Photograph of Georges Cangulhem, 1

993
, courtesy of Francois Delaporte.
Kowledge of Life
Georges Canguilhem
Edited by Paola Marrati and Todd Meyers
Translated by Stefanos Geroulanos and Daniela Ginsburg
F OR DHAM UNI VE R S I TY PR E S S
NE W YORK 2 0 0 8
111ifIrIllrllilililrlll[nl
39001105527512
Copyright 2008 Fordham University Press
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Kowledge ofLi was frst published in French as La connaissance de
la vie Librairie PhilosophiqueJ. Vrin 1 965; 1 992, 2003 for the
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Printed in the United States of America
10 09 08 5 4
3
2 I
First editon
CONTENTS
Foreword: Li, as Such
by!aolaMarrati andJoddMeyers
Translators' Note
byStelanosGeroulanos and OanielaGinsburg
!nuoducuon. JhoughtandtheLivng
PART ONE
Method
I. Experimentaton in Animal Biology
PART Two
History
2
.
Cell Theory
PART THREE
Philosophy
3
4

5

6
.
7
Aspects ofVitalism
Machine and Organism
The Living and Its Milieu
The Normal and the Pathological
Monstosity and the Monstrous
o;!s
\III
KUTUPHANESI
0925056
vi
xiii
X1
3
25
59
7
5
98
121
1
3
4
v
v Contents
APPENDIXES
I. Note on the Transition fom Fibrillar Theory to Cell
Theory 1
4
9
2 Note on the Relatonship Between Cell Theory and
Leibniz's Philosophy 151
3
.
Extracts fom the "Discours sur I'anatomie du cerveau"
("Discourse on the Anatomy of the Brain"), delivered by
Nicolas Steno in Paris in 1665 to the "Messieurs de
I' Assemblee de chez Monsieur Thevenot" in Paris 152
Notes
Biblogaphy
FOREWORD
Life, as Such
Paola Marati and Todd Meyers
Jrainedin philosophyandmedicine, GeorgesCanguilhem( 1 904-95) con-
unues to exertuemendous inuence onthe historyand philosophy olsci-
enceaninuencethatcanhardlybeoverstated. Canguilhemwas a major
pointolcontactbetween philosophers in!rancethroughoutthe twentieth
century, including ngures suchas Michel !oucault, Louis Althusser, !ran-
ois]acob,]acques Lacan, !ierre 8ourdieu, and]acques Oerrida, to name
onlyalew.verhislongcareer, CanguilhemwasaprolessorinSuasbourg
andattheSorbonne,wherehetooLoverhomGaston8achelardasdirector
olthe !nsutut d'Histoire des Sciences etJechniques olthe \niversity ol
!aris.Healsoservedasinspectorgeneralolphilosophyandlaterasamem-
berolthe!renchation committee, aposiuonthatgavehimconsider-
ablepoweroverexaminauonsanduaininginphilosophy.!nhismostwdely
LnownworL,Essai sur quelques problemes concerant le noral et le pathologique
( 1 943), later republished under the utle Le noral et le pathologique ( 1 966;
in!nglish as The Noral and the Pathological, Canguilhem addressedhow
theconceptsolthe 'normalandthe 'pathological ariseandtaLeholdin
medicine.!nLa fration du concept de reexe aux XI et XI siecles ( 1 955),
heturnedhisattenuontothelormationoltheconceptol'reexandhow
it shaped ideas in the history olbiology and physiology. therworLs by
Canguilhemthathave been uanslatedinto!nglishincludeIdeolog and Ra
tionalit in the Histor of the Li Sciences ( 1 988) andA Vital Rationalist: Selected
Writings ofGeorges Canguilhem ( 1 994).
vu
!n the opening statements ol his inuoducuon to Kowledge of Li,
Georges Canguilhem suongly amrmswhatcan be considered the guiding
threadnotonlyolthe eight essays collectedin thevolumebutolallolhis
philosophical,historical,andepistemologicalworLs. ' AccordingtoCanguil-
hem, contrary to what a long and inuential uadition holds, there is no
conict between Lnowledge and lile, no mndamental divde between the
supposedlypure anddisinterestedprocedure olreason andscience, on the
one hand, and the supposedly obscure and irrauonal power ollile, on the
other. Canguilhem considers these two complementary assumpuons to be
deeplymisleading. theyareprejudicial both tothetasLolthe historian ol
scienceandtothe arguablyevenmoreimportanttasLolunderstandingthe
specincityolthehumanlormollile.
Knowledge,liLe anyotherhuman acuvity, cannotavoid the questionol
itsmeaning,thosewhobelievethatLnowledgeexistsloritsownsaLe,asan
autonomousquestthatwouldsetapartthosewhopursueithom'lileand
its needs, in Canguilhem's view, simultaneously admit the necessity ola
meaningolLnowledgeandlailtoassign one. Jheylailto see thatthinLing
and Lnowing do notseparate humans hom lile. Rather, theyseparate hu-
manshomtheworldandtheirmilieu,theycreate the distancenecessaryto
doubtandevaluate,tolooLlorwaystoovercomeobstacles,reduceinsecuri-
ties. Knowledge, lor Canguilhem, is a 'general method lor solving, di-
rectlyorindirectly, thetensionsthatarise betweenhumansandthemilieu.
Jhe conictis not betweenLnowledge and lile but between humans and
themilieu. Lnowledge, as a humanpracuce, is a wayoltranslorming the
world,olnndinganewbalancewith themilieu, olcreaunganewlormol
lile. !thissense,Lnowledgeis a lormollile, belongstolile, butthenlile,
human and nonhuman, cannot be considered a 'blind and stupid lorce.
Jo recognizethatLnowledgeisneverloritsownsaLebutbelongstoalorm
ollile thatitconstantly helps to renegotiate andmodi[ calls not onlylor
a dierent concepuon ol Lnowledge but also lor an altogether dicrent
understandingollile.
GroundingLnowledgeinliledoesnot, lorCanguilhem,amounttoques-
uoningthe ambiuons olreasonandrauonality, to underplayingscience as
auulitariandeviceamongothers.heaims,ontheconuary, tohighlightthe
lactthatlile as such produces Lnowledge, that there is nothing essenually
iTtional aboutitspower,asisassumedbythosewhoopposeliletothought.
Humans do not need to separate thcmselves out hom the realm olliving
F01'eword i
beingsin order to thinL, tofrget thatthey are animals, certainly, humans
exercise thoughtto a higher degree, and animals cannotsolvemostolthe
problems thatwe set uplor them. 8ut this is because, Canguilhemnotes,
theseareour problems,nottheirs.Knowledge,asthecapacitytosolveprob-
lems, mayandindeeddoesvaryin dierent animals, butitisproducedby
lile.Hencethe doublemeaningolthetitle.'Lnowledgeollileissimulta-
neouslyand inseparably the Lnowledgewe have ollile when we taLe itas
on object, andtheLnowledgethatlileitsellproduces.
Jhe awareness olthe reciprocal belonging ollile and Lnowledge not
onlyundoes the deeply rooted divide between an abstract concepuon ol
Lnowledge and a murLypercepuon ollile. italso demandsrespectlor the
specincityolthe living asanobjectolscience. ! Creative Evolution, Henri
8ergson insists on the inumate interplay between lile and Lnowledge.
emerginghomlile as one olitsproducts, Lnowledgein turnmodineslile.
Human cogitive pracuces emergeasa parucularlypowermlinstanceola
tendencythatis expressed byall living beings. the capacityto solve prob-
lems in new and creative ways. Jhe dierence thatconsututes livng does
notconsistinaninexplicablelorcethatwilllorevereludesciencebutinthis
internal and acuve relation to Lnowledge. Canguilhem's preoccupauons
are certainly dierent hom those ol8ergson, buton this criucalpointhe
acceptsthelegacyolCreative Evolution and,moregenerally,olvitalism.
Canguilhem's conunuallyreamrmed interestin the dierent uadiuons
olvitalism is not a purelyhistorical one but, rather, methodological and
philosophical.Vitalism,asheunderstandsit,isnrstandloremostademand.
it cannot beidentinedwithanyspecinc medical or biological docuine, it
does not consistin theamrmauonolanyparticular set olproperues that
would denne 'lile. Vatvtalism amrmsisthe need to Leep the quesuon
olthesense olthe relauon betweenlile and science open. such a quesuon
in its general lorm is important hom a philosophical or epistemological
perspecuve,butitbecomesparucularlypressinglorthelilesciences,which
cannotignore itwithoutcompromisingtheirowninquiries.Jhespecincity
olbiologyormedicine,lorCanguilhem,isnot due to astate olLnowledge
thatisinsumcentlyadvanced(agapthatrecentdiscoveries,somemayargue,
wouldhavenlled)butisirreducible.Jhespecincityolbiologyandmedicine
depends on the lactthatlivingbeingshave anormativerelauon to lile. 8y
'normative, Canguilhemmeans that livingbeingsare not, and cannot, be
indierenttothe conditionsoltheirlile, bothtotheinternalcondiuonsol
x Foreord
the organism, let us call them 'healu and 'disease, and to the external
conditionsprovided bythenaturalandsocialmilieuinwhichtheyinteract.
Xaver 8ichat, according to Canguilhem, expressed this simple but ohen
neglectedlactbynoucingthatitwouldn'tmaLe sense to have a branchol
physics called 'pathology, butpathology is a necessary category lor the
lilesciences. Canguilhem'smostlamousworL, onthe concepts olthenor-
malandthepathological,attemptstounderstandwhatisatstaLeinthevital
norms that living beings constantly renegouate and modi[, how these
norms are dierent hom and should not be conmsedwith or reduced to
socialnorms, evenwhen, asitisthe caselorhumans,theyinteract.
Jhetrutholvtalism consists inrepeatedlycalling attenuon to the co-
originarityolLnowledge and lile, in ng to unlold the consequences ol
thisreciprocal belonging, and in remindingus thatthe problem olsense
andvalueisnotaphilosophicalconsuuctionthatcouldbedispensedwiu
but a tendency expressed byvital norms. Jhis is not to say that human
lorms ollile should be understood asthe expression olsome sortol'bio-
logical determinism. allthehistoricalandphilosophicalworLolCanguil-
hem, notto menuon his ethical and poliucal commiuents, speaLagainst
suchanidea.Jhisistosay,rauer,thathumanhistoryhastobeunderstood
inthecontextolthehistoryollile,atasLlorwhichthenouonol'biological
determinismisollittlehelp,tosaytheleast.
JhesesetsolproblemsmayconsututethephilosophicalpartolCanguil-
hem'sworL, buttheycannot beseparated hom quesuons olmethod and
history. Vithin Canguilhem's worL the three seemingly separate threads
maLe contactagainandagain, bindingobjects and concepts. Heremethod
isnotasetolpredetermined operauons ortasLsputtouseinsolvngexist-
ing quesuons, whether in philosophy, science, medicine, orthe history ol
theirconunualintersecuonsanddepartures. Meuod, suictlyspeaLing,isa
concernwthwaysolLnowing.Vithclose attenuontothewriungsolRene
Oescartes, Auguste Comte, and Claude 8ernard, Canguilhem moves out-
side the usual paths, transgressing the boundaries olconvenuonal under-
standingsolscientincprogress. CanguilhemshowshowtheseauthorsspeaL
to eachotherwhenonewouldleastexpectitand howtheydiverge again
accordingto anonlinearunderstandingolhistory.Canguilhem'shistorical
epistemology opens a window onto debates within the lile sciences at the
beginningolthegeneucrevolutionexposingthegrounduponwhichcon-
temporaryunderstandingsolliletaLehold.
Foreword x
!ssenualtomethodmethodthatmovesbeyondsimplysecU1-ing anan-
alyuc perspectiveis creativity. Jhrough the pioneering neuropsycholo-
gist Kurt Goldstein, to whom Canguilhem returns again and again, the
understandingolbiologicalLnowledgeistaLentobea'continuedcreauve
activity. . . comingincreasinglyinreacholourexperience. Jhereislittle
questionthatthisactivitysignals somethingproductive andpragmatic, re-
plete with potentialiues and openings. 8ut such a perspective also intro-
duces 'experience as a necessary condition olbiological Lnowledge as
much as its outcome, whether that experience is rendered as the tension
between the organism and its milieu, the singularity olthe growth and
generation olindividual organisms, orthe collecuve processes oladapta-
tionandinheritanceolspecies. !or CanguilhemandGoldsteinand, lor
that matter, 8ernardat the core ol experience are quesuons regarding
experimentation, with all the tensions and alnniues between 'experience
[l'experience] " and 'experiment [l'experience] , " in terms oltranslation and
interpretation,nottomenuonthedierentways thesetwotermsareused
throughout. ! thiscontextthe staLes lormethod are high. As the subtly
problematic utle olhis booLalreadyindicates, the Lnowledge of lile does
notrepresentasingledirectionolthoughtunmaLingits object.!nstead,
we nnd two movements. Lnowledge and lile each coming to rest on the
other. Canguilhem writes thatknowledge (la connaissance) does not destroy
li (la vie) but 'undoes the experience ollile . . . in order to help man
remaLe what lile has made without him, in him, or outside olhim. !
this regard, Lnowledge and lile canno longer be considered outside ola
historicalperspecuve.AttheintersecuonolLnowledge andlile,we begin
to see therelationbetweenphilosophy, method, andthelastthreadolthe
booL. history.
!Kowledge of Li, weareconhontednotwithasinglehistorybutwith
manysingularhistories. History can be approachedmuchinthe sameway
Canguilhem approaches the nouon olindividuality (a concern that is ex-
presslybiologicalandphilosophical). Jhrough LamarcL, Canguilhemcau-
tions against theories olsubsutuuon, against the assumption that a single
organisminonemilieucanoerallthe necessarycondiuonslordescribing
and understandinganother seeminglylike organism. Asimilar cauuon ap-
plies to history. !vents and concepts are not always so easily uaced in a
linear, progressive pattern and cannot hang upon a single scaold, even
xii Foreword
when theyseem (orhave always been assumed) to share qualities or atui-
butes. Viththis we can hear an echoedwarning hom 8ergson regarding
general theories that can contain everything and therelore tell nothing.
!t is important to recognize that science and medicine, their worL, their
geographies (physical and conceptual), parucularlyin regard to a concern
with the normal and the pathological, are lor Canguilhem 'nothing less
than an introduction to concretehumanproblems. !tis inthiswaythat
wecansaythatinKowledge of LqCanguilhem doesnotcreateanaruncial
divdebetweenconceptsollileandtheliving.
TRANSLATORS
'
NOTE
Stefnos Geroulanos and Daniela Ginsburg
!n uanslaungLa connaissance de la vie, wehave soughtto balance exacuess
withreadability.Vherenecessary,wehaveadjustedCanguilhem'spunctua-
tion to clari[themeaningolhistext.therwise,we have uiedtoLeepas
closetotheoriginallormulauonsaspossiblewiuoutimpedingreadability.
! the case ol major !rench terms that have more than one !nglish
equivalent,wehave uanslated according to contextratherthan choosinga
single, all-encompassing!nglishterm.VewouldliLetonotesomeimpor-
tantchoices.
Assimiler in!renchmeanseither'tocompare, 'toliLen, or'toassimi-
late.Ve havechosenauanslauonaccordingtocontext,butreadersshould
Leepinmindthatthedierenceismorepronouncedi !nglish.
Comportement means both 'behavior and 'comporuent. Ve have
prelerred'behaviorexceptwhenCanguilhemisrelerringtothetotalcom-
poruentolan organism, that is, where an organism's behavior and con-
scious acuon are notatstaLe. '8ehavor shouldnot be read through the
prismolbehaviorismtowardwhichCanguilhemwashostile.
Sens in !rench encompasses 'sense, 'meaning, and 'direcuon. Ve
havegenerallyrendereditas'sense, someumesprelerring'meaning.!or
signication wehaveused 'meaning or 'signincation, also dependingon
context.
Experience in !rench means both 'experiment and 'experience. Jhe
oh-notedcontrastbetweentheseparatetermsin!nglishandthesingleone
in!renchhasbeenimportanttothedierentconcepuonsolscienceinthe
!rench- and !nglish-speaLingworlds since the nineteenth century, while
XlIl
xv Translators' Note
theambiguityolexperience hasalsoplayedaroleincriuquesolexperimenta-
uonby twenueth-century!rench epistemologists, notably Gaston 8ache-
lard,AexandreKoyre,andCanguilhemhimsell.Ve notethis,butwehave
maintained the disunct!nglishterms.
!orthe!renchwordsfnalite andfnalisnze in' Machineandrganism,'
we have generally used the term 'nnalism when a conuast to 'mecha-
nismisatstaLe andhaveused 'purpose ratherthan'nnality to denote
the state or quality olnature, machines, or organs having a nnal end or
purpose.
Jhetwo cenual terms olthechapter 'JheLivingand!tsMilieu also
require mrther elanation. Jhe!renchtermvivant isohenuanslated as
'lile in !nglish (e. g. , in the uanslauon ol!ranois]acob'sLa logique du
vivant as The Logic of Li). Yet 'lile doesnotquite capture Canguilhem's
worLonle vivant andhidesthedierencebetweenvie ('lile) andvivant.
!nstead, we have chosen the rendition 'a living being when the author
indicatesasinglevivant, and'thelivingwhenatstaLeisnotthesingularity
olthatbeing. !mportantly, 'a livngbeing" shouldnotberead asbearinga
particularontological hue.
Milieu in!renchmeansnotonly'environmentitsusual!nglishcon-
notationbut also 'center, 'middle (mi-lieu). Canguilhem uses either
meaning, byandlargerelerringto themeaningolmilieuas environment,
but attimes specincallyaddressing the problem olan organism living (or
not)inthecenterolitssurroundings. Atothertimes, heconsiderstherela-
uonship olanorganism, itsella milieu (envronment), to organs ortissue
withinit.JhereadershouldLeepthedoublemeaninginmind,parucularly
whendiscussionsolthecenterappear.VehavelargelyLeptthetermmilieu
in!nglish,atumesclari[ingitsmeaning.
Ve haverendered the !rench term monstruosite as 'monsuosity, even
where'delormitywould ohenbe amore common !nglishterm.
Jhe!renchtermtechnique, whichcomprisesthe!nglishusagesol'tech-
nics, 'technolog, 'technique, and even 'technic (e. g. ,in translations
olKant),has beenrenderedas'technique.
Quotes hom non-!nglish sources have been uanslated directly hom
Canguilhem's !renchrenditions,withthe excepuon olcertainmajorpas-
sages thatalreadyexistin a reliable modern !nglish uanslauonnotably
Claude 8ernard's Introduction to the Study of Expe1'imental Medicine, Kurt
Goldstein'sThe Organism, andpartsolAugusteComte'sPositivist Philosophy.
Translators' Note x
!artsolthisbooLhavealreadyappearedinuanslationin.]onathanCrary
and Sanlord Kwinter, eds. , Incorporations (ewYorL. Zone 8ooLs, 1 992);
Grey Room 3 (Spring 2001 ); and Georges Canguilhem,A Vital Rationalst
(ew YorL. Zone 8ooLs, 1 994). Ve admire the worL carried out by the
uanslatorsinvolvedinthoseprojects,butinLeepingwithoureorttocon-
suuctan integral uanslauonolthe booL,wehavenot consultedtheirver-
sions.Jhe 2002 Vrin ediuon suers typographically, and our corrections
havebenentedhomtheoriginal 1 952 editionbyHachette. !nordernotto
overcomplicate the loouotes, comments hom both editors and translators
areidenunedas'Jrans.
Canguilhem ohen avoids relerences and even cites sources incorrectly.
Moreover, manyolhis!rench sources existonlyinpartial!nglishtransla-
uon. Jhe present ediuon has corrected as many citations as possible and
includescomprehensivebibliographicalrelerencestobooLsandaruclesrel-
erenced by Canguilhem, thanLs to the meuculous editorial worL under-
taLenbyJoddMeyers, andwewouldliLetonotehishelpthroughout.Ve
wishto thanL!aolaMarraulorinvitingus toworLonthisproject, lorher
terminological help, lor her worL acquiring the translauon rights hom
Vrin,andloraidingourtranslauon.!inally,wearegratemllorsuggestions
made by !ranois Oelaporte, !ric Michaud, Katharine !arL, and Maria
Geroulanou, andwewould especiallyliLe to thanL!ve Oelmas lor allher
help.
INTRODUCTION
Thought and the livtng
Jo Lnowis to analyze. Jhis pointis more easilystated than jusuned, lor
theattentioneveryphilosophypreoccupiedwiththeproblemolLnowledge
givestothe operations olLnowingdistractsithomthe meaningolLnowl-
edge. At best, one responds to the latter problem by amrming the sum-
ciencyandpurityolLnowledge.Andyet,LnowingonlyinordertoLnowis
hardlymoresensiblethaneaunginorderto eat,Lillingin ordertoLill,or
laughingin order to laugh, since itis at

once an avowalthatLnowledge
must have a meaningand a remsal to nnd in Lnowledge any meaning
otherthanitsell.
!lLnowledgeisanalysis,thematterissurelynottobelehatthat.Jo de-
compose, to reduce, to cxplain, to idenu[, to measure, to putinto equa-
tions. all this must involve a benentlor intelligence, since, manilestly, it
comes at the cost olenjoyment. ne enjoys not the laws olnature but
natureitsell, notnumbers butqualiues, notrelauonsbutbeings.And, all
told, one does notlive oLnowledge. Vulgar? !erhaps. Blasphemous? 8ut
why`Mustwe believe that, because certainmen dedicate themselves to a
lileolLnowledge,mancanonlyreallyliveinandthroughscience`
Ve acceptlartooeasilythatthereexistsamndamentalconictbetween
kowledgeandlile,suchthattheirreciprocalaversioncanleadonlyto the
destrucuonollilebyLnowledgeortothederisionolLnowledgebylile.Ve
arethenlehwithnochoiceexceptthatbetweenacrystalline(i. e. , transpar-
ent and inert) intellectualism and a loggy (at once acuve and muddled)
mysucism.
ow, theconictis notbetweenuoughtandlilein man, butbetween
manandtheworldinthehumanconsciousnessollile.Jhoughtisnothing
XI
xiii Intoducion
but a disentanglingolman hom the world that permitsus toretreathom,
tointerrogate,andtodoubt(tothinListoweigh,etc.)inthelaceolobsta-
clesthatarise.!concreteterms,Lnowledgeconsistsinthesearchlorsecur-
ityviathereductionolobstacles, itconsistsinthe consuucuonoltheories
that proceed by assimilauon. !tisthus a general methodlorthe direct or
indirect resoluuon ol tensions between man and milieu. Yet to denne
Lnowledge in this wayis to nnd its meaningin its end,whichis to allow
mananewequilibriumwiththeworld, anewlormandorganizauonolhis
lile. !tisnottruethatLnowledge desuoys lile.Rather,Lnowledgeundoes
theexperienceollile, seeLingtoanalyzeitslailuressoastoabstracthomit
botha rationalelorprudence(sapience, science, etc.) and, eventually, laws
lor success, in order to help manremaLewhatlile has madewithouthim,
inhim, or outside olhim. ! consequence, itmust besaid that ilthought
and Lnowledge are inscribedwithin lile so as to regulate itas is the case
with manthisverylile cannotbethe blind and stupid mechanical lorce
that one liLes to imagine when one conuasts it to thought. 8esides, ilit
were mechanical it could beneither blind nor stupid. nlya being that
searches lorlight can beblind, only a beingthat claims to signi[ can be
stupid.
Vhatlightarewethensosurewearecontemplaungthatwedeclareall
eyes other than man's to be blind` Vhat meaning are we so certain ol
having givento uelile inus thatwe declareanybehaviorexceptourown
gesturestobestupid`Ooubtless,theanimal cannotresolvealltheproblems
wepresenttoit,butthisisbecausetheseproblemsareoursandnotitsown.
Could man maLe a nest better than a bird, a web better than a spider`
And ilwe looLclosely, doeshumanthought manilestinits invenuons an
independence hom the summons olneed and the pressures olthe milieu
thatwouldlegitimateman'spity-ungedironytowardin]ahumanlivingbe-
ings` Ooesnota specialistintechnological problems tellus that 'nobody
has everencountered a tool createdwhollylor a useyet to be lound, on
materialsyettobediscovered` ' Ve asLthatonereectonthis.asruptures
withsimplelile, religionandartarejustasspecincallyhumanasisscience
yetwhatsincerelyreligiousspirit,whatauthenucallycreauvearustpursuing
thetransngurationollile,haseverused his eortasapretexttodepreciate
lile` Vhether because he has lost it or, more exactly, because he senses
thatotherbeingspossessit,whatmanissearchinglor isanunproblemauc
Intoducion x
agreement between exigenciesandrealiuesanexperiencewhosesolid,de-
nniuveunitywouldbeguaranteedbytheongoingenjoymentderivedhom
it. Religion and art point him toward this, but Lnowledge, so long as it
remsesto recognizethatitispartandnotjudge, insuumentandnotcom-
mandment,distanceshimhomit.!romthereitlollowsthatmansomeumes
marvels atthe living and someumes, scandalized atbeinghimsella living
being, lorgeslorhisownusetheideaolaseparateLingdom.
!venilLnowledgeisthedaughterolhumanlear(astonishment, anxiety,
etc.),itwould not beveryinsightml to convertthislearinto anirreducible
aversionto the condiuon olbeings that experience learin the crises they
must overcome so long as theylive. !lLnowledgeis the daughter ollear,
this is lor the dominauon and organizauon olhuman experience, lor the
heedomollile.
Jhus, theuniversal relationolhumanLnowledgeto livingorganization
reveals itsellthrough the relauon olLnowledge to human lile. Lile is the
lormauon ollorms, Lnowledge is the analysis olin-lormed matter. !t is
normalthat ananalysiscouldnever explain a lormation andthatone loses
sightolthe orignalityollormswhen one sees themonlyasresultswhose
causes or components are to be determined. 8ecause they are totalities
whose sense resides in their tendencyto realize themselves as such in the
courseoltheirconhontauonwiththeirmilieu,livinglormscanbegrasped
in a vision, never by a division. !t almost seems that, in Leepingwithits
etyology, to divideisto maLe avoid [vide] , whereas a lormexisungonly
asawhole could notbevoidedolanything. '8iology,saysKurtGoldstein,
'hasto dowithindividualsthat exist and tend to exist, thatis to say, seeL
torealizetheircapaciuesasbesttheycaninagivenenvironment.
Jhese amrmauons do not involve anyprohibition. Jhe determinauon
andmeasurementoltheeectolsuchandsuchamineralonthegrowth ol
an organism, the establishment ola measure olenergy expenditure, the
pursuitolthe chemical synthesis ola suprarenal hormone, the search lor
lawslorthe conductionolnervousinuxorthecondiuoningolreexwho
could seriously thinL olholding all this in contempt` Yet, on its own, all
thishardlyamountstobiologicalLnowledge,solongasanawarenessolthe
meaningolthe correspondingmnctionsislacLing.Jhe biologicalstudyol
alimentauondoesnot consistsolelyinestablishinga balance sheet, butin
seeLing, within the organism itsell, the sense olthe organism's choice
when hee in its milieuto seeL sustenance in such and such species or
x Intducion
essenceswhile excludingothers that could, theoreucally speaLing, procure
itequivalentenergeticprovisionsloritsmaintenanceandgrowth.Jhebio-
logical study olmovementbeginsonlywhenone taLesintoconsiderauon
the orientauon olthe movement, lor only then can itdistinguish a vital
movementhoma physical movement, tendency hominertia. A a general
rule, analyticallyobtainedLnowledgecaninuencebiologicalthoughtonly
whenitisinlormedbyrelerencetoanorganicexistencegraspedinitstotal-
ity. According to Goldstein, 'what biology in general believes to be the
basis olits bodyolLnowledge, the 'lacts, ' becomesthe mostproblemauc,
loronlytherepresentauonoltotalitypermitsustoattributevaluetoestab-
lishedlacts bydistinguishingthosewhichhavearealrelauontotheorgan-
ism hom those which are insignincant to it. !n his own manner, Claude
8ernardexpressesananalogousidea.
I physiology, that analysis, which teaches us the properties of isolated elemen
tary parts, can never gve us more than a most incomplete ideal synthesis . . . .
We must therefore always proceed experimentally in vital synthesis, because
quite characteristc phenomena may result fom more and more complex union
or association of organized elements. All this proves that these elements, tough
distinct and self-dependent, do not therefore play the part of simple associates;
their union expresses more than additon of their separate properties. s
8utintheseproposiuonswenndthewaveringthatishabitual in8ernard's
thought. ontheonehand,hesensestheinadequacyolanalyucalthoughtto
anybiological object, on the other, he remains lascinated by the presuge
olthe physico-chemical sciences, which he hoped biologywould come to
resemble,believingitwould thusbetter ensure thesuccessolmedicine.
!orourpart,wethinLthatareasonablerauonalismmustLnowtorecog-
nizeitslimits andtoincorporatethecondiuonsolitspracuce.!ntelligence
can apply itsell to lile only il it recognizes the originality ollile. Jhe
thoughtolthelivingmusttaLehomthelivingthe idea oltheliving. Gold-
stein says. 'itis evidentthatnomatterhowmuch thebiologist] employs
theanalycalmethodlorobtainingrealLnowledge,lorrealinsightintothe
depths ol nature the departure hom the 'immediately given' will always
dominate. Vesuspectthat, todomathemaucs,itwouldsumcethatwebe
angels. 8uttodo biology, evenwith theaidolintelligence,we someumes
needto leelliLebeastsourselves.
P A R T ONE
Method
It would be difcult to cite a biological discovery due to pure reasoning.
And most ofen, when experience has fnally shown us how life goes to
work to obtain a certain result, we fnd its way of working is just that of
which we should never have thought.
-HEN R I B E RG S ON, Creative Evolution
ONE
Eperimentation in Animal Biolog
!tis customary, lollowingHenri 8ergson, toueatClaude 8ernard'sIntro
duction to the Study of Experimental Medicine ( I 865) as the equivalentin the
lilesciencestoOescartes'Discourse on Method ( I 63 7) intheabsuactsciences
olmatter.'!tisalsocommoneducationalpracucetousetheIntroduction as
one uses the Discourse-that is, lor purposes olparaphrase, summary, or
verbal commentarywithoutmaLingthe eortto reinsert either oluese
worLs into the history olbiology or mauemaucs and withouttryng to
establish a correlauon between the language ola gentleman scienust ad-
dressingothergentlemen and the pracuce actually lollowed by specialists
researching physiological constants or solving a geomeuical problem. !
these condiuons, theIntroduction seemsto codi[nothing more thanwhat
Gaston 8achelard describes, apropos olthe Discourse, as 'thepoliteness ol
thescienuncspirit. . . theobvioushabitsolamanolgoodlellowship. A
8ergson notes. 'Vhen Claude 8ernard describes this method, when he
gives examples olit, when he recalls what applicauons he has madeolit,
3
4
Method
everythinghesets lorthseemstoussosimpleand naturalthatitwashardly
necessarylorhimtohavesaid it.weleelwehavealwaysLnownit. !nlact,
educational practice almostalways reduces theIntroduction to its nrstpart,
thatis to say, to a sum olgeneraliues (ilnotbanaliues) currentin labora-
toriesthe salons ol the scientinc worldand concerning the physico-
chemcalsciences asmuchasthebiologicalones.YetitisthebooL'ssecond
andthirdpartsthatcontainthecharterolexperimentauoninbiology.Last-
ly,andaboveall,insteadolexpresslychoosingexamplesolproperlyheuris-
tic experimentation, examples oloperauons exactlycontemporaneouswith
the only authenuc Lnowledgewhichistherecuncationolerrorso asto
appreciatethesignincauonand particularscopeol8ernard'smethodologi-
cal discourse, ohenonlyexperimentsoldidacuc scope are cited, and thus
the meaning and value ol the risLy and perilous enterprise olbiological
experimentationisinvoluntarilyyetproloundlyaltered.
Letus giveanexample.!nalessononmuscularcontraction,contracuon
is denned as a modincation olthe lorm olthe musclewithoutvariauonin
volume,whennecessary, thisis established byexperimentauon,lollowinga
techniquewhoseillustrationisreproducedineveryschoolbooL.anisolated
muscle,placedinaj arnlledwithwater,conuactsunderelectricalexcitauon,
butthewaterlevelstaysthe same. neishappyto have established a lact.
Yetitisanepistemologicallactthatanexperimentallactthustaughthasno
biologicalmeaning.Jhisisthis andthat'sthat. nlyilwe uaceitshistory
bacL to the nrst biologist who had the idea lor such an experiment, ]an
Swammerdam ( i6;So), does its meaning become apparent. Swammer-
damwantedto establish, againstthen-exisungtheories concerningmuscu-
lar conuacuon, that in conuacuon the muscle is not augmented by any
substance. At the origin olthose theories, which allpresupposeda ubular
orporoussuucture olthenervethroughwhichsome uid, spirit, orliquid
would reach the muscle, we nnd an experiment that goes bacL to Galen
(i i zoo),anexperimentallactthat,unchangeddowntoourdays,uaverses
centuries olresearch on neuromuscular mncuon. the ligature ola nerve
paralyzes the muscle that itinnervates. Here is an experimental gesture at
once elementary and complete. all else being equal, the determinism ola
conditioningis signaled bythe intenuonally obtainedpresence or absence
oladevice,theapplicauonolthisdevicepresupposes,ontheonehand,the
empirical Lnowledge, quite newin Galen's time, thatthe nerves, the mar-
row, and the encephalon lorm a single conduit, whose cavity (rather than
Experimentation in Animal Biolog 5
itswalls) is the objectolattenuon, and, on the other, a psychological, that
is, metaphysicaltheoryaccordingtowhichtheseatolcommand oltheani-
mal'smovementisinits brain. !tisthe Stoictheoryoluehegemon ikon that
sensiuzes Galen to an observauon any animal sacrincer or surgeon could
maLe and leads him to institute the ligature experiment, hom which he
deriveshis explanationoltonic and clonicconuacuon bythe transportol
pneuma. !nshort,wenndourmodestanddrylab-exerciseexperimentcome
into relielagainst a permanent bacLdrop olbiological signincauon. !t is
here a matter olnothing less thanwhatmight be calledthough this is
undoubtedlyabittooabstract'thelileolrelauon.theproblemsolpos-
ture and locomotion posed by the animal organism's daily lile, whether
peacemlordangerous,whetherconndentormenaced,whetherinitsusual
environmentorinaperturbed one.
Such a simple example sumces to show that experimental operations
whose codincauon (ilnotinvention) too many manuals atuibute to 8er-
nard, in spite olhis explicit amrmauons to the conuary, in lact go bacL
quitelarinthehistoryolhumanculture.
VithoutnecessarilyreturningtoAristotle orGalen,wecan looLtoan
eighteenth-century text (predaung 8ernard's Intoducion by more than a
century) lora denniuon olthe meaning and techmque olexperimentauon.
!tis anexuacthoma medical thesis delendedbyM.!. Oeisch in 1 73 5 at
Halle, 'Oissertauo inauguralis medica de splene canibus exciso et ab his
experimentiscapiendo hucto ('!naugural Oissertauon ontheAblauonol
theOog's Spleenandonthe!ruits btainedhomJhis!xperiment).
It is not surprising that the insatable passion for knowledge, armed with its
blade, has penetated the secrets of nature and has applied a licit violence to
dogs, cheaply procured victms of natural philosophy-a violence that could not
be applied to man without crime-in order to ascertain the exact fncton of the
spleen by examining lesions resultng fom the ablaton of this viscus and thus
whether such and such an author's proposed explanaton is tue and certain. To
insttute such a painfl and even cruel examinaton, one must, I believe, have
been moved by our certtude concerning the fncton of the genitalia of both
sexes, which we know with certainty to play a most necessary role in generaton,
fom the simple fact that owners customarily castate several thousand animals
yearly in order to deprive them of fecundity, if not of amorous desire altogether.
Thus, one hopes to observe just as easily in dogs surviving an ablation of the
spleen some phenomenon that would have been impossible to observe in dogs
with the spleen intact.5
6 Method
Jhisis a loadedtext. !tauthordoesnotngure inthehistoryolbiology,
which suggests thatwithsomewhatgreatererudiuonwe could nnd other
eighteenth-centurytexts olthe same genre. Jhe author clearly atuibutes
to animal vivisecuon the value ola subsutute. He linLs the insutuuon ol
experimentto theverincauonolatheory'sconclusions.Heshowstherole
olanalogyinthisinsutuuon.Crucially,heseesaconunuitybetweenexperi-
mentauonlorpurposesoltheoreucalverincauonandbiologicaltechniques
such as rearingand casuauon.'!inally, hegrounds experimental teaching
ina comparisonbetween the prepared specimen andtheconuolspecimen.
Vhatmorecouldonewant` A a process, the ablationolanenureorgan
doubtlesssuiLesus asrathercrude. 8ut8ernard himselldid not proceed
dierently.Andwhenin 1 889 ]oselvonMeringandsLarMinLowsLi dis-
covered experimental diabetes andbegantheobservauonsthatwouldlead
totheidenuncauon olLangerhans'sislets,theydidsobydepriving a dog
olitswholepancreas,whichtheyconsideredasingleglandwitharolespe-
cinctointesunaldigesuon.
! lact, as 8ernard shows, biolo
_
cal luncuons can onlybe discovered
through experimentauon. nthis point,hisLefons de physiologie experimen
tale applquee i la medecine ( 1 856) islarmore explicitthan theIntoduction.
8ernardtargetsananatomicalprejudicethatgoesbacLaslar asGalen'sDe
usu partium (On the Useflness of the Parts of the Body), accordingtowhichthe
mereinspectionolananatomicaldetailpermitsthecategoricaldeducuonol
its mncuon.Hedemonsuatesthatthisprinciple couldperhaps be applied
to thoseorgansinwhichmanthinLs(reasonablyornot)thatherecognizes
the lorms olinstents hehas labricated (the bladderis a reservoir, the
boneisalever). 8uteveninthelewandgrosslyapproximauvecasesolthis
Lind,itisman'sexperienceoltheseutensils'roleanduseinhumanpracuce
thatlounds the analogical atuibuuon oltheir luncuonto these organs. !
short,anatomo-physiologicaldeducuonalwaysoverliesexperimentauon.!
biology,weshallsay,theissueisnotusingexperimentalconceptsbutexper-
imentallyconsutuungauthenucallybiologicalconcepts. Havingnoted that
apparentlysimilarsuucturesevenona microscopic scaledonotneces-
sarilyhavethe same lunction (e. g. , thepancreas and salivary glands) and
that,conversely, thesamemncuoncanbecarriedoutbyapparentlydier-
ent suuctures (e. g. , contracubility in both smooth and suiated muscular
nber), 8ernard amrms that one does not discover an organ's mncuons by
asLing what it is used lor. nly by lollowing the various moments and
Experimentation in Animal Biolog
7
aspects ola luncuon does one nnd the organ or apparatus responsible lor
it.!t was notby asLing Wat fnction does the liver serve? thatthe glycogenic
mncuon was discovered but by measuring the glucose in blood drawn at
variouspointsinuecirculatoryuxolan animaldeprivedolloodlorsev-
eraldays.
Ve shouldnoteinpassingthatini S68ernardusedsuprarenalcapsules
asanexampleolanorganwhosemicroscopic anatomyisLnownbutwhose
mncuonisnot.Jheexampleis good andmerits attenuon. ! i ; i S,having
putthe quesuon 'lthe \se olRenal Glands on its yearlycompetiuon,
theAcademyol8ordeauxchargedMontesquieuwiththe tasLolreporting
onthethesesitreceived. Hisconclusion.
We see fom all this that the Academy will not have the satisfacton of giving
away its prize this year and that today's occasion is not nearly as ceremonious for
the Academy as it had hoped. Through the experiments and dissectons that it
has had performed, the Academy has come to recognize the difculty of the
problem in all its breadth, and it has leared not to be surprised that its objectve
has not been achieved. Chance will perhaps one day succeed where all the Acad
emy's eforts have failed.9
! exactly i S6, Charles-

douard 8rown-Sequard established experimen-

tally the mncuons olthe suprarenal gland, proceeding hom the thesis in
which, a year earlier, Jhomas Addison described the symptoms, revealed
byclinicalchance, olthe disease thatbearshisname.
|
a
Ve kowthat8rown-Sequard'sworLoninternalsecretions, alongwiu
8ernard's discoveries concerningtheglycogenic mncuon olthe liver, ' ' in-
augurated Lnowledge oltheinnermilieu. !lwe go bacLto the iniual mo-
mentsolthis (todayclassical)nouon,wewillnndan example olaproperly
biologicalconcept, onewhose elaborauonisatonceaneectandacauseol
experimentauon,and,aboveall,onethatnecessitatedaveritabletheoreucal
conversion. 8ernardwrites. 'Ancientsciencewasableto conceiveonlythe
exterior milieu, but to establish the science olexperimental biology, we
must also conceive an inner milieu . . . , the inner milieu, created by an
organism,isspecialto eachlivingbeing.owhereisthetruephysiological
milieu. 'Jhispointisworthemphasizing. So longasscienusts conceived
olorgans' mncuonswithin the organismin the image olorganisms' mnc-
uons in the external milieu, it was natural lor them to borrow the basic
concepts, the guiding ideas olbiological explicauon and experimentauon
8 Method
hom the pragmatic experience ol the human livng being, since it is a
human living being (as living being) who is, at the same ume, a scholar
curious about theoreucal soluuons to the problems lile poses by the very
lactolits exercise.Vhether one isa nnalistoramechanist,whether inter-
ested in the supposed ends olvital phenomena ortheir condiuons olexis-
tence, one does not get out olanthropomorphism. !n a sense, nothing is
more human than a machine, ilit is uue that man disunguishes himsell
homanimalsthroughtheconstrucuonoltoolsandmachines.!inalistsrep-
resent the living body as a republic olarusans, mechanists as a machine
withoutanmachinist.Yet,sincetheconstrucuonolamachineisnotamnc-
tionolthe machineitsell, lor allthatbiological mechanisminvolves a lor-
getung olnnality, it does notthereby radically eliminate it. ' Jhatiswhy,
no matterwhether the biologistassumed a nnalistoramechanistperspec-
tive,theconceptsoriginallyusedtoanalyzethemnctionsolussues,organs,
or apparatuses were unconsciously charged with a properly human prag-
maucandtechnicalimport.
Jo give an example. blood and sap ow liLe water. !lcanalized water
irrigatestheground,bloodandsapmustalsoirrigate.Jhenrsttocompare
the distribuuon oIblood hom the heart to the irrigation ola garden by
canals wasAristotle.'And Galen did notthinLotherwise.8utinirrigauon,
waternnallylosesitsellintheground. thereinliestheprincipalobstacleto
theunderstandingolcirculation.'

