Saksek 1

Dustin Saksek
Dr. Lee
Phenomenology and Existentialism
2/20/12
Regarding An Idea About An Idea About the Concept of Existence
Is the past more necessary than the future? Or, when the possible becomes actual, is it
thereby made more necessary than it was? These are the subject questions of Soren
Kierkegaards piece Interlude (Kierkegaard). In Interlude he attempts to methodically
answer these two questions by tenuously stepping from the subject of Coming into Existence,
to The Historical, to The Past, to Apprehension of the Past, and lastly concluding with
Application. This paper will follow Kierkegaards argument providing a summery, a walkway
through the strenuous reading of Interlude, as well as my own challenges and criticisms of the
piece.
In what sense is there change in that which comes into existence? Is the opening
question of Coming into Existence, the first chapter of this piece. What is being addressed
here is; what changes are suffered by a thing, anything at all, as it comes into existence?
Kierkegaard promptly notes that all other kinds of change assume the sufferer of said change
already exists, thus the chance is an alteration of state in something already clearly in existence.
This is the case even when the very change happening is something ceasing to exist. Coming
into existence is different from both of these in that the subject did/does not exist, and the very
change in this non-existent sufferer, is that it is becoming existent, it is becoming something that

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exists. So clearly the coming into existence kind of change must be a third type of change. This
might be mistaken, notes Kierkegaard, as the observer may note a change separate from the
subject change, and report the separate copresent change rather than the initial subject itself. He
provides this example;
If a plan in coming into existence [in being fulfilled or carried out]
is in itself changed, it is not this plan which comes into existence;
but if it comes into existence without being changed, what then is
the change of coming into existence? (Kierkegaard 33)
Should a plan in formulation begin, any alterations from the initial structure change said plan.
Thus, post change, this is no longer the original plan. In creating plan X, change 1 was
created resulting in original plan X with the addition of the one change 1. This creates
X+1, which is separate and different from X. So when addressing the change of something
coming into existence it must be noted that it is not a change of essence, of X with the addition
of 1 creates X+1, but rather a change from not-existing to existing. (Kierkegaard 33)
But this non-being which the subject of coming into existence
leaves behind must itself have some sort of being. Otherwise the
subject of coming into existence would not remain unchanged
during the change of coming into existence, (Kierkegaard 33)
The non-being Kierkegaard addresses is identified as possibility itself. Then should the nonbeing, what has yet to come into existence be possibility, what actually has come into existence,
at the moment it is in existence is actuality, the actual. (Kierkegaard 34) The third type of

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change then, separate than the suffering of an existing thing, is the transition from possibility, to
actuality. (Kierkegaard)
Having defined the types three types of changes, and the constituents of the third type
Kierkegaard moves on to ask Can the necessary come into existence. (Kierkegaard 34) To
answer this necessary must be defined. He does so stating this; the necessary cannot be
changed, since it always relates itself to itself and relates itself to itself in the same way.
(Kierkegaard 34) Then by this definition, no, the necessary cannot come into existence as
coming into existence is itself a change (Kierkegaard 34). This is doubly so when considering
that the coming into existence sort of change involves the possible becoming the actual. Not
only is there the transition from possible to actual, but the ceasing of existence of the original
possibility after said transition takes place. Recall X + 1 = X+1. X in this case being the
possibility, and X+1 being the actuality. Not only does X become X+1 having undergone
this transition, but X itself ceases to be. Kierkegaard summarizes the point of this quite nicely
with, Everything which comes into existence proves precisely by coming into existence that it is
not necessary (Kierkegaard 34).
Kierkegaard applies this same logic to the notion that the necessary is a synthesis of
possibility and actuality (Kierkegaard). He comes to the conclusion that no, it is not, and with
the logic having played out already above it is clear why; a synthesis is a change in two or more
parts resulting in the final product. This is a change, something the necessary cannot do,
otherwise it would not be necessary (Kierkegaard 34). This however does not consider the
possibility that should possibility and actuality be constituents of the necessary, they do not need
an actual synthesis, but rather a constant eternal state in which possibility and actuality are, and
have always been indefinitely bonded. This could be comparable to the idea that while no matter

