Marcus Templar Skopjes Nato Adventures

Skopje's NATO Adventures: A Conversation on Insanity and Megalomania
The FYROM: The Groupie that Bribes NATO for its Membership
By Marcus A. Templar
Abstract
The principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law
1
are mans natural and
inalienable rights upon which healthy societies are built. An Alliance such as NATO, being a
voluntary organization, requires from its candidates and its active members that they guarantee the
protection of values of human decency in individuals. NATO is, in other words, a society of free-
states consisting of tolerant citizens, who live in harmony with their neighbors with whom they
wish to ally.
Whether one regards NATO as North Americas and Europes encroaching hand or whether
one conceptualizes the Alliance as the ready policeman of the world, NATO considers itself as the
instrument of stability and well-being of the North Atlantic area founded on the principles of
democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.
Upon the fall of the Wall in 1989, NATO hastily employed an open door policy, inviting
and admitting former Warsaw Pact country members that militarily qualified to join, but lacked
democratic values and principles, the absence of which contravene NATOs own values. In other
occasions, the Alliance invited quasi-qualified countries with their sole criterion being their
strategic geo-political location vis--vis Russia.
The FYROMs candidacy to NATO is not only problematic, but also pointless. The
FYROM does not meet any of the Preconditions set by NATO and save the exception of some
troops that the FYROM sent to ISAF, it does not meet any other NATO requirements including a
less than medium rated strategic location.
1
NATO, Treaty of Washington, Preamble, April 4, 1949.
2
This paper, based on facts, attempts to prove that the FYROM has not met the preconditions
of a democratic society or the military criteria for joining NATO. My conclusions are based on the
results of competing hypothesis in intelligence analysis.
Information on phonetics of the FYROM Slavic Language
C = ts as in thats; = ch as in church; = somewhat like the pronunciation of ch in "chew"
half ch; J = y as in year; Gj = as ghi in Genghis, Ghegg; Lj = as in modern Italian by gl, in
modern Portuguese and Occitan by -lh- and in some Latin American Spanish dialects represented
by -ll-; Nj = ny as in Spanish or French gn in oignon.
Thesis Statement
NATOs principle for enlargement has created misunderstandings and illusions for some
countries that consider NATO the place to be, sometimes for reasons of security and sometimes for
reasons of prestige. Misunderstandings and illusions arise because they feel that their membership
is guaranteed as is without changing their modus operandi, and illusions because they assume
that NATO membership is going to boost their governments prestige and national pride,
sometimes even at the expense of the other member states.
NATOs Enlargement Process
A group of experts on NATO in their report on NATO 2020 Strategic Concept expressed
the following opinion, consistent with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles
for enlargement, the process for states that have expressed their desire for membership should move
3
forward as each state fulfils the requirements for membership. It should go without saying that
NATO is an entirely voluntary organization.
2
While the strategic goal of all Balkan countries is NATO membership, it does require the
achievement of certain political and military preconditions in addition to military, economic, and
security criteria. The question is, what do a number of countries have to offer to the Alliance
considering their insignificant Defense budgets?
The political preparation of the candidate country has to abide by the Study on NATO
Enlargement, Chapter 5: What are the implications of membership for new members, including
their rights and obligations, and what do they need to do to prepare for membership? According to
paragraph 72 of Chapter 5, prospective members have to meet the following before NATO even
considers preconditions and criteria for membership:
3
A. Demonstrated a commitment to and respect for Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) norms and principles, including the resolution of ethnic disputes,
external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by
peaceful means.
B. Shown a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty,
social justice and environmental responsibility;
C. Established appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defense force;
2
NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, Analysis and Recommendations of the
Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, 17 May. 2010,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_63654.htm (accessed July 13, 2011).
3
NATO Study on NATO Enlargement, Chapter 5 http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9506.htm
(accessed June 19, 2011).
4
D. Undertaken a commitment to ensure that adequate resources are devoted to
achieving the obligations described in section A and C.
These points are an obstacle for the FYROM. As we will see, the FYROM has failed to
achieve A and B above with C being under discussion. As for D, it is more or less associated with
C. Regardless of what the government officially claims abroad, it internally teaches in their schools
that the whole territory of geographic Macedonia belongs to the FYROM. During the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) deliberations, Greece brought the matter to the attention of the Court showing
actual footage of what teachers teach in the FYROM schools along with irredentist maps portrayed
above the boards in each of the classrooms.
Regarding the issue of good neighborly relations, Skopje has not done anything to help
itself. It has infuriated Greece and the EU by erecting a statue of Alexander the Great in downtown
Skopje renaming it Equestrian Warrior forcing EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fle to
state,
"Seriously, if you have a neighbour, and I'm not talking about two states now, and there is
an issue between two of you, whatever the nature of that issue is, and you are trying
sincerely to solve it, I guess you would avoid doing anything that your neighbour might call
a provocation. This is simple logic. I would expect the government in Skopje to avoid doing
things which would be called by the other side provocations."
4
During his trip to Bucharest in 2008, President Bush for his own inexplicit reasons pushed
for NATO membership of Albania, Croatia, the FYROM, Ukraine, and Georgia. The decision of
NATO taken by consensus admitted only two countries, Albania and Croatia. Ukraine and
Georgia, torn by bad governance that brought domestic instability, corruption, etc., did not meet the
4
EU shows 'yellow card' to FYROM, ekathimerini,
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_21/06/2011_395365 (accessed June 22,
2011).
5
preconditions or the OSCE political criteria; they could hardly meet the NATO military criteria. It
is doubtful if these countries share Western values. Besides, they both border with Russia, which
was looking at their possible membership rather uneasily, especially when one considers the
hostilities of August 2008 between Russia and Georgia over South Osetia.
It is highly debatable whether Croatia, and especially Albania, was in a position to assume
the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic
area. Even if Croatia had met preconditions, its usefulness in the Alliance is problematic. The case
of Albania is worse. Considering that, modern equipment is highly sophisticated, its price tag is
staggering. Not only is Albanias military small (14,245 personnel), but also the sums vested in its
Defense budget of US$221m cannot possibly buy more than nine F-16C/D. Militarily Albania
cannot be taken seriously since its military capabilities and contributions to the Alliance are almost
non-existent. NATO requires from each candidate member that all modifications in laws and
procedures are real, not just on paper.
5
Using the requirements outlined above, these findings emerged regarding the "long list" of
potential NATO members: Of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) Slovenia and Slovakia had
largely met the criteria outlined by NATO and their accession posed no major strategic problems
for NATO. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia were advanced in terms of meeting NATO
preconditions, but the strategic ramifications of their accession loomed large. Bulgaria and
Romania had the opposite problem of being unable to meet NATO preconditions, even though the
5
Ted Galen Carpenter, Balkan Tensions and the Future of NATO (speech delivered athe 64
th
Conference of the Pan-Macedonian Association, Chicago, IL, May 29, 2010).
http://www.panmacedonian.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=324:to-sink-or-
to-swim-by-marcus-templar&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=50 (accessed June 21, 2011)
6
strategic implications of their accession were not problematic. Of the European Union members
currently not in NATO, Austria is in a good position to join, if it chooses to do so.
6
Although Croatia and Albania did not fully meet NATO preconditions and criteria, they
were allowed to join NATO strictly strategic. The FYROM, facing objections of Greece, France,
Bulgaria, Romania, Spain, and other members, was not allowed membership. Skopje has been
dragging its feet in its negotiations with Greece and scheming in any way possible in violation of
the UN Law on Treaties. Article 26 (pacta sunt servanda) states: Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.
The FYROM has serious domestic issues of instability in the country.
7
The first is an
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) issue, the second is an OSCE and
NATO issue. The final communiqu of the NATO enlargement meeting of the Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels 5 Dec 1995 explains the plan
of NATOs expansion.
8
According to NATO Enlargement Study of September 28, 1995, indicates that the
enlargement process is highly regulated and it is divided into five stages.
9
The first two stages are
only preparatory. The third stage is the key to membership. If a country passes stage 3, it means
that the country has met the preconditions, but not necessarily the criteria.
6
Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense
Planning and Shaping. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001).
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1243 (accessed June 13, 2011).
7
NATO relations with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
http://www.nato.int/issues/nato_fyrom/index.html (accessed June 17, 2011).
8
Final communiqu on NATO enlargement meeting
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24718.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed June
21, 2011).
9
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl- and 9501.htm
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm#CH3
7
Stage 1 is the expression of desire of a country to cooperate with a goal to eventually join
NATO. The expression of a military cooperation is realized by the participation of the applicant to
join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The PfP is a program of practical bilateral
cooperation between individual partner countries and NATO. It allows partner countries to build
up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation.
10
Stage 2 is just one-step up the ladder as a preparatory step to membership.
Stage 3 is the hardest step of all. It is the judgment step and it is NATOs explicit call. It is
a verdict based on negotiations, deliberations, and consultations with a consensual decision. A
country either has what it takes to be member of NATO, or it doesnt. The country has to meet the
preconditions for membership.
Stage 4 is the stage of scrutiny on the criteria listed in NATOs 1995-enlargement study.
Pros and cons of the countrys potential accession are discussed along with any shortcomings in
meeting membership preconditions.
Stage 5 is the final step starting with consensus of country members that recognizes that the
aspiring country has met NATOs preconditions and is minimally prepared to function within
NATO. This determination is strictly political and depends on the each member countrys political
view. This is the stage of intra-alliance bargaining regarding the invitation date to join.
11
Preconditions:
12
10
NATO, The Partnership for Peace programme,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm (accessed June 18, 2011).
11
Planning and Shaping. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001).
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1243. (accessed June 13, 2011).
12
NATO Handbook, Chapter 12 (NATO enlargement), 247-272[1], 117.
8
According to the study, countries seeking NATO membership would have to be able to
demonstrate that they have fulfilled certain requirements. These include:
A functioning democratic political system based on a market economy;
The fair treatment of minority populations;
A commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts;
The ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and
Commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.
Once admitted, new members would enjoy all the rights and assume all the obligations of
membership. This would include acceptance at the time that they join of all the principles, policies
and procedures previously adopted by Alliance members.
A precondition that applies only to the FYROM based on OSCE principles is
solving the name issue with Greece.
According to the release NAC-S(99)66 of April 24, 1999 on the Membership Action Plan
(MAP), the Alliance has set certain requirements which are a practical manifestation of the Open
Door divided into five chapters. However, the Alliance warns, the program cannot be considered
as a list of criteria for membership.
13
Political and Economic issues
Defense/Military issues
13
NATO Membership Action Plan, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm (accessed June
19, 2011.
9
Resource issues
Security issues
Legal issues
The resulting assessment is supplemented by an analysis of the strategic costs and benefits
entailed by a given country's accession to NATO. Each country's strategic position is assessed
according to four criteria:
Criteria:
14
Relevance to NATOs ability to project power in areas of likely contingencies;
Creation of interior and easily defensive borders within the alliance;
Risks that may accrue from a higher level of commitment to a new ally; and
Added transaction costs of a new member for the alliance's cohesion and ability to
perform its main missions on the basis of consensus
Whether Skopje meets NATO Preconditions and Criteria is controversial depending on the
level of political hypocrisy. Objectively, the FYROM is not even near fulfilling its NATO
obligation on its own without any help from the United States. Skopje should be required to fulfill
its obligations before it reaps the benefits.
14
Study on NATO Enlargement, 03 Sep. 1995.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed June
19, 2011). This set of criteria was simplified in Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-
2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping. (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2001). http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1243 (accessed June 13,
2011).
