1.

(A) Duty Render Judgment

(B) Rule on interpretation of law

Karen Salvacion vs Central Bank

Facts:

February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott,
American tourist coaxed and lured petitioner Karen
Salvacion, then 12 y/o to go with him to his
apartment.
Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four
days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape
the child once on February 4, and three times each
day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989.
February 7, 1989: Karen Salvacion was rescued
by policemen and people living nearby. Greg Bartelli
was arrested and detained. The policemen recovered
from Bartelli items: (Dollar Check, Cocobank Bank
book, Dollar Account China-banking Corp -CBC, ID,
Philippine money in cash, door keys, and stuffed doll
used in seducing the complainant)
February 6, 1989: Criminal case for serious
illegal detention and 4 counts of rape and
corresponding civil case for damages was filed against
Bartelli.
February 24, 1989: Greg Bartelli escaped from
jail. Meantime, the Trial Court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment and notice of garnishment
served to CBC where Bartelli maintains a dollar
account.
CBC invoked Sec 113 of Central Bank Circular
960 citing that the dollar deposits of defendant
Bartelli are exempt from attachment.
Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.
Eventually, Bartelli was ordered to pay Karen
Salvacion (plaintiff) and her parents, moral damages,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs of the
suit.
Writ of execution was issued but respondents
CBC and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to
honor the said writ on strength of Central Bank
Circular provision (Sec 113).

Issue: Should Sec.113 of Central Bank Circular No.960
& Sec.8 of RA No.6426, as amended by PD 1246,
otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Act be
made applicable to foreign transient.

Held: The application of the law depends on the
extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the
questioned Sec 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient
injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved
by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli.
This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil
Code which provides that in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
When the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one
of those fundamental solutions that would respond to
the vehement urge of conscience.
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned
Sec 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 would be used as
a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing and
in doing so, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the
innocent.


2. (A)Legal periods
(B)Rule in case of leap year
National Marketing Corporation vs. Miguel Tecson
Facts:

December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation
filed a complaint, docketed as civil case no. 63701 on
the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization
Corporation, against the same defendant from 10 years
ago (December 21, 1955, Price Stabilization Corporation
vs. Tecson). Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to
dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and
prescription of action.

More than ten years have passed a year is a period of
365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960 and
1964 were both leap years so that when this present
case was filed it was filed two days too late.

The lower court, then, issued an order of dismissal with
regards the article 13 of the civil code. Pursuant to Art.
1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment
must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues, the issue thus confined to the
date on which ten years from December 21, 1955 had
expired.

However, National Marketing Corporation insists that
the same is erroneous because a year means a
calendar year. There is no question that when it is not a
leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the
following year is one year. The case reached its
conclusion with the appellants theory that contravenes
the explicit provision of Article 13 of the civil code.

Issue: Whether or not the term year as used in the
article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.

Ruling: Yes. The term year as used in the article 13 of
the civil code is limited to 365 days. However, it is said
to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a
reversion to the policy embodied in the revised
administrative code, this may be done through
legislative process and not by judicial decree.

The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows
that its theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art.
13 limiting the connotation of each "year"-- as the term
is used in our laws-- to 365 days.

[The action to enforce a judgment which became final
on December 21, 1955 prescribes in 10 years. Since the
Civil Code computes "years" in terms of 365 days each,
the action has prescribed on December 19, 1955, since
the two intervening leap years added two more days
to the computation. It is not the calendar year that is
considered.]

3. (A)Legal periods
(B)Rule in case of leap year

CIR vs Primetown Property Group, Inc

Facts:
On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group.
Inc. filed its final adjusted return. On March 11, 1999
Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group.
Inc., filed for the refund or tax credit of income tax paid
in 1997. However, it was not acted upon. Thus
Primetown filed a petition for review but the Court of
Tax Appeals dismissed it claiming that it was filed
beyond the two-year reglementary period provided by
section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

The Court of Tax Appeals further argued that in
National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson the Supreme Court
ruled that a year is equal to 365 days regardless of
whether it is a regular year or a leap year.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents petition was
filed within the two-year reglementary period.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the petition was
filed within the two-year reglementary period because
Article 13 of the New Civil Code that provides that a
year is composed of 365 years is repealed by Executive
Order 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines.
Under Executive Order 292, a year is composed of 12
calendar months

4. Lex Nationalii, Lex rei siteii, lex loci
celebrationis

Miciano vs Brimo

Facts: Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen, residing in the
Philippines, with properties in the Philippines who
executed a will in accordance with Philippine law. In his
will, he imposed a condition to respect his wish to
distribute his estate in accordance with the Philippines
laws, otherwise, legatees will be prevented from
receiving their legacies.
The judicial administrator filed a scheme of
partition. Brimos brother, Andre, opposed it. He argued
that the will is not in accordance with Turkish law, the
law of the nationality of the testator, but was not able
to prove that same.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine law applies
according to the testators intent notwithstanding the
Civil Code provision that the national law of the
decedent applies.

Held: The Philippine law does not apply. Article 10 of
the old Civil Code (now Art. 16 NCC) provides that legal
and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country where said property may be found.
In the case at bar, the national law of Brimo,
Turkish law, governs. However, Andre did not prove
that the testamentary provisions are not in accordance
with Turkish laws. Therefore, it is assumed that Turkish
law is the same as Philippine law. The condition that the
will be made and disposed of in accordance with the
laws in force in the Philippine islands is contrary to law
Hence, it is considered as not written.