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may achieve a speed equal to or faster than that of light, there may still be particles which do not
achieve this speed and/or greater, but always travel at this speed. (Kooistra) This speed, as is the
idea of possibility and actuality being constituents of necessity, is not an achieved status, but an
ascribed one.
Continuing Kierkegaard reiterates several times that nothing necessary ever comes into
existence before claiming, The actual is no more necessary than the possible, for the necessary
is absolutely different from both (Kierkegaard). This could mistakenly be taken as; because
X =/= Z, and Y =/= Z, X must = Y. The subject of comparison is not the variable here, it is not
stating that because possibility is not necessary, and that actuality is not necessary, so possibility
is actuality, but rather the worth assigned to these subjects is what is being measured. Consider it
written this way, with the numbers after the variables signifying value, the variables being of no
true importance; X(0) =/= Z(20), and Y(0) =/= Z(20). Z here is the only subject of value,
regardless of what Y or X denote, if not equal in value to Z, they are equally useless
regarding Z, or regarding necessity. This, and the following are critiques on Aristotles
doctrine of the two kinds of possibility in relationship to the necessary. Secondly he states that
possibility cannot be predicated of the necessary which makes perfect sense considering that
saying otherwise ignores that the transition from possibility to actuality is a change, and the
necessary cannot change in any way, shape, or form.
Necessity, dictated by its own nature to be eternally static in every meaning of the word,
can never change, so the transition from possibility to actuality is something entirely different.
This transition takes place with freedom. One might note here how freedom itself then inherits
the arbitrary nature of possibility from which it coincides once recognizing possibility as entirely
unnecessary. The idea that any event is necessary, as Kierkegaard explains, is an illusion. All

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that comes into existence does so by a cause, then every cause terminates in a freely effecting
cause (Kierkegaard 35). Y needs X to exist, but neither X nor Y is necessary at all,
this illusion of necessity is entirely relative.
Beginning the second portion of Interlude Kierkegaard discusses The Historical. He
begins in stating that everything that has come into existence is eo ipso (matter of fact)
historical, this is even if the only property possessed by said thing, is the fact that it has come
into existence (Kierkegaard 35). This claim while seeming true at a glance, neglects to address
any definition of historical. Is it something, recognized or not, that has come to pass? If not
recognized, if there is no evidence of some event occurring, and none who might speak for this
event, is it still historical? Stating that it is historical insinuates that it is recognized. Should
something entirely fall from all recognition and/or memory, is it then historical? If so, who
would consider it historical, those who are unaware of its existence? Do they then assign this
property of historical to something they can never possibly acknowledge? No, this is
paradoxical and it is not true that everything that has come into existence is historical. While
Kierkegaard neglects to acknowledge that this might be applied to any generic thing that might
go entirely unnoticed (to acknowledge an example would be paradoxical in of itself, as it would
then be noticed, and then have an assigned/recognized history.), but does apply this dilemma to
the abstract concept of nature.
He explains how the historical is dependent upon a capacity to tell a story. Nature clearly
cannot do this for itself. Nature is not sentient, nature cannot identify the changes within itself,
that is something we as humans do with a limited capacity to measure only what we observe, and
of what we observe, only what we pay attention to. In this sense then, as Kierkegaard points out,
two things come into existence with each change of the coming into existence kind, so long as it

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is noticed. As something comes into existence, it does just that, comes into existence through a
change from possibility to actuality. At the same time another coming into existence type of
change occurs, and this is the creation of history within a coming into existence (Kierkegaard
36). Witnessing something coming into existence, acknowledging through any of our senses the
fact that X exists creates the history of X existing as it was experienced. Even should X
undergo a change causing it to cease to exist, there is a level of permanency in the history, so
long as it is recognized, that X did exist.
This creation of history moves Kierkegaard from discussing The Historical to
discussing The Past, opening with What has happened has happened, and cannot be undone.
(Kierkegaard) He rightly notes that while this is immutable, it is different from the immutability
of the necessary in this immutability has been brought about by change, something the necessary
cannot undergo. He continues,
If the past is conceived as necessary, this can happen only by
virtue of forgetting that it has come into existence; is such a
forgetfulness perhaps also necessary? (Kierkegaard 36)
One possible answer to this question steps into the epistemic realm regarding how we take in
information from the world around us, and how said information is used to learn. All we know
is based on either personal experience, or the word of another. The past must be acknowledged
to prepare for the future. Society, even single individuals simply could not function without this,
so yes this forgetfulness is necessary. Kierkegaard then returns to the immutability of both the
past, and of necessity,

