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The Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria

Jacob Zenn , Atta Barkindo & Nicholas A Heras
Published online: 14 Aug 2013.

To cite this article: Jacob Zenn , Atta Barkindo & Nicholas A Heras (2013) The Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria, The
RUSI Journal, 158:4, 46-53, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2013.826506
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.826506

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THE RUSI JOURNAL

The Ideological Evolution of

Boko Haram in Nigeria
Merging Local Salafism and
International Jihadism

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Jacob Zenn, Atta Barkindo and Nicholas A Heras

Ideological factors help to define the evolution of terrorist organisations, influenced

by the domestic and global political context. Jacob Zenn, Atta Barkindo and Nicholas A
Heras examine the ideological motivations that influenced the transformation of Boko
Haram from local salafism to international jihadism. They seek to analyse the extent to
which, in addition to local grievances and its own internal politics, the ideology of other
transnational extremist organisations and Nigerian history and politics have influenced
the ideological development of Boko Haram.

he Nigerian militant group Boko

Haram, which calls itself Jamaatu
Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati Wal-Jihad
(Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad),
has carried out more than 500 attacks
and killed more than 3,500 Nigerians
since its first attack on Bauchi prison in
northern Nigeria in September 2010.
More than a year before this attack, in
July 2009, Nigerian security forces killed
Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf
near the groups main headquarters
in Maiduguri, Borno State, as well as a
thousand of his followers. After a year
spent in hiding, the man who emerged
to replace Yusuf as leader was his former
deputy, Abubakar Shekau.
Since Shekaus assumption of the
leadership of Boko Haram, there have
been two main overlapping strands of
Boko Haram ideology. The first is the
desire to launch a revenge mission
against the Nigerian government and
Islamic leaders in northern Nigeria
who supported both former Nigerian
President YarAduas crackdown on Boko
Haram and the killing of Yusuf in July
2009, and President Jonathans ascent
to the presidency in 2010 after YarAdua

died of natural causes.1 This strand has

been adopted by every faction deriving
from Yusufs original followers, including
the Yusufiya Islamic Movement (YIM)
which broke from Shekau because
of Boko Harams false holy war and
bombings targeted against civilians.2
The second ideological strand is
focused on regional and international
jihadist goals. Both Shekaus faction,
whose members are largely drawn from
Yusufs original followers, and the splinter
group Ansaru whose leadership, having
been trained by Al-Qaida in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), broke away from
Shekau in January 2012 have carried out
operations to further these goals. Ansaru
in particular has translated international
and pan-West African rhetoric into
militant activity, with a focus on the
kidnapping of foreigners. For example,
Ansaru kidnapped and killed a British
and an Italian engineer in Birnin Kebbi
in May 2011, and a German engineer
in Kano in March 2012 (while AQIM
claimed responsibility, the operation was
organised by Ansaru); kidnapped a French
engineer in Katsina in December 2012,
whose whereabouts remain unknown;

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RUSI 158_4 TEXT.indd 46

and kidnapped and killed seven foreign

engineers in Bauchi in February 2013.
After kidnapping the French engineer in
Katsina, Ansaru claimed that the attack
was in response to Frances plans to
militarily intervene in a war on Islam in
Mali and its prohibition on the wearing of
the Islamic headscarf by women in public
places. Similarly, after Ansaru killed three
Nigerians in an attack on a bus convoy of
troops preparing to deploy to Mali, it said
the attack was in response to European
countries transgressions in Afghanistan
and Mali.3 This transnational messaging
has become the public hallmark of
Ansarus ideology to date.
Boko Haram, meanwhile, whilst still
maintaining a primarily domestic ideology,
has also become more international in
its operations, particularly since 2010.
For example, it has issued statements
warning the United States that jihad has
begun and claimed responsibility for the
suicide vehicle bombing of the United
Nations building in Abuja in August 2011.
After the kidnapping of a seven-member
French family in northern Cameroon
in February 2013, an Arabic-speaking
member of Boko Haram who was holding
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Women walk past a compound where two hostages were being held in Sokoto, Nigeria, by an Al-Qaida-affiliated group, March 2012. Courtesy of AP Photo/
Sunday Alamba.

the hostages threatened war against

France everywhere in response to its
military intervention in northern Mali.4
However, this militants language (Arabic
as opposed to Hausa), his focus on France,
and the choice of victim (an engineer and
his family) are more typical of Ansaru
kidnappings, meaning that the kidnapping
in northern Cameroon may have been the
first sign of a hybridisation of the Boko
Haram and Ansaru insurgencies.5
Indeed, co-operation between Boko
Haram, Ansaru and Sahelian militant
groups such as the Movement for Unity
and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA)
will have a profound impact on the
composition of the terrorist threat in
West Africa. This is especially true as
AQIM, whose members trained the
current leaders of MUJWA and Ansaru
prior to the two groups formation in
2011, retreats from the Sahel towards
southern Libya and Tunisia, and as
Al-Shabaab, which has operated with
and inspired Boko Haram and Ansaru
members, comes under increasing
pressure from African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) forces in Somalia.6
Thus, the mantle of jihad in
sub-Saharan Africa has now been passed
to Boko Haram, Ansaru and MUJWA,
which all harbour glocal aspirations.
While Boko Haram is fighting for an Islamic
state in Nigeria and the latter two are
fighting for an Islamic state in West Africa,

all three groups now also see themselves

as part of an international jihad. As such,
if Boko Haram, Ansaru and MUJWA were
to expand their co-operation, Nigeria
Africas most populous and second most
resource-rich country will be faced
with an increasingly violent domestic
insurgency in its northern region at the
same time as West Africa is faced with
several linked insurgencies.

