v.

Beginning of Corporate Existence

Sec. 14, LGC


1. Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil 486
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action of quo warranto against respondents on the ground that the appointments of the latter by the President as councilors of the
City of Dagupan were null and void, and that the former are entitled to said offices because they were elected as such in the general election for
provincial, municipal and city officials on November 1947.
Under Secs. 7 and 11 of Act no. 170, the Mayor of the City of Dagupan shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, and the municipal or city
councilors shall be elected during every general election for provincial, municipal and city officers provided in the Election Code. Sec. 7 of the Revised
Elec. Code prescribes that on the 2nd Tuesday of November 1947 and on the same date every four years thereafter, a regular election shall be held to
elect the officials who will occupy all elective provincial, municipal, and city offices throughout the Philippines. And according to Sec. 88 of Act no. 170,
the city government of Dagupan shall be organized on such a date as may be fixed by the President of the Philippines, and upon qualification of the City
Mayor and the appointment or election of the Members of the Municipal Board. Pending the next general election for provincial and municipal officials,
the offices of the Municipal Board shall be filled by appointment of the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
ISSUE:
Whether the appointment of the respondents as councilors of the City of Dagupan by the President of the Philippines is valid.
HELD:
No.
A public corporation is created from the moment the law or charter creating it becomes effective.
The City of Dagupan came into existence as a legal entity upon the approval of Act No. 170 on June 20, 1947 since a statute is only operative from the
exact instance of its approval or becoming a law. The date of the organization of the city government of Dagupan which the President is authorized to fix
is not and cannot be the date of the creation of the city, because what was to be organized, according to Sec. 88, is the city government, and not the city
as an entity. The word organize means to prepare (the city) for transaction of business, as assembly, by choosing officers, committees, etc. (Funk and
Wagnall College Standard Dictionary).
It is obvious that to create a public corporation is one thing and to organize a government thereof is another.
A juridical institution may exist but it cannot act as such before its officers had been appointed or elected. Along this line, the government of the city
could not be organized before the city itself is created or comes into existence. It would be absurd to elect or appoint officers of a public/private
corporation which does not yet exist.
After the creation of the city took effect, the converted political subdivision continues to act as a municipality until its government has been organized and
the officers thereof appointed or elected. The conversion of the municipality into a city did not make ipso factothe acts of the municipalitys elected
officers the acts of the City of Dagupan.
The status as a municipality has to continue until the qualification of the successor (city).
The phrase pending the next general elections for provincial and municipal officials in Sec. 88 of Act No. 170 must be construed to refer to the general
election for provincial and municipal officials in November 1947 which followed the creation of the City of Dagupan on June 20, 1947, and not to the
general elections for provincial/municipal officials held after the organization of the City of Dagupan by Presidential proclamation.
To hold that the next general elections referred to in Sec.88 of Act. No. 170 are those to be held after the date of the organization of the City
Government, set by the President, would make the alternative provision or election of the Members of the Municipal Board, nugatory or superfluous,
because on the date set for the organization of the City of Dagupan, there would never be Members of the Municipal Board elected.
Since the election of the members of the Muncipal Board of the City of Dagupan took place at the general election held on November 11, 1947, and the
President of the Philippines is only empowered to appoint those members if the organization of the city government had taken place pending or before
the said election, it necessarily follows that the appointments of the respondents on Decmeber 30, 1947 are null and void.

vi. De Facto Municipal Corporations
2. Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 (1969)
FACTS: Municipality of Balabagan was once part of the Municipality of Malabang before it was created into a separate municipality thru an executive
order. The Municipality Malabang filed a suit against the Municipality of Balabagan for having been created under an invalid EO 386 and to restrain the
respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of their respective offices. Petitioner relied on the ruling of the Pelaez case that Sec. 68 of
the Administrative Code is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (b)because it offends against Section
10 (1) of Article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President's power over local governments to mere supervision. Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly
incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment. The Respondents on the other hand argue that the Mun. of Balabagan is at least a de facto
corporation for having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or
appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is
contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo
warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.
The method of challenging the existence of a municipal corporation is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding.
But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporation. For where it is neither a
corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any
one whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct from
doing so.

ISSUE: W/O the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation.
RULING: No, because there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation when EO 386 was subsequently declared as
unconstitutional. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal corporation may be:1. A valid law enacted by the
legislature.2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a)been upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void;
provided that a warrant for its creation can be found insome other valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or
constitution of the state. In the case at bar, there is no other law that could give color of authority to the validity of the existence of the municpality of
Balabagan when EO 386 was later on invalidated. Hence, such municipality is not a de factor corporation.

3. Candijay v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 530 (1995)

FACTS: The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is within its territorial jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the Municipality of
Alicia. The trial court ruled for Candijay but this was reversed by the CA. The CA found that the plans submitted by the two municipalities are inadequate
insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between the petitioner and the Muncipality of Mabini. The CA ruled that in cases of
equiponderance of evidence, the courts must find for the defendant. The petitioner raised the ff issues before the SC:1. The CA improperly applied the
rule on equiponderance of evidence;2. The respondent municipality does not have a juridical personality since it was created under a void executive
order; and 3. the challenged decision throws them back again to their controversy.
ISSUE: WON a municipality, created under a void executive order, can be considered as not having a juridical personality in light of the passage of the
Local Government Code of 1991. NO.
RATIO: The petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of the respondent on19 January 1984 (35 yrs after its creation in 1949)
during the proceedings in this case. After presentation of evidence, Candijay asked the trial court to bar the respondent from presenting evidence on the
ground that it had no juridical personality. Candijay argued that EO 265 issued by Pres. Quirino is null and void ab initio since Sec. 68 of the RAC
constituted an undue delegation of legislative power to the Prez. The Municipality of Alicia was created by EO 265, or ten years ahead of the Municipality
of San Andres, and had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was promulgated. Various governmental acts through the years all indicate the
States recognition and acknowledgement of its existence. Alicia must benefit from the effects of Sec. 422 (d) of the LGC and should be considered a
regular, de jure municipality. According to Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC, municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered
as regular municipalities.Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid
under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with, are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against
impairment of vested rights.

4. Jimenez v. Baz, 265 SCRA 182 (1996)
Facts:
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 by then Pres. Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara, Baja,
and Sinara Alto, based on the technical dedcription in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the
Municipality of Jimenez.
While conceding that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the Municipality of Jimenez, in its answer, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of
an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement, which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental in its
Resolution No. 77 dated February 18, 1950, fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.
On October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the
agreement between the parties was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. 258, that power being
vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the LGC of 1983 (BP 337), Sec. 134. The Provincial Board denied the motion of Jimenez seeking
reconsideration.
On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the RTC of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 against Sinacaban, the
Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management,
and the Executive Secretary.

Issues:
1. Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim
2. Whether R.A. 7160, Sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not conforming to the constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the
creation of new municipalities.
3. If it has legal personality, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. 258 or in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial board of Misamis Occidental
which should be used as basis for adjudicating Sinacabans territorial claim.

Held:
1. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the
creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the
Municipality of Sinacaban. However, where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are
accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal corporationwhere its legal existence has been recognized and
acquiesced publicly and officially.
A quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years from the act complained of was
done/committed. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years, yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949,
it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that is apparently desired for its revenue. The
State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself has recognized Sinacabans corporate existence. Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for
purposes of the establishment of MTCs in the country. Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it
regarding their common boundary.
The Municipality of Sinacaban attained a de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts
throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code of
1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban since it states that:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances/executive orders and which have their respective set of municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be regular municipalities.
2. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. The plebiscite
requirement for the creation of municipalities applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution it cannot be applied to
municipalities created before.
3. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that Sinacaban contains
those barrios. The reason for this is that the technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a municipalitys territory, is controlling. The trial
court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of determining the boundaries of the municipality & consequently to which municipality the
barangays in question belong.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law is not the carrying into effect of the law but its amendment and a resolution of a
provincial Board declaring certain barrios part of one or another municipality that is contrary to the technical description of the territory of the municipality
is not binding. If Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it
cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing Sinacabans claim.
In case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute should be elevated to the RTC of the province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983). Jimenez
properly brought to the RTC for review the Decision and Resolution of the Provincial Board. This was in accordance with the LGC of 1983, the governing
law when the action was brought by Jimenez in 1989. The governing law now is Secs. 118-119, LGC of 1991 (RA 7160).
Jimenezs contention that the RTC failed to decide the case within 1 yr from the start of the proceedings as required by Sec. 79 of the LGC of 1983 and
the 90-day period provided for in Art.VIII, Sec.15 of the Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision rendered. Failure of a court to decide
within the period prescribed by law does not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the case but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible
administrative sanction.

vii. Attack against validity of Incorporations
V. General Powers of Local Governments
i. Police Power

General Welfare Clause- Sec. 16, LGC


5. Dela Cruz v. Paras, G.R. No. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise

FACTS: De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibi tion and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance
would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however
lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN
ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the
prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit
of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of
validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the
laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable.
The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly
the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather
than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

Facts:
1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity,
the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time all eging that their rights to due
process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to
Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'

The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment,
maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar
places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the
same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.

