10, 11-18.2-91, September 1991, The Republics of the Former USSR: The Outlook for the Next Year Biectar of Secret Intelligence The Republics of the Former USSR: The Outlook for the Next Year Special National Intetigence Estimate This Specll National Inelipnce Estinae represents the vino of the Director of Contra. ai the advice and asttance ofthe Intoligence Community. Secret. gue 19.297 ow 458 18510. (Continued) Biroctor of -Secear— ra socom acciT Intelligence SNIE 11-18.2-91 The Republics of the Former USSR: The Outlook for the Next Yearsens Information avaiable as of 23 Septamber 1991 was used fn the preparation of tis Estate The foloning intligance organizations porcpated in the proparation of ts Estee “ie Cental intigence Ago The Defense inoigence Agency The Navonal Seevrty Agency The Buzeau ot lnoligence and Research, Department of State The Ofte o leligence Suepor. Depariment ofthe Treasury 0 panpating, ‘Tho Doputy Chet of Stall or nt Department ofthe Aery The Director of Naval nteligence, Department ofthe Navy The Assistant Cot of Stat Department oft A For The Drctor of neligens Headquarters, Marine Corps ineBgence, This Estimate wes approved for publication bythe ‘atonal Foreign Icligence Bodrd. 18610. (Continued) Scope Note The Republics of the Former USSR: The Qutlook for the Next Year (C NF) This Estimate examines the key factors that will determine develop- ‘ments in the USSR (excluding the Baltic states) over the next year ‘and the possible alternative outcomes. It focuses primarily on the question of interrepublic relations within and outside a union. ‘Although many internal factors will be important determinants of the long-term course of political and economic development of the republic, this Estinate does not attempt to assess internal republic issues in any detail Such issues will become more important and will be the focus of much of our future estimative work. (er Seas 18710. (Continued) Figure 1 Scenarios for the Republics USSR Over the Next Year / trom Repu geo comic non wn plc alert Rus oe ined poll tsa ith vet pai iy hse! Sepa seinen rows ala Ri zon to depen tr cing ale ssl ur 188‘00, (Continued) Key Judgments ‘The USSR and its Communist system are dead. What ultimately eplaces ‘ther will not be known within the next year, but several trends are evident: {¢ Overall, there wil be a high level of instability ‘The economy will get much worse, making a bold approach toward ‘economic reform more necessary but poitically riskier and harder to do, * ‘Russia and Ukraine wll make credible attempts at applying democratic political principles at all levels of goverament and to market exonomics; most other republics probably will not. 1 Ethnic turmoil will increase as nationalism grows and ethnic minorities resist the authority of newly dominant ethnic majorities. ‘© Defense spending and military forces willbe reduced, and republics will participate in collective defense decisions and exercise greater authority ‘ver defense matters within their own borders. ‘+ Foreign policy wil be increasingly fragmented, with the republics ‘conducting their own bilateral relations and to tome extent their own diplomacy in multilateral forums. _ «Yeltsin will be the most powerful national leader; Gorbachev will have ‘only limited power to act independently and could not win an election without Yelain's support. 1 The West will face increased pleas for economic assistance fom {ndildual repubiles as well as from the central government, giving i ‘Western countries increased opportunity to promote economic and politcal reform, but increasing requirements for close coordination of, ‘Western aid effortsatoneer ‘Over the next 12 months, the interplay of several variables wil be ertical whether the new system evolves in a relatively peaceful ‘8 democratic direction. Thee variables are especialy '# The economy will be the most critical variable, We do not believe that ‘economic conditions this winter wil lead to widespread starvation of i massive social unrest [f economic hardships are significantly worse than we expec, however, governments at all levels would lose popular support and authoritarian alternatives would become more attractive. e v secre 18910. (Continued) Secret + Russias of paramount importance not only to the fate ofthe fragile con federal structures that are bring built but also tothe prospects for democracy and fr the transformation to a market economy. Continued progress by Russa in these areas or 2 relapse into authoritarianism, ‘whichis