The Rise of Boko Haram

Most studies of Boko Haram date the

emergence of the group to the period
when it launched its first attack and
became an insurgency, in September
2010, or to its official founding under
Yusuf in 2002. This, however, neglects
the history and organisation of the group
before Yusuf and Shekau became its
leaders. This failure to dig deeper into the
incubation of Boko Haram has obscured
the fact that ideological radicalisation
has been an ongoing process in Nigeria,
intensified by the 1979 Iranian revolution,
the implementation of Sharia Law in
twelve northern states since 1999, and
the 9/11 attacks in the US.7
Before Yusuf and Shekau emerged as
leaders of Boko Haram, Nigerias northern
states especially the northeastern
states of Borno, Yobe and Bauchi were
ideologically fertile for exploitation.
Since Irans Islamic Revolution in 1979,
for example, northern Nigerias Shia

population has been led by the radical

Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, who has
modelled the Nigerian Shia movement
called the Islamic Movement of Nigeria
(IMN) on Hizbullah and, with Iranian
financial support, has overseen the
increase in Nigerias Shia population
from less than 1 per cent of the countrys
Muslim population in 1979 to around
510 per cent in 2013. This period
has also seen protests marked by the
veneration of portraits of Iranian leaders
Khomeini and Khamenei and Hizbullah
leader Hassan Nasrallah, and the burning
of American and Israeli flags, as well as
a number of terrorist plots: for example,
three Nigerian Shias were arrested in
January 2013 after training in Iran and
Dubai to attack both US and Israeli
government and civilian targets in Lagos.8
Zakzaky has also made frequent and wellpublicised visits to Iran.9
Northern Nigerias majority Sunni
population has also become more
radicalised since the 1970s, which has
contributed to the emergence of groups
such as Boko Haram. Boko Harams
leaders were thus able to manipulate
an already radicalised population and
cultivate their own ideology to recruit
and transform a socio-religious group
into a violent militant sect, especially
after the battle between Yusufs followers
and Nigerian security forces in July 2009.
Without this pre-radicalised population it

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The Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria

would have been less likely that Yusuf a

young leader in his thirties would have
been able to attract such a large following
in such a short space of time.
Synergies also exist between Boko
Haram and other diverse movements
in Nigeria, including Zakzakys IMN. For
example, although the IMNs members
are mostly Shia, the movement resembles
Boko Haram insofar as both believe
that the secular authorities should not
hold power and that northern Nigerias
traditional religious rulers have allowed
government abuses against Muslims by
refusing to stand up for them and by
supporting Christian politicians.10
In
addition
to
pre-existing
radicalisation in northern Nigeria, there
are a number of other explanations for
the rise of Boko Haram. International
NGOs, particularly those based in the
US, for example, commonly cite poverty
and unemployment, driven by poor
governance and corruption, as the
cause of Boko Harams rise,11 while US
Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Johnnie Carson stated in July
2012 that Boko Haram thrives because
of social and economic problems in the
north that the government must find a
way of addressing.12 Governor of Kano
State Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso also said
in April 2013 that the security problem in
northern Nigeria was caused by poverty
and a collapse of family and societal
values.13 Boko Haram counts on these
factors including poverty, corruption,
poor governance and unemployment to
recruit new members and convince them
that they are fighting for the greater good.
Another explanation for the
ascendancy of Boko Haram is the
profound influence of the Taliban, from
which Boko Haram has long drawn
inspiration; indeed, the group was called
the Nigerian Taliban by outsiders from
2003 until 2009. Mohammed Yusuf said
in a sermon filmed at some point in or
before 2009, for example, that: We are
yet to establish a pure Sunni Islamic sect
that will be ready to take on ignorance
and secularism. The few we have that
are functioning are the al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, whose ideology and theological
foundations are purely Sunni in nature.14
Some Boko Haram members reportedly
trained in Afghanistan while Yusuf

headed the group, which adopted tactics

similar to those used by the Taliban after
Shekau became leader.15 In 2012, for
example, like the Taliban in Afghanistan,
Boko Haram systematically destroyed
hundreds of telecom towers to prevent
the security forces from tracking its
members, used text messages to warn
civilians against co-operating with the
government, extorted taxes from
merchants by threatening death to the
families of those refusing to pay, and
carried out complex, co-ordinated attacks
involving multiple suicide bombers in
Damaturu in November 2011 and in Kano
in January 2012.
Boko Harams recruits are perhaps
as diverse as the reasons underlying
the groups rise. Although the Nigerian
media has commonly portrayed Boko
Haram members as originating from the
neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad
and Cameroon, the vast majority of the
groups recruits are in fact Nigerians.16
They have various motivations for joining,
from a desire for revenge against the
Nigerian government for its suppression
of the July 2009 uprisings, to the desire
to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria,
to pursuit of the economic incentives
entailed in bank and car robberies, to
the rewards paid to members for killing
government officials. At the same time,
Boko Haram has coerced, or incentivised,
some government officials, especially
immigration officers, to collaborate
with the group by sending them text
messages containing threats to their lives
or the lives of their family members, or by
offering them bribes.17
Other members, particularly those
who trained with AQIM prior to the
formation of Boko Haram as a militant
group in 2009, have likely been attracted
by Shekaus internationalist messaging,
which is focused mostly on jihad against
the Nigerian government but also against
Al-Qaidas number one enemy the
United States. Indeed, the combination
of domestic and international rhetoric
in Boko Harams ideology under Shekau
may well serve to embrace militant
recruits motivated by domestic causes,
such as revenge for Yusufs death and the
prevailing poverty in northern Nigeria, as
well as those influenced by Al-Qaida.
Some of the latter, however, may more