3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title
was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.

4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.


ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title
limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a
night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperi ty,
and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.

2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from
constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that
would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented
from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have
to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be
subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate
regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than
a temporary termination of their business.

4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.


POLICE POWER: (General welfare clause sec. 16 LGC)

G.R. No. 71169 December 22, 1988
JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and
ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.,intervenors-petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 74376 December 22, 1988
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA GONZALVEZ,respondents.
G.R. No. 76394 December 22,1988
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ respondents.
G.R. No. 78182 December 22, 1988
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY, and J. ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, respondents.
G.R. No. 82281 December 22, 1988
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Sangco, Anastacio, Castaneda & Duran Law Office for petitioners & private intervenors- petitioners.
Raul S. Sison Law Offices for intervenor-petitioner Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. Renato L. Dela Fuente for respondent Ayala Corporation.

FACTS:
1) Bel-Air Village is located north of Buendia Avenue extension (now Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave.) when this was planned, this block between Reposo and
Zodiac Streets adjoining Buendia Avenue in front of the village was designated as a commercial block.

(2) Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential subdivision in the 1950s by Makati Development Corporation (MDC), which in 1968
was merged with appellant Ayala Corporation.

The pertinent provisions in said Deed Restrictions, which are common to all lot owners in Bel-Air Village, are as follows:

xxx.... USE OF LOTS

b. This lot/s shall only be used for residential purposes.
xxx

Meantime, on April 4, 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance No. 81, providing for the zonification of Makati Under this
Ordinance, Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street

Thus, Chapter III, Article 1, Section 3.03, par. F. of the Ordinance provides:

F. Bel-Air Village area was classified as Administrative Office Zone

Thus, Chapter III, Article I, Section 3.05, par. C. of the Ordinance provides:

C. The Buendia Avenue Extension areas, as bounded on the N-NE by the center line of Jupiter Street, on the SE by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue; on
the SW by Buendia Avenue and on the NW by the center line of Reposo Street, then on the NE by Malugay Street; on the SE by Buendia Avenue and
on the W by Ayala Avenue Extension."
The Residential Zone and the Administrative Office Zone, therefore, have a common boundary along the center line of Jupiter Street.

The above zoning under Ordinance No. 81 of Makati was later followed under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital
Region adopted by the Metro Manila Commission as Ordinance 81 -01 on March 14, 1981

Meanwhile, in 1972, BAVA had installed gates at strategic locations across Jupiter Street which were manned and operated by its own
security guards who were employed to maintain, supervise and enforce traffic regulations in the roads and streets of the village.

Then, on January 17, 1977, the Office of the Mayor of Makati wrote BAVA directing that, in the interest of public welfare and for the purpose of
easing traffic congestion, the following streets in Bel-Air Village should be opened for public use:

Amapola Street
Mercedes Street Zodiac Street
Jupiter Street
Neptune Street
Paseo de Roxas

On February 10, 1977, BAVA wrote the Mayor of Makati, expressing the concern of the residents about the opening of the streets to the
general public, and requesting specifically the indefinite postponement of the plan to open Jupiter Street to public vehicles.

However, BAVA voluntarily opened to the public Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac, Neptune and Paseo de Roxas streets.

Then, on June 10, 1977, the Municipal Engineer of Makati in a letter addressed to BAVA advised the latter to open for vehicul ar and pedestrian traffic
the entire portion of Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street

Finally, on August 12, 1977, the municipal officials of Makati concerned allegedly opened, destroyed and removed the gates
constructed/located at the corner of Reposo Street and Jupiter Street as well as the gates/fences located/constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati
Avenue forcibly, and then opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic

Then, on January 27, 1978, appellant donated the entire Jupiter Street from Metropolitan Avenue to Zodiac Street to BAVA (Exh. 7)- However,
even before 1978, the Makati Police and the security force of BAVA were already the ones regulating the traffic along Jupiter Street after the gates were
opened in 1977.

In October, 1979, the fence at the corner of Orbit and Neptune Streets was opened and removed .The opening of the whole stretch of Orbit Street from
J.P. Rizal Avenue up to Imelda Avenue and later to Jupiter Street was agreed to at the conference attended by the President of BAVA in the office
of the Station Commander of Makati, subject to certain conditions, to wit:

That, maintenance of Orbit St. up to Jupiter St. shall be shouldered by the Municipality of Makati.

(13) Thus, with the opening of the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic, the different residential lots located in the northern side of
Jupiter Street ceased to be used for purely residential purposes. They became, for all purposes, commercial in character.

(14) Subsequently, on October 29, 1979, the plaintiffs-appellees Jose D. Sangalang and Lutgarda D. Sangalang brought the present action for
damages against the defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation predicated on both breach of contract and on tort or quasi-delict

ISSUE: Whether Metro Manila Commission Ordinance is valid under the mantle fo police power. YES

RULING:

the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power

In the Sangalang case, we absolve the Ayala Corporation primarily owing to our finding that it is not liable for the opening of Jupiter Street to the general
public. Insofar as these petitions are concerned, we likewise exculpate the private respondents, not only because of the fact that Jupiter Street is not
covered by the restrictive easements based on the "deed restrictions" but chiefly because the National Government itself, through the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street into high density commercial (C-3) zone, 64 pursuant to its Ordinance No. 81-01.
Hence, the petitioners have no cause of action on the strength alone of the said "deed restrictions.

In view thereof, we find no need in resolving the questions raised as to procedure, since this disposition is sufficient to resolve these cases.
It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements, especially the easements herein in question, are invalid or ineffective. As far as the Bel-Air
subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, they are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs,
and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees
sanctity of contract and is said to be the "law between the contracting parties, 65 but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. 66 Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health,
safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. In Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership
v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., 67 we are told:
x x x x x x x x x

2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee referring to the
restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee it should be
stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people.' Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guarantee.

As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengson in Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. police power 'is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal
progress of a democratic way of life.' We were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared:
"We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through t he state's exercise of its
police power."

Resolution No. 27, 1960 declaring the western part of High way 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig
River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to
safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the
conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro
Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of
the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of
Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution. 68
x x x x x x x x x

Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold
otherwise other than for the supposed "non-impairment" guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more
compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the
reversal of the judgments so appealed. In that connection, we find no reversible error to have been committed by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, these petitions are DENIED No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.)

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G.R. No. 94759 January 21, 1991
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding Judge, Bulacan, RTC, and HON. VICENTE CRUZ, Acting Mayor and the
MUNICIPALITY OF STA. MARIA, BULACAN, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J .:p
The authority of the local executive to protect the community from pollution is the center of this controversy.
FACTS:
Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal briquette, received a letter dated
February 16, 1989 from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the
petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order. The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr.
Armando Manese to bring with him to the office of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's
permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.
In compliance with said undertaking, petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-Department of Environmental and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit," although among the permits previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's plant was a
"Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued by the then National Pollution Control Commission (now
Environmental Management Bureau) and is now at a stage where the Environmental Management Bureau is trying to determine the
correct kind of anti-pollution devise to be installed as part of petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit.
Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to
secure the same but were not entertained.
On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent acting mayor ordered the Municipality's
station commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.
, petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against private respondent with the
court a quo which is presided by the respondent judge. In its prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, it
alleged therein that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.
. The respondent judge, April 19, 1989, found that petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, hence, it ordered as follows:
...ordering the respondent Hon. Pablo N. Cruz, and other person acting in his behalf and stead to immediately
revoke his closure order dated April 6, 1989, and allow petitioner to resume its normal business operations until
after the instant case shall have been adjudicated on the merits without prejudice to the inherent power of the
court to alter, modify or even revoke this order at any given time.SO ORDERED.
Private respondent filed his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner's counsel failed to appear and the hearing proceeded with the
Provincial Prosecutor presenting his evidence. The following documents were submitted:
a) Exhibit "A", Investigation report on the Technology Developers Inc., prepared by one Marivic Guina, and her conclusion and
recommendation read:
Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from the factory
may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the people. As such, the company
should cease operating until such a time that the proper air pollution device is installed and operational.
b) Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", three (3) sheets of coupon bond containing signatures of residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan;
c) Exhibit "B-3", a letter addressed to Hon. Roberto Pagdanganan Governor of the Province of Bulacan, dated November 22, 1988,
complaining about the smoke coming out of the chimney of the company while in operation.
the lower court, on June 14, 1989, issued an order (a) setting aside the order, which granted a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction, and (b) dissolving the writ consequently issued.
Hence a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals seeking to annul and set aside (a)
the order issued by the trial court on June 14, 1989, setting aside the order dated April 28, 1989, and (b) the order of August 9, 1989, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of June 14, 1989. In due course the petition was denied for lack of meri t by the appellate court in a
decision dated January 26, 1990.
2
A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioner was denied on August 10, 1990.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of the Mayor was valid - YES
RULING: The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that
concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the
health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his
police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are
taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business