less ikely during the next year, will decisively affect the course of reform inthe other republics. + If Ukraine chooses the path of independence without participating in a confederation—a strong possibilty at this point—the viability of a confederation of other republics would be diminished significantly. This ‘development would increase the risk of ethnic confit between Ukeaini- ans and the Russian minority inthe republic and of disputes with Russia over dra xml of mitay fies on Uae errs. emi (Over the next year, we believe that thee base scenarios capture the likely evolution of republic relationships: + Confederation: This senario is the preferred outcome of Gorbachev and ‘Yel'sin, There would be a weak central authority bu close cooperation among the public in the poitieal, economic, and military spheres. Russia and Ukraine atleast, would lay the groundwork for democratiza- tion and a market economy. Nuclear weapons would be controlled ‘operationally by the center. Lite of authority would be relatively clear, and foreign governments could idemify and deal with the appropiate levels of government on different policy question. This scenario would provide the West the advantage of greater predictability. It would so provide increased confidence that nuclear weapons would remain under ‘centralized contro, arms control would remain ontrack, economic tasistance tothe republics could be more eflectively managed, and the ‘ides fra coordinated approach to monetary and financial policy interrepubli trade, debt repayment, foreign afer, and defense. Lines of authority ze clarified, and foreign governments can ently end ‘eal with the appropiate levels of government on Aiferent policy questions. Republic governments re ‘main stable through the food and fuel crises this winter, and democratic institutions and practices in Slavic areas at least gain siength Jo-s) Internal Implications. Economic. While the reps ‘would slfer the consequences af economic tends ‘ident before the artve coup, the damage would ‘be contained and the longer-term prospects for stabi Ticng and reforming the economy woul improve +The republics would not enact disruptive measures, suchas tari, exorbitant energy and commodity rive hikes, and cancelation of contrac. + Some conzol oer the money supa would be censured, with a single currency remining the means of intertepublic exchange. If republic curren: es were allowed, union banking agreement would restain the printing of money. + Coordination offset policies could begin to arest the growth of budget deficits. Apreement on cep lic and foal tax contributions tothe ceater would facilitate narrowing the ental budgetary gap. ~Becre + Some repubic—partiularly Russi—would press head more vigorously toward a market economy, although Polish “shock therapy” wobid not be ‘wid inthe next year + Some old-style adminiseative approaches aimed at ‘Stabilization, eluding sate orders ad wage and Price contol, would remain, but the oreral en foument for frigniavestment and membership in International esonomic organizations would be im- rovedofere Political. This scenario would provide the best pros ests for politcal stability and, therfore, democratic change throught the enfederatio.Intrreputlic aoperation woul help prevent interethnic tensions {rom escalating into violent coniets within or be tween republicdeover” ‘An agreement establish confederl political struc tre would enabe a ceatralgoverameat to continue ‘exist and do business with foreign governments, but the center woulé not dominate the republics The sphere of central responsibities would be greatly Feduced, as would the central bureacracy and the power ofthe presidency. The authority ofthese Institutions woul be enhanced by poplar elections on Russia would be the most powerful tate inthe confederation, All major policies of the center would reguire Russia's concurrence, but the ther republic members would try to use cera structures to check Russian dominance one Gorbachev, in aliance with Ye'sin, would be a key player inthe nejotitions on the economic and politi. ‘al framework fr interrepublic cooperation, atleast ‘ntl elections are bel. Ar Bead of the interim government, eand his frei ministry would remain the chet inerloutor with foreign governments, but he would not hove the power to make major foreign policy decisions without the republic” concurrence, ‘tary. Miliary refor would accelerate. Under this seenario, a common decisionmaking structure ‘would allow fora reasonably coberent and controlled 