Ethnicity the Permanent Instrument of Violence in Democratic Nigeria

The Resurgence of Indigene-Settler Politics in Central Nigeria

Introduction
The transition of Nigeria from military dictatorship to multiparty rule in the late 1990s was
greeted with high expectations of radical and rapid economic changes based on a firm and
collective national identity. However, multiparty democracy reinforced ethnic sentiments,
fertilized ethnic loyalties and further created a massive political consciousness1 along ethnic
lines. Consequently, ethnicity entrenched a commanding presence with a mobilizing
ideology in central Nigeria, manipulated by the political elites to the detriment of regional
and national development .2 The essay intends to examine how colonial and military
regimes along with multiparty democracy have directed the course of ethnic identity
formations and manipulations. It covers three aspects; first, it concentrates on the
theoretical concept of ethnicity, providing arguments about its primordial, constructed and
instrumental nature. Second, it provides an analysis of how the policies of colonial and
military rule helped construct and entrench ethnicity into the Nigerian state. Third, it
examines the resurgence of the indigene - settler ideology as exemplifying the
transformation of ethnicity into a powerful political instrument, manipulated both by
indigenes and settlers in central Nigeria.
Ethnicity as Primordial, Constructed and Instrumental
The concept of ethnicity is widely seen as a group perception of common origin, historical
memories, traditional ties and aspirations.3 In this sense, ethnic nationalists maintain that
an individuals deepest attachments are inherited not chosen. 4 The essay therefore
examines ethnicity as primordial, constructed and instrumental.
The primoridialists present ethnicity on the assumption that primitive or tribal
societies were natural human communities based on intimate association with ones own
kind; who shared the same origin and ancestry and adhered to the same body of beliefs

Mazrui, Ali A. 1997. Soldiers as Traditionalizers: Military Rule and the Re-Africanization of Africa. In
Journal of Asian and African Studies, 12 (4):248.
2 Ronald R. Atkinson, 1999. The (Re)Construction of Ethnicity in Africa: Extending the Chronology,
Conceptualization and Discourse, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa, Constructivists Reflections and Contemporary Politics,
edited by Paris Yeros, New York: Palgrave, p. 15.
3 Naomi Chazan et al, 1999 (3 rd edition), Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Inc., p. 109.
4 Ignatieff M., 1993, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, London: BCC Books and Chatto &
Windus, p. 7.
1

and values.5 The natural primoridialists represented by Edward Shils and Van De Berghe
claim that ethnicity is a primordial sentiment that leads to the search for a natural,
genetically based origin of ethnic group sentiments, because group identity defines
personal identity and ethnic attachments are a natural kind of group affiliation with
ineffable significance rooted in blood ties.6 On the other hand, the historical primoridialists
represented by Clifford Geertz define ethnicity as primordial not because ethnicity is a
natural, biologically based identity but because ethnicity is a historically important cultural
identity.7 The reason being that, ethnic bonds become politically significant when former
autonomous, prestate societies are forced to reorganize into state-level social systems.8 The
primordial character of ethnicity is defined by certain elements such as similarities of sociocultural practices, unsystematic internal migration, community living, lack of visible
political institutions, leadership based on college of elders and land ownership by usage
not freehold.9 Critics such as Richard Thompson observe that the primordial position on
ethnicity dwells so much on the fundamental nature of ethnic sentiments without giving
explanations why that should be the case and if the primordial nature of ethnicity was
unchangeable, how do we reconcile the fact that ethnic sentiments change due to sociopolitical circumstances?10
The constructivists on the other hand argue that ethnicity is not primordial. Rather
it is the by-product of modern political and economic advancement created by either
external or local forces. They are of the opinion that words like tribe, ethnicity etc, were
invented by Europeans to distinguish between different Africans with whom they came in
contact. It was a struggle to make sense out of the very complex and enormous diversity
of the African peoples. They could not administer a colony without the classification of its
subjects.11 Crawford Young describes how Belgian officials first made use of the term
Ngala in order to distinguish the people dwelling alongside the Zaire River and later
extended to include urban migrants from riverine areas in Kinshasa.12 Thus, ethnicity
becomes a kind of a phenomenon introduced from without. Abner Cohen concludes that
African ethnicity is not an archaic survival arrangement carried over into the present by