recently also have left Boko Haram to

join Ansaru, the specific focus of which is
international jihad.

The Origins of Boko Haram

Although popularly known as Boko

Haram, the group established under
Yusufs leadership was nameless, or
simply called the Yusufiya, meaning the
followers of Yusuf. Nonetheless, the
terms boko and haram seem accurately
to reflect Yusufs belief system, although
within the Muslim community in northern
Nigeria there are conflicting notions as to
what the word boko really means.18 It is
clear that the word crept into the lexicon
with the penetration of the colonial state
and its Western education system
into northern Nigeria in the nineteenth
century. Boko, derived from the English
word book, was often used in relation to
a second noun, ilimi, meaning education.
Thus the full expression, ilimin boko, was
used derogatorily to refer to Western
education and to distinguish this from
what the Muslim community understood,
at the time, to be the only form of
education namely, ilimin Islamiyya, or
Islamic education.
Ilimin Islamiyya was focused on the
teachings of the Quran, the recitation
of which was the entry point for children
into Islam. The language of instruction
was also exclusively Arabic. Ilimin boko,
on the other hand, was considered
suspect because it did not teach about
the Quran and Islam, or use Arabic. The
white man, with his incomprehensible
ways, was also often associated with
witchcraft boka in Hausa. Such an
understanding was supported by Islamic
theology, where every act is either halal,
meaning permissible, or haram, meaning
impermissible. Within this context, ilimin
Islamiyya was considered halal, ilimin
boko was haram, and anyone undertaking
Western education was considered to be a
sinner, carrying out an impermissible act.
In an extension of this, Yusufs
most notorious teaching was that
boko represents the whole of Western
civilisation, which he equated with
atheism and unbelief, secular education
and Judeo-Christian traditions. Politically,
he argued that European countries
had colonised the Muslim world,
established artificial borders to weaken

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Muslim countries, especially in Africa,

imposed democracy, and used boko
to brainwash Muslims and eliminate
Islam. He therefore concluded that
anything related to Western civilisation
or Western institutions must be rejected
as haram, including agriculture, biology,
chemistry, physics, engineering, medicine,
geography and the English language. Yusuf
also preached that employment in the
legislature, judiciary and law-enforcement
areas of government was haram so long
as Nigerias government was non-Islamic.19

Perceptions of Western
Education in Northern Nigeria

Yusufs teachings gained particular traction

in predominantly Muslim northern
Nigeria because of the pre-existing
perception that Western education had
been introduced into the area by British
colonialists to corrupt Islamic morals and
to perpetuate Western hegemony over
Muslims.
Centuries before the arrival of the
British, the expansion of Islam from
the Kanem-Bornu Empire which, at
its height, incorporated parts of Chad,
Libya, Niger and Cameroon into part
of northern Nigeria ensured that the
religion was rapidly integrated into
political practices and court systems in
the region. As a result, by the seventeenth
century, Islam was well established in
many northern Nigerian cities. Political
leaders enhanced their careers by waging
successful jihads, building new mosques
and Quranic schools, and recruiting
Islamic scholars into their courts. Literacy
in Arabic began to take root in the
nineteenth century, and Islamic education
began to have an impact upon social
and political life. Muslim emirs began
strengthening their commitment to Islam,
while Muslim scholars enjoyed a certain
level of privileges, especially after the Dan
Fodio jihad led to the establishment of
the Sokoto Caliphate in 1804.20 The arrival
of the colonialists during the nineteenth
century, however, affected and even
reversed the expansion of Islamic
education in the region.
During the early years of colonialism,
Muslim elites were wary of the
consequences of accepting British rule.
As such, they reached an agreement
with the British not to introduce Western

