Florence Horwich (ID:200383095)

Define “collective security”. How is this principle

articulated in the aims of the UN and has that
organisation been successful in achieving those
aims?

Dr Jason Ralph – International Politics

Word Count: 2,907

Define “collective security”. How is this principle articulated in the aims of

the UN? Has that organisation been successful in achieving those aims?

This essay will focus on ““collective security””. It will begin by amalgamating

political philosophers’ definitions in an attempt to come to a clear understanding

of what ‘““collective security””’ actually is. Subsequently, the essay will go on to

argue, using the failings of its embodiment to date in the aims of the United

Nations, that the concept remains a political ideology.

The concept of ““collective security”” can be said to have begun with the Prussian

philosopher Immanuel Kant in his Second Definitive Article when he referred to a

‘pacific federation’ as a ‘particular kind of league’ that ‘would seek to end all

wars for good’. He saw the possibility of promoting and maintaining international

peace through an extensive partnership of committed states. This is the key

concept of ““collective security””. According to Inis Claude, (an influential

philosopher in this study) ““collective security”” was a ‘system for the

maintenance of international peace’ which was evolved as a ‘replacement for the

system commonly known as the Balance of Power’ by the international

community. It was the argument that through ‘consensus, commitment and

organisation’, international peace could be facilitated and ensured. ‘Superior’ to

its predecessor -the Balance of Power- it would transcend the reliance on

deterrence of competing alliances through a network or scheme of ‘national

commitments and international mechanisms.’ More recently, Claude argues that

the term has become a synonym for world peace, and that it has moved from its

original definition as a method for preserving world order, to a ‘catchall

designation for a variety of means and even for the end itself’.

The central idea of ““collective security”” is that there is certainty backed by legal

obligation, that any aggression to one state will be confronted with collective

sanctions. Its logic lies in two-fold: that the collective power of all the members

will act as a deterrent to an aggressor, and that through the promotion of co-

operation rather than competition, it ‘mitigates the rivalry and hostility of a self-

help world’ and creates a less war prone environment

““Collective security”” has been marked by disagreement in its structuring and

regulation of the international system since its first incarnation in the League of

Nations and in the treaty of Versailles in 1919. In the wake of the Second World

War a revised attempt at the targets and functionality of the concept resulted in

The United Nations.

““Collective security”” was the primary reason for the establishment of the

organisation. Whittaker states that the principle behind the United Nations is that

‘states unite to maintain, develop and protect a world progressively freed from

conflict, poverty and threat’ -a definition which holds clear parallels to that found

earlier in this study. The United Nations Charter is the treaty of this organisation

which codifies its rules and practices, it is the articulation of this aim.
Although the term ‘““collective security””’ is not explicitly used in the charter, the

concept is continuously expressed. It is primarily summarised in the preamble: ‘to

unite our strength to maintain international peace and security’, and subsequently

in the purposes documented in Chapter 1(1). These purposes (or ‘aims’)

combine the different aspects necessary to the concept. They relate to ‘collective

measures for prevention and removal’ of threat/aggression, ‘friendly relations’

and ‘international cooperation’. The final purpose defines the institution as a

‘centre for harmonizing the actions of the nations’ again linking to cooperation.

Logically it follows that if all of the Articles in the Charter are adhered to, then

peace (through ““collective security””), is the direct conclusion. Article 2 (4) states

that all member states must refrain from using threat or force, or act in any way

inconsistent with the principles of the United Nations. This negatively protects

peace. In the positively active sense, f this is violated, the Security Council has

the power to decide whether, and how, to discipline. It can do this peacefully

through Chapter VI (diplomacy ‘pacific settlement of disputes’), or forcibly

through Chapter VII (militarily– ‘action with respect to threats to the peace,

breaches of the peace and acts of aggression). Furthermore as, under Article 43,

member states are obliged to participate – collective action is guaranteed.

In Chapter VI, the co-operational aim of ““collective security”” in the United

Nations is articulated – ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation…’ to ‘seek a solution’ to

any disputes. Chapter VII articulates the collective measures for prevention and

removal of threats. Article 39 gives the Security Council power to determine

these ‘’threats’ or ‘acts of aggression’. Article 41 links to economic sanctions in

terms of ‘interruption of economic relations’. This invokes ““collective security””

because it obliges member nations combine in reacting to threats or aggression

by economically isolating aggressors. Articles 42, 43 and 45 legally endorse use

of force and bind members to contribution, again epitomising the collective

aspect.

The organisation of the United Nations has been undeniably successful in its aim

for ““collective security”” articulated in Chapter 1 (1) point 4. It is a ‘centre for

harmonizing actions’. With 192 members it is an irrefutable, means for

‘develop(ing) friendly relations’ and enhancing ‘international cooperation’ (points

2 & 3 in Chapter 1(1). Winston Churchill backs up this point. He stated that even

if the United Nations is just a ‘talking shop’, ‘to jaw jaw is always better than to

war war’, meaning that the United Nations has been successful in ““collective

security””, maintaining lack of war through co-operation and negotiation (two

aims in the charter.)