The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its
action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse
of its discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.
To the mind of the Court the following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment
that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control
Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants
from pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or
otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the
residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its
plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that
petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following:
(1) Building permit;
(2) Mayor's permit; and
(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.
3

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.
4
The alleged NBI finding that some of the signatures in the four-page petition
were written by one person,
5
appears to be true in some instances, (particularly as among members of the same family), but on the
whole the many signatures appear to be written by different persons. The certification of the barrio captain of said barrio that he has
not received any complaint on the matter
6
must be because the complaint was sent directly to the Governor through the Acting
Mayor.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of
December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no
proper air pollution device has been installed.
7

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by
an official of Makati on March 6,1987.
8

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on
December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988.
9
Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its
permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.
All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by the trial court and the appellate court correctly upheld the action of the lower
court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against petitioner.
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G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991
HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners, vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

FACTS:
The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 assisting those who only earn less than P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of
P500.00) made by Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, in the exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was referred to the
Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the disbursement of four hundred thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by
said commission of such disbursements because there cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be
attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of its inhabitants.

ISSUE: on whether or not Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
RULING:
Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. The police power is a governmental
function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, Sic utere tuo et ahenum
non laedas (use your property so as not to impair others) and Salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its
fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. The
care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion
of the common good.


Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards
social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and
it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the
promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different
groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes
have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under
Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of
Makati."
In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms
to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real
needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public
needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and,
while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto,
but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or
general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is
deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is hereby GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is
hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992
CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner, vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; GAVINO V. GUERRERO, in his capacity
as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T. BUEBOS, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELES TABLIZO, in his
capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in
his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; and PEDRO A.
GUERRERO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes,respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality concerning
the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner's warehouse.
A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of
the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood.
Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the
New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952,
prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200
meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is
unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void. - NO

RULING: NO
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that
municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police
powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
3
Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause
under the Administrative Code, which reads:
The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provi de
for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.
4

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature.
These principles require that a municipal ordinance

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such
warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to
avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government.
As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact
that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason
to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented
by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof
that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the bodegas
concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.
The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound
government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable
products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is
concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government.
As to petitioner's contention of want of jurisdiction by the lower court we find no merit in the same. The case is a simple civil suit for abatement of a
nuisance, the original jurisdiction of which falls under the then Court of First Instance.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
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ALFREDO TANO et al. v. HON. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES et al.
G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997
FACTS: Petitioners caption their petition as one for Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order. One of the contentions in this case is that:
The Ordinances:
(a) Ordinance No. 15-92, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa;
"AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY
1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF.

(b) Office Order No. 23 and
(c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993
deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether the ordinance is valid and does violated the provisions of the Constitution specifically Section 2 of Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article
XIII ? - YES
2.) Is the preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources absolute? - NO
RULING:
1.) YES
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government units under Section
16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the
exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
Both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes:
(1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years, and
(2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing
activities. It is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by
the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of
municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters. In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto
Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed legislation to
protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing In the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other
local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future
generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not
approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture. However, the requirement of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances
affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reasons:
(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends Sections 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704 45 insofar as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC.
(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact
ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or
poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable
fishery laws. 46 Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact
ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other
forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological
imbalance." 47
In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Palawan for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby
sharing in the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now be roused from their
lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this time, the repercussions of any
further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED.
2.) NO
The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the
Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Moreover, their mandated protection,
development, and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment
there may be in favor of anyone.
Section II of Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. As to Section 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution there is absolutely no showing that any
of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is described
as a private association composed of Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim
to be fishermen, without any qualification, however, as to their status. It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local
government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt.Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. After a scrunity of the challenged
Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, the court find petitioners contentions baseless and so hold
that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on November 11, 1993 is LIFTED.
=====================================
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 2 of Article X I I reads: The State shall protect the nation' s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic z one, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law , allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as w ell as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons.
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide: Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities
based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. x x x x x x x x x Sec. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such
fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State
shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall ex tend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen
against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:
SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as
well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion
of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things,
the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.

11. G.R. No. 104786 J anuary 27, 1994
ALFREDO PATALINGHUG, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO CRIBILLO, MARTIN ARAPOL, CORAZON ALCASID, PRIMITIVA SEDO, respondents.

FACTS
On November 17, 1982, the SangguniangPanlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363, otherwise known as the Expanded Zoning Ordinance
of Davao City, Sec.8 of which states:

A C-2 District shall be dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses as provided hereunder:

3.1. Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street parking space and provided that they shall be established not less than 50 meters from
any residential structures, churches and other institutional buildings.

Petitioner constructed a funeral parlor in the name and style of Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City.

Acting on the complaint of several residents of Brgy.Agdao that the construction of petitioners funeral parlor violated Ordinance No. 363 since it was
allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the IglesianiKristo chapel and several residential structures, the SangguniangPanlungsod conducted an
investigation and found that the nearest residential structure, owned by Wilfred Tepoot, is only 8 inches to the south.

Notwithstanding the findings of the SangguniangPanlungsod, petitioner continued with the construction of his funeral parlor until it was finished on
November 3, 1987.

Private respondents filed a case for the declaration of the nullity of the building permit granted to the petitioner. RTC dismissed the complaint which held
that although the residential building owned by Mr. Teepot is adjacent to the funeral parlor, said residential building is being rented by a certain Mr.
Asiaten who devotes it to his laundry business with machinery thereon.

On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court. It ruled that although the buildings owned by Cribillo and IglesianiKristo were beyond the 50-meter
residential radius prohibited by Ordinance 363, the construction of the funeral parlor was within the 50-meter radius measured from the Tepoot's
building. The Appellate Court disagreed with the lower court's determination that Tepoot's building was commercial and ruled that although it was used
by Mr. Tepoot's lessee for laundry business, it was a residential lot as reflected in the tax declaration, thus paving the way for the application of
Ordinance No. 363.

ISSUES:

Whether petitioners operation of a funeral home constitutes permissible use within a particular district or zone in Davao City?

RULING
SC reversed the CA and reinstated the ruling of the RTC that petitioner did not violate Section 8 of Davao City Ordinance No. 363.

In the case at bar, the testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's building was used for a dual purpose both as a dwelling and as a
place where a laundry business was conducted. 8 But while its commercial aspect has been established by the presence of machineries and laundry
paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other than being declared for taxation purposes as such, was not fully substantiated.

The reversal by the Court of Appeals of the trial court's decision was based on Tepoot's building being declared for taxation purposes as residential. It is
our considered view, however, that a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. A property may have been
declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the
determination of the nature of property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a property for zoning purposes.

a tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the same for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration does not bind a provincial/city assessor.

The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial and, therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, is strengthened by the fact that the
SangguniangPanlungsod has declared the questioned area as commercial or C-2. Consequently, even if Tepoot's building was declared for taxation
purposes as residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail.

The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote the good order
and general welfare of the people in the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and the order dated July 6, 1989 of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City is REINSTATED.

12. G.R. No. 97619 November 26, 1992
SPOUSES SOCRATES PILAPIL and ROSARIO PILAPIL, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU, BRANCH 17, and SPOUSES GORGONIO COLOMIDA and GLORIA
COLOMIDA, respondents.

FACTS
Spouses Pilapil own a parcel of land in Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu. Spouses Colomida, on the other hand, bought a parcel of land located also in
Bahak, Lilo-an.

