Civil Procedure Case Digest

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
RULE 1, Sections 1 to 6 G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001 PATRICIA NATCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Respondents, Sps. Graciano Del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra (Graciano and Graciana, LOL), were registered owners of a parcel of land located in Manila. o When Graciana died, her husband Graciano and their 6 children entered into an extrajudicial settlement, dividing among themselves the land owned by Graciano and Graciana. o Heirs executed and forged an Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights where they subdivided among themselves the properties already given. o Graciano married petitioner Patrician Natcher. Then Graciano sold his part of the property to Patricia Natcher. o Later, Graciano died. His heirs being Patricia Natcher and the 6 children. Civil Case was filed in the RTC of Manila. Wherein the private respondents (6 children) alleged that upon the death of Graciano, Patricia Natcher through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery acquired the property by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor of her. o Natcher averred she was legally married to Graciano making her a compulsory heir. She further alleged that during Gracianos lifetime, he already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, respondents may not anymore claim against the estate of Graciano. o RTC said: The Deed of Sale in favor of Natcher is null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals: reversed and set aside the lower courts decision. o It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The lower court went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts that is proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. o What the lower court should have done was to rule on the validity of the sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition under Rule 45 in the Supreme Court, assailing the CAs decision for being contrary to law and the facts of the case.
RULING: The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals. The petition bears no merit.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise: "XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. "A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. "XXX "c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules . The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion." According to American Jurisprudence: "It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice." Applying these principles, matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding. The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher. The RTC of Manila Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher. The trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. Hence, the decision of the CA is affirmed. Hernandez vs Rural Bank 81 SCRA 75 Facts: Spouses Hernandez obtained a loan secured by real estate from Rural Bank (1961) a sum of 6ooo payable on 1962 - 3 months after they loan the bank became distresses and later was suspended to operate by Monetary Boars in its resolution No. 928 The bank filed with CFI Manila a complaint for seeking to restraint the implementation of the Resolution Hernandez before the expiration of the term of loan went to bank and offered payment by means of check drawn against the bank by depositor San Pablo Colleges payable to Hernandez -payment was not consummated and check was dishonored because the banks operations was suspended - Hernandez after several requests to offer payment finally mailed the same check he presented to the bank and request to cancel the loan Monetary Board decided to liquidate the bank. Meanwhile, CFI Manila rendered decision restraining the enforcement of MB Resolution 928 and required the bank to undertake reorganization and curtail its operation Central Bank (CB) appealed the decision before SC Sc reversed the decision of CFI manila and dismissed the complaint for injunction CB filed a petition before CFI MANILA for liquidation of bank and it was granted

Among the receivables of bank was the account of Hernandez Hernadez went to bank requested to cancel the mortgage and claimed that he already paid it CB claimed that no payment was made because the check cannot be honored because the bank was already closed when it received the check and advised to settle it in cash Hernandez disregarded it and filed separate action in CFI Lipa to compel the bank to accept the check and cancel the mortgage and ask for damages. CB filed motion to dismiss contending: that the venue is improper because the encumbered property was situated in QC thus the case should be filed in QC since bank is under liquidation his assets are under custodial egis and may be reached only by motion or petition in CFI MANILA (the liquidation Court) MD was denied CFI LIPA ordered the bank to accept the check and pay the damages Rural Bank went to SC to appeal the decision arguing that: Venue is improper CFI MANILA has Jurisdiction over the claim liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent. In this case Hernandez files a separate action in CFI LIPA and not in the liquidation bank which is CFI MANILA. THEREFORE, Venue is improper and the separate action filed therein is not allowed and the REMEDY available for Hernandez was to intervene in the Liquidation Proceedings in CFI MANILA. * Sorry cant really see the connection of this case with Rule 1. This case is about jurisdiction. G.R. No. L-49475 September 28, 1993 JORGE C. PADERANGA, petitioner, vs. Hon. DIMALANES B. BUISSAN, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch III and ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY, represented by its General Manager, JOSE J. ELUMBA,respondents.
Facts: Petitioner PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA entered into an oral contract of lease for an indefinite period (P150.00 per month) of a commercial space in Ozamiz City. P subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by constructing a partition wall in between. He then took possession of the other half, allegedly with Jose Elumbras consent. CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City R instituted an action for damages and prayed for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years. P moved for its dismissal
RULING: VENUE ISSUE: the complaint of cancellation of real estate mortgage is a personal action because the mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage. (Rule 4 of ROC Sec2 (a)). When the action is personal plaintiff may file the action in his residence or defendants residents at the election of plaintiff. (Rule 4 of ROC Sec2 (b)). HOWEVER in this case BATANGAS was the domicile of Hernandez and their actual residence is in QC. The term resides in Rule mentioned refers to place of actual residence not domicile. SEPARATE ACTION FILED ISSUE: It is not maintainable because it is provided that if there is judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank all claims against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceedings. Judicial