education to the north. Included was the

assurance that there would be no colonial
interference in Islam, with these elites
given control over the levels of access
granted to the Christian missionaries who
evangelised and resided in their areas.
The British, for their part, did not press
for the introduction of Western education
for two reasons: first, they were cautious
about introducing a policy that would
displease the Muslims and had no bearing
upon colonial economic objectives; and
second, they preferred the Muslim elites
to Western-educated Nigerians, who came
to be regarded as arrogant and impatient.
In addition, the British considered it useful
to temper the influence of the Westerneducated elite and promote the cause of
Islam, arguing that Muslims, and others,
would eventually come to realise the
value of Western education of their own
accord.21
While the fact of this agreement
remains, its full implementation has
always been a subject of debate amongst
Nigerian historians. Colonial rulers were
cautious to an extreme in not allowing
missionaries to operate as they would
have liked and granted emirs the authority
to permit the establishment of missionary
institutions within their territories. Emirs
were reluctant to grant this permission
and missionaries were only allowed to
establish missions far away from the
city centres or among the immigrant
communities in the Sabon Garuruwa
(new towns or strangers wards in
Hausa, referring to the parts of northern
Nigerian towns occupied by those other
than the indigenous Hausa). Ultimately,
however, there was little northern emirs
or religious elites could do to prevent
what became the inevitable expansion
of boko into their region. By 1910, there
were missions at Zaria and Bida, as well
as the Sudan Interior Mission established
in Pategi, in Kwara State,22 with missionary
activities gradually expanding to Yola,
Kano, Maiduguri and other cities in central
Nigeria.23
Indeed, the manner in which the
Western education system gradually
penetrated the north of the country
showed that there was an agreement
in principle but not in practice, with
the particular way in which it was
implemented meaning the agreement

nonetheless allowed the concept of

boko to creep into northern Nigeria. In
addition, the adoption of the colonial
concept of statehood in 1960 when
Nigeria gained independence and the
nature of the post-colonial Nigerian state
had an impact on the aforementioned
agreement, which could not be
maintained in the face of independence,
the consolidation of self-governance,
and the drive towards modernisation
and economic growth, which made
Western education an inevitable tool for
prosperity.

The Manipulation of Boko

Boko Haram has manipulated the history

of boko in northern Nigeria to argue that
the acceptance of Western education
was what led to Nigerias adoption of
the colonial concept of the state, the
destruction of the pre-existing Islamic
order, and the poverty and suffering
experienced by northern Nigerians today.
For example, in a speech made before
Boko Haram became a militant group in
2009, Abubakar Shekau said:24
Western education is meant to pull a
wool across your eyes In the modern
world, if you cannot speak English
anything you say is considered stupid
and unintelligent It is those who
have obtained western education that
are seen as educated, civilized and
polished! The rest are illiterates. This
in essence is what the beneficiaries of
western education believe and they use
such thinking to treat us disdainfully.
This is why education is a source of
destruction for our children, our friends,
our daughters and our brothers.

Another of Yusufs former deputies, the

Cameroonian Mamman Nur, also said,
prior to 2009, that:25
Dan Fodio [the Fulani jihadist who
established the Sokoto Caliphate in
1804] and other Islamic scholars carried
out the jihad and ensured that Quranic
law was implemented. Allah did not
interfere with this situation until our
Muslim leaders accepted from the
Europeans the secular constitution.
Since that time, Allah took away the
comfort and peace Muslims used to

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Yusuf himself used this sentiment to

lay the foundations of Boko Haram by
converting this belief system into jihadist
ideology. He said, for example, in a
sermon recorded on video some time
before July 2009, that:26
These European educated Muslims
returned home only to confuse other
Muslims, claiming that democracy is
compatible with Islam, while Jihad
should only be for self-control We
are for jihad, and our jihad is to put an
end to democracy, to western education
and western civilization. The Jihad is
intended to make us [Muslims] return
to the original state of Islam.

These Boko Haram leaders were more

radical than most other Salafists, who
condemned their prohibitions on boko,
with one prominent scholar arguing that
if Muslims were to follow Yusufs advice,
then pagan policemen [who serve in
government] will kill and injure Muslims,
and when taken to hospitals pagan
doctors and nurses [with a Western
education] will attend to them.27 Despite
the impracticality of his teachings,
however, Yusuf succeeded in tapping
into the popular sentiment in northern
Nigeria, with his sermons attracting
thousands of listeners as his movement
spread throughout the states of Borno,
Yobe and Bauchi. According to scholars in
northeastern Nigeria, by 2009 as many as
280,000 from northern Nigeria and parts
of southern Niger, northern Cameroon
and Chad the three countries that
border Borno State were familiar with
Yusufs preaching, as a result of listening
to his sermons in person in the mosques
of Borno State, seeing him on television,
or purchasing the CDs and DVDs of his
sermons that were sold throughout the
region.28 Yusuf claimed to have 3,000
students, including university teachers
and students, as well as al-majiri students
and unemployed youths.29
Indeed, in 2003, several hundred
of these followers fled mainstream society
and established a community which
they called Afghanistan in Kannamma,
Yobe State, two miles from the border

with Niger. They refused to follow local

ordinances such as wearing motorcycle
helmets, which they considered an affront
to Allah and frequently clashed with the
local police. In one such incident in late
2003, however, when members of the new
community raided several police stations,
the police responded with enough force
to put down the rebellion, destroy the
encampment and prevent the community
from reforming.30
A 2006 interview with one of Yusufs
followers about the former Afghanistan
encampment highlights the jihadist
inspiration of Yusufs followers before
the insurgency began in September
2010: I dont know who gave us the
name Taliban, I prefer mujahideen;
the fighters. I only know the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and I respect them and
what they did very much Those who
fought in Kannama [sic] are Muslims
who performed their holy duty.31