The Colomidas claim that they had acquired from SesenandoLongkit a road right of way which leads towards the National Road; this road right of way,
however, ends at that portion of the property of the Pilapils where a caminovecinal exists all the way to the said National Road. 10

In the early part of July of 1981, the Colomidas "tried to improve the road of "caminovecinal", for the convenience of the public," but the Pilapils harassed
and threatened them with "bodily harm from making said improvement." The Pilapils also threatened to fence off the caminovecinal. 11

Thus, on 16 July 1981, the Colomidas filed against the Pilapils a petition 12 for injunction and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
and/or prohibitory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.Colomidas argued that even in the very remote possibility that the "caminovecinal"
cannot be proved, the petitioners are entitled to the use of the same under Articles 649 to 651 of the Civil Code, it being their only access to public (sic)
highway.

Pilapil denied the existence of a caminovecinal on their property. During trial, Colomidas presented the following witnesses: Gorgonio Colomida, Jr.
himself, SesenadoLongakit and FlorentinoPepito. They also offered in evidence documentary exhibits. the more relevant and material of which are (1)
Resolution No. 106 of the Municipal Council of Liloan passed on 18 August 1973 and entitled "Authorizing the Residents of Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan to
Repair and Improve a Camino Vecinal in their Sitio" 17 and (2) a sketch 18 prepared by witness SesenandoLongakit purportedly showing that the
caminovecinal traverses the property of the Pilapils. Both Longakit and Pepito testified on the said caminovecinal, insisting that it traverses the property
of the Pilapils.

Upon the other hand, the Pilapils presented the following as their witnesses: Roman Sungahid, Engineer Epifanio Jordan (the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator of the Municipality of Liloan) and petitioner Socrates Pilapil. Engineer Jordan testified on Liloan's Urban Land Use Plan 19 or
zoning map which he prepared upon the instruction of then Municipal Mayor Cesar Butai and which was approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan.
Per the said plan, the caminovecinal in sitioBahak does not traverse, but runs along the side 20 of the Pilapil property.

RTC ruled in favor of the Colomidas. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the lower court. The appellate court ruled that It is noted that on direct
examination, witness Engineer Epifanio Jordan testified that the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan, Cebu, instructed him to prepare the zoning map (Exhibit
"1") (TSN, Epifanio Jordan, November 5, 1985, p. 9) but on cross-examination, stated (sic) that he did so upon oral orders of the mayor (TSN, Epifanio
Jordan, February 12, 1986, pp. 6-7). Also on cross-examination, said witness testified that the zoning map (Exhibit "1") prepared by him was based on
an old map drawn and traced by Atty. SoteroAuman, a casual worker in the Municipality of Liloan (Ibid., pp. 8 and 14) yet on redirect examination
testified (sic) that he did not know who authorized said Atty. SoteroAuman to draw the map which served as his basis for Exhi bit "1", or if it was
approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan.

ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in ruling that a caminovecinal traverses the property of the Pilapil

RULING
The unrebutted evidence which shows that the Municipality of Liloan, through its Sangguniang Bayan, had approved a zoning plan, otherwise called an
Urban Land Use Plan. 38 This plan indicates the relative location of the caminovecinal in sitioBahak, 39 Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu.

It is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment of the caminovecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No private
party can interfere with such a right. Thus, even if We are to agree with both the trial court and public respondent that Longakit and Pepito were telling
the truth, the decision of the Municipality of Liloan with respect to the said caminovecinal in sitioBahak must prevail.

Under the applicable law in this case, Batas PambansaBlg. 337 (The Local Government Code), the Sangguniang Bayan, the legislative body of the
municipality, had the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations subject to the provisions of existing laws, and to
provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other
public places, regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction or placing of obstacles or encroachments on them

A caminovecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the above powers of a local government unit, the
Municipality of Liloan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare and adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may
consider, among other things, the municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close any municipal road.

In the instant case, the Municipality of Liloan, through the Sangguniang Bayan, approved the Urban Land Use Plan; this plan was duly signed by
the Municipal Mayor (Exhibit "1"). By doing so, the said legislative body determined, among others, the location of the caminovecinal in
sitioBahak.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of 26 October 1990 and Resolution of 13 February 1991 of public respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17235, as well as the Decision of 8 February 1988 of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu in Civil Case
No. R-20732 are hereby SET ASIDE. Said Civil Case No. R-20732 is hereby DISMISSED with costs against the private respondents.

13. MMDA vs. Bel-Air (this already has an existing case digest under the first batch of cases assigned)

14. [G.R. No. 149743. February 18, 2005]
LEONARDO TAN, ROBERT UY and LAMBERTO TE, petitioners, vs.
SOCORRO Y. PEREA, respondent.

FACTS
In 1974, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 449, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law of 1974, was enacted. Section 5(b) of the Decree provided for
limits on the number of cockpits that may be established in cities and municipalities in the following manner:
Section 5. Cockpits and Cockfighting in General.
(b) Establishment of Cockpits.Only one cockpit shall be allowed in each city or municipality, except that in cities or municipalities with a
population of over one hundred thousand, two cockpits may be established, maintained and operated.

In 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu Province, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 6 (Ordinance No. 6), Series of
1993. Section 5 thereof, relative to the number of cockpits allowed in the municipality, stated:

Section 5. There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan, Province of Cebu, not more than its equal number of
cockpits based upon the population provided for in PD 449, provided however, that this specific section can be amended for purposes of
establishing additional cockpits, if the Municipal populations so warrants.

Shortly thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan passed an amendatory ordinance, Municipal Ordinance No. 7 (Ordinance No. 7), Series of 1993, which
amended the aforequoted Section 5 to now read as follows:
Section 5. Establishment of Cockpit.There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan, province of Cebu, not more than
three (3) cockpits.

Petitioner Leonardo Tan applied with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission for the issuance of a permit/license to establish and operate a cockpit in
SitioCombado, Bagay, in Daanbantayan. At the time of his application, there was already another cockpit in operation in Daanbantayan, operated by
respondent Socorro Y. Perena.

The Municipal Gamefowl Commission favorably recommended to the mayor of Daanbantayan, petitioner LambertoTe, that a permit be issued to Tan. Te
issued a mayors permit allowing Tan to establish/operate/conduct the business of a cockpit in Combado, Bagay, Daanbantayan, Cebu.

This act of the mayor served as cause for Perena to file a Complaint for damages with a prayer for injunction against Tan, Te, and Roberto Uy, the latter
allegedly an agent of Tan. She alleged that there was no lawful basis for the establishment of a second cockpit because the ordinance violated P.D. No.
449. She insisted that the unlawful operation of Tans cockpit has caused injure to her own legitimate business, and demanded actual, moral and
exemplary damages.

ISSUE
Whether or not the municipal ordinances 6 and 7 are valid

RULING: No, they are not valid

While the Local Government Code expressly repealed several laws, the Cockfighting Law was not among them. Section 534(f) of the Local Government
Code declares that all general and special laws or decrees inconsistent with the Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly, but such clause is
not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the acts that are intended to be repealed.[43] It is a cardinal rule in statutory
construction that implied repeals are disfavored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.

In Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[52] the Court, through Justice Cruz, asserted that the conferment of the power to
license and regulate municipal cockpits in municipal authorities is in line with the policy of local autonomy embodied in the Constitution.[53] The Court
affirmed the annulment of a resolution of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission which ordered the revocation of a permit issued by a municipal mayor for
the operation of a cockpit and the issuance of a new permit to a different applicant. According to the Court, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission did not
possess the power to issue cockpit licenses, as this was vested by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1802, as amended, to the municipal mayor with the
concurrence of the sanggunian. It emphasized that the Philippine Gamefowl Commission only had review and supervision powers, as distinguished from
control, over ordinary cockpits.[54] The Court also noted that the regulation of cockpits was vested in municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines
laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission.[55] The Court conceded that [if] at all, the power to review includes the power to disapprove; but it
does not carry the authority to substitute ones own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the exercise of its sound discretion.

The twin pronouncements that it is the municipal authorities who are empowered to issue cockpit licenses and that the powers of the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission were limited to review and supervision were affirmed

it is the sanggunianbayan concerned alone which has the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and
regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks within its territorial jurisdiction.

While the sanggunian retains the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, its discretion is limited in
that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have a population of over one hundred
thousand, in which case two cockpits may be established in accordance with the Cockfighting law.

the Court recognizes that Section 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law arises from a valid exercise of police power by the national government. Of course, local
governments are similarly empowered under Section 16 of the Local Government Code.

