SATURNINO OCAMPO V.

JUDGE EPHREM ABANDO

FACTS
P C/Insp. Almaden of the (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Army Captain Tiu of the
8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte.
o The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavit
accusing 71 named CPP/NPA/NDFP of murder.
o The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry
Brigade of the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan,
Leyte.
o The mass grave contained 67 skeletal remains of individuals believed to
be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by
members of the (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected
military informers.
o Attached to the letters were the affidavits of the former members of
CPP/NPA/NDFP. According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985
by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.
The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team conducted a crime
investigation to collect, preserve and analyse the skeletal remains in the mass
grave. An investigation team composed of intelligence officers, and medico-legal
and DNA experts, conducted forensic crime analysis and collected from alleged
relatives of the victims DNA samples for matching.
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued
a subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits
and those of their witnesses.
o Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counter-affidavit.
o Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis did not file counter-affidavits because
they were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence.
o Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8
December 2006 during the preliminary investigation. However, Ladlad did
not file a counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not served a
subpoena.
Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of
multiple murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.
o The Information was filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte presided by
Judge Ephrem S. Abando.
o Petitioner Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for
Clarificatory Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior to receiving a copy of the
Resolution recommending the filing of the Information.
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause and
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended
bail for their temporary liberty.
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before the S.C. a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
docketed as GR 176830 seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of
Judge Abando and the 16 February 2007 Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.
o Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44
others (including petitioners Echanis and Baylosis and Ladlad) was then
pending before the RTC Makati.
o Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues
that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed
by the crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in
connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.
o The OSG was asked to comment on the petition and the case was set for
oral arguments. Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their
memoranda within 10 days.
o On 3 April 2007, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner
Ocampo under a P100,000 cash bond.
The prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information and New
Informations on 11 April 2007 based on the oral arguments that the single
Information filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective for charging 15
counts of murder.
o In an Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge Abando held in abeyance the
resolution thereof and effectively suspended the proceedings during the
pendency of G.R. No. 176830 in the SC.
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested on 28
January 2008 by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on 6
March 2007.
On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to
Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of
Warrant.
o Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.
o Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order
transmitting the records of Criminal Case to the Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC Manila.
o The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided
by Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina (Judge Medina) and re-docketed as
Criminal Case No. 08-262163.
o Petitioner Echanis was transferred to the PNP Custodial Center in Camp
Crame, Quezon City.
o Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their Supplemental Arguments to
Motion for Reconsideration.
In an Order dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the
proceedings of the case pending the resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this
Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion to
Quash and/or Dismiss.
Petitioners Echanis (on Dec. 23,2008) and Baylosis (on Jan. 5, 2009) filed a
before the S.C. a petition for a special civil action for Certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 30
April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge
Medina .
o The petitions were consolidated on January 12, 2009.
o The OSG was asked to comment on the prayer for petitioner Echaniss
immediate release. The OSG did not interpose any objection on these
conditions: that the temporary release shall only be for the purpose of his
attendance and participation in the formal peace negotiations between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August 2009; and that his temporary
release shall not exceed six (6) months. The latter condition was later
modified, such that his temporary liberty shall continue for the duration of
his actual participation in the peace negotiations.
o On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner
Echanis under a P100,000 cash bond, for the purpose of his participation
in the formal peace negotiations.
Meanwhile, the DOJ filed its Opposition to petitioner Ladlads motion to quash
before the RTC Manila.
o The motion to quash was denied by Judge Medina.
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6
May 2009 and 27 August 2009 Orders of Judge Medina. The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 190005.
o Petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail.
o Petitioner Baylosis filed A Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail.
o The OSG interposed no objection to the grant of a P100,000 cash bail to
them considering that they were consultants of the NDFP negotiating
team, which was then holding negotiations with the GRP peace panel for
the signing of a peace accord.
o The motions of Petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis to post bail (Php 100,000)
was granted, subject to the condition that their temporary release shall be
limited to the period of their actual participation in the peace negotiations.
ISSUES
1. Whether the Petitioners were accorded due process during the preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges against the petitioners should be dismissed under
the political offense doctrine.

HELD
1. The Petitioners were accorded due process during the Preliminary Investigation.
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law
entails the opportunity to be heard.
The Petitioners were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known
address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.
This is sufficient for due process.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to
resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could
not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and
he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the
preliminary investigation remains valid.
Having opted to remain passive during the preliminary investigation, petitioner
Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of due process, since their
failure to file a counter-affidavit was of their own doing.
2. The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the
trial judge
As a general rule, the trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not
be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion
Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the
arrest of the accused is a question of fact based on the allegations in the
Informations, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other
documents and/or evidence appended to the Information.
3. The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of rebellion.
Political offense doctrine
o common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from
the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion.
A well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure: The institution of criminal
charges, including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound
discretion of the public prosecutor.
When the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court,
it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was
done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act to
be conclusively demonstrated.
Any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be
made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party
and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the
motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the
offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial.
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for which the
accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.
o Petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944. Even
before the indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati,
petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a petition
before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ
denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the
prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and independence.
o When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and
Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 06-944.131 and the rebellion case was dismissed.
It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDGARDO ODTUHAN
GR. NO. 191566
July 17, 2013

FACTS:
In 1980, Odtuhan, respondent, married Jasmin Modina.
In 1993, he married Evelyn Alagon, private complainant.
In 1994, Odtuhan filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Molina which
was granted by the RTC of Pasig in 1999 for lack of a valid marriage license.
In 2003, Alagon filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging Odtuhan with bigamy. An
Infomartion was filed in 2005.
In 2008, Odtuhan filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the quashal of the
infomation based on the following grounds:
o that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy
o that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by the declaration
of nullity of the first marriage
RTC of Manila denied Odtuhan's Omnibus Motion, stating:
o that the facts alleged constitute the crime of bigamy
o the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of
extinguishing criminal liability
On appeal via a special civil action on certiotari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, stating:
o one essential element of the crime of bigamy is wanting: valid first
marriage (Morigo case application)
o the Odtuhan was in a better position than Morigo since the declaration of
nullity was obtained before the complaint was filed against him

ISSUES:
WON the motion to quash the information is proper
WON the declaration of nullity of the first marriage extinguished the criminal
liability of Odtuhan which already attached prior to such declaration.