Shekaus Rhetoric and Record

While the key issues addressed under

Yusuf
were Western education,
collaboration with secular institutions
and employment in government which
Yusuf and his deputies, including Shekau,
discussed in their sermons or dawaa
upon succeeding Yusuf, Shekau focused
on immediate jihad as a means to achieve
an Islamic state in northern Nigeria.
Yet at that time, Shekau was unable to
preach openly or engage in dawaa as
Boko Haram had prior to July 2009 due
to the fact that the group had been
forced underground as a result of the
raid. This meant that, had he resurfaced
publicly, Shekau would have been killed
by the security forces (having even been
declared dead by Nigerian security forces
in the wake of the July 2009 clashes).
Under Shekau, Boko Haram became
a takfiri organisation, accusing all other
groups of being apostates, and as a
result, has provided the Nigerian federal
government, northern Nigerian religious
leaders and other sectarian communities
most notably Christians with few
opportunities to negotiate with it. It has
also rejected both Nigerias secular federal
system of governance and the presence
in the north of Christian migrants from
southern and central Nigeria, as well as
violently contesting the legitimacy of

Muslim political and religious leaders in

the north that oppose it. Several hundred
Christians have been killed in suicide and
drive-by shooting attacks against Christian
churches, community centres, businesses
and farmsteads in northern Nigeria since
July 2009.32
The group has also attempted,
on several occasions, to assassinate
northern Nigerias traditional religious
leaders, including the Shehu of Borno,
the Emir of Fika and the Emir of Kano,
and it attacked government offices in
Sokoto in July 2012 to send a message
to the Sultan of Sokoto and ensure the
immediate and unconditional release
of Boko Haram members it said had
been arrested there.33 In reponse to
Boko Harams violent opposition to
both Nigerias federal government and
the northward movement of Christian
southerners, northern Nigerias religious
figures have used their social status
and doctrinal authority to call for
Muslims to engage in dialogue with the
federal government, urging co-existence
between Muslims and Christians
throughout Nigeria.34 Shekaus response
to this was to label the traditional
religious authorities as conspirators
against Muslims in Nigeria.35
Boko Haram also conflates the
Nigerian federal government with the
Christian migrants and its northern
Nigerian Muslim opponents, seeing them
as a coalition of occupying enemies
seeking its destruction.36 This theme of
occupation also applies to those theatres
of jihadist struggle that Shekau openly
identifies with, such as Palestine,
Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Mali, all
places that are deemed to be Muslim
and are or were occupied by
non-Muslims. Yet ideologically, Boko
Haram under Shekau views all non-Boko
Haram members, whether Muslim or
non-Muslim, as potential enemies or
occupying kuffar (apostates), who it
considers, accordingly, to be subject to
jihad.

The Internationalist Element

Shekaus first appearance after the July

2009 clashes was in a July 2010 video
statement filmed by a journalist who was
taken to Shekaus hideout in Maiduguri,
Borno State. This first statement not only

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Zenn, Barkindo and Heras

silenced rumours about Shekaus death,

but also carried a jihadist tone unlike
any that Yusuf had ever used. Shekau
addressed the statement to the leaders
of al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups
in Algeria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen.
He also sent condolences on behalf
of the mujahideen in Nigeria to the
mujahideen in the Islamic State of Iraq,
Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
Abu Yahya Al-Libi, Abu Abdullah
Al-Muhajir, the Emir of the Islamic
State in Somalia, the Emir of Al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb, the Emir of the
Mujahideen in Pakistan, in Chechnya,
Kashmir, Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula,
and our religious clerics whom I did not
mention.37
However, although international
themes linked to Al-Qaida were
prevalent in its rhetoric, Boko Haram
under Shekau also continued to focus on
domestic issues. In 2011, for example,
Boko Haram issued thirty statements,
only six of which focused on international
themes and four of which specifically
mentioned the United States or Al-Qaida.
In 2012, Boko Haram issued thirty-eight
statements, five of which centred on
international themes and three of which
specifically referred to the United States
or Al-Qaida.38 Boko Haram also carried
out virtually all of its attacks against
Nigerian targets mostly government
offices, police stations, schools, beer and
poker halls, media institutions, churches,
and Nigerian political and religious
leaders. The one attack it carried out
against an international institution the
United Nations building in Abuja on 26
August 2011 was likely a joint operation
with MUJWA.39
Indeed, Shekaus intentions in calling
out to Al-Qaida and promoting jihad
against America may have been to solicit
funding and support from Al-Qaida
leaders abroad a strategy that seems
to have worked. In 2011, according to
Nigerian intelligence reports, AQIMaffiliated militants provided Boko Haram
with an instalment of $250,000 and
training in kidnapping and bomb-making
to enable the group to kidnap white
expatriates in Nigeria and transfer the
hostages to desert hideouts, from where
they could be exchanged for more money
and arms from the Algerians.40