A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, otherwise it is void.[69] Ordinance No. 7 unmistakably contravenes the
Cockfighting Law in allowing three cockpits in Daanbantayan. Thus, no rights can be asserted by the petitioners arising from the Ordinance. We find the
grant of injunction as ordered by the appellate court to be well-taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

15. [G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005]
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs.
J AC LINER, INC., respondent.

FACTS
The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited
from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all
temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys,
mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city.

JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an inval id exercise of police power, an
undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

ISSUE
Whether or not the ordinance is valid

RULING
The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method

The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest
warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present. This l eaves for determination the issue
of whether the means employed by the LucenaSangguniangPanlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.

The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscri ption against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from
operating at all.

As for petitioners argument that the challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the power of the SangguniangPanlungsod to [r]egulate traffic on
all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of
encroachments and illegal constructions in public places:[36] Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads,
they are not obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the
SangguniangPanlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles does not extend to terminals.

Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to
the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

_______________________________________________________________________________
City of Manila v. Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the peopl e to due process and
equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically, as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation
or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights.
Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare.

FACTS:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels
and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism
as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza,
and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Councilon 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the
Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard
in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement,
entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the
inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to:
1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
12. Inns
SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or
otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section.
SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given
three (3) months from the date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside
of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area, such as but not limited to:
1. Curio or antique shop
2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
4. Art galleries
5. Records and music shops
6. Restaurants
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops
9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome family entertainment that cater to
both local and foreign clientele.
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows, stage and theatrical plays,
art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the zoning ordinances for
Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light
industry with any machinery, or funeral establishments.
SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of
FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person, the President, the General
Manager, or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent violation and conviction, the
premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.
Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)

In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels
and inns such as MTDCs Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for amusement or entertainment and they were not services
or facilities for entertainment, nor did they use women as tools for entertainment, and neither did they disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants
or adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons:
(1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code)
grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments;
(2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 499 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a
commercial zone with certain restrictions;
(3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable
relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected;
(4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its
enactment;
(5) The Ordinance violates MTDCs constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiffs property rights; (b) the
City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisanceper se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and
(6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and
inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not
outside of this area.
In their Answerdated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to prohibit certain forms of
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code,
which reads, thus:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
. . . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose
shall:
. . . .
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities, including theatrical
performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to
disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)
[
which reads, thus:
ARTICLE III
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
. . .
Section 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
. . .
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single
offense.
Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain forms
of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone. The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed
as ex post facto as it was prospective in operation. The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class
legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila.
On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the
enforcement of the Ordinance.
]
And on 16 July 1993, again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.
After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from implementing the Ordinance.

Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in
conjunction with its police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila. Judge Laguio rendered a decision curtailing the power of the City Government of Manila to enforce such ordinance.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila is valid.
RULING:
Petition is denied.
This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being its home for several decades. A long-
time resident, the Court witnessed the area's many turn of events. It relished its glory days and endured its days of infamy. Much as the Court harks
back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end.
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional provision. The prohibitions and
sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts
at rendering them worthless.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two
requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be
constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to
the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify
or violate it.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local
government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:
SECTION 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitan.ts.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council.
The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/
municipality provided under the Code. The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the Ci ty Council acting as agent of Congress. Local
government units as agencies of the State are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the In addition, the Ordinance
is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The Ordinance in Section 1
thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business
operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance, which permanently restricts the use of
property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose, goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3) months from its approval within whi ch to wind up business
operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.
The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically
confiscatory.
Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed business, the structure, which housed the previous business, will be left
empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be given to
the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time.
Not only is this impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous. How may the
respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of
private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be
compensated by the government. The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed permanently after a
subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which
limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private
property, which is not noxious or intended for noxious purposes, may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support
in the principles of justice, as we know them. The police powers of local government units, which have always received broad and liberal interpretation,
cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners actions. It in no way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It
provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of
prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make
possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by which
its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establ ishments tend to disturb
the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm.
The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may
attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinanceand is
therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Concededly, the challenged Ordinance we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of thewas enacted with the best of
motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such character
deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary Ordinance not even under the guise of police power.has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand
on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or
order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws .
__________________________________________________________________________
United BF Homeowners v. City Mayor, G.R. No. 141010, February 7, 2007
FACTS:
BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision (BF Homes Paraaque), with a land area straddling the cities of Paraaque, Las Pias, and Muntinlupa, is
the largest subdivision in the country.
On 11 November 1997, the Municipal Council of Paraaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 entitled, An Ordinance Prescribing the
Comprehensive Land Use Plan & Zoning of the Municipality of Paraaque Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991 and Other Pertinent
Laws. Sections 11.5 and 11.6 of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, reclassifying El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Paraaque from
residential to commercial areas, read:
11.5 C-1 LOW INTENSITY COMMERCIAL ZONES

x x x x

BARANGAY BF HOMES

Lot deep both side[s] along Aguirre Avenue from Governor A. Santos Street eastward to Gng. Elsie Gatches Street

Lot deep both side[s] along El Grande Avenue from Lopez Avenue gate southward to corner Aguirre Avenue

x x x x

11.6 C-2 MAJOR COMMERCIAL ZONES

x x x x

BARANGAY BF HOMES

Lot deep both side[s] along Aguirre Avenue from Dallas to El Grande Avenue

Lot deep both side[s] along Aguirre Avenue from El Grande Avenue to Gov. A. Santos Street

BF Paraaque Commercial Plaza

Area bounded on the
North - Pres. Quezon Street
South - A. Aguirre Avenue
East - Presidents Avenue
West - MMP, Creek along BF Homeowners Association
clubhouse

Lot deep east side along Presidents Avenue from Mac Donald southward
to M. Rufino Street

Area bounded on the
North - A. Aguirre Avenue
South - A. Soriano Sr. & M. Rufino Street
East - Presidents Avenue
West - Gng. Elsie Ga[t]ches Street

x x x x

On 27 January 1998, the United BF Homeowners Associations, Inc. (UBFHAI), several homeowners associations, and residents of BF
Homes Paraaque (collectively petitioners) filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with an application for temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Sections 11.5, 11.6, 15, 17, and 19.6 of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08.

Petitioners alleged that the reclassification of certain portions of BF Homes Paraaque from residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional
because it amounts to impairment of the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Paraaque and the lot buyers. Petitioners cited the annotation
on the lot buyers titles which provides that the property shall be used for residential purposes only and for no other purpose.
On the other hand, public respondents alleged that the passage of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police power by the
Municipal Council of Paraaque and that such ordinance can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations entered into by the petitioners and the
developer.
Meanwhile, El Grande Aguirre Commerce and Trade Organization (EL ACTO), a non-stock, non-profit corporation, intervened as respondent.
EL ACTO claimed that its members are lot owners, residents, and operators of commercial establishments along El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF
Homes Paraaque, who will be affected if Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is declared unconstitutional. EL ACTO asserted that MunicipalOrdinance No.
97-08 is a valid exercise of police power and that petitioners are guilty of estoppel since petitioners endorsed the opening of many of these commercial
establishments in BF Homes Paraaque. EL ACTO further alleged that the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court
in accordance with the principle of hierarchy of courts.
On 28 June 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is valid.
RULING:
The petition is without merit.


Power to Enact Zoning Ordinances

The Municipal Council of Paraaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 pursuant to the provisions of RA 7160 and Executive Order No.
72.
Under Section 447 of RA 7160, the Sangguniang Bayan or the Municipal Council, as the legislative body of the municipality, has the power to enact
ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants.

Among the functions of the Sangguniang Bayan enumerated under Section 447 of RA 7160 are:

(2) Generate and maximize the use of resources and revenues for the development plans, program objectives and priorities
of the municipality as provided for under Section 18 of this Code with particular attention to agro-industrial development
and countryside growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

x x x x

(vii) Adopt a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality: Provided, That the formulation, adoption,
or modification of said plan shall be in coordination with the approved provincial comprehensive land use plan;

(viii) Reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the municipality subject to the pertinent
provision of this Code;

(ix) Enact integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establish fire limits or zones, particularly in populous
centers; and regulate the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones
in accordance with the provisions of the Fire Code; (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Executive Order No. 72 provides:

SECTION 1. Plan formulation or updating. (a) Cities and municipalities shall continue to formulate or update their
respective comprehensive land use plans, in conformity with the land use planning and zoning standards and guidelines
prescribed by the HLURB pursuant to national policies.