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What has happened has happened as it happened; in this sense it

does not admit of chance. But is this immutability identical with
the immutability of the necessary? (Kierkegaard 37)
One answer to this is an all around no, these are not identical at all should you consider the past
as something historical. The immutability of the historical depends upon recognition to exist. If
no one has a thought about X, X is not. Also, while immutable, this is an achieved
immutability, not an ascribed immutability as is possessed by the necessary. Yet another
difference between the immutability of the past/historic, and the immutability of the necessary is
in how the necessary is always relating itself to itself always in the same manner, where with
the past or historic the thus, or what may always be recognized, but the how may change,
and is not consistent (Kierkegaard 37). Moving on Kierkegaard addresses the future, the
possible. The future has not yet happened. But it is not on that account less necessary than the
past (Kierkegaard 37). While no less necessary than the past, it still is not necessary. Consider
that having come into existence the past-past-future(present day past) was/is not necessary If it
were necessary there would be no future beyond stated time, at which point time itself would
become static. But even then, one time becoming necessary is contradictory in of itself in that it
is undergoing change. Kierkegaard makes the same point like this; If necessity could gain a
foothold at a single point there would no longer be any distinguishing between the past and the
future (Kierkegaard 37). This seems to hold true, if one point in time became, or was
necessary, then time would not progress, rather, the future, or all possibilities would cease to
exist, and simply not be. As would the past, since no possible future could transition from
possible to actual to no longer. The creation of past would not be. This would also mean there

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would be no freedom in any sense of the term. Without possibility, there is only what is,
freedom depends on possibility for probable possibilities to be realized and become actualities.
Moving to The Apprehension of the Past Kierkegaard notes the dialectic property
everything existing has in regards to time. Anything having existed, even if no longer existing
has left behind the fact that it did, it creates past (Kierkegaard 38). With more reiteration
Kierkegaard continues in stating that if history is the concretion of the Idea then it can hold an
immutability about itself in that it has happened, and once having transpired cannot be changed.
So from that point forward relates to itself exactly the same every time. But therein lies another
problem. History being assigned by sentience can only be assigned by sentience, beyond even
this, the designated assignment may change from person to person, from time to time, and so it
continues to change based upon who relates it (Kierkegaard 39). Rather, than history being the
concretion of an idea, history perhaps is more of the creation of an idea which resembles the
experience(s) of the past. He continues by stating that every apprehension of the past which
proposes to understand it better by construing it, has only the more thoroughly misunderstood it.
(Kierkegaard 39) This seems sound; To understand is to assimilate, but one can not assimilate
what no longer is. One can only assimilate the idea of what is believed to have been, therefore
an understanding of the past itself cannot be, but rather, an understanding of an idea resembling
the past is possible. Again Kierkegaard highlights how unnecessary the past is, that the illusion
of some form of temporal necessity is entirely relative before moving onto his summery of,
Knowledge of the present does not confer necessity upon it;
foreknowledge of the future gives it no necessity; knowledge of the
past confers no necessity upon the past; for no knowledge and no
apprehension has anything of its own to give. (Kierkegaard 39)

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Kierkegaard throws the word knowledge around in this passage far too casually. How does he
define it? What does he believe knowledge is? There is no way to know anything of the
future yet he uses it as an example. Belief about the future perhaps, but he does not state having
belief about the future having any impact on necessity, he states knowledge does not. This
passage when considering the vast number of ways to interpret what knowledge is, what
constitutes it, does it even exist(?), is simply baffling.
Moving to his next paragraph, the thought begins with;
Whoever apprehends the past, historico-philosophus, is therefore a
prophet in retrospect. That he is a prophet expresses the fact that
the certainty of the past is based upon an uncertainty, an
uncertainty that exists for the past in precisely the same sense that
it exists for the future, being rooted in the possibility. (Kierkegaard
39-40)
While he is correct in stating that prediction is rooted in the possibility, Kierkegaard is incorrect
in this possibility being of precisely the same sense. To understand the past is to be able to
relate some form of history, some idea which emulates the past with some percentage of
accuracy. To then understand the future compounds this understanding of the past.
Understanding the future in this sense is to first understand an idea of the past which has a high
probability of being a correct representation of what actually occurred, then once possessing the
model of the past probable possibilities can be drawn from it; because I opened a box of cereal
five seconds ago, in the near future I intend to eat said cereal. They are both rooted in
possibility, but the later, understanding the future, is much more involved.

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Works Cited
Kierkegaard, Soren, David F. Swenson, Niels Thulstrup, and Howard V. Hong. Philosophical
Fragments, or, A Fragment of Philosophy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press,
1962. Print.
Kooistra, J.. "THE CHINK IN EINSTEIN'S ARMOR." Analog Science Fiction & Fact 1 Apr.
2012: Research Library, ProQuest. Web. 20 Feb. 2012.