Richard H. Thompson, 1989, Theories of Ethnicity, A critical Appraisal, London: Greenwood Press, p. 49.
H. Thompson, 1989:56.
7 Ibid: 53.
8 Ibid: 61.
9 Collins and Burns, 2007:130.
10 H. Thompson 1989:61.
11 John Thornton, 1992, Africa and the Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1680, New York:
Cambridge University Press, p. 125, 182.
12 Elizabeth Isichei, 1983, A History of Nigeria, New York: Longman Inc., p.154.
5
6

conservative people.13 What he means is that, ethnicity is a political phenomenon

constructed by the forces of socio-economic change to operate within contemporary
political contexts.
The instrumentalists however, try to analyze how ethnicity is manipulated both in its
primordial and constructivist aspects to secure economic and political domination. It is the
tactical maneuvers by external and local administrative systems and an elite strategy, they
argue, to divide the people in the face of intense competition over political power,
economic resources and social services.14 Joane Nagel and Susan Olzak argue that ethnic
mobilization is not simply the inevitable result of primordial differences rather it is the
product of manipulation in both old and new states determined by the context, the actors
and the desired political and economic goals.15 The process of modernization such as
urbanization, political sector expansion, economic growth etc intensify the competition,
justifying historical origins of ethnicity as a vehicle for advancing group interests.16
Therefore, in adjusting to the emergence of this new economic and political situation, old
and new ethnic identities have become an instrument of manipulation.
The Construction and Entrenchment of Ethnicity in Nigeria
Though the primordial nature of ethnicity is difficult to justify in central Nigeria, the essay
contends that the constructed and instrumental aspects are very much evident in the face
of stiff economic and political competition. Scholars such as Okwudiba and Diamond
identify colonial rule and the Nigerian military regime as stages through which ethnicity
was constructed and further entrenched into the Nigerian polity.
In creating Nigeria, the British applied certain policies that left Nigeria weak and
divided along ethnic lines. The separate administration of North and South, the carving of
arbitrary boundaries merging people with fewer or no common cultural bonds hindered
the development of common national identity.17 Furthermore, the colonialists had a policy
of segregation in terms of housing and education for the Southern ethnic groups who
migrated to the Northern part of the country while denying them of freehold title to land.18
In addition, they created native authorities along ethnic lines. This fragmented communal
Robert M. Price, 1991, The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990, New
York: Oxford University Press, p. 15-17.
14 Talal Asad, 1993, Genealogies of Religion, Disciplines and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 4.
15 Joane Nagel and Susan Olzak, 1982, Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An Extension of the
Competition Model, In Social Problems, 30 (2):127.
16 Ibid:131.
17 Diamond 1988:24.
18 Nnoli Okwudiba, 1978, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu: Forth Dimension Publishing Company, p. 115.
13

groups and left out others without a traditional authority figure.19 The pattern of colonial
economy was organised around three regional enclaves of Lagos, Kano and Enugu.20 There
emerged a split in entrepreneurial class along regional ethnic lines who came to view the
regional economy as their own preserve and sphere of influence while marginalizing a
massive number of other ethnic groups.21 Consequently, when nationalism and calls for
independence began to take root, it largely took the form of separate ethnic nationalism. 22
However, when the Nigerian military seized power in 1966, the manipulation of
ethnic sentiments featured prominently in its handling of state affairs both within the
military institution and the civil society.23 Within the military institution, it was necessitated
by the need to stave off further coups and ensure the survival of generals in power.
Consequently, the military pampered loyal members of their ethnic constituencies through
accelerated promotions, political appointments and special welfare packages.24 They filled
the military ranks with officers from their ethnic stock while targeting other ethnic groups
for surveillance and repression.25 Within the civil society, on the other hand, entrenchment
of ethnicity was based on the system of patronage and was carried out in a number of
ways. The military appointed influential and respected civilians into juicy government
offices based on ethnicity. A striking example of this is the appointment of Chief
Awolowo; the acclaimed leader of the Yoruba as vice chairman of the federal executive
council to win Yoruba support by general Gowon.26 Furthermore, the military amended
the constitution and introduced policies like the federal character which states that,
The composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies
and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect
the federal character of Nigeriathereby ensuring that there shall be no
predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other
sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies.27