As a policy recommending body of the LGU, the city or municipal development council (CDC/MDC) shall initiate the
formulation or updating of its land use plan, in consultation with the concerned sectors in the community. For this purpose, the
CDC/MDC may seek the assistance of any local official or field officer of NGAs operation in the LGU.

The city or municipal planning and development coordinator (CPDC/MPDC) and/or the city or municipal agriculturist, if there
is any, shall provide the technical support services and such other assistance as may be required by the CDC/MDC to effectively
carry out this function.

The comprehensive land use plan prepared by the CDC/MDC shall be submitted to
the sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, for enactment into a zoning ordinance. Such
ordinance shall be enacted and approved in accordance with Articles 107 and 108 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of the LGC.

(b) The comprehensive land use plans of component cities and municipalities shall be formulated, adopted, or modified in
accordance with the approved provincial comprehensive land use plans.

(c) Cities and municipalities of metropolitan Manila shall continue to formulate or update their respective comprehensive
land use plans, in accordance with the land use planning and zoning standards and guidelines prescribed by the HLURB pursuant to
EO 392, S. of 1990, and other pertinent national policies.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Thus, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that public officers performed their official duties regularly and legally and in compliance
with applicable laws, in good faith, and in the exercise of sound judgment.

We find no sufficient evidence disputing the regularity of the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08. Before the Municipal Council
ofParaaque passed Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, it has been the subject of barangay consultations and committee hearings in accordance with
Executive Order No. 72.

Reclassification of El Grande and Aguirre Avenues
Contrary to petitioners allegations, we find Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 reasonable and not discriminating or oppressive with
respect to BF Homes Paraaque. As held by the Court of Appeals, the increasing number of homeowners in BF Homes Paraaque necessitated the
addition of commercial areas in the subdivision to service the needs of the homeowners. In fact, several homeowners along El Grande and Aguirre
Avenues already converted their residences into business establishments. Furthermore, as found by the Court of Appeals, El Grande and Aguirre
Avenues are main thoroughfares in BF Homes Paraaque which have long been commercialized.

Even petitioner UBFHAI, the recognized umbrella organization of all homeowners associations in BF Homes Paraaque, acknowledged the
need for additional commercial area. Records reveal that as early as 30 July 1989, UBFHAI recommended for approval an Amended Integrated Zoning
Policies and Guidelines for BF Homes Paraaque. UBFHAI proposed another commercial zone in BF Homes Paraaque to accommodate the growing
needs of the residents, thus:

Subject to the approval of BF Homes, Inc., the Local Zoning Official/Planning Officer of Paraaque and the Metro Manila
Commission and in recognition of the fact that the subdivision has tremendously grown in size and population since 1983
when the above-mentioned guidelines of the MMC [Ordinance 81-01] were promulgated, such that one commercial zone for
the entire subdivision is now inadequate vis-a-vis the needs of the residents, the UBFHAI is proposing another commercial
zone in Phase III of the Subdivision, in the vicinity of the Parish of the Presentation of the Child Jesus as follows:

One lot deep along Aguirre Avenue from Gov. Santos St., to the end of Aguirre Avenue and two lots
deep along El Grande from where it intersects Aguirre Avenue.

Pending approval of the aforesaid proposal, commercial buildings constructed and existing in the aforesaid area will be
given temporary-use permits good for five (5) years from December 31, 1986 or until December 31, 1991, after which, the
same must revert to residential status, unless, in the meantime the proposal is approved, provided all such buildings must comply
with the set-back and parking provision of the Metro Manila Commission Ordinance 81-01; I.M. 09-83.

x x x x

The term for temporary use permits of the designated commercial area shall be considered extended for 8 years
from December 31, 1991 toDecember 31, 1998; without prejudice to the official conversion of the area under existing
MMA/LGC guidelines to commercial. (Emphasis supplied)


Thus, UBFHAIs proposed new commercial area, encompassing El Grande and Aguirre Avenues, is substantially the same area, which Municipal
Ordinance No. 97-08 later reclassified as a commercial zone.
Furthermore, in the subsequent years, UBFHAI and its member homeowners associations endorsed the issuance of municipal and barangay
permits for commercial establishments along El Grande and Aguirre Avenues. Contrary to petitioners allegations, the commercial establishments
endorsed by UBFHAI were not mere convenience stores, which Metro Manila Commission Ordinance No. 81-01 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08
allow in residential areas. Among the commercial establishments which UBFHAI endorsed were a trading business, electronics repair shop, mini-
grocery store, beauty salon, school, dress shop, and consultancy or management services business.

Clearly, the reclassification of El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Paraaque as commercial area was reasonable and justified under
the circumstances.

Non-Impairment of Contract
Petitioners invoke Presidential Decree No. 957 (PD 957), otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree.
Petitioners maintain that PD 957 is intended primarily to protect the buyers and to ensure that subdivision developers keep their promises and
representations. Petitioners allege that one of the promises of the developer of BF Homes Paraaque is that the property shall be used for residential
purposes only. Petitioners assert that the reclassification of certain portions of BF Homes Paraaque from residential to commercial zone is
unconstitutional because it impairs the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Paraaque and the lot buyers.

The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the non-impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of
non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and
general welfare.

Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise of police power and the reclassification of El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in
BF Homes Paraaque is not arbitrary or unreasonable.


WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 1999 and the Resolution dated 16 November 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 46624.

__________________________________________________________________________
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009
FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-
Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of
room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who
own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground
that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police
power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the
Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well
as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could
nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay.
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the
Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that
under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and
its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the
right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit indivi duals for short time stays.
Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective
of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third,
the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
RULING:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes
beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted wi th a view of regulating public
morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale
ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the
extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with publi c policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more
than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code
through such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police
power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution,
drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at
bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the
petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would
be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same
fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be
free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business
ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining
to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. The behavior
which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive
measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So
would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the
businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from
their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-
intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The
ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous
intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
_________________________________________________________________________
Rimando v. Naguilian Emission, G.R. No. 198860, July 23, 2012
FACTS:
The present controversy stemmed from a petition for mandamus and damages filed before Branch 67 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bauang, La Union, by Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., represented by its President, Rosemarie Llarenas (respondent) against Abraham P.
Rimando (petitioner), who, at the time material to the case, was the sitting mayor of the Municipality of Naguilian, La Union.

The petition prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner to issue a business permit in favor of the respondent.

In support of its plea, the respondent claimed that its business is being
conducted on a parcel of land which formerly belonged to the national government but later on certified by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The respondent had operated its business of emission testing on the land
from 2005 to 2007. On January 18, 2008, the respondent filed an application for the renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding fees
therefor.
The petitioner, however, refused to issue a business permit unless and until the respondent executes a contract of lease with the Municipality
of Naguilian. The respondent was amenable to signing such contract subject to some proposed revisions, which, however, were not acceptable to the
petitioner. The parties did not reach a common ground hence, the petition for mandamus.

Ruling of the RTC
On May 26, 2009, the RTC denied the petition for lack of merit based on the ratiocinations that: (a) the Municipality of Naguilian is the declared
owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax Declaration No. 002-01197; (b) under Section 6A.01 of the Revenue Code of the Municipality of
Naguilian, the municipality has the right to require the petitioner to sign a contract of lease because its business operation is being conducted on a real
property owned by the municipality; and (c) a mayors duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature which may not be enforced by a
mandamus writ.

The Ruling of the CA
CA held that the appeal was dismissible on the ground of mootness considering that the period for which the business period was being
sought had already lapsed. As such, any ruling on the matter would bring no practical relief. Nonetheless, the CA proceeded to resolve the issues
involved in the appeal for academic purposes.
The CA disagreed with the RTC and found that the factual milieu of the case justifies the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The CA reasoned
that the tax declaration in the name of the municipality was insufficient basis to require the execution of a contract of lease as a condition sine qua non
for the renewal of a business permit. The CA further observed that Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the municipality anchored
its imposition of rental fees, was void because it failed to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
The CA held that the petitioner may not be held liable for damages since his action or inaction, for that matter, was done in the performance of official
duties that are legally protected by the presumption of good faith.
The CA likewise stressed that the civil action filed against the petitioner had already become moot and academic upon the expiration of his term as the
mayor of Naguilian, La Union.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for mandamus is not the proper vehicle to determine the issue on the ownership of the subject land.