VilliamHarveyispraisedlortheexperi-
ment olthe ligature olthe arm's veins, whose turgidity below the point
olconstriction is one olthe experimentalprools olcirculauon. Vell, this
experiment had already been perlormed in i 6o by Hieronymus !abri-
ciusanditisquitepossiblyevenolderthanthat. !abriciusconcludedhom
itthe regulauve role olthevalves olveins butthoughttheyservedto pre-
venttheaccumulauonolbloodinthelowerlimbs. ' VhatHarveyaddedto
earlier observauons was the lollowing, at once simple and crucial. in one
hour, the leh ventricle pumps into the body, through the aorta, blood
weighingthreetimesasmuchasthebodyitsell.Vherecouldallthisblood
comehom`VLeredoesitgo`Andlurthermore.ilonecutsopenanartery,
theorganismwillbleeditselldry.'Jhus, theideaolaclosedcircuitisborn.
'!asLedmysell, Harveysays,'ileveryhingcouldbeexplainedbyacircu-
larmovementoltheblood. ' Jhen, repeaungthe ligature experiment, he
succeededin providinga coherent meaning to allthe observations and ex-
periments.Ve see howthe discoveryolthecirculauonolbloodisnrst, and
Eermentation in Animal Biolog 9
perhapsessenually,thesubsutuuonoloneconcept,lashionedsoastomaLe
precise observauons olthe organism atvarious points and moments 'co-
here, loranotherconcept,thatolirrigauon,directlyimportedintobiology
homthe domainolhumantechnique.Jherealityolthebiologicalconcept
ol circulauon presupposes abandoning the convenience ol the technical
conceptolirrigauon.
!orourpart,wethinL,liLe 8ernard, thatLnowledgeolthemncuons ol
lilehasalwaysbeenexperimentalevenwhenitwaslancimlandanthropo-
morphic. ' !orus,thereexistsabasicLinshipbetweenthenouonsolexperi-
ment [experience] and mncuon.Velearn our hcuons over the course ol
experiences and our mncuons then become lormalized experiences. And
experienceisnrstand loremostthegeneralmnction oleverylivingbeing,
thatis,its debate (Aueinandersetzung, saysGoldstein)withitsmilieu.Man
nrstexperiencesandexperimentswithbiologicalacuvityinhisrelauons ol
technicaladaptauontothemilieu. Suchtechniqueisheteropoeuc,adjusted
to the outside, andittaLes homthe outsideits means, orthe means toits
means.8iologicalexperimentauon,proceedinghomtechnique, isthusnrst
olall guided byconcepts thatareinstrumentalandliterallylactiuous.nly
aher a long series olobstacles surmounted and errors acLnowledged did
mancometosuspectandrecognizetheautopoeuccharacter olorganicac-
tivity and to recu[ progressively, in contact with biologcal phenomena,
theguidingconceptsolexperimentauon.Moreprecisely,becauseitishet-
eropoeuc,humantechniquepresupposesaminima logiclortherepresen-
tauonoltheexteriorreal,whichhumantechniquemodines,determinesthe
discursive, reasoned lacetolthe arusan's acuvity, and all the more so the
engineer's. Yet we must abandon this logic olhuman acuon ilwe are to
understandlivingmncuons.Charlesicollehasvigorouslyemphasizedthe
apparently alogical, absurd character olthe processes ollileabsurd only
inrelauon to a norm thatin lactitis absurd to applyto lile. !tis in the
samesense thatGoldsteindennesbiologicalLnowledgeas
a creatve actvity, a movement essentally akin to the actvity through which the
organism interacts with the ambient world in such a way as to be able to realize
itself, that is to say to exist. Biological knowledge reproduces in a conscious
fashion the movement of the living organism. The cognitve movement of the
biologist is exposed to difcultes analogous to those that the organism encoun
ters in its learning, that is to say, in its attempts to adjust itself to the outside
world. 21
1 0 Method
owwhat8ernard wanted to teach (accordingto 8ergson)wasthe biolo-
gist'sobligauontoprogressivelylormbetteryet,toprogressivelyripen
biologicalconceptsthroughasortolmimeusm.
He perceived, he measured the diference between man's logic and the logic of
nature. If, according to him, we can never bring too much prudence to bear upon
the verifcation of a hypothesis, we shall never have exercised sufcient audacity
in inventing it. What is absurd in our eyes is not necessarily so in the eyes of
nature: let us ty the experiment and if the hypothesis is verifed it will of neces
sity become clearer and more intelligible the more the facts constrain us to
become familiar with it. But let us also remember that an idea, no matter how
fexible we may have made it, will never have the same fexibility as a thing.22
!undamentally,theinterestoltheIntroduction inastudyolexperimental
proceduresinbiologyliesmoreintheresuicuons8ernardplacesongeneral
considerauonsconcerningthepostulatesandtechniquesolexperimentauon
than in these considerauons themselves. Jhat is why, lor us, the second
chapter olthe second part counts lor much more than the nrst. n this
point,moreover,8ernardhasaprecursorinAuguste Comte. !nthelorueth
lesson olthe Cours de philosophie positive (Course on Positive Philosophy), enu-
tled'Considerauonson8iological Science asaVLole, weread.
A experiment is always aimed at discovering on the basis of what laws each of
the determining infuences or modifcatons of a phenomenon partcipates in the
realizaton of a phenomenon, and it consists, in general, in intoducing a well
defned change to each conditon in order to directly assess the corresponding
variaton in the phenomenon itself. The entre ratonality of such an artfce and
its incontestable success depend on two fundamental conditons: (I) that the
change introduced be flly compatble with the existence of the phenomenon
studied-without which any response would be purely negatve; (2) that the two
cases being compared difer in only one regard, for otherwise the interpretaton,
though direct, would be essentally equivocal. 23
Comte adds. 'Jhenature olbiological phenomenapreventsanyadequate
realizauonolthetwocondiuonsandespeciallythesecond. YetilComte,
belore8ernardandpresumablyundertheinuenceolXavier8ichat'sideas
in his Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort ol 1 800,24 amrms that
biologicalexperimentauoncannotlimititsellto copyingtheprinciplesand
pracuces olexperimentauon in physics or chemisuy, it is surely 8ernard
who teaches (above all byexample) that the biologistmustinventhis own
Experimentation in Animal Biolog I I
experimentaltechnique.Jhedimculty,ilnottheobstacle,liesinapproach-
ingthroughanalysisa beingthatisneitherapartorsegmentnorasum ol
parts orsegments, a beingthatonlylives bylivingas one, thatis to say, as
awhole.
Physiologists and physicians must never forget that a living being is an organism
with its own individuality. We really must lear, then, that if we break up a living
organism by isolatng its diferent parts, it is only for the sake of ease in experi
mental analysis and by no means in order to conceive them separately. Indeed
when we wish to ascribe to a physiological quality its value and tue signifcance,
we must always refer it to this whole and draw our fnal conclusion only in rela
tion to its efects in the whole. 25
ReturningnowindetailtothedimculuesraisedbyComteand8ernard,
letusexaminewiththehelpolsomeexamplestheoriginalmethodological
precauuons uatnrstthespecincityollivinglorms, secondthediversityol
individuals,thirdthetotalityoltheorganism,andnnallytheirreversibility
olvital phenomenamustelicitinthebiologist'sexperimentalapproach.
I . Specicit. Conuaryto8ergson,whothinLsweshouldlearnhom8er-
nard 'thatthereis no dierencebetweenan observationwell-taLen and a
well-loundedgeneralizauon,itmustbesaidthat,inbiology, thespecincity
olan object olobservauon orexperimentlimits unpredictablyanylogical
generalizauon.VeLnowthatnothingisasimportantlorabiologistashis
choice olmaterial to sudy. He chooses to operate on such and such an
animal according to the convenience olmaLing a certain anatomical or
physiologicalobservation, dueeithertotheplacementorthedimensionsol
anorgan,ortotheslowdevelopmentolaphenomenon,orperhapsinstead
totheaccelerauonolacycle. !nlact,thechoiceisnotalwaysdeliberateand
premeditated, chance, liLe ume,courtsthebiologist. !anycase,itwould
ohenbebothprudentandhonestto addtotheutleolachapterolphysiol-
ogythatitconcernsthephysiologyolacertainanimal, sothatthe laws ol
phenomena,whichalmostalways bearthenameolthepersonwholormu-
latedthem,would alsobearthename olthe animalusedlortheexperiment.
the doglorconditioned reexes, thepigeonlorequilibrauon,thehydralor
regenerauon,the ratlorvitaminsandmaternalcomporuent,the hogthat
']ob olbiology) lorreexes, the sea urchinlorthe lertilizauon and seg-
mentauonoltheegg,thedrosophilalorheredity,thehorselorthecircula-
uonolblood. '
1 2 Method
Vhatis important here isthatnoexperimentallyacquiredlactwhether
it deals with structures, lunctions, or comporuents) can be generalized
eitherhomonevarietytoanotherwithinasingle species, orhomonespe-
ciestoanother,orhomanimaltomanwithoutexpressreservauons.
From one variet to another. Vhenstudyingthe condiuons underwhich
specinc chemical substances penetrate a living cell, lor example, one can
observe that bodies solubleinlipidspenetrate the cell easily under certain
conditions. Jhus, caeine is inacuve on the suiated muscle olthe green
hog when the muscle is intact, but ilone lesions the muscular ussue an
intenseahnityisobserved.Yetwhatistruelorthegreenhogisnotlorthe
redhog. inredhogs, caeineactsimmediatelyontheintactmuscle.
From one species to another. ManytextbooLs,lor example, sullcite !g-
er's laws on the progressive extension olreexes unilaterality, symmetry,
irradiation, generalizauon). Still, as ViLtor von VeizscLer and Charles
SherringtonremarLed, the materialol!ger's experiments didnotallow
himtolormulate generallaws olreex.Morespecincally,!ger'ssecond
lav onsymmetry),verinedonanimalswiu ahoppinggaitliLetherabbit,
is lalse in the case olthe dog, the cat, and, in general, all animalswitha
diagonalgait.'Jhemndamentallactorincoordinauonistheanimal'smode
ol locomouon.!rradiationisidenticalinanimalswhosemodeollocomouon
isidentical,butitdiersinthosethathave dierentlocomouon. !nthis
regard, the catdiers homtherabbitbutresemblesthenewt.
From animal to man. JaLe,lorexample,thephenomenonoltherepairol
bonehactures.Ahacturerepairsitsellthroughthelormauonolacallus.!
the lormation ola callus, one uadiuonally disunguishes three stages. the
conjunctive callus i. e. , the organizauon ol the interhagmentary hema-
toma), the carulaginous callus, andtheosseouscallusi. e. , theuanslorma-
tion olcarulaginous cells into osteoblasticones). Ren Leriche andAlbert
!olicard have shown that in the normal development ol a human callus
thereisno carulaginous stage. Jhisstagehad been observedindogsthat
isto say, animalsthatcanneverbe completelyimmobilizedlortherapeuuc
reasons.'
2. Individualization. Vithina givenlivingspecies,theprincipalmethod-
ological dihculty concerns nnding individual representauves capable ol
sustainingtestsoladdiuon,subuacuon,ormeasuredvariauonolaphenom-
enon'ssupposedcomponents,testsinsututedinordertocompareaninten-
uonallymodined organism to a conuol organism, thatis, anorganismleh
Experimentation in Animal Biolog I 3
to its spontaneous biological late. !veryexperimenton the anu-inlecuous
emcacy olvaccines, lor example, proceeds by inoculaung two groups ol
animalswithmicrobe cultures. Jhesetwogroupsareinterchangeableinall
aspectsbutone.onegrouphasbeenpreparedwithvaccinalinjections,while
theotherhas not. ow, rigorouslyspeaLing, the conclusions olacompari-
sonthusinsututedhavenovalueunlessonecanrightlyconsidertheorgan-
isms compared to be the equivalent olwhat physics and chemisuy call
'closedsystems, thatis,conjunctionsolphysicallorcesorchemicalspecies
dulyenumerated and measured. 8uthowcould one becertainin advance
that two individual organisms are idenucal in all aspects when, although
they belong to the same species, each has a unique combinauonolheredi-
tarycharacterisucsowingto the conditionsoltheirbirthsexuality, lerul-
ization,amphimixis)Viththeexcepuonolcasesolagamousreproducuon
plant cutungs), auto-lecundauon, identical twins, or polyembryony e.g. ,
inthearmadillo),itisnecessaryto operateonorganismswhoselineages are
pureinallrespectscompletelyhomozygous organisms. Suchacase,ilnot
purely theoreucal, is at least suictly aruncial. Such animal material is a
human labricauon, the result ola constantlyvigilant segregauon. !n lact,
some scienuncorganizauons raise speciesinOavidStarr]ordan'ssenseol
theterm)olratsandmice obtainedbyalongseriesolcouplings olconsan-
guine organisms. Consequently, the study ol such biological material,
whoseelementsareagiven,isliterallythestudyolanarqact. ' Andjustas
inphysicsas!ierreOuhemhas show) theutilizauon,seeminglyingenu-
ous, olan insuument such as a magni[ing glass implies adherence to a
certain theory, so in biology the use ola white rat raised by the Vistar
!nsutute implies adherenceto geneucs andMendelismwhicheventoday
aresullbuttheories.
3 . Jctaliq. !venilwe assume that the identity olorganisms has been
attained, a mrther problem is posed. !s itpossible to analyzewhat deter-
minesaphenomenonbyisolaungit,gventhatweareoperaungonawhole,
which, assuch, is altered byanyattempted removal !tis notcertainthat,
aherthe ablauon olan organovary, stomach,Lidney), an organismissull
the same organism minus one organ. n the contrary, there is reason to
believethatwearedealingwithaverydierentorganism,whichwecannot
easily 'superimpose, evenpartly, onto the conuol organism. Jhe reason
is that, onthe one hand,withina single organism oneandthe sameorgan
is almostalwayspolyvalentand thus the ablauon olthe stomach aects
I4 Method
notonlydigesuonbutalsohematopoiesis.ntheother,allphenomenaare
integrated. Jo give an example olnervous integrauon, cutung the spinal
cord ola dogorcatbeneaththe nhhcervicalsegment induces a state ol
shocLcharacterizedbytheeradicauon olreexesintheregionsbelowthe
incision,lollowedbyaperiodduringwhichautomausmisrecuperated. 8ut
asvonVeizscLerhasshown,thisrecuperationisnotare-establishing,itis
theconsutuuonolanothertypeolautomausm,thatolthe'spinalanimal.
Jo giveadierentexample,thistimeolendocrinalintegrationandpolyva-
lence,abirdlaysaneggthatgrowsrapidly, coveredbyashell.!henomena
lor mobilizingthemineral, protein, andlipidelementsolthe eggareinte-
gratedintotheovariancycle. Here, oesuonecondiuonsboththemorpho-
logical modincauons olthe genital conduitand the chemical mobilizauon
oltheegg'scomponentsaugmentauonolalbuminproducuonbytheliver,
neolormation olthe medullary bone in the long bones). A soon as the
acuon oloesuone ceases, the neolormed bone is reabsorbed, and the cal-
ciumusedbytheoviduct'sshell-lormingglandis released.Jhus,theabla-
uon oltheovariesin a bird has animpactnotonlyonthemorphologyol
theorganismbutequallyontheensembleolbiochemicalphenomena.
4. Ireversibilit. !lthetotalityoltheorganismisadimcultyloranalysis,
thentheirreversibilityolbiologicalphenomena, eitherhomtheviewpoint
olthebeing's developmentorhomtheviewpointoltheadultbeing'smnc-
tions, consututes a lurther dimculty lor chronological exuapolauon and
prediction.
veruecourseolitslile,anorganismevolvesirreversiblyinsuchaway
that the majorityolits presumed components areilone considers them
separatelymll olpotenualiues that do notrevealthemselves atall under
normalconditionsolexistence.Jhestudyolthe egg's developmentandol
phenomenaolregenerauonisparucularlyinstructivehere.
Jhe best example olirreversible development is the sequence olthe
stages olindeterminacy, determinauon, and dierenuauon in the sea-ur-
chinegg.
Ouringthestageolindeterminacy, the ablauonola segmentolthe egg
willbecompensated.Attheendoldevelopment,inspiteolthisamputauon,
the organismwill be complete. Ve can consider the part to be endowed
withthesamepoweroldevelopmentasthewhole.
! the lollowing stage, that olthe determinauon olthe embryo's mor-
phologicaldevelopment [ebauche] , the organo-lormauve substances appear
Experimentation in Animal Biolog 1
5
localizedinclearlydelimitedsectors.A theyareno longer toupotent, the
dierent parts olthe embryo are also no longer equivalent. Jhere can be
nocompensauonlortheablauonolasegment.
Morphologicaldierencesappearinthestageoldierenuauon. nthis
subject,letusnote thatexperimentsolthisLind,byrevealinginitial organic
possibiliues that are progressivelyreduced as lile goes on, serve to bridge
the gap between normal consutuuon and the monsuous lorm olcertain
organisms. Jheyallowus to interpretmonstrosityas anarrestin develop-
mentor as a nxauon, which depending on the age olthe embryo) allows
partsoItheembryoto expresspropertiesthattheirordinaryplacementand
connecuonsinthemorphological developmentoltheembryowouldother-
wisehaveprevented.
! the living being, the irreversibiliq oldierentiauon i slollowed by
mnctional irreversibility. 8ernard remarLed thatilno animal is absolutely
comparabletoanotherolthesamespecies,neitherissameanimalcompara-
bletoitsellilexaminedatdierentmomentsinitslile. !lthisnouonhas
todaybecome lamiliarthanLs toworLsonimmunityand anaphylaxis), we
mustalsorecognize thatitencountered dimcultyinbecomingacategorical
imperative olresearchandthatthemndamentaldiscoveriesthatmostcon-
uibutedto givngit credence wereinlactonly possible because itwasun-
Lnown. Jhe discovery ol immunity by Louis !asteur : SSo) and the
discoveryolanaphylaxisbyClaude !oruer andCharles Rchet : oz)were
duetotechnicalmistaLes. !twasbyanoversightthat!asteurinjectedchicL-
enswithanold choleraculture, andloreconomy'ssaLethathetheninocu-
lated the same chicLenswithaheshculture. !oruerandRichetestablished
anaphylaxiswhentheyinjecteddogswithadoseolaglycerinatedexuactol
anemone tentacles not suong enough to be lethal, and then in a second
experimentinjectedthesameanimalswiuanother,muchweaLerdose,re-
sulungintheirdeathwthinalewminutes.Jhelactestablishedby!oruer
and Richet can be termed experimentalwithoutpremeditation to experi-
ment.Anditshouldnotbelorgottenthatthetherapeuucuulizauonolanu-
inlecuous substances has longshown that microscopic beings bacteria or
protozoa)display,intheirrelauonstoanubioucs,variations insensiuvityor
delormauons olmetabolism, in otherwords, phenomena olresistanceand
evendependence. Jhese phenomena someumes, paradoxically, lead to the
germs' inabilityto survive outside the milieu aruncially created to desuoy
them. Jhis is what Charles icolle has in mind when he insists on the
1 6 Method
necessity ol studying inlectious diseaseswhich are biological phenom-
enain their biological sense and not in a mechanistic spirit, when he
writesthat 'the phenomenon changes in our hands and that 'we are ad-
vancingonapaththatisitsellmoving.
! the end, weseehow the irreversibility olbiological phenomena, in
conjuncuonwiththeindividualityolorganisms,limitsthepossibilityolre-
peaungandreconsuucungthedeterminingconditionsolaphenomenon
one olthe characterisuc pracuces ol experimentauon in the sciences ol
matter.
!thasalreadybeensaidthatdimculuesolbiologicalexperimentauonare
notabsoluteobstaclesbutstimulantstoinvenuon.Certainproperlybiolog-
caltechniquesanswertothesedimculues. nthispoint,wemustnotethat
8ernard'sthinkngisnotalwaysverynrm,lorwhileheremsestoletphysi-
ologybeabsorbedbychemistsandphysicistswhenhewritesthat'biology
hasitsspecialproblemanditsdennitepointolview),healsowritesthatit
isonlythecomplexityolthephenomenaollilethatprescribesthespecinc-
ity olexperimental pracuceinbiology. 'ow, the quesuoniswhetherby
speaLing ol a progressive complexity one does not thereby implicitly il
unwillingly) amrmamndamentalidenutyolmethods. nlyina homoge-
neousordercanthecomplexbesaidtobecomplexbycomparisontothe
simple. Yetwhen8ernard amrms uatlile 'creates the condiuonsspecinc
to an organic milieu that isolates itsellmore and more hom the cosmic
milieu, thatthequid proprium olbiologicalscienceconsistsin 'particular,
evoluuonary, physiological condiuons, and that, as a result, 'to analyze
thephenomenaollileitisnecessaryto peneuate livingorganismswiththe
helpolproceduresolvivisecuon, doesn'theadmitthatthespecincityol
the biological object imposes a method enurely dierent hom those ol
physicsandchemistry
Joday, one would have to be quite uninlormed olthe methodological
tendencies ol biologistseven those biologists least inclined to mysu-
cismto believe that anyone canhonestlyboastolhaving discovered, by
physico-chemicalmethods, anythingmorethanthe physico-chemicalcon-
tentolphenomena, whose biological meaningescapes alltechniquesolre-
ducuon.A ]acquesOuclauxsays.
Surely, it must be possible to extend to the cell by some means those notons
that come to us fom the mineral world, but this extension cannot be a mere
Experimentation in Animal Biolog 1
7
repetton, and it must be accompanied by a creatve efort. A we have already
said, the study of the cell is not that of a particular case to which we can apply
more general formulae; on the contary, it is the cell that constitutes the most
general system, in which all variables come into play simultaneously. Our labora
tory chemisty concerns itself only with simple cases with a limited number of
variables. 39
!or a longtimeitwasbelieved thatthemncuon ola living cellularmem-
branecouldbeconsideredto beasumolphysico-chemical lawsthatwould
be its positive equivalent. 8ut the biological problem does not consist in
determiningthepermeabilityolthemembraneonthebasisoltheequilibria
producedonitstwosides.!tconsistsinunderstandingthatthispermeability
isvariable,adapted,selective,sothat,toquoteJheophileCahn'speneuat-
ingremarL, '!biology,evenwhenwewishtoveri[nothingmorethana
physicalprinciple,weareunavoidablyledtostudylawsolthecomporuent
olliving beings, inotherwords, to study, throughthe responses obtained,
the types oladaptauon olorganismsto physical laws, physiological prob-
lemsproperlyspeaLing.
Letus,then,rapidlyindicatetheprinciples olsomeproperly biological
experimentaltechniques.Jhesetechniquesmaybegeneralandindirectas
whenonemodinesthemilieuinwhich anorganismor organ lives and de-
velops by adding orsubuacungsome hypothesized basic component. r
theymaybespecincanddirect,aswhenoneactsonadelimitedterritoryol
anembryoataLnownstageolitsdevelopment.
wing to Alexis Carrel's experiments, techniques olorgan and ussue
transplantation and explantauon have become publiclyLnownwithoutan
accompanying exact understanding oltheir impact. 8y inserung a part ol
the organism inan abnormalplace, either in the same individual orin an-
other one, we modi[its topographical relations in the hope olrevealing
thedierentrolesandresponsibiliuesolinuenceolsectorsandterritories.
8yplacingaussueororganinaspeciallycomposed,conditioned,andmain-
tainedmilieu,whichallowsloritssurvivalasinanorganortissueculture),
one also liberates the tissue or organ hom all the sumulauons and inhibi-
tionsexerted onit,viathenormalinnermilieu,bythecoordinated ensem-
ble ol other ussues and organs that, along with it, comprise the total
organism.
Jhelollowingisan exampleolauthenticallybiological experimentation
and analysis. ! order to dissociate the acuon olovarian and hypophysial
I S Method
hormones on the morphological aspect ollemale genital organs i. e. , to
enumerate and denne, separately and disunctly, the elements ola global
determination), a physiological castrauon ola lemale rodentis perlormed
bytransplanungtheovariesandgraungthemontoamesentery.Jheresult
isthat, astheycirculate,allthe esuogen hormonesuaversetheliver,which
iscapableolrendering theminacuve. !ollowingthis grah,weobservethat
the genital conduits atrophy, as would be the case lollowing a casuauon.
8utthehypophysis,intheabsenceoltheovarianhormonewhichlunctions
as a regulator), steps up its secretion olgonadouophic hormone. ! sum,
theovariesnolongerexistlorthehypophysis,giventhattheirsecretionno
longerreachesit.8utastheyneverthelessdocontinuetoexistandsincethe
hypophysis exists lorthemits secreuon sull reaches themthe excess ol
gonadotrophichormoneleadsthemtohyperuophy.8ymodi[inganexcre-
tioncircuit,weobtaintheruptureolacycleolacuonandreaction, andthe
dissociationbyatrophyandhyperuophyolanormalmorphologicalimage.
aturally,suchexperimentalmethodsstillleaveunresolvedanessenual
problem. towhatextentdoexperimentali. e. , aruncial)techniquesthusin-
stitutedpermitus to concludethatnaturalphenomena areadequatelyrep-
resentedbythe phenomenathusrendered percepubleJhebiologistseeLs
lowledgeolwhatis andolwhathappenstherusesandinterventionsto
which his avidity lor Lnowledge consuains him aside. How can we avoid
thelactthatobservauonwhichisanacuonbecauseitisalwaysplanned
disturbsthephenomenonunderobservauonAnd,moreprecisely,howdo
we conclude the normal hom the experimental' Jhis is why, when
!tienneVolconsiders the mechanism olproducuon olthoselivingbe-
ings paradoxically bothnormal and monstroushuman identical twins
and brings togetherthelessonsolteratologyand experimentalembryology
lortheirmutualelucidauon,hewrites.
It is difcult to accept that accidental factors act with as much precision as experi
mental techniques. If the latter allow us to create ideal conditons for the analysis
of mechanisms and the comprehension of phenomena, it is plausible that nature
ofen "utlizes" indirect methods more ofen than direct ones. Probably te
entire embryo is subject to the teratogenous factor. There is little chance that a
banal accident would do the same work as a delicate operaton.42
Jheexampleolhumanidenticaltwinsallowsusnnallytoposeaproblem
thatno essay on biological experimentauon can ignore today. that olthe
possibilityandpermissibilityoldirectexperimentauononman.
Experimentation in Animal Biolog 1 9
Knowledge,includingandperhapsaboveall)biology,i s oneoltheways
by which humanity seeLs to taLe control ol its desuny and to translorm
its being into a duty. !or this project, man's Lnowledge about man is ol
mndamental importance. Jhe primacy olanthropology is not a lorm ol
anthropomorphism,butacondiuonloranthropogenesis.
!onesense,itisnecessaryto experimentonmaninordertoavoidthe
previously menuoned pitlall olextrapolating hom observauons made on
animalsolsuchandsuchaspecies.8utweLnowwhatethicalnormswhich
one side would callprejudices and the other imprescriptibleimperauves
clashwiththisLind olexperimentation.Jhematterismrthercomplicated
bythe dimcultyindenningthe boundaries olthe conceptolexperimenta-
uon on manin principle, an operation olsuictly theoreucal intentby
disunguishingit hom therapeutic interventions e.g. , lobotomy) and hom
techniques olhygiene or penal prevention e. g. , legal sterilizauon). Jhe
relation olLnowledge to acuon, which is not mndamentallydierenthere
homwhatitis in physics and chemis, issodirectly, sourgently, andso
poignantly aected by the identity olman as both subject olLnowledge
andobjectolacuonthatphilanthropicimpulsescombiningwithhumanist
hesitanciesthe soluuon to the problem presupposes an idea olman, that
istosay, aphilosophy.
Ve recallthat8ernard considerstherapeuucendeavors andsurgicalin-
tervenuonstobelegiumateexperimentauononman. 'Moralsdonotlorbid
maLingexperimentsonone'sneighbororonone'ssell,ineverydaylilemen
do nothing but experiment on one another. Chrisuan morals lorbid only
one thing, doingill to one's neighbor. !t does not seem to us that this
lastcriterion lordisunguishingbetweenlicit and immoralexperimentauon
is as solid as 8ernard thinLs. Jhere are muluple ways oldoingmen good
thatdependsolelyon one's denniuonolthegoodandthelorcewithwhich
onebelievesonesellobligedtoimposeitperhapsevenatthecostolanevil
thatiscontestedassuch. Letusrecall,withsadness,themassiveexamplesol
therecentpast.
!tisessenualtoconservelorthedenniuonolexperimentauonevenon
thehumansubjectitscharacterasaquestionposedwithoutanypremedi-
tatedplantoputtheresponsetoimmediateuse,itsqualityolanintenuonal
and deliberate gesturewithoutthe pressureolcircumstance. Asurgicalin-
tervenuoncan bethe occasion lor and the means olexperimentauon. 8ut
itis not experimentauon per se, lor it does not obey the rules ola cold
2 0 Method
operation on indierent material. A with any therapeuuc gesture per-
lormedbyphysicians, surgical intervenuon corresponds to norms irreduc-
ible to the simple technique olan impersonal study. Jhe medico-surgical
actis notjusta scientinc act, lorthe sicLmanwho entrustshimsellto his
doctor's conscienceevenmore thanto hisscienceis notonlya physio-
logical problem to be resolved. he is above all in a distress homwhich he
seeLs to be rescued. ne might objectthat the disuncuon between an at-
tempt at a pharmacodynamic or surgical treauent lor a given condition
andthecriucalorheuristicstudyolbiologicalcausalconnectionsisaruncial
andimsy.JhisistrueilonetaLestheviewpointolaspectatororpatient.
!t is no longer true il one puts onesellin the position olthe operaung
surgeon. He and he alone Lnows precisely atwhat moment the intention
and meaningolhisintervention change. JheAericansurgeonVaIter!.
Oandy, lor example, inthe course ola surgical intervenuon onthe opuc
chiasm, perlormed a complete dissecuon olthe corpus callosum ola seven-
teen-year-oldgirl.Heobservedthatthedissecuondidnotdisturbthewom-
an'sgenitallile,contrarytowhatisobservedincertainspeciesolmammals,
whereboththeovariancycleandlactauonaresignincantlyperturbed. Jo
saywhether,inthiscase,experimentauonhastaLenplace,itisnecessaryto
Lnowilitwaspossi0leto avoid dissecungthecorpus calosum andwhatone
hadintendedin so doing. nlythe operatingsurgeon, insucha case, can
sayilthe operationhas gonebeyond a strictlysurgicalgesture, thatis, be-
yond the therapeutic intention. !theexample cited, Oandysays nouing
aboutthematter.
Ve Lnowthatthepatient'sconsenttobeingputinthepositionolguinea
pigisordinarilyinvoLedas avalidcriterionlor legiumaung biological ex-
perimentauononman.AlstudentsinbacteriologyLnowthelamousexam-
ple ol George !redericL OicL and his wile Gladys Henry OicL, tesung
consentingsubjectslorstrepthroatorscarletleverbyrubbingtheirthroats
witha streptococci culure taLen hom the pharyor the lallon olscarlet
lever pauents. Ouring Vorld Var !!, in the \nited States, experiments
related to immunitywere pracuced on consenungconscienuous objectors
andprisoners. !lonewere here to observe that, inthe case olmarginalized
individualsseeLingtorehabilitatethemselvesinsomelashion,consentrisLs
no longer being lull, as it is no longer pure, one could respond by ciung
cases where physicians, laboratory researchers, and medical assistants
Experimentation in Animal Biolog 2 I
plainlyawareolan experiment's ends andhazards proceededwithouthesi-
tauonandwithnoothercarethantoconuibutetosolvngtheproblem.
8etween suchlimitcases olapparentlegitimacy and the opposite cases
olmanilest ignomny(wherehuman beings, devalorized bylegislators as
socially inlerior or physiologicallylacLing, are lorcibly utilized as experi-
mental material`) lies the innnite variety olcases where it is dimcult to
decide whether, in the absence ola complete Lnowledge olthe elements
olthe problemwhich the operating surgeon also lacLs, given that he is
experimenung, thatis, runnIngarisLwecansullspeaLolapatient'scon-
senttothesemI-therapeuticandsemi-experimentalactproposedtohim.
!inally, there are caseswhere evaluauonandcriuquecould bedirected
notjustatpauentconsentbutalsoattheinvtauonextendedbyresearchers.
Jhestudyolthenrststagesolthedevelopmentolthehumaneggbenented
homobservationsmadeinthelollowingexperimentalcircumstances. agy-
necologist asLed certain women, on whom he was to operate lor various
uterinecondiuons,tohavesexualrelationsonnxeddates.Sincetheablauon
oltheuterustooLplaceonaLnown date,itwaspossibleto dissectthepart
removedand examine thesuuctureolthelerulized eggs,whoseageswere
thus easytocalculate.
Jhe problemolhumanexperimentauonis nolongera simpleproblem
oltechniquebuta problem olvalue. A soonas biologyconcernsman no
longermerelyasaproblembutasaninsuumentlorresearchintosoluuons
concerning him, it becomes a matter oldeciding whether the benent ol
Lnowledgeissuchthatthesubj ectolLnowledgecouldconsenttobecoming
theobjectolitsowLnowledge.Ve havenodimcultyrecognizingherethe
always-open debate regardingmanasa means oran end, as anobjector a
person.Jhisistosaythathumanbiologydoesnotcontainwiuinitsellthe
answerto quesuonsconcerningits nature andmeaning.
Jhisstudyhasuiedtoinsistonthe originalityolbiologicalmethod, on
thelormalobligauontorespectthespecincityolitsobject,andonthevalue
ola certain sense olbiological nature that is proper to the direcuon ol
experimentaloperations.Someonewhoconsidershimsellmoreintellectual-
ist or more empiricistthan we aremightconsider too great the share we
have granted to uial and error in experimentauon or, on the conuary, to
invenuon.necansaytodaythatbiologyisascienceoldecisiveimportance
lor posing the philosophIcal problem olthe means to Lnowledge and the
2 2 Method
value olthesemeans.Jhisisbecausebiologyhas becomeautonomous,be-
causeittesunestotherecurrenceoltheobjectolLnowledgeintheconsu-
tuuonolLnowledgetargeungthenatureolthisobject, andnnallybecause
initLnowledgeandtechniqueareindissolublylinLed.
!n order better to approach the paradox olbiology, we would liLe to
useanimage. !n]eanGiraudoux'sElectra,49 thebeggar, thevagabondwho
stumbles across squashed hedgehogs onthe road, meditates onthe hedge-
hog'soriginal sinthatdriveshimto crossroads. !lthisquesuonhasphilo-
sophical sense, because it poses the problem oldestiny and death, it has
much lessbiologicalsense. Aroadisaproductolhumantechnology, one
oltheelements olthehumanmilieubutithasnobiologicalvaluelorthe
hedgehog.Hedgehogsassuchdonotcrossroads.theyexplore,intheirown
way, their ownhedgehogmilieu,onthebasisoltheiralimentaryandsexual
impulses. nthe conuary, itisman-maderoadsthatcrossthehedgehog's
mIlieu, his huntIng ground and the theaterolhis loves, justastheycross
the milieus olthe rabbit, the lion, or the dragony. ow, experimental
methodas the etymology olthe word method shows`is also a sort ol
road thatthehumanbiologist traces through theworld olthe hedgehog,
the hog, the huit y, ue paramecium, or the sueptococcus. Jhe use ol
conceptsandintellectual toolslorgedbythatlivIngscienust, thebiologist,
inordertounderstandtheexperienceollilepropertotheorganismisthus
at once both inevItable and aruncial.Ve will not conclude hom this that
experimentauon in biology is useless or impossible. !nstead, Leeping in
mind 8ernard's lormula that'lile is creauon,wewIll saythattheLnowl-
edge ollilemusttaLe place throughunpredictableconversions,asitsuives
to grasp a becoming whose meaning is never so clearly revealed to our
understandingaswhenitdisconcerts it. ` '
P A R T T WO
History
The extension of knowledge must be based upon that already achieved.
Now the limits of knowledge are by no means clearly demarcated. Between
the unknown and the known is no well-surveyed fonter, but rather a
ragged and ill-defned borderland. Before he reaches the frm ground on
which alone foundatons can be safely laid, the man of science must work
backwards for a space until he is behind that disturbed and shifng area.
A we widen the sphere of our scientfc purview, so shall we need-if we
would make our vision clear and fee fom distorton-to penetate ever
farther back in history.
C HA R L E S S I N G E R, A His01Y of Biolog
TWO
Cell Theor
\nul now, the hIstoryolscience in!rance has received more encourage-
mentthan conuibuuons. !ts place and rolewithingeneral culture are not
denIed, buttheyarepoorlydenned.!tsverymeaningisinu. Shouldthe
historyolscience bewrittenas a special chapterin the general hIstory ol
civilizauon` r should one looL lor the expression ol an age's general
spiritits WeltanschaZZng-in its scienunc concepuons` !roblems olatui-
butionandcompetencealsoremainunresolved.!sthishIstorytheprovince
olthe historian, with his competences as exegete, phIlologist, and erudite
(especially lorantiquity) or rather olthe specialized scienust, capable ol
mastering,inhiscapacityasexpert,thescientincproblemwhosehistoryhe
retraces`
Mustoneonesellbecapableolconuibutingtotheprogressolascienunc
quesuon in order to be able to reuace it historically, down to the nrst
clumsyattempts olthose who nrst lormulated it` r is itenough lor the
historianolsciencetobringoutthehistorical,asinouuoded,characterol
26 His01J
suchandsuchaworL, olsuchandsucha concepuonin ordertorevealthe
obsoletenature ola notion despite the persistence ola term` !inally, and
lollowing hom the above, what is the value olthe history olscience lor
science`!lthe uuethegoalolscientincresearchisexempthomhistori-
caltranslormauon,thenisthehistoryolscience anythingmorethanamu-
seumolerrors olhumanreason` ! thatcase,thehistoryolscience would
notbeworthasinglehour'seortlorthescientist,lorthehistoryolscience
wouldbea questionolhistorybutnotolscience. !lonewere to conunue
inthatvein,onecouldgosolar astosaythatthehistoryolscienceismore
ola philosophical curiositythanasumulanttothe scienunc spirit. '
A atutude olthis sort presupposes a dogmatic concepuon olscience
and,ilwemay,adogmaucconcepuonolscientinccritique,aconceptionol
the 'progresses olthe human spirit that belongs to the Aufldrung, the
MarquisdeCondorcet,andAugusteComte.Hoveringoverthisconcepuon
isthemirageola 'denniuvestateolLnowledge,byvrtueolwhichscien-
tincprejudice belongstothejudgments olbygoneeras. Somethingis con-
sidered an error because itis homyesterday. Chronological anteriority is
taLenlor logicalinleriority. Suchanatutude doesnotconceiveprogressas
arelationolvaluesinwhichthedisplacementolvaluesbyotherswouldbe
consutuuveolvalueitsell,instead,itidentinesprogresswiththepossession
olanulumatevaluethatuanscendsthe others,permitungtheirdeprecia-
uon.

mile 8rehier has accuratelyremarLed thatwhathistorythereis in

AugusteComte's Cours de philosophie positive isaninventorylessolscienunc
nouonsthanolprescientincnouons.Accordingto thatconcepuonolsci-
ence,anddespiteitsequauonolthepositivewiththerelauve,theposiuvist
notion olthe historyolscience masLs a latent dogmausm and absoluusm.
!positivism,therecouldbeahistoryolmythsbutnotahistoryolscience.
evertheless, the development olthe sciences beyond the age olthe
positivist philosophyolscience doesnotpermitsuchsereneconndencein
the automaticprogressolthedepreciauonoltheories.Jo citebutone ex-
ample,whichhastaLenonthedimensionsolacrisis,inthe course olwhich
numerousscientincconceptshavehadtobere-elaborated,wecannolonger
say in optics that the theory olwaves has invalidated the theory olemis-
sions, that Huyghens and !resnel have denniuvely convicted ewton ol
error. Jhe synthesis olthese two theoriesinwavemechanicsprohibitsus
homconsidering eitherrepresentationolthephenomenonollighttohave
Cell Theor 2 7
beeneliminatedinlavor oltheother.ow, oncean old theory,longcon-
sidered outdated, gains a new(althoughsomeumesseeminglyparadoxical)
actuality, oneperceives, in rereadingwithamoresympatheticatutude the
authors who proposed it, that they themselves quite ohen experienced a
certainreluctance aboutitsvalueasanexhaustiveexplanationandwereable
to glimpse its eventual correction and compleuon by otherviewsviews
thattheythemselveswere naturallyineptatlormulaung.
!tisthusthatewtondiscovered,intheguiseoltheringsthatnowbear
his name, phenomena oldimacuon and interlerence that the corpuscular
theoryolemission couldnotexplain. Hewasthenledto suspecttheneces-
sityolcompleunghisconceptionollightbyrecoursetoelementsolaperi-
odicnature(thetheoryol'ntsoleasyreecuonandeasytransmission),a
complement that Louis de 8roglie sees as 'a sort olpre-ngurauon oltLe
synthesistoberealizedtwo centuries laterbywavemechanics. Regarding
ewton, !aul Langevin has remarLed that the theory olgravity oers a
suiLing case olthe 'senilization oltheories by dogmauzauo

, lorwhich
the author olthe I 687 Principia is not personally responsible, attentive as
hewas to all the lacts thatthe hypothesis olatuaction ata distance could
notmaLeintelligible. '!tishis discipleswho,inthecontextolthe success
olthe ewtonianattempt,gaveita dogmauc aspectthatwentbeyondthe
thoughtolitsauthorandmadegoingbacLonitmoredimcult. !romthis
and certain otheranalogouslacts,Langevindrawsconclusions clearlyunla-
vorabletothedogmaucspiritoltheteachingolthesciencestoday.!order
topreparenewmindslorscienuncworL,thatis,lorawiderunderstanding
olproblems orlora callinginto quesuon olcertain solutions, areturnto
thesourcesisindispensable.
To combat dogmatsm, it is very instuctve to observe to what degree the
founders of new theories were more and better aware than their successors and
commentators of the weaknesses and insufciencies of their systems. Their reser
vatons are then forgotten, and what was for them a hypothesis becomes dogma,
more and more intangible the further it is fom its origins, and a violent efort
becomes necessary in order to fee oneself fom it when experience comes to
refute the more or less distant consequences of ideas whose provisionary and
precarious character had been forgotten.6
!biology,wewouldliLe to cite,insupportolLangevin'slertileideas,the
caseoltheproblemolspecies. !veryelementarymanualolnaturalhistory
2 8 Hist01Y
orphilosophyolsciencedenounces Linnaeus asthe authoritarianlatherol
the theoryolnedspecies. !mile Guycnot, inhisworLLes sciences de la vie
aux XI et XII si'cles, writesthat'itwasLinneaus'sdogmaticspiritthat
erectedthenotionolthenityolspecies into aprinciple. 'Yetmrtheron,
Guyenotrecognizes that Linnaeus's observauons onhybridizauonledhim
to admit'asortollimitedtranslormism,whosemechanismremainedun-
Lnown to him. Charles Singer, whoinonepassageolhisHistor of Biolog
alsosubscribesto thedogmaolLinnaeus'snistdogmausm,oers ata dil-
lerentmomenta correctionto this nrstinterpretation.8othGuyenotand
SingercontrastLinnaeuswith]ohn Ray, a nuanced and hesitantnist. 8ut
Linneaus himsell made much clearer correcuons to his iniual nism than
did Ray, and he did so in view olbiological phenomena olmuch greater
signincance. Lucien Cuenot, in his L 'Espece (Species), saw this very well,
1 0
andi talsocomesoutwithadmirableclarityi nthebooLCarl Linne (Carolus
Linneaus), by !nut Hagberg. ' ' Linnaeus's meditauon on monsuous and
'abnormalvarietiesintheanimalandvegetableLingdomledhimtoaban-
don completelyhis nrst concepuon olspecies. According to Hagberg, we
mustconcedethatLinnaeus, thealleged champion olnism, 'is oneolthe
naturalistswhodoubtthevalidityolthatthesis. Linnaeusnevercompletely
abandonedthe ideathatcertainnaturalorderswerecreatedbyGod, buthe
recognizedtheexistence olspecies andevengenerathatwere 'childrenol
time, ' andheendedupsuppressinginthelast,conunuallyreworLededi-
tionsolhisSystema Naturae (System of Nature) theassertionthatnewspecies
are never produced. Linnaeus never came to a clear nouon olspecies.
Verehissuccessors,whodidnothavetoovercomeashedidtheobsta-
cle oltheirownpointoldeparture,anymoresuccessmlJhenwhywould
the historian olscience presentLinnaeus as responsible lora docuinal ri-
gidity lor which pedagogy, rather than the consutuuon olthe theory, is
responsible` 1innaeus's worL doubtless allowed one to derive nism, but,
on the basis of the entire oeuvre, one could also have taken something dirent. Jhe
lecundityolascientincworLstemshomthelactthatitdoesnotimposethe
methodologicalordoctrinalchoicetowardwhichittends. nehasto looL
lorthereasonsbehindthischoiceelsewherethani theworLitsell.!tseems
tousthatthebenentolahistoryolscienceproperlyunderstoodistoreveal
thehistoryinsciencebywhichwemeanthesenseolpossibility. Jo Lnow
is not so much to run up against the real as to validate the possible by
Cell Theor 2 9
renderingitnecessary. !rom then on, the genesis olthepossibleis as im-
portantasthedemonsuationolthenecessary.Jhehagilityolonedoesnot
depriveitoladignitythattheothergainsbyitsstability. Jheillusioncould
havebeenatruth.Jhetruthwillperhapsrevealitsellonedaytobeillusion.
! !rance, in parallel with the exuncuon oleclecuc spiritualism's last
adherentsattheendolthenineteenthcentury, thinLerssuchas!mile8ou-
troux, Henri !oincare, Henri 8ergson, and the lounders olthe Revue de
miaphysique et de morale undertooL,withgoodreason, to bringphilosophy
andthesciencesclosertogether.8utitisnotenoughtogivephilosophythe
appearance olseriousness bydoingawaywith itsverbal and dialectical (in
thebadsenseolthe term) juggling.!twould be huitml lor scienceto gain,
homitscommercewithphilosophy,acertainLindolheedom,whichwould
preventithomsuperstiuouslyueaungLnowledgeas along-soughtrevela-
uon and uuth as positive dogma. !tis thus prontable to looLlor the ele-
ments ola concepuon olscience and even ola method olculture in the
history ol science, understood as the psychology ol the progression by
which nouons have attained their current content, as the articulauon ol
logical genealogies andto use an expression ol Gaston 8achelardas a
censusol'epistemologicalobstaclesovercome.
Ve havechosen, as a nrstattempt olthisorder, the case olcell theory
inbiology.
Cell theoryisvery well suited to induce the philosophical spirit to linger
overthe characterolthe science olbiology. !sitrauonal orexperimental
!tis the eyes olreason that see lightwaves, butitcertainlyseems thatitis
thebodilyeyes, thesenseorgans, thatidenu[cellsina plantcutung. Cell
theory could thus be considered a collecuon olprotocols olobservauon.
Jhe eyearmedwiththe microscope sees macroscopiclile as composed ol
cells,justasthenaLedeyeseesmacroscopiclileasmaLingupthebiosphere.
Andyetthemicroscopeisanextension olintelligenceratherthanolsight.
!urthermore,celltheoryisnotthe amrmauonthatbeingsarecomposed ol
cells, but, nrst, thatthe cell isthesole componentolall livingbeings and,
second,thateverycellcomeshomapre-existingcell.ow,whatauthorizes
us to saythis is notthe microscope. Jhe microscope is atmostone olthe
means lorveri[ingitaherithas been said. 8utwheredidtheidea tosayit
come hom, belore it had beenverined !t is here that the history olthe
3
0 Hisor
lormauon olthe conceptcell has its importance. Jhe tasLis greatlylacili-
tatedbyMarc!lein'sworLHistoire des origines de la theorie cellulaire. 14
A regards the cell, toomuchcreditisgenerallygiventoRobertHooLe.
Jre, hediscoveredthething, abitbychanceandabitbyaplaylcurios-
ity, amused bythe microscope'snrst revelauons. Havng made a nne slice
inapieceolcorL,HooLeobservedits paruuoned suucture.is !twasalsohe
who, under the inuence olan image, invented the word cel, comparing
the plant object to ahoneycombtheworLolan animalandthehoney-
combto ahumancreationa cellisa smallroom. Sull,HooLe'sdiscovery
did not iniuate anyingitwas not a pointoldeparture.Jhe word itsell
waslostandwouldbeloundonlyacenturylater.
Jhediscoveryolthethingandtheinvenuonolthewordcalllorseveral
reecuons.Viththecell,wehavebeloreusabiologicalobjectolconsider-
able and incontestable aecuve overdeterminauon. Jhe psychoanalysis ol
Lnowledgenowcounts enoughlelicitoussuccessestomeritthedignityola
genretowhichonecancontribute,evenwithoutsystemaucintent.'!very-
one can nnd among his memories olnatural history lessons ue image ol
thecellularsuuctureollivingbeings.Jhisimagehas aquasi-canonicalcon-
stancy. Jhe schemauc representauon olthe epithelium is the image ola
honeycomb.Jhewordcell maLesusthinLnotolamonLoraprisonerbut
olabee. !rnstHaecLel observedthatwaxcellsnlledwithhoneycorrespond
completely to plant cells nlled with cellular uid.is However, we do not
thinLthatueinuence olthenouon 'cell on the mind stems hom the
integralityolthiscorrespondence. !nstead,whokowsilthehumanmind,
consciouslyborrowingthetermcell homthebeehiveinordertodesignate
the element olthe living organism, did not also borrow, almost uncon-
sciously,thenouonoltheco-operauveworLthatproducesthehoneycomb
]ust as a honeycomb cell is an element olan edince, bees are, inMaurice
MaeterlincL'sexpression,individualsenurelyabsorbedbytherepublic. ' !n
lact, 'cellisanouonatonce anatomicaland mnctional,itisthenotion ol
anelementarymaterialandanindividual,parual,andsubordinatedworL.!t
is certainthataecuve and socialvalues olco-operation loom, nearorlar,
overthedevelopmentolcelltheory.
!n 1 67 1 , several years aher HooLe, Marcello Malpighi and ehemiah
Grew simultaneously and separately published worLs on the microscopic
anatomyolplants.VithoutrelerencetoHooLe,theyrediscoveredthesame
thing, butused a dierentword. !ach olthem observed thatin the living
Cell Theor
3 I
beingthereexistwhatwenowcallcells, butneither claimed thattheliving
being is nothing but cells. According to !lein, Grew was much more a
parusan olthe theory according to which cells are secondary lormations,
appearing in an iniual living uid. Let us taLe this occasion to pose a
problem lor which the history ola biological theory is oluue scientinc
interest.
A longasbiologyhasbeeninterestedinthemorphologicalconsutuuon
ollivingbodies, thehumanmindhas oscillated between the lollowingtwo
representauons. either a mndamental, plastic, conunuous substance, or a
composiuon olparts, organized atoms, orseeds ollile. Here, asin optics,
the two intellectual exigencies olconunuity and disconunuity come up
againstoneanother.
! biology, the termprotoplasm nowdesignates a componentolthe cell,
whichisconsideredanatomicelementoltheorganism'scomposiuon. !ty-
mologically, however, thewordrelersusbacLtotheconcepuonolaprimal
lormative liquid. Jhe botanistHugovonMohl, oneolthe nrstauthorsto
observewithprecisionthebirtholcellsbythedivisionolpre-existingcells,
proposedthe termprotoplasm in :Sq torelerto thephysiologicalmncuon
ola uid thatprecedes the nrstsolid productionswherever cells areborn.
Jhisisexactlywhat!elixOujardinhadnamedsarcode in : S , meaningby
this a livingjelly later capable olsell-organizauon. \p to and including
JheodorSchwann(consideredthelounderolcelltheory),thetwotheoreti-
calimages are combined.Jhere exists, accordingto Schwann, a substance
withoutsuucture, the cytoblastema, in which are born the nuclei around
which cellslorm. Schwannsays thatcells lorminside a tissue atthe points
wherethenuuientliquidpeneuatestheussue.Jheobservauonoltheoreti-
calambivalenceintheveryauthorswhodidthemosttolaytheloundauons
olcelltheorysuggeststo!leinthelollowng,olcapitalimportancelorour
study. 'ne thus nnds a small number olmndamental ideas persistently
reemergingamongauthors worLingonthe most varied objectsandplacing
themselves atvery dierent points olview. Jhese authors have certainly
nottaLen these ideashomeach other, these mndamental hypothesesseem
to representconstantmodesolthoughtthatarepartolexplanauoninthe
sciences. ' !lweuansposethis epistemologicalobservationontotheplane
olthe philosophyolLnowledge, we mustsay, againstthe empiricistcom-
monplaceohenuncriticallyadopted byscienustswhentheyarriveataphi-
losophy ol their experimental Lnowledge, that theories never proceed fom
3
2 Hisor
facts. Jheories only proceed hom previous theories, ohen very old ones.
!actsareonlytheroute(rarelydirect) bywhichtheoriesproceedhomone
toanother. Such a nliauonoltheories homtheories alonewasbroughtto
lightverywellbyComtewhenheremarLedthat,sincealactolobserauon
presupposesanideathatorientsthe attenuon, itislogicallyinevitablethat
lalse theories precedetrue ones. 8utwehave already statedwhytheCom-
uanconcepuonseemsuntenabletous. itisitsidenuncauonolchronologi-
cal anterioritywith logical inleriority, an idenuncauon that leads Comte
(under the inuence olan empiricism tempered by mathemaucal deduc-
uon)tosanctionthetheoreucalvaluehencelorthdenniuveinhiseyesol
thelogicalmonsuositythatisthe 'general lact.
Jo summarize. wemust seeL the authenuc origins olcell theory else-
where than in the discovery olcertain microscopic suuctures ol living
beings.
i ;o;is a memorable date in thehistoryolbiology. !tis theyearwhen
two great naturalists who dominated the eighteenth century were born.
CarolusLinnaeusandtheComtede8uon.! i ;oS, theirequalwasborn.
AlbrechtvonHaller.!theirdierentways,theywereallpreoccupiedwith
the unity olthe diverse manilestauons ollile. Jhe idea olan elementary
compositionollivingbeingswaslamiliartoallolthem. 8utwithLinnaeus,
itisamatterolanintuitive,almostpoeucview,whichhelormulatedrather
incidentallyinthe i ;q; Vistgif Resa (Vyages to Westrogothia):
When plants and animals rot, they become humus, the humus then becomes the
alimentaton of the plants which are planted and rooted in it. I this way, the
most powerful oak and the most lowly nettle are made of the same elements, that
is to say, partcles fner than humus, which by nature or by a philosopher's stone
the Creator has placed in each seed in order to change and tansform the humus
according to the species proper to the plant.22
JhisiswhatLinnaeushimsellwilllatercallametempschosis corporum. Mat-
terremains andthelormislost. Accordingtothiscosmicvision, lile is in
the lormandnotinthe elementarymatter. Linneaus didnotlormanidea
olalivingelementcommontoalllivingbeings.Rather,hewasasystemau-
cian,looLinglortheunityolthesystemolthecomposiuonolspeciesrather
thanlortheplasticelementoltheindividual'scomposiuon.
ntheotherhand,Hallerand8uon,inordertorespondtospeculative
demands(ratherthantomicroscopicanatomicaldata),lormulatedattempts
Cell Theo'y 3 3
to reduce living beings to a living unity thatwould beaprinciple in biol-
ogyaprincipleinthesensebothol'primordialexistenceand'reasonol
intelligibility.
Haller sees nber as the living elementolorganisms' composiuon. Jhis
nbrillartheory, based above all on the examination olnerves, muscles and
tendons, and sohconnecuve tissuewouldpersist, invarious lorms and lor
muluple biologists, unul the mid-nineteenth century. Jhe explicitly sys-
temauc character olHaller's concepuon is already obvious hom the nrst
pages olthe Elementa Physiologiae ol 1 757: '!iber is lor the physiologist
whatthelineislor the geometer. A Hallerconceivedit, theelementin
physiology presents the same ambiguity oloriginwhether empirical or
rauonalthattheelementingeomeuyasconceivedby!ucliddoes. !nan-
otherworLhom the same period, Haller writes. 'Jhe smallest nber, the
simple nber that we perceive through reason rather than through the senses, is
composed olterrestrial molecules attached lengthwise and linLed to one
anotherbygluten.
!theworLol8uon (who, as!leinemphasizes, madelittleuse olthe
microscope) we nnd a theoryolthe composition olliving beings thatis,
suictly speaLing, a systemin thesensethatthe eighteenth century gave
to this term. 8uon posits principles in order to explain certain lacts as
consequences olthese principles. Jhese are, essentially, lacts olreproduc-
tion and heredity. 8uon presents the theory ol'organic molecules in
Histoire des animaux (1 748), where he writes. 'Jhe animals and plants that
canmuluplyandreproducethemselvesbyalltheirpartsareorganizedbod-
iescomposedolothersimilar organicbodies,theaccumulated quanutyol
whichwediscernwiththenaLedeye,buttheprimarypartsolwhichwecan
onlyperceive byreasoning. Jhis leads8uonto argue thatthereexists
aninnnitequanutyollivingorganicparts,whichareolthesame substance
as organized beings. Jhese organic parts, common to animals and plants,
are primaryand unalterable, such that the generauon and desuucuon ol
organizedbeingsisnothingotherthanthe conjuncuon anddisjuncuonol
theseelementarylivingbeings.
According to 8uon, this supposiuon is theonlyonethatallowsus to
avoidthedimculuesencounteredbythetworivaltheoriesolphenomenaol
reproductionproposedbelorehim.ovismandanimalculism. !boththese
theories,heredityisunilateral.However,theydierinthatthenrstaccepts,
34
Hisor
lollowing Regnier de Graal, a maternal heredity, whereas the second ac-
cepts,lollowingAntonievanLeeuwenhoeL,apaternalheredity.8uon,at-
tentive to phenomena olhybridizauon, could conceive onlyola bilateral
heredity.'!tis the lacts thatimpose this concepuon. a child canresemble
bothitslatheranditsmother. 'Jhelormationoltheletusisaccomplished
by the coming togetherolorganicmolecules contained in the mixture ol
theseminaluidolthetwo individuals. Ve Lnow,homthetesumonyol
8uonhimsell,thattheinitialidealorhistheorycamehom!ierreLouis
MoreaudeMaupertuis,whose Venus physique (The Earhl Vnus, 1 745) is a
criucal account oltheories concerning the origin olanimals.Jo explain
theproducuonolaccidentalvariauons,thelineolsuccessionolthesevaria-
uons hom one generauon to another, and, nnally, the establishment or
desuction olspecies, Maupertuis came to 'regard, as lacts thatit seems
experiencelorcesustoaccept, thelollowing.thattheseminaluidoleach
animal species contains a multitude olparts capable ollorming, by their
assemblages, animals olthe same species, thatin the seminal uid oleach
individual,thepartscapableollormingtraitssimilartothoseoltheindivid-
ualare thoseparts greatestinnumberandwiththemostamnity,thateach
partolthe animalsuppliesits seeds,such thatthe animal's semen contains
a condensedversionoltheanimal.
Jheuse olthe termafnit byMaupertuis isworthyolnote.A a con-
cept,itappearstodayto benomorethananemptyword.!theeighteenth
century, it was an authenucally scientinc concept, charged with all the
weight ol ewtonian mechanics. ne must realize that behind amnity
stands atuacuon. ! 8uon's thinLing, thejurisdicuon olewtonian me-
chanics overthedomainolliving organizauonisevenmoreexplicit.
It is obvious that impulsion and the other laws of ordinary mechanics can explain
neither the circulaton of blood, the movement of muscles, nor the animal fnc
tons; it is just as obvious that nutriton, development, and reproduction take
place by other laws. If so, then why not admit forces which penetate and act on
the masses of bodies, especially since we have examples of such laws in the gravity
of bodies, magnetic attractions, and chemical afnites?3 1
Jhis aggregauonolorganicmolecules by atuacuon obeys a sortollawol
morphologicalconstancy,thisiswhat8uoncallsthe'innermold. Vith-
outthehypothesisoltheinnermoldaddedtothatolorganicmolecules,the
nuuition, development, and reproduction ol the living are unintelligible.
Cell Them
) 3
5
The body of an animal is a kind of inner mold in which the matter used for its
growth is modeled and assimilated to the whole . . . . It thus seems to us certain
that the body of the animal or plant is an inner mold, which has a constant form
but whose mass and volume can increase proportonally, and that the growth or,
if one prefers, the development of the animal or plant is only efected by the
extension of this mold in all its exterior and interior dimensions; this extension
is done through the intussuscepton of an accessory and foreign matter, which
penetates into the interior and becomes similar to the form of the mold and
identcal with its matter.32
Jhe inner mold is a logical intermediarybetween theAistotelian lormal
cause and the 'guiding idea olwhich 8ernard speaLs. !t answers to the
same exigencyolbiological thought, that olexplaining the morphological
individualityolthe organism.8uonisconvincedthathe doesnotlallinto
metaphysicsinproposingsuchahypothesis,heisevensurethatitdoesnot
come into conictwith the mechanistic explanation ollile, on condiuon
thatoneacceptsboththeprinciplesolewtonianmechanicsandtheprin-
ciples olCartesian mechanics. '!myexplanationoldevelopmentandre-
producuon, ! agreed nrst with the accepted mechanical principles, and
secondwith theprincipleolthepeneuaunglorce olgravity,whichoneis
obliged to accept, and by analogy, ! thought! was able to say that there
weresullotherpeneuaunglorcesthatactintheorganizedbody, asexperi-
ence assures us is the case. Jhese last words are remarLable. 8uon
thinLshehas proven,bythelactsandbygeneralizinghomexperience,that
there existsaninnnite numberolorganicparts.
!lact, what8uonatuibutesto experienceisactuallya certainwayol
interpreungexperience, lorwhich experienceitsellislessresponsiblethan
8uon'sreadings.8uonread,studied,andadmiredewton, in 1 740, he
uanslatedandwrotetheprelacetotheMethod of Fions. 35 Charles Singer
perspicaciouslyrecognizes this uanslauon as a lact oldennite interestlor
the historyol!renchbiology, lorit gaveumbragetoVoltaire,who wanted
tomonopolizetheimportauonolewtoniantheoriesinto!rance.Voltaire
neverpraised8uonwithoutreservauon,hemocLed8uon's collaborator
]ohnJurbervilleeedham,andheadvancedobj ecuonstothegeographical
explanauons in the Theor of the Earth and the Epochs of Nature thatwere
moreohenthannotridiculous.!tis incontestable that8uonsoughttobe
the ewton olthe organic world, a bit liLe Hume, in the same period,
soughttobetheewton olthepsychicworld.ewtonhaddemonstrated
3
6 Hismy
the unity olthe lorces that move heavenly bodies and those that act on
bodiesontheearth'ssurlace.Jhroughatuacuon,heexplainedthecohesion
olelementarymassesintomorecomplexmaterialsystems.Vithoutatuac-
uon, realitywouldbedustandnotuniverse.
!or8uon,'ilmatterwouldceasetoatuactisasupposiuonequivalent
to 'ilbodieswereto losetheircoherence.8eingatrueewtonian,8ul-
lon accepts the material and corpuscular realityollight.
The smallest molecules of matter, the smallest atoms we know, are those of
light . . . . Light, although endowed in appearance with a quality completely
opposed to that of gravity-that is to say, a volatility one would take to be essen
tial to it-is nevertheless weighty like all other matter, since it bends every tme
it passes near other bodies and fnds itself afected by their sphere of attacton .
. . . And just as all matter can be converted into light by the division and repulsion
of its overly divided parts, when these parts clash against each other, light can
also convert itself into completely diferent matter by the adding together of its
own parts, accumulated by the attraction of other bodies. 37
Light,heat,andnrearemodesolbeingolcommonmatter.Jo dotheworL
olscienceistolooLlorhow'withthissinglemotorandthissinglesubject,
naturecanvaryits worLs innnitely. A corpuscular concepuonolmatter
and light cannotbut lead to a corpuscular concepuon ollivingmatterlor
anyonewho thinLs thatlivingmatterisonlymatterandheat.
One may ascribe to attracton alone all the efects of raw matter and, to this same
force of attracton plus that of heat, all the phenomena of live matter. By live
matter I mean not only all the beings that live or vegetate, but also all the livng
organic molecules, dispersed and spread out through the detitus or residues of
organized bodies; I mean also by live matter that of light, fre, and heat; in a
word, all matter that appears to us to be actve by itself39
Jhisisthelogicalnliauonthat,lorus,explainsthebirtholthetheoryol
organicmolecules.Abiologicaltheoryisbornoutolthepresugeolatheory
olphysics.Jhetheoryolorganicmoleculesexemplinesamethodolexpla-
nauon,theanalyucmethod, andprivilegesatypeolimaginauon,theimagi-
nation ol the disconunuous. ature comes down to the idenuty ol an
element'a single motor and a single subjectwhose composiuonwith
itsellproduces the appearance oldiversity. 'to vary its worLs innnitely.
Jhe lile olan individual, whether animal or plant, is thus a consequence
Cel Them)
3 7
andnotaprinciple,aproductandnotanessence.Aorganismisamecha-
nismwhoseglobaleectnecessarilyresultshomtheassemblageolitsparts.
Jruelivingindividualityismolecular, monadic.
The life of the animal or the vegetal appears to be nothing more than the result
of all the actons, all the partcular little lives (if I may be allowed to express
myself in this way) of each one of these active molecules, whose life is primitive
and appears to be indestructble: we have found these living molecules in all
living or vegetatng beings: we are certain that all these organic molecules are
also proper to nutiton and by consequence to the reproducton of animals and
plants. It is thus not difcult to conceive that, when a certain number of these
molecules are united, they form a living being: life being in each of the parts, it
can be in a whole, in any assemblage whatsoever of these parts.40
Ve have liLened 8uonto Hume. ' As is well Lnown, Hume believed
thathiseortto enumerate anddeterminethe simple ideaswhoseassocia-
uonwithoneanotherproducestheappearanceolaunityolmentallilewas
authorized byewton'ssuccess. Lucien Ley-8ruhl has broughtoutthis
pointverywellinhis prelace toHume'sOeuvres choisies.43 8uon's biologi-
calatomismcorrespondssymmetricallytoHume'spsychologicalatomism.
Ve would liLe to pursuethis symetrymrtherby describing the theory
olorganic molecules as biological associauonism. Associauonism implies
associauonthatis to say, the consutuuon ola societysubsequent to the
separate existence olits parucipaung indivduals. 8uon certainly shared
the sociological concepuons olthe eighteenth century. Human society is
theresultola reected co-operauonolthinLingsocialatomsindividuals
who, assuch, arecapableolpredicuonandcalculauon. 'Society, eventhat
ola single lamily, presupposes the lacultyolreasoninman. Jhe social
body,liLe theorganicbody,isawholeexplicablebythe composiuonolits
parts.Yetitisnottoasocietyolthehumantypethat8uoncomparedthe
complexorganism, butratherto anunpremeditatedaggregate.!or8uon
disunguishedquiteclearlyanarrangedsociety, suchasthatolmen, homa
mechanical gathering, such as that ola beehive. Ve are lamiliarwith the
lamous pages inwhich8uondrove anthropomorphic comparisons outol
accountsolbees'lives,bringingbacLtheprinciplesolCartesianmechanics
inorderto explainthe 'marvels olbeehives. Jhesocietyolbees 'isnoth-
ing but a physical assemblage ordered by naure and independent olall
vision, all Lnowledge, and all reasoning. ote here the termassemblage.
3
8 Hisor
8uon used it to denne the individual organism as well as the society ol
insects.Jhecomparisonolthesuuctureolinsectsocieuestothemulucel-
lularsucture olmetazoa is also lound in Alhed !spinas, Henri 8ergson,
Maurice MaeterlincL, and Villiam Morton Vheeler. 8ut these authors
have a concepuon olindividuality large and supple enough to encompass
the social phenomenonitsell. Jhere is no such thingin8uon. !or him,
individuality is not a lorm, it is a thing. there is onlyindividuality at the
nnal degree olreality that analysis can attain in its decomposiuon ol a
whole. nly the elements have a natural individuality, compounds have
merely an aruncial individuality, whether mechanical or intentional. !t is
uuethattheinuoducuonolthe conceptolthe 'innermold intouethe-
oryolgenerauonplaces alimitontheexhausuvevalueoltheanalyucbias
thatsparLedthe'organicmoleculeconcept.Jheinnermoldisthepresup-
posiuon necessary to explain the persistence olcertain lorms among the
perpetualreshumingolvitalatoms,ittranslatesthelimitsolacertainmeth-
odologicalexigencyinthepresenceolanindividualdatum.
Jhe obstacles a theory laces are just as importantto understandingits
lateasisthetheory'sowntendency. 8utitisbythistendencythatatheory
begins to create theintellectualauosphere ola generauonolresearchers.
Reading8uonm+sthavereinlorced,lor thebiologistswhoreadhim,the
samespiritolanalysisthatreadingewtonhadarousedinhim.
SpeaLing ol8uon, Singer says. 'Jhe cell docuine, had itbeen avail-
able,wouldparucularlyhaverejoicedhim.Jhisisindubitable.Vhenthe
naturalisthomMontbardsought'thissinglemotorandthissinglesubject
thatnatureusesto diversi[itsellintocomplexlivngbeings, hecouldnot
yetLnowthathewasseeLingwhatnineteenth-centmbiologistswouldcall
a cell.Andthosewho located thennal elementollileinthecellundoubt-
edlylorgotthattheywererealizinga dream, ratherthana project, ol8ul-
lon's. !ven in scienusts' dreams, a small number olmndamental themes
persist.Mancanthuseasilyrecognizehisowndreamsintheadventuresand
successes olhislellowmen.
Ve have just examined, in the case ol8uon, the origins ola theoreucal
dream that we can call propheuc so long as we do not lail to appreciate
the distance that separates a presenumenteven an expert onehom an
anucipation, even an unsophisucated one. !or there to be anucipation
strictlyspeaLing, the lacts that authorize itandthe paths to its conclusion
Cell Theor
39
mustbeolthe sameorderasthosethatimpartto a theoryits trulyuansi-
uonalreach. !ortheretobepresentiment, ndelitytotheelanolwhatGas-
ton 8achelard calls inL 'air et les songes (Air and Dreams) 'a movement ol
the imaginauon is sumcient.' Jhis distance between presenument and
anucipationisthedistancethatseparates8uonhomLorenzLen.
Singerand!lein!mileGuyenottoo,althoughmoresummarilyhave
not lailed to emphasize the role played by Len in the lormauon olcell
theory. He belonged to the Romanuc school ol philosophers ol nature
loundedby Schelling. ! thenineteenthcentury, the speculauons olthis
schoolhad asmuchinuenceon German doctorsandbiologistsasonliter-
ary ngures. Jhere is anunbroLen connecuon between Len and the nrst
biologists aware olnnding the nrstgroundings olcell theoryin observed
lacts. Matthias ]aLob Schleiden, who lormulated the theory ol cells lor
plants,taughtat the \niversityol]ena,wherethe memoryolLen'steach-
ingwasverymuchintheair.JheodorSchwann,whoextendedcelltheory
toalllivingbeings( 1 839-42), livedinthecompanyol Schleidenand]ohan-
nes Mller, who was his teacher. ! lact, Mller had belonged to the
school olphilosophers olnature in his youth. Singerthus canveryjustly
say olLen 'thathe inacertainwaysowed the thoughtolthe authorswho
are consideredinhis placeto be uefunders olcelltheory. '
JhelactsLencitedbelongtothedomainolwhathassincebeencalled
protistology. Ve Lnow the role !elix Oujardin's worLs ( 1 841) played in
the elaborauon olcell theory, criuquing Chrisuan Gotthied !hrenberg's
concepuon,accordingtowhichtheinfsoria areperlectorganisms( 1 838)
that is, complete and complex animals with co-ordinated organs. 8elore
Oujardin,infsoria designatednotaspecialgroupolunicellularanimalsbut
the ensemble olmicroscopiclivingbeings, animal orplant. Jhis term re-
lerred to paramecia (describedin 1 702), amoebae (describedin 1 755), and
eventomicroscopicbutincontestablymulucellularalgae andworms. And
atthetimeLenwrote his treauseDie Zeugung (Generation) ( 1 805), infso
rium did not explicitly desigate a protozoan, but nevertheless Len used
the word in the sense ol an absolutely simple and independent living
being.Ouringthisperiodthetermcel, whichhad been reinventedseveral
timessinceHooLe(notablybyGalliniandAcLermann),didnotcorrespond
to that ensemble olnotions. !twas onlystarungwithOujardin, vonMohl,
Schwann, and Max Schultzethatit began to do so, but itwas alreadyin
40 Hisor
more orless this same sense that Len had understood it. Jhis, then, is a
perlectcase olanucipauon.
Letusturntoahighlysignincantlact.Vhenhistoriansolbiologyto
persuadetheirreaders,bymeansolquotauons,thatLenshould beconsid-
eredalounderratherthanaprecursorolcelltheory,they do not cite the same
texts. JhisisbecausetherearetwowaystothinLtherelauonolawholeto
itsparts. onecanproceedhomthepartstothewhole orhomthewhole to
theparts.Jo saythatanorganismiscomposedolcells doesnot amountto
the same thing as to say thatitcan be broLen down into cells. Jhere are
thustwodierentways toreadLen.
Singerand Guyenotcitethe samepassage hom Generation: 'All organ-
isms are born hom cells and are lormed bycells orvesicles. Jhese cells
are, according to Len, the protoplasm ( Urschleim), the inmsorial mass
homwhich larger organisms are lormed. Jhe infsoria are primiuve ani-
mals(Urtiere). Singeralsocitesthelollowingpassage.'Jheirproducuonis
therelore nothing else than a regular agglomerauon ol!nmsoria. Apart
hom his terminology, Len says justwhat 8uon said. there exist abso-
lutelysimplelivingunits,andtheirassemblageoragglomerauonproduces
complexorganisms.
However,theerspecuvechangeswhenwereadthetextscitedby!lein.
'Jhegenesisolinmsoriaisnotduetoadevelopmentstarunghomeggs,it
is a breaLing ollinLs inlargeranimals,a dislocauonoltheanimalintoits
consutuentanimals. . . . Alleshdecomposesintoinmsoria.nemayinvert
this statementandsaythatalllarger animalsmustbecomposedolconsutu-
tiveanimalcula. Heretheideathatthecomposiuonolorganismsbegins
homelementaryliving beings isonlya logical reciprocity. Jhe iniual idea
is thattheelementis theresult ola liberauon.Jhewhole dominates the
part.Andthisisindeedwhatthetextthatlollows!lein'scitationconnrms.
The associaton of primitive animals in the form of fesh should not be thought
of as a mechanical joining of one animal to the other, like apile of sand in which
there is no other associaton than an accumulaton of numerous grains. No. Just
as oxgen and hydrogen disappear into water, mercury and sulfr into cinnabar,
what occurs here is a veritable interpenetaton, an interlacing and a unificaton
of all the animalcula. From this moment on, they no longer lead their own lives.
They are all put to the service of the more elevated organism; they work in view
of a unique and common functon; or rather, they carry this fncton out in
realizing themselves. No individuality is spared here; individuality is quite simply
Cell Theor 4I
ruined. But this language i s inappropriate: the individualites brought together
form another individuality; the former are destoyed and the latter only appears
by their destucton.56
Herewe are lar hom 8uon. Jhe organism is not a sum olelementary
biological realities. !t is a superior reality in which the elements as such
are negated. Len anucipates the theory oldegrees olindividuality with
exemplaryprecision.Jhisisnolongermerelyapresentiment.Anypresenti-
ment in Len concerns instead nouons that the technique olussue- and
cell-cultures has provided contemporary biologists, nouons regarding the
dierencesbetweenwhatHans !etersen calls the 'indivduallile andthe
'prolessional lile olcells. ' Len conceived the organism in the image
olsocietynotsocietyas anassociationolindividuals, asperthe political
philosophyoltheAujlirung, butasthecommunityconceivedbyRomanuc
poliucalphilosophy.JhatauthorsasinlormedandthoughtmlasSingerand
!lein could presentthe same docuine homsuchdierentvewpointswill
surpriseonlythoseincapableolappreciaungwhatwehavecalledthetheo-
reucal ambivalence ol scienunc minds. Jhe heshness ol their research
protects these minds hom dogmausm, the symptom oleither sclerosis or
precocious senility. !ven more, we nnd a single author, Kein, relating
Len to his biologist contemporaries invery dierentways. Jhe !rench
botanistCharles8risseau-Mirbelwrote in i S that 'eachcell is adisunct
utricle, and it seems that a uuly organic connection is never established
betweenthem.Jheyaresomanylivngindivduals, eachoneenjoyingthe
abilityto increase, to muluply, to modi[themselves within certainlimits,
worLingincommontotheprontoltheplant,whoseconsutuuvematerials
theythusbecome,theplantisthusacollecuvebeing. nthistext,!lein
commentsthat8risseau-Mirbel'sdescripuonswerewarmlyreceivedbythe
schoololphilosophersolnature,lortheyconnrmedthrough experimenta-
uon the general vesicular theoryproposed by Len. 8ut elsewhere !lein
cites an i Sz6textby !ierre]ean !ranoisJurpin, a botanistwho thought
that a cell canlive either in isolauon or in lederauonwith others to lorm
the compositeindividualityolaplant,inwhich the cell'grows and propa-
gates itselllor its own benent, without uoublingitsellin the least about
whatishappeningwithitsneighbors. !lein adds. 'Jhisideais opposite
to Len's concepuon, accordingtowhichthelivesoltheunitsthatcom-
pose a livingbeingmsewitheach otherand losetheirindividualitytothe
42 His01Y
benentolthelileoltheensembleoltheorganism. 8etweenthelinLingol
Len to 8risseau-Mirbel, on the onehand, and the opposiuonolLen to
Jurpin, on the other, theconuadicuonisonlyapparent. !twould be areal
contradicuoniltherelationbetweensimplicityandcomposiuonwereitsell
asimplerelation. 8utitispreciselynotsimpleespeciallyinbiology.Jhe
enureproblemoltheindividualisatstaLehere. 8ythetheoreucaldimcul-
ties it raises, individualityobliges us to dissociate twoaspects ollivingbe-
ings that arenavely andimmediatelyblended in ourpercepuon olthese
beings.matterandlorm.Jheindividualiswhatcannotbedividedinlorm,
evenaswe sense the possibilityoldividingits matter. !n certaincases, the
indivisibilityessenualtoindividualityisonlyrevealedoncethedivisionola
materiallylargerbeinghas been completed.8utisthisindividualitymerely
a limitto the divsionundertaLen, orisita priori uanscendentto all divi-
sionJhe history olthe conceptolthe cell isinseparablehomthehistory
olthe concept olthe individual. Jhis has already allowed us to maintain
thatsocialandaectivevalueshoverabovethedevelopmentolcelltheory.
How could one not bring together Len's biological theories and the
poliucal philosophy dear to the German Romanucs so proloundly inu-
enced by ovalis Glaube und Liebe: Der Ko"nig und die Konigin (Faith and
Love: The King and Queen) appeared in :;S, Europa oder die Christenheit
(Europe, or Christendom) in : Soo (Len's Generation is hom : So). Jhese
worLscontain aviolentcriuque olrevolutionaryideas. ovalis reproaches
universalsumageloratomizingthepopularwillandlorlailingtoappreciate
the conunuity olsociety (more exactly, olthe community). Anucipaung
Hegel,ovalisand, someyears later,AdamHeinrichMller considerthe
state a reality willed by God, a lact that exceeds the individual's reason
and to which ue individual must sacrince himsell. !lthese sociological
conceptionsoerananalogywithbiologicaltheories,thisisbecause,ashas
ohenbeenremarLed, Romanucisminterpretedpoliucal experience onthe
basis ola certainconcepuon ollile. Jhat concepuonwas vitalism. At the
verymomentwhen!renchpoliucalthoughtwasoering!uropethesocial
contract and universal sumage, the !rench school olvitalistmedicine was
proposing an image ollile as transcendent to analyc understanding. !or
thisschool, anorganism could notpossiblybe understoodasamechanism,
lileisalormirreducibletoanycomposiuonolmaterialparts.Vitalistbiol-
ogygavetotalitarianpoliucalphilosophythemeansilnottheobligauonto
Cell Them)
43
inspirecertaintheories concerningbiologicalindividuality.Jheproblemol
individualityisitsellindivisible. '
Jhemomenthascometopresentaratherstrangeparadoxinthehistoryol
cell theory among !rench biologists. Jhe advent olthis theorywas long
delayed bythe inuence olXavier 8ichat. 8ichathad been the studentol
!hilippe !inel, whose Nosogrhie philosophique (Philosophical Nosography,
:;S) assigned each diseaseanorganiccauseinthelormolalesionlocated
lessinanorganoranapparatusthanin'membranesthatarecomponents
commonto dierentorgans. 8ichat, inspired bythis, published the Traite
des membranes (:Soo), in which he enumerated and described the twenty-
one tissues that compose the human body.Accordingto 8ichat, tissue is
the plasuc principle olthe living being and the nnal term in anatomical
analysis.
Jhe term tissu ('ussue) merits attenuon. Tissu comes hom tistre, an
archaiclormoltheverbtisser ('toweave). !lthetermcel appearscharged
withimplicitsignincauons olan aective and social order, the term tissue
seems no less chargedwith exua-theoreucalimplicauons. A cell maLes us
thinLolthe beeandnotolman. VeavingmaLes usthinLolmanand not
olthespider.wovenlabricishumanworLparexcellence.Jhe cell, withits
canonical hexagonal lorm, is the image ola whole closed in upon itsell.
Jissue oers the image ola conunuityinwhich anyinterruption is arbi-
trary,anditistheproductolanacuvityalwaysopentoconunuation.ne
cuts here and there asneeded. !urthermore, a cellis a hagile thing, made
to be admired, looLed at but not touched at the risL ol desuucuon. 8y
conuast, onehasto touch,leel,rub a tissue toappreciateits grain, supple-
ness, somess.neloldsandunloldsa ussue, oneunrollsitintowavesatop
oneanotheronthemerchant'scounter.
8ichatdidnotliLemicroscopes,perhapsbecause(as!leinsuggests,lol-
lowing!ranoisMagendie)he didn'tLnowhowtousethem well. 8ichat
prelerredthescalpelandwhathecalledthennalelementoltheanatomi-
cal orderwas what the scalpel allowed himto dissociate and separate. 8ut
at the up ola scalpel itis just as impossible to discover a cell as it is to
nnd a soul. Ve intenuonallyallude to tms materialistclaim.Jhroughthe
intermediary ol!inel, 8ichat is a descendant ol!aul-]oseph 8arthez, the
lamousvitalistdoctoroltheMontpellierSchool.8ichat'sRecherches physiolo
giques sur la vie et la mort ( : Soo)issymptomaucolthisnliation.!lvitalism
4 His01)
holds lile to be a principle transcendent to matter, an
indivisible and un-
graspable lorm, then even an anatomist inspired byitwould be unable to
make the supposed elements olthe living being containwhatheconsiders
to bea qualityolthetotalityolthisbeing. Seenby8ichatto be thelabric
out olwhichlivingbeings are cut, tissue oers an image adequate to the
continuityolthevitallact,asrequired byvitalistexigency.
8ichat's docuine providedAuguste Comte (eitherthroughthe teaching
olHenri Marie Oucrotay de 8lainville or through a direct reading) with
some olthe themes he presented in the lorty-nrst lesson olthe Cours de
pbilosopbie positive. Comte makes manilesthis hosulitytotheuseolthemi-
croscope and to cell theory, hosulitylorwhich hehas been hequentlyre-
proachedbythosewhohaveseenthedevelopmentolthescienceolbiology
sincethen as a condemnauonolhishesitauonsand aversions. Leon8run-
schvicginparticularneverlorgaveComtehisdogmaucinterdicuonsagainst
certainmathemaucalorexperimentaltechniques,nordidhelorgveComte's
inndelityto theanalycmethodandhis'lalseconversionto theprimacy
olsythesisatthe precise momentinthe Cours (the lorty-eighthLesson)
when Comte undertaLes his examination olthe procedures olLnowledge
adequate to the organic object and recognizesthe posiuvevalidity olthe
intellectualprocessthatconsists ingoing'homthewholeto the parts. '
8ut it is not easyto abandon all dogmatism, even when denouncing the
dogmausm ol others. Comte's authoritarianism is certainly unacceptable,
but, at least insolar as cell theory is concerned, his reservauons about a
certain tendencyolthe scienuncspirit perhaps meritan honest attemptat
understanding.
Comte considers cell theory to be 'a lantasucal theory, obviously the
productolan essentiallymetaphysicalsystemolgeneralphilosophy. And
it is the German naturalists olthe period, pursuing 'speculauons above
and beyond biological science, whom Comte maLes responsible lor this
manilest deviation. 8ut herein lies the paradox. Comte lails to recognize
thatthe ideas olLen andhisschoolhave a scopeverydierenthomthe
observations olmicroscope technicians. he lails to recognize that what is
essential to ken's biology is a certain concepuon olindividuality. Len
representsthelivngbeingintheimageolacommunitariansociety.Comte,
lor his part, rejects 8uon's concepuonthatthe lile olan organismis the
sum ol particular lives, just as he rejects the eighteenth-century poliucal
philosophers' concepuon olsociety as an association olindividuals. !s he
Cell Theo'
45
thenas lar removedhomthephilosophersolnatureashethinLs Ve see
hereagainthelatentandproloundunity,lorathinLer,olconceptionsrela-
tive to individuality, whether biological or social.]ust as in sociologythe
individual is an absuaction, in biology the 'organic monads, as Comte
calls cells, are abstractions. '!whatcould eithertheorganizauonorthe
lileolasimplemonadreallyconsist Alewyearsago,A.!ischerandAlbert
!olicardwereabletodemonstrate,throughthetechniqueoltissuecultures,
thatinordertobecapableolprolileraung,acultureoltissuesmustcontain
aminimalquanutyolcells. Vithoutthis,cellularmuluplicauonisimpossi-
ble. A per !ischer, a nbroblast isolated in a drop olplasma survives but
doesnotmuluply.Jo survivewithoutmultiplyngisthissulltolive Can
we divde up the properties ola living being and sull consider it living
Jhese are questions thatnobiologistcan avoid. Jheyarelactsthat, along
with many others, have weaLened the hold olcell theory today. ! what
respectis Comteguiltyolhavnghada presenumentolthesequesuons,il
not olhavng anucipated these lacts Comtehas rightly beenreproached
lor basingpositivistphilosophyonthesciencesolhis ume,asilthesewere
eternal. And certainlyitisimportantnotto ignore thehistoricityolume.
8uttime,liLeeternity,belongstonoone,andndelitytohistorycanleadus
torecognizeinitcertainreturnsoltheoriesthattranslatethehumanmind's
oscillauonbetweencertainpermanentorientauonsinresearchingaparucu-
larregionolexistence.
Jherelore, we cannever be too prudentwhen oeringsummaryjudg-
ments oncertainauthors(whethertopraise or to blame them)whose sys-
temaucminds are ample enough to prevent them hom rigidly closing o
what we have come to call 'their system. \nconscious and involuntary
theoreucalcompliciuesmayappear.JheGermanbotanistHeinrichAnton
de 8ary wrote in i S6o thatitis not cells that lorm plants, butplants that
lorm cells. Jhis phrase becomesevenmore clearlyanaphorismolRoman-
ticbiologilitistaLentogetherwitharemarLby8ergsoninCreative Evolu
tion: 'Very probably it is not the cells that have made the individual by
means olassociauon, itis rather the individualthathas made the cells by
means oldissociauon. 8ergson'slargelyjusunedreputauonasaRoman-
uc was created by a generauon olposiuvist thinLers, in whose midst he
stoodout. necouldevensaythatthesamethinLerswerethequicLestto
denounce in Comte even the uaces olbiological and social Romanucism
that would lead him hom the Cours de philosophie positive to the Synthese
4
6 Hisor
subective bywayolthe Systeme de politique positive. 8uthowcanwe explain
that these Romanuc concepuons olbiological philosophy could have ani-
mated the research olscholars who remained loyal to the scienunc and
materialistdocuine thatoriginatedwiththe Cours de philosophie positive?
!leinhasshownhowCharles Robin, thenrstchair olhistologyatthe
!aris!acultyolMedicineand Littre's collaboratorlorthelamousDiction
naire de midecine ( 1 873), neverabandonedhistenacioushosulityto cellthe-
ory.'Robinconcededthatthecellisoneoltheanatomicalelementsolthe
organized being, butnot that it is the only one, he accepted that the cell
mayderivehom a pre-exisung cell, butnot thatitmustalways do so, lor
he accepted the possibilityolthe lormauon olcells in an iniual blastema.
SomeolRobin'sdisciples,liLe!redericJourneux,prolessorolhistologyat
the !aculty olMedicinein Joulouse, conunued not to teach cell theory
unul i zz. ' ' Vhat criterion would we use to dierenuate between and
judgethosewhopiouslyreceivedhomtheworLsolSchwannandRudolph
Virchow the hndamental axioms olcell theory, and those who relused
themJhelateolhistologicalresearch 8uttodaytheobstaclestotheom-
nivalenceolcelltheoryarealmostas considerable asthelactsitisasLedto
explain.rthecomparauveemcacyolmedicaltechniquesoriginatinghom
the dierent theories 8utJourneux's teaching, whichwas important lor
thecreauonolthe!acultyolMedicineinJoulouse,certainlydidnothinder
thatinsutuuonhomtodayhavingaschoololcancerologyasbrilliantasany
olthosewhoseteachingoltumorpathologywas rigorouslyinspiredbythe
worLs olVirchow. !romtheorytotechniquethe distanceisgreat, and itis
dimcult, especially in medicine, to demonsuate that eects obtained are
uniquely a mncuonolthe theories adduced tojusu[the therapeuucges-
turesthataccompanythem.
Ve willperhaps bereproachedlorhavngunulnowcited thinLers rather
thanresearchers,philosophersratherthanscienusts,thoughwehaveshown
that the nliauon olthe latter to the lormerolSchwann to Len, Robin
to Comteis incontestable and conunuous. Let us, then, examine what
becomes olthequesuoninthehandsolbiologists obedienttotheteaching
ollacts,ilindeed therecanbesuchateachingatall.
Letus recall whatismeant by cell theory. itincludestwo lundamental
principles deemed adequatelorthesolutionoltwoproblems.
Cel Them) 47
i . neproblemisthatolthecomposition of organisms: everylivingorgan-
ismiscomposedolcells, wherethecellisheldtobethevitalelementbear-
ingallthecharacteristicsollile. Jhisnrstprincipleanswerstotheexigency
olanalyuc explanation, which, according to ]ean !errin, leads science to
'explainthecomplicatedvisiblein terms olthesimpleinvisible. '
2 . Jhesecond problemis that olthegenesis of organisms: everycellde-
riveshomananteriorcell,omnis cellula e cellula, saysVirchow.Jhissecond
principle answers to an exigency olgeneuc explanation, itis no longer a
quesuon olelement butoneolcause.
Virchowwasthenrsttobringtogetherthetwopartsolthistheory.' He
recognized thatthenrstdatedbacLtoSchwann, andhe claimed the second
lorhimsell,lormallycondemningSchwann'sconcepuon,accordingtowhich
cells could be bo in a primal blastema. Starung withVirchow and Albert
vonKlliLer,the studyolthe cell became a specialscience, ctolog, disunct
homwhat, since Carl Heusinger, has been called histolog, the scienceolus-
sues.'Jo thetwoaboveprinciplesmustbeaddedtwocomplements.
i . Livingbeings that arenot composite are unicellular. Jhe alorecited
worLs olOujardin and the worLs ol!rnst HaecLel gave cell theory the
supportolprotistology. HaecLelwasthenrstto clearlydivideanimalsinto
protozoa, orunicellular,andmetazoa, ormulucellular.
2 . Jhe egghomwhichsexed livingorganismsare bornis a cellwhose
development can be explained by division alone. Schwann was the nrstto
considerthe egg to be a germinaungcell.Hewaslollowedonthis path by
KlliLer, anembryologistwhoseworLgreatlyconuibutedtotheinuence
olcelltheory.
Vemaydate the establishmentolthis inuence totheyear i S;q,when
HaecLel began publishing on the gastraea,75 and 8ernard, wmle studying
physiological phenomena olnuuiuon and generauon common to animals
andplants,wrote. '!anin-depth analysis olaphysiologicalphenomenon,
one always arrives at the same point, the same elementary, irreducible
agent, the organizedelement, the cell. '!or8ernard, thecellisthe 'vital
atom. 8ut let us note that this same year Robin published Anatomie et
physiologie cellulaire, inwhichthecellisnotthesole elementolcomplexliving
beings.!venatthe momentolitsquasi-omcialproclamauon,theinuence
olcelltheoryisnottotal.
Have the concepuons olindividualitythatinspired the above-discussed
speculauons onthe composiuon olorganismsentirelydisappeared among
biologistswhocanbeconsideredauthenucscienusts !tdoesnotseemso.
4
8 His01Y
Oescribingthe organism as 'an aggregate olcellsorelementaryorgan-
isms, 8ernard,inLe(ons sur les phenomenes de la vie communs aux animaux et
aux vegetaux (published posthumously in I 878-79 by Oasue) amrms the
principle olthe autonomyolanatomicalelements. ''Jhis amounts to sup-
posing that cells would behave in isolauon as they do in association, pro-
vided they are in a milieu identical to the one created in the organism by
theacuonolneighboringcellsin short, thatcellswould live exactl the same
way in freedom as in societ. Ve shouldnoteinpassingthat, ilthemilieuol
theculture olheecells containsthesamesubstancesastheinternalmilieu
olanorganism(thesubstancesthatregulatecelllilebyinhibiuonorsumu-
lation), then itcannotbe said thatthe celllives 'inheedom. !anycase,
8ernard,hopingtomaLehimsellbetterunderstoodbymeansolacompari-
son, asLs us to consider the complexliving being 'liLe a citywithits own
specialseal, where individualsnourish themselvesidentically and exercise
thesamegenerallacultiesthoseolmanbutwhereeachoneparucipates
dierentlyinsociallilethroughhisworLandparucularaptiudes.
!nI 899, HaecLelwrote.'cellsaretrueautonomousciuzens,who,assem-
bledbythethousands,consututeourbody, thecellularstate. 'Aassem-
blyolautonomousciuzens,astate.theseareperhapsmorethanimagesand
metaphors.Apoliucalphilosophyholdsswayoverabiologicaltheory.Vho
couldtellwhetheroneisa republican because oneisaparusanolcellthe-
ory,orratherapartisanolcelltheorybecauseoneisarepublican
Letusconcedethat8ernardandHaecLelarenotheehomphilosophical
temptation or sin. ! the I 904 Traite d'histologie byA. !renant, !. 8ouin,
andL.Maillard(which!leincalls,alongwithLouis-!elixHenneguy'sI 896
Le(ons sur la celule, thenrstclassicworLtohavebroughtcelltheoryintothe
teachingolhistologyin!rance'),thesecondchapter, onthecell, iswritten
byAuguste !renant. Jhe author's sympathieslorcell theory do notblind
himtothoselactsthatcouldlimititsscope. Hewrites,withadmirableclar-
ity, that "the qualit of individualit dominates the notion of the cel, and even
sumces to denneit. 8uthe also writes that every experimentwhich re-
veals that cells seemingly closedin on themselves are in reality 'open to
one another (in the words olVilhelm His), devalorizes cell theory. Hence
!renant'sconclusionthat.
Individual unites may by turns be individuals in varying degrees. A living being
is born as a cell, a cell-individual; ten cellular individuality disappears in te
Cel Theor
49
individual or person formed out of a plurality of cells, to the detiment of personal
individuality; this can be efaced in tur, in a society of persons, by a social indi
viduality. What happens when one examines this series that ascends fom mult
ples of the cell (the person and the society) is also the case for cellular infa
multples: the parts of a cell in turn possess a certain degree of individuality,
absorbed in part by the individuality that is more elevated and more powerfl
than that of the cell. From top to bottom there is individuality. Life is not
possible without the individuaton of what lives.
8
1
Arewesolarhom Len'sviewshere!sthisnotonceagainanoccasion
tosaythattheproblemolindividualityisitsellnotdivisible!erhapsithas
notbeensumciently noted that the etymologyolthe word individual ne-
gates the concept 'individual. Jhe individual is a being at the limit ol
nonbeing,sinceitiswhatcannotbemrtherhagmented withoutlosingits
propercharacterisucs. !tisa minimum olbeing. Yetno beingisinitsella
minimum. ! itsell, the individual necessarilypresupposes its relation to a
greaterbeing, itcallslor,itdemands (inthe sense ctaveHamelin gaveto
these terms in his theory olthe opposiuon olconcepts) a bacLground ol
conunuityagainstwhichitsdisconunuitystands out.!this sense, there is
no reason to stop the power olindividuality at the limits olthe cell. 8y
recognizing,in i oq,acertain degreeolindividualityincellparts, anindi-
viduality absorbed by that olthe cell, !renant anucipated recent concep-
tions concerning the ultra-microscopic suucture and physiology ol
protoplasm. 8iologists asL. Are virus-proteins living or nonliving Jhis
comesdowntoasLingwhethernucleoproteincrystals areindividualized.'!l
theyareliving, says]eanRostand,'theyrepresentlileatthesimpleststate
conceivable, ilthey are not, they represent a state olchemical complexity
thatalreadyannounceslile. 8utwhywould onewishto claim thatvirus-
proteins are at once living and simple when their discovery has shattered
the concepuon(whichwentbythenamecell olanelementatoncesimple
andlivingVhywould onehaveitthattheyareatoncelivingandsimple,
whilerecognizingthatanyannouncementolliletobeloundinthemisdue
totheircomplexity !short,individualityisnotaterm,ilbythatwemean
alimit. itisatermin arelauon. neshouldnotuseitinthewayresearch
thataimsatgraspingitasa beingdoes.
!inally, is thereanyless biological philosophyinthealorecited textby
Auguste !renant than in certain passages olthe i S6S worL Memoire sur
diverses manistations de la vie individuele, bytheCountdeGobineau,aworL
50 Hisor
asunLnownas itis disconcerung, with its mixture olohenlanciml linguis-
ucsandsomeumespenetratingbiologicalviews GobineauLnowsandac-
cepts cell theory. Counung down the stages ol development ol the
organized being,hewrites. 'Aerthe spermauc entozoa, thereis the cell,
the nnal termin the state olgenesis so lar discovered, and the cell is the
lormauve principle olthe plant Lingdom justas olthe animal Lingdom.
8utGobineau doesnotconceiveolindividualityasarealityalwaysidenucal
to itsell,rather,heconceivesolitasone olthetermsina shiungrelauon
thatlinLs dierent realiues to dierent levels olobservauon. He calls the
otherterminthisrelationthe'milieu.
It is not enough that an individual be equipped with the complete ensemble of
elements that belong to it for it to be able to subsist. Without a special milieu,
the individual does not exist, and if it did, it could not last one second. It is thus
absolutely necessary that all that lives live in the milieu appropriate to it. Conse
quently, nothing is of greater importance for the maintenance of beings, that is
to say, for the perpetuity of their life, than milieus. I have just said that the earth,
the celestal spheres, the spirit, make up so many envelopes of this kind. But in
the same way, the human body and the body of all beings are also milieus in
which the always-complex mechanism of existences fnctons. And the fact is so
incontestable that it is only with great difculty that, by abstactng fom a host
of conditons of life, one manages to detach, to isolate, to consider separately the
cell, such a close relaton of the monad, and to indicate there the frst vital form,
quite rudimentary, to be sure, which yet, at the same tme, again displaying a
duality, must be itself be designated a milieu.
Gobineau'sworLcouldnothavehadanyinuenceonbiologists.Jheorigi-
nal!renchtextremainedunLnownunulthelastlewyears.AGermanver-
sion appeared in 1 868, in the Zeitschri fr Philosophie und philosophische
Kitik (published in Halle by!mmanuel Hermann von !ichte), but it did
notmeetwitheventheslightestresponse. Sull, itseemsinteresungtoem-
phasize,viathiscomparison,thattheproblemolindividuality,intheguise
oltheproblemolthecell,suggestsanalogoushypothesestomindsasdier-
enthom one anotheras those ola pure histologist and an anthropologist
moreoccupiedwithmetaphysicalgeneralizauonsthanwithhumbleandpa-
uentobservauons.
Vhat is happening today with cell theory !irst, let us recall ]ulius
Sachs'snowalreadyoldcriuques,subsutuunglorthenouonolthecellthat
olthe energide, thatis to say, a cytoplasmic area represenungwithout a
Cell Theor S I
suicttopographical delimitauona gvennucleus'szoneolinuence, next,
the research olRudoll!eter Heinrich in 1 902 on metaplasmas, thatis to
say, intercellularsubstances such asthe base substances olcarulage, bones,
ortendons,substanceshavingirreversiblylostallrelationwithnuclearlor-
mauons, and, since 1 91 3 , the worLs olCliord Oobell and his remsal to
consider as equivalent, hom the anatomical and physiological points ol
view, the metazoa cell, the protist, and the egg (lor the proust must be
considered averitable organism, the size ola cell, and the egg an original
enuty, dierenthom boththe cell andthe organism), wthueresultthat
'cell theorymustdisappear,ithasnotonlyceasedto bevaluable,itistruly
dangerous. Letus quicLly signal the importance increasinglyatuibuted
to theliquidsoltheinteriormilieuandto substancesinsolution,whichare
notallproductsolcellsecreuonbutwhichareall'elementsindispensable
tothesuuctureandlileoltheorganism.
Second, we would liLe to consider, inparticular, someworLshom the
'interwarperiod by three authorsas dierenthom one anotherin spirit
as they are i their research specialues. Remy Collin's 1 92 9 article 'La
theorie cellulaire etlave, Hans !etersen's thoughts on thecellin the
nrstchaptersolhis1 93 5 Histologie und mikroskopische Anatomie,86 andctave
Ouboscq's1 93 9 lectureontheplaceolcelltheoryinprotistology.'Starung
homdierentordierentlyarguedposiuons, thesepresentauonsconverge
ononeanalogoussoluuon,whichwewill letOuboscqlormulate. 'Jo taLe
the cell to be aunitynecessaryto the constituuonollivingbeings is to go
down the wrong path. !irst ol all, it becomes dimcult to compare the
metazoan organism to arepublicolcellsorto a construction basedonthe
addiuon olindividualized cells when one observes the place held in the
consutuuonolessenualsystemssuchasthemuscular systembyplasmodial
orsyncyal lormationsuat is to say, bylayersolconunuous cytoplasm
sprinLledwith nuclei. !reality,in thehumanbodyonlytheepitheliaare
clearlycellularized. 8etween a heecell (e. g. , a leuLocyte) and a syncyium
(e. g. , the cardiac muscle or the superncial layer olthe chorionicvllus ol
the letal placenta), we can nnd all the intermediarylormsnotably, giant
mulunucleated cells (polyLaryocytes)without being able to determine
preciselywhether the syncyual layers areborn homthe msion olfrerl
independent cels or it is the opposite that occurs. !n lact, both mechanisms can
beobserved. !ven in the course olan egg's development, itis notcertain
thateverycellderiveshomthedivsionola pre-exisung cell.

