PELE 14.3 Can Animals Be Taught Language? 14.3.1 Attempts to Teach Animals Language ‘The previous file discussed how animals communicate in the wild. As far as we know, 0 naturally occurring animat communication system is either qualitatively or quantitatively equivalent to uman language. But just because animals do not use or acquire language nat- urally does not necessarily mean that they cannot be taught. This file describes attempts to teach primates language. 14.3.2 Primate Studies ‘The grest apes (gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans) are very intelligent crea tures and Homo sapiens’ nearest relatives in the animal kingdom. Chimpanzees, for ex- ample, share close to 99% of their genetic material with human beings. This biological similarity of ape and human, as well as tbe apes’ inteliigence, has protnpted some scientists ‘0 wonder if language could be taught to apes, even though ape language does not occur naturally (see File 14.2). Many such projects have been conducted, most in the past thirty years or so, The ape used most often has been the chimpanzee, mainly because they are ‘most easily available. They are also considered to be one of the most intelligent of the great apes, Orangutans, gorillas, and bonobos have also been used in some studies. ‘These experiments have generated both exuberance and disappointment, anc a tig- ‘orous debate about the interpretation of their results continues to the present day. On the ‘one hand, there are still some scientists who maintain that they have indeed taught an ape touse human language. On the other, many scientists dispute this claim and have proposed alternative explanations for the behaviors other researchers assumed could only have been Tanguage use. We will return to this debate later a. Early Projects. The first prominent experiment conducted on the linguistic ca- ‘pacity of great apes in the United States took place in the 1930s, W. N. and L. A. Kellogg wanted to raise a baby chimpanzee in a human environment to determine whether the chimp would acquire language on its own, just as a human child does, merely by virtue of being exposed to it. They decided not to give training or “forcible teaching” to Gua, the chimp they acquired at seven and a half months, other than that which would be given a ‘human infant. Gua was raised alongside the Kelloggs’ newborn son, Donald, and the de- velopment of the chimp was compared to the boy's. W. Kellogg stated that his intent was to determine how much of human language ability derived from heredity and how much from education. He reasoned, a bit naively in retrospect, that what the chimp could not learn would be those aspects of language that a human inherently knows. Kellogg admitted one violation of this program when, at one point, he attempted to mold Gue's lips in an ef- fort to teach her to say papa. This effort, lasting several months, proved unsuccessful. The uration of the Kelloggs’ experiment was rather short (obly nine months) in comparison to those that were to follow, 576File 14.3, Can Animals Be Taught Language? 57? Jn the 1950s, Keith and Cathy Hayes decided to raise Viki, a female chimp, also as much like a uman child as possible, believing that with @ proper upbringing, a chirap could learn language. The Hayeses believed that they could teach Viki to speak, even ‘though doubt was emerging at the time about whether the chimpanzee’s vocal anatomy could even produce human speech sounds. The Hayeses, hrowever, believed that the vocal ‘tract of the chimp was similar enough to a human's for it ta be able to articulate human sounds. They had no aversion to “training,” and their program included fist teaching Viki to vocalize on demand (this took five weeks), and then shaping her lips with their hands into various configurations that yielded consonant sounds. After three years, Viki could “speak” three words— ora spoken word with a particular phonological form. Second, many words have re- erence. Reference s the relationship of the form to a eal tree somewhere. Third, these is the mental representation we have for the word tre, an idea of tree that is calied up when we hear, say, see, or think of the word tree, Note that “mental representation” dees not mean ‘image’ ox ‘pictme'—not every word can have one of these either (see File 6.2). Mental rep- resentations have an existence separate from reference and can be menipilaicd indepen- dently from reference, Thus, we can think and tatk about things like invistbiity for which ‘we do not have a menta! image, but for which we do bave a mental representation. No one disputes that humans use their words in this way, Furthermore, no ope dis putes that in many cases animals have been able to associate a phonological ot visual form ofa sign with a referent. But how are we to know whether an ape, when it uses a signin the same way we might, really has a mental cepresentation for it? Savage-Rembaugh has sug. gested that in all previous experiments, apes were not using thelr signs symbolically. Se augues that apes had mertly