action was a real action, jurisdiction is with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental stationed in Ozamiz City where the property in question was situated. Motion to Dismiss DENIED (case merely involved the enforcement of the contract of lease, and while affecting a portion of real property, there was no question of ownership raised hence, venue was properly laid P filed MOR but was also Denied Petition for Prohibition is GRANTED. Erminita Munoz v. Victoriano Yabut Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions and resolutions of the CA. The subject is a house and lot sold Munoz which she sold to her sister Emilia Ching, who in turn sold it to the Go spouses. When the Go spouses defaulted on their loan to BPI the property was foreclosed. BPI won as the highest bidder at the auction and the property was sold to the Chan spouses. Munoz registered her adverse claim and filed a complaint with the RTC for annulment of a deed of absolute sale, cancellation of TCT in the spouses Gos names and for revival of the TCT under her name. She also caused the annotation of a lis pendens. The RTC granted Gos motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and Munoz was driven out of the property. Munoz, meanwhile, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA assailing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction granted by the RTC, but it was dismissed. The RTC rendered its judgment against Emilia Ching and the Go spouses. It found that Munozs signature and the absolute deed of sale was forged. Munoz never sold the subject property to her sister and that the Go spouses were not innocent purchasers for value. The sale was null and void. Emilia Ching appealed the decision, but the appellate court not only affirmed the decision of the RTC, it ordered the spouses Go and their successors in interest to vacate the premises. After the RTC filed a writ of execution implementing its judgment, the spouses Chan came forward and filed an urgent motion to stop the execution against them. They asserted ownership and possession on the basis of a clean title registered in their names, also contending that the final judgment cannot be executed against them as they were not parties to the case and that they purchased the property from BPI without any defects to the title.
SC - P filed petition for prohibition
PADERANGA - inasmuch as ELUMBA seeks to recover possession of the portion surrendered to P, being a real action, venue is laid in the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies. ELUMBA - present action is chiefly for damages arising from an alleged breach in the lease contract; hence, the issue of recovery of possession is merely incidental. ISSUE: WON CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City has jurisdiction over the case HELD: NO. While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery of possession, such is the necessary consequence thereof. The instant action therefore does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the case which is to recover the one-half portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner. Indeed, where the ultimate purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, such an action must be deemed a real action and must perforce be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies (Ozamiz City)

Munoz discovered the cancellation of her adverse claim and notice of lis pendens, plus the subsequent events that led to transfer and registration from Go, to BPI then to the Chans. It was denied by the RTC. The photocopy of BPIs TCT could hardly be regarded as proof that Munozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens were missing from the original, also pointing out that the registration in the day book is what serves as sufficient notice to the world. There was no more need to annotate the title. They were deemed to have taken the property subject to the final outcome of the present dispute. The RTC then issued an alias writ of execution and the subject property was taken from the spouses and returned to Munoz. Their motion for reconsideration was denied. Munoz then instituted a complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction alleging that with the aid of armed men, Chan and Atty. Yabut forcibly ousted Munoz of possession. They claim Chan to be the true owner that his possession was never interrupted, and the men were there to attend services at the Buddhist Temple on the fourth floor of the building on the property. Munozs claim of forcible entry should be dismissed for lack of merit and legal basis. The MeTC granted Munozs petition and restored possession to her. Yabut and Chan questioned the MeTCs decision through a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC. They asserted that they were not bound by the final judgment between Go and Munoz. Munoz on the other hand argued that the MeTC order was an interlocutory order, and is thus a prohibited pleading under the rules of summary procedure. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the MeTC order. The RTC found that the MeTC had committed grave abuse of discretion for not dismissing the complaint for forcible entry on the ground of lis pendens as the issue to who had a better right to possession between Chan and Munoz was the subject of a pending proceeding. The RTC dismissed the ejectment suit. Munoz appealed to the CA, but the CA sustained the RTC orders holding that the Chans right to due process was vitiated by impleading them only at the execution stage of the civil case. The order of the RTC in the civil case was null and void, and considering they are strangers to the case and they are innocent purchasers for value. Thereafter Munoz filed a motion for contempt with the RTC against the Chan spouses and Atty. Yabut. Munoz also filed a Motion for an alias writ of execution and application for surrender of the owne rs duplicate TCT, in which she prayed to direct the RD not only to cancel the TCT of Go, but all documents declared null and void, and to restore her TCT free from all liens and encumbrances. In its order the RTC denied Munozs motion for contempt, but o rdering an alias writ of execution to deliver the property to Munoz, ordering Go to vacate. It also ordered the RD to cancel from the records all documents determined void and to restore Munozs TCT. Unrelenting Munoz filed a motion for clarificatory order, pointing out that the spouses Chan are the present occupants and that the property could not be delivered unless the spouses Chan are evicted. The motion was denied reiterating the rule that once a judgment has become final only clerical errors may be corrected. Munoz elevated the complaint to the SC, but it was remanded to the CA in observance of the hierarchy. The CA dismissed Munozs petition agreeing with the RTC that the Chan spouses could not be covered by the writ of execution considering they were not impleaded in the civil case. Munoz claims that the decision in the civil case binds not only Ching, the Go spouses and BPI, but their successors in interest, assigns or persons acting on their behalf, hence they cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for value. Ruling The SC denies Munozs petition for contempt and motion for clarificatory order seeking that the Chans be executed against because the prior civil case against Go is an action for reconveyance which is an action in