Funding from AQIM also contributed

to the formation of Ansaru, allowing
Abu Muhammed the Boko Haram
commander from Kaduna who split
from Shekau and formed his own Shura
committee and Khalid Al-Barnawi a
Nigerian militant with close links to AQIM
to establish and command a Boko Haram
breakaway cell known as Al-Qaida in the
Lands Beyond the Sahel. A related cell
in Kano was led by a Mauritanian AQIM
member and the Nigerian Abubakar Adam
Kambar, who trained under Al-Barnawi in
Algeria, but broke from him while there.
Al-Barnawi remained loosely affiliated
with AQIM and more closely connected
to the kidnapping mastermind Mokhtar
Belmokhtars AQIM-affiliated brigades
in the Sahel, while Kambar remained
an AQIM member. The Mauritanians
and Kambars cell in Kano kidnapped a
German engineer on 20 January 2012
and allowed AQIM to claim credit for the
hostage-taking in March and again after
the hostages murder during a rescue
operation in May 2012.
The Al-Qaida in the Lands Beyond
the Sahel cell kidnapped a British and
an Italian hostage in Birnin Kebbi in May
2011 and killed them in March 2012,41
while independently claiming credit for
both actions.42 It was during this interim
period that Ansaru announced what it
termed its public formation, distributing
flyers throughout Kano on 26 January
2012 one week after the Boko Haram
attacks in Kano had led to the deaths
of 186 people, most of whom were
Muslims. Before this announcement,
which signified Ansarus split from Boko
Haram, Ansaru had been unknown to the
media and the public-at-large.
In particular, Ansaru disagreed
with Boko Haram about how to share
the funds from AQIM, and it rejected
Shekaus acceptance of civilian deaths
and preference for attacking Nigerian
targets. However, another reason for
Ansarus split from Boko Haram was the
favouritism displayed by Shekau for his
own ethnic group the Kanuri. The Kanuri
form the main ethnic group in Borno and
neighbouring parts of Chad, Cameroon
and Niger, while the Hausa and Fulani
are predominant in the rest of northern
Nigeria. A government investigation into
Boko Haram in 2013 concluded that about

80 per cent of the groups members are

Kanuri, while a captured Boko Haram
spokesman, Abu Qaqa, revealed that
Shekaus selection of non-Kanuri for
suicide missions the refusal to agree to
which resulted in the death penalty had
served to alienate Boko Haram members
from other ethnic groups.43 Many Ansaru
members, meanwhile, are likely ethnic
Hausa and Fulani from northwestern
Nigeria, including Kaduna, where the
founding Shura council under Abu
Muhammed was based. They resent the
fact that as many as 90 per cent of Boko
Harams victims are Muslims, and mostly
Hausa and Fulani.44
After April 2012, when AQIM and
allied militant groups gained control of
northern Mali, Shekau and hundreds
of Boko Haram members reportedly
travelled to Gao to find refuge, train,
and support AQIM, MUJWA and Ansar
Dine. Boko Haram members helped the
militants in Mali in their attack on the
Algerian consulate and kidnapping of the
Algerian consul in Gao, while in Timbuktu,
Boko Haram raided Sufi shrines, and
in Konna, Boko Haram members aided
the militants push towards Mopti, in
central Mali.45 In a November 2012 video,
Shekau appeared in camouflage combat
gear training in a desert environment
resembling Mali with masked gunmen.
Speaking in Arabic, instead of his usual
Hausa, Shekau praised the memory of the
martyrs Osama bin Laden, Abu Yahya
Al-Libi and Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, and
called the United States, United Kingdom,
Nigeria and Israel crusaders. He further
proclaimed the virtues of the brothers
and sheikhs of the Islamic Maghreb and
the soldiers of the Islamic State of Mali.46
Shekau reportedly returned to Mali two
months later, in January 2013, when the
militants assault on Konna led the French
to intervene militarily. Yet the time spent
with AQIM and MUJWA in northern Mali
was likely sufficient for the establishment
of networks that will allow these groups to
co-ordinate operations in the future and
exchange combat skills in desert warfare.

Conclusion

Boko Haram has always drawn strength

from its ability to capitalise on its location
in the porous border region between
Borno State in Nigeria, Cameroon and

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The Ideological Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria

Chad. In addition, the grassroots support

it enjoys within Borno and the failure of
the Nigerian government to address the
accumulated grievances of radicalised
youths in the north has benefited Boko
Haram. However, the duration of the
conflict which is now in its fourth year
is increasingly coming to be seen as a
weakness on the part of the group. Some
followers are sceptical about its ability to
hold onto territory, while others may be
alienated if Shekau continues to focus on
international causes at the expense of the
local causes that started the insurgency in
July 2009 and won the group its members
under Yusuf.
Ansarus strengths, meanwhile, lie in
its international connections, its targeting
of Western institutions and personnel
which appeals to international jihadists
and its avoidance of local civilian
casualties. However, the groups lack of a
specific base region from which to operate
constitutes a weakness, in terms of both
recruitment and security, especially in
a country such as Nigeria, where ethnoregional forms of mobilisation are
common. It may be, therefore, that Boko
Haram and Ansarus relative strengths
and weaknesses will make the two groups
compatible, as long as they can overcome
the issues that led to the split in the first
place. Ansaru could potentially employ
members of Boko Haram in its attacks and
it can provide Boko Harams grassroots