mileRhode
5 2 Hist01J
was ableto demonstratein i z thatvery ohen, both in plants andinani-
mals, individualized cells derive hom the subdivision ol a primary
plasmodium.
8uttheanatomicandontogeneucaspectsdonotcoverthewholeprob-
lem. !ven authors who, liLeHans!etersen, bothacceptthatthedevelop-
ment ol the metazoan body constitutes the veritable loundauon ol cell
theoryandseein the labricauonolchimeraslivingbeingscreatedbythe
arunciallyobtainedcoalescenceolcells originatinginthe eggs oldierent
speciesan argument in lavor olthe 'addiuve composiuon olcomplex
livngbeingsare obliged to admitthatthe explanation of the fnctions of these
organiss contradicts the explanation of their genesis. !lthebodyisreallyasum
olindependentcells,howdoweexplainthatitlormsawholethatmncuons
inaunilormmanner!lcellsare closedsystems,howcantheorganismlive
andactasa whole ne couldattemptto resolvethis dimcultybyseeLing
themechanismoltotalizauoninthenervoussystemorinhormonalsecre-
uons. 8utas lor thenervous system, onemustrecognizethatthemajority
olits cells are attached inaunilateralratherthanareciprocallashion.And
aslorhormones, onemust admit thata good number olvital phenomena,
notably those olregenerauon, are quite poorly explained by this mode ol
regulauon, no matterwhatcumbersome complicauons one adds on. Jhis
brings!etersentowritethat.
One may perhaps say in a general way that it is very difcult to make all the
processes where the body intervenes as a whole-and there are in pathology, for
example, few processes where this is not the case-intelligible through the theory
of the celular state or the theor of cels as independent organiss . e o o I the way the
cellular organism behaves, lives, works, maintains itself against the attacks of its
surroundings, and re-establishes itself, cells are the organs of a uniform body.
88
Jhe problem olliving individuality reappears here, and we see how the
aspect oltotality, iniually rebelling against all division, prevails over the
aspect olatomicity, thepresumednnaltermoladivision. !etersen'squote
ol]ulius Sachs's i SS; claim concerningmulucellular plants is thushighly
relevant. '!t depends entirelyon ourway of seeing whether we regard cells
asindependentelementaryorganismsoronlyasparts.
!recentyears, wehave seen theintensincauonolhesitauonsandcriuques
concerning cell theoryin its classical lorm, that is to say, in the dogmatic
Cell Them)
53
andnxedlormgiventoi ti nmanuals,eventhoseusedi nhighereducation.
Joday,includingnoncellularelementsinthe orderolsubstancesconsutu-
tive oltheorganismandattendingto possible modesolcelllormationout
olcontinuous protoplasmic masses encounters much less opposition than
when Virchow, in Germany, reproached Schwann lor accepung the exis-
tenceolaprimalcytoblastemaandwhenCharlesRobin,in!rance,seemed
liLe a grouchy retrograde. ! I 94I , Jivadar Huzella showed, in his booL
Die Zwischenzellige Organisation (Intercellula1 Organization), thatintercellular
relauons and exuacellular substances (e. g. , the interstiual lymph, orwhat
in connecuve tissue cannot be reduced to cells) are at least as important,
biologicallyspeaLing, asthe cellsthemselves.Jhus,theempunessbetween
cells, which is microscopically observable, is lar hom a histological and
mnctionalvoid. ' !n I 946, !. 8usse Grawitz, inhisExperimentelle Grundla
gen zu einer moderen Pathologie (Experimental Foundations fr a Moder Pa
tholog), thought he could conclude hom his observations that cells may
appearin the midst olmndamentallynoncellularsubstances. Cell theory
obligesustoacceptthatcells secretemndamentalsubstances(tendoncolla-
gen,lorexample) ,eventhoughwecannotestablishpreciselyhowthissecre-
tiontaLesplace.Here,thatrelauonisinverted. lcourse,theexperimental
argumentinatheoryliLeGrawitz'sisolanegauveorder,itputsitslaithin
theprecauuonstaLentopreventtheimmigrauonolcellsintothenoncellu-
lar substance where one sees them progressively appear. !n !rance, ]ean
ageotte observed that, in rabbit embryo development, the eye's cornea
nrstappears as a homogeneous substance that, duringthe nrstthree days,
doesnotcontaincells, butbecauseolVirchow'saxiom,hethoughtthatthe
later appearanceolthese cellswastheresultolmigrauon.However, ithad
neverbeen possibleto observe suchmigrauons.
!inally, it must be menuoned that Virchow's memory and reputauon
haveundergoneandconunuetoundergoattacLshomRussianbiologists
attacLs to which publicity ordinarily granted to discoveries inspired by
Marxist-Leninist dialecucs has conlerred an importance quite dispropor-
uonate to their acual signincance measured in terms olthe teachings ol
the history olbiology(written, itis true, bybourgeois) . Since I 93 3 , lga
LepeshinsLaya has dedicatedherresearch to the phenomenonolthe birth
olcells hom noncellularliving substances. Jhe I950 republicauon olher
I 945 worLThe Origin of eel Is from Living Substance was the occasionloran
54
Hisor
examination and approvalolits theses bythebiologysecuonolthe Sovet
AcademyolSciencesandlorthepublicationolnumerousjournalarticles.
Virchow's 'idealist concepuons were violently criucized in the name ol
observedlactsandinthenameoladoubleauthority.thatolRussianscience
(the physiologist !van MiLhaylovich Sechenov had, since r 860, lought
against Virchow's ideas) and that oldialecucal materialism (in the Anti
Dihring and in the Dialects of Nature !ngels had expressed reservauons
abouttheomnivalenceolcelltheory).JhelactsinvoLedbyLepeshinsLaya
come hom observations on the development olthe chicLen embryo. Ac-
cordingtoher, theyolLolthelerulizedeggcontainsproteingrainsthatare
visible underamicroscopeandcapableolaggregaungintospherules thatdo
nothavea cellularsuucture.Later on, thesespherules developintothetypi-
callormolthenucleated cell, wiuoutanyimmigrauonintotheyolLmass
bycellsbornthroughembryoniccelldivisionattheyolL's edge. nemay
asLwhatare thestaLesolsuch a polemic, which, as we have seen, is only
oneolmanyexamplesinthe historyolcell theory.Jheyessenuallyconsist
inanewandapparentlysolidargumentagainstthenecessaryconunuityol
cellularlineages,andconsequentlyagainstthetheoryolthe conunuityand
independence olue germinal plasma. !t is an argument against August
Veissmannandthus insupportolJronmLysenLo'stheses ontheheredi-
tary uansmission ol characterisucs acquired by the individual organism
undertheinuenceolthemilieu. !lweourselvesarenotqualinedtoexam-
ine, homa scienunc pointolview, the solidityolthe experimentsinvoLed
andthetechniquesused,itisneverthelessincumbentuponustoemphasize
thathereagainbiologicaltheorysuetchesunambiguouslyinto asociologi-
cal and poliucal thesis, and that the return to old worLing hypotheses is
legitimated, quite paradoxically, bya progressivistlanguage. !ltheeeri-
mentsolLepeshinsLayaandthetheoriestheysupportstanduptothewell-
armed andwell-inlormed criucism olbiologists, wewould see this less as
proololthelact'thatthereisonlyonecounuyon!aruthatsupportsuue
science. the Soviet\nion`than as reason to once again ascertain, inthe
case olcell theory andVirchow's ideas, that, as a lamous sayinghas it, 'a
theoryisworthlessilonecannotdemonstrateittobelalse.
Ven HaecLelwrote in r 904 that'since themiddle olthenineteenth
century, cell theory has generally been considered, and rightly so, to be
one olthe biological theories olgreatestweight, allworLin anatomyand
histology, physiology and ontogenymust be based on the concept olthe
Cel The01Y
55
cellasonthatoltheelementaryorganism, headdedthatnoteveryng
in this concept was enurely clear yet, and thatnotall biologistswere con-
vinced olit. 8utwhatseemedto HaecLel to be the last resistance olpetty
orreuograde minds seems toustodaymoreliLe acommendableattentive-
nessto thenarrowness ola theory. Certainlythe meaningolcelltheoryis
quiteclear.itisanextensionoltheanalycmethodto thetotalityoltheo-
reucal problems posed by experiment. 8utthevalue olthistheoryresides
asmuchintheobstaclesithas raised asinthesolutionsithasallowed, and
especiallyintherenewalithasbroughtabout,inthe domainolbiology, ol
theold debate concerningtherelauons betweencontinuityanddisconunu-
ity.!stheindividualareality`Anillusion` Aideal`osingle science,even
biology,cananswerthisquesuon.Andilall thesciencescanandmustmaLe
theircontributiontosuchananswer,thenitisdoubtmlthattheproblemis
properlyscientincintheusualsense oltheword.
!tisnotabsurdtothinLthat,onthetopicolthesuucture olorganisms,
biologyisadvancingtowardamsionolrepresentauonsandprinciplesanal-
ogousto the msioninwavemecIanicsolthetwoapparentlycontradictory
conceptsolwaveandparucle.Cellandplasmaareamongthelatestincarna-
tions ol the dual intellectual exigencies ol disconunuity and conunuity,
whichhave conhonted each otherincessantlyoverthe course olthe theo-
reticalelucidauonmenhavepursuedloraslongastheyhavebeenthinLing.
!erhaps it is uue that scienunc theories, with the mndamental concepts
theyputinto their principles olexplanation, are grahed onto ancientim-
ages, andwewouldsayilthistermwerenottodaydevalorized,withsome
reason, asaresultolits usage byphilosophies obviouslyconsuctedinthe
interestolpropagandaandmysuncauonontomyths.!versincetheprob-
lemolastructure commontolivingbeingswas posed, the conunuouspri-
malplasmahas,undervariousnames,providedbiologistswithaprincipleol
explanauoncalledlorbywhattheysawastheinadequaciesolacorpuscular
explanation. \lumately,isthisprimalplasmaanythingotherthanthelogi-
cal avatar olthe mythological uid, the generator olall lile, the loaming
wave hom which Venus emerged` Charles audin, the !rench biologist
whoalmostbeatMendeltothediscoveryolthemathemaucallawsolhered-
ity, usedto saythattheprimalblastemawas the clayolthe 8ible.Jhisis
whywe have proposed that theories are not born lrom the lacts theyco-
ordinate,whicharesupposedtohave givenriseto them. r,moreexactly.
lactsgiverisetotheories,buttheyengenderneitherthe concepts thatunite
5
6 His011
them internally nor the intellectual intentions they develop. Jhese inten-
uons come hom lar away, and these concepts are lew in number, this is
whytheoreucalthemessurvive theapparentdesucuon thatpolemics and
remtauonspridethemselvesinhavingwrought.
1 00
ow,itwouldbeabsurdtoconcludehomthisthatthereisnodierence
between science and mythology, between measurement and reverie. 8ut
inversely, to want radically to devalorize old intuiuons on the pretext ol
theirtheoreticalobsolescencerendersoneimpercepublybutinevitably
unabletograsp how suchastupidhumanitycouldonenne day havewoLen
upintelligent.Vecannotchaseawaymiraclesaseasilyasmightbethought,
andintryingto suppress themintheorderolthings,wesometimesreinte-
gratethemintothought-wheretheyarenoless shocLinganduseless. ne
wouldthusdopoorlytoconcludehomourstudythatwenndmoretheoret-
ical value in the myth olVenus orin the narrauve olGenesis than in cell
theory.Ve havesimplywantedtoshowthattheobstaclesandlimitsolthis
theory did not escape many scienusts and philosophers at the ume olits
birth, even some olthosewho mostproloundlyconuibuted toitselabora-
uon. Jherelore, the current need lor a suppler and more comprehensive
theorywillonlysurprise thoseincapableolseeLinginthehistoryolscience
a sense oltheoreucal possibiliues dierenthomwhat the teaching olthe
latestscientincresultshas made lamiliarasensewithoutwhichthere can
beneitherscienunccriuquenoraluturelorscience.
P A R T T H REE
Phi losophy
Biologcal kowledge is contnued creative activity, by which the idea of
the organism comes increasingly within reach of our experience. It is a sort
of ideaton equivalent to Goethe's Schau, a procedure that springs
contnuously fom empirical facts and never fails to be grounded in and
substantated by them.
-K U R T G 0 L D S T E I N, The Organi
THREE
Aspects of Vitalism
!tisquitedimcultlorthephilosophertohishandatbiologicalphiloso-
phywithoutrunning the risL olcompromising the biologists he uses or
cires.Abiologyuulizedbyaphilosopheristhisnotalreadyaphilosophical
biology,andtherelorealancimlone`Yetwoulditneverthelessbepossible,
withoutrenderingbiologysuspect, to asLolitan occasion, ilnotpermis-
sion,torethinLorrecu[mndamentalphilosophicalconcepts,suchasthat
ollile` Can one reproach the pmlosopherwho has taLen up the study ol
biologylorchoosing,amongtheteachingshehasreceived,theonethathas
bestenlargedandorganizedhisthought`
!or this tasL, we should not expectmuch hom a biologlascinated by
thepresugeolthephysico-chemicalsciences,abiologyreducedorreducing
itselltotheroleolasatelliteolthesesciences.Areduced biologyhasasits
corollarythe eacement olthe biological objectas suchinotherwords,
the devaluauon olits specincity. ow, a biology autonomouswithregard
to bothits subject and its manner olapprehendingthis subjectwhich is
59
60 Philosophy
notto saya biologythatignores or disdains the sciences olmatteralways
risLs, to a certain degree,the qualincauonilnotthe accusationolvitalism.
Jhistermhas served as the labellorsomanyexuavagancesthat, ata mo-
mentwhen the practice olscience has imposed a style olresearch and, so
tospeaL,acodeandadeontologyolscientinclile, vitalismcarriesapejora-
tivevalueeven lor thosebiologists leastinclined toaligntheirobjectwith
that olphysicists and chemists. Jhere arelewbiologists who, classined as
vitalists by their criucs, willingly acceptthis label. !n !rance, atleast, itis
notexactlyacomplimenttoinvoLethenamesandlameol !aracelsusor]an
8aptistvanHelmont.
!tisnonethelessalactthat,ingeneralandasaconsequenceolthesigni-
ncation it acquired in the eighteenth century, the term vitalisz is appro-
priate lor any biology careml to maintain its independence hom the
annexauonistambitionsolthesciencesolmatter.!tishereasimportantto
consider the history olbiology as itis to consider the current state olits
nndings and problems. A philosophy that asLs science lorclarincauons ol
conceptscannotremain uninterested in the construction olthisvery sci-
ence. !n tl+isway,acertainorientauonolbiologicalthought, whateverthe
limitedhistoricalresonance olthe namegivento it,willbeseentohavea
signincance greaterthanjustthatolastageinbiology'sdevelopment.
AtstaLeisnota delenseolvitalism homa scientincpointolview,such
a debate is olreal concern only to biologists. ur concern iswithunder-
standingvitalismhomaphilosophicalpointolview.!tmaybethatvitalism
appearstotoday'sbiologists, astoyesterday's, to be anillusionolthought.
8utlarhomlorbiddingorloreclosingphilosophicalreecuon,thisdenun-
ciauon olits illusorycharacter callslorsuchreecuon,loreven todaythe
necessityolreluungvitalismsignines oneoltwothings. !itheritisanim-
plicitconlession thatthe illusion in question is not olthe same order as
geocenuism or phlogiston theorythat is, ithas avitalityolits ownin
whichcase, one mustphilosophicallyaccountlorthevitalityolthisillusion.
r it is a conlession that the illusion's tenacity has obliged its criucs to
relorge their arguments and weaponsthat is, to recognize in the corre-
spondingtheoreticalorexperimentalgaina benentwhoseimportancecan-
not bewithout relauon to the occasion hom which it proceeds, since it
alwaysturnstowardandagainstthatoccasion.!tisthusthataMarxistbiolo-
gistsays ol8ergsonism,classi[ingitasaphilosophicalspeciesolthegenus
vitalism, that.
Aspecs of Vitalis 6 I
From Bergsonian fnalism there follows a dialectc of life which in its overall
aspect has some analogy to Marxist dialectcs, in the sense that both create new
facts and beings . . . . I biology, of interest would be Bergsonism's critque of
mechanism-had it not been carried out, much earlier, by Marx and Engels. A
for Bergsonism's constructve arguent, it is worthless; Bergsonism is, in hollow
form, the mould of dialectical materialism. !
Jhus,thenrstaspectolvitalismthatphilosophicalreecuonisledtoexam-
ineis, lorus, thevitalityolvitalism.
Aseriesolnames attests to tmsvitality,homHippocrates andAristotle
toHansOriesch,ConstantinvonMonaLow, andKurtGoldstein,bywayol
]an 8aptistvan Helmont, !aul-]oseph 8arthez,]ohann !riedrich 8lumen-
bach, Xavier 8ichat, ]ean 8aptiste LamarcL, ]ohannes Mller, and Karl
!rnstvon8aer,withoutexcludingClaude8ernard.
nemaynoucethatbiologicaltheoryrevealsitselltobeathinLingthat
throughoutitshistoryhasbeendividedandoscillaung.MechanismandVi-
talism conhont one anouer on the problem olsuuctures and mnctions,
Oisconunuity and Conunuityon the problem olthe succession ollorms,
!relormauonand!pigenesisontheproblemolthedevelopmentolabeing,
AtomicityandJotalityontheproblemolindividuality.
Jhis permanent oscillauon, this pendular return to posiuons that
thoughtseemedtohave denniuvelylehbehind,canbeinterpretedindier-
entways. ! a sense, one can asLilthere is really any theoreucalprogress
aside homthe discoveryolnewexperimentallactswhosecerutudeasre-
alitydoesnotatallcompensatelortheincertitudeoltheirsignincauon.!
anothersense, one can consider uis apparent theoretical oscillauon to be
theexpressionolanundiscovereddialecucandunderstandthereturntothe
same posiuonas occurring bythe opucal error thanLs towhichwealways
perceivedierentpoints onaline as one andthe samewhenprojectedona
perpendicular plane. And, transposing the dialecucal process olthought
onto the real, one can maintain that it is lile, the object olstudy itsell,
thatis the dialecucal essence, whose structure thoughtmust espouse. Jhe
oppositions olMechanism andVitalism, !relormauon and !pigenesis are
thustranscendedbylileitsellasitextendsinto atheoryollile.
Jo understand thevitalityolvitalism is to engage in the searchlorthe
meaningoltherelationshipbetweenlileandscienceingeneral,lileandthe
scienceollilemorespecincally.
62 Philosophy
A dennedby!aul-]oseph8arthez,aphysicianoltheMontpellierSchool
intheeighteenthcentury,vitalismexplicitlyclaimstobelongtotheHippo-
crauctradiuon,thisn liauonisundoubtedlymoreimportantthantheAris-
toteliannliauon, lor ilvitalismohen borrows termshomAristotelianism,
italwaysholdsontothespiritolHippocrausm.
I call the vital principle of man the cause that produces all the phenomena of life
in the human body. The name for this cause is rather unimportant and can be
chosen at will. If I prefer the name vital principle, that is because it presents an
idea less limited than the name impetzmz faciens (to enorin) that Hippocrates
gave it, or other names by which one has designated the cause of the fnctons
of life. 2
!tisnotwithoutinteresttoconsidervitalismtobethebiologyolphysi-
cians sLepucal olthe constraining power olremedies. ! pathology, the
Hippocrauc theoryolthe natura medicatrix accords greaterimportance to
the organism's reaction and delense than to the morbid cause. Jhe art ol
prognosisprevailsoverthatoldiagnosis,onwhichitdepends.!tisasimpor-
tanttopredictthecourseola disease asitisto determineitscause.Jhera-
peuucs consists as much in prudence as in audacity, lor the nrst among
doctors isnature. Jhus, vitalismandnaturalismareindissociable. Medical
vitalismistheexpressionoladistrust,shallwesayaninstincuveone,olthe
poweroltechniqueoverlile. JhereisananalogyherewiththeAristotelian
opposition between natural andvolentmovement. Vitalismisthe expres-
sionolthe conndence uelivngbeinghasinlile, olthesell-idenutyollile
within thelivinghumanbeingconsciousolliving.
Ve canthussuggestthatvitalismtranslatesapermanentexigencyollile
inthe living, the sell-identityollile immanent to thelivng.Jhis explains
oneolthe characteristics that mechanist biologists andrauonalistphiloso-
pherscriucizeinvtalism.itsnebulousness,itsvagueness.!lvitalismisabove
all an exigency, itis normal that itwould have some uouble lormulating
itsellin terms oldeterminauons. Jhiswill emerge more clearlyin a com-
parisonwithmechanism.
!lvitalismtranslatesapermanentexigencyollilewithinthelivng,mech-
anismuanslatesapermanentatutudeolthelivinghumantowardlile. Man
isherealivngbeingseparatedhomlilebyscienceandattemptingtorejoin
lile through science. !lvitalism, beingan exigency, isvague andunlormu-
lated,mechanism,beingamethod,issuictand imperious.
Aspec of Vitals 6
3
Mechanism,asiswellLnown, comeshommechane, whosemeaning, 'en-
gine, containstwosenses.thatolruseandsuatagem,ontheonehand,and
that olmachine, on the other. ne could asLwhetherthe twomeanings
do not amount to just one. !s not man's invenuon and utilizauon olma-
chines, and technicalactivityin general,whatHegel calledthe ruse olrea-
son`Jheruseolreasonconsistsinreason'saccomplishingitsendsthrough
the intermediary olobjects acung upon one another in conlormity with
their nature. !ssentially, a machineis a mediauon or, asmechanists say, a
relay.Amechanism does notcreateanythingandthereinliesitsmerit(in-
ars)but it can be constructed only through art, and it is a ruse. Jhus
mechanism,asascientinc methodandasaphilosophy,istheimplicitpostu-
late olall usage olmachines. Humanruse canonlysucceedilnature does
nothavethe sameruse. ArtcanonlymaLenaturesubmitto itilnatureis
notitsellanart.JhewoodenhorsecannotbebroughtintoJroyunlessone
isnamed\lyssesandislacedwithenemieswhoarelorcesolnaturerather
than astuteengineers.Jo the Cartesiantheoryoltheanimal-machine, one
has always opposed the ruses used by animals to evade traps. Leibniz,
adopung in the loreword to his New Essays on Human Understanding the
Cartesian thesis that animals are capable only olempirical consecuuons
(todaywe would say condiuoned reexes), gives as proololit the lacility
with which man entraps animals. Reciprocally, the hypothesis olthe de-
ceiver Godorevil genius lormulated byOescartesin theMeditations ends
upturningmanintoananimalsurroundedbytraps.!tisimpossiblelorman
toatuibutetoGodtheveryrusethatmanusestodealwithanimalswithout
intheprocessnulli[ingmanasalivingbeing,reducinghimtoinerua. 8ut
isonenotthenjusunedinconcludingthatthetheoryolthelivingmachine
isahumanrusethat,iltaLenliterally,wouldnulli[theliving`!ltheanimal
isnothingmorethanamacmne,andthesameholdslorthewholeolnature,
whyissomuchhumaneortexpendedinordertoreducethemtothat`
Jhatvtalismmaybeanexigencyratherthana method and a morality
ratherthanatheorywasperceivedby!manuelRdl,who spoLe,itseems,
withmllLnowledgeolthelacts.
Man,hesays, can considernaturei ntwo ways. !itherhefels himsel a
childolnatureand experiences asenumentolbelongingandsubordinauon
toit,heseeshimsellinnatureandnatureinhimsell.relse,heholds himsel
in hont ol nature as belore a loreign, indennable object. A scientist who
experiencesa nlialsenument, asenumentolsympathytowardnature, does
6
4
Philosophy
not consider natural phenomena to besuange and loreignhe nnds lile,
soul, andmeaninginthem, completelynaturally. Suchamanishdamen-
tallyavitalist.!lato,Aristotle,Galen, allthemenoltheMiddleAges, and
alargenumberolthe menolthe Renaissancewere, inthissense,vitalists.
Jheyconsideredtheuniverseto beanorganism, thatistosay,aharmoni-
oussystemregulated accordingto both laws and ends. Jheyconceived ol
themselves as an organized partoltheuniverse, a sortolcell intheuni-
verse-organism,andallcellswereuninedbyaninternalsympathysuchthat
thedesunyoltheorgan-partseemednaturallytohavetodowiththemove-
mentsoltheheavens.
!l this interpretation (in which the psychoanalysis olLnowledge un-
doubtedlynndsmaterial)merits beingretained, thisisbecauseitcoincides
withValtherRiese'scommentariesonConstantinvonMonaLow'sbiologi-
caltheories.'!vonMonaLow'sneurobiology,manisachildolnaturewho
never abandons his mother's bosom. !t is certain that, lorvitalists, the
lundamental biological phenomenonwith the images it evoLes and the
problemsitraisesresonaung,toadegree,withthemeaningolotherbiolog-
ical phenomenais the phenomenon olgenerauon. A vitalist, we would
suggest,isamanwhoisledtomeditateontheproblemsollilemorebythe
contemplationolaneggthanbythehandlingolawinchoranironbellows.
Jhisvtalist conndence in the spontaneityollile, this reluctance (and
even, lor some, horror) to consider lile as springing lorth hom a nature
broLen downintomechanismsanatureparadoxicallyreduced tonothing
morethanacollecuonolenginesanalogoustothosecreatedbyhumanwill
inordertostruggleagainstnatureasagainstanobstacleisembodiedbya
manliLe]an8apustvanHelmont.VanHelmontisoneolthethreevtalist
doctorswhomthehistoryolphilosophycannotignore.JhomasVillis,be-
cause ol8erLeley (Siris); van Helmont, because olLeibniz (Monadolog);
]ohann!riedrich8lumenbach,becauseolKant(Critique of Judgent).
RdlpresentsvanHelmontasamysuc,rebellinginLouvainagainstthe
science andpedagogyolthe]esuits(whosepupilsincluded Oescartes), re-
turningdeliberatelytoAristotleandHippocrates, andbypassingOescartes,
Harvey, 8acon,andGalileo,whomhescornsorignores.VanHelmontbe-
lievesin thepoweroltheworld, inasuology, inwitches,in the devl.He
taLesexperimentalscienceandmechanismtobetheworLolboththe]esuits
and the devil. He reluses mechanism because itis a hypothesisthatisto
say, a ruse olintelligencewithrespecttothereal.JheJruth, accordingto
Aspects of Vitalsm 6
5
him,isreality,itexists.Adthoughtisnothingbutareecuon.JheJruth
piercesmanliLelighuing.VereLnowledgeisconcerned,vanHelmontis
anintegralrealist.
Van Helmontis lar hom accepungthe unityolnaturallorces, as Oes-
cartesdid.!verybeinghasitslorce,aspecinclorce.atureisaninnnityol
hierarchizedlorcesandlorms.Jhishierarchyincludesseeds, lerments, the
Archei,andthe!deas.JhelivingbodyisorganizedbyahierarchyolArchei.
Jhisterm (archeus), taLenhom !aracelsus, designates a directingand or-
ganizinglorce,whichresembles theleaderolanarmymorethanaworLer.
Jhis is areturnto theAristotelian idea olthebodysubmttingto the soul
liLe a soldier to aleader,liLea slave to a master. ' Letus note once again,
inthisregard, thatthehostilityolvitalismto mechanismis aimedasmuch
andperhaps more againstitstechnologicallormasitstheoreticallorm.
8ecausenoauthenucvitalityissterile,thesecondaspectolvitalismthat
interestsusisitslecundity.
Amongitscriucs,vitalismgenerallyhasthereputationolbeingchimeri-
cal.Andthistermis,inthecaseinpoint, alltheharshernowthatbiologists
kowhowto labricatechimeras byj oiningcells obtainedbythe divisionol
eggshom dierent species. Hans Spemann labricatedthenrstanimalchi-
merasbytransplantingussueshomyounguitonembryosoldierentspe-
cies onto each other. Jhis labricauon ol chimeras has been a precise
argument againstvitalism. Since it is possible to lorm a living being ol
equivocalspecies,whatisthevtalprincipleortheentelechythatrulesand
guides the cooperation between the two species olcells` Oo quesuons ol
precedence orjurisdictionarise betweenthetwo specinc entelechies` !tis
incontestablethatHans Spemann'sexperimentsandhistheoryolthe 'or-
ganizerhave ledtotheinterpretauonolgerminal localizauonsinawayat
nrstapparentlylavorabletothemechanistviewpoint. ' ' Jhe dynamicolthe
developmentolthe embryo isconuolledbyalocalizedzonelorexample,
theimmediateenvironmentoltheprimiuvemouthinthecaseolthenewt.
ow, to startwiu,theorganizercansumulateanddirectthedevelopment
olan embryo ola dierent species onto which ithas been grahed, more-
over, loritto do so, itisnotnecessary thatitbe alive. Jhe desucuonol
the organizer by heat does notnulli[its power olorganizauonand, in
the end, it is possible to compare the organizer's acuon to the acuons ol
chemicalsubstancesolthesterollamilypreparedinvitro(theworLol]ohn
Jurberville eedham). Yet one lact nevertheless remains-and here the
momentarily uiumphant mechanist interpretauon is laced with a new
66
Philosophy
obstacle. though the action ol the organizer is notspecinc, its eect is. A
hog organizer, grahed onto atriton, induces the lormauonolthenervous
axis ola uiton. Oierent causes obtain the same eect, dierent eects
dependonthesamecause.Jheorganizer,reducedtoachemicalsuucture,
maywellbeconsidereda cause, ilonewishes, butacausewithoutnecessary
causality.Jhecausalitybelongsto thesystemconstitutedbythe organizer
plus the tissue ontowhichitis implanted. Jhe causalityisthatolawhole
on itsell, notoloneparton another. Jhuswehave here a specinc casein
whichthe chimericalinterpretauonisrebornoutolitsashes.
!tisnonethelessonlytootruethatthetheoreucalnouonselicitedbythe
vitalistexigency,inthelaceolobstaclesencounteredbymechanisttheoreti-
cal notions, areverbalnouons.Jo speaL olthe vital principle, liLe 8arthez,
olthevital frce, liLe 8ichat, olentelechy, liLe Oriesch, orolthehore, liLe
vonMonaLow,istobegthequesuon. ' nthispointeventhephilosophers
mostsympathetictothespiritolvitalismagreeweneedonlyciteAntoine-
Augustin Cournot (Materialisme, vitalisme, rationalise), Claude 8ernard
(Lefons sur les phenomenes de la vie communs aux animazlX et aux vegetaux), and
RaymondRuyer(
E
lements de pschobiologie).
Vitalism'slecundityappearsatnrstglancetobeallthemorecontestable
in thatas itnavelyshowsbysoohenborrowinghom GreeLthe names
lortheratherobscureentiuesitconsidersitsellobligedtoinvoLeitalways
presents itsellas a return to anuquity. Jhevitalism olthe Renaissanceis a
returnto !lato againstanoverlyrauonalizedAristotle. Jhevitalismol]an
8aptistvanHelmont,Georg!rnstStahl, and!aul-]oseph8arthezis, ashas
been said, a return, beyond Oescartes, to theAristotle olDe anima. Jhe
lactsinHans Oriesch's casearecommonkowledge.8utwhatisthemean-
ing olthis return to anuquity` !s it a revalorizauon olconcepts that are
chronologicallyolder and consequentlymoreworn out, or a nostalgia lor
intuiuons ontologicallymoreoriginalandcloserto theirobject`Archaeol-
ogyisjustas much areturnto sources asitis a love olthe old. Ve come
closer to graspingthe biological and human sense oltools and machines,
lor example,whenwehavebeloreus a intstone oranadzeinstead olan
electrical umeswitchor a camera. And, moreover,whenitcomesto theo-
riesonemustbecertainoltheiroriginsandthedirectionoltheirdevelop-
mentinordertointerpretareturnasastepbacLwardandanabandonment
as a reaction or as treason. Vas Aristotle'svitalism not already a reacuon
against Oemocritus's mechanism, as !lato's nnalism in the Phaedo was a
Aspects of Vital 6
7
reacuonagainstAnaxagoras'smechanism`!tiscertain,inanycase,uatthe
vitalist's eye seeLs a certain nave vision olthings, a pretechnological and
prelogicalvision, a vsion ollile anterior to tools and language, that is, to
insumentscreatedbyman toextend and consolidatelile.!tisinthis sense
thatJheophile de 8ordeu ( 1 72 2-76), the nrst great theoretician olthe
Montpellier School, calledvan Helmont'one olthose enthusiasts needed
ineachcenturyinordertoLeepthescholasucsbreathless. '
!ti sup to the lacts andupto historytojudgethe lecundityolvitalism.
nemustbecaremlnottocreditvitalismwithachievementsmadebyinves-
ugators associated with vitalism afer the discovery olthese lacts and not
/c{rclacts hom which their vtalist conceptions lollowed but to which
they did not lead. Hans Oriesch was led to vtalism and to the docuine
olentelechy,lorexample,byhis discoveries olthe totipotence olthe nrst
blastomeres olthe sea-urchin egglertilized duringtheprocess oldivision.
Yethehadiniuallyconductedthisresearch(1 891-95) withtheintentionol
connrmingtheworLolVilhelmRouxonthehogeggandthedoctrineol
Enticklungsechanik ('developmentalmechanics).
|

Jhat said, a history olbiology systemauc enough not to privilege any

bias orpointolvewwould perhaps teach us thatthe lecundityolvitalism
as suchislarhomnulland in parucular thatthis lecundityis a mnction
olhistorical and nauonal circumstances, whose signincance is somewhat
dimcultto esumate andnts poorlyeitherthe rigid theoreucalhameworLs
olrace,milieu, andhistoricalmomentorthe more exible theories olhis-
toricalmaterialism.
|

