Morgan Riestis

University of Denver
PSYC2031 - Sweeny

Can consciousness be explained by Cognitive Neuroscience?

Self-awareness is the mechanism that allows the Universe to perceive itself, but what
makes it work still remains to be one of the biggest riddles in psychology today. Scientists run
into major hurtles in explaining consciousness, because there has not been a satisfactory
definition formulated of what we mean when we say consciousness. With so many questions
that still surround the topic, even defining consciousness becomes a philosophical debate by
nature. We are not able to scientifically explain a phenomenon, if we cannot even determine
what it is we are looking for. For this paper, I will use a common definition of consciousness
worded as the phenomenon of being self-aware; to have perceptions, thoughts, and feelings
while realizing that you are having an experience. Although these thoughts and perceptions are
quantifiable in neurological activity, Cognitive Neuroscience only scratches the surface and is
not able to explain consciousness in its entirety.
Humans have developed the ability to learn how to focus attention through practices in
self-awareness. Through meditation, practitioners become mindful of thoughts, feelings, and
sensations and observe them in an [objective] way (NCCAM). If such objective awareness of
the neural activity has been reported, then questions arise around what is carrying out the act of
watching our thoughts. Is there something additional doing the listening, or is consciousness
simply a result of cells firing in the brain? Our inner narrative, otherwise known as a system
called the interpreter, is the closest shot we have at answering questions around the mindful
observer. Thought to be cortically based1, this interpreter system, makes sense of all the
internal and external information that is bombarding the brain (Gazzaniga, Irvy, and Mangun,
620). Therefore, such awareness can arguably still be dictated by neural activity in the brain.
Although this system hypothetically answers what is doing the watching, it cannot be considered
a strong line of evidence because science is still unable to quantify any specifics on the nature
of these networks.

Even though studies have confirmed that Magpies, who do not have a neocortex, respond in a similar
fashion to the self-awareness mirror test as apes, dolphins, killer whales, pigs, elephants, and infants.
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Activity of perceptual awareness in the brain has been able to be neurologically

measured, but unfortunately, up to this point this data does not encompass the entirety of
consciousness. William Newsome at Stanford University was able to measure through singlecell recording, an individual cell that was stimulated in a monkeys cortex as it perceived rightward motion (Gazzaniga, Irvy, and Mangun, 618). In other words, the monkeys performance
capacity to distinguish movement could be predicted by a single neuron (Gazzaniga, Irvy, and
Mangun, 618). Scientists believe that this study simply suggests we have tapped into a part of
the neural loop involved with particular perceptual discrimination (Gazzaniga, Irvy, and
Mangun, 619), but this cannot not explain consciousness, considering it takes far more than one
cell to produce self-awareness.
Even with the findings mentioned above, there are extremely significant gaps in our
understanding of what consciousness even is. With so many questions still present, we can
clearly see that at this point in time science does not have the answers. Cognitive Neuroscience
is beginning to scratch the surface on defining the neural activity that makes up awareness, but
scientific language is not able to currently provide the mind enough awareness and
understanding in order for it to fully comprehend itself. As philosopher Allan Watts puts it, it is
like trying to bite your own teeth.

Works Cited
Gazzaniga, Irvy, and Mangun. Cognitive Neuroscience: The Biology of the Mind. N.p.: n.p., n.d.
Print.
"Meditation: An Introduction." National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine.
NIH, n.d. Web.

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