Though this was expected to reduce the dominance of one ethnic group over the
other, it rather sacrificed competence and placed ethnicity above national identity. In
addition, the military created irrelevant parastatals and commissions with ethnically
Coleman James, 1958, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Berkeley: University of California Press, p.52.
Okwudiba 1978:149.
21 Ibid.
22 Diamond 1988:28.
23 Adegboyega Isaac Ajayi, 2007, The Military and the Nigerian State 1966-1993, A Study of the Strategies of Political
Power Control, Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press, Inc., p. 65.
24 J.Bayo Adekanye, 1997, The Military in the Transition. In Larry Diamond et al, eds. Transition Without
End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, p. 66-67.
25 R. Luckham, 1994. The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa, In African Studies Review,
37: 22.
26 Ajayi 2007:76.
27 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation Decree 1989), in Supplement to Official
Gazette Extra Ordinary no. 29 vol. 76, 3rd May, 1989, p. A79.
19
20

motivated appointments in order to respond to the diverse demands for ethnic

representation.28 As a follow up to this, the military created more traditional chiefdoms
and emirates in order to accommodate other ethnic minorities sometimes by way of
government delegations abroad, contract awards and extension of government largesse.29
Finally, the military used states and local government creations alongside boundary
adjustments to delineate ethnic compositions. By the end of General Sani Abachas regime
in 1998, thirty six states have been created.30 The creation of more states invigorated ethnic
sentiments and was one of the major factors in the ethnic and religious violence in central
Nigeria.
Indigene settler ideology as a means of Political Mobilization in Central Nigeria
Central Nigeria sometimes known as the Middle Belt Region is said to have been for
centuries a resort of refugees and was at the time a scene of a flourishing art culture of
high quality,31 defined by the Nok culture.32 By 1903, diverse ethnic groups of central
Nigeria suddenly found themselves in contact with British administrators. Politically, the
Middle Belt region comprises of the following states in central Nigeria: Benue, Kogi,
Kwara, Niger, Plateau, Nassarawa, Taraba, Southern Kaduna, Southern Adamawa and
Southern Bauchi.33 Ibrahim James identifies various factors that have created massive
immigrant settlements alongside the different ethnic groups in these states of central
Nigeria, factors such as; mining, economic expansion, drought, internal migration,
formation of trading colonies by the Hausa settler communities and the colonial
administrative activities.34 Eventually, as settlements took on permanent patterns alongside
economic expansion, indigenous communities were threatened and the indigene settler
ideology became the most effective means of indigenous mobilization against nonindigenous communities.
Thus, the instrumentalisation of ethnicity in central Nigeria was important for two
reasons; first it was a necessary tool to fight long years of perceived political domination
and economic inequality. Second, it was encouraged by the policies and practices of

Ajayi 2007:77.
African Guardian, 30th October 1989, p. 21.
30 Ajayi 2007:85.
31 Sr. Marie de Paul Neiers, 1979, The Peoples of Jos Plateau, Nigeria, Their Philosophy, Manners and Customs,
Cirencester, UK: Peter D. Lang, p. 13.
32 Ibrahim James, 1998, Primordial Setting: The Nok Culture Middle Belt Connection. In The Settler
Phenomenon in the Middle Belt and the Problem of National Integration in Nigeria, edited by Ibrahim James, Jos:
Midland Press Limited, p. 1.
33 Ibid:ix.
34 Ibrahim 1998:94-95.
28
29