Jhe adherence olCaspar!riedrichVol( 1 73 3-94) tovitalist concep-

tionsdidnotpreventhimhomuulyloundingmodernembryology,thanLs
tohiscapableandprecisemicroscopeobservations,inuoducinghistoryand
dynamicsintotheexplanauonolthesuccessivemomentsintheegg'sdevel-
opment.!twasanothervitalist,Karl!rnstvon8aer,who,aherdiscovering
mammal eggs in 1 82 7, in 1 82 8 lormulated his germ-layertheorythere-
sult olremarLable observauons on the producuon olthe nrst embryonic
lormauons. At that time, to bea vitalist was notnecessarily to slow down
the progress olscientinc research.
Jhehistoryolthedevelopmentolcelltheoryincludesamongitsprecur-
sors and lounders as manyvitalists as mechanists. ' Vere vitalists in Ger-
many(Lorenz Len and]ohannes Mller), mechanists in !rance (Charles
8risseau-Mirbel,HenriOutrochet)`Jhelactsaremuchmorecomplex.Jo
68 Pbilosopby
taLe justoneexample,JheodorSchwann,who is rightlyconsideredtohave
established the general laws olcell lormation ( : S S), could also beseen as
having been sympathetic to certain anumechanist conceptions because ol
his belielin the existence ola lormauve blastomere inwhich cells appear
secondarily, ila lormative blastomere exists, then the living being is not
simplya mosaic or coalitionolcells. !nversely, RudollVirchow, dogmauc
delender olthe explicauve omnivalence olthe concept olthe cell, hostile
to the theory olthe lormative blastomere, author olthe aphorism Omnis
celula e cellula ('each stell stems hom anouercell), generallypasseslora
stalwart mechanist. 8utin the opinion ol]ohn ScottHaldane, the opposite
istrue.Schwann,anorthodoxCatholic,prolessorattheCatholic\niver-
sityolLouvain, was a strict mechanist. hebelieved that cells appearinthe
primal substance byprecipitation, the amrmation that each cell originates
inapreexistingcell seems in comparisonliLe adeclarauonolvitalism.
Jhere is another domain, although this is generally little Lnown, in
which vitalist biologists can claim discoveries as authenuc as unexpected.
neurology. Reex theorywe do not speaL here olthe experimental or
clinical description olautomaticmovementsprobablyowes its lormation
moretovitaliststhanto mechanists, homtheseventeenthcentury(Jhomas
Villis) to the beginningolthenineteenthcentury(!duard!riedrichVil-
helm !ger). Georg!rochasLato cite him aloneis partolthis tradi-
tion ol biologists who were led to the notion ol reex by their vitalist
theoriesolthesensorium commune andthemedullarysoul.Jhelatermecha-
nizationolreextheorycannotbelieitsorigins.
I S
Yethistorywouldalsoshowthat, eventhoughthevitalistbiologisti nhis
youth may have participated in the advancement olscience through con-
nrmedexperimentalworL,inlateryearsheohenendsupengaginginphilo-
sophical speculation and supplemenung pure biology with philosophical
biology. Al in all, he is hee to do as heliLesbutone is jusuned in re-
proachinghimlorseeLingto pronthomhis capacityasbiologistonphilo-
sophical terrain. Jhe vitalist biologist who urns philosopher olbiology
thinLs he bringsacertaincapitalwithhim to philosophy, butinrealityhe
bringstoitonlya land-income [rentes] , whichconunuallydecreasesin the
marLetolscientincvalueslorthesimplereasonthatresearch,inwhichhe
no longer participates, continues to move lorward. Such is the case with
Oriesch's abandonmentolscientincresearchlorphilosophicalspeculation
Aspec of Vitalism 6
9
andeven teaching. Vhatwehave here is anunpremeditated abuse olcon-
ndence. Jhe presuge olscienunc worL stems above all hom its internal
dynamism.Jhelormerscienustseeshimselldeprivedolt|:ispresugeinthe
eyes olacuvescienusts. Hebelieveshewillpreserveitamongthephiloso-
phers.Jhismustnotbeso. !hilosophy, beinganautonomousenterpriseol
reecuon, doesnothonoranypresugeatall,noteventhatolthescientist,
orevenmorerightlythatoltheex-scienust.
!s itpossible toacLnowledgetheselactswithoutlooLinglor theircause
inthevitalistexigency`Ooesn'tthevitalistconndenceinliletranslateinto
a tendency toward negligence, laziness, lacL ol ardor lor biological re-
search` !sn'tthere amongthe postulates olvitalismaninternalreason lor
its intellectualsterility, as its adversariessuspectandvigorouslyamrm`
!svitalismnothingmore than the transposiuon olthe limits olmecha-
nismandthephysico-chemicalexplicauonollileintodogmaucinterdicts`
Jo use8achelard'sexpression, areweinthepresence olalalseconception
olthenotionolepistemological hontier` ' !svitalism anythingotherthan
aremsalto grantmechanismtheumeitneedstocompleteitsproject`]ean
Rostand linLs it to precisely this remsal. 'Atpresent, mechanism has an
extremely solid position, and one hardly sees how one can respond to it
when,suonginitsdailysuccesses,itasLsonlylorumetocompleteitsworL,
to completel explain li without li. "2
0
A 8achelardremarLs. 'Anyabsolute honuerproposedto science isthe
marLolabadlystatedproblem. . . . !tisto be learedthatscienuncthought
does notretain uaces olphilosophical limitauons. . . . ppressivehontiers
are illusory honuers. ' Jhese considerauonsquite accurate in them-
selves and perlectly adapted to our problemare in lactvalid lorvitalism
insolar as we can equate itwith a docuine that seeLs to explain a division
wiu:in experience, as with a biologist liLe 8ichat. !or 8ichat, the acts ol
lile oppose their instability and irregularity to the invariabilityolphysical
lawsliLe a 'reelonwhich all the calculauons olphysicist-doctors olthe
previouscenturyhave been suanded. Headds.
Physics and chemistry are conjoined because the same laws preside over their
phenomena. But an immense interval separates them fom the science of orga
nized bodies, because an enormous diference exists between their laws and those
of life. To say that physiology is the physics of animals is to give an extemely
inexact idea of it; I would as much like to say that astronomy is the physiology of
the stars.22
70 Philosophy
!short, the classicalvitalistaccepts the inseruonolthe livingorganism
into a physical milieu to whose laws it constitutes an excepuon. Jherein
lies,inouropinion, thephilosophically inexcusable lault.Jherecannotbe
an empire within an empire without there being no longer any empire,
neitheras containernorascontents.Jhere canbeonlyonephilosophyol
empire, thatwhich remses any division. imperialism. Jhe imperialism ol
physicistsorchemistsisthusperlectlylogical,pushingtoitslimittheexpan-
sionollogicorthelogicolexpansion. necannotdelendtheoriginalityol
thebiologicalphenomenon,andconsequentlytheoriginalityolbiology,by
demarcaungwithinthephysico-chemical territorythat is, within the mi-
lieuolinertia,olexternallydeterminedmovementsenclavesolindetermi-
nation, zones ol dissidence, or loyers ol heresy. !l one is to assert the
originalityolthe biological, this mustbe interms olthe originalityolone
realmoverthewholeolexperience,andnotoverisletsolexperience.!nthe
end, classical vitalism sins, paradoxically, onlyin its excessive modesty, in
itsreluctancetouniversalizeitsconcepuonolexperience.
nceonerecognizestheoriginalityollile,onemust"comprehend" mat-
terwithinlile, and the science olmatterwhich is science itsellwithin
the activty oltheliving. !hysics and chemistry, in seeLing to reduce the
specincityolthelivng, didnomorethanremainlaithmltotheirunderlyng
intention,whichisto determine thelawsbetweenobjects,validwithoutany
relerenceto anabsolute, cenual point olrelerence.Joday, thisdetermina-
uon has led them to recognize the immanence olmeasuring to the mea-
sured,andtoseethecontentolobservauonprotocolsasrelativetothevery
actolobservauon.Jhemilieuinwhichone looLs lortheemergenceollile
onlyacquiresitsmeaningasmilieuinvirtueoltheoperauonolthehuman
living beingwho taLes measurements olit, measurements that bear anes-
senualrelationto the technicalapparatusesandproceduresbywhichthey
aremade. Aerthree centuries olexperimental andmathemaucalphysics,
mileu, whichinphysics nrstsigninedenvironment, hascometo signi[cen
terin both physics and biology. !thas come to signi[whatitsignined
atits very origin. !hysics is a science olnelds, olmilieus. 8utithas been
discovered that, in orderlor there to be an envronment, theremustbea
center. !tis the position ola living being, its relauon to the experience it
livesinasatotality,thatgivesthemilieumeaningascondiuonsolexistence.
nlyalivngbeing, in{a-human, can coordinate a milieu. Jo explainthe
centerbythe environmentwouldthusseemtobea paradox.
Aspect of Vitalis 7 I
Jhisinterpretauon doesnottaLeanythingawayhomaphysicsas deter-
ministasitwantsto beandcanbeitdoes nottaLeawayhomphysicsany
olits objects. 8ut it includes the physical interpretation within another,
which is vaster and more comprehensive, since the meaning olphysics is
jusunedwithinitandtheacuvityolthephysicistmllysecured.
Sull, homanauthenucallybiologicalpointolview, ageneraltheoryol
themilieuolmanastechnicianandscientist[l'homme technicien et savant]
oneliLe]aLobvon\exLll'stheorylortheanimalandKurtGoldstein'slor
the sicLremainsto be elaborated.
Jhus understood, a biological point olview onthetotality olexperience
appears perlectly honest, both as regards man the scienust [l'homme sa
tant]specincally, the physicianand as regards living man [l'homme vi
vant] . Jhis very character ol honesty is contested by the mechanist and
materialistadversariesola biologythatisjealousolitsmethodicalanddoc-
trinalautonomy.Jhis,then,isthethird aspectolvitalismthatwepropose
toexamine.
Vitalism is held byits criucs to be scientincallyreuogradeandwe have
shownhow,lorus, this regress should beunderstood.!tis also held to be
politicallyreactionaryorcounter-revoluuonary.
Classical vitalism (thatolthe seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) ex-
poses itsellto this accusauon bymaintaininga relauon to animism(Georg
!rnst Stahl), whichisthe theoryaccordingtowhich thelileolthe animal
body depends on the existence and acuviqola soul endowedwithallthe
atuibutes ol intelligence'Jhis vital, acuve, and viv[ing principle ol
man, endowed with the laculty olreasoning, ! mean, the reasoning soul
suchasitis`andacungonthe bodyasonesubstanceon another, hom
which itis ontologicallydisunct. Here, lile is to the livngbodywhatthe
Cartesiansoulisto thehuman body,whichitdoes notanimatebutwhose
movementsitgovernsvoluntarily, theCartesiansoulwouldnotceasetobe
all thatitis ila bodywere notalive. Vitalism contaminatedwithanimism
thusencountersthe same criucisms, atonce philosophical and political, as
dualistspiritualism.Jhereasonslorseeingspiriualismasareactionaryphi-
losophy become reasons lor holding vtalist biology to be a reactionary
biology.
72 Philosophy
Joday, aboveall, the uulizauon olvitalistbiologybyaziideology,the
mysuncauonthat consisted inusing theories olGanzheit ('wholeness) to
advocate against individualist, atomist, and mechanist liberalism and in
lavoroltotalitarianlorcesand sociallorms, andtherathereasyconversion
olvitalistbiologiststoazismhaveservedtoconnrmtheaccusauonlormu-
lated by positivist philosophers liLe !hilipp !ranL, as well as by the
Marxists.
Oriesch's thoughtrepresents a typicalcaseolthe transplantauon olthe
biological conceptolorganictotalityontopoliucalterrain.Aer I 93 3 , the
entelechy came to be seen as the Fuhrer olthe organism. Vhatwas re-
sponsible lor the pseudo-scienunc jusuncation ol the Fuhrerprinzip
vitalism or Oriesch's character` Andwas it Oarwinism or!aul 8ourget's
characterin his response to Charles Maurras's Enquete sur la Monarchie
(Investigations on Monarchy)-that wasresponsiblelortheexploitationolthe
conceptolnaturalselecuoninthepoliucalarena`!sthisamatterolbiol-
ogy or olparasiusmolbiology` Couldwe not thinL, rather,thatpoliucs
simplyborrowshombiologywhatithasalreadylenttoit`Aristotle'snouon
ola soulthatis to thebodywhatthepoliucal ordomesuc leaderisto the
cityorthelamily, andvanHelmont'snouonolthearcheus asanarmygen-
eralareprengurauonsolOriesch'stheories. !Aristotle, the suuctureand
mncuons olthe organism are expounded by analogieswith a tool intelli-
gentlymanipulatedandwiuahumansocietyuninedbycommand. !the
exploitauonolanumechanistbiologicalconceptsbyazisociologists,what
isatstaLeistheproblemoltherelauonbetweenorganismandsociety.o
biologist can, qua biologist, givethis quesuon a responsewhose authority
would be guaranteed by biological lacts alone. !t is as absurd to seeL in
biologya jusuncationlora poliucs and economics olexploitauon olman
by man as itwould be to deny the uuth olmnctional hierarchies in the
living organism and the integrauon olmnctions olrelauon at ascending
levels (Sherrington) simply because one is a parusan, lor reasons olsocial
jusuce, olaclasslesssociety.
Moreover, vtalist biologywas not all the azis annexed and oriented
towardtheirsell-serving conclusions.JheytooLgeneucstojusu[racist
eugenics,techniquesolsterilizationandaruncialinseminauonjustasthey
didOarwinism, tojusu[theirimperialismandtheirpoliucsolLebensraum.
necannomorehonestlyreproachabiologyconcernedwithitsautonomy
Aspecs of Vital
73
lor having beenuulizedbyazism than one can reproach arithmeuc and
the calculauonolcompoundinterestslorhaving beenutilizedbycapitalist
banLers oractuaries.Jhesell-interestedconversionolcertainbiologiststo
azismproves nothingagainstthe qualityoleitherthe experimental lacts
themselves or the supposiuons accepted to account lor these lacts
suppositions to which these biologists, prior to their conversion, had be-
lievedtheyowedtheirscienuncsupport.neisnotobligedtolocatewithin
biology,asalogicallyinevitableconsequence,theatutudethatcertainbiol-
ogistsadoptedoutolalacLolcharacterandphilosophicalresoluteness.
!lwe looLlor vitalism's meaningin its origins, and lor its purity atits
sources,wewillnotbetemptedtoreproachHippocratesortheRenaissance
humanistslorthedishonestyoltheirvitalism.
!tmustnevertheless beacLnowledged thatitisneitherwithoutinterest
norentirelylalse tothinLolthe oensiveor delensivereturns olvital-
ismasuedtobourgeoissociety'scrises olconndenceintheemcacyolcapi-
talistinsutuuons. Sull, thisinterpretauon olthe phenomenonmay appear
tooweaL,intheepistemologicalsense,ratherthantoosuong.!tmayappear
tooweaLinasmuchasitpresentsaphenomenonolbiologicalcrisiswithin
thehumanspeciesaphenomenonthatisa matter olatechnologicalphi-
losophyandnotonlya poliucal philosophyas aphenomenonolpoliucal
andsocialcrisis.Jherebirthsolvitalismtranslate,perhapsindisconunuous
lashion, lile'spermanentdisuustolthe mechanizauon ollile. ! themwe
nndlile seeLingtoputmechanism bacLintoits placewithinlile.
\lumately, the dialecucal interpretauon olbiological phenomena de-
lendedbyMarxistphilosophersisjusuned,butitisjusunedbywhatwithin
lilerebelsagainstitsmechanizauon. !ldialecucsinbiologyisjusunable,it
is because what gave rise to vitalismin the lorm olan exigency rather
thanadocuineandexplainsitsvitalityisloundinlile. thisislile'sproper
spontaneity,whatClaude8ernardexpressedbysayingthatlileiscreation. '
!tis,nevertheless, easierto denouncemechanismandscienusmi nbiol-
ogyinwordsthanitis to give up in lacttheirpostulates andtheatutudes
theycompel.!lMarxistbiologistsareattenuvetotheinvenuonandirreduc-
ibilityliledisplays,theyshouldpraisevitalismloritsobjectivitytowardcer-
taincharacterisucsollile. A an!nglish biologist,]ohn8urdon Sanderson
Haldane, the son ol]ohn Scott Haldane, writes in his booL The Marxist
Philosophy and the Sciences,32 a theorysuch as Samuel 8utler's, which posits,
74
Philosophy
within a LamarcLianpoint olview, consciousness as the principle ollile,
contains a priori nothing that dialecucal materialism could not eventually
accommodate. 8utwehave read nothingolthesorthere in!rance.
nthe otherhand,]eanVahl,inhis Tableau de la philosophie franfaise, 35
haslortunatelybroughttolighttheconsiderableroleolvtalismintheworL
olthoseeighteenth-centuryphilosophers ordinarilythoughtolasmaterial-
ists. Oiderotishereshowntous asa philosopherwitha senseoltheunity
ollile, situated 'on thepaththatleadshomLeibnizto 8ergson, hisdoc-
trine is characterized as a 'vtalistmaterialism, and as a 'return to the
Renaissance.
!theend,todojusucetovitalismissimplytogivelilebacLtoit.
FOUR
Machine and Organism
Jhemechanical theoryolthe organism, aherhavinglongbeenaccepted as
dogma inbiology, is today consideredbybiologists adheringto dialectical
materialismto beanarrowandinsumcientpointolview. Oealingwiththis
theory hom aphilosophicalpointolviewcould therelore seemto connrm
thewidespread nouon thatphilosophy does nothaveits own domain, that
itis but speculauon's poor relauon, obliged to dress in clothes worn out
andabandonedbyscienusts.VewouldliLeto trytoshowthatthe subject
ismuchmorevastandcomplex, andthatitisphilosophicallymoreimpor-
tant than its reducuon to a matter ol docuine and method in biology
presupposes.
Ve mightevensaythatthesciencethatwouldappropriatethisproblem
isitsellsullaproblem,lor,thoughtherearegoodworLsontechnology,the
verynouonandmethodsolan'organologyremainvague.Jhus,paradoxi-
cally,larhomcominginbelatedlytooccupyanabandonedviewpoint,phi-
losophypointssciencetowardaposiuontotaLe.!ndeed,theproblemolthe
75
7
6 Pbilosopby
relationsbetweenmachineandorganismhasgenerallybeenstudiedonlyin
one direction. almostalways,the attempthas been to explainthe suucture
and mnction olthe organism onthebasis olthe structure and mncuon ol
an already-constructed machine. nlyrarely has anyone sought to under-
standtheveryconstructionolthemachineonthebasisolthesuctureand
lunctionoltheorganism.
!hilosophers and mechanist biologists have taLen the machine to be a
givenor, when theyhave studiedits consuucuon, theyhave explained it
byinvoknghuman calculauon. Jheyhave appealedto the engineerthat
is, lor them, to the scientist. Oeceived by the ambiguity olthe term me-
chanical, theyhaveseenmachines as nothing but theorems solidined and
displayedin concreto by a totallysecondaryoperation olconsuucuonthe
simple application olaLnowledge conscious olitsimportandcertainolits
eects. However,we believe thatitisnotpossibletoaddressthebiological
problem ol the organism-machine by separaung it hom a technological
problem thatitpresumesresolvedthatolthe relauonship betweentech-
nique and science. Jhis problem isusuallyexplained bywayolthe logical
and chronological anteriority olLnowledge vis--vis its applicauons. 8ut
we will try to show that one cannot understand the phenomenon olthe
construction olmachines by recourse to authentically biological notions
without engaging at the same time the problem olthe originality olthe
technicalphenomenoninrelationtothe scienuncphenomenon.
Ve willthusexaminesuccessively.themeaningolthecomparisonolthe
organism to a machine, the relationship betweenmechanismand nnalism,
thereversalolthetraditionalrelauonship betweenmachineandorganism,
andthephilosophicalconsequencesolthisreversal.
Vith theexceptionolvertebrates, livingbeingsandtheirlormsrarelydis-
playtothescrupulousobserverdevices [dispositi] thatcouldevoLetheidea
ola mechanism, in thesensegiven to this term by scientists. !La pensee
technique (Technical Thought), lor example,]ulien !acotte observes thatthe
articulations olthe limbsandthemovements olthe eyeball correspond, in
the living organism, to what mathematicians call a mechanism. ' Ve may
denne a machine as an artincial construct, a worL olman, whose essenual
lunctiondependsonmechanisms.Amechanismisaconngurauonolsolids
in motion such that the mouon does not abolish the conngurauon. Jhe
Machine and Organis
77
mechanismisthusanassemblageoldelormableparts,withperiodicrestora-
uonoltherelationsbetweenthem.Jhe assemblage consistsinasystemol
connectionswiuadetermineddegreeolheedom.lorexample,apendulum
andacamvalveeachhaveonedegreeolheedom,athreadedscrewhastwo.
Jhe material realizauon olthese degrees olheedom consists in guides~
thatis,inlimitauonsonthemovementsolsolidsincontact.!nanymachine,
movementisthusamncuonoltheassemblage, andmechanismisamnction
olconngurauon.Jhe mndamental principlesolageneraltheoryolmecha-
nismsthusunderstoodcanbelound,lorexample,in!ranzReuleaux'swell-
LnownworLonLinemaucs.
Jhemovements produced (butnotcreated) bymachines are geometri-
cal, measurable displacements. Jhe mechanismregulates and uanslorms a
movementwhoseimpulseisuansmitted toit.Amechanismisnotamotor.
neolthesimplestexamplesolsuchtranslormauonolmovementsconsists
in gathering an iniual translateral movement into rotational lorm via the
intermediary ol technical devices such as a wheel cranL or an eccentric
cranL. aturally, mechanismscanbe combined, bysuperposiuonorbyad-
diuon.necanconsuuctmechanismsthatmodi[theconngurauonolthe
original mechanism and render the machine alternately capable olseveral
mechanisms.Jhisisthecaseinmodincauonseectedbyreleaseorengage-
mentacuonslor example, theheewheel onabicycle.
Ve have already stated that what i sthe rule i nhuman indus is the
excepuoninthe suucture olthe organismandinnature, andwemustadd
to this that, inthehistoryoltechniques, olhuman inventions, conngura-
tionsbyassemblagewerenotthe earliest. Jhe oldestLnowntoolsaremade
olonepiece.Jheconsucuonolaxesorarrows byass

mblingaintand
a shah, ortheconsuuctionolnetsorlabrics,wasnotprimiuve.Jheirap-
pearanceisgenerallydatedtotheendoltheQuaternary.
JhisbrielreminderoltheelementaryconceptsolLinemaucsisusemlin
allowingusto poseinallitsparadoxicalsignincancethelollowingproblem.
!ow do we explainthe lact thata model lor understandingthesuucture
andlunctionsolthe organism has been soughtin machines andin mecha-
nisms,asdennedabove`!tseemspossibletoanswerthatthisisbecausethe
representationolthe livng being bya mechanicalmodel does notinvolve
only mechanisms olthe Linemauc type. A machine, as denned above, is
not sell-sumcient, since it must receive hom elsewhere the movement it
7
8 Philosophy
translorms. Jherelore, one canonlyrepresenta macmne inmovementby
associatingitwithasourceolenergy.
!or a very long time, Linemauc mechanisms were set in mouon by
humanoranimalmusculareort.Atthatstage,itwasobviouslytautological
to explain the movementola livingbeingbyliLeningitto the movement
olamachinedependent,lor itsownmovement, onthemusculareortola
livingthing. Jhus, the mechanical explanauon olthe mncuons ollile his-
toricallypresupposesas has ohen been shownthe construcuon olau-
tomatons, whose name signines atonce the miraculous character and the
apparent sell-sumciency ola mechanism uanslorming an energy that is
notat leastnotimmediatelythe eectola human or animal muscular
eort.
Jhiscomesacrossinawell-Lnowntext.
Examine with some attenton the physical economy of man: What do you fnd?
The jaws armed with teeth: Ae they anything but pliers? The stomach is but a
retort; the veins, the arteries, the entire system of blood vessels are hydraulic
tubes; the heart is a spring; the viscera are but flters, screens; the lungs are but
bellows. And what are the muscles, if not cords? What is the ocular angle, if it is
not a pulley? And so on. Let us leave it to the chemists with their grand words
of "fsion," of "sublimation, " of "precipitaton" to want to explain nature and
thus to establish a separate philosophy; it is nonetheless incontestable that all
these phenomena must be related to the laws of equilibrium, of angles, of cords,
of the spring, and of the other elements of mechanics.
JhistextisnothomwhomonemightthinL,buthomtheDe praxi medica,5
published in : 66andwritten by Giorgio 8aglivi ( : 66S: ;o6), an !talian
doctorolthe iatromechanic school. !ounded byGiovanniAllonso 8orelli
(: 6oS;)
'
thisschoololiauomechanists clearlyseems tohavebeeninu-
enced by Oescartes, despite the lactthatin !talythe school is more com-
monly linLed to Galileo, lorreasons olnational presuge. Jhis text is ol
interestbecauseitplaces angle, cord, andspringonthesamelevelasprinci-
ples olexplanauon. !tis clear, nevertheless, that hom a mechanical point
olview there is a dierence between these engines, whereas the cord is a
mechanism oltransmissionandthe angleamechanismlortheuanslorma-
uon ola given movement, the springis a motor. o doubt, itis a motor
thatmerelygives bacLwhat has been lent to it, but atthe moment olits
acuonitappears to beendowedwithindependence. ! 8aglivi'stext, itis
Machine and 01'gani
79
thehearttheprimum movens-that isliLenedtoaspring.!nitresidesthe
motorolthe whole organism.
Jhe lormation ola mechanist explanation olorganic phenomena thus
requires that, in addiuon to machines in the sense ol Linematic devices,
thereexistmachinesasmotors, drawingtheirenergy,atthemomentolits
use,homasourceotherthananimalmuscle.Jhisiswhy,although8aglivi's
text should relerus to Oescartes, we must actuallytrace bacLto Aristotle
theliLeningoltheorganismtoamachine.VhenconsideringtheCartesian
theoryolthe animal-machine, itis dimcultto establishwhetherOescartes
had precursors in the matter. Jhosewho looLlorOescartes' predecessors
generally cite Gmez !ereira, a Spanish doctor olthe second hallolthe
sixteenthcentury.!tisquitetruethat!ereira,beloreOescartes,thoughthe
was able to demonsuate that animals are pure machines and that, in any
case,theydo notpossessthesensorysoul soohen atuibuted tothem.8ut
itis indisputable thatAristotle lound in the consuuctionolwar machines
such as catapults license to liLen themovements olanimals to mechanical,
automaucmovements. Jhishas been established byAlhed !spinas in his
article 'L'organisme ou la machine vivante en Grce au !Ve sicle avant
]C. (Jhe rganism orLivingMachineinthe Greeceolthe!ourth Cen-
turys. c. ). !spinas uaces theLinship olthe problems ueated byAristotle
inhisueauseDe motu animalium andhiscollecuonQuaestiones mechanicae.9
Aristotle indeedliLens the organs olanimal mouonto O1'gana, that is, to
theparts olwarmachines (e. g. , to thearmola catapult, which launches a
projecule), and he compares the course oltheir movement to that olma-
chines capable olreleasing, aher being set o, a stored-up energy, auto-
mauc machines, olwhich catapultswerethe typical exampleinhis period.
!n the sameworL,AristotleliLens themovementollimbs to mechanisms,
inthe sense given abovehe is on thispointlaithml to !lato, who, inthe
Timeaus, dennesthemovementolvertebratesonthebasisolpivots.
1 0
!tistrue thatAistotle'stheoryolmovementisverydierenthomthat
olOescartes. Accordingto Aristotle, the principle olall movement is the
soul.Almovementrequires a nrst motor.Movementpresupposesthe im-
mobile.what moves thebodyisdesire, and whatexplainsdesireisthesoul,
justaswhatexplainspotenualityis actuality. Oespite this dierencein the
explanauonolmouon, the lactremainsthatlorAistotle, as laterlorOes-
cartes,thecomparisonoltheorganismtoamachinepresupposesman-made
devices inwhich an automaucmechanism is linLed to a source olenergy
80 Philosophy
whose motor eects continue well aher the human or animal eortthey
releasehasceased.!tisthisinterval between thestoringup andtherelease
olenergy bythemechanism thatallows one to lorget therelationship ol
dependence between the mechanism's eects and the acuon ol a living
being. Ven Oescartes turns to machines to nnd analogiesinhis explana-
tion olthe organism, he invoLes automatons with springs and hydraulic
automatons. Heisthus a tributary, intellectuallyspeaLing, olthe technical
lormsolhisage.oltheexistenceolclocLsandwatches,watermills,aruncial
lountains, pipe organs, etc. Ve maytherelore saythat, solong as a living
human oranimal 'sucLs to the machine, the explanationolthe organism
bywayolthe machine cannotbe born. Jhis explanauon canonlybecon-
ceived once humaningenuityhas constructed apparatuses thatimitate or-
ganicmovements. lor example,the launchingolaprojectile, thebacL-and-
lorthmovementolasawapparatuseswhoseacuon(theirconsuuctionand
acuvationaside)taLesplaceindependentlyolman.
Ve havejustsaidittwice.can beborn.!sthattosaythatthisexplanauon
must beborn`Howdoweaccountlortheappearance,soclearandabruptin
Oescartes'thought,olamechanistinterpretauonolbiologicalphenomena`
Jhistheoryis evidentlyrelated to a changein the economic and poliucal
suucture olVestern socieues, but the nature olthis relationship remains
obscure.
Jhis quesuon has been addressed by!ierre-Maxime Schuhl inMachi
nisme et ph ilosophie. 1 1 Schuhl has shown thatwithin ancient philosophy the
opposition between science and technics overlies the opposiuons between
heedom and servitude, and, more proloundly, between nature and art.
Schuhl relers to the Aristotelian opposiuon between natural and violent
movement.Jhelatterisengenderedbymechanismsinorderto counteract
nature and has the lollowing characteristics. itexhausts itsellquicLly, and
it never engenders a habitthat is to say, a permanent, sell-reproducing
disposition.
Herewecomeacrossaratherdimcultprobleminthehistoryolciviliza-
uonandinthephilosophyolhistory.!nAistotle, thehierarchyolheedom
andservitude,theoryandpractice,natureandartparallelsaneconomicand
politicalhierarchythehierarchy,withinthecity, olheemenandslaves. '
A slave, says Aistotle in the Politics, is an animate machine. ' !rom this
emerges a question that Schuhl merelyindicates. Ooes the GreeLconcep-
tion ol the dignity ol science engender contempt lor technology and
Machine and Organi 8 I
therebya paucityolinvenuons, thus leading, in a certain sense, to a dim-
culty in transposing the results oltechnical acuvty to the explanauon ol
nature` ' r, rather, does the concept olthe eminentdigityola purely
speculauve science, a contemplauve and disinterestedLnowledge,uanslate
the absence oltechnologicalinvenuons` !s a contemptlorworLthe cause
olslavery, or doesan abundance olslaves, in connecuonwthmilitarysu-
premacy, engender contemptlorworL` Mustwehere explainideologyby
the economicsuucture olsocietyor, rather, thatsuucture bythe orienta-
tionolideas`!sittheeasewthwhichmanexploitsmanthatleadstodisdain
lor techniques olman's exploitauon ol natureor is it the dimculty ol
man's exploitationolnaturethatnecessitatesjusuncauonolman'sexploita-
tionolman`!sthereacausalrelauonhere, andilso,inwhichdirecuon` r
arewe lacedwitha globalsuuctureolreciprocalrelauons andinuences`
!atherLucienLaberthonnireposesananalogousprobleminLes etudes
sr Descartes, notablyin the appendix to volume 2, 'La physique de Oes-
cartes etlaphysiqued'Aristote, whichconuastsaphysicsoltheartistand
aesthete to a physics olthe engineer and artisan.IS !ather Laberthonnire
seems tothinLthatherewhatis determinauve istheidea, since the Carte-
sianrevolutioninthephilosophyoltechnicspresupposesueChristianrev-
oluuon. !orhisrightanddutyto exploit matter, withoutanyregardlorit,
to be amrmed, mannrsthad to be conceived olasa being thatuanscends
nature andmatter. ! otherwords, itwas necessary uatman bevalorized
lornature to be devalorized. !t was then necessary that men be thought
olas radically and originally equal so that, the poliucal technique olthe
exploitauon olman by man havng been condemned, the possibility and
duty ola technique lor man's exploitauon ol nature could appear. Jhis
allows!atherLaberthonniretospeaLolthe Christian origin olCartesian
physics.Hehimselluenraisesthelollowingtwoobjecuons.!irst,thephys-
icsandtechniquesmadepossiblebyChrisuanitycame,withOescartes,well
aher the loundauon olChristianity as a religion. Second, is there not an
opposiuon between humanist philosophy, which sees man as master and
possessorolnature, andChrisuanity,whichwas considered bythe human-
iststobeareligionolsalvation,olightintothebeyond, andthusresponsi-
bleloracontemptlorvitaland technique-relatedvalues, lor anytechnical
arrangementolhumanlileinthisworldbelow` !atherLaberthonniresays.
'Jimeplaysnoroleinthematter.!tisnotcertainthatumeplaysnorole
in the matter. ! any case, one cannotdenyand this has been shown in
82 Philosophy
classictextsthatcertaintechnicalinventions, suchasthehorseshoeorthe
yoLe,modi[ingtheusage olanimal motorlorce,didmorelorthe emanci-
pauon olslavesthananypreaching could.
Ve saidearlierthatonemightlooLlor asolutiontotheproblemolthe
relationship betweenmechanistphilosophy andthe ensemble oleconomic
andsocialcondiuonsinwhichitarisesineitheroltwo directions. eitherin
a causalrelationorina global suucture. !ranz 8orLenau, in his booLDer
O
bergang vom fudalem zum burgerichen Weltbild (The Transition fom a Feu
dal to a Bourgeois Wrdview), sees it as a causality. ' Jhis author amrms
that,atthebeginningoltheseventeenthcentury,themechanistconcepuon
eclipsed the qualitauve philosophy olanuquity and olthe Middle Ages.
Jhesuccessolthisconceptiontranslates,withintheideologicalsphere, the
economic lact olthe organizauon and spread ollactories. !or 8orLenau,
the divisionolarusanalworLinto unilorm and qualityless segmented acts
ol producuon imposed the concepuon ol an abstract social worL. Jhe
breaLdown olworLinto simple, idenucal, repeated movements demanded
acomparisonollaborhours,sothatpricesandsalariescouldbecalculated,
andthusledtothequanuncauonolaprocessprevouslyregardedasquali-
tauve. ' !orhim,thecalculauonolworLasapure,mathemaucallytreatable
quanutywasthebasisandthepointoldepartureloramechanistconcepuon
oltheuniverseollile. !tisthusthroughthe reducuonolallvalueto eco-
nomicvalue,toa'callouscashpayment,asMarxputsitinThe Communist
Manisto, that the mechanistconcepuon ol the universe was a lundamen-
tally bourgeois Wltanschauung. ! 8 \lumately, says 8orLenau, behind the
theoryolthe animal-machine we should detect the norms olthe nascent
capitalisteconomy. Oescartes, Galileo, and Hobbes wouldthushave been
theunconsciousharbingersolthiseconomicrevoluuon.
Jhese ideas ol8orLenau have been ouuined and criuqued with great
vigor in an arucle byHenryLGrossman. ' According to Grossman, 8or-
Lenau does away with I SO years oleconomic and ideological history by
maLingthemechanistconcepuoncontemporaneouswiththeappearanceol
manulacturing at the beginning ol the seventeenth century. 8orLenau
writes as ilLeonardo daVincihadnever existed. Relerring to !ierre Ou-
hem'sworL,inLes origines de la statique,2 andtothe I 904-I 907 publication
olLeonardo'smanuscripts, 'Grossmanamrms,alongwithGabrielSeailles,
thatthepublicauonolLeonardo'smanuscriptspushestheorigins olmod-
ernsciencebacLbymore than a century.Jhe quanuncationolthenouon
Machine and Organis 8
3
olworLisnrstolallmathemaucal,andthisprecedesits economic quanun-
cauon. ! addiuon, the norms lor the capitalist assessment olproducuon
had been denned by !talian banLers begnning in the thirteenth century.
Relying onMarx, Grossman reminds us that, as a general rule, there was,
originally, no uue division ollaborin lactories. Rather, the lactoryorigi-
nally brought together in the same locale hitherto scattered artisans. !tis
thus not, according to him, the calculauon olprices by labor hours but
ratherthedevelopmentolmechanizauonthatistheauthenuccauseolthe
mechanistconcepuonoltheuniverse. Jhe developmentolmechanizauon
hasitsoriginsintheRenaissanceperiod.Oescartesthusconsciouslyration-
alized amechanisttechniquemuchmorethanheunconsciouslytranslated
the pracuces ola capitalist economy. Mechanics is, lorOescartes, a theor
of machines-it presupposes a spontaneous invention, which science must
thenconsciouslyandexplicitlypromote.
'^hichmachinesmodinedman'srelauonshiptonaturebeloreOescartes,
givngbirthtoahopeunLnowntotheancientsandcallinglorthejustinca-
tion and the rauonalizauon olthis hope` Jheywere, nrst and loremost,
nrearms,whichinterestedOescartesscarcelyatall, andonlyinsolarasthey
related to the problem olprojectiles. 8y conuast, Oescartes was greatly
interested in watches and clocLs, in hoisung machines, in water-powered
machines, etc.
Consequently, we say that Oescartes integrated into his philosophy a
humanphenomenonthe consuction olmachinesmuch more than he
transposedintoideologythe social phenomenon olcapitalistproducuon.
Vhat are, then, in Cartesian theory, the relauons between mechanism
andnnalismcontainedwithinthecomparisonolorganismtomachine`
Jhe theoryolanimal-machines is inseparable hom Cogito ergo sum. Jhe
radical disunctionbetween soul and body, thought and extension, entails
amrming the substanual unity olall matter, regardless olits lorm, and ol
all thought, regardless olits mnction. Given that the soul has but one
lunction,thatoljudgment,itisimpossible to admittheexistenceolanimal
souls,sincewehavenosignthatanimalsjudge,beingincapable ollanguage
andinvention.
Jhe remsal togranta soulthatis to say,reasonto animals doesnot
entail,accordingto Oescartes, denyingthattheyhavelile,whichconsistsin
8
4
Philosophy
no more than the warmth ol the heart, or sensiuvity, inasmuch as this de-
pendsonthearrangementolorgans. `
!thesameletter,thereappearsamoralloundauonlorthetheoryolthe
animal-machine. Oescartes does to the animal what Aristotle did to the
slave. he devalorizes itin order to justi[ its use byman as aninsuument.
'My opinion is not so much cruel toward animals as indulgent toward
human beingsat least to those who are not given to the supersutions ol
!ythagorassinceitabsolvesthemhomthesuspicionolcrimewhenthey
eat orLill animals. RemarLably, one nnds this same argument reversed
in a text by Leibniz. ilone is lorced to see the animal as more than a
machine, one must become a !ythagorean and give up dominaung ani-
mals. Ve nndourselveshereinthepresenceolanatutudetypicalolVest-
ernman.Jhetheoreticalmechanizationollileandthetechnicalutilizauon
olthe animalareinseparable.MancanmaLe himsellmasterandpossessor
olnatureonlyilhedeniesallnaturalpurposeandcanconsiderallolnature,
including,apparently,animatenatureexceptlorhimselltobeameans.
Jhisiswhatlegiumates the construcuon olamechanicalmodel olthe
livingbody,includingthehumanbodyloralreadyinOescartesthehuman
body, ilnot man, is a machine. Oescartes nnds this mechanical model, as
wehavesaid, inautomatons. thatistosay,inmovingmachines.
!n orderto givethelull meaningolOescartes' theory, wenowpropose
to read the beginning olhis Traite de /'homme (Treatise of Man), nrstpub-
lishedin Leyden hom a Launversionin 1 662, andin!renchlor the nrst
umein 1664:
These men will be composed, as we are, of a soul and a body, and I must frst
separately describe for you the body; then, also separately, the soul; and fnally I
must show you how these two natures would have to be joined and united to
constitute men resembling us. I assume their body to be but a statue, an earthen
machine formed intentonally by God to be as much as possible like us. Thus not
only does He give it externally the shapes and colors of all the parts of our bodies;
He also places inside it all the pieces required to make it walk, eat, breathe, and
imitate whichever of our own functons can be imagined to proceed fom mere
matter and to depend entrely on the arrangement of our organs. We see clocks,
artfcial fountains, mills, and similar machines which, though made entirely by
man, lack not the power to move, of themselves, in various ways. And I think you
will agree that the present machine could have even more sorts of movements
than I have imagined and more ingenuity than I have assigned, for our supposi
ton is that it was created by God.3D
Machine and Organis 8
5
!lone reads this text as navelyas possible, it seems that the theoryol
theanimal-machinedependsloritsmeaningontheenunciationoltwopos-
tulates,whicharetooohenneglected.Jhenrstisthatthereexistsabuilder
God,andthesecondisthatthelivngisgivenassuch,priortotheconstruc-
uonolmachines.!notherwords, itisnecessary,in ordertounderstandthe
machine-animal,to seeitashavngbeenpreceded,logicallyandchronolog-
ically, both by Godas emcient cause and bya pre-exisunglivingbeingas
lormalandnnalcauseto beimitated. !short,inthetheoryolthe animal-
machine, whichhas generally been seen as a rupturewiththe Aristotelian
concepuon olcausality, we propose that all the tyes olcausalityinvoLed
byAristotlearelound,thoughnotinthesame placeandnotsimultaneously.
Jhe construcuon olthe livng machine implies, ilone reads the text
well, an obligation to imitate a prior organic given. Jhe consuuction ola
mechanical model presupposes a vtal original, and, in the end, we may
wonderwhetherOescartesisnotcloserheretoAristotlethanto !lato.Jhe
!latonicdemiurge copies the!deas.Jhe !deaisa model olwhichthenatu-
ralobjectisacopy.JheCartesian God, theArtix Maximus, worLstoequal
the livingitsell. Jhe model lorthe living machine is the livng itsell. Jhe
!dea olthe living, which divine artimitates, is the livngthing. Andjust as
a regular polygon is inscribed within a circle, and in order to derive the
circle hom it, it is necessary to pass throughinnnity, so the mechanical
arunceisinscribedwithinlile,andtoderiveonehomtheother,itisneces-
sary to pass through innnitythatis to say, God. !tis this that seems to
emergeatthe endolthe text. 'And!thinLyouwill agreeuatthepresent
machine could have evenmore sorts olmovements than! have imagined
andmoreingenuitythan!have assigned, lor oursuppositionisthatitwas
created byGod. ' Jhetheoryoltheanimal-machinewouldthusbetolile
whataxiomaticsistogeometrythatistosay, merelyarauonalreconsuuc-
tion,whichignoresonlybymeansolaleintthe existence olwhatitrepre-
sentsandtheanteriorityolproducuonoverrauonallegtimizauon.
JhisaspectoltheCartesiantheory,moreover,wasnoucedbyananato-
mistolthetime,thelamousicolasSteno,inthe'Oiscourssurl' anatomie
ducerveau (OiscourseontheAnatomyolthe8rain), deliveredin!arisin
i 66thatis, oneyearaherthe appearance olthe Treatise of Man. Steno,
whilepaynghomagetoOescartes(allthemoreremarLablegiventhatanat-
omists have notalways had much sympathy lor Oescartes' anatomy), ob-
serves thatOescartes' man is man reconsuucted by Oescartes under the
86 Philosophy
coverolGod,butthatthisis notthe manolthe anatomist. !tmay uus be
said that, in subsututing mechanism lor the organism, Oescartes eaces
teleology homlile, buthe does soonlyin appearance, lor hereassembles
it, in its entirety, at his point ol departure. Aatomical lorm subsututes
lordynamiclormauon, butasthislormis a technical product, allpossible
teleology is contained within the technique olproduction. !n uth, one
cannot,itseems,opposemechanismandnnalism,onecannotopposemech-
anism and anthropomorphism, lor ilthe mnctioning ola machine is ex
plained byrelations olpure causality, the consuction ola machine can be
undentood neitherwithoutpurposenorwithoutman.Amachineismadeby
man and lor man, with a view toward certain ends to be obtained, in the
lormoleectsto beproduced.
Jhus, Oescartes' projectolexplaininglile mechanicallyeliminatespur-
pose initsanthropomorphiclorm.Yetinrealizingthisproject,oneanthro-
pomorphism subsututes lor another. A technological anthropomorphism
subsututeslora poliucalanthropomorphism.
!n 'La descripuon du corps humain ('Oescription ol the Human
8ody), a short treatise written in : 6qS, Oescartes undertaLes to explain
voluntary movementin man. He maLes the case that the body obeys the
soul only on the condition olnrst being mechanically predisposed to do
soa claim thatheldswayoverthe entiretheoryolautomaticand reex
movementsunulthenineteenth century. Jhesoul'sdecisionisnotasum-
cientconditionlor the movementolthe body. Oescartes says. 'Jhe soul
cannotproduce anymovementwithout the appropriatedispositionolthe
bodilyorganswhichare required lor maLingthemovement. n the con-
uary,whenallthebodilyorgansaredisposedlorsomemovement,thebody
hasnoneedolthesoulinordertoproducethatmovement.
Oescartesmeansthatwhenthesoulmovesthebody,itdoesnotdosoin
thewaythat (as popularrepresentauonwould have it) a Ling or a general
commandshissubjectsorsoldiers. !nstead,byliLeningthe bodyto a clocL
mechanism, he means to saythat the movements olthe organs directone
another liLe interlocLed cogwheels. Jhus, in Oescartes, the technological
imageol'command (atypeolposiuvecausalitybyadeviceorbytheplay
olmechanical connecuons) subsututeslorthepoliucalimageolcommand-
ment(aLindolmagicalcausality, causalitybywordorbysign).
Oescartes' argumenthereisthe opposite ol8ernard'sinhiscritiqueol
vitalisminLefons sur les phenomenes de la vie communs aux animaux et aux
Macbine and Organi 87
vegeaux ( i S;S;). ` Vhile remsingtoaccepttheseparate existence ola
vtallorce,becausesuchalorce'couldnotpossiblydoanything, 8ernard
surprisinglyadmitsthatitcould,however,direct'phenomenathatitdoes
not produce. !n other words, 8ernard substitutes lor the notion ola
vitallorceconceivedasaworLerthenotion olavital lorceconceivedas a
legislatorora guide.Jhisisto acceptthatitispossible to directwithout
acting, we might call this a magical conception oldirection, because it
impliesthatdirectingtranscendsexecuuon.ntheconuary,accordingto
Oescartes, amechanicaldevicethatexecutesreplacesapowerthatdirects
andcommandsbutGodhassetthedirectiononceandlorall, the direc-
tionolthemovementisincluded bythebuilderinthe mechanicaldevice
thatexecutesit.
!short,withtheCartesianexplanauon, inspiteolappearances, itmay
seem thatwe have not taLen a single step outside nnalism. Jhe reason is
thatmechanism can explain everything solong as we taLe machines as al-
readygranted, butitcamotaccountlor the construction olmachines.o
machinebuildsmachinesandone couldevensaythat, in a certainsense,
toexplainorgansororganismsthroughmechanicalmodelsistoexplainthe
organusingtheorgan.!tisatautolog,basically,becauseandweshall
to jusu[ this interpretauonmachines can be considered organs olthe
human species. 'A tool ora machine is an organ, and organs are tools or
machines. Consequently, it is hard to see where the opposition between
mechanismandnnalismlies.oonedoubts thatamechanismisneededto
ensurethesuccessola givenpurpose,andinversely, everymechanismmust
haveasense,loramechanismisnotjustanaccidental seriesolinterdepen-
dent movements. !n reality, the opposition is between those mechanisms
whosesenseismanilestandthosewhosesenseislatent.JhesenseolalocL
oraclocLismanilest,thesenseolthepincersolacrab,sooheninvoLedas
marvels oladaptauon, is latent. A a result, it does not seem possible to
denythepurposeolcertainbiologicalmechanisms. Letus taLeanexample
thatohenservesasanargumentlorcertainmechanistbiologists.Jheydeny
the purpose olthe enlargementola woman's pelvis prior to givngbirth,
yetoneneedonlyturnthequesuonaround.giventhatthewidestdimension
oltheletusexceedsthewidestdimensionolthewombby i to i . centime-
ters, ilthe womb were notto enlarge a bit, by a Lind olloosening olthe
syphysesandabacLwardrocLingmouonolthesacrococcygen,thenbirth
would be impossible. Ve are warranted inrejecungthe suggestion thatan
88 Philosophy
actwhosebiologicalsense is so clearis possible onlybecausea mechanism
withoutany biological sense allows it. And we have to use the wordalow
herebecausetheabsenceolthismechanismwouldlorbidit. !tiswellLnown
that,whenconhontedwithanunlamiliarmechanism,inordertoveri[that
it really is a mechanisma necessary sequence ol operauonswe are
obligedtotryto nndoutwhateectisexpectedhomit,whatendhasbeen
envisioned.Ve cannotdetermineitsuselromthelormandstructureolthe
apparatus unless we already Lnow the machine's use, orthat olanalogous
machines.!tisthusnecessarynrsttoseethemachinemnctioningsoasthen
to appearableto deducethelunctionhomthestructure.
Ve have come to the pointwhere the Cartesianrelationsmp between ma-
chineandorganismisreversed.
! an organismand this istoowellLnown to needinsistingone ob-
serves phenomena olsell-construction, sell-conservauon, sell-regulauon,
andsell-repair.
! a machine, its constrcuonis loreign and presupposes theingenuity
olthe mechanic, conservauon demands the constantsurveillanceandvigi-
lance olthe machinist, andwe Lnowhowirreparably certain complicated
machines canbe damaged throughlacLolattentionorsurveillance.A lor
regulation and repair, they also presuppose the periodic intervention ol
human acuon. Jhere are doubtless devices thatregulate themselves, but
these are machines superposed upon machines by man. Jhe constrcuon
olservomechanisms or elecuonicautomatons displaces the relationship ol
mantomachinebutdoesnotalteritssense.
!nthemachine,therulesolarauonalaccounungarerigorouslyverined.
Jhewhole is suictlythesumoltheparts.Jheeectis dependenton the
order olcauses.!naddiuon, amachinedisplays aclearmnctionalrigidity, a
rigidity made increasingly pronounced by the practice olstandardizauon.
Standardizationis thesimplincauon olmodels and replacementparts, the
rendering unilorm olmeuic and qualitative characteristics, which allows
lorthe interchangeabilityolparts.Anypartisequivalentto anyotherwith
the same purposewithin, naturally, a margin ol tolerance that dennes
manulacturinglimits.
Viththepropertiesolamachineincomparisontothoseoltheorganism
thus denned, is there more or less purpose in the machine than in the
organism`
Machine and 01-ganis 8
9
!tcan easily be said that there is more purpose inthe machine than in
the organism, because thepurposeolthemachineisrigid,univocal,univa-
lent. A machine cannot replace another machine. Jhe more limited the
purpose, the more themarginoltoleranceisreduced, andthe morehard-
enedandpronouncedthepurpose appearsto be. !theorganism,bycon-
trast,oneobservesandthisagainistoowellLnownto beinsistedupona
vcariousness olmnctions, a polyvalence olorgans. Ooubtless, this vicari-
ousness olmncuons and polyvalence olorgans are not absolute, but they
aresomuchgreaterthaninthemachinethatthere canreallybenocompar-
ison. A an exampleolthevicariousnessolmncuons, onemayciteasim-
ple, well-kown case. childhood aphasia. Hemiplegia on the rightside is
almost never accompanied by aphasia, because other regions olthe brain
ensure the language mncuon. And when aphasia appears in a child under
nineyears old, itdissipatesrapidly. A lorthematterolthepolyvalence ol
organs,onemaysimplycitethelactthat,aluoughwe believethatlormost
organs there is some denned mncuon, in realitywe are ignorant olother
mncuonstheymayserve.!thismanner, thestomachissaidinprincipleto
be the organ oldigesuon. Yetitis a lact that, lollowing a gasuectomy to
ueat an ulcer, one observes problems ol digestion less than problems ol
hmatopoiesis. !twas thus discovered that the stomachbehaves liLe anin-
ternal secreuon gland.Vecould also cite hereand notjustas a display
olwondersthe recent example olan experiment perlormed by Robert
Courrier,prolessorolbiologyattheCollgede!rance. Courriermade an
incisiononagravidrabbit's uterus, exuactedoneplacenta, andplaceditin
theperitonealcavty.Jheplacentagrahed ontotheintestine andnourished
itsellas normal. nce the grahwas eected, the rabbit's ovaries were re-
movedthat is to say, the pregnancy mncuon olthe corpus luteum was
therebysuppressed.Atthismoment,alltheplacentasintheuterusaborted,
andonlytheplacentaplacedintheperitonealcavitycametoterm.Hereis
an examplewhere theintesune behavesliLe a uterus, even, one couldsay,
withmoresuccessthantheuterusitsell.
nthispoint,wearethustemptedtoreverseaproposiuonolAristotle's.
HewritesinthePolitics: '!ornatureisnotsungy, liLethesmithwho lash-
ions the Oelphian Lnile lormanyuses, she maLes each thinglor a single
use,andeveryinsuumentisbestmadewhenintendedloroneandnotmany
things. ntheconuary,itseemsthatthis denniuonolpurpose isbetter
suitedtothemachinethantotheorganism.Ve mustatleastadmitthat,in
90 Philosophy
the organism, a plurality ol mnctions can adapt to the singularity olan
organ. A organism thus has greater lautude olacuon than a machine. !t
has less purpose and morepotenualiues.' Jhe living organismacts in ac-
cordance with empiricism, whereas the machine, which is the product ol
calculation,verines thenormsolcalculauon, thatis,therationalnormsol
identity,consistency,andpredictability.Lile,bycontrast,isexperience,that
istosay, improvisation, theutilizauonoloccurrences,itisanattemptinall
directions. !romthis lollows a massive and ohenneglectedlact. lile toler-
ates monsuosities. Jhere is no machine monster. Jhere is no mechanical
pathology, as8ichatalreadyobservesin i Soi inAnatomie generale applquee
i la physiologie et i la medecine (General Anatomy Applied to Physiolog and
Medicine).42 Vhereasmonstersarestilllivingbeings,thereisnodisuncuon
betweennormalandpathologicalinphysicsandmechanics.Jhedisuncuon
betweenthenormalandthepathologicalholdslorlivingbeingsalone.
Aboveall,whatledtotheabandonmentolmechanistrepresentationsin
theinterpretauonollivingphenomenawasworLinexperimentalembryol-
ogy,whichshowedthattheseed doesnotcontainwithinitasortol'specinc
machinery (Cuenot) desuned, oncesetin mouon, automaucallyto pro-
ducesuchandsuchanorgan.JhatwasundoubtedlyOescartes' concepuon.
!nthe 'OescripuonoltheHuman 8ody, hewrites. '!loneLnewwellall
thepartsoltheseminaluidolaspeciesolparucularanimallorexample,
manone could deduce, hom uis alone and lor sure and mathemaucal
reasons, the enure ngure and conlormity oleacholits membersjust as,
reciprocally,byLnowingseveralparuculariuesolthisconlormity,onecould
deduce the seminal uid. However, as Guillaume points out, it seems
thatthemoreonecompareslivingbeingstoautomaticmacmnes,thebetter
oneunderstandstheirmncuonbutthelessoneunderstandstheirgenesis.`
!lthe Cartesian concepuon were truethat is to say, ilthere were both
prelormauon in the seed and mechanism in development, an alterauon
at the outset would disturb or even enurely prevent the development ol
theegg.
! lact, this is lar hom being soas, thanLs to the worLs olOriesch,
Hrstadius, Spemann, andMangold, the study olthe potenualiues olthe
egghasmadeclearthedimcultyolreducingembryologicaldevelopmentto
amechanistmodel. LetustaLeasanexampleHrstadius's experiments on
theseaurchinegg.HecutseaurchineggA atstage i6 alongahorizontally
symmetricalplane, andeggB alongaverucallysymmetricalplane.Hethen
Machine and Organis 9 I
joinedone-hallolA toone-hallolB, andtheresulungeggdevelopednor-
mally. OrieschtooLasea-urchineggatstage r 6 andcompresseditbetween
two suips, modi[ingthe reciprocal posiuon olthe cells atthe two poles,
the eggdevelopednormally. Jhese two experiments allowus to conclude
that the eectis indierent to the wayinwhich the causes are arranged.
AnotherexperimentisevenmorestriLing.!tisalsoOriesch's,anditconsists
inexuactingthe blastomeres olthe sea-urchin eggatstage 2 . Jhe blasto-
meres are dissociated either mechanically or chemically, in sea water de-
pleted olcalcium salts. Jhe resultis that each blastomeregivesbirth to a
larva that is normal, apart hom its dimensions. Here, consequently, the
eectis indierent to the quanuty olthe cause.Jhe quantitative decrease
in cause does not qualitauvely alter the eect. And conversely, when one
conjoinstwosea-urchineggs,oneobtainsasinglelarva,largerthannormal.
Jhis ismrtherconnrmationolthe eect's indierence to the quanutyol
the cause. Jhe experiment bymuluplicauonolthe cause connrms the ex-
perimentbydivisionolthecause.
!tmustbesaidthatitisimpossibletoreducethedevelopmentolalleggs
tothisschema.!thaslongbeenasLedwhetherwearedealingwithtwosorts
oleggsregulated eggs olthe sea-urchin eggtype andmosaiceggs olthe
hog-eggtype,inwhichthecellularmtureolthenrstblastomeres,whether
theyaredissociatedorstaytogether, isidenucal.Mostbiologistsatpresent
acceptthat there is simply a dierence olprecocityin the appearance ol
determinauonamong 'mosaic eggs. !orone thing, hom a certain stage
onward, regulation eggs behave liLe mosaic eggs, lor another, the blasto-
mereolahogeggatstage2 producesacompleteembryo,asdoesaregla-
tioneggilitisturnedupsidedown.
!tseems to us, then, thatitis an illusion to thinLthat purpose can be
expelledhomtheorganismbycomparingittoacompositeolautomatisms,
nomatterhowcomplex. Solongasthe consuuctionolthemachineisnot
amnctionolthemachineitsell,solongasthetotalityolanorganismisnot
equivalent to the sum olits parts (parts discovered by analysis once the
organismhasalreadybeengiven),itseemslegitimatetoholdthatbiological
organizauon must necessarily precede the existence and meaning olme-
chanicalconstructions. !romthe philosophicalpointolview, itislessim-
portantto explainthemachinethantounderstandit.Andtounderstandit
is to inscribe itwithin human history byinscribinghuman historyin lile,
92 Phiosophy
without, however, neglecting the appearance, with man, ol a culure irre-
ducibletosimplenature.
JhuswehavecometoseeinthemachIneafact of eultun expressingitsell
in mechanIsms that, lor their part, are nothing but afact of nature to be
explained. ! a lamous textolthe Principles, Oescarteswrites. '!tiscertain
thatalltherulesolmechanicsbelongtophysics,to the extent that all articial
things an thereby natural. Since,lorexample,whenawatchcountsthehours,
byusingthe cogs homwhich itis made, this isno less natural loritthan
lor a tree to produce huit.' 8ut, hom our pointolview, we can andwe
mustinvertthe relationship between the watch and the tree, andsay that
the wheels awatchis made ol, soasto showthe hours, and, ingeneral, all
thepiecesolmechanismsassembledsoastoproduceaneectaneectat
nrstonlydreamed or desiredare the immediate or derived products ola
technical acuvity as authentically organic as the bringinglorth olhuit by
trees, an acuvity, inthe beginning, as little conscious olthe rules andlaws
ensuring its emcacy as plant lile is. Jhe logical anteriority, at any given
moment, olaLnowledgeolphysicstotheconstruction olmachinescannot
and must notallowus to lorgetthe absolute chronological and biological
anteriorityoltheconstrucuonolmachinesto theLnowledgeolphysics.
ow, contraryto Oescartes, one author has amrmed both the irreduc-
ibilityoltheorganismtothemachineand,symmeuically,theirreducibility
olartto science.JhisisKant, inthe Critique of Judgment. !tistrue thatin
!rancewe are notusedto looLing loraphilosophy oltechniques inKant,
butGermanwriterswhohavebeeninterestedinthese problems, especially
hom : S;oonward,havenotlailedto doso.
!paragraph6olthe'CriuqueoltheJeleological!owerol]udgment,
Kantuses the example olthe watch, so dear to Oescartes, to distinguish
machine hom organism. ! a machine, he writes, each part exists lor an-
other,butnotbyanother.opieceisproducedbyanother piece, nopiece
isproducedbythewhole, norisanywholeproducedbyanotherwholeol
thesamespecies.Jhere is nowatch-maLingwatch. opartreplacesitsell
by itsell. o whole replaces a missing part. Jhe machine thus possesses
motor lorce, but not a lormative energy capable oltransmitung itsellto
externalmatterandpropagaungitsell. !paragraph;, Kantdisunguishes
man's intenuonal technique hom lile's unintenuonal technique. 8ut in
paragraph 43 (hom the 'Criuque olthe Aestheuc !ower ol]udgment' ,,
Machine and Organism
93
Kantdennestheoriginalityolthisintenuonalhumantechniquerelative to
Lnowledgeinanimportanttext.
Art, as human skill, is distnguished also fom science (as abilit fom knowledge),
as a practcal fom a theoretical faculty, as technic fom theory (as the art of
surveying fom geometry) . For this reason, also, what one can do the moment
one only knows what is to be done, hence without anything more than sufcient
knowledge of the desired result, is not called art. To art that alone belongs for
which the possession of the most complete knowledge does not involve one's
having then and there the skill to do it. Camper describes very exactly how the
best shoe must be made, but he, doubtless, was not able to tr one out himself4
8
Jhistextiscitedby!aulKrannhalsinDer Weltsinn der Technik (The Univer
sal Meaning of Technique); heseesinit, rightly, itwould seem,arecognition
olthe lact that every technique essentially and posiuvely includes a vital
originalityirreducible to rationalizauon. !ndeed, let us consider the lact
that dexterityin maLinganadjusuent, or synthesis inthe process olpro-
ducuonwhat we customarily call ingenuity, responsibility lor whichwe
sometimes delegateto aninstinctallthisisasinexplicableinitslormauve
movementastheproducuonolamammal eggoutside oltheovarymaybe,
even ilwe were to presume the physico-chemical composiuon olproto-
plasmandthesexualhormonesto be completelyLnown.
Ve therelore nnd that the worLs olethnographers shed more (though
sull weaL) lighton the construction olmachinesthan those olengneers.`
!!rance,itisethnographerswhoaretodayclosesttoconsutuungaphilos-
ophyoltechnique,inwhichphilosophershavelostinterest,sincetheyhave
been attentive, above all, to the philosophy olscience. !thnographers, by
contrast, havebeenattenuve totherelauonshipbetweentheproducuonol
thenrsttools, the nrstdevces [dispositi] lor acung onnature, and organic
activityitsell. Jhe onlyphilosopherin!rancewho, to ourLnowledge,has
asLed quesuons olthis orderis Alhed !spinas, andwerelerthe reader to
his classic i S;worLLes origines de la technologie. 5 1 JhisworLincludes an
appendix,theoutline ola course onVillgivenatthe!aculte desLettresin
8ordeauxaround i So,init,!spinasdiscusseshumanpracticalacuvityand,
inparucular, theinvention oltoolsunderthe nameolwil. Ve Lnowthat
!spinasborrowedhistheoryolorgannprojection,whichheusestoexplain
the construction ol the nrst tools, hom a German author, !rnst Kapp
(i SoS6),who presented itlor thenrstumeinhis i S;;worLGrndlnien
9
4
Philosophy
einer Philosophie der Technik (Outlines of a Philosophy of Technique). s2 Jhis
work, a classicin Germany,wassolittleknownin !rancethatcertain psy-
chologistswho, onthe basis olstudies byVollgangKhlerand!aulGuil-
laume, have taLen up the problems olanimal intelligence and the use ol
toolsbyanimals,atuibutethistheoryolprojecuonto!spinashimsell,with-
outnoucingthat!spinasexplicitlydeclares atseveralpointsthatheis bor-
rowing hom Kapp.