10 20410. (Continued) Figure System Confederation: “Phe Union of Soverelga States” cb ernst mt mt {once reduction os well as restructuring. A unified command over strategic and general purpose forces, ‘woul be retained, preserving the stability ofthe armed fores and providing the strongest guarantes forthe security of nuclear weapons. The center would also retain operational conto of smaller air and naval fore and rapid reaction ground foees, backed up by repubiie-controled reserves en ‘The republics probably would spend ls of thei ows money in establishing their own military forces. A though the military under anid command would 205 have some influence in overnment cece, they would ot beable to protect the armed forces from drastic reductions one Implications forthe West Tis senari would pro vie a more predictable pth othe future, A new ‘onfederal union would remain 2 major alitary ‘ower, but would be stronly committed to reducing the defense burden through notations and unilatr- al euts, The prospects would be god fr ratifying the10. (Continued) (CFE and START agresments, a5 would the chances that implomentation and verification of arms contrat sgreements would not be disrupted, ar “The West inevitably would have to dal with a pelferaton of foreign policies as republic seek Feprerentation in inernationl forums. Under his Scenario, however, iis les lkely that these foreign plies Would work at crss-purpose ‘The smaller threat of political instability and intere- public confit under this scenario would reduce but ot eliminate the vsks to Wester engagement. As ‘economic performance continued to decline, a least in {he sort term, the outlok for Western trade and investment would remain poor. Debt default might be averted, but large-scale debt restructuing would be kel, ‘With demands for ad inereasing fom ll republics, Western governments would have 19 channel most assistance direc 1 them. Aurion agrecment, how: er, would facilitate interrepubli coordination inthe Tadicetors f Lose Association: + Agreement i reached on forming loose conomic salon + Rustia, other republics conclude series of ‘lateral agrmtnts on economia pol al cooperanon. + Strong vote Jor Ukranian independence ix 1 December referendum leads 0 severing af tiesto confederation + Chommont ddeats Kesvctuk in presidential | election (Content Bere ing depres of poitcal cooperation exist, however: several republics, mot ie thoes of ental Si osibly Byelorussia, agree to assclation with Rus ‘Although Rossa and the essocated states try to ‘wordinate frsign and military paiy, the republics basically pursue independent policies in these areas a allocation and distribution of asstance and make the on} ‘economic and politcal climate more favorable for foreign investment. fo" Under this scenario, the replies would exert thie independence in bilateral relations but would allow ‘he central foreign ministry to represen ther interests in arms conto! and other multilateral republic ters, They wood cetain responsibilty fr frami Alscutsion of foreign policy questions i ntrrepubic bodies, for communicating Western proposals to those bodies, and for negotiating with Western partners, ‘While Gorbachev remains president, his experience, ‘nernational stature, and sks at persuasion would sive him considerable infuosce in dstermining the uteame of ealletve decisions, Joey [Loose Association Tn this senario, the proses of polities! and eoonomie reform continues, bat several republies—most impor tant, Ukrtine—o their own wa. The republics including some that have opted for independence — form loose common markt, but implementation of ‘omen ezonomic polices is hindered by the absence ‘of strong political ies among al the republics. Vary~ Internal Implications. Economic. The replies would reach broad agreements covering foal and monetary targets, common currency, and frciga debt repay= men, The repables are unlikely, however, ofeach ‘ontenus on the dels neded oeffectively cary out lf the provisions af the common market. Trade Aisruptions and shortages would intensily Becnse of the nck of strong enforcement wechanisms, the difler- ing pace of econamic reforms within esc repblc, nd rowing republic prossetionism. Under these etcun stances, republic sdministative decrees aimed at sa lization woud incase; necessary, but unpopular steps toward marketztion would som dea Political. Russian dominance of any political aso ton would heighen fears among other republic lend rs of Russian hegemonism. Fen if Rusa did not, ‘behave