HELD:
Motion to quash the information is NOT proper.
As defined in the Antone case, "a motion to quash information is the mode by
which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed
against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information."
A motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is
evident on its fact.
If the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, prosecution is given by the court the
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is
sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed
except when the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal
liability or double jeopardy.
SC held that the information against Odtuhan is sufficient to constitue the crime
of bigamy.
o The declaration of nullity of the first marriage is only an evidence that
seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information. This is
a matter of defense and cannot be raised in a motion to quash.

The declaration of nullity of the first marriage DID NOT extinguish the criminal liability of
Odtuhan for bigamy.
Odtuhan's criminal liability has already attached because when he contracted the
second marriage with Alagon, his first marriage with Modina is still validly
subsisting. The declaration of nullity was only obtained in 1999 whereas the
second marriage was contracted in 1993.
A judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage is required BEFORE a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted.


ISABELO A. BRAZA v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (1
ST
DIVISION)
GR. NO. 195032, FEB. 20, 2013
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Braza seeking to reverse and set aside the two Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan.
FACTS
In preparation for the 12
th
ASEAN Leaders Summit in December 2006 held in the province of
Cebu, the DPWH identified projects relative to the improvement and rehabilitation of roads and
installation of traffic safety devices and lighting facilities.
4 out of 11 street lighting projects were awarded to FABMIK Construction and Equipment Supply
Company, Inc. in which Braza is the president. The 3 other projects were bidded out only on November
28, 2006 or less than 2 weeks before the scheduled start of Summit. Thereafter, the DPWH and FABMIK
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby FABMIK obliged itself to implement the
projects at its own expense and the DPWH to guarantee the payment of the work accomplished.
FABMIK was able to complete these projects within the deadline of 10 days utilizing its own resources
and credit facilities. The schedule of the ASEAN Leaders Summit, however, was moved by the national
organizers to January 9-15, 2007 due to typhoon Seniang.
TIMELINE OF THE CASE
After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before Public Assistance and Corruption
Prevention Office (PACPO), Ombudsman Visayas, alleging that the ASEAN Summit street lighting
projects were overpriced.
March 16, 2007 - Ombudsman directed the DBM and the DPWH to cease and desist from
releasing or disbursing funds for the projects in question.
March 23, 2007 - The fact-finding body issued its Evaluation Report recommending the filing of
charges for violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practice Act against the DPWH officials and Employees in Region VII and thee cities of Mandaue
and Lapu-lapu, and the private ontractors FABMIK and GAMPIK Construction and Development,
Inc.
This report was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (OMB-
Visayas) for the conduct of preliminary investigation.

January 24, 2008 - After the P.I., the OMB-Visayas issued its Resolution finding probable cause to
indict the concerned respondents for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. It was found that the
lampposts and other lighting facilities installed were indeed highly overpriced and that the
contracts entered into between the govt officials and the private contractors were manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
OMB-Visayas filed several informations before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Sec.
3(g) of RA 3019 against the officials of DPWH Region VII, the officials of the cities of Mandaue
and Lapu-lapu and private contractors, FABMIK President Braza and GAMPIK Board Chairman
Surla.
1
st
information - which involved the street lighting project covered by Contract I.D. No.
06H00050 with FABMIK, was raffled to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. It was alleged
therein that Braza acted in conspiracy with the public officials and employees in the commission
of the crime charged.
2
nd
information is dated May 4, 2009.
June 6, 2008 - Braza was arraigned as a precondition to his authorization to travel abroad. He
entered a plea of not guilty.
August 14, 2008 - motions for reinvestigation filed by Radaza (Mayor) and the DPWH officials were
denied by the Sandiganbayan for lack of merit. Consequently, they moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution.
August 27, 2008 - Braza filed a motion for reinvestigation anchored on the following ground:
(1) The import documents relied upon by the OMB-Visayas were spurious and falsified.
(2) Consiituted new evidence, if considered, would overturn the finding of probable
cause
(3) The finding of overpricing was bereft of factual and legal basis.

He prayed for suspension of the proceedings of the case pending such
reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan treated Brazas motion as his motion for
reconsideration of its August 14, 2008 Resolution.
November 3, 2008 - the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its August 14,2008 resolution and directed a
reinvestigation of the case.
November 13, 2008 - Braza filed a manifestation to make of record that he was maintaining his
previous plea of not guilty without any condition.
February 2, 2009 - Braza filed his manifestation informing the Sandiganbayan of his intention to
abandon his previous motion for reinvestigation. He opined that the prosecution would merely
use the reinvestigation proceedings as a means to engage in a second unbridled fishing
expedition to cure the lack of probable cause.
March 23, 2009 - Braza filed a motion in support of the abandonment of reinvestigation with a
plea to vacate Information, insisting that the further reinvestigation of the case would only
afford the prosecution a second round preliminary investigation which would be vexatious,
oppressive and violative of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case,
warranting its dismissal with prejudice.