According to the theory ol projecuon (whose

philosophical loundauons reach bacL, through !duard von Haruann and
hisPhilosophy of the Unconscious,S4 to Schopenhauer), the nrsttoolswereno
morethanprolongationsolhumanorgansinmotion.!lints,clubs,andlev-
ers prolong and extend the arm's organicmovement olpercussion. Jhis
theory, liLe all theories, has its limits and encounters notable obstacles in
explaining inventions liLe nre orthewheel, whichare so characterisuc ol
humantechnique. necouldsearchinvain,here, lorthegestures andor-
gansolwhichnreorthewheelwouldbetheprolongationorextension,yet
itiscertainthatthis explanauonisacceptablelorinsuumentsderivedhom
thehammer or thelever, lor alltheselamilies olinsuuments. ! !rance,
thusethnographershavegatherednotonlythelactsbutalsothehypotheses
upon which a biological philosophy ol technique could be consututed.
Leroi-Gourhan, in his Milieu et Techniques,ss taLes upwhat the Germans
developed byway olphilosophylor example, a theory olthe develop-
mentolinvenuonsloundedonOarwiniannouonsolvariauonandnatural
selection
oratheoryolthe constructionolmachinesasa 'tacucollile
without, so lar aswe Lnow, any direct derivation. Leroi-Gourhan seeLs
to understand the phenomenon ol the consuucuon ol the tool through a
comparison with the movement olan amoeba, pushing out olits mass an
extensionthatgraspsandcapturesthe external objectolits desireinorder
todigestit.Hewrites.'!lpercussionhasbeenproposedasthemndamental
techmcalact, itis because thereis, in almostall technicalacts, theattempt
to contactbytouch, butwhilethe expansionolthe amoeba always pullsits
preytowardthesame digesuveprocess, betweenthemattertobedealtwid
andthetechnicalthoughtthatenvelopsitarecreated, ineachcircumstance,
specinc organs olpercussion. Jhe last chapters olthis worL consutute
what is todaythe mostsuiLing example ola systemauc and duly detailed
attempttobringbiologyandtechnologytogether.!lonetaLestheseviews
as a point oldeparture, the problem olthe consuucuon olmachines re-
ceives a totallydierentsoluuonhomthetradiuonal one,whichwassitu-
ated within a perspecuve that, lor lacL ol a better term, we might call
Machine and Organi
95
Cartesian,aperspectiveaccordingtowhichtechnicalinvenuonconsistedin
theapplicauonoILnowledge.
!tisuadiuonaltopresenttheconsuucuonoIthelocomotiveasa'marvel
oIscience. Andyet the consuuction oIthe steam engine is unintelligible
iIone doesnotunderstandthatitisnotanapplicationoIpre-exisungtheo-
reticalLnowledgebutthesolutiontoamillennial,trulytechnicalproblem
the problem oIdrainingmines. Jo understandthatthe essenual organina
locomouve is a cylinder and piston, one must Lnowthe natural history oI
the Iorms oIthe pump, one mustLnow oIthe existence oInre pumps, in
which steam did not at nrst play the role oI motor but served rather to
create, by condensauon under the piston oIthe pump, a vacuum that al-
lowed the auospheric pressure to act as a motor and to push down the
piston.
Leroi-Gourhangoesevenlurtheralongtheselines,andhelooLsIorone
oIthe locomouve's ancestors (in the biological sense oIthe word) in the
spinning wheel. He writes. 'Steam engines and actual motors developed
hommachinessuch as the spinningwheel. Around the circularmovement
is clustered all that theinvenuvespiritoIour times has discovered that is
highestamongtechniques. the cranL, thepedal, the conveyor belt.' And
later. 'Jhe reciprocal inuence oIinventions has not been sumciently
broughtto lightandweignore that, withoutthespinningwheel,wewould
nothave had the locomouve. !urther on. 'Jhe beginning oIthe nine-
teenthcenturydid notLnow the Iorms that would become thematerially
uulizableembryosIorthelocomouve,theautomobile,andtheairplane.Ve
discoverthe mechanical principles scattered in twenty applicauons Lnown
Iorseveralcenturies.Jhereinliesthephenomenonthatexplainsinvention,
butwhatispropertoinvenuonisthatitmaterializes,asitwere, instantane-
ously. ne sees how, inlight oIthese remarLs, Science and Jechnique
mustbeconsiderednotastwotypesoIacuvity,oneoIwhichisgrahedonto
theother, butastwotypesoIacuvity, eachoIwhichborrowshomtheother
someumes its soluuons, someumes its problems. Jhe rationalizauon oI
techmquesmaLes oneIorgettheirrauonaloriginoImachines.Anditseems
thatinthisarea,asinanyother,onemustLnowhowto cedeaplacetothe
irrauonal, evenandespeciallywhenonewantsto deIendrationalism.
Jo this we mustadd thatthereversal oIthe relation between machine
andorganismthatisbroughtaboutbyasystemaucunderstandingoItechni-
calinvenuonsasbehaviorsoIthelivngnndssome connrmationintheatu-
tudethatthegeneralizeduseoImachineshaslittlebylittleimposedonmen
9
6 Philosophy
in contemporary indusuialized socieues. Georges !riedmann's important
worL Problenzes hunzains du nzachinie industriel depicts the stages in the
reactionthathasrestoredtheorganismtonrstplaceintherelauonbetween
machine and human organism.`VithJaylor and the nrst technicians ol
the rauonalizauon olworLers' movements, we see the human organism
aligned, so to speaL, withthe luncuoningolthe machine. !roperlyspeaL-
ing,rationalizationisamechanizationoltheorganism,inasmuchasitaims
to eliminate movements that appear useless because they are seen solely
hom the viewpoint oloutput, considered as a mathematical mncuon ol
certainlactors.8uttheobservauonthattechnicallysuperuousmovements
arebiologicallynecessarywasthenrststumbling blocL encountered bythis
exclusively technicist assimilation olthe human organism to the machine.
!romhere,thesystematicexaminationolcondiuonsphysiological,psycho-
technical, and even psychological, in the most general sense olthe word
(becausebytaLingvaluesinto consideration onearrivesatthemostorigin-
arycoreolthepersonality), hasledtoa reversal. !riedmannsees the devel-
opmentolatechniqueloradapung machines tothehumanorganismasan
ineluctablerevolution.Jhistechniqueseemstohimascientincrediscovery
olthe empirical processes by which primiuve peoples have always sought
to adapt their tools to the organic norms olan emcient and biologically
economical actionthatis to say, an acuon that situates positive value in
theevaluauonoltechnicalnormswithintheorganismatworL,whichspon-
taneouslydelendsitsellagainstanyexclusivesubordinauonolthebiological
to the mechanical.!riedmanncanthusclaim, withoutironyorparadox,
thatitislegitimatetoconsidertheindustrialdevelopmentoltheVesthom
anethnographicpointolview.'
!summary,byconsideringtechniquetobeauniversalbiologicalphenom-
enonandnolongeronlyanintellectualoperauonolman, oneisled,nrst,
toamrmthecreauveautonomyolartsandcrahshomanyLnowledgecapa-
ble olappropriatingthemsoas toapplyitsellto them orinlormingthem
soastomuluplytheireects. Second,inconsequence,oneisledtoinscribe
themechanicalwithintheorganic.!tisthennaturallynolongera quesuon
olasLinginwhatwaythe organismcanormustbe considered to be a ma-
chine,whetherhomtheviewpointolitsstructureorhomthevieyointol
itsmnctions.Rather,itisnecessarytolooLlorthereasonswhytheopposite,
Cartesian opinion could have been born. Ve have tried to elucidate this
Machine and Organis
97
problem.Ve haveproposedthat,i nspiteol iniualappearances,amechanist
concepuonolthe organismisnolessanthropomorphicthana teleological
concepuonolthephysicalworld.Jhesoluuonwehaveuiedtodelendhas
the advantage olshowing man in conunuitywith lile through technique
prior to insisting on the rupture lor which he assumes responsibility
throughscience.Jhis soluuon doubtlesssuershomtheinconvenience ol
appearingtoreinlorcethe nostalgic indicuents that,withoutmuchregard
lorthe originalityoltheir themes, toomanywriters addressto technology
anditsprogress. !tisnotourintenuontocometotheiraid. !tisquiteclear
that,ilthehumanlivnghasprovideditsellwithatechniqueolthemechan-
ical type, this massive phenomenon has a sense that is notgratuitous and
thattherelore cannot be revoLed atwill. 8utthatisa quesuon completely
dierenthomtheonewehavejustexamined.
FI VE
The Living and Its Milieu
Jhenouonolmilieuisbecomingauniversalandobligatorymodeolappre-
hendingtheexperienceandexistenceollivingbeings, onecouldalmostsay
itisnowbeingconsututedasacategoryolcontemporarythought.8utunul
nowithasbeenquitedimculttoperceiveasasyntheticunitythehistorical
stagesinthe lormation olthis concept, thevarious lorms olitsuulizauon,
and the successive inversions olthe relationship in which itis one olthe
termsingeography,inbiology,inpsychology,intechnology,ineconomic
and social history. !orthis reason, philosophymust taLe the iniuauvein
synopucallyinvesugaungthemeaningandvalueolthis concept. 8yiniua-
uve, we do notmeanwhat appears to be aninitiativebut only consists in
reecung on the sequence olscienunc explorauons soasto comparetheir
appearanceandresults.Rather,throughacriucalcomparisonolseveralap-
proaches, we mean, ilpossible, to bring to light their common point ol
departure and to postulate their lecunditylora philosophyolnature cen-
tered on the problem olindividuality. Ve shall thus examine one by one
The Living and Its Milieu 99
the simultaneous and successive components olthe nouon olmileu, the
varieues olits use, hom : Sootoourtime, thevariousreversals oltherela-
tionshipbetweenorganismandmilieu,and,nnally,thegeneralphilosophi-
calimpactolthesereversals.
HistoricallyspeaLing, the nouon and term milieu were imported hom
mechanics into biology duringthe second hallolthe eighteenth century.
Jhemechanicalnouon though not the term) appearedwith ewton, and
initsmechanicalmeaningthetermcan be loundinthe arucle 'Milieuin
d'AlembertandOiderot'sEncclopedie. 1 LamarcL,inspiredby8uon,inuo-
duced it into biology, but he used it only in the plural. Jhis usage was
establishedbyHenride8lainville.

tienneGeomoySaint-Hilairein :S: )
andAuguste Comte in : S S)used the term inthe singular, asan absuact
term.Honorede8alzacinuoduceditintoliteraturein : Sqzintheprelace
to The Human Comedy), and Hippolyte Jaine established it as one olthe
threeprinciplesoltheanalyucexplanauonolhistorythe othertwobeing
raceandmoment.!tishomJaine,ratherthanhomLamarcL,that!rench
neo-LamarcLianbiologistsaher: S;oAlhedGiard,!elixLeOantec,!re-
deric Houssay, ]ohann Costantin, Gaston 8onnier, and Louis Roule
inheritedthisterm.JheideacamehomLamarcL,buttheterm,asuniversal
and absuact, wastransmittedtothembyJaine.
Jhe !rench mechanists oltheeighteenth century called'milieuwhat
ewton had relerred to as 'uid. ! ewton's physics, the typeilnot
the sole archetypeolduidis ether. !ewton's time, the problem me-
chanics had to solve was that olthe action oldisunctphysical bodies ata
distance.Jhiswasthemndamentalprobleminthephysicsolcenuallorces.
!twasnotanissuelorOescartes,however.!orhim,thereisbutonemode
olphysicalacuon,collision,inonepossiblephysicalsituauon,contact.Jhis
iswhywecansaythatthenouonolmilieuhasnoplaceinCartesianphysics.
Oescartes' 'subtlematterisinnowayamilieu. 8uttherewasdimcultyin
extendingthe Cartesian theoryolcollision and contactto the case oldis-
tinctphysical bodies, lor theiracuons blendtogether.Ve thusunderstand
howewtoncametoposetheproblemolthemedium olacuon.!orhim,
luminilerous etheris uid as the medium olacuon ata distance. Jhis ex-
plains thepassagehomthe nouon olduid asvehicletothatolits designa-
tion asmilieu. Jheduidis an intermediarybetween two bodies, itis their
milieu,andinsolarastheduidpenetratesall these bodies,theyaresituated
inthemiddle olit [au milieu de lut] . Accordingto ewton andthephysics
r oo Philosophy
olcenuallorces, onecanspeakolan environment, amilieu, becausethere
exist centers ol
lorce. Jhe nouon olmilieu is an essentially
relauve one.
Vhenwe consider separately the bodythat receives an acuon transmitted
bythemilieu,welorgetthatamilieu isamedium,in beteen to centers, and
we retain onlyits mnction as a centripetal uansmitter, its position as that
whichsurrounds abody. !nthisway, milieutendsto lose itsrelativemean-
ingandtotaLeonthatolanabsolute,arealityinitsell.
ewton is perhaps responsible lor the importauon olthe term hom
physics into biology. He used ether notonly to solve the problem olthe
phenomenonolilluminauonbutalsotoexplainthephysiologicalphenome-
non olvisionand, nnally, to explain the physiological eects olthe sensa-
tion ollight, thatis, muscular reacuons. !n his Optics, ewton considers
etherto beconunuousintheair,the eye,thenerves, andthemuscles.!tis
thus the action olthe milieu that guarantees the relation oldependence
betweentheilluminauon olaperceivedlightsource andthemovementol
themusclesbywhichmanreactstotmssensauon.Jhis,itseems,isthenrst
example olan organic reaction being explained by the acuon ola milieu,
thatistosay,bytheacuonolauidstrictlydennedbyphysicalproperues.`
!ndeed,the aloremenuonedEncclopedie arucleconnrmsthisviewandbor-
rowsallitsexamplesolamilieuhomewton'sphysics.Anditisinapurely
mechanical sense that water is said to be a milieu lor the nsh that move
about in it. !tis also in this mechanical sense that LamarcL nrst uses the
term.
LamarcLalwaysspeaLsolmilieusinthepluralbywhichheexpressly
means uids liLe water, air, and light. Ven LamarcLwishes to designate
the ensemble olacuons that acton a livingbeing homthe outsidewhat
we todaycall the milieuhe never says 'milieu, butalways 'inuencing
circumstances. Consequently, circumstance is lor LamarcL a genus,
whosespeciesareclimate,place, andmilieu.JhisiswhyLeon8runschvicg,
in Les etapes de la philosophie mathematique/ could write that LamarcL had
borrowedhomewtonthemodelloraphysical-mathemaucalexplanauon
olthelivingbyasystemolconnectionswthits environment.Jheconnec-
uons betweenLamarcLandewtonare directattheintellectuallevel and
indirect historically. 8uon linLs LamarcL to ewton. Ve mightsimply
recallthatIamarcLwas8uon's studentandthetutorolhisson.
8uoninlactcombinestwoinuencesinhisconceptionoltherelations
betweenthe organismandthe milieu.Jhe nrstisewton'scosmology, ol
The Living and Its Miieu I Or
which 8uonwas a constant admirer. Jhe secondi sthe tradition olan-
thropo-geographers, which, aher Machiavelli, ]ean 8odin, and]ohn A-
buthnot,wasLeptalivein!rancebyMontesquieu.JheHippocraticueause
On Airs, Waters, and Places canbeconsideredthenrstworLtohavegiven a
philosophical lorm to this anthropo-geographical concepuon. Jhese are
thetwoelements8uonbroughttogetherinhisprinciplesolanimalethol-
ogy, to the extent that the mores olanimals are distinctive and specinc
characterisucs and can beexplained by thesame method geographers use
to explain the diversity olmenthevariety olraces and peoples on the
earth'ssurlace.
ID
Jhus, asteacherandprecursortoLamarcLinhistheoryolmilieu, 8ul-
lon appears atthe convergence olthe two components olthis theory. the
mechanical and the anthropo-geographical. Here is posed a problem ol
epistemology and olthe historical psychology olLnowledge, a problem
whose scope greatly exceeds the present example. Shouldn't we interpret
the lactthat two or more guiding ideas combine at a certain moment to
lorm a single theory as a sign thatin the nnal analysis and despite their
apparentdierencestheyhaveacommon origin, whosemeaningandvery
existence welorgetwhenwe considerseparatelytheirdisjointedparts`Ve
willreturn to thisproblemattheendolthepresentessay.
Jheewtonianorigins olthe nouon olmilieuthussumce to account
lor itsiniualmechanicalsignincauonandtheusethatwas nrstmade olit.
Jheorigindeterminesthemeaningandthemeaningdeterminestheusage,
tosuchan extentthatComte,whenproposinga generalbiologicaltheory
olmilieuin : S S(in the lortieth lesson olhis Com-se of Positive Philosophy),
hadtheimpressionhewasusingmilieu asaneologismandclaimedresponsi-
bilitylorerecungitintoauniversalandabstractnouonolbiologicalexpla-
nation. Comte says that bythis term heno longermeans only'the uid
intowhichabodyisimmersed(therebyconnrmingthemechanicalorigins
olthe nouon) but 'the total ensemble olexterior circumstances necessary
lortheexistenceoleachorganism. 8utwe alsoseein Comtewho hasa
perlectlyclearsense oltheoriginsolthe nouon, aswellasoltheimporthe
wouldliLetogivetoitinbiologythatitsusagewillremain dominated by
the mechanical origins olthenouon,ilnotoltheterm. !ndeed,itisquite
interesting to nouce that Comte is on the brinL ollormng a dialecucal
concepuon olthe relations between the organismand the milieu. Ve are
102 Philosophy
alludingheretothepassagesinwhichhedennestherelationolthe'appro-
dth '

bl
1 " "

l

d th
priate organism an e suita er ieu asa con ict0 orces, an e
actconstituungthatconictasmncuon. ' ' Heposits that'the ambientsys-
tem couldnotpossiblymodi[the organism ilthe organism did notexert
onitinturnacorrespondinginuence. 8ut, aparthomthehumanspecies,
heholdstheorganism'sactiononthemilieutobenegligible.!thecaseol
thehumanspecies,Comte,laithml tohisphilosophical concepuon olhis-
tory, admits that, bythe intermediaryolcollecuve action,humanitymod-
inesitsmilieu. Still,lorthelivingingeneralComteremsestoconsiderthis
reactionolthe organismonthemilieujudgngitto be simplynegligible.
Jhis is because hevery explicitly looLs lor a guarantee olthis dialecucal
linL,thisreciprocalrelationbetweenmilieuandorganism,intheewton-
ian principle olaction and reaction. !ndeed, hom a mechanical point ol
view,theacuonolthelivngonthemilieuis almostnegligible.AndComte
endsupposingthe biologicalproblemolthe relauonsbetweenthe organ-
ism and the milieu in the lorm ola mathemaucal problem. '! a given
milieu, and given an organ, nnd the mnctionand vice versa. Jhe linL
betweentheorganismandthemilieuisthusthatola mnction toanensem-
bleolvariables,anequationbywayolwhich, 'allotherthingsbeingequal,
onecandetermine themnction bythevariables, and eachvariable by the
mncuon.'
!nthelorty-thirdlessonolthe Course of Positive Philosophy, Comteanaly-
ses the variables lorwhich the milieu is the mncuon. Jhese variables are
weight, air and water pressure, movement, heat, elecuicity, and chemical
speciesall lactors that can be studied experimentally and quanuned by
measurements. Jhe quality olan organism is reduced to an ensemble ol
quantiues, despite Comte's prolessed disuust olthe mathemaucal treat-
mentolbiological problemsadistrustthatcame tohimhom8ichat.
! sum, the benentolevena cursoryhistoryoltheimportauonolthe
termmilieu intobiologyduringthe nrstyearsolthe nineteenth centuryis
that it accounts lor the originally strictly mechanistic acceptance olthe
term.!linComte there appears ahintolanauthenticallybiologicalaccep-
tanceand amoreexibleusage oltheword,thisimmediatelygveswayto
theprestige olmechanics, anexactscienceinwhichpredictionisbasedon
calculauon.Jo Comte,thetheoryolmilieuseemsclearlytobeavariantol
thelundamental project that the Course of Positive Philosophy endeavors to
complete.nrsttheworld,thenman,togohomtheworldtoman.!lComte
The Living and It Mileu r0
3
anucipates the idea ola subordinauon olthe mechanical to the vitalthe
idea he would later lormulate in mythical lorm in The System of Positive
Polit and The Subjective Synthesis-here he nevertheless deliberately re-
pressesit.
8utthereissullonelessontobetaLenhomtheuseabsoluteandwith-
out qualincauonolthe term milieu as it was dennitively established by
Comte.Jhe term would hencelorth designatethe equivalentolLamarcL's
'circumstancesand

uenneGeomoySaint-Hilaire's 'ambientmilieu(in
his : S: thesis at the Academie des Sciences). Jhese terms, cirumstances
and ambience, point to a certain intuiuon ol a lormation around a center.
Vith the success olthe term milieu, the representauon olan indennitely
extendible line or plane, at once conunuous and homogeneous, and with
neitherdenniteshapenorprivlegedposition, prevailed over therepresen-
tauonolasphereorcircle,whichare qualitauvelydennedlorms and, dare
we say, attachedto a nxed center olrelerence. Cirumstances and ambience
sull retain a symbolic value, butmilieu does notevoLe any relation except
that ola position endlessly negated by exteriority. Jhe nowrelers to the
belore, the hererelersto its beyond, andthus always and ceaselessly. Jhe
milieuisuulyapuresystemolrelationswithoutsupports.
!romthere one can understand theprestige olthe nouon olmilieulor
analytic scientincthought. Jhe milieu becomes auniversal instrumentlor
the dissolution olindivdualized organic syntheses into the anonymity ol
universal elements and movements. Vhen the !rench neo-LamarcLians
borrowed hom LamarcL, ilnot the term milieu in the singular and inits
absolutesense,thenatleasttheideaolit,theyretained olthemorphologi-
cal characterisucs and mncuons olthelivingonlytheir lormauonbyexte-
riorconditioningonly, soto speaL, theirlormation bydelormauon. !tis
enough torecall ].Costanun'sexperiments onthelorms olthearrowhead
lealor!redericHoussay's experiments on the lorm, nns, and metamerism
olnsh.' LouisRoulewasabletowrite, inhissmall booLLa vie des rivieres,
uat'nshdonotleadtheirlives ontheirown, itistheriver thatmaLesthem
leadit, they are persons withoutpersonality. ' Ve have here an example
olwhatastrictlymechanistusage olthe nouon olmilieunecessarilyleads
to.IS Ve are brought bacL to thetheoryolanimal-machines. ! the end,
thisisjustwhatOescartessaid,insayngolanimalsthat'itisnaturewhich
acts inthembymeans oltheir organs. '
-
I04 Philosophy
Irom :8
onthatisto say, aherthepublicationolOarwin's The Origin
of Specesthe problem ol the relations between organism and milieu is
dominated by the polemic between LamarcLians and Oarwinians. Jo un-
derstand the meaning and importance olthis polemic, it is necessary to
recall the originalityoltheirrespecuvepoints oldeparture.
!his : SoZoological Philosophy, LamarcLwritesthatilbyacuonolcir-
cumstancesormilieus onetaLeshim to meandirectactionbythe exterior
milieu on the living, one is putung words into his mouth. !t is via the
intermediaryolneed, a subj ective nouon implying relerence to a posiuve
poleolvitalvalues,thatthemilieudominatesandcompelstheevoluuonol
livingbeings. Changes incircumstances lead to changes inneeds, changes
inneedsleadtochangesinactions.!ltheseactionsarelong-lasting, theuse
ornonuse olcertain organs causes the organs to develop or atrophy, and
thesemorphologicalacquisiuonsorlosses,obtainedbyindivdualhabit,are
preserved bythemechanism olheredity, on conditionthat the newmor-
phologicalcharacteristiciscommontobothparents.
AccordingtoLamarcL,thesituauonolthelivinginthemilieuisdisuess-
mlanddistressed.Lileexistsinamilieuthatignoresit,astwoasynchronous
series olevents. Circumstances change on their own, and the living must
taLetheiniuativetomaLeaneortnottobe'droppedbyitsmilieu.Adap-
tation is a renewed eort by lile to continue to 'sucL to an indierent
milieu. Sinceitistheresultolaneort,adaptauonisthusneitherharmoni-
ous norprovidential, itis gained andneverguaranteed. LamarcLismis not
mechanist, anditwouldalsobeinaccuratetocallitnnalistic. !nreality,itis
abarevitalism.Jhereisanoriginalityinlilelorwhichthemilieudoesnot
accountandwhichitignores.Herethemilieuistrulyexterior,intheproper
sense olthe word. it is loreign, it does nothing lor lile. Jhis is uuly a
vitalism because itis a dualism. Lile, says 8ichat, is the ensemble olmnc-
tions that resist death. ! LamarcL's concepuon, lile resists solely by de-
lorming itsellso as to outlive itsell. Jo our Lnowledge, no portrait ol
LamarcL, no summaryolhisdoctrine, surpasses theone given byCharles
AugustinSainte-8euveinhisnovel Vlupte. 1 8 neseeshowlaronehastogo
togetlromLamarcL'svitalismtothe!renchneo-LamarcLians'mechanism.
!dward Cope,anAmericanneo-LamarcLian,wasmorelaithmltothespirit
olthedoctrine.
Oarwinhadacompletelydierentideaolthe environmentoldeliving,
aswellasoltheappearanceolnewlorms.!ntheintroducuonto The Origin
The Living and It Milieu r 0
5
of Speces, he writes. 'aturalists conunually reler to external conditions
such as climate, lood, etc. as the only possible cause olvariation. ! one
limited sense, . . . thismaybe uue. ' !tseems thatOarwinlaterregretted
having atuibuted only a secondary role to the direct acuon olphysical
lorcesontheliving.Jhis comes across inhis correspondence.Marcel !re-
nant, in his inuoducuon to a collecuon olOarwin's texts, has published
someparucularlyinteresungpassages onthistopic.OarwnlooLslor the
appearance olnewlorms in the conjuncuon oltwomechanisms. one that
produces dierences, namely,variauon, and onethat reduces andtests the
dierences thereby produced, namely, the suuggle lor lile and natural
selection.Jhemndamentalbiologicalrelauon,inOarwin'seyes,istherela-
tion olonelivingbeingtoothers,itprevails overtherelauonbetweenthe
livingandthemilieuconceivedasanensembleolphysicallorces.Jhenrst
milieuanorganismlivesinisanentourageollivingbeings,whicharelorit
enemiesorallies,preyorpredators.8etweentheselivingbeings areestab-
lished relations oluse, desuucuon, and delense. ! this competiuon ol
lorces,accidentalmorphologicalvariationscountasadvantagesordisadvan-
tages.Andvariauonthe appearanceolsmallmorphologicaldierencesby
which a descendantdoes not exactlyresemble its ancestorsstems hom a
complex mechanism. the use or nonuse olorgans (the LamarcLian lactor
applies only to adults), correlauons or compensauons in growth (lor the
young), orthedirectacuonolthemilieu(ongermseeds).
!this sense,onecansaythatlor Oarwin, byconuasttoLamarcL, the
iniuauve to variauon comes someumesbut only someumeshom the
milieu. ne gets a somewhat dierent idea ol Oarwin depending on
whether one accentuates this acuonornot and whether one limits onesell
to his classicworLs orinstead considers ueenuretyolhisthought, asre-
vealedinhis correspondence. !n any case, lor Oarin, toliveis to submit
anindividualdierence to the judgmentolthe ensemble ollivingbeings.
Jhisjudgmenthas onlytwopossible outcomes. eiuer death orbecoming
onesellpartoluejurylorawhile. Solongasonelives,oneisalwaysjudge
and judged. A a result, in Oarin's oeuvre as he lehit to us, the thread
linLingthelormauonolthelivingbeingtothephysico-chemicalmilieucan
seem lairlythin. Andwhen mutationism, a newtheoryolthe evolutionol
species, used geneucs to explain the appearance olimmediatelyhereditary
speciesvariauons(Oarwinhadunderesumated thisphenomenon), the role
olthemilieuwas reduced to eliminaungtheworstwithoutparucipaungin
I 06 Philosophy
the producuon olnewbeings,normalizedbytheirunpremeditatedadapta-
uon to new conditions olexistence, monsuosity becoming the rule and
originalityatemporarybanality.
! the polemic between LamarcLians and Oarwinians, the same argu-
ments and objecuons are made in both direcuons and applied to both au-
thors. nnalismis denounced andmechanism celebrated someumes in one,
someumesintheother.Jhisisno doubtasignthatthequestionhasbeen
badlyput.!Oarwin,onecann ndnnalismnotinthingsthemselvesbutin
his choice olwordshehas been hequently reproached lorhis termselec
tion. !n LamarcL, itis less nnalism than vitalism. 8oth are authenticbiolo-
gists,towhomlileappearsasagiventhateachseeLstocharacterize,instead
oltrynganalyucallytoexplainit.Jhesetwoauthenticbiologistsarecom-
plementary.LamarcLthinLs ollileintermsoldurauon,andOarwnthinLs
olitmostlyintermsolinterdependence.alivinglormpresupposesaplural-
ityolotherlorms in relauon to it. Jhe synopucvision thatis the essence
olOarwn's geniusis missingin LamarcL. Oarwin is more closelyrelated
to the geographers, and weLnowhow much he owed to hisvoyages and
explorauons. Jhemilieuinwhich Oarwn depictsthe lile olthe livngisa
bio-geographicalmilieu.
Atthebeginningolthenineteenthcentury, twonamesstandlorthe birth
olgeographyas a science conscious olits method and dignity. Carl Ritter
andAlexandervonHumboldt.
!n : S : ;, Ritter published his Comparative Geography. 2 1 Humboldtpub-
lished, during the decade beginning in : Sq, a booL whose utle, Kosmos,
perlectlycapturesitsspirit. !nthesetwoworLs are unitedtheuaditionsol
GreeLgeography. thatistosay,ontheonehand,thescienceolthehuman
ecumenesinceAristotleandStrabo,andontheother, thescienceoltheco-
ordinauonolhumanspaceinrelationtocelestialconngurauonsandmove-
mentsthescience olmathemaucal geography, which !ratosthenes, Hip-
parchus,and!tolemyare considered tohavelounded.
According to RItter, without man's relation to thelandto allland
human historyis unintelligible. Jhe earth, considered as a whole, is the
stable ground lorthevicissitudes olhistory. Jerresuial space and its con-
ngurauonare,consequently,notonlygeomeuicalandgeologicalobjectsol
Lnowledgebutalsosociologicalandbiologicalones.
The Living and It Mileu 1 0
7
Humboldtwas anaturalist-traveler,whorepeatedlycoveredwhatitwas
possible to coveroltheworld inhis ume andwho applied a whole system
olbarometric,thermomeuic,andothermeasurementstohisinvesugauons.
Humboldt'sinterestwas abovealllocusedon the distribuuon olplantsac-
cordingtoclimate.heisthelounderolbotanicalgeographyandzoological
geography.Kosmos isasynthesisolLnowledgeconcerninglileonearthand
therelationsolliletothephysicalmilieu.Jhissynthesisdoesnotaimtobe
anencyclopediabutrathertoarriveatanintuitionolueuniverse,itbegins
with a history ol Weltanschauungen, with a history olthe Cosmos whose
equivalent it would be dimcult to nnd in a worL olphilosophy. !t is an
absolutelyremarLableoverview.
!tisessential tonotethatRitterandHumboldt applied totheirobject
the relauons between historical man and milieuthe category oltotality.
Jheirobjectisthewholeolhumanityonthewhole!arth.VithRitterand
Humboldt, theideaoldetermininghistorical relations bythegeographical
subsuatewasconsolidatedingeography.!tgaverisenrstto!riedrichRatzel
and anthropo-geography in Germany, and then to geopoliucs. Jhe idea
theninvadedhistorybycontagion, starungwithMichelet(letusrecallhis
Le tableau de la France). 23 !inally,aswehave alreadysaid,Jaineconuibuted
tothespreadoltheideatoallmilieus,includingtheliterarymilieu.Ve can
sum up the spirit olthis theory olthe relauons olgeographical milieu to
manby sayng that doing history came to consistinreadinga map, where
this mapisthengurauon olan ensembleolmeuical, geodesic, geological,
andclimatologicaldata, aswellasdescripuvebio-geographicaldata.
Jhe treauent olanthropological andhuman ethological quesuonsa
treauentthatbecamemoreandmoredeterminisucor,rather,mechanisuc
thelartheronewenthomthespiritolitslounderswasdoubledbyaparal-
lel, ilnotexactlysynchronousueauentinthe domainolanimalethology.
Jhe mechanisuc explanation olthe organism's movements in the milieu
succeededthemechanisticinterpretauonolthelormauonolorganiclorms.
LetussimplyrecalltheworLsol]acquesLoeband]ol8.Vatson.Gener-
alizingthe conclusions olhis research onphotouopisms in animals, Loeb
considered all movementolthe organismto bemovementlorced onitby
the milieu. Jhe reex, considered to be an elementaryresponse ola seg-
mentolthe bodyto an elementaryphysical sumulus, is thesimplemecha-
nism whose composiuon allows one to explain all behaviors olthe living.
r08
Philosophy
A!ongwthDarwinism, this exorbitantCartesianismisincontestablyatthe
originolthepostulatesolbehavoristpsychology.
Vatsonassignedto psychologythe tasLolconducunganalyucresearch
into the condiuons olthe adaptationolthelivingto the milieuby experi-
mentallyproducingexcitationandresponserelations(thestimulus-response
pair). Jhere is a physical determinism in the relauon between excitauon
andresponse.Jhebiologyolbehavioris reducedtoneurology,whichitsell
isreducibleto energetics,thescienceolenergy.Jheevoluuonol Vatson's
thought led him hom a concepuon thatsimplyneglects consciousness as
useless to one thatnullines it as illusory. Jhe milieuthus comes to be in-
vestedwithall power over individuals, its power [uissance] dominates and
even abolishes thatolheredityand geneuc consutuuon. Since themilieuis
given, the organismgivesitsellnothingit does not, in reality, alreadyre-
ceive. Jhe situationoltheliving,its beinginthe world, isa conditionor,
moreexactly, aconditioning.
AlbertVeiss intended to construct biologyliLe a deductive physics, by
proposing an electronic theory olbehavior. !t lell to the psycho-techni-
cianswho expandedJayloristtechniqueslorumingmovements through
the analyc study olhuman reactionsto perlect the worL olbehaviorist
psychologyandconsutute,throughtheirscience,manasamachinereacung
tomachines,asanorganismdeterminedbythe 'newmilieu(!riedmann).
!short,because olits origins,thenouonolmilieunrstdeveloped and
spreadina perlectlydeterminedway, andwe cansay,applyngtothisno-
tionthemethodologicalnormitstandslor,thatitsintellectualpowerwasa
mncuonolthe intellectual milieuinwhichithad been lormed.Jhetheory
olmilieu was at nrst the positive and apparently verinable translauon ol
Condillac's lableolthe statue. `Vhenthe air smellsliLe roses, a statueis
rose-scented.!nthesameway,theliving,withinthephysicalmilieu,islight
andheat, carbonandoxygen, calciumandweight. !tresponds bymuscular
contractions to sensory excitations, it responds wth a scratch to an itch,
withighttoan explosion. 8utonecanandmustasL.Vhereistheliving`
Ve see individuals, but these are objects, we see gestures, but these are
displacements, centers, but these are environments, machinists, but these
are machines. Jhe milieu olbehavior coincideswiththe geographical mi-
lieu, thegeographIcalmilieu,withthephysicalmilieu.
!t was normal, in the suong sense olthe word, lor this methodological
norm to have nrst reached its limits and the occasion lor its reversal in
Tbe Living and Its Milieu 1 0
9
geography. Geographyhas to do with complexescomplexes olelements
whose acuonsmutually limit each other andinwhich the eects olcauses
become causesin turn, modi[ngthe causes thatgaverise to them. Jrade
winds are a typical example ola complex in this respect. Jhey displace
surlacewater that has been heated by contactwiththe air, the cold deep
watersrisetothesurlaceandcooltheauosphere,lowtemperaturesengen-
der low pressure, which generates winds, the cycle is