10
A functioning democratic political system based on a market economy
It is a very important precondition, but also the most violated by Skopje. In fact, a
functioning democratic political system never existed and not one state of the EU or the Untied
States cared about it. I dare state that they still do not. If they did, they would have taken a good
look at the situation and they would have avoided falling into the trap set up by the politicians of
the FYROM. Western multicultural countries demand unquestioning support for the economic
philosophy of multi-nationalism, capitalism, and anti-communism. However, in the countries of
the Eastern block, the reverse is true. In the Balkan countries, even when the countries have gotten
out of communism, they continued as if they are still under the communist spell. They have
permitted some constituent national groups as long as there is an unswerving loyalty to the dictates
of the governing party or ethnic majority. Any deviation from this is likely to be immediately
suppressed by military force, if necessary.
15
This is exactly the behavior of the FYROM authorities
regarding loyalty.
Early on a Monday morning (00:40h, June 6, 2011) Martin Nekovski, an unarmed 22 year-
old man celebrating the victory of his political party in Skopje's Central Square, was beaten to death
by a member of the FYROM special police force, Tigers. Admittedly, police personnel are
empowered to keep law and order and could abuse their power. Such abuse is not limited to the
police of the FYROM, it could happen anywhere; but here it is different. No investigation was
done. They picked up the mans body in a plastic bag as if nothing happened and left. This abuse
stems from intimidation of losing ones job, having a loved one bodily harmed, or even losing ones
own life. False imprisonment of dissidents is common including priest Bishop Jovan VI
15
Anthony H. Richmond, Ethnic Nationalism and Post-Industrialism, in Beyond Nationalism?,
eds. John Hutchinson, Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press,
1994), 267.
11
(Vranikovski) of Ohrid and Exarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Vasko Gligorov, a historian,
was arrested, kept in Police custody for three days, and then sent to a mental institution where he
underwent electro-shock treatment. The official explanation was that he endangered himself and
others (by stating the ancient Macedonians were Greeks!). These are only some examples of what it
is happening in that country.
Considering that for the people of the FYROM, since the inception of the Peoples Republic
of Macedonia, democracy is an empty word. The mere superficial adherence to any democratic
principles at present is a simple polling, which is in their view political manna. Nevertheless, is it?
EU officials have warned the FYROM government to hold fair elections or they would become the
black hole of Europe. A few weeks before the elections diplomats noted media reports that civil
servants had been threatened with losing their jobs if they did not vote for the ruling party. "There
is too much at stake. If any of those predictions come true, this small country is risking its future.
The EU will be further off than ever," a senior Western diplomat told Reuters... One person was
shot dead and several were wounded in an election-related incident in an ethnic Albanian area
during the 2008 elections.
16
On December 19, 2007, only a few months before the NATO Conference in Bucharest,
President Crvenkovski delivered his annual address to the Parliament stating that,
The long and unsuccessful negotiations and even worse not putting in action what has been
agreed, seen from the Brussels viewpoint, has damaged the image of Macedonia and has
created the perception that the country has insufficient democratic potential and institutional
capacity, while perception is of the utmost sometimes even of decisive importance,"
17
16
Kole asule, Macedonia vote ends peacefully after bitter campaign, Reuters, U.S. Edition,
Skopje, June 5, 2011 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/05/us-macedonia-election-
idUSTRE7542GH20110605 (accessed June 15, 2011).
17
Skopje MIA (in English), December 19, 2007, "President Crvenkovski Delivers Annual Address
in Macedonian Parliament."
12
Considering the incidents of fraud, intimidation, violence, etc. of previous elections, a
delegation consisting of representatives from the EU, NATO, OSCE, and United States visited
Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski on May 13, 2011. After the meeting, the OSCE issued the
following statement.
We, the Head of Delegation of the European Union and Heads of Mission of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and
the United States of America met on 13 May with Prime Minister Gruevski to discuss the
parliamentary elections scheduled for 5 June 2011, as we also reach out to other political
leaders.
We urge all responsible political stakeholders to do their utmost to ensure that elections are
in line with established international democratic standards, free from intimidation and
violence. We also embrace the Code of Conduct for Free and Fair Elections signed by the
political parties on 12 May, and all other commitments to this end.
We urge the government and other relevant institutions to ensure that the electoral process
has the confidence of all political parties and above all the citizens, who we encourage to
exercise their democratic rights on Election Day.
We fully support the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
Election Observation Mission.
18
Although officially one could consider the elections fair and free, unfortunate incidents
before, during, and after the elections did take place. The FYROMs aspirations to join NATO are
not even near the preconditions set by NATO. The countrys institutions have no concept of what
democracy is and how to implement enacted laws protecting the citizens while mentally fighting
the communist understanding of democracy by replacing them with neo-fascist ideals. Their goal is
to protect the state from all evils, including democracy if it interferes with the wishes of the
political elite.
The pre-Cold War perception of membership was different from the present one. While the
USSR was a formidable adversary, the concepts that the present preconditions demonstrate were
18
OSCE Mission to Skopje, http://www.osce.org/skopje/77556 (accessed June 17, 2011).
13
irrelevant to the Alliance. The most important criterion was the defense of Western Europe, the
United States, and Canada determined by the military contribution to the Alliance of the country-
candidate through its strategic location in relation to the USSR and its allies.
Iceland is the only NATO member, which maintains no standing army, although it
contributes financially to NATO overhead costs. Its Coast Guards might of three ships and four
aircraft armed with small arms, naval artillery, and air defense weaponry, for instance, cannot be
seriously taken as a militarily vital contributor to the defense of any country, even its own. The
only factor that made Iceland important to the Alliance is its geo-strategic position that dominates
the northern seas.
The Wall fell; the Iron Curtain ceased to exist. The federation of the USSR broke up into
mostly militarily weak countries with no means to sustain strong armies. Arms manufacturers under
the USSR that were disseminated in various locations all over the vast country no longer existed.
Almost immediately similarly formed multinational countries such as Czechoslovakia and the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) disintegrated. Therefore, NATO finding itself as
the only alliance that could be considered as a super power, considered accepting countries of the
Warsaw Pact, but these countries had to meet certain Western values, including democracy. The
preconditions set by NATO are derived from sociological factors that are aimed at domestic as well
as regional stability, a very important factor in an alliance since any means of instability could be
its Achilles heel. One condition that had to be fulfilled was the political consensus of political
forces within the candidate country through public debate.
Nevertheless, this never happened in the FYROM. The decision to join NATO was not a
result of any public debate. It came as the result of the Slavic-Albanian war that ended on August
13, 2001 with the hope that both Albanians and Slavs would be forced to be nice to each other
using NATO as their stabilizing, if not an imposing, factor instead of the other way around. Even
14
the Foreign Minister of the FYROM, Antonio Milooski, did not understand the concept of a
countrys stability. Asked to comment on the Greek veto on Macedonias NATO entry, Milooski
qualified the move as Greek hypocrisy that preponderates over the wider interests in regional
stability[sic],
19
according to the news agency MINA, making the case for Greece. The FYROM is
supposed to have domestic stability formed from within, i.e. security, self-confidence, functioning
as a wholesome democratic society operating as an independent country, instead of expecting its
own security to come from the outside as if it requests to join NATO as its protectorate. As NATO
operates in the Balkans and specifically in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the FYROM, the
level of instability is disturbing.
20
Sinia Tatalovi of the University of Zagreb, Croatia and Political Affairs Adviser to the
President of Croatia emphasize that the FYROM is a parliamentary democracy, and its
constitutional model accepted the solutions of the developed Western democracies.
21
What
Tatalovi fails to differentiate is theory from practice in applying democratic values. The citizens
of the FYROM are obviously affected by their previous communist education that was
implemented in their home country on democracy. Education in the FYROM has changed only on
face, not in substance.
This assessment is based on the concept of how people learn, which is:
Because learning involves transfer from previous experiences, ones existing knowledge can
also make it difficult to learn new information. Sometimes new information will seem
incomprehensible to students, but this feeling of confusion can at least let them identify the
19
Milooski: Itll be difficult to find solution with Greece, MINA, 18 April 2008,
http://macedoniaonline.eu/content/view/968/45/ (accessed June 16, 2001).
20
Christopher S. Chivvis, Recasting NATO Strategic Concept: Possible Directions for the United
States, Project Air Force, Direction 1: Refocus on Europe, Strategic Rationale, The Rand
Corporation, 2009. http://www.rand.org/paf (accessed June 16, 2011).
21
Sinia Tatalovi, National Security of Macedonia, Politika Misao, Vol. XXXV, (1998), No.
5, 105-124, 105.
15
existence of a problem (see, e.g., Bransford and Johnson, 1972; Dooling and Lachman,
1971). A more problematic situation occurs when people construct a coherent (for them)
representation of information while deeply misunderstanding the new information. Under
these conditions, the learner doesnt realize that he or she is failing to understand.
22
The Freedom House report of 2011, an independent watchdog organization that supports the
expansion of freedom around the world, strongly disagrees with Tatalovis point of view.
According to Neda Milevska-Kostovas report by the Freedom House, which includes data
provided by the World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011 (Nations in Transit Ratings and
Averaged Scores - best score being 1 and worst being 7.00), the FYROMs scores on Democracy is
3.82. Specifically, in the field of National Democratic Governance the FYROM scored 4.00;
Electoral Process 3.25; Civil Society 3.25; Independent Media 4.50; Local Democratic Governance
3.75; Judicial Framework and Independence 4.00; Corruption 4.00.
23
In general the country is
considered as PARTLY FREE.
24
Turkey is an old member of NATO meeting the strategic criteria
of the Cold War, but not meeting the EU requirements which are similar to NATO preconditions
and criteria.
Freedom of the Media including Academic Freedom
22
John Bransford, National Research Council (U.S.), Committee on Developments in the Science
of Learning, National Research Council (U.S.), National Academy Press, 2000, 70. Compare to
Plato, the Cave, Republic and Leo Lionni, Fish is Fish, 1970.
23
Neda Milevska-Kostova, MSC, MCPPM is executive director of the Centre for Regional Policy
Research and Cooperation Studiorum in Skopje, and assistant professor of Public Policy and
Management at the University American College in Skopje.
24 Neda Milevska-Kostova, Macedonia, Freedom House, July 2011.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/NIT-2011-Macedonia.pdf (accessed
January 20, 2012).
16
The FYROMs constitution includes basic protections for freedoms of the press and
expression, but government representatives do not uphold them consistently. Journalists remain
subject to criminal and civil libel charges, though imprisonment has been eliminated as a
punishment. Most of the countrys private media outlets are tied to political or business interests
that influence their content, and state-owned media tend to support government positions. The
government of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and its media allies has shown growing hostility
toward critical or opposition-oriented news outlets.
25
Biljana Vanskova, professor of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University Sts. Cyril and
Methodius of Skopje, offers the best account regarding the details and the conditions under which
the FYROM obtained its constitution and thus its legal legitimacy:
The major focus was on democratic legitimisation with special emphasis on fundamental
human rights and freedoms. Again the solution was easy to find the list was copied from
the basic international documents and pasted into the Constitution. There was nothing much
to constitutionalise in autumn 1991, so the Constitution was more a list of good intentions
than a product of the social reality. Having lacked democratic traditions, the
constitutionalists had a rare opportunity to draft a political system out of nothing. The
tabula rasa situation allowed free selection among the available Western models.
26
Since the fundamentals of democracy were imposed on the people of the FYROM who, due
to their communist past, could not relate to the concept of democracy, it is impossible to effectively
instill the ideology of democracy by force. Democracy is a matter of spiritual growth, mental
maturity, and social stability with emotional, mental, social, and spiritual benefits, not a force-fed
political education of democratic values unknown to the society.
25
UNHCR, Refworld, Freedom of the Press 2011 - Macedonia,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e89adc6c.html (accessed January 24, 2012).
26
Biljana Vankovska, "Looking West: Civil-Military Relations in Macedonia" (paper presented at
the XVII World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) Congress,
Seoul, August 17-21, 1997), 16.