May 4, 2009 - OMB-Visayas issued Supplemental Resolution (2
nd
Information) which upheld
the finding of probable cause but modified the charge from violation of Sec 3(g) of RA 3019 to
violation of Sec 3(e) of same law.
July 1, 2009 - Braza filed his Comment with Plea for Discharge and/or Dismissal of the Case.
He claimed that the first information had been rendered ineffective or had been deemed
vacated by the issuance of the Supplemental resolution and, hence, his discharge from the first
information was in order. By way of an alternative prayer, Braza sought the dismissal of the case
with prejudice claiming that his right to speedy disposition of the case had been violated.
Braza averred that he could not be arraigned under the second information
without violating the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
October 12, 2009 - the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed Resolution admitting the Ammended
Information, dated May 4, 2009, (2
nd
Information) and denying Brazas plea for dismissal of the
criminal case. The Sandiganbayan ruled that Braza would not be placed in double jeopardy
should he be arraigned anew under the 2
nd
information because previous arraignment was
conditional (a precondition to Brazas request to travel).
Sandiganbayan continued that even if he was regularly, arraigned, double
jeopardy would still not set in because the 2
nd
information charged an offense different from,
and which did not include or was necessarily included in, the original offense charged.
Lastly, it found that delay in the reinvestigation proceedings could not be
characterized as vexatious, capricious or oppressive and that it could not be attributed to the
prosecution.
Consequently, Sandiganbayan DENIED Brazas Alternative Relief for Dismissal of
the Case and set the arraignment on November 18, 2009.
November 6, 2009 - Braza moved for reconsideration with alternative motion to quash the
information reiterating his arguments that his right against double jeopardy and his right to a
speedy disposition of the case were violated warranting the dismissal of the criminal case with
prejudice.
In the alternative, Braaza moved for the quashal of the second information
vigorously asserting that the same was fatally defective for failure to allege any actual, specified
and quantifiable injury sustained by the government as required by law for indictment under
Sec 3(e) of RA 3019, and that the pricing was unfounded.
October 22, 2010 - Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed resolution which denies Brazas
Motion to Quash the information. The anti-graft court ruled that the Ammended Information
was sufficient in substance as to inform the accused of the nature and causes of the accusations
against them.
The Sandiganbayan deemed it proper that a new preliminary investigation be
conducted under the new charge. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the Office of the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor for P.I. of violation 3(e) of RA 3019.

ISSUE
WON the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying Brazas plea for the
dismissal of the case and his subsequent motion to quash the Second Information, particularly
on the grounds of:
1. double jeopardy,
2. violation of his right to a speedy disposition of the case,
3. failure of the information to state every single fact to constitute all the elements of
the offense charged.

RULING
The petition is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, much less did it gravely err, in denying Brazas motion to
quash the information/dismiss the case.
1. Constitutional right under Double Jeopardy Clause
Brazas assertion: his arraignment under the first information was simple and
unconditional and, thus, an arraignment under the second
information would put him in double jeopardy.
Courts ruling: the arraignment of the accused was conditional (a precondition
for Brazas request to travel) in the sense that if Information will
be amended as a result of the pending incidents, he cannot
invoke his right against double jeopardy and he shall submit
himself to arraignment anew under such Ammended
Information.
On the other hand, his conditional arraignment shall not
prejudice his right to question such Ammended information.
Note: The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting provisional or conditional
arraignment of the accused is NOT specifically sanctioned by
the Revised Internal Rules of the Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Procedures.
The court had tangentially recognized such practice in People v.
Espinosa, provided that the alleged conditions attached to the
arraignment should be unmistakable, express, informed and
enlightened. The Court further required that the conditions
must be expressly stated in the order disposing of arraignment,
otherwise, it should be deemed simple and unconditional.

The arraignment of Braza under the 1
st
information was conditional in nature as it was a
mere accommodation in his favor to enable him to travel abroad without the Sandiganbayan losing its
ability to conduct trial in absentia in case he would abscond. The Sandiganbayans Order clearly and
unequivocally states that if the information would be amended, he shall waive his constitutional right to
be protected against double jeopardy and shall allow himself to be arraigned on the amended
information without losing his right to question the same. Such waiver was clear, categorical and
intelligent. Braza is now estopped from assailing its conditional nature just to conveniently avoid being
arraigned and prosecuted of the new charge under the second information.
FOR ARGUMENTATIVE PURPOSES ONLY
Assuming that there was a valid and unconditional plea, Braza cannot plausibly rely on
the principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment under the second information because the
offense charged is different and not included in the offense charged under the first information.
Article III, Sec 21a.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the accused has the buren of demonstrating the
following requisites:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
a. the first jeopardy attached only
i. after a valid indictment
ii. before a competent court
iii. after arraignment
iv. when a valid plea has been entered
v. when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed ot
otherwise terminated without his express consent
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the first.
The doctrine of double jeopardy is a revered constitutional safeguard against the accused
from risk of being prosecuted twice for the same offense, and not a different one. No double
jeopardy attaches as long as there is a variance between elements of the two offenses charged.
Although violation of Sec 3(g) of RA 3019 and violation of Sec 3(e) of the same law share a
common element, the accused being a public officer, the latter is not inclusive of the former.
The essential elements of each are not included among or do not form part of those
enumerated in the other.
There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges another
and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the
same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense.

2. Constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case
Brazas assertion: the proceedings have unquestionably been marred with
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay meriting the
dismissal of the case. Braza claims that it tok the OMB more
than two (2) years to charge him and his co-accused with
violation of Sec 3 in the second information.
Courts Ruling: the petitioners contention is untenable.
The constitutional guarantee to a speedy disposition of cases is
a relative or flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and
depends upon the circumstances. What a Constitution prohibits
are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which
render rights nugatory.
The determination of whether the right has been violated, the factors that may
be considered and balanced are as follows:
(a) The length of the delay
(b) The reasons for the delay
(c) The assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused
(d) The prejudiced caused by the delay
Using the above yardstick, the Court finds that Brazas right to a speedy
disposition of the case has not been infringed. Indeed, the delay can hardly be
considered as vexatious, capricious and oppressive. The complexity of the
factual and legal issues, the number of persons charged, the various pleadings
filed, and the volume of documents submitted, prevent this Court from yielding
to the petitioners claim of violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his
case.
Mere mathematical reckoning for the time spent for the investigation is not a
sufficient basis to conclude that there was arbitrary and inordinate delay.