closed and begins

again.Jhesametypeolcomplexcanbeobservedinplantgeography.Vege-
tation grows in natural ensembles, in which dierent species limit each
otherreciprocallyandwhere, in consequence, eachcontributesto creating
anequilibriumlor the others. Jhe ensemble oltheseplantspecies endsup
consutuung its own milieu. Jhus the exchanges between plants and the
auosphereendup creating asortolvaporscreenaround thevegetal zone,
whichlimitstheeectolradiauon, andthiscausegivesrisetoaneectthat
willinturnslowdownthecause,andsoon.
s
Jhe same approachesmustbeappliedtoanimalsandto man. However,
the human reaction to provocauon by the milieu is diversined. Man can
giveseveraldierentsolutionstoasingleproblemposedbythemilieu.Jhe
milieu proposes, without everimposing, a soluuon. Jo be sure, in a given
state olcivilization and culture, the possibiliues are notunlimited. 8ut the
lact olconsidering as an obstacle something that may later be seen as a
means to acuon ulumately derives hom the idea, the representation, that
man (collecuve man, olcourse) builds himsellout olhis possibiliues, his
needs. ! short, itresults homwhathe represents to himsellas desirable,
whichisinseparablehomtheensembleolvalues.'
Jhus,therelauonbetween the milieuand theliving beingendsup re-
versed. Man, as a historical being, becomes the creator ola geographical
conngurauon, he becomes a geographical lactor. Ve simply call to mind
here that the worLs ol !aul Vidal-Lablache, ]ean 8runhes, Albert Oe-
mangeon,andLucien!ebvreandhisschoolhaveshownthat,lorman,there
is no pure physical milieu. Vithin a human milieu, man is obviously sub-
jected to a Lind ol determinism, but this is the determinism olartincial
creations, homwhich the spirit olinvenuon thatbrought them into exis-
tence has been alienated. ! the same line olthought, the worL ol!ried-
mannshowshow,inthenewmilieuthatmachinescreatelorman,thesame
reversalhasalreadybeenbroughtabout.!ushedtotheextremelimitsolits
ambition, the engineers' psycho-technics that descended hom Jaylor's
IO Philosophy
ideassucceedsin grasping, as an irreducible center oIresistance, the pres-
enceinmanoIman'sownoriginalityintheIormoIasenseoIvalues.!ven
when subordina
ted to machines, man cannot apprehend
himselIas a ma-
chine.Hisproducuve emciencyimprovesthebetterawareheisoIhiscen-
ualitywithregardtomechanismsintendedtoservehim.
Much earlier, the samereversal oIthe relauon between organism and
milieu had taLen place in animal psychology and the study oIbehavior.
]acquesLoebledtoHerbertSpencer]ennings,and]ohn8. VatsontoRob-
ert]acobKantorand!dward C. Jolman.
Here, the induence oIpragmatism is obvious and well-established. !I
pragmatism served as an intermediary between Oarwinism and behavior-
ismin one sense bygeneralizingand extendingthe nouon oIadaptauon
tothetheoryoILnowledge,andinanotherbyemphasizingtheroleoIval-
uesinrelationtotheinterests oIanacuon]ohnOeweyledthebehavor-
ists to see the reIerence oIorganic movements to the organism itselIas
essenual.Jhe organismis considered a beingonwhichnoteverythingcan
beimposed,becauseitsexistenceasorganismconsistsinitsproposingitselI
tothingsonthebasisoIcertainorientauonsthatarepropertoit.Jolman's
teleological behaviorism, nrst developed by Kantor, consists in searching
IorandrecogizingthemeaningandintentionoIanimalmovement. Vhat
appears essenualinthe movementoIreacuonisthatitpersists,througha
varietyoIphases,whichcanbeerrorsorlapses,unulthemomentwhenthe
reaction either brings the excitauon to an end and re-establishes rest or
leads to a new series oIacts, enurely dierent hom mosc that have been
concluded.
8eIore Jolman, ]ennings, in his theory oItrial and error, had shown
(againstLoeb),thattheanimaldoes notreactasasumoIdisunctmoIecular
reacuonstoasumulantthatcanbedividedintounitsoIexcitauon.!nstead,
theanimalreactsasawholetototalobjects, anditsreactionsareregulators
Ior the needs that govern them. aturally, one must recognize here the
considerable contribution oIGesaltheorie, andin parucular oIKurtKo-
La's disunction between the milieu oI behavior and the geographical
milieu.
!inally,therelauonbetweenorganismandmilieuisreversedinvon\ex-
Lt:ll'sstudies oIanimal psychologyandinGoldstein'sstudiesoIhumanpa-
thology. !achoIthemmaLesthis reversalwith a luciditythatcomeshom
amllyphilosophicalviewoItheproblem.Von\exLllandGoldsteinagree
Tbe Living and Its Milieu I I I
on this lundamental point. to study a living being in experimentally con-
suucted condiuons is to maLe a milieulorit, to impose a milieuonit,yet
it is characteristic olthe living that it maLes its milieu lor itsell, that it
composesitsmilieu. lcourse,wemightsullspeaLolinteractionbetween
the livingand the milieu even hom a materialist point olviewbetween
onephysico-chemcalsystemcutouthoma largerwhole, andits environ-
ment. 8ut to speaL olinteracuon does not sumce to annul the dierence
betweenarelationolthephysicaltyeandarelationolthe biologicaltype.
Iromthebiologicalpointolview,onemustunderstandthattherelation-
shipbetweentheorganismandtheenvironmentisthesameasthatbetween
thepartsandthewholeolanorganism.Jheindividualityolthelivingdoes
notstop atits ectodermic borders anymorethanitbegins atthe cell. Jhe
biologicalrelationshipbetweenthebeinganditsmilieuisamnctionalrela-
uonship, and therebya mobile one, its terms successively exchange roles.
Jhe cell is a milieu lor intracellular elements, ititselllivesin an interior
milieu, whichissometimesonthescaleolthe organand sometimes olthe
organism, the organism itselllives in a mlieu that, in a certain lashion, is
to the organismwhatthe organismisto its components. !n order to judge
biologicalproblems,wethusrequireabiologicalsense,towhoselormation
von\exL|illandGoldstein cangreatlyconuibute.
Von\exLllchoosesthewords Umwelt, Umgebung, andWelt anddistin-
guishes betweenthemwithgreat care. Umwelt designates themilieuolbe-
havior proper to a certain organism, Umgebung is the banal geographical
environment, Wlt istheuniverseolscience. Jhemilieuolbehaviorproper
to the livng (Umwelt) is an ensemble olexcitauons, which have uevalue
and signincation olsignals. Jo acton alivingbeing, a physical excitation
has notonlyto occur but also to be nouced. Consequently, insolar as the
excitation acts on the living being, it presupposes the orientation olthe
living being's interest, the excitation comes not hom the object but hom
theliving. !n orderlorthe excitationto be eecuve, itmustbeanucipated
byanattitudeolthe subject. !lthelivingisnotlooLing, itwillnotreceive
anything. A living being is not a machine, which responds to excitations
withmovements, itisamachinist, whorespondstosignalswithoperauons.
aturally, this is not to contest that it happens through reexes whose
mechanismisphysico-chemical.Jhatisnotwherethequesuonlieslorthe
biologist. Rather, the quesuon lies inthelactthatoutolthe abundance ol
the physical milieu, which produces a theoretically unlimited number ol
I 1 2 Philosophy
excitauons, the animalretainsonlysomesignals(Merkmale). !ts liIerhythm
orders the time oIthis Umwelt, justas itorders space. Along with 8uon,
LamarcL used to saythat ume and Iavorable circumstances consutute the
livingbitbybit.Von \exkll turns therelauonaround andsays. ume and
Iavorablecircumstancesarerelative tocertainlivingbeings.
Jhe Umwel isthusan elecuve exuacuonhomthe Umgebung, the geo-
graphical environment. 8ut the environment is nothing other than the
Umwelt oIman, that is to say, the ordinaryworld oIhis perspective and
pragmaticexperience.]ustas this Umgebung, this geographic environment
externaltotheanimal,is,inasense,centered,ordered,orientedbyahuman
subjectthatistosay, acreatoroItechniquesanda creatoroIvaluesthe
Umwelt oItheanimalisnothingotherthanamilieucenteredin relauonto
thatsubjectoIvitalvaluesinwhichthelivingessentiallyconsists. Ve must
seeattherootoIthisorganizauonoItheanimal Umwelt asubjecuvityanal-
ogous to the one we are bound to see at the root oIthe human Umwelt.
ne oIthe most gripping examples cited byvon \exkllis ue Umwelt oI
theticL.
JicLsliveothewarmbloodoImammals.JheadultIemale,ahermat-
ing,climbstotheendoIatreebranchandwaits.Shecanwaituptoeighteen
years.AttheRostocL!nstituteoIZoology,ucLswereLeptaliveincapuvity
withouteatingIoreighteen years. Vhena mammal passesunder the ucL's
looLoutand hunungpost, she dropsdown.!tisthesmell oIrancidbutter
emanaunghomtheanimal'scoetaneousglandsthatguides her. Jhisisthe
onlysumulantthatcansetothisIallingmovement.Jhisisthenrststage.
VLenshehasIallenontotheanimal,sheattachesherselIthere.!Itheodor
oIrancidbutter has been artinciallyproducedon a table, Ior example
the ucLwillnotstaythere, butwill climbbacLuptoherobservauonpost.
nlythetemperature oIthebloodLeepsherontheanimal. Sheisnxedto
the animal byherthermalsenseand, guidedbyhertaculesense,sheseeLs
out placeson the sLinwherethere are no hairs. Sheburiesherheadthere,
andsucLstheblood.nlyatthemomentwhenthemammal'sblood enters
into herstomach do the ucLeggs (encapsulated ever since the moment oI
maung and capable oIremaining encapsulated Ior eighteen years) open,
mature, and develop.JheticLcanlive Ior eighteenyearsto perIorm her
reproductive mncuonin severalhours. !tis noteworthythat, over a long
period oItime, the animal can remain totallyindierent, insensible to all
the excitauons that emanate hom a milieu such as the Iorest, and thatthe
The Living and It Milieu I I 3
sole excitation that canreleaseits movementto the exclusion olall oth-
ersisthe odorolrancidbutter.
Acomparisonwith Goldsteinisimperativehere,lor Goldsteinbaseshis
theoryona criuqueolthe mechanical theoryolreexes. Areexisnotan
isolatedor gratuitous reaction.Areactionisalwaysa mnction olthe open-
ing ola sense to stimulauons, and olits orientationwithregard to them.
Jhis orientauon depends onthe signincauon ola situauonindistincthom
this ensemble. !solated sumulihave meaninglorhuman science, butnone
lorthesensibilityolalivingbeing. A animalinanexperimentalsituauon
isinanabnormalsituation,asituationitdoesnotneedaccordingtoitsown
norms,ithas notchosenthissituauon,whichisimposedonit. Anorganism
isthusneverequaltothe theoreticaltotalityolitspossibiliues. necannot
understandits actionswithoutappealingto the notionolprivilegedbehav-
ior. '!rivileged does notmean objecuvelysimplerjustthe inverse.Jhe
animalnndsitsimplertodowhatitprivileges. !thasitsownvitalnorms.
Jhe relauon between thelivingandthemilieu establishes itsellas a de-
bate (Auseinandersetzung), towhich the livngbrings its own propernorms
olappreciaungsituauons, bothdominatingthe milieuandaccommodaung
itselltoit.Jhisrelauondoesnotessentiallyconsist(asonemightthinL)in
a suuggle, in an opposiuon. Jhat applies to the pathological state. Alile
thatamrmsitsellagainstthemilieuisalilealreadythreatened.Movements
ollorcelor example, reactions olmuscularextensiontranslatetheexte-
rior's domination olthe organism. A healthy lile, a lile conndent in its
existence, initsvalues, is a lile olexion, suppleness, almostsomess.Jhe
situauon ola living being commanded hom the outside by the milieu is
whatGoldsteinconsidersthearchetypeolacatasuophicsituauon.Andthat
isthesituauonolthelivinginalaboratory.Jherelationsbetweentheliving
and the milieu as they are studied experimentally, objectively, are, among
all possible relations, those thatmaLe the least sense biologically, theyare
pathologicalrelations.Goldsteinsaysthat,intheorganism,''meaning'and
' being'arethesame, wecansaythatthebeingolanorganismisitsmean-
ing. Certainly, the livingcan and must beanalyzed in physico-chemical
terms. Jhis has its theoreucal and practical interest. 8ut this analysis is a
chapterin physics. !n biology, everythingis still to bedone. 8iologymust
nrstholdthelivingtobeasignincauvebeing,anditmusttreatindividuality
notasanobjectbutas an atuibute within the order olvalues.Jo liveis to
1 1
4
Philosophy
radiate, it is to organize the milieuhom and around a center olrelerence,
whichcannotitsellberelerredtowithoutlosingitsoriginalmeaning.
Vhile the relation between organismand milieuwas beingreversed in
animal ethologyand in the studyolbehavior, the explanauon olmorpho-
logical characterisucs was undergoing a revoluuon that led to the accep-
tance ol the autonomy ol the living in relation to the milieu. Ve are
alludingheretothewell-LnownworLsolVilliam8ateson, LucienCuenot,
JhomasHuntMorgan,HermannMller,andtheircollaborators,whotooL
upandextendedGregorMendel'sresearchonhybridizauonandheredity.
!n creatingthe scienceolgeneucs, theycametomaintainthatthe acquisi-
tion by the living being olits lorm and, hence, its hcuon depends, in a
givenmilieu, onitsownhereditarypotential andthatthemilieu'sacuonon
thephenotypeleavesthegenotyeintact.Jhegeneucexplanauonolhe red-
ityand evoluuon (the theory olmutauons) converged with August Veis-
mann'stheory. !rematureisolauonolthegerm-plasm duringontogenesis
nullined theinuence onthe developmentolthe species olsomauc modi-
ncationsdeterminedbythemilieu.Albert8rachet,inhisLa vie creatrice des
fres, could write that 'the milieu is not, properlyspeaLing, an agent ol
lormation, butrather olrealization, invoLing as an examplethevariety
ollorms oloceanic living beings within an identical milieu. AndMaurice
Caullery concludes his discussion in Probieme de l'evolution byrecognizing
thatevoluuondepends muchmoreontheinuinsicproperues olorganisms
thanontheambientmilieu. `
8utweLnow that the concepuon olthe total autonomy olhereditary
geneucmaterialhas beencriucized. ne criuque emphasizedthatnucleo-
plasmauc disharmony tends to limitthe hereditaryomnipotenceolgenes.
!sexualreproducuon,althougheachparentsupplieshallolthegenes,the
mother supplies the egg cytoplasm. ow, the lactthat ospring hom the
crossbreeding oltwo dierent species are not the samedepending on
whicholthespeciesisthelatherorthemotherleadsonetotn thatthe
genes' strengthvaries as a mnction olthe cytoplasmcmilieu. Atthe same
ume, H. Mller's experiments ( i z ;) inducing mutauons in huit ies
throughtheaction olamilieuolpenetrauveradiation(X-rays), seemedto
shedlightonhowanorganicphenomenonthathas perhapsbeentoosmugly
usedtohighlighttheseparationoltheorganismhom the environmentcan
be condiuonedhomthe outside. !inally, there was arenewal olLamarcL-
ism in the polemicsat least as ideological as scienuncsurrounding the
The Living and Its Milieu I 1
5
indignantrepudiauonolthe'pseudo-scienceolRussiangeneucists,whom
Jronm LysenLo led bacL to the 'sound method ol!van Vladimirovich
Michurin ( i Si). !xperiments on the vernalizauon ol culuvated
plants such as wheat andrye led LysenLo to amrmthathereditarymodin-
cauonscanbeobtainedandreinlorcedbyvariationsinconditionsolnutri-
uon, maintenance, and climate, leading to a dislocauon orrupture olthe
hereditaryconsutuuonoltheorganism,wronglysupposedbygeneticiststo
be stable. !nsolar as we can summarize the complex experimental lacts
within our presentscope,we can say that, accordingto LysenLo, heredity
is dependentonmetabolismandmetabolismisdependentoncondiuonsol
existence. HereditywouldtLus be theassimilation, by the living, overthe
course olsucceeding generauons, olexterior conditions. Jhe ideological
commentaries surrounding these lacts and this theory do indeed bring to
light its sense, regardless olits ability to accommodate, or even to with-
stand, the experimental counter-prools and criucisms that are the rule in
scienunc discussion and that, olcourse, lie outside our competence. !t
seems thatthe technicalthatis, agronomicaspectolthe problemis es-
senual.JheMendeliantheoryolheredity,byestablishingthespontaneous
character olmutauons, tends to damp humanand specincally Soviet
ambiuonslorthe total dominationolnature and to limit the possibilityol
intenuonally altering living species. !inally, and above all, recogniuon ol
the milieu's determiningacuonhas a poliucal and socialimpact. itautho-
rizes man's unlimited acuon on himsellvia the intermediary olthemilieu.
!toershopeloranexperimentalrenewalolhumannature.!tthusappears
progressivein the highest degree. Jheoryand pracuce are inseparable, as
bentsMarxist-Leninist dialecucs. ne can then understand how itis that
geneucscouldbechargedwithallthesinsolracismandslavery, andMen-
delpresentedasthe head olareuograde, capitalist,andidealistbiology.
!tisclearthat,althoughtheheredityolacquiredcharacteristicsmayhave
regainedlavor, this does notauthorize oneto designatethe recenttheories
olSovetbiologists as LamarcLianwithout qualincauon. VLatis essenual
inLamarcL'sideas,aswehave seen, isthattheorganism's adaptauontoits
milieu is attributed to tLe iniuauve olthe organism's needs, eorts, and
conunualreactions.JhemilieuprovoLestheorganismtoorientitsbecom-
ing by itsell. 8iological response by lar exceeds physical sumulauon. 8y
rooung the phenomena oladaptauon in need, whichis at once pain and
1 1 6 Pbilosopby
impatience, LamarcLcentered the indivisible totality olthe organism and
the milieu on the point where lile coincides with its own sense, where,
through its sensibility, the living situates itsellabsolutely, eitherposiuvely
ornegatively,withinexistence.
!n LamarcL, as in the nrst theoreticians olthe milieu, the nouons ol
'circumstancesand'ambiencehadaverydierentmeaninghomthatin
ordinary language. Jhey evoLed a spherical, centered arrangement. Jhe
termsinfuences andinfuencing cirumstances, whichLamarcLalsoused,taLe
theirmeaninghomastrologicalconcepuons.Vhen8uon,inDe la degenera
tion des ani7naux, speaLs ol'dye hom the sLy, which man gradually re-
ceives,heuses,nodoubtunconsciously,atermborrowedhom!aracelsus.
Jheverynotionol'climateis,intheeighteenthcenturyaswellasatthe
beginning olthe nineteenth, an undivided nouon, at once geographical,
astronomical, and astrological. Jhe climate is the change in the s|'s ap-
pearance,degreebydegree,homtheequatortoeachpole,anditisalsothe
inuencethatthesLyexertsonthe earth.
Ve have alreadyindicated that, in the beginning, the biological nouon
olthe milieu combined an anthropo-geographical componentwith a me-
chanicalone. Jhe anthropo-geographical componentwas even,ina sense,
the entirety olthe nouon, lor it included the asuonomical component,
whichewton had converted into a notion olcelestial mechanics. At its
origin, geographywas, lorthe GreeLs, the projecuon olthe heavens onto
theearth,thebringinginto correspondenceolthes|andthe earth.acor-
respondenceatoncetopographical(geometrywithcosmography) andhier-
archical(physicsandastrology).Jheco-ordinauonolthepartsoltheearth,
andthesubordinationtothesLyolanearthwhoseareaiscoordinated,were
underlainbyanastro-biologicalintuiuonolthe Cosmos. GreeLgeography
had itsphilosophythatolthe Stoics. Jheintellectual relauons between
!osidonius, ontheonehand, andHipparchus, Suabo,and!tolemy,onthe
other,areincontestable. Vatgivesmeaningtothegeographicaltheoryol
milieu is the theoryoluniversal sypathy, a vitalistintuition oluniversal
determinism. Jhis theory implies the comparison olthe totalityolthings
to an organism and the representauon ol this totality in the lorm ol a
sphere, centered on the situauon ola privileged living being. man. Jhis
biocentric concepuon olthe Cosmos persisted through the Middle Ages
andblossomedin theRenaissance.
The Living and Its Milieu I 1
7
Ve Lnow what became ol the idea olthe Cosmos with Copernicus,
Kepler,andGalileo,andhowdramauctheconictwasbetweentheorganic
concepuon olthe world and the conception ola universe decentered in
relation to the ancient world's privileged center olrelerence, the land ol
living beings and man. !romGalileo and Oescarteson, one had to choose
between two theories olmilieu, that is, between two theories olspace. a
centered, qualined space, where the mi-lieu is a center, or a decentered,
homogeneousspace,wherethemi-lieuisanintermediaryneld. !ascal'sla-
mous text Disproportion of Man clearlyshows the ambiguityolthis termlor
amindthatcannotordoesnotwanttochoosebetweentheneedlorexisten-
ual securityand the demands olscientincLnowledge. !ascal Lnows per-
lectlywell thatthe Cosmos hasbroLentopieces,butthe eternal silence ol
innnitespacesterrineshim. Manisno longerinthemiddle [milieu] olthe
world, buthe is a milieu (a milieu betweentwo innniues, a milieu between
nothingandeverything, amilieubetweentwoexuemes' ), themilieuisthe
state in which nature has placed us; we a1e floating on a vast milieu; man is in
prop017ion with parts of the world, he has a relation to all that he knows: 'He
needsspacetocontainhim,timetoexistin,motiontobealive,elementsto
constitute him,warmthand loodlornourishment, air to breathe. He sees
light, heleelsbodies, everythinginshortisrelated to him. Ve thussee
three meanings olmilieu intervene here. medial situauon, uid olsuste-
nance,andvitalenvironment.!developingthelastsenseoltheterm,!as-
cal presents his organic concepuon ol the world, a return to Stoicism
beyondandagainstOescartes.
Since all things are both caused and causing, assisted and assistng, mediate and
immediate, providing mutual support in a chain linking togeter naturally and
imperceptbly the most distant and diferent things, I consider it as impossible to
know the parts without knowing the whole as to know the whole without
knowing the individual parts.43
Andwhen!ascal dennestheuniverseasan'innnitespherewhosecenteris
everywhere and circumlerence nowhere, he paradoxically attempts, by
usinganimageborrowed homthe theosophical tradition, to reconcilethe
new scientinc concepuon (which maLes theuniverse anindennite andun-
dierenuated milieu) with the ancient cosmological vsion (which maLes
the world a nnite totality connected to its center). Jhe image !ascal uses
I 1 8 Philosophy
hereis apermanentmyth olmysucalthought,a myth oleo-!latonicori-
gin,inwhichtheintuiuonolasphericalworldcenteredonandbytheliving
iscombinedwiththe alreadyheliocentriccosmologyolthe!ythagoreans.`
\pto and includingewton, therewas no onewhodidnottaLe hom
]acob 8oehme, Henry More ('the !latonist olCambridge), and their
eo-!latonist cosmology some symbolicrepresentauon olwhata ubiqui-
tous acuon radiating out hom a center would be. ewtonian space and
ethermaintainanabsolutequality,whichthescholarsoltheeighteenthand
nineteenth centuries were not able to recognize. space, as the means lor
God'somnipresence,andether, as the supportandvehicle ollorces.ew-
tonianscience,whichwastounderliesomanyempiricistandrelauvistpro-
lessions ol laith, is lounded on metaphysics. !ts empiricism masLs its
theological loundauons.Andinthisway, thenatural philosophyatthe ori-
ginolthepositivistandmechanicistconcepuonolthemilieuisinlactitsell
supported by the mysucal intuition ola sphere olenergy whose central
acuonisidenucallypresentandeectiveatallpoints.
!ltodayitseems completelynormal to anyone trainedin mathemaucs or
physicsthattheidealoltheobjecuvityolLnowledgedemandsadecentering
olthe vision olthings, it also seemsthatthe moment has come to under-
standthatinbiology,lollowingthewordsol]. S. HaldaneinThe Philosophy
of a Biologist, 'itis physicsthatis notan exactscience. A !douardCIapar-
dewrites. 'Vhat disunguishes the animal is the lactthatitis a center in
relationtoambientlorcesthatare,inrelauontoit,nomorethansumulants
orsignals, a center, thatisto say, a systemwithinternalregulauon,whose
reactions are determinedbyaninternalcause. momentaryneed.' ! this
sense, the milieu onwhich the organismdependsissuuctured, organized,
by the organism itsell. Vhat the milieu oers the living is a mncuon ol
demand. !tis lor this reasonthat, withinwhatappears to man as a single
milieu,variouslivingbeingscarveouttheirspecinc andsingularmilieusin
incomparableways.Moreover, asalivingbeing, mandoes notescape hom
the generallawollivingbeings. Jhemilieupropertomanistheworld ol
his percepuonin otherwords, the neld olhis pragmaticexperience, the
neldinwhichhis acuons, oriented and regulated bythevaluesimmanent
to histendencies,picLoutquality-bearingobjects andsituatetheminrela-
uon to each other and to him.Jhus the environmenttowhichheis sup-
posed toreactisoriginallycenteredonhimandbyhim.
The Living and Its Milieu I 1 9
Yet man as scienust and bearer oILnowledge constructs a universe oI
phenomenaandlawsthatheholdsto beanabsoluteuniverse.Jheessential
mncuonoIscienceistodevalorizethequaliuesoIobjectsthatcomprisethe
milieupropertoman, sciencepresentsitselIasthegeneraltheoryoIareal,
that is to say, inhuman milieu. Sensory data are disqualined, quanuned,
identined. Jheimperceptibleis presumed, andthendetected and proven.
Measurements subsututeIorappreciauons,lawsIorhabits, causalityIorhi-
erarchy, andtheobjecuveIorthesubjecuve.
HencetheuniverseoIthescientist[l'homme savant] . !instein'sphysicsis
itsidealrepresentauon. auniversewhoselundamentalequauonsoIintelligi-
bilityarethesame,nomatterwhatthesystemoIreIerencemaybe. 8ecause
thisuniversemaintainsadirectrelauontothemilieupropertolivingman
albeit a relation oInegauon and reductionit conIers upon this proper
milieu a sort oIprivilege over the milieus proper to other living beings.
Oespite nnding his ordinary perceptual experience conuadicted and cor-
rected by scienunc research, living man [l'homme vivant] draws hom his
relauonto the scienust [l'homme savant] a sortoIunconsciousselI-conceit,
which maLes him preIer his own milieu over the milieus oIother living
beings, as having more reality and not just a dierent value. ! Iact, as a
proper milieu Ior comporuent and liIe, the milieu oIman's sensory and
technicalvalues does notinitselIhavemore realitythanthemilieus proper
to thewoodlouse or the graymouse. ! allrigor, the qualincauonreal can
be applied onlyto the absoluteuniverse, theuniversalmilieu oIelements
andmovements disclosed by science. !ts recogniuon as real is necessarily
accompaniedbythedisqualincauon,asillusionsorvitalerrors,oIallsubjec-
tivelycenteredpropermilieus,includingthatoIman.
JheclaimoIsciencetodissolvelivingbeings,whicharecentersoIorga-
nization, adaptauon, andinvenuon, into theanonymityoIthemechanical,
physical, and chemcal environment must beintegralthat is, itmust en-
compass thehuman livinghimselI. VeLnowwellthatthis project didnot
appeartooaudacioustomanyscienusts.8utwemustthenasL,homaphilo-
sophical point oIview, whether the origin oIscience does not reveal its
meaning better than the claims oIcertain scientists do. ! a humanity to
which, hom the scientinc and even the materialist point oIview, innate
Lnowledge isrightlyremsed, the birth, becoming, and progress oIscience
mustbeunderstoodasasortoIenterpriseasadventurousasliIe. therwise,
onewouldhavetoadmittheabsurditythat reality contains thescienceoI
1 20 Philosophy
realipbelorehand
, as apartolitsell.Andwe wouldthenhaveto wonderto
whIcb amon
gthen
eedsolrealitythis ambiuonto determinerealityscien-
uhcallycouldcorrespond.
8utilscienceis theworLolahumanityrootedinlile belore beingen-
lightenedbyLnowledge,ilscienceisalactintheworldatthesameumeas
it is a vision olthe world, thenit maintains a permanent and obligato
relationwithpercepuon. Adthusthemilieupropertomenisnotsituated
within the universalmilieu as contents in a container. A center does not
resolveintoitsenvironment.Alivingbeingisnotreducibletoacrossroads
olinuences.!romthisstemstheinsumciencyolanybiologythat,incom-
pletesubmissionto thespiritolthephysico-chemicalsciences,wouldseeL
toeliminateallconsiderauonolsensehomitsdomain.!romthebiological
andpsychologicalpointolview, asenseisanappreciauonolvaluesinrela-
uon to a need. And lor the onewho experiences andlivesit, a needis an
irreducible, andtherebyabsolute, systemolrelerence.
S I X
The Normal and the Pathological
Aphysician's uought and acuvityare incomprehensible withoutthe con-
ceptsoIthenormalandthepathological.Yetagreatdealisneededinorder
Iortheseconceptstobecomeascleartomedicaljudgmentastheyareindis-
pensable toit. !s 'pathological the sameconceptas'abnormal`!sitthe
conuary to or the conuadictory oI 'normal` !s 'normal the same ts
'healthy` !s 'anomaly the same thing as 'abnormality` Adwhatare
we to thinL oImonsters` SupposingthattheconceptoIthe pathological
could be adequately delineated homits related concepts, would one con-
siderdaltonismtobeapathologicalsituauononalevelwithanginapectoris,
or blue babysyndromewith malaria` Vould one believe that, other than
the mere identity oIthe adjecuve that qualines them in human language,
thereexistsanidentitybetweenaninnrmitywithin the orderoItheliIe oI
relation and a permanent threat to vegetauve liIe` Human liIe can have
a biological meaning, a social meaning, and an existenual meaning. !n an
assessment oI the modincauons that disease inicts on the living human
1 2 1
1 2 2 Philosophy
being,allthesemeaningscanequallybe retained. Amandoesnotliveonly
liLeatreeorarabbit.
Jhe ambiguity olthetermnoral has ohen been noted. Sometimes it
designatesalactthatcanbedescribedthroughstausucalsampling,itrelers
to themeanolmeasurements made ola traitdisplayed bya species and to
the pluralityolindividuals displayngthis traiteitherin accordance wth
the mean orwith certain divergences considered insignincant. Ad yet it
alsosometimesdesignatesanideal,aposiuveprincipleolevaluauon,inthe
sense ola prototye or a perlect lorm. Jhe lact that these two meanings
arealwayslinLed, sothatthetermnoral isalwaysunclear, comes outeven
in the advice we are givento help us avoid this ambiguity. ' onetheless, it
is perhaps more urgent to looL lor the causes olthis ambiguity in order
to understand its renewedvitalityand to taLe hom itlessons ratherthan
advice.
VLatismndamentallyatstaLeisasmuchthe objectolbiologasolthe
artolmedicine. !hisRecherches sur la vie et la mort (r 800), 8ichatlocates
the disunctive characteristic olorganismsin theinstabilityolvital lorces,
in the irregularity olvital phenomenain conuast to tLe unilormity ol
physicalphenomena.!hisAnatomie generale ( r 80r), heremarLsthatthere
is no pathological asuonomy, dynamics, or hydraulics, because physical
properuesneverdivergehomtheir'naturaltypeandthus donotneed to
be restored to it.` Jhe essentials ol8ichat's vitalism lie in these two re-
marLs. 8utsince lor thelasthundredyears orso to call a medical theory
vitalisthas been to disparage it, theseremarLs havenotbeen giventhe at-
tenuontheydeserve.However,itisume tobedonewiththeaccusauonol
metaphysics (hence ollantasy, ilnot worse) that sull pursues the vtalist
biologistsoltheeighteenthcentury. !lactandwecouldeasilyshowthis
onanotheroccasionvitalismrejectedtwometaphysicalinterpretauons ol
the causes olorganic phenomena. animism and mechanism. AIl the eigh-
teenth-century vitalists were ewtonians, men who resisted hypotheses
about the essences olphenomena and thoughttheyhad onlyto describe
and coordinate eects as theyperceived them, directly and without bias.
Vitalismsimplyrecognizes theoriginal aspectolthevitallact.!thissense,
8ichat'sremarLs linLingthe two characteristics olirregularity and patho-
logicalalterauontovitalorganizauonasa specinc lactappeartousworthy
olcareml reconsiderauon.
The NO'zal and the Pathological 1 2 3
!n essence, the quesuonis whether, when consideringthe livingbeing,
we should treatitas a systemollaws or as anorganizauonolproperties,
whetherweshouldspeaLolthelawsollileorolanorderollile.Jooohen,
scienustsholdthelawsolnatureto beessenuallyinvariant.Jheytreatsin-
gularphenomenaasapproximatecopies,whichlailtoreproducetheselaws'
supposedlawmlrealityinitsentirety.!romthisperspective,thesingular
that is, the divergence, the variauonappears to be a lailure, a delect, an
impurity. Jhe singularisthusalwaysirregular, butthatisatthe same time
perlectlyabsurd,lornoonecanunderstandhowalawwhoserealityisguar-
anteedbyits invariance orsell-idenutycould be atonceverinedbydiverse
examples andpowerlesstoreducetheirvariety,thatis, theirinndelity.Jhis
is because, despite modern science's subsutuuon olthe nouon ollaw lor
that olgenus, the nrst olthese conceptscarries overhom the second (and
homthephilosophyinwhichthelatterheldaneminentplace) themeaning
olanimmutableandrealtye, suchthattherelauonshipollawtophenom-
enon (the lawolgravityandthelallingshard thatLilled!yrrhus)isalways
conceivedonthemodeloltherelationbetweengenusandindividual(Man
and !yvrhus).Ve thus see, without anyintentional paradox or irony, the
reappearance ola lamousproblemoltheMiddleAges, the problemolthe
nature ol\niversals.
JhisdidnotescapeClaude8ernard'sattention. !hisPrincipes de mede
cine experimen tale , 8ernard dedicates to the problem olthe reality ol the
tye and the relations olthe individual to the type (as a luncuon olthe
problemoltheindividualrelativtyolpathologicallacts) some pages richer
in invitauons to reecuon than inresponses proper.Ve intentionallyin-
voLe Claude8ernard,ratherthananyoneelse,becauseweloowhowmuch
eort, in the Introduction i l'etude de la medecine experimentale aswell as in
the Principes de medecine experimentale,5 he put into amrming the legality
olvtal phenomena, their consistencyas being as inexible, under denned
condiuons, as thatolphysical phenomena. inshort, the eort heputinto
thus remung 8ichat's vtalism, which he considered an indeterminism.
Vell,preciselyinthePrincipes 8ernard observes thatil'truthisinthetype,
realityisalwaysoutsidethistyeandconstantlydiershomit.Jo thephy-
sician,thisisveryimportant,lorhe always dealswith theindividual.Jhere
isno medicine olthe human type, olthe human species. Jhe theoreucal
and practical issuethusbecomes to study 'the relations between the indi-
vidualandthetype. Jhisrelationappearsto beaslollows. 'aturehasan
1 2
4
Philosophy
ideal type lor all things, this is certain, yet this type is neverrealized. !lit
wererealized, thentherewouldbenoindivduals, and everyonewouldre-
sembleoneanother. Jherelationthatconsututestheparucularityoleach
being, each physiological orpathological state, is 'theLeytotheidiosyn-
crasyuponwhich all medicine rests. 8utatthe same time as itis aLey,
thisrelationisanobstacle.Jheobstacletobiologyandexperimentalmedi-
cineresides in individuality. one doesnotencounter this sort oldimculty
when experimenting on purely physical enuties. !or this reason, Claude
8ernardtriedto enumerateallthecausesthatarelinLedto thelactolindi-
vdualityandthatalter,inspaceandume,thereactionsolapparentlysimilar
livingbeingstoapparentlyidenticalcondiuonsolexistence.
Oespite 8ernard's prestigeamongphysiciansandphysiologists, wewill
not hesitate to lormulate certain limitauons in the alorecited reecuons.
Jhe recognition olindivdual, atyical, irregular existents as the basis ol
thepathological case is,allin all, a nne ilinvoluntaryhomageto8ichat's
perspicacity.8utthishomagecouldneverbetotal,onaccountol8ernard's
belielin amndamental lawlulnessollile,analogoustothatolmatter.Jhis
belieldoes not necessarily bearwiuess to all the sagacitylorwhich he is
usuallyrecognized. Aer all, to amrm that truth is in the type butreality
outsideolit,thatnaturehastyesbutthattheyarenotrealizedisthisnot
torenderLnowledgepowerlesstograspthereal` Ooesn'titjusti[Aristot-
le's objection to !latonamely, that ilone separates !deas hom Jhings,
one cannotaccountlorthe existence olthingsorlorthe science ol!deas`
VLat'smore,toseeindividualityas'oneolthemostconsiderableobstacles
tobiologyandexperimentalmedicine isn'tthisasomewhatnaVemisun-
derstandingolthe lactthat science's obstacles and objects are one andthe
same` !lthe objectolscienceisnotanobstacleto overcome, a 'dimculty
in the Cartesian sense, a problem to solve, then what is it` Ve might as
well say that the disconunuity between whole numbers is an obstacle to
arithmetic.Jhetruthisthat8ernard'sbiologyincludesamlly!latoniccon-
cepuonollaws, coupledwitha deep senseolindividuality. Sincethissense
does notaccordwith thatconcepuon,wehavereason towonderwhether
the lamous 'experimental method is not merely an avatar oltradiuonal
metaphysics.Andwecouldnndanargumentinsupportolthisproposiuon
in 8ernard's well-Lnown aversion to stausucal calculauons, which, as we
Lnow, have long played an important role in biology. Jhis aversion is a
symptom olhis inability to conceive the relauon olthe individual to the
The Noral and the Pathological 1 2 5
type as anything other than the alterauon olan ideal perlecuon, posited
as a lully realized [achevee] essence prior to anyattemptatproducuonby
reproducuon.
Vewillnowinquirewhetherbyconsideringlileasanorderolproperues
wemightnotcome closertounderstandingcertaindimculuesthatcannot
besolved homwithinthe otherperspecuve. 8y 'order olproperties, we
meanan organizationollorcesandahierarchyolmncuonswhosestability
isnecessarilyprecarious,loritis the solutionto a problem olequilibrium,
compensation, and compromise between dierentand competing powers.
!romsuchaperspecuve,irregularityandanomalyareconceivednotasacci-
dents aecunganindivdualbutasitsveryexistence. Leibnizbapuzed this
lactwithout really explaining itthe 'principle olthe identity olindis-
cernibles, amrmingthatnotwoindividualsarecompletelyaliLeanddier
solo numero. 8 !rom this, weunderstand that, ilindividuals olthesamespe-
ciesremaindistinctandnotinterchangeable,thisisbecausetheyaresode
jure. nly within a hypothesis thatconceives thelaws olnaturetobege-
neric,eternalessencesistheindividualaprovisionalandregrettableirrauo-
nality.Jhathypothesispresentsdivergenceas an 'aberrauon thathuman
calculauoncannotreducetothesuictidentityolasimplelormula,itsexpla-
nauon maLes ol divergence the error, lailure, or prodigality ol a nature
considered at once intelligent enough to proceed in simple ways and too
rich to resolve to conlorm to its own economy. However, lorus a living
species is viable onlyto the extentthatitshows itsellto be lecund, thatis,
producuve olnovelties, howeverimpercepublethesemaybeatnrstsight.
!tiswellLnowthatspeciesneartheirendoncetheyhavecommittedthem-
selvestoirreversibleandinexibledirecuonsandhavepresentedthemselves
inrigidlorms.!short,individualsingularitycanbeinterpreted eiuerasa
lailureorasanattempt, asalaultorasanadventure. !thelatterhypoue-
sis, the humanmindmaLesno negauvevaluejudgment, preciselybecause,
asattempts oradventures, livinglorms areconsiderednotbeingsrelerable
to a real, pre-established type but organizauons whose validity (that is,
value) must berelerred tothe eventual success oltheir lile. !t is because
value isin thelivingbeingthatnovaluejudgmentis made onit. Jherein
lies the prolound meaning ol the idenuty between value and health, to
which language attests. valere, in Laun, means 'to bewell . At this point
thetermanomal taLes bacLthesame, nonpejorauve meaningasthe corre-
sponding (and no longer in use) adjective anomal, which was hequently
1 2 6 Philosophy
uulized in the eighteenth centuryby naturalists, notably8uon, and even
late into thenineteenthcentury, byCournot.!tymologically, ananomaly
isaninequaliq,a dierenceindegree.Jheanomalissimplythedierent.
!n supportoItheprecedinganalysis, wewouldliLetoinvoLetwointer-
esung orientauons in contemporary biology. Ve Lnow that today experi-
mental embryology and teratology consider the producuon and study oI
monsuosiues to oer insightintothe mechanisms oIegg development.
ID
Here we nndourselves atthe uue anupodes oIthcAristotelian theoryoI
monsuosity,whichisnxistandontological.Aristotlewouldnothavesought
a law oInature inwhatheconsidered Iailures oIlivng organizauon, Ior a
conception oInaure as a hierarchy oIeternal Iorms, this is logical. !n-
versely,however, iIwe hold the livingworld to be an attemptatthe hier-
archizauon oIpossible Iorms, then there is no in itselIa priori dierence
between a successml Iorm and a Iailed Iorm [re manquee] . !roperly
speaLing, there are no Iailed Iorms. othing can be lacLing [manque] to a
livingbeingonceweacceptthatthereareathousandandonedierentways
oIliving.]ust asinwarand poliucsthereisnodenniuvevctory, but onlya
relauve and precarious superiority or equilibrium, so in the order oIliIe
there are no successes that radically devalorize other attempts and maLe
them appear Iailed. A successesarethreatened, sinceindivduals andeven
species die. Successes are delayed Iailures, Iailures are aborted successes.
Vhatdecides thevalueoIa Iormiswhatbecomes oIit.' ' AlllivngIorms
are, touseLouisRoule'sexpressioninLes poissons, 'normalizedmonsters. '
r, asGabriel Jarde puts i ti nL'opposition universele, 'the normal i sthe
zero oImonsuosity, with zero here meaning the vanishing point. ' Jhe
termsoItheclassicalrelauonoIreIerencearethusinverted.
!tisinthesamespiritthatweshouldunderstandtherelauonshipestab-
lishedbycertaincontemporarybiologistsbetweentheappearanceoImuta-
uons and the mechanism oI the genesis oI species. Genetics, which
originallyserved toremte Oarwinism, is todaywidelyused toconnrm and
renew it. According to Georges Jeissier, every species, even in the wId,
includes, alongwith'normal individuals, some originaloreccenuicones,
carriersoIcertainmutantgenes. ' Vithinanygivenspecies,wemustallow
Ioracertaingeneuctuauon,onwhichdependsthepIasticityoIthespecies'
adaptauon, thatis, its evoluuonary power. Vithout being able to decide
whetherthereexistmutation genes,whosepresencewouldmuluplyother
The N01zal and the Pathological 1 2 7
genes'lautudelormutation(assomehavethoughtcanbeidentinedincer-
tainplants),wemustnotethatdierentgenotypesthelineages olagiven
speciespresent dierent 'values in relauon to ambient circumstances.
Selection,thatis, screeningbythemilieu,issometimes conservativeinsta-
ble circumstances and someumes innovauve in criucal circumstances. At
certaintimes,'therisLiestattemptsarepossibleandlicit.JaLinginto con-
siderauon novelty and unloreseen circumstancesand the tasLs they
imposeananimalmayinheritapparatuses thatsupporthencelorth indis-
pensable mnctions, or it may inherit organs that have become devoid ol
value. 'Animalsandplantsmeritadmirationasmuchascriucism. 8utthey
live and reproduce, and this alonematters. !nthiswayweunderstandhow
itisthatmanyspecieshavebecomeextinct, while others 'thatwerepossible
wereneverrealized.
Ve canthereloreconcludethatthetermnormal hasnoproperlyabsolute
oressentialmeaning.!nanearlierworL,weproposedthatneithertheliving
being nor the milieu can be called 'normal ilwe consider them sepa-
rately.
|
nlybyconsideringtheminrelationcanwemaintaintheguiding
threadwithoutwhichwewouldnecessarilyhave to treatasabnormal(that
istosay,we believe, pathological)everyanomalindividual, everycarrierol
anomaliesevery individual aberrant in relation to a specinc, statistically
denned type. !nsolar asthe anomal living being ultimatelyreveals itsellto
have been a mutant at nrst tolerated and then invasive, the excepuon be-
comestherule,in ue stausucal sense oltheword. 8uteven as biological
invenuon appears to be an excepuon to the currentstaustical norm, this
invenuonmustbenormalinadierent,thoughunLnownsense.therwise,
onewouldarriveatthebiologicalcontradicuonthatthepathologicalcould
engenderthenormalthroughreproduction.
Jhrough the conjunction ol geneuc uctuauons with oscillauons in
quanutative and qualitative conditionsolexistenceortheirgeographic dis-
tribuuon,wecangraspthatthenormal someumessigninesanaverage trait,
hom which any divergence will be rarer the more perceptible it is, and
sometimes a uait whose vital importance and value will be revealed byre-
production, the maintenance and multiplication ol beings. !n the latter
sense, thenormalmustbecalledaninstitutorolthenorm,ornormative.it
isprototypicalandnolongersimplyarchetypal.Andthissecondsensemust
normallyunderliethenrst.
1 2 8 Philosophy
Ve arenotlosingsighthere olthelactthatwhatinterestsaphysicianis
man. Ve Lnowthat the problems olanomaly, monsuosity, and mutauon
areposedinmaninthesametermsasintheanimal.!tisenoughtomenuon
someolthemostcommoncases. albinism, syndactylia,hemophilia, dalton-
ism. Ve also Lnow that the majority olthese anomalies are regarded as
inlerior,andwemightbesurprisedatnotseeingthemeliminatedbyselec-
tionilwedidnotLnow, ontheonehand,thatmutauonincessantlyrenews
them,and,ontheother(andabove all), thatthehumanmilieualwayssome-
howsheltersthemandcompensates,withitsartinces,lorthemanilestden-
cittheseanomaliesrepresentwithrespecttotheircorresponding'normal
lorms. !ndeed, itshouldnotbelorgottenthat, inhumancondiuonsollile,
socialnormsolcustomaresubsututedlor biologicalnormsolpracuce. Al-
readytheconsiderauonoldomesucauonasabiologicalmilieu, as!dmond
Oechambre calls it, shows us that the lile ol domesuc animals tolerates
anomaliesthatwouldhave beenpiulesslyeliminatedinthewild.Mostdo-
mesticated speciesthe dog, lor exampleareremarLablyunstable. Jhis
has made some authors wonder whether this instabilitymight not be ue
sign ol something that causes these species' domesucauon. the sign, lor
example,olahiddenlowerresistancethatwouldexplainthe elecuvesuccess
oldomesucation lor these species as opposed to others, atleast as well as
wouldman'spragmaticaims.!l,then,itisuuethatanomaly, anindividual
variauon on a specinc theme, becomes pathological only in relauon to a
milieuollileandaLindollile, thenthe problemolthepathologicalinman
cannotremainstrictlybiological,lorhumanacuvity,worL,andculturehave
the immediate eect olconstantlyaltering the mlieu olhuman lile. Jhe
history proper to man modines problems. !n a sense, there is no natural
selectionin the human species, to the extentthatman can createnewmi-
lieus instead olpassively submitung to changes in the old ones. And in
another sense selection in man has reached the limit olits perlection, to
the extentthat man is the livingbeing capable olexistence, resistance, as
wellastechnicalandculturalactivity,inall milieus.
Ve donotthinLthatthelormolthisproblemchangeswhenwegohom
morphologicalanomalyto mncuonal disease,lorexample, hom daltonism
to asthma, lor it is possible to nnd muluple intermediaries between the
two. ' !nparticular, onecannnd cases olconsutuuonal oressential diseases
(e.g. , hypertension)lorwhichapossiblerelauontocertainasyetundiscov-
ered 'microanomalies cannota priori be denied and which may one day
The Noral and the Pathological 1 2
9
reveal a linL between teratology and pathology. ]ust as a morphological
anomaly (a simple lactual dierence) can become pathologicalthat is to
say,cantaLeonanegauvevitalvaluewhenitseectsareassessedinrelation
toa denned milieuinwhichcertaintasLshave becomeunavoidablelorthe
living beingso the divergence ola physiological constant (e. g. , cardiac
pulsations, arterial tension, basal metabolic rate, nycthemeral temperature
rhythm) doesnotinitsellconsututeapathologicallact.8utitbecomesone
ata momentthatisverydimcultto determine objectivelyand in advance.
JhisiswhyauthorsasdierenthomoneanotherasHenriLaugier,Henry
Sigerist,andKurtGoldsteinthinLwecannotdeterminethenormalbysim-
plerelerence to a statisuc mean but onlyby comparing the individual to
itsell, either in identical successive siuauons or invaried situauons.
I?
n
this point, no authorseemsasinstructiveasGoldstein.Anorm, he tellsus,
musthelpusunderstand concreteindividual cases.!tis thus worthlesslor
its descripuve contentas a summary olphenomena, symptoms onwhich
a diagnosisis loundedthanloritsrevelauonolthe total comporuentol
an organism,which has been modined in the sense ola disorder, in the
senseoltheappearanceolcatasuophicreacuons.Analterauoninthesymp-
tomaticcontentdoesnotappearto beadiseaseunulthe momentwhenthe
being's existence, hitherto inequilibriumwiuits milieu, becomes danger-
ouslytroubled.Vhatwasadequatelorthenormalorganism,initsrelations
to the environment, becomes inadequate or perilous lor the modined or-
ganism.!tisthetotalityoltheorganismthatreacts'catasuophicallytothe
milieu,asitbecomeshencelorthincapableolactualizingthepossibiliuesol
activityessentiallybelongingtoit.Adaptauontoapersonalmilieuisoneol
thelundamentalpresupposiuonsolhealth.
I S
Such a concepuon may appear paradoxical, since i ttends todirect the
physician's attention to lacts subjecuvely experienced by the pauentor to
events(suchas disturbance,inadequacy,catasuophe,ordanger)more aptto
be appreciated than measured orobj ecuvelydisclosed. According to Renc
Leriche, who dennes health as 'lile lived in the silence olorgans, itdoes
notsumcetodennediseaseasthatwhichimpedesmenintheiroccupauons.
And doubtlesswe couldthinLthathis lormula 'to denne disease wemust
dehumanizeitconsututesaremtauonolGoldstein'stheses.Yetitishardly
so simpleLeriche also writes that '\nder the same anatomical exterior
one may either besicL or not . . 4 . ! itsell, a lesion does notconstitute a
13
Pilosoph
Iia disease, a diseaseoFtheauent. Jhis isanamrmauon olthe pri-
macyothe hysiological over the anatomical. 8ut itis not a physiology
thattakes the rabbit orthe dog asits object, itis a physiologyolthe total
man,whosuers,lorexample, in'theconictbetweenastimulantandthe
entireindividual, a physiology thatnecessarilyleadsto a considerauon ol
man's overall comporuentintheworld.'
A possible mediation between Goldstein's and Leriche's theses can be
loundi nthe worLs olHans Selye. Selye observes thatwhen lailures and
deregulauons olcomportment (e. g. , emotion orlaugue)repeatedlyengen-
derstates olorganic tension, theyprovoLe a suucturalmodincauonin the
suprarenal cortex.Jhis modincauonisanalogousto theone caused byany
inseruon olpure hormonal substances in massive doses or olimpure or
toxic substances into the interior milieu. !very organic state olsuess or
unordered tensionprovoLesthis suprarenal reacuon. !litis normal, given
the role olcorticosterone in the organism, that every situauon olsuess
causes a suprarenal reacuon, it is conceivable that every prolonged cata-
strophiccomporuentcould result nrstin mncuonal disease (e. g. , hyper-
tension), and then in a morphological lesion (e. g. , a stomach ulcer). !rom
Goldstein's point ol view, disease lies in the catasuophic comporuent,
hom Leriche's point olvew, it lies in the producuon ol a histological
anomaly by a physiological disorder. Jhese two points olview are by no
means exclusivequite the conuary. !tis nouse appealing to a reciprocal
causalityhere, lor we have noclearLnowledge olthe eectolthe psychic
on the mnctional and the morphological, orviceversa,we simultaneously
observetwosortsolperturbauon.
!anycase,whenweindivdualizeuenormandthenormal,weseemto
erasetheboundariesbetweenthenormalandthepathological.!nsodoing,
we seem to be suengthening a commonplace that is hequently invoLed
becauseithas theinvaluable advantage olactuallysuppressingtheproblem
intheguiseolnndingasolutiontoit.!lwhatisnormalherecanbepatho-
logicalthere, itistemptingto concludethatthereisnoboundarybetween
the normal and the pathological. !ineilbythiswe mean that hom one
indivdual to thenextthe relauvityolthenormalistherule. 8utthisdoes
notmeanthatlor a given individual thedistincuonisnotabsolute. Vhen
anindividualbeginsto leelsicL,to callhimsellsicL,tocomporthimsellas
a sicLman, he has passed into a dierentuniverse and become a dierent
man.Jherelativityolthenormalmustinnowayencouragethephysician,
The N01zal and the Pathological 1
3
1
inconlusion, to nulli[the distinction between thenormal andthe patho-
logical. Jhis conmsion is ohen decLed out with the presuge ol a thesis
essentialto 8ernard's thought, accordingtowhichthepathologicalstateis
homogeneouswiththenormalstateanddiersuomitonlyasaquantitauve
variation. Jhisposiuvistthesis,whoserootsgo bacLbeyondtheeighteenth
centuryandScottishphysician]ohn8rownto!rancis Glissonandthenrst
sLetches olthe theory olirritability, was popularized belore 8ernard by
!ranois8roussaisandAugusteComte.!nlact,iloneexaminespathologi-
callactsinthedetailolsymptomsandanatomo-physiologicalmechanisms,
there indeed existnumerous caseswhere the normal and thepathological
appeartobesimplequantitativevariauonsonaphenomenonthatishomo-
geneous in the two lorms (e. g. , glycemia in diabetes). Yet this atomistic
pathology, though perhaps pedagogicallyinevitable, remains theoretically
and pracucally contestable. ' Considered in its entirety, an organism is
'other when itis diseased and notthe same savelorcertain dimensions
(e. g. , diabetes mustbethoughtolas anutritional disease, inwhich glucid
metabolism depends on multiple lactors coordinated by the indivisible
action olthe endocrinal systemand, in general, nutriuonal diseases are
lunctional diseases related to denciencies in dietary regimes). Jhis is
what Leriche recognizes when he writes. '!n man, disease is always an
ensemble. . . . \'atproducesittouchestheordinarylorces [ressorts] ollile
within us in such a subtle lashion that their responses are less a deviated
physiologythananewone.
!tnowappearspossibletorespondwithsomehopeol claritytotheques-
tions posed atthe beginning olthese considerauons. Ve cannot say that
the conceptolthe'pathologicalisthelogicalconuadictoryoltheconcept
'normal, lor lileinthepathologicalstateisnotthe absenceolnormsbut
the presence olother norms. Rigorously speaLing, 'pathological is the
vital conuaryol'healthy andnotthelogicalcontradictoryol'normal.
!the!renchwordabnormal, theprenxab- usuallyindicatesdistoruon.Jo
beconvincedolthis,itisenoughtorelatethe!renchtermtotherespective
termsinotherlanguages.inLaun,abnormis, abnormitas; inGerman,abnorm,
Abnormitit; orin!nglish,abnoral, abnormalit. Oiseasethepathological
stateisnottheloss olanormbutthe aspectolalile regulatedbynorms
that are vitally inlerior or depreciated, insolar as theyprevent the living
being uom an acuve and comlortable parucipation, generauve ol conn-
denceand assurance, in theLindollile previouslybelongingtoitandsull
1
3
2 Philosophy
permitted to others. ne
could object, as has been done,that by speaLing
oIinIeriorityanddepreciationwearebringinginpurelysubjecuvenouons.
Yetthisisa
matternotoIindivdualbutoIuniversalsubjecuvty. !Ithereis
any
objectivesignoIthisuniversalsubjecuvereacuontodivergence,thatis,
tovital depreciation in disease, itispreciselythe existence, coextensive in
spaceandtimewithhumaniq,oImedicineasamoreorlessscienunctech-
niqueIorhealing diseases.
A Goldsteinputsit,thenormsoIpathologicalliIe arethosethatoblige
theorganismtohenceIorthliveina'shrunLenmilieu,whichdiersquali-
tatively, structurally, homits IormermilieuoIliIe,theorganismisobliged
byits incapacity to conhontthe demands oInewmilieus (inthe Iorm oI
reactions orundertaLings dictated bynewsituauons) toliveexclusivelyin
this shrunLen milieu. ow, to live, alreadyIor animals and even more so
Ior man, is notmerelytovegetate and conserve oneselI. !tis to conhont
risLs and to triumph over them. !specially in man, health is precisely a
certainlautude,acertainplayinthenormsoIliIeandbehavior.Vhatchar-
acterizeshealthis a capacityto toleratevariationsinnorms onwhich only
the stability oIsituations andmilieusseeminglyguaranteedyetinIactal-
ways necessarily precariousconIers a deceptive value oIdenniuve nor-
malcy.Manistrulyhealthyonlywhenheiscapable oIseveralnorms,when
he is more than normal. Jhe measure oIhealth is a certain capacity to
overcome organiccrisesandtoestablishanewphysiologicalorder,dierent
homtheold.HealthistheluxuryoIbeingabletoIallillandrecover.!very
disease is, by contrast, a reduction oIthe power to overcome others. Jhe
economic success oIliIe-insurance policies depends mndamentally on the
Iact that health is, biologically speaLing, insurance in liIewhich usually
remains within its range oIpossibiliues but is potenually superior to its
'normalcapacities.
Ve do notthinL that these views on the problem oIphysiopathology
areremtedwhenconhontedwiththeproblemoIpsychopathology. nue
contraryitisaIactthatpsychiauistshavebetterreected ontheproblem
oIthenormal than physicians have. Amongthem, manyhaverecognized
thatamentallyillpersonis an 'other person, notmerelya personwhose
disurbanceis anextensionor enlargementoIthenormal psyche.! this
domain,the abnormalistrulyinpossessionoIothernorms.8utmostoIthe
time,whenspeaLingoIabnormal directionsorrepresentauons,thepsychol-
ogistorpsychiatristhasinmind, as 'normal, a certainIormoIadaptauon
The Noral and the Pathological 1
3 3
to therealortolile,onethathasnoabsolutemeaningexcept, thatis, lor
thosewhohaveneverhadaninLlingolthe relativityoltechnical,economic,
or cultural values, who adhere without reservauon to the value olthese
values,andwho,intheend,lorgetungtheirownconditioningbytheirsur-
roundings and by the history olthese surroundings, and thinLing in too
good laith that they themselves incarnate the norm olthese norms, show
themselvestoanythinLingevenabitcriucalto bethevcumsolanillusion
very near to what they denounce as madness. Adjust as in biology one
sometimes loses the guidingthread that allows one to disunguishbetween
progressiveanomalyandregressive diseaseinthecaseolasomaticorlunc-
tionalsingularity, soitalso ohen happensinpsychologythat one losesthe
guiding thread that allows one to distinguishbetweenmadness and genius
inthe case olinadaptauonstoagiven milieu olculture. Jhus, justasithas
seemednecessaryto recognize in health the normative power to quesuon
the usual physiological norms byseeLing a debate between the livingand
the milieua search that implies a normal acceptance olthe risL olill-
nesssoitseemstousthatthenorminmattersolthehumanpsycheisthe
reclamauon and use ol heedom as a power olrevision and instituuon ol
normsa reclamauon that normally implies the risL olmadness. ` Vho
wouldargue,inquestionsolhumanpsychology,thattheabnormaldoesnot
obeynorms` !tisperhapsabnormalonlybecauseitistoo obedienttosuch
norms.JhomasMannwritesthat'itisnotsoeasyto decidewhenmadness
anddisease begin.Jhemanonthe sueetisthelastto beableto decide on
this. Jooohen, physicians'lacLolpersonalreectiononthese quesuons,
which give meaning to their acuvity, means that they are hardly better
equippedthanthemanonthestreet.Howmuchmoreperspicaciousseems
Mann, when, doubtless via an intentional encounter with ietzsche, the
hero olhis booLpronounces that. 'everhave! heard anythingmore stu-
pidthanthatonlysicLcancomehomsicL.Lileisnotsqueamish, andcares
notanglormorality.!tgraspsthe boldproductoldisease,devours, digests
it, andno sooner taLesitto itsellthan itis health. 8elore the lact ollile's
emcacy. . . alldisuncuonoldiseaseandhealthisundone. '
!conclusion,weholdthathumanbiologyandmedicineare, andalways
have been, necessary parts ol an 'anthropology. 8ut we also hold that
there isnoanthropologythatdoesnotpresupposeamorality,suchthatthe
conceptolthe 'normal, whenconsideredwithinthehumanorder,always
remainsanormauve conceptolproperlyphilosophicalscope.
SEVEN
Monstrosity and the Monstrous
Jheexistenceolmonsterscallsintoquesuonthecapacityolliletoteachus
order. Jhis callingintoquesuonisimmediatesocomprehensivewasour
prior conndence, so nrmly accustomed had we been to seeing wild roses
bloomingonrosebushes, tadpolesturningintohogs, maressucLlingloals,
and,ingeneral,thesameengenderthesame.Abreachinthisconndence,a
morphological divergence, an appearance equivocal a to its species is
enoughlorus to be gripped byradical lear. Verywelllorlear, onemight
say. 8utwhyradical lear 8ecausewe are living beings, realeects olthe
laws ollile, and ourselves possible sources ollile in our turn. Alailure ol
lile is oldouble concern to us, lor such a lailure could touch us orcould
come lromus. !tisonly because we humans arelivingbeings thata mor-
phologicallailureis,toourlivingeyes,amonster.!lwewerebeingsolpure
reason, pureintellectualmachinesolobservation, calculauon, andexplana-
uon, and thusinertand indierent to the occasions olourthinkng, then
the monsterwould bemerelywhatis otherthan the same, an orderother
thanthemostprobable order.
1
34
Monstosit and the llonstl"OZlS 1
3 5
Ve mustreserve the qualincation 'monster lororganic beings.Jhere
are no mineral monsters. Jhere are no mechanical monsters. Something
with no rule olinternal cohesion, something whose lorm and dimensions
cannotbeseenasdivergenceshomamodulethatcanbeexpressedinterms
ola measure, mold, ormodel, cannotbecalled monstrous. ne could say
thatarocLis enormous, butnotthatamountainis monstrous, exceptina
universeolmyhical discourse inwhichithappens thatthemountaingives
birthtoamouse. ' Jhere isaclarincauonto bemaderegardingtherelauon
between the enormous and the monsuous. 8oth are, indeed, outside the
norm.Jheenormousescapes a normthatisonlymeuic. 8utinthatcase,
whydoestheenormousreleronlytoenlargement`Ooubtlessbecause, be-
yondacertaindegreeolgrowth, quantitycallsqualityintoquestion.!nor-
mitystretches toward monsuosity. Hence the ambiguity olgigantism. !s a
giant enormous or is it a monster` Jhe mythological giant is a prodigy,
whichistosay,itssize 'annihilatestheendthatconsututesitsconcept. !l
manis denned byacertainlimitationollorcesandlunctions,thentheman
who, byhis size, escapes these limitauons isno longer a man. Jo saythat
heisnolongeroneisalsotosayhesullisone. Smallness,ontheotherhand,
seems to enclose the qualityola thingininumacy and secrecy. Qualityis
betterpreservedthelessitisexposed.
Ve mustthusincludeinthedenniuonolthemonsteritsnatureasliving
being.Jhe monster isalivingbeingwithnegativevalue. Herewecanbor-
row some olthe mndamental concepts ol!ugne Oupreel's original and
proloundtheoryolvalues.VatmaLesthevalueollivingbeings, ormore
exactly,whatmaLeslivingbeingsvalorizedinrelauontothemodeolbeing
oltheirphysicalmilieuistheirconsistencyasa species. Slicingthroughthe
vicissiudes ol the material environment, consistency expresses itsell
through resistance to delormauon and a suuggle lor the integrity ol
lormbytheregenerauonolmuulatedorgansinsomespecies, andbyre-
producuon in all. ow, the monsterisnotonlya living being olreduced
value, itis alivingbeingwhosevalueisto bea counterpoint. 8yrevealing
the precariousness ol the stability to which lile has habituated usyes,
merelyhabituated, even thoughwehaveturned thishabitinto a lawthe
monsterbestows upon therepeuuonolspecies, upon morphologicalregu-
larity,anduponsuccesslulstructurauonavalueallthemoreeminentinthat
we can now grasp their conungency. Jhe vital counter-value is thus not
deathbutmonsuosity.Oeathisthepermanentandunconditionalthreatol
theorganism'sdecomposiuon,thelimitationhomwithout, thenegationol
1
3
6 Philosophy
the living by the nonliving. Monsuosityis the accidental and condiuonal
threatolincompletenessordistoruoninthelormauonolthelorm,itisthe
limItationhomwithin,thenegauonolthelivingbythenonviable.
Jheambivalentatutude olhuman consciousness towardthemonsteris
certainlygroundedinaconmsedsenseoltheimportanceolmonsterslora
correct and complete appreciauon olthe values ollile. nthe one hand,
thereis lear, as we have said, and evenpanicLed terrorbut also, on the
other hand, curiosiq, even lascination. Jhe monsuous is the marvelous
inverted, butitis marvelousnonetheless. n the one hand, itdisconcerts.
lileislesssureolitsellthanwethought.ntheother,itvalorizes.sincelile
is capable ollailures, all its successes are lailures avoided. Jhat these suc-
cessesarenotnecessarydepreciatesthemenblocwhileenhancingeachone
in parucular. Vhenwe approach thephilosophyolvalues hom the angle
olnegauvevalues,wehavenodimcultysaying,withGaston8achelard,that
the trueis thelimitollost illusions, and, lorthe problem thatconcernsus
here,wehavenomoredimcultysaying,withGabrielJarde, thatthenormal
typeisthe degree zeroolmonsuosity.`
8utas soon as consciousnesshasbeenledto suspectthe eccentricityol
lile, to dissociatetheconcepts olreproducuon andrepeuuon,whatwould
preventithomsupposingliletobeevenmorealivethatistosay, capable
olthegreatestheedomolexercise,homsupposinglilecapablenotonlyol
provoLedexcepuonsbutalsoolspontaneoustransgressionsolitsownhab-
its:Vhenlacedwithabirdwiuthreelegs,shouldwebemoresensiuveto
thelactthatithasonelegtoomanyortothelactthatithascn[onemore:
Jo judgelile to betimid orhugalisto senseinonesellamovementto go
evenmrtherthanitwill.Adwheredoesthismovementcomehom,lead-
ingthemindsolmentojuxtaposetolile'smonsuousproducts,liLesomany
projects to temptit,gli withmulupleheads, perlect men, oremblemsin
theshapeolmonsters:Ooesthismovementcomehomlile'sinscripuon(in
the geomeuical sense olthe term) within the arc ola poetic elan made
consciousbytheimaginauonandrevealedbyittobeinnnite:risitrather
thatthelittlelolliesollileinciteimitauoninhumanlantasy,whichreturns
to lile what lile had lent to it: Jhere is, however, so great a dierence
between loan andresutuuonhere thatitmay seem unreasonableto accept
suchavirtuouslyrauonalistexplanation.Lileispoorinmonsters.Jhelan-
tasucisaworld.
Monstosit and the Monstous 1 3 7
!t is here that the thorny question olthe relauon between monsuosity
andthemonsuous arises.Jheyaretwoconceptshomthesameetymologi-
calstocL.Jheyareintheserviceoltwolormsolnormauvejudgmentthe
medical and the juridicalwhich were initially conlounded rather than
combined in religious thought, and then progressively absuacted and
secularized.
JhereisnodoubtthatClassicalAnuquiqandtheMiddleAgesconsid-
eredmonstrosityan eectolthe monsuous. Jhevery term hybrid, seem-
ingly so posiuve and descriptive, attests to this in its etymology.
!nterspecies animal ospring are the result olcrossbreedingsthatviolate
the rules olendogomy, unionswithoutobservance olsimilitude. Jhe pas-
sagehomhybridizauontomonstrosityiseasy.JheMiddleAgesretainsthe
idenuncauon olthemonstrouswiththecriminalbutalsoenrichesitwitha
relerencetothediabolical.Jhemonsterisatoncetheeectolaninhacuon
olthe rule olthe sexual segregation olspecies and the sign ola will to
perversion in the table olcreatures. Monsuosity is a consequence less ol
the conungency ollile than olthe licentiousness olthe living. Vhy, asLs
Scipion du !leix, does Aica produce more monsters than other regions`
'8ecause, all sorts olanimals nnding themselves together by the waters
to drinL, theyordinarilymatewithout discreuon asto species. ' ne sees
monstrosityarisingunexpectedlyoutolalacLoldiscreuonanambiguous
termthathereismllolmeaning.Monsuosity,theconsequenceolacarnival
olanimals aher drinLing'
Vhenitcomestoman,theappearanceolmonstrosityisevenmoreola
signature than in the case ol animals. the quesuon olthe illicit eclipses
that olthe irregular,responsibilityeclipses causality. !lthe rient deines
monsters,GreeceandRomesacrincethem.Moreover,inSparta,themon-
ster'smotherisstoned, inRome, she is expelled andreintegratedinto the
cityonlyaherpurincauon. Suchadierenceinattitudebetween!gytand
Romestemsnrstolallhomdierenttheoriesconcerningnature'spossibili-
ties. Jo acceptmetempsychosisand metamorphoses, as the !gyuans did,
is to admit to a Linship between speciesincluding manthat insututes
their interlecundity. Yet as soon as one singles out, in nature, diviniues'
zones ol inuence or lundamental alliances Lucreuus), as soon as one
sLetches a classincauon olspecies based on their mode olgenerauon and
applies onesellto observingconditions and circumstances olimpregnauon
Aristotle), nature is denned as much byimpossibiliues as by possibiliues.
1 3 8 Philosophy
Zoomorphicmonstrosity,iloneacceptsits existence, mustbetreatedasthe
consequenceoladeliberateattempttoinhingetheorderolthings(anorder
congruentwith theirperlecuon),itis the consequence olabandonmentto
thevertiginouslascinationoltheundenned,olchaos,oltheanucosmos.A
!rnestMartinpointedoutinhIsHistor of Monsters, duringtheMiddleAges
theconnectionolteratologytodemonologyappearstohavebeentheresult
ola persistentdualismin Chrisuantheology.Jheliteratureonthisques-
tion is abundant. Ve allude to it onlyto the extentthat itpermIts us to
understand that the monstrous, inIually a juridical concept, was gradually
made into a category olthe imaginauon. !tis a matter, in short, ola dis-
placementolresponsibility.Jheologians,judgesorphilosopherswhocould
not accept the possibilityoldirect commerce betweenwomen and incubi
orsuccubi didnothesitate to accept thatthe sightola demonic appariuon
could lead to an alterauon in the development ola human embryo. Jhe
theory olbirthmarLs, sull alive in the popular mind, was nrst elaborated
by Hippocrates in the treauseEpikyesis (On Supeitation ) . ' Jhisprince ol
medicine reportedly applied that theory to exonerate a noble Athenian
woman, explaining thather contemplation olthe poruaitolan !thiopian
sumced to account lor the appearance olher child. !n sum, long belore
!ascal denounced the imagination as the misuess olerrors and lalsehood,
ithad beencreditedwiththephysicalpowerto lalsi[theordinaryopera-
uonsolnature.Ambroise!arecountsthepoweroltheimaginauonamong
thecausesolmonstrosity.IollowingtheprinciplesolCartesianmechanism,
icolasMalebranche proposes a suictlyphysiological explanationolthis.
Jhe imagination is here nothIng but a physical mnction olimItation, ac-
cordingtowhichobjectsperceivedbythemotherhavea'repercussionon
theletus.LiLeHippocrates,Malebrancheackowledgesthatthepercepuon
ola simulacrum induces the same eects as the percepuon olthe object
itsell.Heamrmsthatthepassions,desire,andadisorderingoltheimagina-
uonhavesimilar eects. ' ' ! a rationalized and henceweaLened lorm, we
nndhereyetagainthemonsuousattheoriginolmonsuosities.Jheadvan-
tage olthis theorylorMalebranche, a parusanolprelormauon and olthe
encasementolgerm seeds, is thatitexculpates God hom thegrievanceol
having created monsuous seeds. ne is tempted to object that, although
such a theoryis perhaps appropriate in the case olhuman monstrosity, it
couldnotbegeneralized. 8utitwas.]ohann Jheodore !ller (i 6Si ;6o),
directorolthe RoyalAcademyol!russia, publishedin i ;6, inthe annals
Monstosit and the Monstous 1
39
ol thatacademy,adissertationthatcreditsanimalswiththepowerol engen-
dering noteworthy monstrosities via their imagination. !ller describes a
dog, whichhe himsellhad observed, thatwas broughtinto theworldwith
aheadthat'resembledquite closelythatolaturLeycocL.VLenthedog's
motherwaspregant,shehadhabituallywalLedinthelarmyard,whereshe
waschasedandbeaLedbyanirascibleturLeycocL.nthebasisolthis,!ller
couldwrite.'Vomenshouldnotboastolbeingtheonlyonestopossessthe
prerogauveolproducingmonstersbythelorceoltheirimagination,weare
convincedbythe precedingstorythatbeastscan dosojustaswell. ' ne
nnds the imagination credited with the power olimprinung upon living
beings in gestation thetraitsolaperceivedobject, anemgy, asimulacrum,
the inconsistentcontours ola desirethatis to say, ola dream. !lwe ob-
servethat,intheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies,thismuchisgranted
to the imaginauonandwiththe intentolgivinga rational explanation
how, then, couldwe beastonishedbythe lamiliaritywithwhichmenlived
with monsters` Jheyblended legends olmonsterswithhistory, and were
insouciantaboutseparaungrealityhomnctionsoreadyweretheyto be-
lievethatmonstersexistbecausetheyareimaginedandthattheyexistonce
they are imaginedin other words, that ncuon molds reality and reality
authenucatesncuon.
JheteratologoltheMiddleAgesandtheRenaissanceishardlyacensus
olmonsuosiues,itis, rather, a celebrauonolthe monsuous. !tis an accu-
mulationolthemesollegendsandschemesolnguresinwhichanimallorms
play, sotospeaL, at exchanging their organs andvaryingthe combinauons
oltheseorgans,inwhichtoolsandevenmachinesaretreatedasorgansand
are composed olthe parts ollivingbeings. !Hieronymus 8osch's gles,
there is no demarcaung line bereen organisms and utensils, no honuer
between the monsuous and the absurd.]urgis 8aluusaus's recent worLs
Le Moyen
A
ge fantastique and Reveils et prodiges conuibute decisively to our
Lnowledge olthe origins and signincauon olmonsuous themes. monsters
areconstantmoulsinthebas-relielsolcathedrals,inillustrationsolApoca-
lypses, besuaries, and cosmographies, in comic prints, in anthologies ol
omens, andinprognosucauons. ' Jhe same schema olmonsters, the same
compositebeings,aresomeumessymbolic,sometimesdocumentary,some-
umes didacuc. Jhe dierentcounuiesol!urope circulate, exchange,and
compare them. Jhe Low Countries and Switzerland,Antwerp and 8asel,
areparucularlyourishinghomelandslorthis.JhenrstteratologicalworLs
1 40 Philosophy
ofeuologicalintent
, bysurgeonsorphysiciansliLe!are or!ortunioLiceu,
canhardlybe
distinguished uomthechronicles olprodigiesby]ulius b-
sequens
(lourthcentury)andConradLycosthenes(i ;) . ' Jheiriconogra-
phyjuxtaposes monstrosityand the monsuous. lor example, a two-headed
child, a mrry child, and a child with a rat's tail comingoutolitshead, a
magpie-woman and a donLey-legged girl, a pigwith a human head and a
bovinemonsterwithsevenheads(liLethe monster oltheApocalypse), and
many others. 8ut it seems the moment has come when rauonal thought
wouldtriumphovermonsuosity, justastheimaginationhad taLenpleasure
inbelievingthatheroesandsaintscoulduiumphovermonsters.
'Jhenecessarycomplementtothemonsterisachild'sbrain, said!aul
Valery. Valeryjudges as unilormlyridiculous the role thatthe arts grant
to painted, sung, or sculpted monsters and conlesses to beingable to re-
spondonlywithlaughtertothesightolthebizarreandmisshapencomposi-
tionsoeredinpaleontologicalanthologies.Valery'sremarLcouldbetaLen
as the epitome olthe rationalistatutude toward the monsuous in the age
olpositive teratolog. nce monsuosityhas become a biological concept,
oncemonstrosiueshavebeendividedinto classes based oninvariablerela-
tions,onceonepridesonesellonbeingabletobringthemaboutexperimen-
tally, the monster is naturalized, the irregular is brought bacL to the rule
andtheprodigytopredictability.!tthengoeswithoutsayingthatthescien-
tincspiritwouldnnditmonsuousthatmancouldhaveoncebelievedinso
manymonstrousanimals.8acLintheageollables,monsuosityexposedthe
monstrous power olthe imaginauon. !n the age olexperiments, themon-
ster is taLen to be a symptom olpueriliq or mental malady, itindicates
debilityorabreaLdown olreason. nerepeats, lollowingGoya,that'Jhe
sleep olreason begets monsters. 8utone doesn'tasL onesell(Leepingin
mind Goya'soeuvreinparucular)whether'begetung heremeansengen-
dering monsters or merelygivingbirth to them. put dierently, whether
thesleepolreasonmightnotbealiberatorratherthanageneratorolmon-
sters. Jhe same historical epoch that, according to !oucault, naturalized
madness occupied itsell with naturalizing monsters. ' Jhe Middle Ages
(which is notso named because it allowed the coexistence olexuemes) is
theageinwhich one sees the madlivinginsocietywiththe sane andmon-
sters with the normal. !n the nineteenth century, the madman is in the
asylum,whereheservestoteachreason,andthemonsterisintheembryol-
ogist'sglassj ar,whereitservestoteachthenorm.
Monstosit and the Monstous I4I
Jheeighteenth centurywas nottoohardonmonsters. !venthoughits
lumieres chased many ol them away, just as they chased away many
witches'!l day breaLs, let us leave, say the witches in one ol Goya's
Caprichos-the centuryespoused theparadoxollooLingtoaberrantorgan-
ismslorenwaysto anunderstandingolregularphenomenaolorganiza-
tion.Monstersweretreatedassubsututeslorcrucialexperimentsto decide
betweentwo possiblesystems olthegenerauonand developmentolplants
and animals. prelormationand epigenesis. Jheywerealso used to provide
thetheoryolthe conunuousladderolbeingswththe argumentoltransi-
tional lorms, or, as Leibniz called them, intermediate species. 8ecause
theyappearequivocalas to species, monstersensurethe passage homone
speciestoanother.Jheirexistencelacilitatesthemind'sconcepuonolcon-
tinuity.Natura non facit saltus, non datur hiatus frarum ('aturemaLesno
leaps,thereisnogapbetweenthelorms) .thatiswhymonstersexist,albeit
onapurelycomparative basis.8enoItdeMailletand]ean-8apusteRobinet
evoLed all the monsters theyneeded,withouthavingto inventthem, and
onesees alltheyingnsh,allthe mermen, allthesirensspringbacLupout
olthe besuariesoltheRenaissance.Jheyreappear, mrthermore, ina con-
text and lollowingan intuiuon that recall the spiritolthe Renaissance. an
insurrection against the suict legality imposed on nature by mechanistic
physicsandphilosophy,anostalgialorthenondisuncuonollorms,lorpan-
psychism,lorpansexualism.Monstersarecalledupontolegitimateanintu-
itivevisionollile, inwhichlecunityeacesorder. Teliamed, entretiens d'un
philosophe indien avec un missionnaire franfais (Teliamed; or, Conversations Be
teen an Indian Philosopher and a French Missionar on the Diminution of the
Sea, I 748) is riental mythology resuscitated in the servce olanutheol-
ogy. ' And in the Considerations philosophiques de la gradation naturele des
fres de l'etre (Philosophical Considerations on the Natural Gradation of Fors
of Being, I 768), weread. 'Vebelievethatthelormsmostbizarreinappear-
ance. . . serveaspassagetoneigh boringlorms,thattheyprepareandbring
about the combinauons that lollow them, just as theyhave been brought
about by those that precede them, that, lar hom troubling the order ol
things,theyconuibute to it. ' Jhe samethesesandsimilarargumentsare
taLen up again in D'Alembert's Dream and in the Letter Concering the
Blind.2
0
Moreover, by calling the blind-born Saunderson a monster
Saunderson, the prolessor olphysical optics whose lesson he presents on
the occasion olthe visit olthe blind-born du !uisauxOiderotmeans, in
142 Pbilosopby
this letter, to demonstrate his method ol the systemauc employment ol
monstrosityasaninstrumentloranalysisanddecompositioninthedomain
olthe genesis olideas andideals. !n sum,whetherin embryology, classin-
cauon,orphysiology,theeighteenthcenurymadethemonsternotonlyan
objectbutaninsuumentolscience.
!t is truly in the nineteenth century that the scientinc explanauon ol
monstrosityandthecorrelauvereducuonolthemonstrous are elaborated.
Jeratologyis born out olthe encounterolcomparauveanatomywithan
embryologytranslormed by the adopuon olthe theoryolepigenesis.]o-
hann !riedrichMecLel the Younger explainscertainsimplemonstrosities,
notablywhat were called monstrosities by delault, liLe arrested develop-
ment (as had alreadybeen suggested by C. !. Vol). '