members with the combat skills that its

leaders received from AQIM.
Indeed, reports from interviews with
Ansaru members and the circumstantial
evidence regarding Ansarus focus
in Borno suggest that Ansaru is now
operating with Boko Haram.47 According
to Ansarus spokesman, the groups are
complementary, having the same mission
and ideology (despite their different
leaders), as well as the same enemies
security officials and Christians.48
Meanwhile, the destruction of Ansaru
cells in Kaduna, Sokoto and Kano; the
deaths of Ansaru leaders Abubakar Adam
Kambar and Abu Muhammed; the growing
distance between Ansaru and AQIM,
which has now retreated from northern
Mali; and Ansarus desire to obtain
protection from Boko Haram may compel
Ansaru to rejoin it.
Finally, the Nigerian armys offensive
in Borno, which started with President
Jonathans declaration of a state of
emergency in the state in May, has driven
hundreds of Boko Haram militants from
Borno into the border region. This may
further encourage Ansaru and Boko
Haram to co-ordinate their operations
and to reintegrate with other Sahelian
militant groups that fought in northern
Mali, such as MUJWA. As a result, the
militant threat in Nigeria will likely
now shift to neighbouring regions. The
key to combating the new threat will

be intelligence sharing between West

African countries and increased regional
co-ordination to counter what has now
become a regional insurgency, with Boko
Haram, Ansaru and MUJWA sharing
increasingly similar operational and
ideological space.
Jacob Zenn is an analyst of African
affairs at the Jamestown Foundation,
Washington DC. He is the author of
Northern Nigerias Boko Haram: The
Prize in al-Qaedas Africa Strategy
(Jamestown, 2012). His current research
is on the role of Al-Qaida in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) in exacerbating
violence in the Middle Belt after
Nigerias elections in 2011.
Atta Barkindo is a PhD candidate at the
School of Oriental and African Studies
(SOAS), where he studies conflict and
political Islam and conflict in
northeastern Nigeria. His current
research is on impunity, memory and
the transformation of the Boko Haram
sect.
Nicholas A Heras is an analyst with the
Jamestown Foundation, and an
Associate Editor with the international
affairs journal Fair Observer. He is also
the Research Programme Strategist for
the international security organisation
361 Security.

Notes
1 Sahara Reporters, Boko Haram Leader
Imam Abubakar Shekau Message to
President Jonathan, 12 January 2012;
Ikechukwu Nnochiri, We are on Revenge
Mission, Boko Haram Suspect Tells Court,
Vanguard, 25 November 2011; Al Jazeera,
Suspects Charged in Nigeria Bombing,
25 December 2011; Michael Olugbode,
Boko Haram Claims Killings in Borno,
ThisDayLive, 22 September 2010.
2 Daniel Idonor et al., Boko Haram Sect
Splits, Vanguard, 21 July 2011.
3 A
 l Jazeera, Ansaru Fighters Claim Nigeria
Abductions, 18 December 2012.
4 Ola Audu, Boko Haram Threatens JTF
Spokesperson, Demands Prisoners

Exchange for French Nationals, Premium

Times, 18 March 2013.
5 Jacob Zenn, Ansaru Logo Gives Hints to
Boko Haram and Transnational Links,
Africa in Transition blog, Council on
Foreign Relations, 21 June 2013.
6 
Magharebia, Niger Links AQIM Suicide
Bombers to Libya, 26 May 2013; Agence
France-Presse, Barnawi, Kambar: QaedaLinked Militants with Boko Haram Ties,
21 June 2012.
7 Abiodun Alao, Islamic Radicalisation and
Violence in Nigeria: Country Report,
1 February 2009, pp. 1320.
8 Yemi Akinsuyi and Damilola Oyedele, Iran

Linked to Terrorist Plot to Kill IBB, Dasuki,

ThisDayLive, 21 February 2013.
9 Islamic Movement in Nigeria, Tafiyar
Sheikh El-Zakzaky jamhuriyar musulunci
ta Iran cikin hotuna, 30 May 2009.
10 Jonathan N C Hill, Sufism in Northern
Nigeria: Force for Counter-Radicalization?
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
2010).
11 IRIN, Analysis: Understanding Nigerias
Boko Haram Radicals, 18 July 2011.
12 Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic, States
Carson Says U.S. Supports a Stable,
Prosperous Nigeria, US Africa Command,
12 July 2012.

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Zenn, Barkindo and Heras

13 Aliyu Askira, Boko Haram Caused by

Poverty Kwankwaso, Blueprint, 1 April
2013.
14 Shaykh Muhammad Yusuf , Tarihin
Musulmai (History of Muslims), YouTube.
15 ThisDayLive, Boko Haram Trained in
Algeria, Afghanistan, 1 September 2011.

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16 Vanguard, Boko Haram: Members are

Largely Nigerians Immigration PRO,
19 November 2011.
17 Kingsley Omonobi, Army Blocks Move
by Boko Haram to Hoist Flag in Damatru,
Vanguard, 26 October 2012; Gbenga
Akingbule Ijagba, Boko Haram: JTF
Arrests Customs Officer over Aiding Arms
Importation, Daily Newswatch, 29 May
2013.
18 Mathew Hassan Kukah, Boko Haram:
Some Reflections on Causes and Effects,
unpublished article, 2009, pp. 12.
19 On 30 May 2008, Yusuf provided a
Hausa translation of the book Al-Madris
al-Islamiyya al-ajnabiyya al-istimriyya:
tarikhuha wa makhiruha (Global, Foreign
and Colonialist Schools: Their History and
Dangers). Other things, such as sports,
were forbidden by Bakr (born Abdullah
Abu Zayd).
20 Toyin Falola, Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis
of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies
(Rochester, NY: University of Rochester
Press, 1998), pp. 2427.
21 Frederick D Lugard, The Dual Mandate in
British Tropical Africa (London: Blackwood
and Sons, 1922, reprint by Frank Cass,
1965).
22 J H Boer, Missionaries Messengers of
Liberation in a Colonial Context: A Case
Study of the Sudan United Mission, Vol. 1
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1979), pp. 12829.
23 Falola, Violence in Nigeria, pp. 3037.
24 YouTube, Mallam Abubakar Shekau.

