ‘Anon. In Theaetetum col v. 36 as quoted above). The word has no established [atin translation: oddly enough, Latin authors have a tendency to tread round the concept altogether, But for what it is wort, I note that Robert Grossetest= chose consencientes to calgue owaiaBavouevor at Anstotle, Nicomachear Ethics 11704 (Iranslatio incolniensis) UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIOQNE 313 unde natura duce cognatio quaedam est cum bonis ei animae portioni uae curam sui consents. Heenoe there is, as ¢ matter of nature, a certain afinity towards “goods” in that part ofthe soal which co-perceives the care of the self In this case, Apuleius would be saying that we experience a drive towards the so-called goods of the body in virtue of being able to see those things as suited for our care. This drive, in other words, toms (specifically the kind that Anon. calls aigenxt}: cf. n. 6 ve) this is right, then Apuleius is making a very interesting claim. He is claiming that olueloois works as an end- Platonists find other ways to tak about the sort of “Justice” that can be ‘exercised by someane who is not yet a sage. See Apuleius, On Plato 2.7 (229) ‘with P. Dozini, “La giustizia nel medioplatonismo, in Aspasio cin Apulcio”, in 1M, Vegetti and M. Abbate(ed.),La “Repubblica” di Plarone nella tradicione antica, Napoli, 1999, p. 131-50. (Note that the ‘good natural traits’, eiuias, ‘meationed at Alcinous, Didaskalikos 1, 152.24, are something else again: not ‘types of virtue, but merely homonyms of the virtues.) 3 There isan excellent discussion of this point in J.G. Milhaven, op. cit, ch. 1; see also now DN. Sedley. “The Theoretikos Bios in Aleinous", in ‘T_Bénatouil and M.Bonaz2i (ed), Theoria, Praxis and che Contemplative Life after Arisiotte and Plato, Leidea/Boston, 2012, p. 163-81; and M. Bonazzi himself, in the same volume, arguing the point for Plutarch (“Theoria snd Praxis: On Platerch’s Platonism”, at p. 139-61). For a muanced scoount of PPotinus, and the rather different way in which he relates our ongoing practical ‘activity to the contemplative life, see B. Collette-Datié, “Sommeil, éveil et attention chez Plotin”, Xdhoa: Revue d’éuudes anciennes et médiévales, 9-10 (2011-2012), p. 259-81. 318 George Boys Stones affairs no more than necessary (Didaskalios 2, 152:30-153.15); but this in only to say that we should not look to the realm of practical affairs for the source of ethical value, or as something which is choice- ‘worthy in its own right. He also says that we should turn to practical affairs when we are needed: philosophers should undertake military ‘and jury service; and they are obviously expected to keep an eye on the political health of their state, because they ough to step in when the affairs of government are being handled badly by others (Didaskalikos 2, 153.15-20). Nor is this understood as a regrettable distrection from ‘contemplative activity: Alciaous seems clear that action within the politcal sphere is consistent with contemplative activity (2, 153.21-24): rates di fx xv clomutvow 10 orhoabo nbauis wis Sewplas Gechelecodon, GON di ran rose na aDEAY, ds ExSuerOY Béexal ei cov mpaxndy xogety Blov. From what has been said, the philosopher ought never to leave off con- texplation, but always nurture and increase it and only parsve the practical life as well, as a secondary consideration Indeed, it looks as if the fruits of contemplation are what enable the philosopher to act well within the political sphere: note, anyway, the ‘assumption that the philosopher would be capable of such action. And {in fac, this is not surprising, given that god himself, that is, the god to ‘whom we are supposed to become assiznilated (28), is not alienated, or in flight, from the world, though he is involved in contemplation. Indeed, be is engaged with the world precisely insofar as he is a con- templator (14, 169.35-41). % Apuleius makes much te same point see On Plato 2.28 (252-3) with 4. Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New, Ktnce/London, 1999, 9: of. aso Diogenes Laériv II 78; and e.g. Plutarch, On the Generation ofthe Soul 26, 1025E fr the soul being, oft essence, “atthe same same practical ad con- template”. For the identification ofthis “celestial” god withthe werld soul ia ‘Aleinous seo JH. Loenen,“Albious' metaphysics. An atempt at rehabilitation”, ‘Mnemosyne, 9 (1956), 9.296319; contra eC. Moreschin,“Lesegesi del UNITY AND THR GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKFIQD2: 319 ‘Alcinous, in other words, does not see a tension between the politi- cal and the contemplative lives. He rather see a subordination of the (one tothe other. Someone who only seeks ethical value inthe political sphere is in trouble — precisely, in fact, and for the very same reason, as the empiricists who ground their ethics on olxelwog are in trouble. But someone who pursues a contemplative life and finds value in the divine realm is able to apply it in everyday life as well”, V. Conclusion AAs ever with Platonism, there is a lot of convergence in language and thought with the systems of their predecessors. But this is not tobe viewed either a8 a lack of originality ot as an attempt to minimise diversity. It is part ofa systematic strategy to show that the immediate successors of Plato were right where they followed in his tracks, and

    You might also like