tienne Geomoy
Saint-Hilairesubstitutesthe nouonoldelaylorthatolarrest.Monstrosity
isthenxationoloneorgan'sdevelopmentatastagesurpassedbytheothers.
!tisthesurvivalolatransitoryembryoniclorm.!oranorganismolagiven
species,the monstrosityoltodayisthenormal state olthe daybeloreyes-
terday. Adin the comparative series olspecies, amonstrouslormolone
canbeanormallormlor another. !nhisHistoire des anomalies de l'organisa
tion ( 1 83 7), !sidore GeomoySaint-Hilaire (son ol

tienne) achievesin a
denniuve lashion, in some respectsthe domesucauon olmonsuosiues,
orderingthemamonganomalies, classi[ingthemaccordingto therulesol
the natural method, applying to them a methodical nomenclature sullin
use today, and, aboveall, naturalizingthecomposite monster, thatis, the
one in which we nnd complete or incomplete elements oltwo or more
organisms united. !reviously, the composite monster was held to be the
monster'smonster,becauseitwascomparedtothenormolasingleindivid-
ual. 8utilonerelersthe compositemonstertotwoormorenormalindivid-
uals,thecompositetypeolmonstrosityisnomoremonsuousthanasimple
monsuosity. Isidore GeomoySaint-Hilaire'sveryperunent reecuons on
the existence olanomalies are summarizedin one olhis lormulas. 'Jhere
arenoexcepuonstothelawsolnature, onlyexcepuonstothelawsolnatu-
ralists. !inally,nolessinterestingishislinLingoltheconceptsolanom-
aly andvariety, which would acquire great importance toward the end ol
thecenturyinthecontextoltheoriesolevoluuon.
!romthispointon,consututedbydescripuons, denniuons, and classin-
cauons, teratology became a natural science. 8ut in a centuryhardlytwo
years olderthan the term and conceptbiolog, all naturalhistorytendedto
Monstsit and the Monstous I
43
becomeanexperimental science. !nmid-century, Camille Oareste ( r 82 2-
) lounded teratogeny, the experimental study olthe conditions lorthe
artincial producuon olmonstrosiues. ! theMiddleAges, the artistrepre-
sented imaginarymonsters, the scientist olthenineteenth centuryclaimed
to labricate real monsters. !choing Marcelin 8erthelot, who said that
chemistrycreatesitsobject,Oaresteproclaimedthatteratogenymustcreate
its own objects. He boasted olhaving successmlly produced manysimple
monstrosiues (as classined by!sidore GeomoySaint-Hilaire) ona chicLen
embryo, andhehopedto be able to producehereditaryvarieties. !ncour-
agedbyOarwin'sappreciauonolhisexperiments'lullolpromiseslorthe
lutureOareste resolved to employ the resources olexperimentauon to
elucidatetheoriginolspecies.
!rom then on, monsuosity appears to have revealed the secret olits
causesand laws, while anomaly appearscalledupon toexplicatethelorma-
uon olthe normal, not because the normal is an attenuated lorm olthe
pathological, butbecause the pathological is the normal impeded or dev-
ated. Remove the impediment and you obtain the norm. Hencelorth, the
transparencyolmonsuositytoscientincthoughtcutsmonsuosityohom
any relauon to the monsuous. Realism inartsystemaucally condems the
monsuous to being no more than the carbon copy olmonstrosity. !n an
epoch when Gustave Courbet grumbled, 'ilyou want me to paint god-
desses, showme some' onehad to be]apanese still to paint dragons. Jo
the extentthatthe monsuouspersistedin !urope, itbecamewell behaved
and unexciting. !or an occasion to paint a monster, !ngresborrows hom
Orlando Furioso the theme olRuggiero savingAngelicawith the double
resultolbeinglorcedtotelltheConcourtsthattheonlymonsterLnownto
!rench art comes hom Jheramenes' story, and ollater arousingValery's
laughter.At the same ume, posiuvistanthropologysetoutto depreciate
religious myths and ueir arusuc representauons. ! r 878, ]oseph Marie
]ules !arrot tried to establish, belore the members olthe !rench Society
lorAnthropology, that the dwarl-god!tah, worshipped bythe !gypuans,
displayedthecharacteristicsolanachondroplasicmonster. `
Ve would have liLedtoshowhow, hom this period on, the monsuous
seeLs remge in poetry, andwe would taLe pleasure in lollowingthe sullu-
rous trail that leads hom 8audelaire to the surrealists byway olRimbaud
and Lauueamont. 8uthow canwe resist the temptation to nnd the mon-
suous once again attheveryheart olthe scientincuniversehomwmch it
1
4
Philosophy
was believed expelledto nnd the biologisthimsellpartaLing, in fnte
delicto, in surrealism` Haven't we heard Oareste claim lor teratology the
gloryolcreatingitsobject`Haven'tweseen!sidoreGeomoySaint-Hilaire
and Oareste linL, the lormerwithumidity, thelatterwith conndence, the
two questions olmonsuosityand olthe creationolraces`Jhe submission
olthe scientinc spirit to the reality ollaws-might this be nothing more
thanaruseoltheVillto!ower`
!n r 826, inAuteuil,

tienneGeomoySaint-Hilairereprisedexperiments
in artincialincubationhehadundertaLenin!gypt, imitaung then-current
techniques used in the lamous chicLen-egg incubators. Jhese experiments
aimed to denne embryonic anomalies. !n r 82 9, drawing a lesson hom the
relation olthese investigations to the question posed by LamarcL's thesis
on the modincations ol animal types,

tienne Geomoy Saint-Hilaire

writes. '! sought to lead organizauon down unusual paths. Vithout a
doubt, this decision, insolarasitleadsto operations onbird eggs, does not
arise lromanyunconscious inclination toward the labulous. 8utwouldwe
saythe same olReaumurwhen, havingrecounted atlengthwhathe calls
thelovesolachicLenandarabbit,heexpresseshisdisappointmentthatthis
strange union did notprocurehim 'chicLenscoveredinmrorrabbitscov-
eredinleathers`Vhatwillwesaythedaywelearnthatteratogenicexperi-
mentshavebeenperlormedonman`!romthecurioustothe scabrous, and
hom the scabrous to the monsuous, the road is suaight, ilnot short. !l
inscribed in the code olexperimentation is a tryingout olall possibiliues
withaviewtowardrevealingthereal,thereisa risLthattheboundarybe-
tween the experimental andthe monsuous will notbe perceived at nrst
sight.!orthemonsuousisoneolthesepossibiliues.Ve wouldliLehereto
berelerringto themonsuousonlyasimaginal), butweareconsciousolits
ambiguity. Jhere is a gap between biologists who create their own object
andlabricators olhumanmonsters desunedto bebuoonssuch asthose
described by VictorHugo in L'homme qui rit (The Laughing Man). 28 Ve
mustwantthis gap to remainasitis,butwe cannotamrmthatitwill.
Jheignoranceoltheancientsheldmonsterstobegamesolnature,while
the science olour contemporariesturnstheminto the games olscienusts.
Let us play at labricating cyclopean chicLens, nve-legged hogs, Siamese
newts,whilewe arewaiting, assomethinL, tobeabletoplayatlabricating,
notsirensorcentaurs,butperhapsaprimiuveman.Haditnotbeen coined
Monstosit and the Monstous I
45
bya Lnownauthor,theexpression'toseeLto leadorganizauondownun-
usualpathscouldpassIorthe announcementoIa diabolicalproject.Here
onceagainwenndthemonsuous attheoriginoImonsuosiuesonlythis
ume authentic ones.!twould thus be the centuryoIpositivismthatwould
have realizedthinLing it was abolishing itwhat the Middle Ages had
dreamt.
Ve havejustusedthecondiuonalbecause,iIitistruethatthemonsuous
is atworL, in its own way, in experimental teratology, itisjust as certain
thatthemonstrous doesnotsurpass,intheintensityoIits eects,whatliIe
obtainswithoutit. Joday'steratologistislessambiuousand moremeasured
than