leaned 10 associate certain behaviors (making ar seeing a particular sign) with cercain consequences (@g, getting somethingto eatl—similar toadog. or example, which, upon hearing the word walk, knows i's going to get to go for a walk. This is an extremely subtie distinction fos hutsaas to perceive, since the use of symbols comes naturally to us, We interpret other creatures’ signals to-us in the same way we inter- pret those from each other, but that doesn’t necessarily mean they're intended in the same ‘way. For this reason, Savage-Rumbaugh has pointed out the necessty of proper experiraents that prove that an ape has truly acquired a word in the same way a froman has. She hasAnimal Communication criticized the Claims made about previous projects either because they were not based on testing with proper controls or because use of symbols had not been tested at all, In addi tion, Savage-Rumbaugh reasoned that because apes had not Jearned to use symbols given the training techniques used previously (which had assumed that the symbol aspect of sign use would come naturally), apes must specifically and intentionally be taught to use sym- bols fist, before tests could be informatively administered. How could Savage-Rumbaugh determine whether such instruction was successfil: ‘how can one find evidence of a mental phenomenon? One must still look for it in the be- havior of the animal or in the “processes of the exchange” with the trainet, but one cust, bbe more discriminating about what counts as evidence. Savage-Rumbaugh and her col- leagues have worked extensively with two male chimpanzees, Sherman and Austin, at- ‘tempting to teach them language skills with the computer and the lexigrams used with Lana. They have found that use of symbols by humans is not a single holistic phenomenon butrather a complex of independent abilities and behaviors. For example, the ability to pro- duce a symbol was found to be composed of at least three separate abilities. Using the a5s0- ciation of a lexigram and an object to request the object is only one of these (and a display of this ability does not prove the user has a mental representation for the symbol). Naming 48a second relevant behavior, which involves providing the lexigram associated with an ob- ject without the expectation of consuming or receiving that object. The third ability m- volved in symbol use is called comprehension of the symbol. It involves inking the symbol to its referent. One might find it difficult to separate these three, but they each had to be taught separately to the chimpanzee, and the presence of one ability could not be assumed because of the presence of another. Savage-Rombaugh also points out the extreme importance of a fourth aspect of sym- bol use and human communication that had previousty been overlooked: the role of the receiver or listener. This in itself was also found to comprise its own compiex of skills and behaviors, each of which had to be taught separately to Sherman and Austin. Savage- Rumbaugh claims to have been successful at teaching the chimps these skills as well as the links between them (the coordination that occurs naturally in humans). Furthermore, she has acknowledged Terrace’s criticisms of other projects but main- tains that Sherman and Austin do not evidence Nim’s shortcomings. She maintains that they take tums, their utterances are not imitations of their trainers, ané that they produce ‘messages not only when they are elicited, burt at other times as well ‘This project certainty has made re] progress both in clarifying what human language skills are and in investigating our ability to teach them to apes. Criticisms have been lev ‘led, of course. Some suggest that, again, the apes have been skillfully trained but still nei- ‘ther comprehend what they are saying nor use their signs symbolically. After all, itis pethaps impossible to know whether another creature has a mental representation for a word. Savage Rumbaugh might respond that this criticism fs a reflection of 2 cynical att tude rather than scientific considerations. However, given past experience and the ten- dency to overinterpret, there is @ need to scrutinize the claims in this eld. ‘Savage-Rumbaugh’s most recently begun project must be mentioned. She has started towork with another species of epe, the bonobo, Pan paniscus, which she claims is more in- telligent than the common chimpanzee, Pan troglodytes, which she had used in all of her other projects, She claims that the bonobo she has been working with, Kanzi, has learned to comprehend spoken English just by being exposed to it and has spontaneously begun to use the keyboard with lexigrams to make requests and comment on bis environment. Savage-Rumbaugh reports both anecdotal observations and the results of tests that might substantiate these astonishing claims. Again, these newest claims are difficult to accept with- ‘out further confirmation based on carefully controlled experimentation and the objective scrutiny thet was advocated at the inception of the Sherman and Austin project.