Linking to the success of the co-operational aim of ““collective security”” in the

United Nations, Jackson and Sorensen put forward the point that membership of

the United Nations allows transparency in policy and actions of each state. They

argue that with transparency, states are less likely to cheat on one another and
hence this creates a more stable and trusting environment.

Furthermore, as the fundamental laws of the United Nations apply to non-

members it can also be seen as a success in ““collective security””. Collectively

even non member states are prohibited from acts of aggression or threats to

peace through Chapter 1(2) Point 6.

A generally accepted empirical example of the success of the United Nations is

in the 1st Gulf War in 1990. There was an immediate collective response to the

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Tthe Security Council passed a number of resolutions

calling for unconditional withdrawal including Article 41 for economic sanctions

and Chapter VII for a US-led coalition of international forces. In six weeks,

Operation ‘Desert storm’ crushed the Iraqi resistance.

The key argument for the success of the United Nations in achieving its aims of

“collective security” is in its legitimating function. Despite having been criticised in

its material active attempts at “collective security”, its role in legitimization is

significant. It is recognised that legitimization is not a complete necessity, and

that ‘powerful states may act anyway’, examples such as the Iraq invasion in

2003 and Kosovo in 1998-1999, show that military action without legitimization by

the United Nations’ approval leads to serious unease. Claude also makes this

point calling the United Nations an ‘agency of collective legitimization’. With

Security Council approval, the use of force is conceived as more acceptable

because it has popular endorsement.

However, despite these successes one can not deny that there are numerous

failings in the success of the United Nations in achieving its aims in “collective

security”. The failure of the organisation in these aims is an accumulating

combination of problems.

The Cold War period highlights the lack of success of the organisation in

achieving “collective security” due to the VETO given by Article 27 Chapter 3.

The Security Council was unable to reach agreement over the Cold War divide.

Despite the organisation having the potential to act, it was paralyzed because

any threat to the interests of the US or the Soviet Union resulted in a VETO

preventing the United Nations from acting.

Another cause of failure in the United Nations’ aims for “collective security” is due

to the presence of superpowers. “Collective security” is said to be ‘superior’ to

the Balance of Power system because of the preponderant physical power‘s

ability to defer or defect actual or potential breaches of peace and security and

because the overall diffusion of power is more stabilizing than shifts in the

distribution of power. However, this fails when a single superpower is stronger

than the collective. A clear example of this is in America’s unilateral approach

when invading Iraq 2003 (despite not having the Security Council's approval).

Claude emphasizes this failing with the example of the Korean War. He states ‘it
is neither feasible to carry out nor prudent to undertake “collective security”

operations in direct or indirect opposition to a major power.’ The lack of feasibility

he relates to the ;general failure of states to follow their own advice…to

designate military contingents’

This threat of individual power being stronger than the collective also relates to

ruthless dictators. Sergei Markov the head of the institute for political research in

Moscow draws parallels with Hitler and the United States. He said ‘Hitler thought

he was above the League of Nations, and the United States thinks it is above the

United Nations’.

Another argument that the United Nations fails in achieving its aims in “collective

security” is evident in its record of actions. Adam Roberts and Bennedict

Kingsbury use the term ‘selective security’ to talk about the failing of the UN in

“collective security” through its unreliability. In some cases, such as the Vietnam

War, numerous acts of ‘aggression’ were brought in front of the Security Council:

Laos against Hanoi in 1959, and Cambodia against the USA and South Vietnam

in 1964, but there was no action taken.

As was the case in these instances, the Security Council reaching a decision

about what action is appropriate can be very slow. The size of the membership

means there are numerous different opinions to be considered in every instance

and it can be hard to define what an act of aggression is or who the culprit is.
Claude encapsulates this saying that the organisation is ‘too big, too slow and

too diffuse in political composition to constitute an ideal instrument for “collective

security”’ Furthermore, even when a decision has been reached, the success of

the consequential response is dubious due to a number of reasons.

The first, which draws to our attention another argument against the success of

achieving the aims of collective security, is the problem of commitment to the

aim and to the United Nations. Without commitment, the ‘collective’ aspect fails,

the concept is undermined. There are two main areas where lack of commitment

is highlighted. Primarily, this is evident in instances where resistance is

anticipated and so members are less prepared to provide forces (as pre-

mentioned with the case of Korea). Claude writes that, ‘states must be prepared

to go to war even though this may involve injury to innocent people.’ However, in

reality, with proof through examples in the failure in Bosnia and Rwanda, they are

not. The operation in Rwanda was described as ‘slow … and massively

undermanned’ due to this lack of commitment.

