Find the set of all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

ANSWER: NEpure = . To see this analyze case by case. Let n1 and n2 be the integers picked by player 1
and 2, respectively. Then,
case1: 11 = n1 = n2: player 1 deviates to 20.
case2: 11 < n1 = n2 20: player 1 deviates to n2 1.
case3: 11 < n1 < n2 20: player 2 deviates to n1 1.
case4: 11 = n1 < n2 < 20: player 2 deviates to 20.
case5: 11 = n1 < n2 = 20: player 1 deviates to 19.
In all cases there is no pure strategy.
This game is dierent from similar games, like the travelers dilemma, in that to win a prize you have to
play exactly one step lower than the other player. Given the structure of the game, there is no Nash
equilibrium in pure strategy. Assuming both players to be expected gain maximizers, there is a unique
symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.The symmetric equilibrium distribution puts a zero
probability on strategies 11 to 14, probability 1/4 on strategies 15 and 16, and probabilities 4/20; 3/20;
2/20 and 1/20 on strategies 17, 18, 19 and 20, respectively. This equilibrium distribution is not at all
obvious to identify, and depends on the assumptions made regarding players utility function