RULING:
SC agreed with the CA that the petition for mandamus has already become moot and academic owing to the expiration of the period intended
to be covered by the business permit.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be
without practical use and value or in the nature of things, cannot be enforced. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the applicant
would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on
ground of mootness.
The objective of the petition for mandamus to compel the petitioner to grant a business permit in favor of respondent corporation for the period
2008 to 2009 has already been superseded by the passage of time and the expiration of the petitioners term as mayor. Verily then, the issue as to
whether or not the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, may be compelled by a writ of mandamus to release the respondents business permit ceased to
present a justiciable controversy such that any ruling thereon would serve no practical value. Should the writ be issued, the petitioner can no longer
abide thereby; also, the effectivity date of the business permit no longer subsists.
While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the otherwise moot appeal of the respondent, we find that the decretal portion of its
decision was erroneously couched.
The CA s conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject land and the invalidity of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, aside
from being unsubstantiated by convincing evidence, can no longer be practically utilized in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the overriding and decisive
factor in the final disposition of the appeal was its mootness and the CA should have dismissed the same along with the petition for mandamus that
spawned it.
More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the same is a delegated police
power hence, discretionary in nature.
Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides, thus:
SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
x x x
3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program
objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-
industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
x x x
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had
been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the Local Government Code
of 1991, which declares:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. Local government units
exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the
municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which
said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. x x x
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the respondent mayor to issue license and permits is
circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed
ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not
of mandamus.
Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed by the respondent is incompetent to compel the exercise of a mayor s
discretionary duty to issue business permits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112152 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated May 26, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________________________________________________________

Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013
The goal of the decentralization of powers to the local government units (LGUs) is to ensure the enjoyment by each of the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State of a genuine and meaningful local autonomy. To attain the goal, the National Legislature has devolved the three great inherent
powers of the State to the LGUs. Each political subdivision is thereby vested with such powers subject to constitutional and statutory limitations.
In particular, the Local Government Code (LGC) has expressly empowered the LGUs to enact and adopt ordinances to regulate vehicular traffic and to
prohibit illegal parking within their jurisdictions. Now challenged before the Court are the constitutionality and validity of one such ordinance on the
ground that the ordinance constituted a contravention of the guaranty of due process under the Constitution by authorizing the immobilization of
offending vehicles through the clamping of tires. The challenge originated in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at the instance of the petitioners vehicle
owners who had borne the brunt of the implementation of the ordinance with the RTC declaring the ordinance unconstitutional, but it has now reached
the Court as a consolidated appeal taken in due course by the petitioners after the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment of the RTC.

FACTS:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu
City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City). The
pertinent provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 read:
Section 1. POLICY It is the policy of the government of the City of Cebu to immobilize any motor vehicle violating any provision of any City
Ordinance on Parking Prohibitions or Restrictions, more particularly Ordinance No. 801, otherwise known as the Traffic Code of Cebu City, as
amended, in order to have a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times.

Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLES Any vehicle found violating any provision of any existing ordinance of the City of Cebu which
prohibits, regulates or restricts the parking of vehicles shall be immobilized by clamping any tire of the said violating vehicle with the use of a
denver boot vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget designed to immobilize motor vehicles. For this particular purpose, any traffic
enforcer of the City (regular PNP Personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel) is hereby authorized to immobilize any violating
vehicle as hereinabove provided.

Section 3. PENALTIES Any motor vehicle, owner or driver violating any ordinance on parking prohibitions, regulations and/or restrictions, as
may be provided under Ordinance No. 801, as amended, or any other existing ordinance, shall be penalized in accordance with the penalties
imposed in the ordinance so violated, provided that the vehicle immobilizer may not be removed or released without its owner or driver paying
first to the City Treasurer of Cebu City through the Traffic Violations Bureau (TVB) all the accumulated penalties for all prior traffic law
violations that remain unpaid or unsettled, plus the administrative penalty of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for the immobilization of the said
vehicle, and receipts of such payments presented to the concerned personnel of the bureau responsible for the release of the immobilized
vehicle, unless otherwise ordered released by any of the following officers:
a) Chairman, CITOM
b) Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology
c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belcia

3.1 Any person who tampers or tries to release an immobilized or clamped motor vehicle by destroying the denver boot vehicle immobilizer or
other such special gadgets, shall be liable for its loss or destruction and shall be prosecuted for such loss or destruction under pain or penalty
under the Revised Penal Code and any other existing ordinance of the City of Cebu for the criminal act, in addition to his/her civil liabilities
under the Civil Code of the Philippines; Provided that any such act may not be compromised nor settled amicably extrajudicially.

3.2 Any immobilized vehicle which is unattended and constitute an obstruction to the free flow of traffic or a hazard thereof shall be towed to
the city government impounding area for safekeeping and may be released only after the provision of Section 3 hereof shall have been fully
complied with.

3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance shall, upon conviction, be penalized with imprisonment of not less than one (1)
month nor more than six (6) months or of a fine of not less than Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) nor more than Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.
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On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban, Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban, Jr.) brought suit in
the RTC in Cebu City against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its
Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osmea, and the chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM), seeking
the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages.


Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street,
Cebu City to get certain records and documents from his office; that upon his return after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being
immobilized by a steel clamp, and a notice being posted on the car to the effect that it would be a criminal offense to break the clamp;

that he
had been infuriated by the immobilization of his car because he had been thereby rendered unable to meet an important client on that day;
that his car was impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City
Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car;
6
that the fine was imposed without any court hearing and without due process of law, for he
was not even told why his car had been immobilized; that he had undergone a similar incident of clamping of his car on the early morning of
November 20, 1997 while his car was parked properly in a parking lot in front of the San Nicolas Pasil Market in Cebu City without violating
any traffic regulation or causing any obstruction; that he was compelled to pay P1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping and P1,000.00
for the violation) without any court hearing and final judgment; that on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where
there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative Lito Gilbuena; and that he was compelled to pay the
total sum of P1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.


On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, T.C. Sayson, Ricardo Hapitan and John Does to
demand the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.
8
He averred that on the morning of July
29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of
the anay exterminator who had asked to be allowed to unload his materials and equipment from the front of the residence inasmuch as hi s daughters
car had been parked in the carport, with the assurance that the unloading would not take too long;
9
that while waiting for the anay exterminator to finish
unloading, the phone in his office inside the house had rung, impelling him to go into the house to answer the call; that after a short while, his soninlaw
informed him that unknown persons had clamped the front wheel of his car; that he rushed outside and found a traffic citation stating that his car had
been clamped by CITOM representatives with a warning that the unauthorized removal of the clamp would subject the remover to criminal charges;

and
that in the late afternoon a group headed by Ricardo Hapitan towed the car even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.
12


In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its codefendants,

the City Attorney of Cebu presented similar defenses, essentially stating that
the traffic enforcers had only upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the plaintiffs; and that Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality and validity.


The cases were consolidated before Branch 58 of the RTC, which, after trial, rendered on January 22, 1999 its decision declaring Ordinance
No. 1664 as null and void.

Under Ordinance No. 1664, when a vehicle is parked in a prohibited, restrycted (sic) or regulated area in the street or along the street, the
vehicle is immobilized by clamping any tire of said vehicle with the use of a denver boot vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget which
immobilized the motor vehicle. The violating vehicle is immobilized, thus, depriving its owner of the use thereof at the sole determination of any traffic
enforcer or regular PNP personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel. The vehicle immobilizer cannot be removed or released without the
owner or driver paying first to the City Treasurer of Cebu through the Traffic Violations Bureau all the accumulated penalties of all unpaid or unsettled
traffic law violations, plus the administrative penalty of P500.00 and, further, the immobilized vehicle shall be released only upon presentation of the
receipt of said payments and upon release order by the Chairman, CITOM, or Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology, or Asst. City Fiscal
Felipe Belcina. It should be stressed that the owner of the immobilized vehicle shall have to undergo all these ordeals at the mercy of the Traffic Law
Enforcer who, as the Ordinance in question mandates, is the arresting officer, prosecutor, Judge and collector. Otherwise stated, the owner of the
immobilized motor vehicle is deprived of his right to the use of his/her vehicle and penalized without a hearing by a person who is not legally or duly
vested with such rights, power or authority. The Ordinance in question is penal in nature, and it has been held;

x x x

WHEREFORE, premised (sic) considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional and directing the defendant City
of Cebu to pay the plaintiff Valentino Legaspi the sum of P110,000.00 representing the value of his car, and to all the plaintiffs, Valentino L. Legaspi,
Bienvenido P. Jaban and Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban, the sum of P100,000.00 each or P300,000.00 all as nominal damages and another
P100,000.00 each or P300,000.00 all as temperate or moderate damages. With costs against defendant City of Cebu. SO ORDERED.




On June 16, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,
17
overturning the RTC and declaring Ordinance No. 1664 valid.