Study of Boko Haram, Journal of Religion

in Africa (Vol. 42, No. 2, 2012),
pp. 11844.
28 N D Danjibo, Islamic Fundamentalism
and Sectarian Violence: The Maitatsine
and Boko Haram Crises in Northern
Nigeria, Peace and Conflict Studies
Programme, Institute of African Studies,
University of Ibadan, 2010.
29 Vanguard, UN House Bombing: The Hunt
for Mamman Nur, 4 September 2011.
30 
Information Nigeria, Foreigners from
Niger, Chad, Cameroon Responsible for
Bombings Kaduna CP, 22 June 2012.
31 Emmanuel Goujon and Aminu Abubakar,
Nigerias Taliban Plot Comeback from
Hide-Outs, Agence France-Presse,
11 January 2006.
32 Onyebuchi Ezigbo, Boko Haram:
Nigerian Christians in US Petition
Obama, ThisDayLive, 2 January 2013;
The Sun (Nigeria), Boko Haram Kills Four
Yoruba Produce Buyers in Borno, 8 May
2013; Agboola Ayo, Tension Mounts
in Ibadan over Boko Haram Killings,
Blueprint, 4 July 2013.
33 
ThisDayLive, North Insists on Amnesty
for Boko Haram Members, 30 March
2013; Daily Trust, No Boko Haram
Members in Sokoto Prison Attorney
General, 30 January 2012.
34 
Vanguard, Islam, Christianity Not at War
Sultan, December 27, 2011.
35 YouTube, Sako Zuwa Ga Duniya (A
Message to The World)!, 30 September
2012.
36 Tobi Soniyi, Boko Haram: Zanna Urges
FG to Probe Sheriff, ThisDayLive,
28 October 2012.
37 International Institute for Counter
Terrorisms Jihadi Websites Monitoring
Group, Periodical Review July 2010
No. 2, August 2010.

26 
Ibid.

38 The authors catalogued all Boko Haram

statements issued from 2010 to 2013
and determined the statistics from their
review of these statements.

27 Muhammad Sani Umar, The Popular

Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi
Counter-Radicalism in Nigeria: A Case

39 Omololu Ogunmade, Military Lays

Claim to Killing Boko Haram Kingpin,
ThisDayLive, 7 June 2013; Sahara

25 YouTube, MOHD Nur & Yusuf.3gp, 28

October 2011.

Reporters, Another Islamist Sect

Surfaces in Kano, Threatens To Bomb
Radio Station, 12 September 2012;
Jemal Oumar, AQIM Link to Abuja
Suicide Bombing, Magharebia,
9 September 2011.
40 Emmanuel Ogala, Boko Haram Gets
N40million Donation from Algeria,
Premium Times, 13 May 2012.
41 Jihadology.net, <http://jihadology.net/
2012/03/23/al-andalus-media-presentsa-new-statement-and-video-messagefrom-al-qaidah-in-the-islamic-maghrib-tothe-german-government-if-they-releaseumm-sayf-allah-al-an%E1%B9%A3arithen-we-will-re/>, accessed 16 July 2013.
A translation is available at <http://
azelin.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/alqc481_idah-in-the-islamic-maghrib-22onthe-killing-of-the-german-prisoner-innigeria22-en.pdf>, accessed 16 July 2013.
42 Monica Mark, Nigerias Militant Islamists
Adopting a Disturbing Change of Tactics,
Guardian, 8 March 2012.
43 
Strategy Page, Islamic Terrorists Furious
over Recent Defeat, 2 June 2013; Yusuf
Alli, How Bombers are Chosen, by Boko
Haram Suspect, The Nation, 9 February
2012.
44 
Sahara Reporters, Christian Militants
in Southern Kaduna Threaten Fulani
Herdsmen, Give Seven Days Evacuation
Notice, 5 June 2012; Desert Herald,
Jamaatu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladi
Sudan Threatens Southern Kaduna
Militant Group, Akhwat Akwop, 11 June
2012.
45 
Vanguard, Dozens of Boko Haram
Help Malis Rebels Seize Gao, 9 April
2012; Serge Daniel, Bilal Hicham,
rebelle du Nord du Mali, Radio France
Internationale, 4 August 2012.
46 Abubakar Shekau, Glad Tidings, O
Soldiers of Allah, Ana Al-Muslim Network,
29 November 2012.
47 Adam Nossiter, New Threat in Nigeria as
Militants Split Off, New York Times,
23 April 2013.
48 
Desert Herald, Security Officials and
Christians are Enemies of Islam and
Muslims, We Will Target and Kill Them
Says Spokesman of Jamaatu Ansarul
Muslimina fi Biladi Sudan, Abu Jaafar,
5 June 2012.

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