3. Sufficiency of the allegations in the second information
Brazas assertion: Braza challenges the sufficiency of the allegations in the second
information because there is no indication of any actual and
quantifiable injury suffered by the government. He then argues
that the facts under the second information are inadequate to
support a valid indictment for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019.
Courts Ruling: The petitioners simple syllogism must fail.
There are 2 ways by which a public official violates Sec 3 (e) of RA 3019 in the performance of
his functions, namely:
(1) By causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or
(2) By giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference
The accused may be charged under either mode or both. Braza was indicted for violation of
Sec 3 (e) of RA 3019 under the second mode. To be found guilty under the second mode, it
suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor benefit to another, in the exercise of his
official, administrative and judicial functions. The element of damage is not required for
violation of Section 3 (e) under the second mode.
Settled is the rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may
be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Sec 3 of RA 3019.
Considering that all the elements of the offense of violation of Sec 3 (e) were alleged in the
second information, the Court finds the same to be sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction.


PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. LILIAN S. SORIANO
G.R. No. 164051
October 3, 2012

FACTS:
- PNB extended a credit facility in the form of a Floor Stock Line (FSL) in the increased
amount of 30 Million to Lisam Enterprises, Inc. (LISAM), a family-owned and
controlled corporation. Soriano is the chairman and president of LISAM, she is also the
authorized signatory in all LISAMs Transactions with PNB.
- On various dates, LISAM made several availments of the FSL in the total amount of
P29,645,944.55 and for each availment, LISAM through Soriano, executed 52 Trust
Receipts (TRs).
- PNBs authorized personnel conducted an actual physical inventory of LISAMs motor
vehicles and motorcycles and found that only 4 units covered by the TRs amounting to
140,800.00 remained unsold.
- Out of the 29,644,944.55 as the outstanding principal balance of the total availments,
LISAM should have remitted to PNB 29,487,844.55. Despite several formal demands,
respondent Soriano failed and refused to turn over the said amount to the prejudice of
PNB.
- It was stated in the given terms of the TRs that the trustee agrees to hold the Motor
Vehicles in storage as the property of PNB, with the liberty to sell the same for cash for
the Trustees account and to deliver the proceeds thereof to PNB to be applied against
its acceptance on the Trustees account. Also, for the purpose of effectively carrying out
all the terms and conditions of the Trust, the Trustee agreed and consented to allow and
permit PNB or its representatives to inspect all of the trustees books at any time and
whenever PNB, at its discretion, may find it necessary to do so.
- Also stated in the terms and conditions that the trustees failure to account to PNB for
the Motor Vehicles and the proceeds of the sale thereof within 30 days from PNBs
demand shall constitute a prima facie evidence that the trustee has misappropriated the
said vehicles and proceeds to the prejudice of PNB.
- Sorianos failure to account for the proceeds of the sale of the motor vehicles prompted
the PNB to file a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga
City
- Soriano filed a counter-affidavit asserting that the obligation of LISAM, and
consequently her obligation, if any, is purely civil in nature. She further alleged that
when her husband was still alive, LISAM submitted proposals to PNB for the
restructuring of all of LISAMs credit facilities and that the proposal was approved by
the Board of Directors of PNB. The FSL and the availments thereon allegedly secured by
Trust Receipts, therefore, was already converted into, and included in, an Omnibus Line
(OL) of 106 million, which was actually a Revolving Credit Line (RCL).
- PNB filed a reply-affidavit maintaining Sorianos criminal liability under the TRs. PNB
alleged that the restructuring was never implemented because LISAM failed to comply
with the conditions of approval, such as the payment of interest and other charges and
the submission of the title of the vacant residential land in Tandang Sora QC, and
therefore, the non-implementation of the approved restructuring of the account of
LISAM has the effect of reverting the account to its original status prior to the said
approval.
- City Prosecutor of Naga City found a prima facie evidence that Soriano is probably
guilty of the offense charged and filed information for 52 counts of Estafa before the
RTC Branch 21 of Naga City.
- PNB (PNB talaga nakalagay sa case, pero feeling to Soriano dapat to?) filed a petition
for review of the Naga City Prosecutors Resolution before the Secretary of the DOJ.
- RTC ordered the dismissal of one of the criminal cases against Soriano. Soriano was
arraigned and pled not guilty to the rest of the case.
- The DOJ reversed and set aside the earlier resolution of the Naga City Prosecutor
and directed said prosecutor to move, with leave of court, for the withdrawal of the
information for estafa against Lilian S. Soriano.
- RTC issued the following Orders:
o 27 November 2002
It gave the prosecution 15 days from receipt of the order to comply with the
directive of the Department of Justice.
o 21 February 2003
It granted the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by Prosec. Edgar Imperial. The
information is hereby ordered withdrawn.
o 15 July 2003
It denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the private complainant.
- PNB filed a petition for certiorari before the CA alleging that the secretary of DOJ
committed garve abuse of discretion in setting aside the resolution of the city
prosecutor.
- CA did not find grave abuse of discretion in the questioned resolution of the DOJ,
and dismissed PNBs petition for certiorari.
- NOTE: Respondent Soriano, despite several opportunities to do so, failed to file a
Memorandum as required by the SC. Thus, SC resolved to dispense with the filing of
Sorianos Memorandum.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether the withdrawal of Criminal Cases against Soriano as directed by the
DOJ violates the well-established rule that once the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a case, it is retained until termination of litigation.