17
The concept of what democracy is not has become obvious to all who followed the elections
held in the FYROM after its independence. Violence, fraud, intimidation, imprisonment, and/or
institutionalization of adversaries, and even murder have been the modus operandi of the otherwise
democratic FYROM. If elections were the only criterion of what democracy is all about, their
country belongs to the same category of democratic countries such as North Korea and Belarus.
The FYROM, with anti-democratic articles in their penal code such as article 178, 179, and article 6
of the Law on the Scientific Research Activity, is guaranteed a place within the above-mentioned
democratic countries. Aside from their geographical location, both North Korea and Belarus
definitely meet NATO criteria, but they would not be near the doorstep of NATO preconditions.
Democracy requires freedoms that the people of the FYROM do not understand and their
leaders are not ready to offer for fear of their own political downfall. Ironically, even the FYROM
diaspora born in democratic countries and enjoying the fruits of democracy, do not wish that their
home country enact true democracy in fear of their own future relevance in the political process of
their home country. Once their home country becomes democratic, the FYROM diaspora will fall
into oblivion.
The problem with democracy in the FYROM is not that the people do not want it; they do,
but they do not know what democracy is all about except for what they hear from their own
politicians. Their own politicians impose on the people ideals, concepts, and laws, assuming that
they know what is good for the people. For as long as the politicians sell their constituencies
nonsense instead of the truth by forcing suppression of speech and Press through intimidation the
people of the FYROM, regardless of social standing or ethnicity, the false concept of what
democracy is will continue.
18
This brings us to the territorial nationalism, which is the result of non-democratic thinking.
27
Ethnic Slavs of the FYROM and the FYROMs diaspora advocate territorial nationalism, which
almost cost them the disintegration of the country in 2001. Their attitude was if you dont like the
way we treat you go to your country, forgetting that they were in their country, the FYROM.
Simultaneously, they expect and demand that Skopje finds the right patrons to help them annex the
Greek region of Macedonia, which is inhabited by Macedonian Greeks, expecting them to revolt
against Greece! The FYROM population and diaspora have no concept that the Macedonians of
Greece are Greeks, not Slavs.
Since 1949 the FYROM citizenry and diaspora have kept their eyes on the so-called
Aegean Macedonia and in the last 20 years has dangerously increased their ultra nationalistic
activities openly and without pretext claiming the Greek region of Macedonia. The oxymoron of the
matter is that on one hand the same people declare that Greeces fears of losing its northern region
of Macedonia to the Slavs as absurd, but simultaneously they demonstrate their desire and goal to
unite Macedonia into one country applauding anyone who wants a United Macedonia or displays
maps of Macedonia like the map according to Kunchov.
27
Statistics published upon permission from the author. Stefanos Doumtsis, Major, USAF,
Balkans: Ethnic Minority Implications for FYROMs Future Stability - Beyond Kosovo- An I &
W Tool for the Intelligence Analyst, U.S. National Defense Intelligence College, Class 2010.
19
At this juncture, the FYROM diaspora has reached the point of standing at the door step of
the U.S. Congress creating a caucus with the sole purpose of destabilization of the Balkan Peninsula
in hope that that they will do in Greece what the Albanians had done in Kosovo. The difference is
that in Kosovo the Albanians comprised 90% of the population whereas in Greece the Slavic
element in the last EU elections obtained only 4,530 votes out of 10,014,795 registered voters in the
country or 0.0452330776615997% (or 0.000452330776615997%).
28
The threshold for political
parties in Greece is 3%, which is in normal range of European parties compared to Turkeys 10%.
The FYROM does not use thresholds, but instead it uses the d'Hondt method, which is a highest
averages method for allocating seats in party-list proportional representation.
The United Macedonian Diaspora (UMD) is an international NGO representing a foreign
country in the United States. With a thorough investigation, one finds out that UMD was founded
in 2004 and portrays itself on its own website as: "an international non-governmental
organization addressing the interests and needs of Macedonians [sic] and Macedonian [sic]
communities throughout the world. UMD's main goals are to foster unity among Macedonian [sic]
people, and advance their cause... With headquarters in Washington, D.C., UMD has
28
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Greece, December 6, 2009, http://ekloges-
prev.singularlogic.eu/e2009/pages/index.html (accessed June 16, 2011).
20
representatives serving Macedonian [sic] communities around the world, including Brussels,
Canberra, London, Melbourne, New York, Paris, Stuttgart, Sydney, and Toronto."
http://umdiaspora.org.
An example of irredentism, where a claim to territory was combined with arguments about
the allegiance of the population, is provided by the Moroccan claim to Mauritania in the early
1960s. The Moroccan claim was based on history. In this case, the claim was based on the
overlordship or suzerainty, which the Moroccan sultans had exercised over the peoples of
Mauritania before the establishment of the French Empire in West Africa and the French
protectorate over Morocco itself. What gave the claim its salience in the politics of contemporary
Morocco was the fact that the vision of a greater Morocco was shared by the ruling dynasty and by
the Istiqlal, the nationalist part which in most other respects was in opposition to the regime. In this
case irredentism opened up a prospect of a bipartisan foreign policy.
29
If one replaces Morocco
with the FYROM and Istiqlal with VMRO, one sees the present situation very clearly. Although
Moroccan claims especially within the Istiqlal party on Greater Morocco were quickly shelved,
Morocco and Mauritania fought a proxy war over West Sahara.
Ever since independence, the FYROM diaspora never let an occasion pass without declaring
that all three parts of Macedonia should unite under the government of the Macedonians i.e.
Slavs, with Thessaloniki as their Capital. This is a pure an expansionistic nationalistic notion
mostly associated with militarist governments during the 20th century such as Nazi Germany and
the Japanese empire. It is transnationalism that advocates the FYROMs right to increase its
borders at the expense of its neighbors, especially Greece and Bulgaria and possibly Serbia and
29
James Mayal, Irredentist and Secessionist Challenges, in Nationalism and the International
System, eds. John Hutchinson, Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994), 271.
21
Albania under the pretext of population homogeneity. The demographics at least of the Greek
region of Macedonia do not support such a population claim, because 2.5 million Greeks inhabit it.
As part of internal strife, the issue of nationalism gave an opportunity to intervene without
considering that both internal borders were not drawn in ethnic lines and that two of the republics
were artificial products of micro-politics "the Slovenes acquired a national consciousness only in
the nineteenth century ... the Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Bosnia-Hercegovinian Muslims...are
the products of twentieth century mutations in South Slavic national affinities and are, indeed, still
in the process of formation."
30
Tito had practical external and internal reasons for the promotion of the Macedonian
republic. Sovereign Macedonia was useful in terms of neutralising Bulgarian claims on the
territory and population. Internally, it was directed towards diminishing the relative size of
Serbia in comparison with the other republics. The Macedonian leadership also flirted with
the national sentiments whenever it was useful. In regard to the central government it could
complain on the basis of allegedly reawakened fears from the Belgrade terror in Southern
Serbia. Macedonians could always rely on the sympathies from the Croats and Slovenes
against centralist tendencies.
31
But the other constituent republics of the SFRY found the FYROM nationalism useful in
promoting their own interests:
The involvement of the Macedonian reformists gave enough coverage to their northern
partners, who received protection against Belgrades accusations about nationalist
deviations: the Macedonian case was perfect, since the nationalist element that was the
moving force in the process of construction and affirmation of the young nation could not
be doomed as nationalistic.
32
30
Ivan Bana, The National Questionin Yugoslavia. Origins History Politics (Ithaca: Cornell
University, 1984), 23.
31
Seoul, August 17-21, 1997), 9.
32
Stefan Troebst, Bugarsko-Jugoslovenskata kontroverza za Makedonija, 1967-1982, 74.
22
Checking the statistics of the population in the vilayets of Kosovo (Kosova), Manastir
(Bitola) and Selanik (Thessaloniki) submitted and published by Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in 1914 provided the national statistics listed below.
33
In the case of the
Macedonian-Slav ethnicity, the 1921 and 1931 census does not even mention the existence of
Macedonians, but indicates a Serbian and Bulgarian presence.
34
However, the 1981 publication
Yugoslav figures for FYROM introduce Macedonians as a separate ethnic minority into the 1921
and 1931 census.
35
33
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Enquete dans les Balkans (Paris, 1914), 9-10.
34
Stojkovi, Ljubia and Milo Marti, National minorities in Yugoslavia (Beograd Publishing and
Editing Enterprise Jugoslavija, 1952), 29.
35
Popis stanovnistva domacinstava I stanova u 1981 [Population, household and housing census in
1981]. Beograd: Savenzi zavod za statistiku, 1982.
23
The Greek Community in the FYROM contests the actual number of Greeks to be
approximately 250,000 and Pres. Kiro Gligorov has already stated they are only 100,000 Greeks.
36
Furthermore, the State Board of Statistics in Belgrade, 1921 census numbered Greeks to be 41,597,
and in the 1931 census to be 44,608. In 1949, Skopje alone had 30,000 Greeks.
37
In 1981, the SFRY issued a revised census for the same area showing that in 1921 only
2,000 Greeks inhabited the area of the present day FYROM while the figures of 1931 portrayed
there to be 1,000 respectively.
38
Thus, the question is, what has happened to the Greeks of the
FYROM?
The town of Pehevo, according to the 2002 census, has 5,517 residents the vast majority of
whom are of Greek ancestry. In 1923, after Greeces defeat, the ancestors of the present inhabitants
left Gallipoli, Eastern Thrace (Trakya in present-day Turkey) coming to Greece as refugees. They
arrived in Thessaloniki, but eventually went north to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes, then to work in the mines of the Maleevski Mountain range. They settled in the village
36
Kiro Gligorov, Ethnically pure states is an anachronism esk Denk, June 10, 1993, Prague,
interview with Teodor Marjanovi and Stanislav Drahn.
37
Stojkovi, Ljubia and Milo Marti, National minorities in Yugoslavia (Beograd : Publishing
and Editing Enterprise Jugoslavija,), 1952, 29.
38
Popis stanovnistva domacinstava i stanova u 1981 (Beograd: Savenzni zavod za statistiku),
1982). [Population, household and housing census in 1981].
24
of Pehevo (), which today is the seat of the municipality in the easternmost part of the
FYROM.
Oddly enough in the census of 2002, only a few residents made it in the statistics as Greeks
and were referred in the record under others. Due to statistical scheming, the Greek inhabitants
made it as "Macedonians" and most others as Turks since they originally left Turkey (Specifically
the census states: "Macedonians" 4,737, Roma 390, Turks 357, and others 33).
39
Based on the above,
40
Stefanos Doumtsis concludes,
This in itself makes a weighty argument against the existence of a Macedonian nation and
the discrepancies of demographics within Yugoslavia. Regardless of the significance or
validity of absolute numbers, the conclusion drawn on the validity of any census conducted
in the former Yugoslavia and FYROM happens to be highly unreliable and untrustworthy.
41
39
State Statistical Office of FYROM, Total population of the Republic of Macedonia by ethnic
affiliation, by municipalities, Census of population, households and dwellings 2002, State
Statistical Office, http://www.stat.gov.mk (accessed May 3, 2009).
40
Natasha Gaber and Aneta Joveska, Macedonian census results - controversy or reality? South
East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs (2004).
41
Stefanos Doumtsis, Major, USAF, Balkans: Ethnic Minority Implications for FYROMs Future
Stability - Beyond Kosovo- An I & W Tool for the Intelligence Analyst, U.S. National Defense
Intelligence College, Class 2010.
25
But the FYROM has a different and much more serious demographic problem. As the
population growth continues, the projected population in FYROM by 2050 is going to be negative,
below the 2 million mark. The demographic shift of Albanians, assuming current birth rates of 1.14
percent, will be approaching 46 percent or 980,000 and the Slavs will be 691,108 or 37 percent of
the total population.