multiparty democracy in Nigeria. Since Nigerias return to multiparty politics in 1999,

democracy has been practiced based on the principles of negotiations, zoning of political
offices and the allocation of national and economic resources, according to regional and
ethnic group orientations. The strategies for the various political parties for winning
political power were similar. There was a collection of cross-ethnic elite at the echelon of
each political party. These elites called for intensive mobilization of the ethnic homeland
to ensure grassroot support at times of elections and mostly with violent consequences.35
For example, the emergence of candidates for political offices in the various political
parties was followed by an instruction from party hierarchy to the party elites to ensure
that their ethnic groups, towns, villages or even regions are delivered to the particular party
in question. Consequently, party elites sought to eliminate opposition in their ethnic
homelands, encouraging ethnic minority agitations against their governments in regions
under rival political parties.36 This way of practicing democracy allowed the indigene
settler concept to fester and be manipulated in various ways in central Nigeria.
There was a massive economic propaganda by the indigenous host communities.
They associated the settler communities with commercial activities and centers like Jos,
Bauchi and Kafachan, propagating the idea that the settlers are relatively wealthier than
their host communities. This apparent economic prosperity gave the settlers advantage
over lucrative sectors of the hosts economy thus conferring on them greater economic
power. This was compounded by the transfer of Nigerias federal capital from Lagos to
the central city of Abuja. There was massive migration from both the Southern and
Northern Nigeria to the center. Economic competition threatened the economic base of
indigenous populations and their ability to mobilize political support. The combination of
the settler communities economic and political power consigned the indigenous host
communities to an inferior economic and political power status. Under the banner of
indigenes against settlers ideology, the indigenous communities vehemently resented this
economic domination as demonstrated by the Zango Kataf conflicts in 1984 and 1992,
disputes between the Bachama and the Hausa settler communities in 198937 and the
continuous ethnic and religious riots Plateau and Kaduna states.
In addition, there was propaganda around the issue of land. As earlier indicated, land
ownership for the inhabitants of central Nigeria was by usage not freehold. However,
diminishing farm lands, threats from widespread gully erosion, environmental degradation
Okwudiba 1978:159.
Ibid.
37 Ibid:116.
35
36

and the need for fertile farmlands attracted massive outmigration from all round the
country. As settlements grew and became permanent alongside population explosion, land
became a prized possession. Both the host communities and the settlers alike began to
rationalize their ability to acquire and possess land. The indigenous host communities
considered land not just a matter of heritage but a justification for their primordial
ownership. Different ethnic groups rallied round the ideology of indigenes against settlers
over land acquisition as seen in the 1997 fadamaland dispute between ethnic Beroms and
Hausa settlers, the 1989 land and boundary disputes between the Tiv settler community
and the non-Tiv host communities of Alago, Mighili, Gwandaras, in Awe local government
of Nassarawa State, etc.
Furthermore, political propaganda and memory play a vital role in the manipulation
of the indigene settler ideology especially against the Hausa settler communities in central
Nigeria. These Hausa settler communities are seen as an extension of the hegemonic
Hausa-Fulani oligarchy from the far North who had dominated Nigerian politics to the
detriment of other indigenous tribes of Northern and Central Nigeria. The yearnings and
aspirations of most indigenous communities in central Nigeria for greater political
participation, social justice and equality in policy and decision making process was a way
of fighting this perceived extension of hegemonic domination. To achieve this, the
ideology was mobilized in the formation of political parties where most indigenous host
communities belong to the ruling party; PDP, producing state governors and a host of
other political officials while the settler communities found themselves in the opposition
parties with each ethnic group seeking to control state power and resource. Consequently,
in order to find legitimacy for themselves in central Nigeria, settler communities sought
for both traditional and political recognition using primordial justifications. Though their
demand for a Hausa emirateship within Jos was rejected, general Babangida created Jos
North Local Government, perceived as a political recognition of the Hausa settlers in
Plateau state. This single act has been a source of ongoing conflict between the indigenous
Beroms, Afizere, Anaguta and the Hausa settler communities from 1994 to date.38
Finally, religious propaganda was not left out. Religion in Nigeria has always
provided unique set of common identities either in terms of dress, music, names,
ceremonies or even class identification. In central Nigeria, the competition for the values
of the society to be realized politically triggered the manipulation and mobilization of
religion along ethnic lines. Thus the settler communities have clung to the religions of their
38