toward these republics in a heavy-handed fashion, fears of Russian domination wuld jeopardize {he long-term survival of this association. The legte macy of some reublc leaders would became more 20610. (Continued) ‘cote + Hom berber be Fragile as they filed to halt their repulics' economic slide. This woud lead to inreased popular dscoment fad pessres to adopt mare authoritarian measures, ‘Gortacher’s pola ole woul be minimabfety attary. Rusia andthe associated republis could agree to smaller centaly commanded srtege and tseneal purpose ftes, bt the non-Russian republics ‘woul expand the “ational guaré™ units under their ontrel to counterbalance a Ruslan dominated army Uraine would press abead with forming its own ‘armed frees and woud seek removal feet! forces ‘ecoaining ia the republic. Ukrainian and eter aoe ‘sian republic leaders probably would agre to 13 207 removal or destruction of strategic weapons on thet teritory. Some eepubic leaders might iss on ob taining contro ofthe actialnuslear arsenal on sit tenors asa hedge against Rian imperialism, se Implications forthe West Western sorernets would be dealing mostly with Rutia and Ukraine ot those republis led to develop democratic govern ‘ments and market economies. The other republic, hhoneter, would be sensitive to Western, Rossa, ot ‘Ucainian conduct that suggested their interests could ‘be ignored. Because the epublics woud insist ox10. (Continued) conducting significant portion oftheir own foreign aur, there would be grate dfs in negoiat- ing and eavering compliance with inteeational agree- rents At he sire Ue, most publics would be age 0 expand their contacts and cooperation vith the West, primarily for eoanomie reasons. The i ‘dual reptice would be even more cage fr eco- nomic asstanee given the dificuly of negotiating ‘Mfectve mechanisms fo intetepalic economic co- ‘operation, They would aso seek membership in rex ‘ional and international organizations and pursue clleativ security agreements, Rosia anit associates would adhere to arms contra agreements and pursue follow-on negotiations aed At ensuring even deeper force ets. Ukraine's decision to buildup sown Fores would endanger the sae ‘mentation an verification of existing tet Disintegration fore to form a new confederation and a economic community fi. Intetepublic cooperation is modest tnd bilateral Animosites between eepublis rise ‘hacly, and, a8 atonaism becomes a more virulent farce, teats and counterthrets erp up over baer spats. Separatist movements inthe republics gin popular strenath, and the sstgrty ofthe Rosan Republic undermined as some ethnic minorities preue thet independence, Kepubics arse coset ‘over economic resources an establish strict border and tn controls, but leaders cannot cope with ‘mounting economic and political problems. Nationa {st autoritaran politicians and paitical parts, srength The potential For righting coups in ke republics increases dot} Internal Implications. Economie. The reps would be let to their own devices. Fora stort time, ‘Ressian leaders woul have the popular support and polical will 1 attempt economic reforms, bt sous fod shortages exacerbated by barees to inetepblc trade would soon erode thei legiimacy. Other repub- Iie leaders would be verwhelned by economic prob- lems and lok outwaré for assistance, Cental Sian republics would look toward the Middle Eas fo bly “The succes of efforts in Rosin and the other demo. cratiealy oriented republics would depend laczly on "he coneluson of ade agreements with the West Indicators af Disintegration: + Negotiations om policat and economic cops ‘eration collapse. + Economic condions deteriorate sharply: mx ‘merous ineentsof ood shortages, perhaps Famine, provoke largeseatesrkes, |e Rivalries beoween republic leaders ncn | iggey ete and coms ‘hanged over wecimen of natlonal minories | ihn epublier. | + Shara srowth in opuderity of aurhontarin | petal paris/movements calling for ecole tebe autor and the other breakaway republics, but negotiations probably would be prolonged. The presure of time would be intense, however, becawse of mounting eoonomle chaog dew Political. The ibility ofthe Russian leadership to hold the confederation together would encourage na- tional groups within its borders to assert thee sover- cgnty Ina scramble to seve conta oferta! economic resources. AC he ste time, Rusianmi- torte in other republics, fearing hole eaten, would temp to migrate o° Seek unification with Russia, thereby increasing te prosperts fr sii sir Xenophobic