2.) Whether the reinstatement of the 51 counts of criminal cases for estafa (1
already dismissed) against Soriano would violate her constitutional right
against double jeopardy.

3.) Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the DOJs ruling that
the restructuring of LISAMs loan secured by trust receipts extinguished
Sorianos criminal liability therefor.


HELD:
- Significantly, the trial court gave the prosecution 15 days within which to comply with
the DOJs directive, and thereupon, readily granted the motion. Indeed, the withdrawal
of the criminal cases did not occur, nay, could not have occurred, without the trial
courts imprimatur. BUT, a perusal of the RTCs Orders reveals that the trial court
relied solely on the Resolution of the DOJ Secretary and his determination that the
Information for estafa against Soriano ought to be withdrawn. The trial court abdicated
its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. On one
occasion, we have declared that while the recommendation of the prosecutor or the
ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
- In the same vein, the reinstatement of the criminal cases against Soriano will not violate
her constitutional right against double jeopardy.
- In the present case, the withdrawal of the criminal cases did not include a categorical
dismissal thereof by the RTC. Double jeopardy had not set in because Soriano was not
acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the 51 cases
against her. It stands to reason therefore that the fifth requisite which requires
conviction or acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the
approval of the accused, was not met.
- In Cerezo v. People, the SC states that: In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or
to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the
findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the courts bounden
duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be
embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. Since we have held that the Order
granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then
respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or
termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction and
acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the
accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.
- The purported restructuring of the loan agreement did not constitute novation.
Novation is one of the modes of extinguishment of obligations. The substitution or
change of the obligation by a subsequent one extinguishes the first, resulting in the
creation of a new obligation in lieu of the old. It is not a complete obliteration of the
obligor-obligee relationship, but operates as a relative extinction of the original
obligation.
- We look to whether there is an incompatibility between the Floor Stock Line secured by
TRs and the subsequent restructured Omnibus Line which was supposedly approved
by PNB. The test of incompatibility is whether the two obligations can stand
together, each one having its independent existence. If they cannot, they are
incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first.
- The records were scoured and no incompatibility was found between the Floor
Stock Line and the purported restructured Omnibus Line. While the restructuring
was approved in principle, the effectivity thereof was subject to conditions
precedent.
- Well-settled is the rule that, with respect to obligations to pay a sum of money, the
obligation is not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old, changes
only the terms of payment, adds other obligations not incompatible with the old ones,
or the new contract merely supplements the old one. Besides, novation does not
extinguish criminal liability.
- There was a grave error in the Court of Appeals dismissal of PNBs petition for
certiorari. Certainly, while the determination of probable cause to indict a respondent
for a crime lies with the prosecutor, the discretion must not be exercised in a whimsical
or despotic manner tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. The RTC is further
ordered to conduct the pretrial with dispatch.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA

FACTS:

Information charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC.
Following Lara's plea of not guilty, trial ensued.

PROSECUTION:
3 witnesses: Enrique Sumulong, SPO1 Bernard Cruz and PO3 Efren Calix
May 31, 2001, 9: 00 AM, he withdrew the amount of P230, 000. 00 from
the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasi g City todefray the salaries of the
employees of San Sebastian and while at around 10:30 AM, while the pickup he was
riding was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara
suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at
him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?";
Bautista, one of those who accompanied him told him not to give the bag. He threw
the bag in Bautista's direction and Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran. Seeing
Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun
He then ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to
relay the incident and when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went
to the rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground;
He was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken
away from him;
June 7, 2001: While on his way to Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil
Street, San Miguel, Pasig City and he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter
arrested. At the police station, he, Atie and Manacob identified Lara as the one who shot and
robbed them of San Sebastian's money.

DEFENSE:
LARA
May 31, 2001: he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother,
Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort room which was corroborated by his sister,
Edjosa Manalo and neighbor, Simplicia Delos Reyes.
June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of
his cousins, police officers arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara and after
confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to go with them to
the Barangay Hall. He voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car,
one of the policemen said,"You are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in another
place we will kill you".
He was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told
where he was investigated for robbery with homicide and when he told the police
that he was at home when the subject incident took place, the police challenged him
to produce witnesses but when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police
officers told them to come back the following day.
While he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told
Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan atuuwi na tayo"; and when his witnesses
arrived the following day, they were told that he will be subjected to an inquest.

RTC: GUILTY of robbery with homicide sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
Rejected Lara's defense of alibi as follows because Enrique Sumulong positively
identified accused Arturo Lara as the person who carted away the payroll money of
San Sebastian Allied Services, and the one who shot Joselito Bautista which caused
his instantaneous death on the same day. Also, it is not impossible for him to be at
the place

ARGUMENTS:

On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction.
First, that he was arrested without a warrant under circumstances that do not
justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all proceedings including those that led to
his conviction.
Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be
identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial investigation and his right
to counsel had already attached.
Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the prosecution failed to present a witness who actually saw him
commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he was the one who shot
Bautista and who took the bag of money from him. The physical description of Lara
that Sumulong gave to the police was different from the one he gave during the trial,
indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of the perpetrator.
Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his unidentified companion
who shot Bautista and took possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably
claimed that his conviction was attended with moral certainty.
Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony of his witnesses. Without
any showing that they were impelled by i mproper motives in testifying in
his favor, thei r testimonies shoul d have been given the credence they
deserve.
While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does not by itself
suggest the existence of bias or impair their credibility.