42
In addition, the population of the Greek region of Macedonia is about 3 million with a
Slavic minority of about 5,000 according to the last EU elections, a negligible number. The Slavic
migrs whose families had voluntarily left Greece for political reasons in 1949, at the end of the
Civil War, claim that the democratic forces of Greece forced their families out of the country in
order to cleanse Greece ethnically. If that argument were true, Greece would not have about 5,000
Slavic speakers that are free to participate in the democratic institutions of Greece and are equal to
all other Greek citizens. What is additionally interesting is that the same people who claim that
they have been ethnically cleansed and eradicated by the democratic forces of Greece in 1949, also
claim that they have a minority of 100,000 in the Greek region of Macedonia. If there had been an
ethnic cleansing in 1949, not one Slav would have been left in Greece. The question is which of
these claims is true? The fact is that neither is true. The Civil War of Greece started as a war
aiming at the regime change, albeit violent in 1944, but it ended up being a war for territorial
occupation of the Greek region of Macedonia on behalf of Yugoslavia. As the Slav insurgents were
losing the war they spread rumors that the democratic forces of Greece were killing civilians
spreading fear resulting in the Slavic population leaving the country. Those who claim that the
42
Stefanos Doumtsis, Major, USAF, Balkans: Ethnic Minority Implications for FYROMs Future
26
Greek Army had committed ethnic cleansing are descendants of those who had lost their homes due
to Slavic intimidation and lies.
43
The only way that the Greek region of Macedonia could be united with the territory of the
FYROM would be the result of war. But if for arguments sake we assume that the FYROM
somehow incorporates the Greek region of Macedonia under Skopjes Slavic government as a result
of war, what is their plan for the Greek population that numbers close to 3 million? Are they going
to ethnically cleanse a population with a very strong culture and is more populous? Any realization
of such dreams would in fact result in the extinction of their Slavic culture. Let us not forget that
the FYROM Slavs have received their religion from the Greeks with plenty of Greek terminology
in their canonical books. In addition, their food is similar to the Greek food and their language
includes many Greek words and expressions including the name Macedonia. Even most of their
first names are Greek.
Democratic civilian-military relations
44
On March 27, 1992, the last soldier of the Yugoslavian Peoples Army (Jugoslavenska
Narodna Armija - JNA) returned home after the Petokraka
45
was lowered in the FYROM. Calls for
the demilitarization of the FYROM were heard strongly and firmly. Even the nationalist party
Movement for All-Macedonian Action (MAAK)
46
that had called for secession since 1990, in
43
The mother of the present FYROM PM Gruevski is one of those who left Greece for the
communist paradise of Yugoslavia.
44
Seoul, August 17-21, 1997).
45
Petokraka is the name of the old flag of SFRY branding the five-point star in the middle of the
white horizontal band. The complete phrase is Petokraka zastava or Five-Pointed flag.
46
or Macedonian Action.
27
September 1991 proposed a radical solution in the form of a Manifesto for Demilitarisation of the
Macedonian Republic. Some domestic authors are uncritically euphoric about the document:
The process of gaining independence from the ex-Yugoslav federation peacefully has cast
light on the Republic of Macedonia as a civilised state and the small Macedonian population
as a great civilised people striving for establishing eternal peace in Kants sense of the word:
Zum ewigen frieden. [] The essence of the Macedonian peace model on the Balkans has
been pointed out in the Manifesto for Demilitarisation of the Macedonian Republic in
September 1991.
47
47
Olga Murdzeva-karik and Svetomir karik, Peace and UNPREDEP in Macedonia, paper
presented at XVI IPRA General Conference, Brisbane, Australia, 8-12 July 1996, 11.
28
However, according to Biljana Vankovska, the FYROMs peacefulness had nothing to do
with any political decision, although the FYROMs political elite takes credit for it; it was simply
coincidence. Soon after the FYROM became a demilitarized country with almost no armament
whatsoever, it had an opportunity to either stay demilitarized or start building up its armament.
48
It
had virtually no external enemies threatening it. On the contrary, Bulgaria was ready to recognize
it and it did recognize it as an independent country guaranteeing its borders and so did Greece, as a
member of NATO. While Greece recognizes a Slavic country north of its borders, it does not
recognize the FYROMs so-called constitutional name. Albania had political troubles of its own
and Serbia i.e. FRY had taken its Army out of the FYROM peacefully. Therefore, to conclude that
demilitarization and making the FYROM an oasis of peace led by the FYROM governments
policy making process in 1991-2 is nonsense. One might argue the same regarding a neutral
Macedonia [sic] because the public did not pay serious attention to it treating it only as a nice but
unrealistic idea.
49
The same sentiment is echoed in the statement of Eric J. Hobsbawm. According to him, in
the years before its independence, the FYROM was not immuned to nationalism, neither wished to
secede nor did they prepare themselves for independence. It was for this that foreign analysts
praised the FYROM as the only peaceful actor.
It was not the Macedonian Question, well known to scholars as leading to battles between
rival experts in a half-dozen fields at international congresses, which provoked the collapse
of Yugoslavia. On the contrary, the Macedonian Peoples Republic did its best to stay out of
48
Seoul, August 17-21, 1997), 11.
49
Trajan Goevski, Neutralna Makeodnija: od vizija do stvarnost (Neutral Macedonia: From
Vision towards Reality) (Kumanovo: Makedonska riznica, 1995).
29
the Serb-Croat imbroglio, until Yugoslavia was actually collapsing, and all its components,
in sheer self-defence, had to look after themselves.
50
Soon after independence, it became apparent that the state was breeding deep ethnic conflict
potential due to lack of democratic values. The surrounding enemies that the FYROM governments
later encountered were created by the FYROM political elite for internal consumption in order to
create scapegoats of their failures, as the Nazis did with the Jews. The FYROMs diaspora, living
in a time warp away from the home country, based their irredentist views on tales and not historical
facts, and organized on platforms of revenge. They chose not to realize that if the FYROMs
neighboring countries wanted, they would have plenty of opportunities to divide the country among
themselves. When Serbias Miloevi suggested to the other three countries (Albania, Greece, and
Bulgaria) the division of the FYROM, the reaction of those countries was negative.
For Greece, annexing the suggested part would be an additional sociological and
demographic burden that would create unnecessary problems without offering any factual solutions
and benefits. Its ethnic Greek population lives mostly in the area of Skopje. The remaining is
spread all over the country, especially in the southwest and south. In addition, there are no reliable
statistics in the country and Greece never had professional personnel dedicated to collect
information on Greeks in the FYROM.
The territories Miloevi suggested lie south of the line that starts from Greeces present
common borders with Albania/FYROM borders in Prespa to a point to be determined between
Struga and Bitola to a point in Bakarno Gumno to the confluence of the rivers Axios and Bregalnica
(just north of Gradsko, ancient Capital of Paeonia, Stobi). From there the borderline would descend
50
Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), 166.
30
to the flow of the river Axios to Greeces present borders including the towns of Gevgelija and of
Bogorodica, which lies on the east bank of Axios just north of the Greek town of Evzoni.
The issue of the relations between civilian and military is crucial since the military is part of
the people and consists of minorities, one of which was strong enough to take arms to defend its
own survival in a Slavic dominated society. No government has paid appropriate attention to the
issue of civilian control over the military, which is an accepted norm and fundamental in
democratic societies as part of checks and balances, and not as self-awareness.
51
Even though the country was facing a double embargo by the UN in the north and Greece in
the south, it was not threatened militarily from an external enemy, but from an internal one, the
Albanians. The beginning of the republic showed that it would be a problem for the two main
ethnic groups to reconcile their differences while a war was going on in the territory that in the near
past formed the country to which the FYROM belonged.
Nevertheless, the Albanians marched to their own drummer. They boycotted the 1991
referendum for independence from the FYROM, and in 1992 they held a successful referendum for
their own independence as their inherent right to self-determination, which the Slav-dominated
government declared illegal and in violation of the UN Charter (Articles 1.2 and 55 ). In early
November 1993, the police arrested a group of Albanians (including a Deputy Minister of Defense
of the FYROM) and accused them of attempting to establish paramilitary forces. Following that
incident, in 1994 the Albanians declared an autonomous Republic of Illirida in the western part of
the FYROM. The idea was to declare independence afterwards and then unite Illirida with either
Kosovo, or even Albania. They almost succeeded in 2001, but because of Francisco Javier Solana
51
Seoul, August 17-21, 1997), 16.
31
de Madariaga, Jos Manuel Duro Barroso, and Geoffrey George Papandreou, they did not succeed.
At that period, the FYROM Press exalted George Papandreou for his efforts to keep the country
together.
According to Yelena Guskova of the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of
Sciences (ISL RAS), George Papandreou, the then Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced
the idea of the Federation of Balkan States that would include all Western Balkan countries
minus Slovenia, which idea was supported by the EU leadership. In essence, what he was
proposing was a new federation of the countries included in the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe, signed on June 10, 1999 per EU initiative. The new federation would include Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia (including Kosovo), and the
FYROM.
52
In theory, it is a good plan, but only for the future. These countries faced and are still facing
different issues and only a natural process would enable them to find the right solution from within,
not a solution imposed by outsiders. What Western Balkan countries need is economic and
political stability that could transform the independent political entities to a possible federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) with Montenegro and Serbia; and why not the FYROM? Without
establishing good neighborly relations, however, first with themselves and then with their potential
adjacent countries, such an idea will remain only in the dream stage. Outside organizations should
help from the sidelines without trying to impose their solutions based on their own political gains.
During the Slavo-Albanian war in the FYROM and while indicators pointed to the
disintegration of the FYROM, a delegation of FYROM Slavic Parliamentarians visited Athens for
52
Yelena Guskova,
(The Process of Stabilization of the Former Yugoslav States and International
Organizations), Institute of Slavic Studies Russian Academy of Sciences, February 16, 2005.
http://inslav.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=169&Itemid=1
32
discussions with Panos Beglitis, Director of the Information Department and Spokesman of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PASOK government. Although the contents of those discussions
have not been disclosed, the information that the Slav media of the FYROM exposed suggested that
they were related to the existence of the FYROM after the Ilirida break up. Some media even
suggested that the delegation sought the possibility of a federation between the FYROM and
Greece.
As in most democratic countries, the military represents the people because it is part of the
people and is designed to defend the country from external dangers. In theory, it is exactly what
happened in the FYROM, but in practice nobody expected the Army to be involved in any
defensive war because the danger was within as it proved later. According to a member of the
General Staff, one cannot expect loyalty from a military consisting, among others, of Albanians
and Kosovars.
53
Politics marred the FYROM Army of the new republic, which encountered a new internal
rival, the police. In the strife on which force was more effective, the police proved the most
important and functional rival to the Army since the danger to the Slavic majority were the
minorities, especially the Albanians. The antagonism of the security forces crowned the police as
the winner and as a result, the police benefited in funding and equipment. In addition, the Army
felt inferior since its top brass, moving slowly and full of perplexity, did not know what to do about
raising the morale. The result was that the Chief of Staff, Gen. Arsovski, several years later
proposed an internal security doctrine that would allow the military to intervene in domestic riots
53
Budo Vukobrat, Mitre would like to go to NATO!, AIM Press, 5 March 1998
http://www.aimpress.org (accessed June 17, 2011).
33
when the police were not sufficient to cope with them.
54
He probably copied the idea from the
first paragraph of the original Preamble of the 1982 Constitution of Turkey.
55
Since the country had no democratic traditions, the legal system was based on a constitution
filled with adopted Western principles not understood by the people, principles taken from various
countries in bits and pieces which often times had no cohesion or reconcilement, were improperly
espoused without public debate, and the laws enacted regarding the Army were the result of
political polarization.
Civilmilitary relations have been shaped in an atmosphere of sharp political fragmentation
and antagonism. The party system is divided along ethnic lines, but there are also traditional
divisions among the Macedonians (and Albanians) themselves. A political opponent is
usually seen as an enemy who should be discredited as a traitor. Some years ago the
SDSM government was accused for its soft policy towards Albanians demands. From the
beginning VMRO has declared itself as the only genuine Macedonian party, and introduced
the division of patriots and traitors, i.e. real Macedonians and if the others. Having
got in power, the situation changed: VMRO made a coalition with the radical Albanian
party (PDPA) and was blamed for dividing Macedonia between Albania and Bulgaria.