tienne Geomoy Saint-Hilaire or Oareste. ! a recent lecture,

uenneVolremarLedthatthe experimentalteratologistlimitshisinter-
venuon to the perturbauon oIa process that has begun without him and
whose iniual, elementary condiuons he disregards. Aerwhich, he leaves
livingmatter to itselI, hewaits andwatches Iorwhatmay come. ! short,
saysVol, 'theexperimenterhastheIeelingoIbeingnomoreuanaprop
master. His poweris narrowly limited. nrst, bythe Iact that embryonic
plasticityisoIshortdurauon,andsecond,bytheIactthatmonsuosiuesdo
not transgress the order oIspecies. otonly does the biologist oItoday
createnothingreallynew,healsounderstandswhy.Hehasabetterunder-
standing oI the merit oI the two Geomoy Saint-Hilaires' insightthat
thereexistteratological tyes oIorganizauonandthatthese aredominated
by the laws oIthis organizauon. Jhus, all cyclops, hom nsh to man, are
similarlyorganized.ature,saysVol,alwayspullsthesamesuings. Jhe
experimentercannotpullmoresuingsthannature.
Ve havesaidthatliIeispoorinmonsters,whiletheIantasucisaworld.
Ve can nowunderstandwhyliIe is relatively poorin monsters. organ-
ismsareincapableoIsuucturaleccenuiciuesexceptduringashortmoment
atthe beginningoItheir development. 8utwhysayoIthe Iantasuc thatit
isaworld,iIitistruethataworld,acosmos,isanorder? !sitbecausethere
aretypes(somewouldevensayarchetypes) oItheIantasuc`Vhatwemean
isthattheIantasuciscapableoIpopulaungaworld.JhepoweroIimagna-
tionisinexhausuble, indeIatigable. Howcoulditnotbe` Jheimaginauon
is a mnctionwithoutan organ. !tis not one oIthose mncuons that cease
mnctioning to recuperate theirmncuonalpower. !tIeeds onlyon its own
acuvity. A 8achelard teaches us, the imaginauon incessantly deIorms or
1
4
6 Philosophy
relormsoldimagestolormnew ones.Vethusseethatthe monsuouspro-
lileratesinsolarasitisimaginary. !overtyonthe onehand, prodigalityon
theotherthisisthenrstreasonlormaintainingthedualityolmonsuosity
andthemonstrous.
Jhe second reason is situated at the level olthe principle olthe nrst.
LiletransgressesneitheritslawsnoritsstructuralhameworL.Accidentsare
no excepuon to this, and there isnothing monstrous about monsuosities.
'Jhere are no excepuons in nature, says the teratologist, in the posiuve
age olteratology. Yet this positivist lormula, which dennes a world as a
system ollaws, ignores the lact that it acquires its concrete signincation
throughitsrelationto the signincauon olan opposite maxim, onethatsci-
ence excludes but the imagination applies. Jhis maxim gives birth to an
anticosmos, to a chaos olexceptions without laws. Vhen seen hom the
perspective olthosewho hauntitaher havng created it, believing every-
thingtobeexcepuonallypossibleinit,andwholorgetthatonlylawspermit
excepuons, thisanuworldistheimaginary, murLy,andvertiginousworldol
themonstrous. '
Reference Mater
AP PENDIXES
Appendix I: Note on the Transition fom Fibrilar Theor to Cel Theor
!nthesixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, anatomists gener-
allysaw nber as the anatomical and mnctional elementolmuscles, aswell
asolnervesand tendons. !ldissectionbyscalpelandthenlaterexamination
bymicroscope ledtoanacceptanceolthenbrousconsutuuonoltheselas-
ciculatedorganiclormations, theoriginolthetermfber mustnevertheless
besoughtinanimagethatwould seeLtoexplicatetheirmncuons.
Since Aristotle, animal movements have been explained by the com-
parisonolarticulatedlimbstoprojectilemachines,muscles,tendons,and
nerveswere seen as pulling on leversbonesjustas cables do in cata-
pults. Muscular, tendonous, andnervous nbers exactly corresponded to
theplantnbersolwhichropeswere made. JheiatromechanistGiovanni
8orelli (in his De motu animalium) , l among others, looLed to an analogy
with the retraction ol a wet cable (nis madidus) to explain muscular
contraction.
!ibrillartheorywaslormedbyextendingthissuucturetotheentireor-
ganism,andtoallplantandanimalorganisms.!tismenuonedinOescartes'
wriungs (Treatise of Man) and was popularized above all byAlbrechtvon
Hallerintheeighteenthcentury.
!ndependentolHooLe'sobservauonsandterminology, thenouonolthe
cellwasinuoducedintonbrillartheory asthe nouon olalorm,inthegeo-
meuical sense, ratherthan as a lormauon, in the morphological sense. A
muscularcellrelerredtoarelativedispositionolnb erandnottoanabsolute
element. !urthermore, whatwould later be called celular tissue was a soh
and spongy tissue, a paradoxical tissue, whose suucture was lacunar and
whoselunctionconsistedinnllinginthelacunabetween muscles, between
the muscles andthesLin, betweenorgans, andwithin bone caviues. !twas
whattodayiscalledsohconnecuveussue.
!nDe motu musculorum (i 6q),]ean8ernoulliwrotethatmuscularnbers
are intersected at right angles by uansversal, parallel nbers, lorming a
1
49
I
S
O Appendixes
reticular texure. At the moment ol their dilatauonthat is to say, their
contractionmuscular motor nbers are squeezed at regular intervals by
these transversal nbers, andthustheirinterior(cavum) isseparatedbythese
ligatures olsorts into equalinternodal spaces,which lorm cells orvesicles
(quae plures cellulas vel vesiculas ef17ant).
!nhis
E
lements de physiologie,3 Haller describes cellular ussue thus. 'Cel-
lulartissueis composedinpartolnbrils, andinpartolan innnitenumber
ollittleslats,whichbyvirtueoltheirdierentdirectiondividealltheparts
olthe human body up into small spaces, lorm small sites, and unite the
parts, lunctioning as a large and solid linL, without depriving the parts ol
theirmobility.!certain treatises homthe same period,thetwonotions
olcells interior to nber and cellulartissue are connectedlor example, in
Claude icolas Le Cat's Traite du Mouvement musculaire. 5 Jhis author
writes, describingthestructureolapreparationolarat-musclenber exam-
inedunderamicroscope.
The fber seemed to me similar to the tube of a thermometer, when its liquid is
shaken and divides alternately into bubbles or little cylinders of liquid and air.
These alternatng bubbles furthermore gave it the appearance of a row of rosary
beads, or of small segments or knots in reeds; these segments were alternately
opaque and transparent . . . . Half an hour later, the knots disappeared, for appar
ently the liquids dispersed or coagulated, and the reed appeared to me to have a
uniform cavity, flled with a kind of retcular tissue, either cellular or medullar,
which in certain places looked to be composed of many cells or sacs leaning up
against one another and interlaced in the manner of chains.6
!romwhichlollowsthisstatement. 'Muscularnberis a canal, thewallsol
which are made olan innnity olconnected threads, and whose cavity is
divded into a great number olcells which are, or are nearly, rhombus-
shaped. 'Ve see heresummarizedhowa conjecturalinterpretauonolthe
suiated aspect olmuscular nber led the delenders olnbrillar theorylittle
by little to use a terminology such that, although the subsuuuon olone
morphologicalunityloranothermayhave required a veritable intellectual
conversion, it was lacilitated by the lact that its vocabulary had in large
partalreadybeenprepared. vesicle, cell.Jhetermutricle, also employedto
designate the lacuna olcellular tissue, especiallyin botany, seems to have
beencreatedbyMarcelloMalpighi.
Appendix 2: Note on the Relationship
Beteen Cel Them) and Leibniz 's Philosophy
Cell Them) and Leibniz 1
5
1
!tis certain that, atthe end olthe eighteenth centuryand during the nrst
hallolthenineteenth, thetermmonad wasohenusedtodesignatethesup-
posedelementoltheorganism.
!!rance,LamarcLusedthis termtodesignatetheorganismthen held
to bethesimplestand leastperlectolorganisms,theinmsorium. lorexam-
ple, 'thesimplestanimalorganizauon. . . the monadwhichisno more, so
to speaL, than an animated point"; ' 'Jhe monad, the most imperlect ol
animalsLnown. ' ' JhismeaningissullpreservedintheLittreDictionnaire
de la langue fanfaise: 'Genus olmicroscopic animalcules. Ve have seen
thatwhen Comte criucized cell theory and the nouon olthe cell in the
lorty-nrstlesson olthe Course in Positive Philosophy, itwas underthe name
'organicmonad. ' ! r 868, Gobineaurelatedcellandmonadassimilar.
!nGermany,asOieuichMahnLehasshowninhisworLUnendlicbe Spb
lre und Almittelpunkt, 'itwasbecauseolLen,Schelling'shiendanddisci-
ple at]ena, that the image ol the monad came to impart its indivisibly
geometricandmysucsignincauonto biologicalspeculations. !tisquiteex-
actly a matter olbiological !ythagorism. Jhe elements and principles ol
every organism were indierently named Urbllscben ('original vesicles),
Zelen ('cells), Kugeln ('balls), Spblren ('spheres), or organiscbe pzmkte
('organic points). Jhese are the biological correspondents to what the
point (the maximal intensity olthe sphere) and the sphere (the maximal
extensionolthepoint) areinthe cosmic order. 8etween LorenzLenand
thenrstlounderstohaveempiricallyestablishedcelltheoryMatthiasSch-
leiden andJheodor Schwannthere existall the nuances olobedience to
and dependence upon biological monadology, presented in the Lebrbucb
der Naturpbilosopbie (r 809-r r ) . ' Although the great botanist Karl igeli
(r 8 r 7-9r), whoseenthusiasmlorLenledhimawayhommedicinetobiol-
ogy, became a resolute materialist under the inuence olOarwinism, he
sullretaineda certainndelityto theideas olhis youth, theiruace can be
lound in his theory ol micels: invisible living units consutuung proto-
plasmatheorythat, in a certainway, depicts celltheory's second degree.
MoreolaRomanuc,moreolametaphysician, CarlGustavCas,painter,
doctor, andnaturalist(r 789-r 869) lollowed Len's ideas almosttothelet-
ter. Jhe nouon olorganic totalitydominates his philosophyand psychol-
ogy, the universal primiuve lorm is the sphere, and the lundamental
1 52 Appendixes
biological sphere is the cell. !n his worLPsche (: Sq6), the terms Urellen
and organische Monaden are strictlyequivalent.
JhereisnodoubtthatthephilosophersolnaturetooLtheirmonadolog-
icalconcepuonollilehomLeibniz,viatheintermediaryol!riedrichSchel-
ling,]ohann!ichte,!ranzvon8aader,andovalis. ' `
!n!rance,i t wasaboveallthroughMaupertuisthatLeibniz'sphilosophy
inlormedandorientedeighteenth-centuryspeculationsconcerningthelor-
mauonandstructure ollivingbeings. ' !hisEssai SU1' la jr1zation des etres
organises (: ;q), ' Maupertuis presented his theory olthe lormation olor-
ganismsbytheunionolmolecularelementselementsoriginatinghomall
thepartsolthebodiesoltheparents andcontainedinthe seminal uids ol
the male and lemaleeven more clearly than he had in Venus physique
(: ;q). Jhis union olmolecular elements is not a simplemechanicalphe-
nomenon, notevenaphenomenonsimplyreducible to ewtonian attrac-
tion. Maupertuis did not hesitate to invoLe an instinct inherent to each
particle(Venus physique) andeven'someprincipleolintelligence,something
similartowhatwe calldesire,aversion,memory(Essaz). Jhus!aulHazard,
summarizing the development ol Maupertuis's ideas, could write. 'Let
there be no mistaLing. whatappears here is the monad. ' Ve have seen
whatMaupertuis'sinuenceon8uonwas,inparucularlortheelaborauon
olthetheoryolorganicmolecules. '
Appendix 3, Extracts from the "Discours sur l'anatomie du cereau"
("Discoure on the Anatomy of the Brain ' j, delivered by Nicolas Steno in Paris
in 1 665 to the "Messieurs de l'ssembtee de chez Monsieur Thivenot"
A lorMonsieurOescartes,hewastoowellawareoltheawsinthehistory
wehaveolmantoundertaLeanexplanationolman'sveritablecomposiuon.
Jhus,inhis l'eatise of Man, hedoesnotuytodothis,butrathertogiveus
the explanauon ola machine that does all the acuons olwhich men are
capable. Certainolhislriendssayotherwise,however,weseeatthebegin-
ningoltheworLthatthisis what he intended, and inthis sense, one can
rightly say thatMonsieur Oescartes has, in the treatise ! have just men-
tioned, surpassed other philosophers. o one else has mechanically ex-
plained all the actions olman, in principal, those olthe brain, the others
describe man himsell, Monsieur Oescartes tells us only ola machine that
"On the Anatomy of the Brain" 1
53
neverthelessmaLesusseetheinsumciencyolwhatothers teachus, andhe
teachesusamethodlorresearchingtheusagesolotherpartsolthehuman
body,withthe same clearnesswithwhichhe demonstrates theparts olthe
machine olhisman,whichnoonebelorehimhad done.
Monsieur Oescartes must therelore notbecondemnedilhis system ol
the brain does not enurely conlorm to experience, the excellence olhis
mind,whichappearsprincipallyinhis Treatise of Man, covers theerrors ol
hishypotheses.Ve seethatverysLilledanatomists,liLeVesaliusandothers,
havenotbeen abletoavoidsimilarerrors.
!lthesegreatmen,whohavespentthebetterpartoltheirlivespracucing
dissecuons, are pardoned, why would you want to be any less indulgent
toward Monsieur Oescartes, who has most lortunately used his time lor
otherspeculations` Jhe respectthat ! leel !, alongwith everyone, owe to
mindsolthisorderwould have preventedme hom speaLingolthe aws in
thisueause.!wouldhavecontentedmysell, alongwith certainothers,with
admiringit,asthedescripuonolabeauumlmachineandallitsinvention
hadithad notbeenreceivedquitedierentlybymanywhowanttomaLeit
outtobealaithmlaccountolthemosthiddenlorces[ressorts] olthehuman
body. SincesuchpeopledonotattendtoMonsieurSilvius'sverycleardem-
onstrauons,whichhaveohenshownthatMonsieurOescartes'descripuons
arenotinaccordwiththe dissecuon olthebodytheydescribe,itisneces-
sarywithoutheredetailinghisentiresystemtopointouttosuchpeople
certainplaceswhere!am certain thattheywillhaveonly to seeclearly to
recognize the great dierence between the machine thatMonsieur Oes-
carteshasimagnedandwhatitisthatweseewhenwe dothe anatomyol
humanbodies.
NOTES
FOREWORD: LIFE AS SUCH, PAOLA MARRATI AND TODD MEYERS
1 . Kowledge ofLi spans twenty years of Canguilhem's writng and lectures.
"Thought and the Living" was frst published in the 1 952 Hachette editon of
La connaissance de la vie. "Experimentaton in Animal Biology" was frst given as
a lecture at the Cente Interatonal Pedagogique de Sevres in 1 95 1 . "Cell
Theory" was frst published as "La theorie cellulaire en biologie: Du sens et de
la valeur des theories scientifiques," in Melanges 4 ( 1 945; Paris: Belles Lettres,
1 946). "Aspects of Vitalism, " "Machine and Organism, " and "The Living and
Its Milieu" were delivered as lectures at Jean Wahl's College Philosophique in
Paris, on Febrary 1 7, March 1 7, and May 1 9, 1 947. "The Normal and the
Pathological" was frst published in 1 95 1 , in the frst volume of Somme de mee
cine contemporaine, ed. Rene Leriche (Paris: Editions de la Diane fansaise,
195 1), 2 7-3 2 . Cf. Georges Canguilhem, Le noral et le pathologique (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1 966), a work comprising Canguilhem's medi
cal thesis, "Essai sur quelques problemes concernant le normal et le pathologi
que" (University of Strasbourg, 1 943); see also the second editon (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1988). "Monstrosity and the Monstous" was
frst published in Dio
f
ene 40 (1962): 29-43 and was delivered as a lecture at the
Insttut des Hautes Etudes de Belgique in Brussels on February 9, 1962 . The
essay was included in the second editon of La connaissance de la vie by Vrin in
1965.
2. Canguilhem, "Thought and the Living, " p. xviii of this volume.
3. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tans. Arthur Mitchell (Lanham, Md. :
University Press of America, 1 984-)
4- Kurt Goldstein, The Organis (New York: Zone Books, 1 995), 37.
5. Foucault, in "La vie: L' experience et la science, " suggests a stong divide
between philosophies of experience (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty) and philosophies
of knowledge, rationality, and the concept (Cavailles, Bachelard, Canguilhem).
But in Kowledge ofLi we fnd that this divide may be more blurred, or at least
more complicated, than Foucault suggests.
I
55
1
5
6 Notes to Pages xi-6
6. Canguilhem, "Thought and the Living," p. xviii of this volume.
7. Henri Bergson. The Creative Mind: An Intoduction to Metaphysics, tans.
Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Citadel Press, 2002).
8. Canguilhem, Ideolog and Rationalit in the Hist01J of the Li Sciences, tans.
Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: M.LT. Press, I 988), vii.
INTRODUCTION: THOUGHT AND THE LIVING
I . Andre Leroi-Gourhan, Milieu et Techniques ( I 945; Paris: Albin Michel,
I992), 393
2 . Kurt Goldstein, "Remarques sur l e probleme epistemologique de l a bio
logie," in Congres international de philosophie des sciences, vol. I,
E
pistemologie
(Paris: Hermann, I 95 I), I42 .
3 . [Bilan bzb-eique: Since Canguilhem is referring to Goldstein, we have
retained Goldstein's term, "energy expenditure. "-Trans.]
4- Kurt Goldstein, The Organism (New York: Zone Books, I 995), 306.
5. Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine,
trans. Henry C. Greene (New York: Dover Publications, I957), 9I .
6. Goldstein, The 01-anism, 3 78, translation amended to echo Canguilhem's
phrasing.
7. [NoZs avons besoin paiis de nous sentir betes: Bete in French is either a noun
meaning "animal, beast" or an adjectve meaning "stupid. "-Trans.]
I . EXPERIMENTATION IN AIMAL BIOLOGY
I . Henri Bergson, "The Philosophy of Claude Bernard, " lecture delivered
on December 30, I 9I 3 , in The CTeative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics,
trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Citadel Press, 2002), 20I .
2 . Gaston Bachelard, "Discours d'ouverture du Congres Internatonal de
Philosophie des Sciences" (Paris, I 949), in Conwes interational de philosophie des
sciences (Paris: Hermann [Actualtes scientiques et industrielles I I 26] , I 95 I), 3 2 .
3 . Bergson, The Creative Mind, 202 .
4- Cf. Charles Joseph Singer, A Hist01J of Biolog to about the Yar I90o: A
General Introduction to the Study of Living Things (New York: Abelard-Schumann,
I 959), I 64-
5. Markus Paul Deisch, Dissertatio inauguralis de splene canibus exciso et ab his
experimentis capiendo fcto (Halle: Typis Jo. Christ. Hilligeri, I 73 5).
6. The text also does not fgure i n Fielding H. Garrison and Leslie T. Mor
ton's otherwise excellent Medical Bibliowaphy (London: Grafon and Co. , I 943 ;
2nd ed. I954).
7. Let us note, in passing, that the author distnguishes clearly, in the act of
reproduction, between fecundity and potency. We lmow that it is thanks to
observations of this order, in conjunction wth veterinary practce, that Paul
Notes to Pages 6-10 1 57
Bouin was led to works that allowed him to identif (histologically and fncton
ally) the interstital gland in the testicle, i. e. , the cells that secrete hormones,
which are distnct fom those of the seminal line.
S. [Claude Bernard, Lectures on the Phenomena of Li Common to Animals
and Plants, tans Hebbel E. Hof, Roger Guillemin and Lucienne Guillemin
(Springfeld, Ill: Charles C. Thomas Pub. , 1974), 6.-Trans.]
9. Montesquieu, "Discours sur l'usage des glandes renales, " in Oeuvres com
pletes (Paris: Seuil, 1 964), 49.
10. I fact, Addison had already published his frst observatons in a two
page I S49 article. [The thesis Canguilhem refers to is Addison's On the Constitu
tional and Local Efcts of Disease of the Supmrenal Capsules (London: Taylor and
Francis, I S55). -Trans.]
I I . It is these discoveries that won Bernard the grand prize of physiology in
I SSL
1 2 . Claude Bernard, An Intduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine,
trans. Henry C. Greene. (New York: Dover Publications, 1957), 76 [trans.
modifed] .
1 3 . See Chapter 4, "Machine and Organism, " in this volume.
1 4- Aristotle, De partibus animalum 3 . 66SaI 3-14 and 66Sa26-34, in On the
Parts of Animals I-IV trans. James Lennox (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), 60.
1 5 . Singer, Hist01Y of Biolog , I l l .
1 6. [Ibid. , I 07.-Trans.]
1 7. [Ibid. , I I 2 .-Trans.]
I S. William Harvey, cited in ibid. , I l 2 .
1 9. [In the following passage, the double meaning of experience as "experi
ence" and "experiment" should be kept in mind. -Trans.]
20. Charles Nicolle, Naissance, vie et mort des maladies infctieuses (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1 930), 2 3 7.
2 I . Kurt Goldstein, "Remarques sur l e probleme epistemologique de la bio
logie, " in Congres interational de la philosophie des sciences, 1 43-45. [Translated
in Kurt Goldstein, Selected Papers / Ausgewahlte Schrien (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhof, 1 97 1), 43 9-42 .-Trans.]
2 2 . Bergson, The Creative Mind, 206.
2 3 . Auguste Comte, Cour de philosophie positive (Paris: Bailliere, I S64),
3 : 2 2 3 .
24. "A a result, i t is easy to see that the science of organized bodies must
be treated in a manner wholly diferent fom those that have inorganic bodies
as their object. It is necessary to use a diferent langage, for the majority of
words that we transport fom the physical sciences into that of animal or vegetal
economy continually remind us of ideas that do not ally with the phenomena of
this science" (avier Bichat, Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort [I Soo;
Paris: A. Delahays, 1855] , 1 st part, article 7, I , "Diference des forces vitales
d'avec les lois physiques").
1 58 Notes to Pages 1 1-20
2 5. Bernard, Intduction, 1 88-89. See also the passage concerning the nec
essary gap between synthesis and analysis on p. 91 .
2 6. Bergson, The Oreative Mind, 202 .
2 7. On this subject, see Leon Binet, Les animaux au serice de la science (Paris:
Gallimard, 1 940).
2 8. C. Kayser, "Les refexes, " in Conferences de physiologie meicale sur des
slets d'actualite (Paris: Masson, 1 93 3).
29. Rene Leriche, Physiologie et pathologie du tissu osseux (Paris: Masson,
1 93 8), lesson 1 .
30. Lucien Cuenot, L'espece (Paris: Doin, 1 93 6), 89.
3 1 . Jacques Duclaux has accurately shown, in L 'homme devant l'zmivers
(Paris: Flammarion, 1 949), that modern science is primarily the study of a para
nature or a supernature rather than of nature itself. "The entirety of scientifc
knowledge leads to two results. The frst is the enunciation of natural laws. The
second, which is much more important, is the creation of a new nature, which
is superimposed on the frst and for which a diferent name should be found,
since it is not natural and would have never existed without man" (2 73).
3 2 . I order to maintain the respiratory fnction of the diaphragm.
3 3 . Etienne Wolf, La science des monstres (Paris: Gallimard, 1 948), 2 3 7.
34- Bernard, Introduction, I I 6.
35. Paul Hauduroy, "Les lois de l a physiologie microbienne dressent devant
les antbiotiques la barriere d'accoutumance, " in La vie meicale (March 1 95 1).
36. Nicolle, Naissance, vie et mort, 3 3 .
3 7 Bernard, Introduction, 95
38. Ibid., 99. On this point, we may also refer to the famous Rapport sur les
prores et la mm'che de la physiologie en France ( 1 867), fom which the following
signifcant passage is taken: "One may well analyze vital phenomena and exam
ine their mechanical and physico-chemical manifestations with the utmost care;
one may well apply the most delicate chemical procedures to them, bring to
observing them the greatest exacttude and the most precise graphical and
mathematical methods; yet one will have done no more than bring the phenom
ena of living organisms under the laws of physics and of general chemistry; this
is right, but one will never, in this way, fnd the laws proper to physiology. "
39. Jacques Duclaux, Analse chimique des jnctions vitales (Paris: Hermann,
1 934), x. This book deserves to be read in its entirety.
40. Theophile Cahn, Qztelques bases physiologiques de la nut1'ition (Paris: Her
mann, 1 946), 2 2 .
41 . See Georges Canguilhem, The Noral and the Pathological, trans. Car-
oly R. Fawcett (New York: Zone Books, 1 989), 1 64 et al.
42 . Wolf, La science des 7zonst1'es, 1 2 2 .
43 . Bernard, Introduction, 102 .
4. We are gratefl to Professor Gaston Mayer of the Medical Faculty at
Bordeaux for pointng out this experiment and certain others cited in the fol
lowing pages. [Canguilhem's reference here is a mis-citation. The correct refer
ence is to W. E. Dandy, "Operative Experience in Cases of Pineal Tumor,"
Notes to Pages 2 1-26 I 59
Archives of Surger 3 3 ( 1936): 2 8, 40. The "species of mammals" in question is
dogs, on which Dandy performed extensive experiments.-Trans.]
45. Rather than recall again the horrible practices perhaps too exclusively
blamed on technocracy or racist delirium, we prefer to menton the antiquity of
human vivisection. We know that Herophilus and Erasistatus, directors of the
medical school in Alexandria, practced vivisection on men condemned to death.
"They hold that Herophilus and Erasistratus did this in the best way by far,
when they laid open men whilst alive-criminals received out of prison fom
the kings and while these were still breathing, observed parts which beforehand
nature had concealed, their position, colour, shape, size, arrangement, hardness,
sofess, smoothness, relation, etc. " (A. Cornelius Celsus, De Medicina [On
Medicine] [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I 93 5] , I : I 5 [Proemium:
2 3-24]).
46.
E
mile Guyenot, "L' experimentation sur l'homme en parasitologie," in
Guyenot, Les problemes de la vie (Geneva: Bourquin, 1 946). We read too late to
engage here Rene Fontaine, "L' experimentation en chirurgie, " in Somme de
meecine contemporaine (Paris: La Diane Francaise, 195 1), I : I 55, an article that
has the great merits of not avoiding difculties or giving in to conformism or
conventons.
47. John Rock and Artur T. Hertio, "Some Aspects of Early Human De
velopment," American Joural of Obstetrics and Gnecolog 44, no. 6 ( I 942): 973-
83. John Rock and Miriam F. Menkin managed to fertilize in vitro human eggs,
gathered fom ovarian follicles removed for therapeutic reasons, and to observe
certain ovarian developments. See their "I Vitro Fertlization and Cleavage of
Human Ovarian Eggs," American Joural of Obstetrics and Gynecolog 40 (1 948):
440-52 .
48. See Marc Kein, "Remarques sur les methodes de la biologie humaine, "
in Conges interational de philosophie des sciences, 145. Medicine does not, on its
own, resolve any better the problems posed by the technologies of the therapeu
tc grafng of organs. See, on this point, a very good artcle by J. Hamburger,
J. Crosnier, and J. Dormont, "Problemes moraux poses par les methodes de
suppleance et de tansplantaton d'organes, " Revue franfaise d'etzdes cliniques et
biologiques 14 Gune-July 1 964): 587-91 .
49. Jean Giraudoux, Electre: Piece en deux actes (Paris: L 'Illustaton , 1 93 7);
i n English i n Giraudoux, Three Plays (New York: Hill and Wang, 1 954).
50. [Canguilhem is referring to the Greek term methodos, which etyologi
cally means "across this path."-Trans.]
5 1. Bernard, Introduction, 93.
2 . CELL THEORY
I . See Dominique Parodi and Louis Robin's interventons in the April 14,
1934, discussion concerning the meaning of the history of scientifc thought,
I 60 Notes to Pages 26-30
"Signifcaton de l'histoire de la pensee scientifque," Buletin de la Societe fn
faise de philosophie (May-June I 934): 73-I07
2. This positivist thesis is set forth without reserve by Claude Bernard. See
Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, trans.
Henry C. Greene (New York: Dover Publications, I 957), pt. 2, chap. 2 : "Pres
ent day science is therefore necessarily higher than the science of the past; and
there is no sort of reason for going in search of any addition to modern science
through knowledge of the ancients. Their theories, necessarily false because
they do not include facts discovered since then, can be of no real advantage to
contemporary science" ( I42).
3. Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, tans. Harriet
Martineau (London: George Bell & Sons, I 896). Brehier's remark can be found
in "Signifcation de l'histoire de la pensee scientfque. "
4- Louis de Broglie, Matter and Light: The New Physics, trans. W. H. John
ston (New York: Dover Publications, I 946).
5. Sir Isaac Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philoso
phy, I, trans. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitan (Berkeley: University of Cali
fornia Press, 1 999).
6. Paul Langevin, "La valeur educatve de l'histoire des sciences," in La pen
see et l'action (Paris: Editeurs fancais reunis, 1 950), 1 94-2 I 1 . This lecture was
originally published in December I 92 6 in the Buletin de la societe fi-lfaise de
peagogie.
7. Emile Guyenot, Les sciences de la vie aux XI et XII siecles (Paris: A.
Michel, 1 941), 3 61 .
8. Ibid., 3 73 .
9. Charles Singer, A Histor of Biolog to about the Yar 19OO: A General Intro
duction to the Study of Living Things (New York: Abelard-Schumann, 1 959).
10. Lucien Cuenot, L'espece (Paris: Doin, 1 93 6).
1 1 . Knut Hagberg, Carl LinnaeZs, trans. Alan Blair (New York: Dutton,
1 953)
1 2 . Carl Linnaeus, Systema nature, tans. M. S. J. Engle-Ledeboer and H.
Engel (Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1 964).
1 3 . See Jean Rostand's Esquisse d'zme histoire de la biologie (Paris: Gallimard,
1 945), 4, in which Linnaeus is presented, without paradox, as one of the found
ers of transformism.
1 4- Marc Klein, Histoire des origines de la theorie celulaire (Paris: Hermann,
1 936).
1 5. Robert Hooke, Microgrhia; or, Some Physiological Descriptions of Minute
Bodies Made by Mnifing Glass, with Some Observations and Inquiries Thereupon
( 1667; New York: Dover, 1 961). [Cited in Klein, Histoire des origines de la theorie
celulaire, 3-4.-Trans.]
1 6. [Canguilhem refers here to Gaston Bachelard's concept of a psychoanal
ysis of scientifc knowledge; see Bachelard, The FOTzation of the Scientic Mind
(New York: Clinamen Press, 2006).-Trans.]
Notes to Pages 30-35 I6I
1 7. See, e. g. , A. Prenant, P. Bouin, and L. Maillard, Traite de l'histologie
(Paris: Masson, I 904), 1 : 95, fg. 84; and also Max Aron and Pierre-Paul Grasse,
Precis de biologie animale, i l'usage des candidat au certicat d'etudes physiques chimi
ques et biologiques et i la lcence des sciences (Paris: Masson, I 935), 525, fg. 245.
1 8. Ernst Haeckel, Gemeinverstindlche Wrke (Leipzig: Kroner Verlag /
Berlin: Henschel Verlag, 1 924), 4: 1 74-
19 [Canguilhem refers to Maeterlinck's The Li of the Bee, tans. Alfed
Suto (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co. , I 90Ih924).-Trans.]
20. [Klein, Histoire des origines de la theorie celulaire, 7.-Trans.]
2 I . [Ibid. , 53 .-Trans.]
2 2 . Carl von Linne, Vistgo'ta Resa 1 747 (Malmo: Malmo Ljustcksanstalt,
1 956).
23. Albert von HaIler, Elments de Physiologie, tans. Bordenave (Paris: Guil
lyn, 1 769) .
24. HaIler proceeds exactly like Nicolas Steno ( 163 8-86), who had proposed
a fbrillar theory of muscle in his teatise De musculis et glanduls observationum
specimen ( 1 664) and who took it up again, in the form of a geometrical presenta
tion, in his Elementorm myologiae specimen (1 667). I the latter work, the frst
defnition (in the geometical sense of the term) is that of the fber. Let us recall
that the fbrillar structure of animals and plants was taught by Descartes in the
Treatise of Man, tans. Thomas Steele Hall, ed. Bernard 1. Cohen et. al. (Cam
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1 972), I I 2-I I 3 . And yet, some have sought
to present Descartes as a precursor of cell theory, because of a text in his Gen
eratio Animalium ((uvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery
[Paris: Vrin, new ed. 1974] , I I : 534): "The formation of plants resembles that
of animals in that both are done with particles of matter rolled into round shape
by the force of heat." We are far fom sharing this opinion, responsibility for
which we leave to Doctor Bertrand de Saint-Germain, Descartes considere comme
physiologiste et comme meecin (Paris: Masson, 1 869), 3 76. See Appendix I to the
present work, pp. 149-50, on the passage fom fbrillar theory to cell theory.
[The emphasis in the quote is Canguilhem's.-Trans] .
25. [Klein, Histoire des origines de la theorie celulaire, I 2 .-Trans.]
26. Georges L. Leclerc Bufon, Natural Histor, tans. William Smellie
(London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, I 8 I 2), chap. 2 . [Cited in Klein, Histoire des
origines de la theorie celulaire, 1 2 .-Trans.]
2 7 Bufon, Natural History, chap. 5.
2 8. Ibid. , chap. 10.
29 Ibid., chap. 5.
30. Maupertuis, The Earthl Vnus (New York: John son Reprint Corp. ,
1 966).
3 I. Bufon, Natural History, chap. 9.
3 2 . Ibid. , chap. 3 .
3 3 . Ibid.
1 62 Notes to Pages 35-40
34. See Bufon's appendix to his Theo'ie de la Tere ( 1 749), entitled Des ele
ments, esp. "Refexions sur la loi de l 'attracton, " in ibid.
35. Vicq d'Azyr does not omit this last merit in his
E
loge de Bufn of Decem
ber I I , 1 788, at the Academie Francaise. Louis Roule attaches great importance
to the fact that Bufon started with mathematical calculus, then went on to
physical sciences and continued toward the natural sciences; see Roule, Bufon
et la description de la natzlre (Paris: Flammarion, 1 924), 1 9f. This aspect of Buf
fon's genius has also been noted by Jean Strohl, in Tableau de la litteratu'e fran
faise (le-Ie sieces) (Paris: Gallimard, 1 93 9).
36. Bufon, Des elbnents, pt. I , "De la lumiere, de la chaleur et du feu. "
3 7. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Bufon, Natu'al Histor, chap. 10.
41 . Bufon met Hume in England in 1 73 8.
42 . "These are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our
simple ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable connex
ion, by which they are united in our memory. Here is a kind of ATTRACTION,
which in the mental world will be found to have as extaordinary efects as in
the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms" (David Hume, A
T'eatise of Human Natu'e [ 1 739; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], vOl. I ,
section 4).
43 . David Hume, The Philosophical W'ks, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose
(Aalen: Scienta Verlag, 1 964).
4. See the closing passages of Bufon's "Homo duplex, " in Discou's S' la
natu'e des animaux (Geneva: H.-A. Gosse, 1 754).
45. Ibid.
46. Singer, A Histor of Biolog , 2 90.
47. Gaston Bachelard, L'ai' et les songes (Paris: J. Corti, 1 943).
48. On Oken as a philosopher of nature, see Jean Stohl, LO'enz Oken zmd
Geo'g Bichne' (Zurich: Verlag der Corona, 1 93 6).
49. M. J. Schleiden, "Beitage zur Phytogenesis," in Milllen Anhiv fi1 Ana
tomie, Physiologie, und Wissenschafliche Medizin (Berlin, 1 83 8), 1 36-76.
50. On Schwann and cell theory, see Marcel Florkin's essental work, Nais
sance et deviation de la theo'rie celulaire dans l'ruv'e de Theodo'e Schwann (Paris:
Hermann, 1 960).
S I . Singer, A Hist01Y of Biolog, 3 3 3 . [Singer's exact passage is "he insemi
nated the minds of the recognized founders of the cell doctine. "-Trans.]
52 . Lorenz Oken, Lehrbuch der Natu1philosophie Gena: August Schnid, 1 8 1 I).
53. Ernst Haeckel writes: "It is enough to replace the word vesice or infso
rium with the word cel to arrive at one of the greatest teories of the nineteenth
century: cell theory . . . . The propertes Oken attributes to his infsoria are the
properties of cells, of elementary individuals, whose assemblage, meeting, and
Notes to Pages 40-44 1 6
3
various formatons constitute the most elevated of complex organisms" (Natur
lche Schbpfungsgeschichte, pt. I , lecture 4, "Allgemeine Entwicklungslehre," in
Gemeinverstindliche Wrke I : 104). Let us add that, in Anti-Duhring, Friedrich
Engels afrms, basing himself on Haeckel, the prophetc value of Oken's intu
itons: "It is much easier, along with the unthinking mob i la Kr Vogt, to
assail the old natural philosophy than to appreciate its historical signifcance. It
contains a great deal of nonsense and fantasy, but not more than the unphilo
sophical theories of the empirical natural scientsts contemporary with that phi
losophy, and that there was also in it much that was sensible and ratonal began
to be perceived afer the theory of evoluton became wide-spread. Haeckel was
therefore flly justfed in recognizing the merits of Treviranus and Oken. I
his primordial slime and primordial vesicle Oken put forward as a biological
postulate what was in fact subsequently discovered as protoplasm and cell. . . .
The natural philosophers stand in the same relation to consciously dialectcal
natural science as the utopians to modern communism" (Friedrich Engels, Anti
Duhring [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1 954] , 1 8-19; note
fom the preface to the 2d ed. , of 1 885).
5+ Lorenz Oken, Die Zeugung, cited in Singer, A Histor of Biolog, 3 3 2 .
5 5 . [Klein, Histoire des origines de la theorie celulair, 1 8-1 9.-Trans.]
56. [Oken, cited in ibid., 1 9.-Trans.]
57. Hans Petersen, Grndriss der Histologie und mikroskopischen Anatomie des
Menschen: Biologie der mikroskopischen Grb'senordnung (Berlin: J. Springer, 1936).
58. Charles (Francois) Brisseau-Mirbel,
E
lements de physiologie vegetale et de
botanique (Paris: Magimel, 1 8 I 5). [Cited in Klein, Histoire des origines de la theorie
celulaire, 2 6.-Trans.]
59. [Cited in Klein, Histoire des origines de la theorie cellulaire, 3 1 .-Trans.]
60. See Louis Sauzin, Adam Heinrich Muler: Sa vie et son (uvre (Paris:
Nizet & Bastard, 1 937), 449f.
61 . On the origins of cell theory, see J. WaIter Wilson's artcles "Cellular
Tissue and the Dawn of the Cell Theory, " Isis 1 00 (August 1 944): 1 68; and
"Dutochet and the Cell Theory, " Isis 1 07-8 (May 1 947): 14.
62. Philippe Pinel, Nosographie philosophique; ou, La methode de l'analse appli
quee a la meecine (paris: J. A. Brosson, 1 8 I 8).
63. Xavier Bichat, Traite des membranes en general et de diverses membranes en
particulier (Paris: Gabon, Mequignon-Marvis, 1 82 7).
6+ Tissue i s made of thread [f, that i s to say, originally, of plant fbers.
That this word fl connotes images of contnuity comes across in expressions
such asfl d'eau ["water current"] andfl du discour ["thread of an argument"] .
65. [Klein, Histoire des origines de la theorie celulaire, 40.-Trans.]
66. Xavier Bichat, Recherhes physiologiques sur la vie et la mort (r 800; Paris:
A. Delahays, 1 855). [Cited in Klein, Histoire des origines de la theorie celulaire,
40.-Trans.]
67. Leon Brunschvicg, Le progres de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale
(Paris: Alcan, 1 927), 543f.
1 64 Notes to Pages 45-48
68. See Appendix 2 in the present volume, "Note on the Relationship Be
teen Cell Theory and Leibniz's Philosophy."
69. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York:
Dover Publicatons, 1 91 I), 2 60.
70. See Robin's articles "Cellule" and "Organe," in A. Dechambre, Diction
naire encclopeique des sciences meicales (Paris: P. Asselin, Sr. de Labe, V. Masson
et fls, 1 864-89). [Cited in Klein, Histoire des origines de la theorie celulaire,
63.-Trans.]
7 1 . Tourneux was a disciple of Robin through the intermediary of Georges
Pouchet. He was, moreover, the assistant in charge of settng up the experi
ments for Robin's courses for a year, replacing Hermann, who was completng
his voluntary service in Lille. Tourneux wrote the Premie'r traite d'histologie in
collaboration with Pouchet. At the time of his death in 1 92 2 , Tourneux was
working on the third editon of his Preis d'histologie humaine. I the second
edition ( 1 9I I), he distinguished between anatomical elements and amorphous
materials, and, among the anatomical elements, between those that are cellular
or have the form of cells and those that are noncellular. Thus the concept of
the anatomical element and that of the cell do not entirely overlap. (We owe
the above biographical information to the kindness of Doctors Jean-Paul and
Georges Tourneux of Toulouse.)
72. Jean Perrin, Atoms, tans. D. L. Hammick (Woodbridge, Conn.: Ox Bow
Press, 1 990), vii, tans. modifed.
73. Rudolf Virchow, Cellulm' Patholog as Based upon Physiological and Patho
logical Histolog, trans. F. Chance (New York: Dover Publications, 1 97 1),
chap. I .
74- According to Lime and Robin's Dictionnaire de meecine, 1 3th ed. (Paris:
Pans, 1 873), the term histolog was created in 1 8 1 9 by Mayer; the term histonomy
was created in 1 82 1 by Heusinger to designate the study of the laws which
govern the generation and arrangement of organic tssues.
75. On the relaton between the Studien zur Gastraeatheorie and cell theory,
see Ernst Haeckel, Natiirlche Schbpfmgsgeschichte, pt. 2 , 20th lecture, "Phylo
genetische Klassifcaton des Tierreichs: Gastaea Theorie," i Gemeinverstand
lche Werke, I I : qI .
76. Claude Bernard, in Revue scientique, September 2 6, 1 874-
77. Claude Bernard, Lewns sur les phenomenes de la vie communs aux animaux
et aux vegetaux (1 878; Paris: ]. Vrin, 1 966).
78. Ernst Haeckel, Die Wltratzel, chap. 2, in Gemeinverstandliche Wrke,
4: 3 3
79. [Klein, Histoire des origines de la theorie celulaire, 63 .-Trans.] Klein has
recently published a valuable article that complements the informaton on this
subject. See Klein, "Sur les debats de la theorie cellulaire en France, " Thales 6
( 1 95 1): 2 5-36.
80. A. Prenant, P. Bouin, and L. Maillard, Traite d'histologie, vol. I, Cytologie
genele et speciale (Paris: Librairie C. Reinwald, 1 904), 37.
Notes to Pages 49-54 165
8 1 . [Ibid. , 47.-Trans.] In the same year, 1 904, Haeckel responds to the
text by Prenant in Die Lebenswunder, chap. 7, "Lebenseinheiten: Organische
Individuen und Assoziatonen; Zellen, Personen Swcke; Organelle und Or
gane, " in Gemeinverstandliche Wrke, 4: 1 72 .
8 2 . Jean Rostand, "Les virus-proteines, " in his Biologie e t meecine (Paris:
Gallimard, 1 939)' Also see a good discussion on the issue by the same author,
"La conception particulaire de la cellule, " in his Les grands courants de la biologie
(Paris: Gallimard, 1 95 1).
83. Arthur de Gobineau, Memoire sur diverses maniestations de la vie indivi
duele (Paris: Desclee De Brouwer, 1 93 5) '
8+ Cliford Dobell, The Intestinal Protozoa of Man (New York: William
Wood & Co. , 1 92 1).
85. Remy Collin, "La theorie cellulaire et la vie, " in La biologie meicale
(April 1 92 9)' The same author has since taken the queston up in his Panorama
de la biologie (Paris:
E
ditions de la Revue des Jeunes, 1 945), 73f.
86. Hans Petersen, Histologie und mikroskopische Anatomie (Munich: Berg
mann, 1 93 I).
87. Octave Duboscq, Bulletin de la Societe zoologique de France.
88. Hans Petersen, Grundriss der Histologie zmd mikroskopischen Anatomie des
Menschen: Biologie der mikroskopischen Grbssenordnung (Berlin: ]. Springer, 1936).
89. Julius Sachs, Gesammelte Abhandlungen iiber Pjanzen-physiologie (Leipzig:
W. Engelmann, 1 892-93).
90. The following lines have been added to the orginal 1 945 version of this
essay, as they ft in here naturally. We do not indicate this in order to claim
some kind of prophetic gif, but quite to the contrary, to emphasize that certain
noveltes are a bit older than some sycophants, concerned with exploiting them
rather than understanding them, would say.
91 . Tivadar Huzella, Die zwischenzelige Organisation azi der Grundlage der
Interelulartheorie und der inte'elularpathologie Gena: G. Fischer, 1 941).
92. The subttle of this work is Vn Zelular- zur Molekular-pathologie [From
Celular to Molecular Patholog] . Paul Busse Grawitz, Experimentele Grzmdlagen
zu einer moderen Pathologie (Basel: Schwabe, 1 946). [Canguilhem cites the Ger
man editon; the book was originally published in Spanish as Bases experimentales
para una patologia modera: De la patologia celular a la molecular (Buenos Aires: El
Ateneo, 1 945).-Trans.]
93. Olga Lepeschinskaya, The Origin of Cels fom Living Substance (Moscow:
Foreig Languages Publishing House, 1 954). We are taking our information
fom Joukov-Berejnikov, Maisiki, and Kalinitchenko, "Des formes acellulaires
de vie et de developpement des cellules, " published in the collection of docu
ments Orientation des theories meicales en U.R.S.S. (Paris:
E
ditons du Cente
Culture I et
E
conomique France-U.R. S. S. , 1 950). References to the journal art
cles we allude to can be found in Andre Pierre's article in Le Monde (August 1 8,
1 950).
1 66 Notes to Pages 54-56
94. Friedrich Engels, Anti-Diihring: Herr Eugen Diihring's Revolution in Sci
ence (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1 954). In this passage,
Engels accepts, like all adherents of cell theory, that "in all organic cellular
beings, fom the amoeba to man, cells multiply in one and the same way, by
scissiparity" ( 109) . [Canguilhem leaves out parts of this passage.-Trans.] But
he thinks there exist a host of living beings, among the less elevated, whose
organization is inferior to the cell: "Al beings have only one point in common
with the superior organisms: it is that their essential element is albumen and
that they consequently perform functions of albumen, i. e. , live and die" ( 1 1 2).
Among these beings, Engels cites "the protamoeba, a simple albuminous part
cle without any diferentiation whatever, and a whole series of other monera
and all bladder seaweeds (Siphonae)" (1 1 2). See also pp. I I 3-16: "Life is the
mode of existence of albuminous bodies. " It is not difcult to recognize here
the ideas of Haeckel, down to his very terminology. In the Dialectics of Nature
(to confne ourselves only to the excerpts laudatorily reproduced in the articles
cited in the previous note), Engels' s ideas-to more clearly afrm the possibility
of cell birth out of living albumen and of a formaton of living albumen out of
chemical composites-do not seem fndamentally diferent fom the theses of
the Anti-Diihring. We humbly avow, however, that, in either of these forms,
these Haeckelian anticipations do not give us the impression of revolutonary
novelty.
95. Joukov-Berejnikov, Maisiki, and Kalinitchenko, "Des formes acellulaires
de vie et de developpement des cellules, " I S. We cannot resist the temptation
to quote other peremptory afrmations fom the same artcle: "It is in the
U. S. S. R. that, for the frst tme, the study of the passage fom the nonliving to
the living has begun" (148); "Questons such as that of the origin of life are of
little interest to scientists in the service of capital; they do not seek in the least
to develop biology in the interest of the human race. The lackeys of imperialism
ascertain that life on Earth must be destroyed" ( I SO).
96. Schuster's expression is cited by Brunschvicg, L'experience humaine et la
causalite physique, 447.
97 Haeckel, Die Lebenswzmder, chap. 7, "Lebenseinheiten, " in Gemeinver
standlche Werke, 4: 1 73 .
98. Since these lines were written, the appearance of Gilbert Simondon's
thesis, L'individu et sa genese physico-biologique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1 964), has fortunately helped to shed light on these questons.
99. Charles Naudin, "Les especes afnes et la theorie de l' evoluton," Revue
scientique de la France et de l'etranger, 2d series, 3 ( 1 875).
100. "Even the feest of mental activities, the imagination, can never wander
completely at random (although the poet has this impression); it remains linked
to preformed possibilities, prototyes, archetypes, or original images. The sto
ries of the most distant peoples reveal, by the resemblance of their themes, this
subordinaton to certain primordial images. Even the images which serve as the
Notes to Pages 61-63 167
bases of scientifc theories are held within the same limits: ether, energy, their
tansformations and their consistencies, theory of atoms, afnities, etc." (C. G.
Jung, Tpes pschologiques [Geneva: Georg, 1 950] , 3 10).
3 . ASPECTS OF VITALISM
1. Marcel Prenant, Biologie et marxisme (Paris:
E
ditions d'hier et d'aujour
d'hui, 1 948), 2 30-3 1 . Originally published as Biologie et marxisme (Amsterdam:
Pegasus, 1 93 7). Prenant has since formulated anew the same opinion: "What
did Bergson do in Creative Evolution? Two things: for one thing, a critque of
mechanical materialism, which is in our opinion an excellent critique, and
whose only fault is that it doesn't go frther still, as he has applied it only to
life. By contast, we think that it is also applicable, under diferent conditions,
to the inanimate world itself. Consequently, on this matter we are in agreement.
What we gravely reproach Bergson for, and what constitutes his mysticism, is
that one searches in vain for a positive conclusion that could be transformed
into any experience" (Progres technique et progres moral: Txtes in-extenso des confer
ences et des entretiens des Rencontres Interationales de Geneve en 1947 [Neuchatel:
Editions de La Baconniere, 1 948] , 43 I).
2. Paul-Joseph Barthez, Nouveaux eliments de la science de l'homme (1 778;
Paris: Goujon et Brunet, 1 806).
3. [Canguilhem uses engin; the OED confrms the applicability in English
of the double meaning, indeed places the interpretaton of engine (or "engin")
as "genius," "cunning," "tickery," or "evil machination" before its interpreta
tion as machine.-Trans.]
4- Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Encclopaedia Logic, with the Zusatze,
pt. I of The Encclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusatze, trans. T. F.
Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1 991), 209.
5. Henry More, letter to Descartes, I I December 1 648, in Oeuvres de Des
canes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1 897), letter 5 3 1 ,
5: 243-45; translated in Leonora D. Cohen, "Descartes and Henry More on the
Beast-Machine-A Translation of Their Correspondence Pertaining to Animal
Automatsm," Annals of Science I , no. I (1936): 50-5 1 . Jean de La Fontaine,
"The Two Rats, the Fox, and the Egg," in The Complete Fables of Jean de La
Fontaine, ed. Norman R. Shapiro (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007),
2 62-64-
6. [Gottfied Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays on Human Undertanding, ed. and
tans. Peter Remant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1 996).-Trans.]
7. "It is impossible for me to indulge in too much distrust, as it is not a
question of actng but only of meditation and knowledge" (Rene Descartes,
First Meditation, in Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First
Philosophy, tans. Donald A. Cress [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishers, 1 998] , 62,
tanslaton modifed).
1 68 Notes to Pages 63-68
8. Emanuel Ridl, Geschichte de' biologischen Theorien in der Neuzeit (Berlin:
Wilhelm Engelmann, 1 91 3), chap. 4 1 , "Der Untergang der biologischen
Weltanschauung. "
9. Walther Riese, L'idee de l'homme dans la nezn-ologie contemp01'aine (Paris:
Alcan, 1 93 8), 8 (see also 9).
10. Aristotle, Politics 1 2 5 2a. 2 3-1 2 52b.
I I. Hans Spemann was himself an example of the greatest feedom of mind
in the interpretation of these facts: "Expressions indicatng psychological and
not physical analogies have been constantly used, which implies that their
meaning goes beyond the poetic image. It must thus be said that the reactions
of a given fagment of an embryo-endowed with its various potentialities, in
conformity with the embryonic 'feld' in which it is placed-and its behavior in
a certain 'situaton' are not ordinary chemical reactons, simple or complex.
This means that these processes of development can one day, like all the vital
processes, be analyzed in terms of chemical or physical processes or can be
constructed on the basis of them-or rather, that this will not be possible, de
pending on the nature of their relation to another, easily accessible reality, such
as the vital processes of which we have the most intimate knowledge, psychic
processes" (Experimentele Beitre zu einer Theorie der Entwicklung [Berlin:
Springer, 1 936] , 2 78).
1 2 . In Lucien Cuenot, Invention et fnalite en biologie (Paris: Flammarion,
1 941), 2 2 3, one fnds a fairly complete list of these verbal notions coined by
vitalist biologists.
1 3 . Theophile de Bordeu, Recherches anatomiques sur la position des glandes et
sur leu1" action (Paris: Quillau, 1 75 1), 64, cited in Charles Daremberg, Histoire
des sciences 7niicales (Paris: ]. -B. Bailliere, 1 870), 2 : I I 57n2 . Comte was well
aware that Barthez's vitalism responds "in his early thought, to an evidently
progressive intention, " that is to say, to a reaction against Descartes' and Boer
haave's mechanism (Cours de philosophie positive, lesson 43 [Paris: Bailliere,
1 864]).
1 4- Wilhelm Roux, Der Kmpf del' Theile im Organisnzus: Ein Beitrag zur Vr
volstandigzmg der mechanischen Zweckmassigkeitslehre (Leipzig: W. Engelmann,
1 88 1), and Roux, Gesammelte Abhandlungen iiber Entwickelungwzechanik del 01'
ganisnzen, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1 895).
1 5. We fnd an example of the natonalist exploitation of a racist interpreta
tion of these facts in the German biologist Adolf Meyer, for whom vitalists are
naturally Nordic. The Latins, with Baglivi, Descartes, and Comte, are naturally
mechanists, harbingers of Bolshevism! This is to turn the Montpellier School
into a rather cheap afair. A for Comte, he took fom Bichat a vitalist concep
tion of life that rendered him hostle to cell theory. See Lucien Cuenot, Inven
tion et fnalite en biologie (Paris: Flammarion, 1 941), 1 52 .
1 6. See the previous chapter, "Cell Theory."
1 7. John Scott Haldane, The Philosophy of a Biologist (Oxford: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1936), 36.
Notes to Pages 68-74 169
1 8. Since this passage was frst published, we have dealt with the question in
fll in our La fmation du concept de refexe aux Xle et Xlle siecles (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1 955; 2d ed. , Vrin, 1 977).
1 9. Gaston Bachelard, "Critique preliminaire du concept de fontiere epis
temologique, " Actes du 8e Conges interational de philosophie de Prague ( 1934),
20. Jean Rostand, La vie et ses problemes (Paris: Flammarion, 1 93 9), 1 55; em
phasis ours.
2 1 . Gaston Bachelard,
E
tudes (Paris: Vrin, 2000), 75-76.
2 2 . Xavier Bichat, Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort ( 1800), article
7, 1, "Diference des forces vitales d' avec les lois physiques" (Paris: Vrin,
1 982).
2 3 . [Milieu in French means both "milieu" in the sense of "environment"
and "center, middle. " See, in the present work, the chapter "The Living and
Its Milieu. "-Trans.]
24. See, later in the present work, the chapter "The Living and Its Milieu. "
For suggestve indicatons concerning the same problem, see Haldane, The Phi
losophy of a Biologist, chap. 2 .
25. Georg Ernst Stahl, cited by Charles Daremberg in Histoire des sciences
meicales, comprenant l'anatomie, la physiologie, la meecine, la chirrgie et les doc
trines de pathologie generale (Paris: Bailliere, 1 870), 2 : 1029. In the same book,
Daremberg justly says (1022) that: "If the religious party spirit, or pure theol
ogy, had not seized onto animism, this doctrine would not have outlived its
author. "
26. Philipp Frank, The Law of Causalit and Its Limits (Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1 998).
27. "Eine Maschine als Werkzeug fr den Fuhrer-aber der Fuhrer ist die
Hauptsache" (Hans Driesch, Die
O
berindung des Materialismus [Zurich:
Rascher, 1 93 5] , 59)
28. Charles Maurras, Enquete sur la monarchie: suivie de Une campagne royaliste
au Figaro et Si le coup de frce est possible (Paris: Nouvelle librairie nationale,
1 92 5)'
29. See Aristote 's De Mot Animalium, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum (rinceton:
Princeton University Press, 1 985).
30. It i s thus unsurprising to see a positvist like Philipp Frank as retcent
about Marist dialectics in biology as about vitalism (Frank, The Law of Causalit
and Its Limits, I I6, I I 7, 1 20).
3 I . Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine,
trans. Henry C. Greene (New York: Dover Publications, 1 957). pt. 2, chap. 2 :
"If I had to defne life in a single phrase, I should clearly express my thought
by throwing into relief the one characteristic which, in my opinion, sharply
diferentiates biological science. I should say: life is creaton" (93).
3 2 . John Burdon Sanderson Haldane, The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences
( 1 939; New York: Random House, 1 990).
1
7
0 Notes to Pages 74-82
3 3 . Samuel Butler, Li and Habit (London: Triibner, 1 878).
34. See our "Note sur la situaton faite en France a la philosophie biologi
que," Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale 52 (October 1 947): 3 2 2-3 2 .
3 S . Jean Wahl, Tableau de la philosophie fran(aise (Paris:
E
ditions de la Revue
Fontaine, 1 946).
36. Ibid., 75-82 .
4- MCHINE AD ORGANISM
1 . Julien Pacotte, La pensee technique (Paris: Alcan, 193 I).
2 . Franz Reuleaux, The Knematics of Machinery, trans. A. Kennedy (London:
Macmillan, 1 876).
3. On matters of machines and mechanisms, see Pacotte, La pensee technique,
chap. 3 .
4- According to Marx, the tool is moved by human force and te machine,
by a natural force. See Karl Marx, Capital, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling (New
York: International Publishers, 1 967), 1 : 3 74-78.
5. [G. Baglivi, De praxi medica, i n Opera omnia medico-practica et anatomica
(Venice, 1 72 7), 78.-Trans.]
6. On this point, see Charles Daremberg, Histoire des sciences meicales, 2 vols.
(Paris: ]. -B. Bailliere, 1 870), 2 : 879.
7. G6mez Pereira, Antoniana Margarita, opus nempe physicis, medicis, ac theo
logis non minus utile, quam necessarium per Gometium Pereiram, medicum Methinc
Dueli, quae Hispanorm lingua Medina de el Campo apellatur, nunc primum in
lucem cditum (MetmCampi, I S 54).
8. Alfed Espinas, "L'organisme ou la machine vivante en Grece au IVe sie
de avant J. C. , " Revue de metaphysique et de morale ( 1 903): 72-1 5 .
9. Aristotle, "Mechanical Problems, " in Aristotle, Minor Wrks, tans. WaI
ter Stanley Hett (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 980).
10. Plato, Timaeus, tans. BenjaInin Jowett (New York: Macmillan, 1 987),
74b6.
1 1 . Pierre-Maxime Schuhl, Machinisme et ph ilosophie (Paris: Alcan, 1 93 8).
1 2 . [Ibid. , 34--Trans.]
1 3 . Aristotle, Politics I 2 5 3b2 3-1 2 54b20 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1 932), 14-19. [Schuhl, Machinisme et ph ilosophie, 3 2 .-Trans.]
1 4- [Schuhl, Machinisme et philosophie, 3 3 et al.-Trans.]
I S. Lucien Laberthonniere, "La physique de Descartes et la physique d'Ai
stote," in Laberthonniere, Les etudes Sr Descm'tes (Paris: Vrin, 1 93 5), 2 : 287-344'
1 6. Franz Borkenau, Der
U
bergang vom feudalen zum biirgerichen Weltbild:
Studien zur Geschichte de' Philosophie der Manufaktzwperiode (Paris: Alcan, 1 934).
[ 1 985, Canguilhem republished his 1 936 essay "Descartes et l a technique"
in L 'esprit dz mecanisnze: Science et societe chez Franz B01-kenaz, Cahiers S. T.S. 7
(1 98S): 87-93 ,-Trans. ]
Notes to Pages 82-84 1 7
1
1 7. La Fontaine's fable "The Cobbler and the Financier" illustates very
clearly the confict between two conceptons of work and its remuneraton [in
The Complete Fables of Jean de La Fontaine, ed. Norman R. Shapiro (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2007), 1 89-90.-Trans.]
1 8. [Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manisto (New York:
Penguin, 2002), 2 2 2 .-Trans.]
1 9. Henryk Grossman, "Die gesellschaflichen Grundlagen der mechanis
tschen Philosophie und die Manufaktur, " Zeitchri fr Sozialrschung 2
( 1 935): . 161 -2 3 1 .
20. Pierre Duhem, The Origins of Statics, tans. G. F. Leneux, V. N. Vag
liente, and G. H. Wagener (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1 991).
2 I. Marie Herzfeld, Leonardo da Vinci, der Denker, Forscher, und Poet (Leip
zig: Diederichs, 1 94); Gabriel Seailles, Leonard de Vinci: L 'artiste et le savant
Essai de biographie pschologique (Paris: Perrin, 1 906); Josephin Peladan, La
philosophie de Leonard de Vinci d'apres ses manuscripts (Paris: Acan, 1 907).
2 2 . In te Principles of Philosophy (IV, I 09-I 3), several passages show that
Descartes was equally interested in cannon powder, but he did not look for an
explanatory principle analogous to the animal organism in the explosion of can
non powder as a source of energy. It was an English doctor, Thomas Willis
( 1 62 1-75), who constucted a theory of muscular movement explicitly based on
an analogy with what takes place when powder explodes in an arquebus. Willis
compared nerves to powder fses, in a way that stll remains valid according to
some (we are thinking in particular of W. M. Bayliss). Nerves are a kind of
Bickford fuse. They conduct a fre that sets of in muscles explosions that, ac
cording to Willis, can alone account for the phenomena of spasms and tetany
observed by doctors.
2 3 . "For there is within us but one soul, and this soul has within it no diver
sity of parts: it is at once sensitve and ratonal too, and all its appettes are
volitons" (Rene Descartes, "The Passions of the Soul," in The Philosophical
Writings of Descartes, tans. ]. Cottngham, R. Stoothof, and D. Murdoch
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 988] , 1 : 346).
24- Rene Descartes, "Fifh Discourse, " in Discourse on Method and Medita
tions on First Philosophy, tans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publish
ers, 1 998), 2 5-34; Rene Descartes, letter to the Marquis of Newcastle,
November 2 3 , 1 646, in The Philosophical Writings of Des cartes, 3 : 302 .
2 5. Rene Descartes, letter to Henry More, February 5, 1 649, in The Philo
sophical Writings of Des cartes, 3: 366. To understand the relation between sensibil
ity and the dispositon of organs, one must know the Cartesian theory of
degrees of sense; on this topic, see the Responses to the Sixth Set of Objections, 9,
in The Philosophical Writings of Des cartes, 2: 294-96.
26. Rene Descartes, letter to More, February 5, 1 649, in The Philosophical
Writings of Des cartes, 3 : 366.
27. Gottfied Leibniz, letter to Hermann Conring, March 1 9, 1 678.
I 7
2 Notes to Pages 84-89
28. One fnds this admirable text in the Oeuvres choisies of Leibniz, published
by L. Prenant (Paris: Garnier, I 940), 5 2 . One should bring together, in partcu
lar: the criteria that, according to Leibniz, distnguish the animal fom an au
tomaton, the analogous arguments invoked in the letter to Conring cited above,
and also Edgar Allan Poe's profound refectons on the matter in "Maelzel's
Chess-Player" [in The Complete Tales and Poems of Edgar Alan Poe (New York:
Random House, I975), 42 I-39.-Trans.] . On the Leibnizian distncton be
tween machine and organism, see "A New System of the Nature and Commu
nication of Substances, " in Leibniz: Philosophical Papers, ed. and trans. L.
Loemker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I 956), and Monadolog and
Other Philosophical Essays, trans. P. Schrecker and A. M. Schrecker (New York:
Macrllan, I 985)'
29. Leibniz was no less interested than Descartes in the invention and con
struction of machines, as well as the problem of automatons. See in particular
his correspondence with Duke John of Hanover (I 676-79), in Simtliche Schri
ten und Brief (Darmstadt: Reichl, I 92 7), Ist series, vol. 2 . In a I 67I text, Beden
ken von AuJichtztng einer Akademie oder Sozietit in Deutschland zu Aufehmen der
Kiinste und Wissenschafen, 4th series (Darmstadt: Reichl, I93 I), I : 544, Leibniz
exalts the superiority of German art, which had always applied itself to making
moving works (watches, clocks, hydraulic machines, etc.) over Italian art, which
had almost exclusively dedicated itself to making objects without life, immobile,
and made to be contemplated fom without.
30. Descartes, Treatise of Man, trans. Thomas Steele Hall, ed. Bernard 1.
Cohen et. al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I 972), I-4-
3 1 . Ibid., 4
3 2 . See Appendix 3 in this volume.
3 3 . Moreover, Descartes can only formulate the meaning of God's construc
ton of animal machines in terms of purpose. See The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes, 2 : 60.
34. Rene Descartes, "Descripton of the Human Body and All of Its Func
tons," in The Philosophical WTitings ofDescaTtes, I : 3 I 5 .
3 5. Claude Bernard, Lectzl1'es on the Phenomena of Lie Common to Animals and
Plants (Springfeld, Ill. : Charles C. Thomas, I 974)'
36. Ibid. , 37.
3 7. Raymond Ruyer, Elements de pschobiologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, I 946), 46-47.
38. "Artifcial means: which tends towards a defned goal. And it thereby
contrasts with living. Artifcial, human, or anthropomorphic are distnct fom
what is only living or vital. Everything tat comes to appear in the form of a
clear and completed goal becomes artifcial, and this is the tendency of an in
creasing consciousness. It is also the work of man when he imitates an object or
a spontaneous phenomenon as closely as possible. Thought that is conscious of
itself makes itself into an artifcial system. If life had a goal, it would no longer
be life" (Paul Valery, Cahier B [Paris: Gallimard, I 9I O]).
Notes to Pages 89-94 I 73
39.
E
douard Pichon, ed, Le developpenent pschique de l'enfant e t de l'adolescent
(Paris: Masson, 1 936), 1 2 6; Paul Cossa, Physiopathologie du sstenze ne'euv" (Paris:
Masson, 1 942), 845.
40. Aristotle, Politics, 1 2 52 b2-5 .
41 . Max Scheler has remarked that the least specialized living beings are
(contrary to what mechanists believe) the most difcult to explain in mechanist
terms, because in them all fnctions are assumed by the entire organism. It is
only with the increasing diferentiation of fnctons and the complication of the
nervous system that structures resembling a machine in some fashion appear
(Max Scheler, Man's Place in Natu'e, trans. Hans Meyerhof [ 1 928; Boston: Bea
con Press, 1 961] , 75-8 1).
42 . Xavier Bichat, Anatonzie gene'ale ( 1 801 ; Paris: Bureau de l'Encyclopedie,
1 834).
43 . Lucien Cuenot, Invention et fnalite en biologie (Paris: Flammarion, 1 941).
4. Rene Descartes, "La description du corps humain, " 66, in Oeuv'res de
Desca'tes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1 974), 1 1 : 2 77.
45. Paul Guillaume, La pschologie de la f017Jze (Paris: Flammarion, 1 93 7),
1 3 1 .
46. Max Aron and Pierre Grasse, P'eis de biologie an inzale , 2d ed. (Paris:
Masson, 1 935), 647f.
47. Rene Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy," 4: 203, in The Philosophical
WO'ks of Descartes, 1 : 2 88, trans. modifed. See our stdy "Descartes et la tech
nique, " Travaux du 9ine Congres international de philosophie (Paris: Hermann,
1 93 7), 2 : 77f.
48. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judent, trans. James Creed Meredith
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2 007), 1 3 3 .
49. Paul Kranhalls, Del Wltsinn de' Tchnik (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1 93 2),
68.
50. The point of departure for these studies must be sought in Darwin's The
Descent of Man. Mar understood well the importance of Darwin's ideas: see
Marx, Capital, 406n2 et al.
5 I . Alfed Espinas, Les ol'igines de la technologie (Paris: Acan, 1 897).
5 2 . Ernst Kapp, Grzmdlnien eine' Philosophie del- Technik (Braunschweig:
Westermann, 1 877).
53. We are alluding here to an excellent little book by Gaston Viaud, Intelli
gence: Its Evolution and F017lS, tans. A. J. Pomerans (New York: Harper, 1 960).
54- Eduard von Hartann, Philosophy of the Unconscious: Speculative Results
Acc01'ding to the Inductive llethod of Physical Science (New York: Macmillan, 1 884).
55. Andre Leroi-Gourhan, Milieu et techniques (Paris: Albin Michel, 1 945)
56. See the work of Eberhard Zschimmer, Deutsche Philosophen del' Technik
(Stuttgart: Enke, 1 93 7)'
57. Alard Du Bois-Reymond, Erjndzmg und Erfnde7' (Berlin: Springer,
1 906). Alain has sketched a Darwinian interpretaton of technical constructons
I
74
Notes to Pages 94-96
in a very good piece ("Prop os d'Alain," Nouvele Revue Franraise I [ I 920] : 60),
which is preceded and followed by several other pieces of interest for our prob
lem. The same idea is gestured toward several times in the Systeme des beaux
arts (Paris: Gallimard, I 926), regarding the making of the violin (4: 5), frniture
(6: 5), and rustc houses (6: 3 ; 6: 8).
58. Oswald Spengler, Der Mensch und die Technik (Munich: Beck, I93 I).
59. Leroi-Gourhan, Milieu et techniques, 499
60. James Watt perfected the double-actng steam engine in 1 784- Sadi Car
not's 1 824 work Riexions sur la puissance motrice du fu (Paris: Bachelier, 1 824)
remained unknown untl the middle of the nineteenth century. On this subject,
see Pierre Ducasse, Histoire des techniques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1 945), which emphasizes the anteriority of technique to theory.
On the empirical sequence of the various organs and the various usages of
the steam engine, see A. Vierendeel, Esquisse d'une histoire de l technique (Brus
sels: Vroment, 1 92 1), which summarizes, in particular, a major work by Robert
H. Thurston, A Histor of the Growth of the Steam-Engine (New York, 1 878). On
the history of Watt's work, see the chapter "James Watt ou Ariel ingenieur," in
Pierre Devaux, Les aventures de la science (Paris: Gallimard, 1 943).
61 . Leroi-Gourhan, Milieu et techniques, 100.
62. Ibid., 104- One fnds the same thing in an artcle by Arthur Haudricourt,
"Les moteurs animes en agriculture": "One must not forget that we owe inani
mate motors to irrigaton: the noria is at the origin of the hydraulic mill, as
the pump is at the origin of the steam engine" (Revue de botanique applquee et
d'agriculture tropicale 20 ( 1 940): 762.
63. Leroi-Gourhan, Milieu et techniques, 406.
64- Henri Bergson, in Two Sources of Moralit and Relgion, tans. R. Ashley
and C. Brereton (New York: Holt, 1 949), explicitly argues that the spirit of
mechanical invention, although nourished by science, remains distnct and
could even separate fom the latter (3 2 9-30). Bergson is also one of the rare
French philosophers, if not the only one, to have considered mechanical inven
tion as a biological fnction, an aspect of the organizaton of matter by life. His
Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Dover Publicatons,
1 91 I), is, in a sense, a teatise of general organology.
On the relations between explaining and doing, see also the two frst texts in
Paul Valery, Vriete V (Paris: Gallimard, 1 945), "L'homme et la coquille" and
"Discours aux Chirurgiens, " also, in Eupalnos, the passage on the constuction
of boats. See Valery, Eupalinos; or, The Architect, trans. WiHiam McCausland
Stewart (London: Oxford University Press, 1 93 2). Finally, see the admirable
"I Praise of Hands, " by Henri Focillon, in The Li of Fors in Art, tans.
George Kubler (New York: Zone Books, 1 989), 1 57-84-
65. Georges Friedmann, Industial Societ: The Emergence of the Human Prob
lems of Automation (Glencoe, Ill. : Free Press, 1 955). [Canguilhem reviewed
Friedmann's original French version, Problemes humains du machinisme industriel
Notes to Pages 96-101 1 75
(Paris: Gallimard, 1 946), in "Milieu et normes de l'homme au travail," Cahiers
interationazl de sociologie 2 3 (1 947): I 20-36.-Trans.]
66. Friedmann, P1'oblemes humains du machinisnze induID'iel, 96.
67. Friedmann, Problemes humains du machinisme industriel, 369.
68. This atttude is beginning to become familiar to biologists. See esp. :
Cuenot, Invention et fnalite en biologie; Andree Tety, Les outils chez les etres vi
vants (Paris: Gallimard, I 948); and Albert Vandel, L'homme et l'evolution (Paris:
Gallimard, I 949). See esp. , in the last of the above, the reflectons on adaptation
and invention, I 2 of. One cannot ignore the fermenting role played in these
matters by the ideas of Father Teilhard de Chardin.
A recent discipline, called Bionics and born in the United States ten years
ago, studies biological structures and systems that can be used by technology as
models or analogues, in particular, in the constructon of devices for detecton,
orientation, or equilibraton to be used in airplane or missile equipment. Bionics
is the art-very scientfic-of informaton that draws knowledge fom living
nature. The fog, with its selective eye for instantly usable information; the pit
viper, with its thermoception, which at night can sense the blood temperature
of its prey; the common house fly, which equilibrates its fight with two cilia
these have supplied a new species of engineers with models. There exsts in
several universites in the United States a special discipline of Bio-engineering,
which seems to have frst found a home in the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Cf. Jean Dufenoy, "Systemes biologiques servant des modeIes a la technolo
gie, " Cahiers des ingenieztrs agronomes Gune-uly I 962): 2 1 .
5. THE LIVING AD ITs MILIEU
I . Denis Diderot, Encclopeie de Diderot et d'lemben; ou, Dictionnaire ri
sonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers (Marsanne: Redon, I 999)'
2 . Hippolyte Taine, Essais de critique et d'histoire (Paris, Hachette, I 9I 3) '
3 . [Sir Isaac Newton, Opticks (Amherst, N.Y. : Prometheus, 2003), 352,
3 64--Trans.]
4- Sir Isaac Newton, The P1'incipia: Mathematical P1-inciples of Natural Philoso
phy, trans. I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitan (Berkeley: University of Cali
fornia Press, I 999)'
5. On all these points, see Leon Bloch, Les origines de la theorie de l'ether et la
physique de Newton (Paris: Alcan, I 908) .
6. [ean Baptste Lamarck, "The Infuence of Circumstances, " in Lamark to
Darin: Contributions to Evolutionmy Biolog, ed. Henry Lewis McKinney (Law
rence, Kans. : Coronado Press, 1 97 I).-Trans.]
7. Leon Brunschvicg, Les etapes de la philosophie mathbnatique (Paris: Alcan,
I 9I 2), 508.
8. See Chapter 2, above.
I
76 Notes to Pages 101-108
9. See the relaton of laws to climate in Montesqieu, De l'esprit des lois, in
Oeuvres completes (Paris: Seuil, I 964), chaps. 1 4-1 8, pp. 61 3-40.
10. Bufon's chapter on "the degeneration of animals" in the Histoire natZ
'ele ( 1 82 3-3 3) examines the acton of the habitat and food on the animal organ
ism. See also Bufon, De la degeneration des animaux (Paris: Parent Desbarres,
1 868).
I I. [Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, trans. Harriet
Martineau (London: George Bell & Sons, 1 896), 2 : 9.-Trans.]
1 2 . In his behaviorist psychology, Tolman also conceives the relatonship
between the organism and the milieu in the form of a relaton of fncton to
variable. See Andre Tilquin, Le behaviorise (Paris: Vrin, 1 942), 43 9.
1 3 . Frederic Houssay, Fore et cause (Paris: Flammarion, 1 920); ]. Costantn,
"Recherches sur la sagittaire, " Buletin de la Societe botanique (1 885).
14. Louis Roule, La vie des rivieres (Paris: Stock, 1 948), 6r .
1 5. We fnd a startling summary of this thesis in Houssay, Force e t cause,
when Houssay writes of "certain kinds of unites that we call living beings,
which we designate separately, as if they really had an existence of their own,
independent, whereas they have no isolated reality and they cannot be otherwise
than in absolute and permanent connecton with the ambient milieu, of which
they are simply a localized and momentary concentaton" (47).
1 6. Rene Descartes, "Fifh Discourse, " in Discourse on Method and Medita
tions on First Philosophy, tans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publish
ers, 1 998), 3 3 , trans. modifed.
1 7. This is above all the case for animals. Lamarck is more reserved con
cerning plants. [See, e. g. , Lamarck, "The Infuence of Circumstances," 1 3 .
-Trans.]
1 8. Charles Augustn Sainte-Beuve, Volupte: The Sensual Man, trans. Marilyn
Gaddis Rose (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1 995), 1 06.
19. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of the Species (Cambridge: Harvard Uni
versity Press, 1 964), 3 . [Canguilhem has modifed the text slightly.-Trans.]
20. Marcel Prenant, Darin (Paris:
E
ditons Sociales Internatonales, 1 93 8),
1 45-49
2 r . Carl Ritter, Comparative Geography (Philadelphia: ]. B. Lippincott &
Co. , 1 865).
2 2 . Alexander von Humboldt, Kosnzos (Stttgart: Cotta, 1 845).
2 3 . For a historical presentaton of the development of this idea and a cri
tique of its exaggeratons, see Lucien Febvre, La tere et l'evolution humaine:
Introduction geogaphique i l'histoire (Paris: Renaissance du livre, 1 92 2).
24. Andre Tilquin, Le behaviorisnze (Paris: Vrin, 1 942), 34-3 5. We have bor
rowed the bulk of the informaton used below fom this solidly documented
thesis.
2 5.
E
tienne Bonnot de Condillac, Treatise on Sensations, trans. G. Carr (Lon
don: Favil, 1 930), 3 .
Notes to Pages I09-I I S 1 77
2 6. See Henri Baulig, "La geographie est-elle une science?" Annales de Geo
grhie 57 Ganuary-March 1 948), l-I I ; "Causalite et fnalite en geomorpholo
gie, " Geografska Annale1- 1-2 (1 949): 3 2 1-24-
27. Louis Poirier's article "L'evolution de la geographie humaine, " Critique
8-9 Ganuary-February 1 947), provides a very interestng focus on this change
of perspective in human geography.
2 8. On this point, see Paul Guillaume, La pschologie de la j1'1e (Paris: Flam
marion, 1 937), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La st1-tctzn-e du comportement (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1 942).
29. Jakob von Uexll, Umwelt zmd Imzenwelt der Tiere (Berlin, 1 909; 2 d ed. ,
1 92 1); Theontische Biologie (Berlin: Springer; 2 d ed. 1 92 8); von Uexll and G.
Kriszat, Streiiige durch die Umwelten von Tieren zmd Menschen (Berlin: Springer,
1 934). Goldstein accepts these views of von Uexll only with considerable
reservations: if one is unwilling to distinguish the living fom its environment,
all research into relations becomes in a sense impossible. Determinism disap
pears and is replaced by reciprocal penetration, and taking the whole into con
sideration kills knowledge. For knowledge to remain possible, within this
organism-environment totality there must appear a nonconventional center
around which a range of relations opens out. See Kurt Goldstein's "Criticism
of Purely Environmental Theory: World and Environment (Milieu), " in his The
Organim (New York: Zone Books, 1 995), 85-90.
30. The example of the tick is taken up, following von Uexll, by Louis
Bounoure in L 'autonomie de l'etre vivant (Paris: Presses U niversitaires de France,
1 949), 143
3 1 . For a discussion of this thesis by Goldstein, see the conclusion of Fran
cois Dagognet, Philosophie biologique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1 955)
3 2 . Goldstein, The Organism, 388.
33. Gregor Mendel, "Versuch liber Pfanzenhybriden, " i n Vrhandlungen des
natzl7frschenden Vreines in B11nn, vol. 4 ( 1 865), teatses 3-47.
34. Albert Brachet, La vie creatrice desj'tes (Paris: Alcan, 1 92 7), 1 7 1 .
3 5. Maurice Caullery, Probleme de l'evolution (Paris: Payot, 1 93 1). One fnds
in Nietzsche an anticipaton of these ideas. See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Wil to
Powe', trans. WaIter Kau&ann and R. ]. Hollingdale (New York: Random
House, 1 967) 647, pp. 345-46. I truth, the criticisms Nietzsche addresses to
Darwin are more applicable to the neo-Lamarckians.
3 6. For a presentaton of this question, see "Une discussion scientifque en
U.R. S. S. , " Europe 3 3-34 ( 1 948), and also C. C. Mathon, "Quelques aspects du
Mitchourisme, etc. , " Revue generale des sciences pures et appliquees 3-4 ( 195 1). On
the ideological aspect of the controversy, see Julian Huxley, La genetique soviet
ique et la science mondiale (Paris: Stock, 1 950). Jean Rostand has given a good
historical and critical presentation of the question in "L' ofensive des Mitchour
iniens contre la genetique mendelienne, " in his Les g1ands COZrants de la biologie
1
7
8 Notes to Pages I I 6-I 24
(Paris: Gallimard, 1 95 I), which contains a bibliography. Finally, see Raymond
Hovasse, Adaptation et evolution (Paris: Hermann, I95 I).
37. Georges L. Leclerc, Comte de Bufon, De la degeneration des animaux
(Paris: Parent Desbarres, I 868).
38. See the article "Climate" i n Diderot, Encclopeie de Diderot et d'lem
be11:.
39. See Theodor Breiter's excellent summary of the history of Greek geog
raphy in the introducton to vol. 2 (Commentary) of Marcus Manilius, Astronom
ica (Leipzig, I908).
40. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin Books,
I 966), 88-95'
4I . [Ibid. , 90.-Trans.]
42 . [Ibid. , 92-93 .-Trans.]
43 [Ibid. , 93 .-Trans.]
4. [Ibid. , 89-Trans.]
45. Dietrich Mahnke, Unendlche Sphire und Almittelpunkt (Halle: Nie
meyer, I 93 7); this author dedicates several very interesting pages to the use and
signifcation of this expression in Leibniz and Pascal. According to Eugene
Havet, Pascal borrowed the expression either fom Melle de Gournay (the pref
ace to the I 595 edition of Montaigne's Essais) or fom Rabelais' Third Book of
Panel (chap. I 3) '
46. See Alexandre Koyre, La philosophie de Jacob Boehme (Paris: Vrin, I 92 9),
3 78-79, 504; also his "The Signifcance of the Newtonian Synthesis, " Archives
interationales d'histoire des sciences I I ( I 950), reprinted in Koyre, Newtonian
Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I 965), 3-2 5. [See also Koyre,
From the Closed Wrld to the Infnite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer
sity Press, I 957), chap. 9.-Trans.]
47. Edouard Claparede, preface to Frederik Jacobus Johannes Buytendijk,
Pschologie des animaux (Paris: Payot, I 92 8).
6. THE NORMAL AD THE PATHOLOGICAL
I . See Andre Lalande, Vcabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie (Paris:
Alcan, I 926-3 2).
2. Xavier Bichat, Physiological Researches on Li and Death, trans. F. Gold
(Boston: Richardson and Lord, I 82 7) '
3 . Xaver Bichat, General Anatomy, Appled to Physiolog and Medicine, tans.
G. Hayward (Boston: Richardson and Lord, I 82 2).
4. Claude Bernard, Principes de meecine experimentale (Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, I 947).
5 Ibid. , chap. I 5
6. Ibid. , I42f.
7. See the study by Dr. M. D. Grmek, "La concepton de la mala die et de la
sante chez Claude Bernard, " in Melanges Alexandre Koyre (Paris: Hermann,
I 964), I : 208f.
Notes to Pages I25-13 1 1 79
8. [See Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. R. Ariew and D. Garber (India
napolis: Hackett, 1 989, 42 .-Trans.]
9. [In his treatent of the term anomal, Canguilhem uses here the obsolete
French term anomal. According to the OED, the English use of anomal is also
obsolete, restricted to the siteenth and seventeenth centuries. We revive it here
specifcally in the sense of something "not bound or borne by a law."-Trans.]
1 0. See the works of Etenne Wolf.
I I . "A seed lives; but there are some that cannot possibly develop. These
try to live, they form monsters, and the monsters die. In truth, we only recog
nize them by this remarkable propert of not being able to endure. Anormal are
those beings that have a bit less fture than the normal ones" (Paul Valery, in
the preface to Monsieur Teste, trans. ]. Mathews [Princeton: Princeton Univer
sity Press, 1 989]).
1 2 . Louis Roule, Les poissons et le monde vivant des eaux, eudes ichthyologiques
(Paris: Delagrave, 1 926-3 7).
1 3 . Gabriel Tarde, L 'opposition universele: Essai d'une theorie des contrires (Le
Plessis-Robinson: Institut Synthelabo, 1 999).
14- Georges Teissier, "Mecanisme de l'evolution, " La Pensee, nos. 2 and 3
( 1 945): 5-1 9 and 1 5-3 1 , respectively.
I S . Georges Canguilhem, The Noral and the Pathological (New York: Zone
Books, 1 989), pt. 2 .
16. [According to Wbster's Revised Unabridged Dictionmy ( 1 91 3), the term
functional disease refers to "a disease of which the symptoms cannot be referred
to any appreciable lesion or change of structure; the derangement of an organ
arising fom a cause, ofen unknown, external to itself opposed to organic dis
ease, in which the organ itself is afected. "-Trans.]
1 7. Henri Laugier, "L'homme normal, " in Enccopeie franfaise (Paris: So
ciete des gestion de l'Encyclopedie fancaise, 1 93 7), vo!. 4; Henry Sigerist, A
Hist01Y of Medicine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 95 1-6 1), chap. 4; Kurt
Goldstein, The Organism ( 1 934; New York: Zone Books, 1 995), chap. 8.
1 8. Goldstein, The Organism, 3 3 7-3 8.
19. See Rene Leriche, "De l a sante a la maladie, " "La douleur dans les mala
dies, " and "Ou va la medecine? " in En cclopeie fanfaise (Paris: Societe des ges
ton de l'Encyclopedie fancaise, 1 936), vo!. 6, as well as his The Surgpy of Pain ,
ed. and trans. Achibald Young (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1939), and La
chiru:ie i l'ordre de la vie (Aix-Ies-Bains: Zeluck, 1 944). On the primacy of
dysfnction in pathology, see also Pierre Abrami, "Les troubles fonctionnels en
pathologie (Lecon d' ouverture du Cours de Pathologie Medicale), " Presse medi
cale (December 2 3 , 1 936).
2 0. Hans Selye, The Physiolog and Patholog of Exposure to Stress: A Treatise
Based on the Concepts of the Geneml-Adaptation-Syndrome and the Diseases of Adap
tation (Montreal: Acta Medica, 1 950).
2 I. For a discussion of this thesis, as well as its critcs, see Francois Dagog
net, La raison et les remedes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 964), and
180 Notes to Pages I3I-I39
Michel FoucauIt, Birth of the Clinic, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York:
Vintage, 1 973), see esp. 1 3 3 .
2 2 . Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Moralit and Religion, tans. R. Ashley and
C. Brereton (New York: Holt, 1 949).
2 3 . On the margin of safety in the stucture and fnctions of the body, see
WaIter B. Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body (New York: W. W. Norton, 1 93 2).
24. Here we are alluding to the works of Eugene Minkowski, Jacques Lacan,
and Daniel Lagache.
2 5. According to Dr. Henry Ey, "Mental health contains disease-in both
senses of the word 'contain' " (cited in Esprit 1 2 [ 1 952] : 789).
26. Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus, trans. John E. Woods (New York: A. A.
Knopf, 1 997). [We have not been able to locate this quote.-Trans.]
2 7 Ibid. , 258.
7. MONSTROSITY AND THE MONSTROUS
I . [Aesop's Fables, trans. Laura Gibbs (London: Oxford University Press,
2002), 240.-Trans.]
2 . [Canguilhem is playing here with the signifcation and etymology of the
word enOTe as an excess of norm.-Trans.]
3. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judment, trans. James C. Meredith (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2 007), 26, p. 1 00, trans. modifed.
4- [Eugene Dupreel, Esquisse d'une philosophie des valeurs (Paris: F. Alcan,
1 939)-Trans.]
5. Gabriel Tarde, L 'opposition universele: Essai d'une theorie des contraires
(Paris: F. Alcan, 1 897), 2 5.
6. [Canguilhem here links hybrid to the Greek term hubris.-Trans.]
7. Scipion du Pleix, C01pS de philosophie: La physique ou science des choses natu
reles (Paris, 1 607; Geneva, 1 636), bk. 7, chap. 2 2 : "Des monstres. "
8. Ernest Martin, Histoire des monstres depuis l'Antiquite jusqu'a nos jours
(Paris: Reinwald, 1 880; rpt. Genoble: Millon, 2 002), 69.
9. ["Theory of birthmarks" translates Canguilhem's theorie des envies, but it
fails to carry the sense of desire that would translate envie. The widespread
theory of birthmarks concerned marks that appear on the body of newborn
children or soon thereafer; these were attibuted to the pregnant mother's de
sire (ofen for a fuit), which, if unsatsfed, was tought to leave its mark on the
body of the child.-Trans.]
10. ["On Superfetation, " in Hippocrates, trans. W. H. S. Jones (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1 988).-Trans.]
I I . Nicolas Malebranche, The Searh afer Trth, tans. Thomas M. Lennon
and Paul J. Olscamp (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1 980).
1 2 . J. T. Eller, "Recherches sur la force de l'imaginaton des femmes en
ceintes sur le fetus, a l'occasion d'un chien monstueux, " Histoire de l'cademie
7'oyale des sciences et beles-lett7'es, 1 756 (Berlin, 1 758), 1 2 .
Notes to Pages 139-145 1 81
1 3 Jurgis Baltrusai'tis, Le Moyen
A
ge fan tastiqu e (Paris: Colin, 1 955); Baltru
saits, Reveils et pl'odiges (Paris: Colin, 1 960).
14. [ulius Obsequens (Giulio Ossequente), De prodigiis libe' (Lione: Giovan
di Tournes, 1 554); Conrad Lycosthenes, Prodigionl1n ac Ostentonlllz Cbronicon
(Basel: Henr. Petri, 1 557).-Trans.]
1 5 Paul Valery, "Au sujet d' Adonis, " in Vm'iete (Paris: Gallimard, 1 92 7), 8 1 .
1 6. Michel Foucault, Histor of Madness, ed. Jean Khalfa, trans. Jonathan
Murphy and Jean Khalfa (London: Routledge, 2 006).
1 7. Gottfied Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. and
trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1 996), 3 . 6. 1 2 , 3 . 6. 14, 3 . 6. 1 7, 4.4. 1 3 .
1 8. Benoit de Maillet, Telliamed; 01; Conversations Between an Indian Pbiloso
pber and a Frencb Missionmy on tbe Diminution of tbe Sea (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1 960).
1 9. Jean Baptise Robinet, Consideations pbilosopbiques de la g71dation naturele
des f'es de l'tre ou les essais de la nature qui appnnd i faire l'bomme (Paris:
Saillant, 1 768), 1 98.
20. Denis Diderot, Leth'e sur les aveugles (Geneva: E. Droz, 1 95 1).
2 1 . Caspar Friedrich Wolf, De ortl monstrontm ( 1 772).
2 2 . Isidore Geofoy Saint-Hilaire, Histoire generale et particulien des anoma
lies de l'organisation cbez l'bomme et les animaux . . . des monstntOsites, des va'rietes et
vices de confration (Paris: ]. -B. Bailliere, 1 83 2-3 7), 1 : 3 1 .
2 3 . Camille Dareste, Recberbes sw' la production articiele des monstntOsites;
ou, Essais de teratogenie experimentale (Paris: Reinwald, 1 877), 44.
24. [Canguilhem's reference to Ludovico Aiosto's Orlando furioso ( 1 53 2)
evokes part 7 of Jean de la Bruyere's Les caracteres (Paris: Le live de poche
classique, 1 995), where Theramenes is pictured as the only man capable of recit
ing Orndo Furioso in its entirety-Trans.]
2 5. [. M. ]. Parrot, "Sur la malformation achondroplasique et le Dieu
Ptah," Buletin de la societe d'antbropologie de Pm'is I , 3d series (meetng ofJuly 1 8,
1 878): 296-308. Parrot, afer whom the Parrot-Kaufann Syndrome is named,
coined acbondroplasie ("achondroplasia")-Trans.] .
26. See Jean Baptste Lamarck, Zoological Pbilosopby: An Exposition witb Re
gard to tbe Natural Hist01Y of Animals, trans. Hugh Elliot (London: Macmillan,
1 914), chap. 7.
27. Camille Dareste, Recberbes sur la production articiele des monsmtOsites;
ou, Essais de teratogenie experimentale (Paris: Reinwald, 1 877), 3 5.
2 8. [Victor Hugo, Tbe Laugbing Man, trans. Bellina Phillips (New York:
Croscup & Sterling, 1 894).-Trans.]
29. Lecture at the College philosophique, Paris Ganuary 24, 1 962). See also
E
tienne Wolf, Les cbemins de la vie (Paris: Hermann, 1 963)'
30.
E
tenne Wolf, La science des monsu'es (Paris: Gallimard, 1 948), 17. See
also, in Wolf's Les cbemins de la vie (Paris: Hermann, 1 963), the chapters on
monstrosity and fnalism and on the experimental producton of monsters.
1 82 Notes to Pages I46-I53
3 I . This artcle reproduces, with some modifcatons, a lecture given i
Brussels on February 9, 1 962, at the Insttut des hautes etudes of Belgium, and
published in Diogene 40 (October-December 1 962). We thank Roger Caillois
for allowing its republicaton.
APPENDIXES
I . Giovanni Borelli, De motu animalium (Rome: A. Bernabo, 1 680).
2. Jean Bernoulli, De motu musculorm (Lipsiae, 1 694).
3 . Albrecht von Haller, Elemens de physiologie, tans. Toussaint Bordenave
(Paris: Guillyn, 1 769).
4- Ibid., chap. I, IO.
5. Claude Nicolas Le Cat, Traite du mouvement musculaire (Berlin, 1 765).
6. Ibid. , 74.
7 Ibid. , 99
8. See Mirko Drazen Grmek's artcle "La notion de fbre vivante chez les
medecins de l'ecole iatophysique, " Clio Medica 5, no. 4 (December, 1970),
297-3 1 8.
9. Johannes Muller, Manuel de physiologie, vol. 2 , trans. A. J. L. Jourdan
(Paris: Bailliere, 1 845), 52 6, "Monades dans le sens des physiologistes. "
1 0. Jean Baptste Lamarck, "Discours d'ouverture, ( 2 I foreal, year 8
[ 1 800]), in Lamarck, Systeme des animaux sans vertebres (Paris: Lamarck et Deter
ville, 1 801).
1 1 . Jean Baptste Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique (paris: J. Bailliere, 1 809),
chap. 8, "The Polyps. "
1 2 . Auguste Comte, Cours de philosophie positive (Paris: Bachelier, 1 83 -42),
forty-frst lesson.
1 3 . Dietich Mahnke, Unendlche Sphire und Almittelpunkt (Halle: Nie-
meyer, 1 937), 1 3-1 7.
14- Lorenz Oken, Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie Gena: August Schnid, 1 8 1 I).
15. See Mahnke, Unendliche Sphire und Almittelpunkt, 1 6.
1 6. On Leibniz's difse, indirect rather than direct infuence on Diderot,
see Yvon Belavel, "Note sur Diderot et Leibniz, " Revue des sciences humaines
(October-December 1 963), 43 5-5 1 .
1 7. Maupertuis, Essai sur la fration des etres organise (Paris, 1 754).
1 8. Paul Hazard, La pensee europeenne au X/le siecle (paris: Boivin, 1 946),
2 :43
1 9. See Jean Rostand, La fration de l'etre (Paris: Hachette, 1 930), chap. 9;
by the same author, "Esquisse d'une histoire de l'atomisme en biologie, " Revue
d'histoire des sciences 2 ( 1 949), no. 3 , and 3 (1950), no. 2 .
2 0. Nicolai Stenonis opera philosophica, ed. Vilhelm Maar (Copenhagen, 1 91 0),
2 : 7-1 2 .
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INDEX
Addison, Thomas, 7
Anaxagoras, 67
Arbuthnot, John, I Ol
Aristotle, s, 8, 61 , 64, 66, 72, 79-80, 84-
85, 89, 106, 1 2 6, 1 3 7, 149
Baader, Franz von, 1 5 2
Bachelard, Gaston, 3, 2 9, 39, 69, 1 36, 145
Bacon, Francis, 64
Baer, Karl Ernst von, 61, 67
Baglivi, Giorgio, 78-79
Bal tusalts, J urgis, 1 3 9
Balzac, Honore de, 99
Barthez, Paul-Joseph, 43, 61 , 62, 66
Bary, Heinrich Anton de, 45
Bateson, William, 1 14
Baudelaire, Charles, 143
Bergson, Henri, i, xii, 3, 10-I l , 29, 38,
45, 60-61 , 74, 1 67n. 1
Berkeley, George, 64
Bernard, Claude, x-xi, xiv, x, 3-7, 9-I l ,
1 5-16, 1 9, 2 2 , 35, 47-48, 61 , 66, 73,
86-87, 1 23-24, 1 3 1 , 1 60n. 2
Bernoulli, Jean, 149
Berthelot, Marcelin, 143
Bichat, Xavier, x, 10, 43-44, 61 , 66, 69,
90, 102, 104, 1 2 2-24
Blainville, Henri Marie Ducrotay de, 44,
99
Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich, 6 I, 64
Bodin, Jean, 1 01
Boehme, Jacob, 1 1 8
Bonnier, Gaston, 99
Bordeu, Theophile de, 67
Borelli, Giovanni Alfonso, 78, 149
Borkenau, Franz, 82
Bosch, Hieronymus, 1 3 9
Bouin, Paul, 48
Bourget, Paul, 72
Boutoux, Emile, 29
Brachet, Albert, 1 14
Brehier, Emile, 26
Brisseau-Mirbel, Charles, 41 , 42, 67
Broglie, Louis de, 27
Broussais, Francois-Joseph-Victor, 1 3 1
Brown-Sequard, Charles-Edouard, 7
Brown, John, 1 3 1
Brunhes, Jean, I09
Brunschvicg, Leon, 44, I OO
Bufon, Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte
de, 3 2 , 3 3-38, 39, 40, 41 , 44, 99-101 ,
1 1 2, 1 1 6, 1 2 6, 1 52, 1 62n. 35
Butler, Samuel, 74
Cahn, Theophile, 1 7
Carrel, Aexis, 1 7
Carus, Carl Gustav, 1 5 1
Caullery, Maurice, 1 14
Celsus, A. Cornelius, 1 59n45
Claparede, Edouard, 1 1 8
Collin, Remy, 5 I
Comte, Auguste, x, xiv, 10, I 1 , 26, 3 2 , 44-
45, 46, 99, 101-3 , 1 3 1 , 1 5 1 , 1 68n. 1 3
Condillac, Etenne Bonnot de, 108
199
2 00 Index
Condorcet, Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis
de, 2 6
Costantn, Johann, 99, 103
Cope, Edward, 104
Copericus, Nicolaus, I 1 7
Courbet, Gustave, 143
Cournot, Augustn, 66, 1 2 6
Courrier, Robert, 89
Cuenot, Lucien, 2 8, 1 I4
D'Alembert, Jean Le Rond, 99
da Vinci, Leonardo, 82
Dandy, WaIter E. , 20
Dareste, Camille, 143 , 144, 145
Darwin, Charles, I04-6, 143
Dechambre, Edmond, I 2 8
Deisch, Markus Paul, 5
Demangeon, Albert, I09
Democritus, 66
Descartes, Rene, x, 3, 63 , 64, 65, 66, 78-
87, 9

, 92 , 99, 103, 1 1 7, 149, 1 5 2-53,

1 6In. 24, 1 7In. 2 2
Dewey, John, 1 1 0
Dick, George F. and Gladys H. , 20
Diderot, Denis, 74, 99, 141
DobeIl, Cliford, 5 I
Driesch, Hans, 61 , 66, 67, 68, 72, 90-91
Duboscq, Octave, 5 I
Duclaux, Jacques, 16, 1 58n. 3 1
Duhem, Pierre, 1 3
Dujardin, Felix, 3 1 , 39, 47
Dupreel, Eugene, 1 3 5
Dutrochet, Henri, 67
Ehrenberg, Christan Gottfied, 39
Eratosthenes, I06
EIler, Johann Theodore, 1 3 8-39
Engels, Friedrich, 54, 61 , 1 62n 53,
1 66n 54
Espinas, Alfed,
38, 79, 93-94
Euclid, 3 3
Fabricius, Hieronymus, 8
Febvre, Lucien, 109
Fichte, Immanuel Hermann von, 50
Fichte, Johann, 1 5 2
Fischer, A. , 45
Foucault, Michel, 140
Frank, Philipp, 72
Fresnel, Augustn-Jean, 2 6
Friedmann, Georges, 96, I 08
Galen, 4-5, 6, 64
Galilei, Galileo, 64, 78, 82, 1 I 7
Geofoy Saint-Hilaire, Etenne, 99, 103,
142 , 144, 145
Geofoy Saint-Hilaire, Isidore, 142, 143 ,
144, 145
Giard, Alfed, 99
Giraudoux, Jean, 2 2
Glisson, Francis, 1 3 1
Gobineau, Arthur de, 49-50, 1 5 1
Goldstein, Kurt, xi, xiv, x, x, 9, 61 , 7 1 ,
1 I 0-1 I , 1 I 3 , 1 2 9-30, 1 3 2 , 1 77n. 2 9
Goya, Francisco, 141
Graaf, Regnier de, 34
Grawitz, Paul Busse, 53
Grew, NeheIniah, 30-3 1
Grossman, Henryk, 82-83
Guillaume, Paul. 90
Guyenot, EInile, 2 8, 39, 40
Haeckel,
Erst, 3

, 47, 48, 54-55,

1 62n 53, 1 66n94
Haldane, John Burdon Sanderson, 73
Haldane, John Scott, 68, 73, 1 I 8
HaIler, Albrecht von, 3 2-3 3 , 149, I S0
Hamelin, Octave, 49
Hartann, Eduard von, 94
Harvey, William, 8, 64
Hazard, Paul, 1 5 2
Hegel, G. W. F., 42 , 163
Heinrich, Rudolf Peter, s I
Henneguy, Louis-Felix, 48
Heusinger, Carl, 47, 1 64ll 74
Hipparchus, I06, 1 1 6
Hippocrates, 61 , 62, 64, 73, 1 3 8
His, Wilhelm, 48
Hobbes, Thomas, 82
Hooke, Robert, 30, 39, 149
Horstadius, Sven, 90
Houssay, Frederic, 99, 103, I 76n. I 5
Hugo, Victor, 144
Humboldt, Alexander von, 106-7
Hume, David, 35, 3 7
Huyghens, Christaan, 2 6
Huzella, Tivadar, 53
Ingres, Jean Auguste Dominique, 143
Jacob, Franois, xiv
Jennings, Herbert Spencer, I IQ
Jordan, David Starr, 13
Kant, Immanuel, xiv, 64, 92-93
Kantor, Robert Jacob, I IQ
Kapp, Erst, 93, 94
Kepler, Johannes, I 1 7
Klein, Marc, 3 0, 3 1 , 3 3 , 39-41 , 43 , 46, 48
Kofa, Kurt, l I O
K6hler, Wolfgang, 94
K611iker, Albert von, 47
Koyre, Alexandre, xiv
Krannhals, Paul, 93
Laberthonniere, Lucien, 8 1
Lamarck, Jean-Baptste, xi, 62 , 99, 100,
1 01 , 103-6, I I 2, l I S, 1 16, 144, 1 5 1
Langevin, Paul, 2 7
Laugier, Henri, 1 2 9
Lauteamont, Comte de, 1 43
Le Cat, Claude Nicolas, I SO
Le Dantec, Felix, 99
Leeuwenhoek, Antonie van, 34
Leibniz, Gottfied, 63, 64, 74, 84, I 2 5,
141, 1 52 , I 72n. 28-29
Lepeshinskaya, Olga, 53, 54
Leriche, Rene, I 2 , 1 2 9-3 1
Leroi-Gourhan, Andre, 94, 95
Levy-Bruhl, Lucien, 28, 37
Licet, Fortunio, 140
Linne (Linnaeus), Carl von, 28, 3 2
Littre, Emile, 46, 1 5 1
Loeb, J acques, IQ7, I I 0
Lucretius, 1 3 7
Index 2 01
Lycosthenes, Conrad, 1 40
Lysenko, Trofim, 54, I I S
Machiavelli, Niccolo, 1 01
Maeterlinck, Maurice, 3

, 38
Magendie, Franois, 43
Mahnke, Dietrich, 1 5 1
Maillard, Louis-Camille, 48
Maillet, Benoh de, 141
Malebranche, Nicolas, 1 3 8
Malpighi, Marcello, 30, I SO
Mangold, Hilde, 90
Mann, Thomas, 1 3 3
Martin, Erest, 1 3 8
Marx, Karl, 61 , 82, 83
Maupertis, Pierre Louis Moreau de, 34,
1 52
Maurras, Charles, 72
Meckel, Johann Friedrich, the Younger,
142
Mendel, Gregor, 55, 1 14, l I S
Mering, Josef von, 6
Michelet, Jules, IQ7
Michurin, Ivan Vadimirovich, I I 5
Minkowski, Oskar, 6
Mohl, Hugo von, 3 1 , 3 9
Monakow, Constantn von, 61 , 64, 66
Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, baron de, 7,
101
More, Henry, 1 1 8
Morgan, Thomas Hunt, 1 14
Muller, Adam Heinrich, 42
Muller, Hermann, 1 14
Muller, Johann, 39, 61 , 67
Nageotte, Jean, 53
N audin, Charles, 55
Needham, John Turberville, 35
Newton, Isaac, 26, 27, 35, 37, 38, 99, 100,
102, 1 1 6, 1 1 8
Nicolle, Charles, 9, I S
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1 3 3
Nigeli, Karl, 1 5 1
Novalis, 42 , 1 5 2
2 02 Index
Obsequens, Julius, 140
Oken, Lorenz, 39, 4
-42, 44, 46, 67, 1 5 1 ,
I6m 53
Pacotte, Julien, 76
Paracelsus, 60, 65, l I 6
Pare, Ambroise, 1 38, 140
Parrot, Joseph Marie Jules, 143
Pascal, Blaise, I 1 7, 1 3 8
Pasteur, Louis, I S
Pereira, G6mez, 79
Perrin, Jean, 47
Petersen, HallS, 41, S I , 52
Pftiger, Eduard Friedrich Wilhem, 1 2 , 68
Pinel, Philippe, 43
Plato, 64, 66, 79, 85, 1 24
Poincare, Henri, 29
Policard, Albert, 1 2 , 45
Porter, Claude, I S
Posidonius, 1 1 6
Prenant, Auguste, 48
Prenant, Marcel, 49
Prochaska, Georg, 68
Ptolemy, 106, 1 1 6
Pythagoras, 84, I 1 8
Radl, Emanuel, 63
Ratzel, Friedrich, 1 07
Ray, John, 28
Reaumur, Rene de, 144
Reuleaux, Franz, 77
Rhode, Emile, 5 I
Richet, Charles, I S
Rese, Walther, 64
Rimbaud, Athur, 143
Ritter, Carl, 106, 107
Robin, Charles, 46, 47, 53 .
Robinet, Jean-Baptste, 141
Rostand, Jean, 49, 69
Roule, Louis, 99, 103, I 2 6
Roux, Wilhelm, 67
Sachs, Julius, 50, 52
Sainte-Beuve, Charles Augustn, 104
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm, 39, 1 5 1
Schleiden, Matthias Jakob, 3 9, 1 5 1
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 94
Schuhl, Pierre-Maxime, 80
Schultze, Max, 39
Schwann, Theodor, 31, 39, 46, 47, 53, 68,
1 5 1
Scipion du Pleix, 1 3 7
Seailles, Gabriel, 8 2
Sechenov, Ivan Mikhaylovich, 54
Selye, Hans, 1 30
Sherrington, Charles, I 2 , 72
Sigerist, Henry, 1 2 9
Singer, Charles, 2 8, 35, 38-41
Spemann, Hans, 65, 90
Stahl, Georg Erst, 66, 71
Steno, Nicolas, 85, 1 5 2
Stabo, 106, l I 6
Swammerdam, Jan, 4
Taine, Hippolyte, 99, 1 07
Tarde, Gabriel, I 26, 1 3 6
Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 96, 109
Teissier, Georges, 1 2 6
Tolman, Edward c. , 1 10
Toureux, Frederic, 46
Turpin, Pierre Jean Francois, 41 , 42
Uexkiill, Jakob von, 71 , l IO-I 2
Valery, Paul, 140, 143
Van Helmont, Jan Baptst, 60, 61 , 64-67,
72
Vidal-Lablache, Paul, 1 09
Virchow, Rudolph, 46, 47, 53, 54, 68
Wahl, Jean, 74
Watson, John B. , 107, 108, l IO
VVeiss, Albert, 108
Weissmann, August, 54
Weizsacker, Viktor von, 14
Wheeler, William Morton, 38
Willis, Thomas, 64, 68
Wolf, Caspar Friedrich, 67, 142
Wolf, Etenne, 1 8, 145