It then makes a general grant of the police power. The scope of the legislative authority of the local government is set out in Section 16, to wit:
Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

This provision contains what is traditionally known as the general welfare clause. As expounded in United States vs. Salaveri a, 39 Phil 102,
the general welfare clause has two branches. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and
regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second
branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the council, and authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and
proper to provide for health, safety, prosperity and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants.

In a vital and critical way, the general welfare clause complements the more specific powers granted a local government. It serves
as a catchall provision that ensures that the local government will be equipped to meet any local contingency that bears upon the welfare of
its constituents but has not been actually anticipated. So varied and protean are the activities that affect the legitimate interests of the local
inhabitants that it is wellnigh impossible to say beforehand what may or may not be done specifically through law. To ensure that a local government
can react positively to the peoples needs and expectations, the general welfare clause has been devised and interpreted to allow the local legislative
council to enact such measures as the occasion requires.

Founded on clear authority and tradition, Ordinance 1664 may be deemed a legitimate exercise of the police powers of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Cebu. This local law authorizes traffic enforcers to immobilize and tow for safekeeping vehicles on the streets that are illegally
parked and to release them upon payment of the announced penalties. As explained in the preamble, it has become necessary to resort to these
measures because of the traffic congestion caused by illegal parking and the inability of existing penalties to curb it. The ordinance is designed to
improve traffic conditions in the City of Cebu and thus shows a real and substantial relation to the welfare, comfort and convenience of the people of
Cebu. The only restrictions to an ordinance passed under the general welfare clause, as declared in Salaveria, is that the regulation must be reasonable,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, consistent with national laws and policies, and not unreasonable or discriminatory.
The measure in question undoubtedly comes within these parameters.
Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration on August 4, 2003, the Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for
review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the legislative powers of the City of Cebu; and
2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for validity and constitutionality, particularly the limitations set by the Constitution
and the relevant statutes.
RULING:


The petitions for review have no merit.


A. Tests for a valid ordinance

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court restates the tests of a valid ordinance thusly:

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
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As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and
whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the
ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with
public policy).


B. Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal requirements

Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the LGU of the City of Cebu?

The answer is in the affirmative. Indeed, with no issues being hereby raised against the formalities attendant to the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664,
we presume its full compliance with the test in that regard. Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of
the States great powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashi oned to delineate the
specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully
functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations.

In particular, police power is regarded as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public
needs.
20
It is unquestionably the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the same.
21
According to Cooley: [The police power] embraces the whole system of internal
regulation by which the state seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences against itself, but also to establish for the intercourse of
citizens with citizens, those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent the conflict of rights and to insure to each the
uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as it is reasonably consistent with the right enjoyment of rights by others.


In point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu of delegated police power. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. BelAir Village
Association, Inc.,
23
the Court cogently observed:


It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was
expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the
LGC.

Section 458 of the LGC relevantly states:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

x x x

(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for
under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall:
x x x

(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places and approve the construction,
improvement repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or regulate the use of the same by
privatelyowned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages and operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands to be
occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets;
and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets and public places;

(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of
public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places;


The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to leave to the cities themselves the task of confronting the problem of traffic congestions
associated with development and progress because they were directly familiar with the situations in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs
would be in the best position to craft their traffic codes because of their familiarity with the conditions peculiar to their communities. With the broad
latitude in this regard allowed to the LGUs of the cities, their traffic regulations must be held valid and effective unless they infringed the constitutional
limitations and statutory safeguards.

C. Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664with the substantive requirements

The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the adherence to the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. The guaranty is embedded
in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which ordains:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of the Government, whether committed by the
Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection essential to every inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on Constitutional Law has
vividly written:

x x x.

If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property, he is denied the protection of due process. If the enjoyment of his rights is
conditioned on an unreasonable requirement, due process is likewise violated. Whatsoever be the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or
merely a statute, its unjustified withholding would also be a violation of due process. Any government act that militates against the ordinary norms of
justice or fair play is considered an infraction of the great guaranty of due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation merely of the
procedure prescribed by the law or affects the very validity of the law itself.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those
forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the
rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under
strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.

To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad enough to include illegally parked vehicles or
whatever else obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks, which were precisely the subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in avowedl y aiming to ensure a
smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times (Section 1). This aim was borne out by its Whereas Clauses, viz:

WHEREAS, the City of Cebu enacted the Traffic Code (Ordinance No. 801) as amended, provided for Parking Restrictions and Parking Prohibitions in
the streets of Cebu City;

WHEREAS, despite the restrictions and prohibitions of parking on certain streets of Cebu City, violations continued unabated due, among
others, to the very low penalties imposed under the Traffic Code of Cebu City;

WHEREAS, City Ordinance 1642 was enacted in order to address the traffic congestions caused by illegal parkings in the streets of Cebu
City;

WHEREAS, there is a need to amend City Ordinance No.1642 in order to fully address and solve the problem of illegal parking and other
violations of the Traffic Code of Cebu City;
30
(emphasis supplied)

Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the population and economic centers of the country, the plain
objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in
order to fulfill the compelling government purpose of immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles
obstructing the streets of the City of Cebu.
Legaspis attack against the provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 for being vague and ambiguous cannot stand scrutiny. As can be readily seen, its text
was forthright and unambiguous in all respects. There could be no confusion on the meaning and coverage of the ordinance. But should there be any
vagueness and ambiguity in the provisions, which the OSG does not concede,
31
there was nothing that a proper application of the basic rules of
statutory construction could not justly rectify.
The petitioners further assert that drivers or vehicle owners affected by Ordinance No. 1664 like themselves were not accorded the opportunity to protest
the clamping, towing, and impounding of the vehicles, or even to be heard and to explain their side prior to the immobilization of their vehicles; and that
the ordinance was oppressive and arbitrary for that reason.
The adverse assertions against Ordinance No. 1664 are unwarranted.
Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle owner whose vehicle was immobilized by clamping could protest
such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance. Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually afforded an administrative
escape in the form of permitting the release of the immobilized vehicle upon a protest directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the
Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belcia officials named in the ordinance itself. The
release could be ordered by any of such officials even without the payment of the stipulated fine. That none of the petitioners, albeit lawyers all, resorted
to such recourse did not diminish the fairness and reasonableness of the escape clause written in the ordinance. Secondly, the immobilization of a
vehicle by clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the apprehension for illegal
parking or obstruction. In that situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver to move the vehicle or issue a traffic citation should the latter
persist in his violation. The clamping would happen only to prevent the transgressor from using the vehicle itself to escape the due sanctions. And, lastly,
the towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from
obstructing traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived
of his property.
In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the elements of fairness and reasonableness.

Did Ordinance No. 1664 meet the requirements of procedural due process?

Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there are many instances under our laws in which the absence of one
or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process. Among the instances are the cancellation of the passport of a
person being sought for the commission of a crime, the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges, the distraint of properties
to answer for tax delinquencies, the padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, and the abatement of
nuisance per se. Add to them the arrest of a person in flagrante delicto.

The clamping of the petitioners vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664 (and of the vehicles of others similarly situated) was of the same character as
the aforecited established exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As already said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the
tires was necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be
superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trialtype hearing prior to the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due process, for giving the transgressors
the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest could equally satisfy the need for a hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of a
court of law was not indispensable to ensure a compliance with the guaranty of due process.
To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce the ordinance against its transgressors;
otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away.
Finally, Legaspis position, that the final decision of the RTC rendered in the Astillero case declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional bound the City
of Cebu, thereby precluding these consolidated appeals from being decided differently, is utterly untenable. For one, Legaspi undeservedly extends too
much importance to an irrelevant decision of the RTC irrelevant, because the connection between that case to these cases was not at all shown. For
another, he ignores that it should be the RTC that had improperly acted for so deciding the Astillero case despite the appeals in these cases being
already pending in the CA. Being the same court in the three cases, the RTC should have anticipated that in the regular course of proceedings, the
outcome of the appeal in these cases then pending before the CA would ultimately be elevated to and determined by no less than the Court itself. Such
anticipation should have made it refrain from declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional, for a lower court like itself, appreciating its position in the
interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation, should have exercised a becoming modesty on the issue of the
constitutionality of the same ordinance that the Constitution required the majority vote of the Members of the Court sitti ng en banc to determine.
34
Such
becoming modesty also forewarned that any declaration of unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding only on the parties, but that a declaration
of unconstitutionality by the Court would be a precedent binding on all.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 16, 2003 by
the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.