Fermentation of the civil-military relationships has not reached its zenith, since both the
political system and the military have been going through mutations with uncertain
outcomes.
56
The Constitutional issue of the FYROM is that it has a dual top leadership, the President and
the Government who compete against each other because of the vagueness of the particular
provisions. Both, the President and the Government draw their legitimacy from the people and
because of the issues I mentioned above regarding the source of various laws, it is very difficult and
often times impossible. Sometimes one has to distinguish who has the final say on certain matters.
54
Seoul, August 17-21, 1997), 15.
55
Constitution of Turkey (1982) http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/con0.html (accessed June 20,
2011).
56
Seoul, August 17-21, 1997), 15.
34
The 1992 Law which is valid at present, failed to address the issue drawing definite lines of
responsibilities among the President of the Republic (as designated Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces), the Government (Ministry of Defense), and the General Staff.
57
In other words, all
of three are responsible and nobody is responsible. The same goes for the name negotiations with
Greece. Although Greece negotiates with the government of the FYROM, according to some
FYROM newspapers the person responsible for the name of the country is the President according
to Article 79.1 of the Constitution, which states, The President of the Republic of Macedonia
represents the Republic who, elected directly by the people of the FYROM, bears full legitimacy
Although many years have passed since independence, the problem continues either
because the laws have not been modified to the extent of clearly closing the gaps or because
politicians find such laws convenient to advance their own agendas. They push the arguments that
they have with each other as part of democracy and not of laws put together in haste.
The Civilian - Military relationship had been shaped in an environment of political
polarization and ethnic antagonism. It is we against them and patriots against traitors, and
although the FYROMs diaspora feels Greece is the enemy, the Civilian Military antagonists see
themselves in a tug of war between Albania and Bulgaria. What is true is the war of 2001 found all
of them unprepared and puzzled as whether the enemy is an external or an internal one.
Treatment of minority populations in accordance with democratic governance
The first Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia of 1991 acknowledged the FYROM
as the country of the Macedonian nation and other nationalities living within. This definition was
57
Seoul, August 17-21, 1997), 19.
35
based on the Constitution of the SFRY, which recognized Nations and Nationalities, another term
for minorities. From 1991 to 2001, the definition of the state, especially in terms of the usage of
words nation and nationalities, was an open political issue.
58
An explanation regarding the system of nations and nationalities is pertinent. According to
the system of Nations and Nationalities, any of the six constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, all Slavs
(i.e. Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, "Macedonians" and Muslims), constituted a narod or a
nation, because their mother country was inside the SFRY. They were not a minority. But if the
mother-country of a specific ethnic group, regardless of its population size, lay outside the borders
of Yugoslavia, then that group was considered to be a narodnost or nationality, therefore a national
minority (i.e. Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, etc.) As explained, the system of Nations and
Nationalities (or national minorities) had nothing to do with the size of an ethnic population, but
only with whether its origin and mother country was inside or outside SFRY. Therefore, although
less in number, the Montenegrins formed a nation living in a Republic, whereas the Albanians,
despite their greater numbers, were only a nationality living in a Province.
Another very important distinction has to be made regarding the definition of nationality in
international law and the manner it is used by the constitution and the laws of the FYROM as
explained above.
Nationality in law is a simple membership in a nation or sovereign state. It is to be
distinguished from citizenship, a somewhat narrower term that is sometimes used to denote the
status of those nationals who have full political privileges. Before an act of the U.S. Congress
made them citizens, for example, American Indians were sometimes referred to as noncitizen
nationals. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states [in article 15 (1)] that
58
Dane Taleski, Political Parties and Minority Participation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Skopje
2008.
36
everyone has the right to a nationality and [in article 15(2)] that no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his nationality.
Nationality is of cardinal importance because it is mainly through nationality that the
individual comes within the scope of international law and has access to the political and economic
rights and privileges conferred by modern states on their nationals. Under international law,
citizenship and nationality are synonymous, although the two may have different meanings under
national law as in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) and possibly its heir states.
Canadian, Greek, and U.S. passports, for instance, state the word nationality with the connotation
of citizenship. In some cases, as in passports of the former SFRJ nationality was missing, because
internally the SFRJ was using nationality as ethnicity. Any mention of nationality SFRJ would
have caused confusion.
Countries do not recognize ethnic groups of other countries because it is against the UN
Charter, which considers such a move as interference in the internal affairs of other countries, nor
do countries have the obligation to recognize ethnic groups within their own borders. The only
thing they have to do is to guarantee equal treatment of their citizens and protection of foreign
nationals and by equal treatment means just that; it does not mean special privileges because it
creates inequality. Recognition of ethnic groups is one of the remnants of the communist era,
something very familiar to the FYROM citizenry, but it is outdated.
However, the international conditions that had required rapid recognition of Macedonia as a
sovereign state by ignoring the fragile ethnic composition of this tiny Balkan country led to
ethnic strife and consequently a political reform process. This process was definitely
predominated by the political demands of the ethnic Albanians at the expense of the
majority Slav Macedonians and the other smaller ethnic groups, including the Turks.
59
59
Mandaci, Nazif (2007) Turks of Macedonia: The Travails of the Smaller Minority, Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, 27: 1, 5 24.
37
Also it can be argued that the difference in understanding the above is the main problem in
the relations between the FYROM and Greece because of the FYROMs past mentality bears
influence still. Any time the matter of nationality comes up, the FYROM and its diaspora translate
it as ethnicity while the Greeks understand the same word as citizenship.
Treatment of minorities is a thorny issue for the FYROM. It took a war to bring the
Albanians close to what they wanted, equality. However, according to FYROM President Ivanov,
"achievements regarding its implementation in the past nine years are tangible, but its complete
implementation costs a lot. Its full functionality requires a US$ 8,000 GDP per capita, with
Macedonia's only being half of this amount."
60
This means nothing more than the FYROM signed
the agreement only to get out of the jam with the Albanians as it did with the Interim Agreement
with Greece in 1995. The FYROMs GDP is only $4,538 per capita.
61
How long should the
Albanians that unofficially constitute a population of 800,000 wait to receive equal treatment?
What exactly does the FYROM government do with the money they receive from the EU and
NATO for home improvement? The Skopje 2014 Project modeled after Papandreous EU
2014, including the antiquization project, has cost the FYROM taxpayer an estimated 200 million
thus far. Then we have the other minorities such as the Serbian, Turkish, Greek (Vlach) that
FYROM officials tend to ignore. It is perhaps the FYROM meaning of transparency!
Paragraph 59 of the 2010 Annual Report by the Defense and Security Committee of NATO
Parliamentary Assembly regarding democracy in the FYROM states,
The case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia deserves special mention. Despite
considerable and indisputable achievements, implementation of the Ohrid Accords,
concluded in August 2001 and seeking to put an end to interethnic violence, still gives rise
to problems. It also remains a reason for tension with political parties representing the
60
President Ivanov, Framework Agreement is specific Macedonian model of multiethnic society,
MIA, August 14, 2010.
61
Military Balance 2011, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 186.
38
Albanian minority; the DUI (Democratic Union for Integration) in 2007, then since August
2009 the DPA (Democratic Party of Albanians), have taken it in turns to boycott parliament
to denounce the failure to implement certain provisions in the Ohrid Agreement. The
October 2009 Progress Report by the European Commission lays stress on progress in
implementing laws on languages, on decentralisation and on equitable representation, but
notes that further efforts in a constructive spirit are needed to fulfil the objectives of the
Agreement and that continued efforts to deepen political dialogue including on interethnic
issues would consolidate the engagement of all parties. The Membership Action Plan for
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for 2009-2010 refers to the same areas of
progress and the same weaknesses.
62
Nazif Mandaci in his paper Turks of Macedonia [sic]: The Travails of the Smaller
Minority exceptionally describes the problems that non-Slavic minorities of the FYROM are
facing on a daily basis. He concludes in essence that the Slavic authorities look towards the EU for
stability in the country and regime survival. His arguments remind me of my arguments on Kim
Jong-Il of North Korea relying on China for the same, and one could even argue the same regarding
Lukashenko depending on Russias support.
Fortunately, at the end of 2005, the European Council heeded the call of the Commission for
granting candidacy status to Macedonia, thereby refreshing the hopes of the Macedonian
ruling elite, who see EU membership as the sole outlet primarily for the survival of the
multinational state. However, since then, the hard process of adoption of EU regulations
seems to be under the mortgage of the ethnic tensions between ethnic Albanians and
Macedonians, which are ebbing and flowing due to disagreements and partial consensuses
on the interpretation and implementation of the Ohrid (Framework) Agreement.
63
62
Marc Angel (Luxembourg), Rapporteur 2010 Annual Report by the Defense and Security
Committee of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 208 CDSDG 10 E rev 1- The Western Balkans, 15
Years After Dayton : Achievements and Prospects.
63
Nazif Mandaci, Turks of Macedonia: The Travails of the Smaller Minority, Journal of Muslim
Minority Affairs (April 2007), 27: 1, 5- 24.
39
On March 31, 2003, the European Union (EU) took command of the NATO mission in the
FYROM under Operation Concordia sending Greek and Italian troops to the country in order to
make sure all is in control, and in addition offered diplomatic and economic aid.
Nevertheless, the EU never effectively encouraged the Slavic majority of the FYROM to
democratize. This kind of an attitude has created more problems than it solved. It has rewarded
autocratic and anti-minority policies of the Slavic majority. In 2005, the EU offered candidacy to
the FYROM, rewarding the Slavic majority for its efforts to suppress its minorities and effectively
censoring democracy. It is true that regional stability is of absolute importance, but rewarding the
nationalist policies of the establishment is simple uncaring to the point that the stability of the
country as well as the western Balkans as a whole is subject to what extent the European Union
looks amiable in keeping its promise to Europeanize the once conflict-ridden region.
64
The ability to make a military contribution to the alliance
The above stipulation means that the candidates armed forces must be able to fit into the
alliance framework. Considering that modern weapons are very sophisticated and consequently
expensive, such commitment requires money that each country has to contribute on its own. To
date the FYROM economy is not great and it is getting worse. The countrys GDP per capita from
US$4,526 in 2008 reached US$4,538 per capita in 2010 and the Defense expenditure keeps
decreasing from US$194m in 2009 to US$140m in 2010 finally reaching US$131m in 2011. All
this occurred when the U.S. Foreign Aid has remained the same at US$2.8m in 2008 and in 2009,
but then decreased to US$4.0m in 2010, and rose to US$5.00 in 2011.
65
64
Nazif Mandaci, Turks of Macedonia: The Travails of the Smaller Minority, Journal of Muslim
Minority Affairs (April 2007), 27: 1, 5- 24.
65
Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2011, 186.
40
This aid does not include the additional aid of US$100 million that the U.S. National
Security Council has provided for improvement of the quality of life of the FYROMs population
and their education since independence, and neither does it include any funding supporting the
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the training of military personnel, etc.
66
One cannot but wonder why the United States is giving so much aid to the FYROM.
A commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts
The name dispute with Greece falls under the precondition of the peaceful resolution of
conflicts, something that Skopje avoids doing. Furthermore, Skopje hinders any serious
negotiations by attempting to derail the outcome by other means such as lawsuits, dragging its feet
or even transferring the name war through its proxy, its own diaspora. The relationship between
the FYROM government and its diaspora is an on-going cycle that feeds each others nationalism
and finances.