CA:
AFFIRMED conviction.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Lara' s supposedly il legal arrest may be rai sed for the fi rst ti me
on appeal for the purpose of nul li fyi ng his conviction? (YES)
2. Whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is
inadmissible because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel? (NO,
identification not custodial investigation)
3. Whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara? (YES)
4. Whether Lara's alibi can be given credence so as to exonerate him from the crime
charged? (NO)

HELD:
DENY appeal.
1. YES. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve
as a ground to invalidate the proceedi ngs leading to his conviction considering its
belated invocation. Any objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should
have been raised in a motion to quash duly fil ed before the accused enters
his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived.
Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the obj ecti on i s
deemed waived. An accused submits to the j urisdiction of the trial
court upon entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes
him invoking any irregularities that may have attended his arrest. In voluntarily
submitting himself to the court by entering a plea, instead of filing a motion to quash
the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-appellant is deemed
to have waived his right to assail the legality of his arrest.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and
set aside a conviction that was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial
conducted without error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void
all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and
his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when
all the facts on record point to their culpability
As Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 9.
Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint
or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege
the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those
based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of
this Rule.

2. NO. There was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since
the latter is not part of custodial
investigation and this does not constitute a violation of his right to counsel

People v. Amestuzo: The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the
so-called Miranda rights may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investi gation is no longer
a general i nqui ry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
parti cular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements.

3. YES. Contrary to appellant's assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him
shoot Bautista, the victim. Also, it is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the
finding of guilt against Lara is based on circumstantial evidence. Not only direct
evi dence but also ci rcumstantial evi dence can overcome the presumption of
innocence. Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of
direct evidence,conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an
unbroken chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.

4. NO. In view of Sumulong's positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying
Lara's alibi outright. It is well-settled that positive identification prevails over
alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule, for as a
defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove
In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that: that he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime he was so
far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place
of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused
was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places.
Proximity of Lara's house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi. He
himself admitted that his house was just a stone's throw (about three minutes
away) from the crime scene. Lara and his witnesses failed to prove that it is well-
nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

DISPOSITIVE:
CA AFFIRMED

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER, vs. SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ,
ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G.
BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M.
MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V.
AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of
residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel
the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly
considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a
logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.
Case Facts
San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties) is a domestic corporation engaged in
the real estate business.
During this time, BF Homes was under receivership. The receiver is Atty. Florencio
Orendain.
San Miguel purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes)
130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Paraaque, containing a total
area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00.
Some of the parcels of land for which San Miguel paid the full price were not delivered.
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands.
San Miguel filed a complaint-affidavit charging BF Homes in violation of PD 957 due to
nondelivery of titles.
At the same time, San Miguel sued BF Homes for specific performance in HLURB,
compelling BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs.
BF Homes contentions:
o San Miguel Properties claim was not legally demandable because Atty.
Orendain did not have the authority to sell the lots due to his having been
replaced as BF Homes rehabilitation receiver by the SEC
o the deeds of sale conveying the lots were irregular for being undated and
unnotarized
o the claim should have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under
receivership
o in receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed
corporation in order to enable the receiver to effectively exercise its powers free
from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue
of the distressed company
o the lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the pending receivership
proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Pias of the jurisdiction to
proceed in the action.
San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Pias, citing
the pendency of BF Homes receivership case in the SEC.
BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend
SEC terminated BF Homes receivership
San Miguel filed a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to the
termination of receivership
The OCP Las Pias dismissed San Miguel Properties criminal complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the following grounds:
o no action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that
had appointed him
o that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957
exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB
o that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the
criminal action
o no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made
o there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents
San Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
San Miguel appealed the OCPs resolution to the DOJ.
DOJ denied the appeal.
San Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
San Miguel elevated DOJs resolutions to the CA but was dismissed by the CA
San Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Issue:
WON there is prejudicial question?
Held:
Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises
a prejudicial question. BF Homes posture that the administrative case for specific performance
in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal
case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction
to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
22
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is
to avoid conflicting decisions.
23


The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to
San Miguel Properties submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of
because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific
performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the
proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 25

of Presidential
Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action
civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction
over the action was exclusive and original.

The action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel
Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the
criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes directors and officers were criminally
liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of
the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of
the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the
sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal
liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby
negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
A prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is
enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case

TEODORO A. REYES vs. ETTORE ROSSI
G.R. No. 159823 February 18, 2013

FACTS: On October 31, 1997, petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes (Reyes) and Advanced Foundation
Construction Systems Corporation (Advanced Foundation), represented by its Executive Project
Director, respondent Ettore Rossi (Rossi), executed a deed of conditional sale involving the
purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth
P10,000,000.00. The parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay the sum of P3,000,000.00 as
downpayment, and the balance of P7,000,000.00 through four post-dated checks. Reyes
complied, but in January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his obligation under the deed
of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated checks with nine post-dated checks that
would include interest at the rate of P25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid portion of the
obligation on April 30, 1998, June 30, 1998, July 31, 1998, September 30, 1998 and October 31,
1998.
Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes request, and returned the four checks. In turn, Reyes
issued and delivered the following nine postdated checks in the aggregate sum of
P7,125,000.00 drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank
Rossi deposited three of the post-dated checks (i.e., No. 72807, No. 79125 and No. 72808) on
their maturity dates in Advanced Foundations bank account at the PCI Bank in Makati. Two of
the checks were denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes instructions to stop their payment,
while the third (i.e., No. 72802) was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Rossi likewise
deposited two more checks (i.e., No. 72809 and No. 72801) in Advanced Foundations account
at the PCI Bank in Makati, but the checks were returned with the notation Account Closed
stamped on them. He did not anymore deposit the three remaining checks on the assumption
that they would be similarly dishonored.
In the meanwhile, on July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and
damages in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). Rossi charged Reyes with five counts
of estafa and five counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati for the dishonor of checks and another criminal charge for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was lodged against Reyes in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City for the dishonor of Check No. 72802.6.

