Professional Documents
Culture Documents
NLRC (1996)
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
Private respondent moves to reconsider the earlier decision of the Supreme Court
First Division on grounds that (a) petitioners are not entitled to recover backwages
because they were not actually dismissed but their probationary employment was not
converted to permanent employment; and (b) assuming that petitioners are entitled to
backwages, computation thereof should not start from cessation of work up to actual
reinstatement, and that salary earned elsewhere (during the period of illegal
dismissal) should be deducted from the award of such backwages.
HISTORY:
-
Pre-Labor Code
o Under RA 875, the CIR was given wide discretion to determine the
amount of backwages. Thus, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the
CIR increased or diminished the award of backpay, depending on
several circumstances, among them, the good faith of the
employer, the employee's employment in other establishments
during, the period of illegal dismissal, or the probability that the
employee could have realized net earnings from outside
employment if he had exercised due diligence to search for outside
employment. In labor cases decided during the effectivity of R.A.
No. 875, the Supreme Court acknowledged and upheld the CIR's
authority to deduct any amount from the employee's backwages,
including the discretion to reduce such award of backwages
whatever earnings were obtained by the employee elsewhere
during the period of his illegal dismissal (Itogon-Suyoc ruling).
o Then came the Mercury Drug ruling, where the Court ruled that a
fixed amount of backwages without further qualifications should be
the application was not filed six (6) days prior to its effectivity, as required by
petitioner's rules and regulations, the application was disapproved.
On 28 August 1974, private respondent reported for work, and was paid the amount
of P3.20 as his salary for the day. He was informed that the nurse who prepared his
certificate of leave authority, Miss Josie Desiderio, committed an error when she
provided therein that as of 17 August 1974, he was still under treatment. This error
was corrected to indicate his fitness to return to work on said date, 17 August 1974.
Also, on 28 August 1974, private respondent filed for an additional fifteen (15) day
vacation leave without pay from 29 August 1974 to 12 September 1974, to enable
him to attend to the immediate repair of his house which was destroyed by the
typhoon. This application was likewise disapproved for having violated the six (6) day
requirement for the filing of leaves; hence, the absences of private respondent were
charged to his sick leave benefits.
On 1 September 1974, before the lapse of private respondent's vacation leave,
petitioner "compulsorily retired" the former for alleged exhaustion of sick leave
benefits based on the company's Health, Welfare and Retirement Plan.
Private respondent instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal a year later. LA and
NLRC ruled in favor of private respondent.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the compulsory dismissal was valid; (2) Whether or not
acceptance of retirement benefits estopped employee from claiming reinstatement.
HELD:
(1) NO. Under company rules, there are 2 requisites before an employee may
be compulsory retired through Health, Welfare and Retirement Plan: a) he
has exhausted all the sick leave with pay benefits to which he is entitled; and
b) is certified by the company physician to be incapable of discharging his
regular assigned duties without impairing his own health or endangering that
of his fellow workers. The 2nd requisite was not meant, as the company failed
to prove that Javate was unfit.
(2) NO. First of all, Javate vehemently denies that he has received any benefits,
and the filing of the complaint strengthens such denials. In any case, the
Court has ruled in De Leon vs. NLRC that receipt of separation pay does not
estop the employee from questioning the legality of the dismissal.
Employees who received their separation pay are not barred from contesting
the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of those benefits would not
amount to estoppels.