The doctrine of irredentism is derived from the Italian irridenta meaning those territories,
Trente, Dalmatia, Trieste, Fiume which, although culturally Italian, remained under Austrian or
Swiss rule and thus unredeemed after the unification of Italy itself. In modem political usage the
term has come to mean any territorial claim made by one sovereign national state to lands within
another. These claims are generally supported by historical and/or ethnic arguments: that is, the
66
Federation of American Scientists, foreign military assistance.
http://www.fas.org/search/index.html?cx=011272476961064978591%3Alx1cammk60s&cof=FORI
D%3A11&q=foreign+military+assustance+macedonia (accessed June 24, 2011).
41
irredentist state insists that part of its rightful homeland has been unjustly taken from it, or that a
part of the nation itself has been falsely separated from the organic national community.
67
Although, in all cases, irredentist claims are made by one state on the territory (the real
estate so to speak) of another, irredentist claims vary in the extent to which they combine the
elements of territoriality for its own sake and genuine national sentiment. A current, if extreme
example, was provided by the Argentine claim to the Malvinas or Falkland Islands, which has been
deliberately kept in the forefront of the Argentine national consciousness by the process of official
national propaganda and censorship. All Argentinean maps show the islands as belonging to the
Argentine. Argentinean history books describe them as an integral part of the nation, despite the
fact that there has been virtually no Argentinean population on the islands for 150 years and not
much before that.
68
Replacing Argentina with the FYROM, one sees the present situation very
clearly.
Greece on the other hand has not taken the matter seriously. According to an article in the
newspaper Makedonia of Thessaloniki,
69
in 2008 alone and while the Greek economy was already
ailing, Greek companies invested 1Billion (about $1.42 billion) in the FYROM economy offering
20,000 job in an economy where unemployment is as high as 35%. All this took place at the
expense of Western Macedonia because investment from there went to Skopje making Western
Macedonia the poorest region in Greece.
67
Press, 1994), 270.
68
Press, 1994), 270 - 271.
69
, : . 20.000
July 20, 2008 20/07/2008, http://www.makthes.gr/news/politics/21350/ (accessed June
13, 2011).
42
As indicated by the same article, 280 Greek-owned companies are operating in the FYROM,
of course not paying a cent to the Greek Revenue Service. Of the 17 largest foreign investments in
Skopje, seven are Greek and the ten largest Greek companies have invested over 780 million euros
in the country. In addition, more than 7 out of 20 largest companies in the FYROMrepresent
Greek interests.
Nevertheless, the article continues to explain a few details that the FYROMgovernment
does not consider. Although the FYROMauthorities bring the above Greek investment down to
262.4 million euros, they do not calculate the total annual Greek investment, regardless of the
country of origin. The Greek side explains that Skopjes assertion would be true only if one
calculates the investment that comes directly from Greece. However, given that a significant part
of Greek equity funds have poured into the FYROMby Greek-owned companies headquartered in
other countries such as the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Ireland, the size of Greek
investments appears much higher than officially registered.
70
The financial dependence on Greece
is proven by the fact that just before Christmas 2011 the FYROMasked and received a loan of
130 million.
71
70
, : . 20.000
July 20, 2008 20/07/2008, http://www.makthes.gr/news/politics/21350/ (accessed June
13, 2011).
71
Macedonia Hellenic Land http://www.macedoniahellenicland.eu/content/view/2427/83/lang,el/
a. Kole Casule, Matt Robinson, Anna Willard, Macedonia to take 130 mln euro bank loan-finmin,
Reuters. Skopje, Nov 8, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/08/macedonia-loan-
idUSL6E7M83O120111108?feedType=RSS&feedName=rbssFinancialServicesAndReal (accessed
January 21, 2012)
b. Gordana Filipovic, Macedonia Accepts World Bank-Backed Citi-Deutsche Bank Loan,
November 09, 2011 Bloomberg/Businessweek (January 21, 2012),
businessweek.com/news/2011-11-09/macedonia-accepts-world-bank-backed-citi-deutsche-bank-
loan.html (accessed January 21, 2012)
c. World Bank, World Bank Finances; IBRD: Summary of Active Loans for Macedonia, former
Yugoslav Republic. finances.worldbank.org/Loan-and-Credit-Administration/IBRD-Summary-of-
Active-Loans-for-Macedonia-former-/k85p-rbdd (accessed January 21, 2012)
43
This cap pictured above is an example of irredentism by the FYROM. It was sold in NATO
Post Exchanges (PX) branding the irredentist red map of Macedonia with the Sun of Vergina.
NATO Criteria
Relevance to NATOs ability to project power in areas of likely contingencies
Creation of interior and easily defensive borders within the alliance
Risks that may accrue from a higher level of commitment to a new ally, and
Added transaction costs of a new member for the alliance's cohesion and ability to
perform its main missions on the basis of consensus
NATO membership criteria must be viewed as a whole, not in segments according to their
individual requirements. The issues are interrelated and considering them separately will not offer
the real picture. Professor Biljana Vankovska of the FYROMmakes an interesting observation
44
about the mentality of the FYROMpopulation and their understanding of their countrys state of
affairs. She explains,
Macedonia still lives somewhere between the pipe dream and the reality, without
knowing what is worse, the dream or the reality. For ten years it has been living on an
imagined peace island, while the population strongly believed in the countrys utmost
strategic importance for the international community. The price for the illusions and
mistakes is being paid but probably the most important thing is for the country to get awake
and not to allow a new round of a post-conflict virtual reality.
72
Relevance to NATOs ability to project power in areas of likely contingencies
The FYROM is a small country with a small military of only 8,000 standing personnel and
4,850 reservists. Comparing its total force (active and reserve) it is approximately equal to a U.S.
Army Infantry Division (on the average five Brigades with six Battalions each) headed by a Major
General (Two Star). The quality of each U.S. Commander is superb in any way possible. Judging
from the statement made by the President of the FYROM, Gjorge Ivanov, the top Commander of
the military does not meet NATO standards. The FYROM government is working on establishing
the profile of the new Chief of the General Staff with the hope that they will find the individuals
that fit the profile. Militarily, the FYROM Army is outdated with donated, mostly discontinued
equipment and, although they have deployed, their military skills are questionable regardless of the
soldiers level of ardent desire to excel. But if the leader of the FYROM Army does not meet the
standards, how can anything coming out of his office?
The FYROMs Army includes its Air Force, which following the Eastern block tradition
and being a landlocked country, the FYROMemploys only a small naval force that uses the lakes
72
Seoul, August 17-21, 1997), 27.
45
and the rivers of the country. Its Army maintains an Army of 8,000 professional personnel
distributed as follows: two Corps HQ (cadre), one Tank Battalion, two Infantry Brigades, one
Special Purpose unit (one Special Forces Battalion and one Ranger Battalion), one mixed Artillery
Regiment, one Air Defense Artillery Company, one Signal Battalion, one Nuclear-Biological-
Chemical Company, and one Security Military Police Battalion.
Under NATO the issue is leadership and the profile of the leader. Leadership is a decision-
making process requiring stamina and the capability of the leader to take the flak.
President Ivanov has admitted that the country lacks the person appropriate to be the leader
of the Army in terms of full NATO membership. He articulated his desire in the following
statement:
"Talks aim at creating a profile of the future chief of staff. We are not discussing about
individuals, but about profiles that need to be met by the ARM [Army of the Republic of
Macedonia] chief of staff. The future chief of staff has to meet the NATO criteria, since
Macedonia is a candidate country. Consultations are under way with the defense minister
and the incumbent chief of staff,"
73
Basically, President Ivanov is looking for individuals who possess not only the right
education, but the following qualities as Sun Tzu has suggested: Intelligence, Credibility,
Humaneness, Courage, and Discipline. The pivotal question is whether he is looking for a man
among his Slav officers or among his military at large, including the Albanians, Serbs, Turks, et al.
Considering himself a leader, his own credibility is at stake as well as improving the image of his
army abroad. If he chooses an Albanian, what is going to be the reaction of the Slav soldiers? It
will be THE test for the harmony of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society that the Slav
politicians have been advocating all along.
73
Gjorge Ivanov, New ARM chief of staff has to meet NATO criteria, MINA, 27 April 2011.
http://macedoniaonline.eu/content/view/18034/45/ (accessed June 17, 2011).
46
Thus far the FYROM has deployed to Afghanistan through the International Security
Assistance force (ISAF) 161 personnel. It the past, it participated in the Multi-National Force
Iraq (MNFI) deploying 77 personnel (in its peak deployed in July of 2003, but withdrawn in
November 2008). They deployed for only one reason, to cajole President Bush with hope for the
recognition of their country as Macedonia, something that they succeeded doing.
Whether the FYROM deployed military personnel as a way of greasing its way to NATO
membership and bypassing the 1995 Interim Agreement with Greece or by cajoling the personnel
supported by the Bush Administration and NATO leadership, the fact is that it has deployed troops.
The FYROM had deployed a military contingent abroad only with heavy military assistance from
the United States, and NATO leadership knew it. NATO requirements demand that the FYROM
does it with its own money, something it cannot do.
Creation of interior and easily defensive borders within the alliance
Sinia Tatalovi has mentioned that the FYROM is for centuries a cross-roads region of the
communication line connecting three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa.
74
Although this
statement is without merit, it is concurrently scary. The statement is without merit because
strategically the FYROMs location as we will see below is not even marginal. It is scary, because
this man is the adviser to the Croatian President on political matters, but he cannot read a map,
unless the map he is looking at is same as Kunchovs map as adapted by the VMRO. However the
FYROM Slavs express their desire with the Macedonian salute as expressed in the photo below
depicting the three parts of Macedonia and the letter O, the first letter of
74
Sinia Tatalovi, National Security of Macedonia, Politika Misao, Vol. XXXV (1998), No. 5,
105-124, 106.
47
(Obedinuvanje) meaning Union. The above statement refers to Greece, at first, and the region of
Macedonia proper which is in Greece, second.
One wonders how anyone can connect Africa with Skopje, perhaps bypassing Thessaloniki, Greece.
Unless the FYROM has lately moved south by about 70 kilometers, one cannot even think of
calling it a cross-roads region of the communication line connecting the two continents, let alone
three. The ONLY way that this statement would be true is if in the term Macedonia one includes
the Greek region of Macedonia or Macedonia proper and specifically the port of Thessaloniki. That
is the part of geographic Macedonia that has strategic value. The FYROM itself has almost
medium strategic value. If one wants to travel from Asia to Europe, one can bypass the FYROM
altogether by using the path through Bulgaria, Serbia, and so on. On the other hand, the seaports of
Thessaloniki, Kavala, and even Alexandroupolis are the key to the Balkans. The people of the
FYROM know it better than anyone else and it is exactly why irredentist education takes place in
48
the FYROM. Does Dr. Tatalovi advocate the incorporation of Greek Macedonia to the
FYROM?What means is he going to use in order to achieve his plan?
Even with planned Corridor VIII (Bari/Brindisi-Durres/Vlore-Tirana-Pogradec-Skopje-
Sofija-Burgas-Varna) the strategic position of the FYROM is not going to improve. If anyone
thinks that such a highway is going to alleviate Skopjes need for the port of Thessaloniki, one has
to have in mind that during Greeces embargo, which excluded food and medical supplies, the
FYROM was transferring oil through Bulgaria for a price that was almost double than the price of
oil imported through Greece.
75
In about one year, the FYROMs economy was near collapse. Even
today, the FYROMs economy heavily depends on Greece. The three main rivers of the FYROM
are not navigational
76
and the country has no effective means to defend its territory with the
military materiel, and its government which is more interested in the antiquization by returning to a
past that never was. The U.S. taxpayer would have to constantly shoulder the financial burden in
order for the FYROM to upgrade its arsenal and maintain a mediocre army while its own
government spends the money of its own taxpayers to support Gruevskis megalomaniac plans to
glorify ancient Greek heroes, fulfilling the ardent desire of the FYROM Slavic taxpayers who are
identifying themselves with the Greeks.