On September 29, 1998, Reyes submitted his counter-affidavit in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati, At the same time, Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati over the criminal charges against him on the ground that he had issued
the checks in Quezon City; as well as argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
should suspend the proceedings because of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action for
rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial question as to the criminal proceedings.
On November 20, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor handling the preliminary investigation
recommended the dismissal of the charges of estafa and the suspension of the proceedings
relating to the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 based on a prejudicial question. On January
5, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Makati approved the recommendation of the handling Assistant
City Prosecutor.
Rossi appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice, but the
Secretary of Justice, , denied Rossis petition for review. After the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, Rossi challenged the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice by petition for
certiorari in the CA. CA granted the appeal of Rossi in so far as the issue of the existence of
prejudicial question is concerned but the dismissal of the complaint for estafa was affirmed.
ISSUE: WON there is a prejudicial question
HELD:
The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the suspension
of the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the Bouncing
Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer issued
in connection with the sale.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be determined
before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.16 The rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid
conflicting decisio. Reyes states that if the contract would be rescinded, his obligation to pay
under the conditional deed of sale would be extinguished, and such outcome would necessarily
result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.It
is true that the rescission of a contract results in the extinguishment of the obligatory relation
as if it was never created, the extinguishment having a retroactive effect. The rescission is
equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie, leaving things in their status before
the celebration of the contract.However, until the contract is rescinded, the juridical tie and the
concomitant obligations subsist.

To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the
criminal actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge
of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3)
the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.21 The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be
without funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission
is whether or not the breach in the fulfilment of Advanced Foundations obligation warranted
the rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced
Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of
the contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the
criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned
elements show, he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he
had issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His
obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should
not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale
through rescission. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless
check was already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for
the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action
for rescission of the conditional sale.
As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue
or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action
is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case.



SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY v. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA
G.R. No. 157472 September 28, 2007
FACTS: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against
petitioner committed as follows:That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the
Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his
armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds
on his body which caused his instantaneous deathWith the aggravating circumstance of
killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.4
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de
parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial
conference and trial on October 8, 2002. However, on the same day and after the
arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order, likewise dated September 12,
2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in
view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information
which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the
word "Homicide" and instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening
paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that
of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victims
name from "Escuita" to "Escueta."
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was
to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground
that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case
had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case.
As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the
public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.8

On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend
Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion9 on the ground of double
jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted
and arraigned before a competent court, and the case was terminated without his
express consent; that when the case for Homicide was terminated without his express
consent, the subsequent filing of the Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed
him in double jeopardy.
The respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. He ruled that a claim of former
acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained
unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former
prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the
Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and
did not terminate the same; that the Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in
substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation
of aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," the crime of Homicide is qualified to
Murder.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his
Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an
arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from
Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence.
In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied the Motion to
Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, elevate the classification of the
crime of homicide to murder. Petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Inhibit
but granting the Motion for reconsideration
HELD:
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not
guilty to the charge in the Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner --
Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated
without his express consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder
which involve the same offense. The petitioner argued that the termination of the
information for Homicide without his express consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus,
to charge him again, this time for Murder, is tantamount to placing the petitioner in
Double Jeopardy.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information
may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following
respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution
necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but
substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to
be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the
new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original
information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has
been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the
other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original
charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first
paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second
paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same
offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first
information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged,
a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction
for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the
second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an
attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense
may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And,
vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the
latter.20
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is
merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as
defined in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that
the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or
preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its
replacement by the word "Murder." There was no change in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court.
The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as those
already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any
change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any
qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and
preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal.21

Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in
which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not
prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b)
before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.25
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case
that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or
the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.26
Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for
homicide without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or
unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.27 And for the dismissal to be a bar
under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.1wphi1
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to
correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new
Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under the last paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge
merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original
Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by
merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead, which
showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR. v. HON. JOB B. MADAYAG
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 103102, 06 March 1992; Regalado, J.

FACTS:
Claudio J. Teehankee (herein petitioner) was originally charged with frustrated
murder on an information dated 19 July 1991 for shooting one Maureen Navarro
Hultman on the head.
After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a
demurrer to evidence.
Hultman died in the course of trial before said motion could be filed.
Private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave of court
to file an amended information.
An amended information was filed now charging the petitioner with murder.
Petitioner filed an opposition and a rejoinder.
Nonetheless, the court admitted the amended information and scheduled the
arraignment.
Petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of
preliminary investigation thereon.
Respondent Judge Job B. Madayag, ordered that a plea of not guilty be entered
for petitioner.
Prosecution presented its evidence upon the order of the respondent judge.
On the other side, the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent the
petitioner as the latters previous counsel refuse participation in the proceedings
due to legal issues raised.
Petitioner elevated this issue: (herein MAIN ISSUE posited by the petitioner)
Whether an amended information involving a substantial element,
without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on
the original information, may legally and validly be admitted
He further averred the following:
a. That the additional allegation in the amended information, as herein
underscored, that the accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with handgun Maureen Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which
directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman x x x constitutes a
substantial amendment since it involves a change in nature of the offense
charged.
b. There is a need to establish that the same mortal wounds, which were initially
frustrated (sic) by timely and able medical assistance, ultimately caused the
death of the victim, because it could have been caused by a supervening act
or fact which is not imputable to the offender.
c. Since the amended information for murder charges an entirely different
offense, involving as it does a new fact
1
, it is essential that another
preliminary investigation on the new charge be conducted before the new
information be admitted.

1
Fact of victims death

RULING:
Before the main issue of the petitioner can be answered, it is necessary to
answer the following sub-issues first:
a. Is there an amendment or substitution in information when the offense
was changed from frustrated murder to (consummated) murder?
b. What kind of amendment does the new information constitute, formal or
substantial?


Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the
margin between amendment and substitution:

Amendment Substitution
May involve either formal or substantial
changes
Necessarily involves a substantial change
from the original charge
Can be effected without leave of court if
occurred before plea has been entered
There must always be with leave of court
as the original information has to be
dismissed
(Form) there is no need for another
preliminary investigation and the retaking
of the plea of the accused
Another preliminary investigation is
entailed and the accused has to plead
anew to the new information
Refers to same offense charged in the
original information or to an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the original charge;
Requires or presupposes that the new
information involves a different offense
which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original
charge;
Hence, substantial amendments to the
information after the please has been
taken cannot be made over the objection
of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the
accused can invoke double jeopardy.
Hence, the accused cannot claim double
jeopardy.

FIRST SUB-ISSUE: Amendment, not substitution.
- Frustrated murder is a stage in the execution of the crime of murder, hence,
the former is necessarily included in the latter.
. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to
support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant
conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the
same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit
or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in, the offense charged in the first information.
. Also, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former constitute
the latter.
- There is identity of the offenses charged in both the original and the amended
information.
. What is involved in this case is not a variance in the nature of different
offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the
same offense from frustrated to consummated murder.

SECOND SUB-ISSUE: The amended portion of the information is a formal
amendment
- An amendment either form or substance may be made at any time before the
accused enters a plea to the charge and thereafter as to all matters of form
with leave of court.
- An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against
herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally
charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is,
the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the
trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime committed
- It is also noteworthy, that the accused committed a felonious act with intent to
kill the victim. Thus, there is no question that whatever defense the petitioner
may adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally
applies to the amended information for murder.

MAIN ISSUE: Since only formal amendment was involved and introduced in the
second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be
demanded by the accused.
- In the case of People v. Magpale, the court held that if the crime originally
charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would
elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a
new preliminary investigation is not necessary.

Extraordinary writs prayed for, DENIED; petition, DISMISSED.

DIANA VS. BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION CO.
Facts:
Plaintiffs are heirs of Florenio Diana, a former employee of the defendant. Sometime in
June 1945, Diana was riding in a truck belonging to the defendant driven by Vivencio
Bristol. The truck ran into a ditch at Bay Laguna resulting in the death of Diana and
other passengers.Bristol was charged and convicted of multiple homicide through
reckless imprudence and he was ordered to indemnify the heirs in the amount of 2,000.
The decision became final and a writ of execution was issued to satisfy the indemnity
but the sheriff stated that the accused had no visible leviable property.Present case
started when the defendant failed to pay the indemnity under its subsidiary liability
under article 103 of RPC.Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there
was another action pending (civil case) between the same parties for the same cause in
which the plaintiffs sought to recover 4,500 damages. This action was predicated on
culpa aquiliana.
Plaintiffs filed a written opposition to dismiss. The lower court dismissed the complaint
so the plaintiffs filed for a MR but it was likewise denied, hence the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether the lower court correctly dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that there
was another action pending between the same parties for the same cause under Rule
8, section 1(d) of the Rules of Court
Held:
Order appealed from is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. Determination of the case hinges on the proper interpretation of Rule 8,
section 1(d) of the Rules of Court. In order that these may be invoked, it must be shown
that:
1) there is identity of parties
2) identity of rights asserted or reliefs prayed for on the same facts
3) the identity of the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment
rendered would amount to res judicata
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under art.100 of the RPC, or create and action for cuasi-delicto or culpa extra-
contractual under arts. 1902-1910 of the NCC. It is a mistake to dismiss the present
action because of a pendency of another action between the same parties involving the
same cause. To deprive them of the remedy after conviction of the defendants
employee, would be to deprive them altogether of the indemnity to which they are
entitled by law and by a court decision, which injustice our duty to prevent.

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these
servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others.

"It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who
could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person
who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee
because of his confidence in the principal or director".

Fausto Barredo proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro
Fontanilla.
Pedro Fontanillataxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo.
Severino Garcia & Timotea Almario parents of Faustino Garcia.
Faustino Garcia 16 year-old boy who suffered injuries from the collision but
died two days thereafter.
J. Bocobo
FACTS:
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The
carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia,
suffered injuries from which he died two days later.
This case is to determine whether it is proper for the Court of Appeals to held Fausto
Barredo civilly liable for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of his
driver Pedro Fontanilla. It is undisputed that Fontanillas negligence was the cause of
the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed when
the accident happened.
Chronology of events:
1. Criminal Action against Pedro Fontanilla was filed at the RTC of Rizal.
2. Complainant reserved the right to file a separate a civil action.
3. The RTC of Rizal granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
action be reserved.
4. The RTC of Rizal convicted Pedro Fontanilla.
5. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of accused Pedro Fontanilla.
6. On March 7, 1939 Garcia & Almario brought an action in the RTC of Manila
against Fausto Barredo. (civil action)
7. On July 8, 1939, RTC of Manila awarded damages of P2,000 in favor of Garcia
& Almario.
8. Court of Appeals modified the award by reducing the damages to P1,000.
THEORY OF THE DEFENSE: The liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no
civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, Barredo cannot be held civilly liable.
CONTENTION OF THE PROSECUTION: The liability in this action is not a civil
obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but
an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of Barredos
negligence in the selection or supervision of Pedro Fontanilla.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employer Fausto Barredo may be held civilly liable for the
crime committed by his employee Pedro Fontanilla to which Fontanilla is convicted of.
HELD: YES because quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity and individuality. It is entirely apart and
independent from delict or crime.
It has been clearly shown that Barredo did not employ the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage when he hired Pedro Fontanilla which he knew had
been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding.
To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to
make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved
by a preponderance of evidence.
It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the
principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and
not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used
such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director.
Same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. There is a
distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code. The same negligent act may produce either a civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault
or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.