Rusia nationalism would gain in ‘teeneth ax economic conditions worsened and as Societal tensions increased. Leaders in he less demo- raticaly oriented republics of Central Asia, com- "tonted by popular unrest and economic disorder, ‘would quickly institute even more authoritarian mea- sures. Overtime, the fragmentation of te former USSR into a number af independent repubis, ome 4 20810. (Continued) a Fae} | See age cael Cmparve Nantes to" RB it oy Rep fm RB ihe eS “SSB yee Geone 70 6 ferenan 8 ig BE a er Sth ee als Horastan 2 a Bie10. (Continued) ofthe palitically ustale and hostile toward one ‘nor, would ineceae the ikeinoed of Fos Si confit some Mateary, Rusia would esume inmate contol of the conventional end nuclear Torees omits erry tnd probably would 1 to d 0 over some asses in ‘ter eepublis. Nou-Russan republics would move Sik to establish their on armed Foret for protec tion agsinst Rosi, aginst one another, or agaizst, ‘other states along thelr borders. Economie difialties ‘woul init thir io and capabilities, however. Rus- ‘woud stl be unde strong pressure to continue at miltary spending in aa ert to overcame its ‘eeanomie problems [53 ‘The rik of serious civil conflict would tse as he republics attempted to assert authority oer military installations and units within thee terior. Man) ‘commanders and soldiers would have to decide to ‘whom they owed thar allegiance; ther wilingoess Submit to # new authority or ly down their ems ‘would be am open question tewe= ‘The disposition of nuclear weapons would be a much rote contentoas vein this eenari A each republic looked it own security, some republics with auclear weapons woul sck to assert operational ‘ontol over ther, ater than tartng them al over to Rossa, Authoritarian plital leaders, unco Sesined by cetrl authority or even a lose confeder- ation, would view mucear weapons as a means of tahancing the status of thee repulle inte ees of the world ewe ‘The probity of military itervention i otis ‘woul increase a6 plitaliastabiity deepened. An alliance betwecnwiltary leaders and nationalists Wold form that would threaten the coneitutiont order dome Implications forthe West. The fragmentation ofthe former USSR would confront the West with grave dangers because ofthe chaos and npreditaity of ‘ents within the republics. The disappearance of felable cereal contol over nuclear weapons in me republic, ax wel a uncertainty ove thir saston, oul increas he prospec of nuclear wsapon fling int terrorist hands. The rk Mould mount ww ‘ocident involving Sock weapons within te ore boundaries of che USSR ot even thei nen inter public confit Use against the outside wir would be much es ikl, The danger that velar materials sod expertise would ind their way to other sata Seeking to develop nuclear weapons would become greene Confit within o between republics would pase sxe ‘ous risks forthe West beeae violence euld any ‘pil across international boundaries, Lone-qucnsnt border disputes probably would reappear and the proliferation of republic armies wool irene the Tikelinood that states would seck to reshe such sixpats by force. Western countries snd ict, organization, such as the UN and CSCU. would be Adrewn ino efforts to end such disputes given the posible sakes invohed dewey “This scenario would make implementing an veriting arms control agreements partclaly CV, virtually imposible. The West would confront mum's ne ‘ordinate foreign plies rather than on, sn! the willingness of many of the new sates to eater ito agreements in god faith would be questionable ‘Agrecments on conventional forces im Ee pb ‘iy would eve tobe renegotiated. I is uta. moreover, tha the former members ofthe USSR. oul reach an agreement on ellocation of forest ‘comply with the CFE free clings. The START agreement would alo be endangered if Using Byelorussia, oe Kazakhstan allempied 10 een con tol ove strategic nuclear weapon on tir feror? Sad All the republics would cll on the West to provide assistance to uriorate the geal exons arash, but most republics coulé not pay for tan sneny sould have domeste polices that would discourage roiding it Suife within and between ccpublics. ‘would complicate nid florist 16 21010. (Continued) Prospects fr Scensios Realty is ikl tobe more complex than ay of thee scoarior we have cased in his Ustimate, We Teller, however, that they capture the broad range of pots, T or view, ti ikely hat codons 12 months from sow wll moat coal resemble the [ote etelatnasenara.Athough the econo stanton ie erave andthe