As well as being reluctant to contribute forces in the face of resistance, states the

United Nations are reluctant to give up control of their forces. Ceding control to

the organisation represents a relinquishment of sovereignty, and requires the

state leader to give up the right to make decisions regarding the use of force.

British Statesmen have been quoted as claiming it ‘essential that we should not

enter into any extensive general and undefined commitment with the result that,
to a large extent, our foreign policy would depend, not on this country, this

Parliament and its electors, but on a lot of foreign governments.’ This highlights

the problem of impartiality in the concept of collective security and in its

articulation in the practices and aims of the United Nations. German

representatives also raised this point questioning the ‘oractical reality that

Germany, one day, should be fegended on her own territory by Soviet Russian

troops against an attack in the West or by French troops against an attack in the

East.’The United Nations secretary General U Thant attributed this to the

‘selfishness’ of the powers who do not give the United Nations necessary

support. However John Mearsheimer raises the point that it could be due to

states remembering previous animosities. For example British troops are

unlikely to be content under German command.

The accumulation of all of these failures of achieving “collective security” through

the United Nations is a circular effect. These failures, combined with the poor

past record of the institutions success, mean that members do not trust it, and as

Claude comprehensively defines: confidence is the ‘quintessential condition of

the success of the system; states must be prepared to rely on its effectiveness

and impartiality.’ Without confidence in the organisation, members are reluctant,

on one hand, to contribute to it, and on the other hand, to rely on it. Both of these

consequences have escalating effects. Lack of contribution means it is less

capable, and hence more likely to continue to fail in the future. Lack of reliance

means that states feel the need to have other protection because, as ‘“collective
security” (cannot) do for the international society what police actions (do) for the

domestic community’, they need domestic forces to be able to defend

themselves (in accordance with Article 51). This creates a knock on effect

whereby other states are threatened by relative military power in the international

system and act the same, building up their national forces (following

Mearshiemer’s conception of defensive realism, ‘power is the best means to

survival’ ). Consequently this detracts further from the capability and intrinsic

base of “collective security” and so it fails.

Despite some areas and some examples of success in achieving the aims of the

United Nations which embody the concept of “collective security”, this essay

clearly shows that there are numerous spheres where it fails. This is epitomised

by Naidu stating that that the United Nations ‘resembles a system of “collective

security” but does not fulfil the requirements of an ideal type’. The problem lies in

the fact that “collective security” is a ‘relative utopia’ operating in a world where

states behave in a realistic, self-interested and self-motivated way. Therefore it

concludes that “collective security” remains an political ideal, and to this date,

despite success in some areas of the concept, attempts at its complete

articulation in an international organisation, such as that of the United Nations,

have not been successful.

 Bibliography
23 Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, (1993), The UN’s Roles in International
Society, United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International elations, 2nd
Edition, United States, Oxford University Press Inc, New York,

24 Barrie Watts, Simon Adams, (2004) The Role of the United Nations, Black Rabbit
Books

25 CBS News, MOSCOW May 10th 2007, Putin Offers Blunt Victory Day Speech

26 Charles A. Kupchan, Clifford A. Kupchan, (1991) Concerts, “collective security”, and

the Future of Europe, International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1

27 Charles A. Kupchan, Clifford A. Kupchan, (1995), The promise of “collective

security”, International Security, The MIT press

28 Chris Brown, (2005) Understanding International Relations,

29 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A study of Order in World Politics

30 http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter

31 http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml

32 Immanuel Kant, (1915) Perpetual peace: a philosophical essay. London, G. Allen &
Unwin Ltd

33 Inis L Claude Jr. (1964) Swords into plowshares the problems and progress of
International Organization, 4th Edition, Random House New York

34 Inis Claude Jr, (1962) Power and International Relations, New York Random House

35 Jackson and Sorensen, (2007) Introduction to International Relations: Theories and

approaches Oxford University Press

36 John Mearsheimer in Baylis and Smith (2008) Globalisation of World Politics,4th

edition, Oxford University Press

37 John J. Mearshiemer (2001) The tragedy of Great Power Politics

38 John W. Wheeler-Bennet, (1948) Munich: Prologue to Tragedy

39 J. Whittaker, (1995), United Nations in Action, London, UCL Press

40 Karl Mannheim as quoted in Encyclopaedia of American Foreign Policy (retrieved

16/11/08) URL: http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Collective-Security-
Dilemmas-of-collective-security.html

41 Naidu Mumulla Venkatrao “Collective Security” and the United Nations (New York: St
 Martin’s Press 1975)

42 Thomas Matussek, In conference ‘21st century threats: The end of “collective

security”, or new opportunities’ Oct 2008
43 Kenneth W Thomson (1953), “collective security” Re-examined American Political
Science Review Vol XCV11 No 3

44 Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, Jack C. Plano (2005) The United Nations:
international organisation and world politics, 4th edition, Belmont, Wadsworth.

45