The main problem is that the FYROM is a small country (my argument would be the same
for Albania, Slovenia, etc., as well) and target range distance is against it. Modern artillery guns can
effectively hit a target from, say, 50 kilometers away. On the other hand, there are no inimical
75
The embargo of Greece on the FYROM was much less painful than the United States has
imposed on Cuba since February 7, 1962. Greeces embargo excluded medicines and food. The
U.S. embargo on Cuba has been a complete one. If the Untied States is justified to continue the
embargo against a small, defenseless and weak island country, one cannot see why Greece was not
justified to do so against the FYROM. The national interests and national security of Greece are
very much at stake.
76
None of the three rivers (River Vardar (Thracian and Greek Axios) and its tributaries, Bregalnica
and Crna (ancient Greek Erigon) of the FYROM can be considered navigational except perhaps for
Patrol River Boats (PBR 2).
49
adjacent countries. The enemy is within, and as much as most citizens of the country would
consider the Albanians as the enemy, in reality the enemy is the Slavic majority digging its own
grave.
For all those who pretend to be concerned with regional stability, I would suggest that they
should pay attention to the psychological stability and the mental condition of the Slavic population
of the FYROM and its diaspora first, because their future psychological instability and their mental
disorders could throw the Balkan Peninsula into a new bloodbath. When under free speech of
NATO, and especially the EU, the Slavs of the FYROM realize that their own political elite were
lying to them about being Macedonians and true descendants of the ancient Macedonians, what
does anyone think is going to happen in the country?
Risks that may accrue from a higher level of commitment to a new ally
Over the years after its establishment, NATO has evolved from a defensive organization
strictly operating within the theater of its countries-members to a confused organization during the
late 1980s and early 1990s looking for raison d'tre. Therefore, in the early 1990 does NATO
have the opportunity to demonstrate its might by getting involved as an organization in war that
some of its country-members as individuals started to begin with.
Former U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman had criticized Germany for supporting
Croatias recognition,
77
while former U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger clarified on
American PBS-TV in December 1994 that Germany bears full responsibility for the bloody
conflict because of its insistence on recognizing Slovenia and Croatia at all costs. This took place
77
Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (Times Books
1996), 249.
50
in November 1991. The German action led to a wildfire escalation of the conflict in Bosnia, he
said. Eagleberger spoke as the Atlantic Alliance sank deeper into a state of crisis.
78
As NATO was transforming to the new reality, it assumed a greater role. The prevailing
philosophy was that it should expand and embrace as many countries of the former Warsaw Pact as
possible in order to counter a formidable adversary that was stripped from its erstwhile power.
Whether one might argue that the war industry was behind this move or whether it was a prudent
decision is a matter of opinion. What is not a matter of opinion is that the small countries cannot
sustain a military that keeps getting increasingly expensive as the sophistication of the arms and
equipment reaches the stratosphere.
The risks that the countries NATO members accrue are not just in blood. As NATO
expands and the United States becomes the policeman of the world, they are also at risk in
monetary terms. NATO members have to keep afloat in this bad world economy as they deal with
their own sociological issues. Membership might be prestigious, but it is expensive and is
becoming more expensive by the minute. The FYROM already has a 30-35% unemployment rate
while spending US$230 million is extravaganzas raising the nationalism in the FYROM at the
expense of Greece and Bulgaria. It cannot afford to spend more unless the United States keeps
feeding the FYROMs military and ethnocentric political elite.
Added transaction costs of a new member for the alliance's cohesion and ability to perform its
main missions on the basis of consensus
NATO is a military alliance of 28 independent countries that decide on various issues after
consultation and consensus. There is no voting in NATO and sometimes members agree to
disagree as was the case of France and Germany vetoing Turkeys air defense missiles to protect it
78
US slams Germany for Yugoslav war, HaGalil.com November 07, 2002. http://www.klick-
nach-rechts.de/germany/croatia.htm (accessed June 23, 2011).
51
against retaliatory attacks from Iraq. The principle of consensus as the sole basis for decision-
making was established at the creation of the Alliance in 1949.
79
Although any European country is welcome to join the Alliance, the candidate has to meet
all preconditions and all criteria for membership. Occasionally when a country candidate has
issues with its neighbors, special preconditions are set in order to conform to good neighborly
relations. It is inconceivable for a country to become an ally of another country with inimical
relations. What kind of allies can they be?
The FYROMs economy is small with a GDP in 2010 of US$9,400,000,000. During the
same year it spent US$159,000,000 in military expenditures or 1.7% of its GDP.
80
Political elites
of small countries, in order to receive votes, have raised the hopes of their constituencies by
applying for membership. The Preconditions and Criteria have been overlooked under pressure of
their diaspora here at home, and the United States has accepted burden after burden in order to
militarily assist new members of NATO. While satisfying the diasporas, U.S. politicians have
accepted third rate militaries of countries that have their priorities elsewhere just as in the case of
the FYROM, antiquization!
Comparing the FYROMs commitment to that of other small NATO countries with similar
military expenditures, the question that arises is whether these countries seriously contribute to the
Alliance. As a matter of synergy and as a matter of practice NATO cannot and will not inherit
79
NATO, Consensus decision-making at NATO.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm (accessed June 20, 2011).
80
IISS, Military Balance, 2011.
52
strategic liabilities of candidate countries amounting ethnic tensions, intra-national and territorial
disputes, etc.
81
Now the United States feels the squeeze since the new members of the Alliance are
incapable of taking care of their own and expect military assistance from the United States. Thus
the question is, What exactly does the United States expect from these small countries?
Since these small countries are depleted of money, the Alliance i.e. the United States is
forced to pay for sophisticated armaments that the militaries of the new members must have in
order to operate sufficiently and respond to the obligations of membership. But while they are
trying to catch up with the present technology, the already military advanced NATO countries keep
going, resulting in an endless military catch up game.
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, expressed these sentiments when
talking about NATO allies not expanding military expenditures and lacking political will. Mr.
Gates further criticized the ongoing process of what he called a two-tiered membership structure,
between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of commitments, and those
who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership but dont want to share the risks and the costs. He
added that some NATO partners are apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to
assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets.
82
There is
clearly a longstanding concern about the transatlantic gap in defense, said NATO spokesman,
Oana Lungescu, when asked about Mr. Gates comments. There is a risk that European allies may
81
Ted Galen Carpenter, Balkan Tensions and the Future of NATO (speech delivered athe 64
th
Conference of the Pan-Macedonian Association, Chicago, IL, May 29, 2010).
http://www.panmacedonian.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=324:to-sink-or-
to-swim-by-marcus-templar&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=50 (accessed June 21, 2011)
82
Gates warns NATO: Carry your weight or else, NewsOK, June 16, 2011
http://newsok.com/gates-warns-nato-carry-your-weight-or-else/article/3577450 (accessed June 22,
2011).
53
fall further behind in terms of technological development because of low levels of defense
spending.
83
The FYROM definitely cannot bear the burden of NATO membership on its own.
According to the ratings posted on the Enlargement Study of the Rand Corporation and using 10 as
High (excellent) and 0 as Low (bad) the FYROM stands as follows:
On the Assessment of Strategic Attractiveness to NATO,
o the FYROMs Strategic Position medium or 4.2;
o the FYROMs Armed Forces Readiness has scored 5.0 or Medium, or an
overall 4.6 / Medium.
84
On the matter of Preparation for and Attractiveness to NATO:
o the FYROM scored on Criteria Low (1.7);
o the Strategic Attractiveness of the FYROM is an Average Medium (4.6) as we saw
above.
The Overall rating ebbs to a Medium Low (3.2).
85
Meeting criteria:
o The Political criteria are considered Low to Media (1.5) while the
o Economic criteria are deemed as Low (1);
o the Military criteria are Medium to Low marked as 2.0
for a total of 4.5.
The Overall average for meeting all NATO criteria was assessed is a Low (1.7).
86
,
87
According to Irina Gelevska of Channel A1 of Skopje, in October 2010, the FYROM
budget for the FY 2011 has increased the Ministry of Internal Affairs budget by 11 m (US$ 16 m)
at the expense of the military budget which decreased by more than 8 m (US$ 11.5 m). It means
83
Thom Shanker, Defense Secretary Warns NATO of Dim Future, New York Times, June 10,
2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/europe/11gates.html (accessed June 21, 2011).
84
NATO Enlargement 2000-2015. Table 4.24.
85
NATO Enlargement 2000-2015. Table 4.26 which is a combination of tables 4.16 and 4.24.
86
Planning and Shaping. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 165.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1243 (accessed June 13, 2011).
87
Ted Galen Carpenter, Balkan Tensions and the Future of NATO, CATO Institute, 2010.
Speech at the Pan-Macedonian Association Conference. May 2010.
http://www.panmacedonian.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=322:balkan-
tensions-and-the-future-of-nato&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=50 (Accessed February 4, 2012).
54
that in FY 2011 the military budget went down from 107 m (or US$155 m) to 99 m (or US$142
m). The report continues that the funds for the program of promoting defense and security
activities for NATO entry have been reduced twofold, from 4.2 m (US$6 m) to 2.2 m
(US$3.2m).
88
Former Defense Minister for the FYROM, Lazar Elenovski, stated, "Obviously, by
using this element, the government puts into jeopardy the army's funding by drastically reducing
the defense budget. On the other hand, we know that there have been no effects on the Ministry of
Internal Affairs' budget, but it has instead been increased." These allocations of military
expenditures bring the military expenses down to 1.4% of the gross national product. Is the
lopsided increase of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Budget against the decrease of Defense
Budget happening because the FYROM Prime Minister expects trouble in the domestic front and
not from the surrounding enemies? The response is probably that Mr. Gruevski is using the Interior
Ministry troops in order to get rid of his political enemies.
Lazar Elenovski, presently President of the Euro-Atlantic Council of the FYROM, and Biljana
Radeva, Secretary General of the Euro-Atlantic Council of the FYROM, drafted a 16-page paper
entitled The Global Guardian: The New Strategic Concept and Macedonia.
89
In this short paper the
authors have devoted only two paragraphs in which they stress that their country sent 4% of its 8,000
strong Army,
90
which is untrue. The FYROM has sent 165 soldiers to Afghanistan or 2%.
91
Regarding Mr. Elenovskis statement that the NATO decision to exclude his country from
membership was purely political, it appears that he has forgotten his previous statement which he
88
Irina Gelevska, "Government Deprives Defense Ministry of More Than 8 Million Euros; Interior
Ministry Obtains 11 Million Euros More," Channel A1, Skopje, 25 Aug 10.
89
Lazar Elenovski, Biljana Radeva, The Global Guardian, supported by Royal Norwegian
Embassy, Euro-Atlantic Council of Macedonia, October 2010.
90
Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2011, 186.
91
Ben Birnbaum Macedonia complains Greece is irrational. Athens wants neighbor to rename
itself, February 6, 2012, The Washington Times.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/6/macedonia-complains-greece-is-
irrational/#disqus_thread (accessed February 7, 2012).
55
uttered on August 25, 2010 on Channel A1 of Skopje, when he protested against his countrys cuts
on Defense. That statement along with some other information he mentioned had indicated that the
FYROM does not meet the criteria. Besides, stage 3 of NATO enlargement is purely political and
as such any decision constitutes a precedent (see page 6). Additionally, the authors statement that
their country shares the same values with the euro-atlantic [sic] family is outright false. Lack of
democratic values and governance of the FYROM are not something that everyone in the Euro-
Atlantic family shares. Democratic values are much more than political; they are values imbedded
in the lives of free people. Thomas Jeffersons "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" are
three aspects listed among the "unalienable rights" or sovereign rights of a free man (U.S.
Declaration of Independence).
56
The FYROMs National Goals and National Interests
Thessaloniki is Ours was the slogan that reigned during the celebrations on the 20
th
anniversary of the FYROMs independence.