republic are having seious problems in reaching agreement on key economic fuer, mat understand that they eaaot survive on {ei orn This awareoesargnes strongly for soe Kind of economic nuaiation that will move, however Iultingy foward common matke-type stem sour 5 We believe the “confederation” sconasio is es ly. Usain wl be th key: ores supporting eonedera- tion are caren favored to win the December tleevons, bu their strength may be eroding and an tet spose, Eve If Ukraine i wiling to work toward a now ution, cenrifue! forces may over them the repubi Poteatally the mos explosive of {hese forces is unest among the Russian minorities living outside the Ruslan Republic. A new enter ‘ould ofr litle inthe wey a ncetves ta gale public support.Altbough many republics would ike {wees covtereight to Russa they hae no terest, In buying into a suengtheed enter to ge item The es likely senaio within the time Fame of this Estimate i “disintegration.” Most republic govern ments have sufficient publc suport o sustain them Selves trough the dealt months aed, and they ‘nderstand the ned for continued cooperation with ter republics, Force of rection ar oo weak st present and thee pole prospects over the next Year {re por unless an economic etatrophe out. Be- ‘yond the next yen, however, thi scenario beomes ‘more likly if elected government fl to sem the Aeterorton of eno conditions fuer Receptvty to Western infueneis greater than ever bore, Central, republic and even local leader are ager (or emeraeney eomomic astance, an for au ‘Wester help and expertise io lying the foundations ofa market economy, building democrat paisa estan, and reducing the burden af defene. seme ‘Over the nett year, the posbilty of etetophi winter poss the mast stious teat to the suceefl Transformation ofthe old system, Wetter food se tance, argeted at key populatian cxaters and fle ‘ively state, would reduce the danger tha ops lar anger oer fod shortages would destabilize democratic goveromeats. I widely visible, sch a= . tance cou promote goodwill toward the Wes ‘Getng the sito where itt most neodd, however, will aot be an esy undertaking, Potentially ere shortages this winter of food, ful, and medicines re scattered ove large geogzaphie areas. Wel- dot ‘mented problems with coomniaton, transport tion, and storage, a well as bureauerat infin fies and bsck-marketerng, wil hamper iste ffrtoney Western pices tht would alleviate esonomic tard ship and increase hope for biter tines ahead end ‘lp stave of further politcal fragmentation ard instability. These include: a coordinated det esirae- tueng package, new red accelerate sep toward IMF membership, and arable stablization Td ene10. (Continued) Secret Figaree The Republics on the Issues = OO ajajalale! Demsentcrctomeniscontat [@ [Al ~ Commie os econ . > [elm ly ce Conniwentowanctietoms [e]®] a] a] ele * Raia’ eesup reform rogram is ‘egetrtnarern olalele cet taesae —— Ser Sceoteecno ee ne els[ele| ee arg Pteyecay sae Detain fitz neualiy Secombe over St ei wt ELA [ae] * sees stein ee ‘Son lc epi alefelalala al Seutticscrtuins, vet coi wh tr fafa] a[ayate] sie Indepensem defense missy [a * tquena oops ony rig owe try a + Ax ica Seem . 21210. (Continued) Figure? Food Situation nthe Soviet Republics 5 Dye? nS 7 Sys Ar (een ‘Gres alu ot fam ouput par apt as rca of atons arage, 1988" tet 67 eww SB weowias BH 124 ccm In either the “confederation” othe “ooe associ ‘ion senaroe, the West would have influence on ‘ubeeguent developments by focusing primacy 09 Rusia and Ukzune, Rossin woud be te principal! player in dessionmaking fr defense policy and ars cong. 1 wouldve the bet chance among the eputlics of eatryng ot economic reform an poi I democratization The West cold cot, but bot ‘compe, Ukraine toward amore cooperative approach ith Rosia and other republs a8 well as toned ‘more democratic procsse in intra policies. Tes: sons over suc issues as atders, minority rights,10. (Continued) ‘conomic relations and military forces could bees ced withthe belpof Western “ood ofc is, to ‘Wester volvement faettated cooperation, it ould affect developments elsewhere. (CMP) ‘Werter infuence would be mor limited wader the “auintgration” seal If authortasian egies came to power i the republics, they would want Western economic asistance and cooperation, but oi demanding respect, pean orn freedoms. It would be especialy dca o promote republic cooperation a working ot common prob lem. As natinait sentiment grew strange, et Western Felngs would become more pronounes, (ew 214