Community, 1996. Jos North: When Power is at Stake, April-June 1996, 1 (1):12-13

places of origins, thus conferring on themselves a religious identity distinct from that of
the host communities. In central Nigeria, a form of a consciously willed oppositional
identify preserving Islam associated with the settler community is currently matched by a
comparable form of identity preserving Christianity associated with the host community.39
This has resulted in various violent conflicts like the communal feud between the Katafs
and the Hausa settlers of Zangon Katab town, inter-religious wars between Christians and
Muslims in Kaduna, Zaria and Ikara in 1992.
The scale and intensity of violence due to the manipulation of the indigene-settler
ideology in central Nigeria demonstrate the weakness and failure of the national integration
policies. As a result ethnicity, regionalism and religious affiliation still weigh heavily as
determinants in the choices and appointments of political officers and even bishops and
imams in the various Christian churches and Mosques in Nigeria. Trade unions, women
organizations and politicians are all wrestling with these problems. Furthermore,
globalization; a process of interaction through which diverse peoples and races are said to
be bonded together by means of international trade, investment and information
technology,40 aided the conventional thinking that the expansion of economic roles and
democratic participation will substantially deemphasize ethnic and racial politics.41
However, the return to civil politics in central Nigeria has rather created new identities that
coexist with the old ones with consequence that citizens come to hold multiple communal
and ethnic identities to their villages, regions, churches etc.42 As a result, the selection and
manipulation of the indigene settler identity does not seem to show any sign of abetting
and central Nigeria remains the hub of ethnically motivated violence.
Conclusion
This essay has been able to examine the theoretical concept of ethnicity, highlighting the
arguments regarding the primordial, constructed and instrumental nature of ethnicity. It
has also looked at how colonial and military policies constructed and entrenched ethnicity
into the Nigeria polity. The essay further argued that Nigerias return to multiparty
democracy and the implementation of policies such as federal character, ethnic balancing,
zoning and quota system led to massive political consciousness that ethnic loyalties and
intensified the instrumentalisation of the indigene-settler ideology in central Nigeria.
P. B. Clark, 1982, Fundamentalist Islam in Nigeria: Ideology for Change? Paper Presented at Seminar on
Political Crisis on Africas Islamic Frontier, SOAS, University of London, p. 185.
40 http://www.globalization101.org/what_is_globalization.h. (accessed 19 December 2011).
41 Ajayi 2007: 1112.
42 Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, 1970. Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A
Theoretical Perspective, In American Political Science Review, 64(4):1126.
39

However, the construction and manipulation of ethnic identities especially in Nigeria

cannot be limited to the policies of colonial and military regimes nor can it be explained
based on the principles of multiparty democracy alone as understood, developed and
practiced in Nigeria. Recent studies in conflict management and development have
examined the possibility of new identities emerging from violence itself in terms of victims
and perpetrators, actors and beneficiaries of the conflicts, and territorial identities as a
result of resettlement. Therefore, it will be absolutely important and interesting to make
further inquiries and research about post conflict ethnic identities in Nigeria, assessing their
impact on national integration.
About the Author

Fr. Atta Barkindo is a priest of the Catholic Diocese of Yola, North-Eastern Nigeria. He is a Visiting Research
Assistant at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore and a
current Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Politics and International Studies, School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London. His research areas involve Political Islam, Terrorism and Conflict Resolution. His
current PhD research is on Impunity, Memory and the Politics of Terrorism in the Transformation of Boko Haram.

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