92
One never before had heard the slogan proclaimed
with such enthusiasm. It is obvious that Thessaloniki, the Capital of the Greek region of
Macedonia, is the national goal of the FYROM Slavs.
National goals of the FYROM are the reflection of the expressed values of its Slavic
population. In the political arena, such domestically and internationally envisaged values are
increasingly manifested as being of vital official national interest.
On September 8, 2011 and in the presence of the President of the FYROM, Georgi Ivanov,
and the Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski, the FYROM singer, Goce Nikolovski, sang the following
92
Tromaktiko Blog Post, January 18, 2012, http://tro-ma-ktiko.blogspot.com/2012/01/blog-
post_9285.html (accessed January 20, 2012).
57
song. There was no reaction by the official government of the FYROM, which means that they had
given their tacit consent to the words of the song.
Pearl of the Balkans
First Stanza
Tears are falling by themselves; forgive me
They are as hard as your mountains
A heart cries from three sides
It bleeds for many years (twice)
Chorus
E, e, e, e, ey, Macedonia
You are the Pearl of the Balkans
Unite Pirin, blue Aegean
With the clear waters from the Vardar
Second Stanza
There is only one truth
There is one Macedonia
Divide her, cut her to pieces
We will still love her (twice)
Chorus
Third Stanza
Macedonians sing as loud as you can
Dance the Macedonian dance
Remember her, dear mother
Macedonia lives on (twice)
Chorus
This event is not an isolated incident, although Greece has made the erroneous strategic
decision to downplay or to ignore such common occurrences. The people of the FYROM are being
encouraged by simple gestures or words of various foreign officials who might mean well, but give
the wrong impression. The slogan Thessaloniki is Ours has been transformed from a dormant
concept to a dynamic plan put into full motion with the aim of absolute completion and it is very
much alive in the hearts of the FYROM Slavs.
58
A group known as Falanga (a name copied from the ancient Greek phalanx Theban,
Macedonian, etc.!) has turned the slogan into a song. On January 19, 2012, during a game of
handball at Ni, Serbia, the U.S. Assistant Undersecretary of State, Philip Reeker, sang the song
along with Falanga. The text from the Macedonian Information News Agency (MINA) is very
clear, Reeker, who speaks excellent Macedonian[sic] celebrated Macedonias [sic] win with
fans and the players by singing Izlezi Momce.
93
FYROM Slavs of all ages sing this song
Children as young as 4-years old are taught the song which proves that the Slavs are instilling in
their children the desire to one day to take claim to Thessaloniki .
94
The songs lyrics:
Young man, go straight to the balcony
and salute the breed of Goce [Delev]
Lift [your] hands high [for the Macedonian salute],
and even the area of Thessaloniki will be ours.
On February 4, 2012, the organization United Macedonians held their traditional Goce
Delchev Night in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Present at the ball were the Metropolitan
95
Methodij of
the FYROM Orthodox Church in Toronto, the Ambassador of the FYROM to Ottawa, Ljuben
Tevdovski, and the Consul General of the FYROM to Toronto, Dragan Gjurevski. Also present
was Sonja Tarulovska, a FYROM singer and the wife of Johan Tarulovski who was convicted as
a war criminal by the The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Mr. Gjurevski, whose Facebook photograph shows his heart with United Macedonia, read a
letter of greetings from Johan Tarulovski expressing the gratitude, love, pride and respect for the
family sacrifice for the survival of the Republic Macedonia[sic] and the Macedonian[sic] people.
93
MINA, Reeker: Of Course Ill Cheer for Macedonia
http://macedoniaonline.eu/content/view/20152/45/ (accessed January 26, 2012).
94
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42-bH9_1OGo
95
Metropolitan is the Orthodox equivalent of a Roman Catholic Cardinal.
59
Following the reading of the letter, Mr. Gjurevski handed over a check for $5,000 intended to help
in the future education of the Tarulovskis two minor children.
96
By giving moral support and
comfort to the wife and praising a convicted war criminal that killed a non-combatant population of
the Albanian minority, indicates the degree of disregard the FYROM has toward their minorities
and the lack of human decency of the Slavic majority, the FYROM Slavic dominated government,
and the Church of that country. This attitude towards their Albanian minority is the main cause of
the FYROMs instability, not the name issue.
Without collaboration, the FYROM officials often argue that the name Macedonia is a
matter of national security for the country. This argument is absurd. Whatever the countrys name
is going to be, it is not going to change the problems the FYROM citizens encounter daily. The
examples we saw above (maps, songs, support of war criminals, and usurped symbols) are part of
the FYROM Slavic socio-cultural mindset and are only the prelude of what is going to happen after
they receive any version of the name Macedonia.
If the FYROM is recognized by Greece as Macedonia, the next item in the FYROMs
agenda will be to officially claim the incorporation of the lands from Greece and Bulgaria. Active
lobbying through exhaustive public relations campaigns, systematic cyber operations, intensive
silent warfare, and constant provocations will be the means to first establish their case, and finally
persuade the right patron, such as Canada to use their persuasive powers in order for the FYROM
Slavs to achieve their national goals.
Mr. Philip Reekers exuberance during a handball match, singing one the FYROMs
irredentist songs and the photo of Ted Opitz , Senior Regional Advisor to the Minister of
Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism of Canada standing next to the FYROM
96
United Macedonians Honored Goce Delchev (
), Kurir, February 5, 2012.
60
Ambassador to Ottawa in front of the irredentist map of territories claimed by the FYROM are only
indications that the FYROM Slavs have already started working on their dream. The FYROM
Slavs are working hard in order to find the right moment and then they will try to do something
similar to what the Albanians did in Kosovo. Making alliances for the attainment of their ethnic
Slavic goal is their paramount desire.
Nevertheless, the matter of the FYROMs final name is solely an issue that concerns only
the Slavic, not the Albanian population. The matter of contention that the name issue is of vital
interest and it constitutes an issue of national security lacks national unanimity. Given that, the
issue has the potential to directly impact the pursuit of the national goal of only the Slavic element
of the FYROM, one can classify it as the FYROMs Slavic ethnic interest and not of national
interest.
In addition, one may not interpret the national goal of aggression as an issue for the
FYROMs national security because external enemies do not threaten the country. The name
dispute with Greece is not the cause of the interethnic problems in the country; but it could be used
as the pretext for a future war precipitated by the FYROM.
The psychological dimension of the issue is subjective because it reflects opinions and
attitudes of the Slavic population of the FYROM that is not shared by at least one third of the
country. The Slavic society of the FYROM, fueled by the FYROMs diaspora, nourishes the
thought of the eventual incorporation of the Greek region of Macedonia to their country.
The FYROM diaspora consists mostly of Bulgarian speakers who left the region of Greek
Macedonia between 1900 and the end of WWI. Accordingly, the FYROM cannot classify such
monoethnic interest of aggression as an issue of the national security of the country; the Albanians
do not share it.
61
The dream of the FYROM Slav nation, as demonstrated in songs, maps, and carefully
manufactured history, is the incorporation of Greek and Bulgarian lands into their country with
disregard of demographic reality on the ground. Officials of the FYROM such as Ambassador
Ljuben Tevdovski and Consul General Dragan Gjurevski keep attending balls where the map of
Greater Macedonia, Greek symbols, and other forms of irredentism are displayed and celebrated by
the FYROM diaspora. In addition, the representative of the Church of the FYROM to Toronto,
Metropolitan Metodij (Methodius), who spiritually guides the education of his flock, gives the
approval of his Church of the representation as being national values of the FYROM Slavs. Thus
the official FYROM nurtures and cultivates the idea of a Greater Macedonia, which is not a value
shared by the Alliance. This irredentist behavior justifies and makes the case for Greeces stance to
reject the FYROMs membership to NATO and the EU.
An issue of vital importance in the relations between the FYROM on one hand and Bulgaria
and Greece on the other is that the FYROM does not recognize the sovereignty of Greece and
Bulgaria over their part of present-day geographic Macedonia. The government, the Press, the
Slavic population of the FYROM and its diaspora constantly and purposely call the Greek and
Bulgarian areas as the communist predecessor did, Aegean (Greek) and Pirin (Bulgarian)
Macedonia. The question arises, what means is the FYROM going to employ in order to
implement its vital national interests against Greece and Bulgaria?
The absence of the word Macedonia in the final FYROMs name is of utmost importance to
the territorial integrity of Greece and thus it constitutes a matter of national security for her. The
addition of the name Macedonia to the final name of the FYROM will precipitate future claims
over the Greek region of Macedonia.
62
Conclusion
One of the thoughts one takes away is that upon independence the Slavic majority of the
FYROM adopted anything they could in order to make a modern country without concerning
themselves about details of the countrys sociological reconcilement. The idea was that the most
important thing is to have a constitution, history, name, and heritage and after they are adopted then
work something out in order to make them fit to their benefit.
Thus, the FYROMSlavs have adopted ancient Greek history making themselves
descendants of glorious warriors, because the history was there and nobody internationally used the
name Macedonia. In addition, the FYROM Slavs have adopted more history from Bulgaria such as
Tsar Samuil, and then they have added all Bulgarian revolutionaries to their pantheon of heroes.
The FYROM Slavs have played the card of the victim in the Civil War of Greece using Greek
children that they kidnapped and called them Macedonian. The FYROM Slavs have adopted the
basics of the SFRY Constitution as well as laws from other countries whether the details of the laws
matched the political understanding of their people. Now somehow they find themselves as having
three different ancestors (Ancient Greeks, Bulgarians, and Slavs) with the usurped name of
Macedonia and its derivatives and being in a multiethnic country, they neglect the presence of
minorities.
It is as if one buys a pair of shoes that are too small and then tries to fits his feet into the
shoes disregarding the pain and discomfort the small shoes cause only because they look good to
the eye of the beholder. This generation may be suffering, but they will make sure that the next
generation has smaller feet.
Whether Skopje meets NATO Preconditions and Criteria is controversial to the level of
political hypocrisy from both sides of the Atlantic. Although the website of the U.S. State
63
Department states that Macedonia [sic] had met the criteria in 2008, FOCUS News Agency of
Sofia, Bulgaria on December 4, 2009 cited the Bulgarian Prime Minster, Boyko Borisov, as stating
that Bulgaria would have supported the FYROM if they had met the criteria, adding that the only
thing his country has seen is, hate speech against Bulgaria and Bulgarians coming from politicians,
state institutions. Prime Minster Borisov wanted the FYROM to remove hate speech from
textbooks and school curriculum and the media; give up all minority claims towards Bulgaria.
97
This statement echoes the Greek complaints officially voiced during the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) presentation against the FYROM. The FYROM has failed the preconditions, and
since its budget is below 2%, it does not meet the criteria.
Objectively, the FYROM is not even near fulfilling its NATO obligations (Preconditions
and Criteria) on its own merit. Without monetary assistance from the United States, Skopje
cannot fulfill the required obligations of NATO and therefore it cannot associate itself with
NATOs prestigious name for domestic political consumption. Admitting the FYROM into NATO
in its present socio-political condition will force NATO to receive Skopjes problems relieving the
perpetrators from their responsibilities of fair and democratic governance that rely for the countrys
defense on multicultural armed forces.
As Aristotle, the Macedonian born polymath and teacher of Alexander the Great put it, a
fundamental principle of the democratic form of a constitution is freedom, which is what is usually
asserted, implying that only under this constitution do men participate in freedom, for they assert
this as the aim of every democracy (Aristotle, Politics, 1317b [Book 6, Part II]). When the
97
The Center for Southeast European Studies, Bulgaria will support Macedonias[sic] NATO and
EU aspirations if criteria fulfilled, Focus News Agency, December 4, 2009.
http://www.csees.net/?page=news&news_id=73409&country_id=3 (accessed June 24, 2011)
64
FYROM reaches that point, then everyone can surely say that the country meets NATOs
requirements, not just the criteria.
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