personam. Since the Chans and BPI were not impleaded as parties, the effect of the judgment cannot bind or be extended to them by simply issuing alias writs of execution. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered to the court. Although the titles of Ching and Go were deemed void, there was no similar determination as to the titles that BPI and Chan had. Munoz cannot collateraly attack the title that the Chans have; they must be given their day in court in a proceeding designated for that purpose. G.R. No. 152272 March 5, 2012 JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioners, vs. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., Respondents Facts: On January 20, 1999, Petitioner (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint for damages in the RTC of Binan, Laguna, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (FilEstate). o The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba, used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road. o They had been using La Paz Road for more than 10 years. o That in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said road; That La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again. o The act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to them, to the commuters and motorists because traffic was re-routed to narrow streets that caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard o And that its permanent closure would not only prejudice their right to free and unhampered use of the property but would also cause great damage and irreparable injury. JCHA prayed for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, from stopping and intimidating them in their use of La Paz Road. RTC issued a TRO for a period of 20 days and a WPI, to stop preventing, coercing, intimidating or harassing the commuters and motorists from using the La Paz Road. Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss. o Arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration. RTC issued an Omnibus Order denying the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. Fil-Estate filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA. o They contended that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. CA affirmed the denial of the RTC of the motion to dismiss. o CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road. o It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint was properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of common interest and that the individuals sought to be represented were so numerous that it was impractical to include all of them as parties. Hence, this petitions for review. o

Fil-Estate explains that La Paz Road is included in the parcels of land covered by TCTs all registered in the name of La Paz. The purpose of constructing La Paz Road was to provide a passageway for La Paz to its intended projects to the south, one of which was the Juana Complex I. When Juana Complex I was completed, La Paz donated the open spaces, drainage, canal, and lighting facilities inside the Juana Complex I to the Municipality of Bian. The streets within the subdivisions were then converted to public roads and were opened for use of the general public. The La Paz Road, not being part of the Juana Complex I, was excluded from the donation. Subsequently, La Paz became a shareholder of FEEC, a consortium formed to develop several real properties in Bian, Laguna, known as Ecocentrum Project. In exchange for shares of stock, La Paz contributed some of its real properties to the Municipality of Bian, including the properties constituting La Paz Road, to form part of the Ecocentrum Project. Fil-Estate insists that the complaint did not sufficiently contain the ultimate facts to show a cause of action. They aver the bare allegation that one is entitled to something is an allegation of a conclusion which adds nothing to the pleading. The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be asserted by the defendant. In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.s averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road. These are: o (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and o (2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said roads. o There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by FilEstate, when they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists from using the same. Third, JCHA, consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the relief sought therein.
Issue: Whether the complaint states a cause of action. Held: Yes. Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: 1. the legal right of the plaintiff, 2. the correlative obligation of the defendant, and 3. the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

Sub-Issue: Whether the complaint was properly filed as a Class Suit. Held: Yes. With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit. Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows: Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Bian, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
PNB vs Court of Appeals PETITION TO REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION OF THE CA WHICH IS AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES FACTS: Donata MONTEMAYOR through her son SALVADOR VITUG mortgaged several parcels of land situated in Pampanga, the property served as a guarantee for the loan granted by PNB o LOAN TO Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani In 1963, MONTEMAYOR also mortgaged 2 parcels of land to guarantee the loan of her son VITUG The TCTs mortgaged were all in the name of Donata MONTEMAYOR VITUG failed to pay, and the properties were foreclosed and sold at public auction o Jaramilla and Bacani also failed to settle the loan o Cert of Sale was issued to PNB o PNB later on sold the properties HISTORY o Clodualdo Vitug was married twice, his second wife is MONTEMAYOR o He died intestate (with no will) and his estate was settled and distributed
1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned. In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA: The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals

MONTEMAYOR was the administratix (meaning, the court made her the administer the estate of Clodualdo) MONTEMAYOR entered a contract of lease with two of her children o But then the other children filed an action for partition and reconveyance and damages against the administrator of MONTEMAYORS estate (by this time Montemayor already passed away) o They also included PNB in the action, because PNB sold the mortgaged properties THE SUBJECT of the action is 30 parcels of land, which they claim to be CLODUALDOs and MONTEMAYORS They argue that o The mortgage to PNB as well as o The PUBLIC AUCTION are null and void. They invoke a previous court decision wherein the properties were decided to be of conjugal nature. 1975, the lower court dismissed the complaint Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the CA Reversed lower court decision stating that the public auction of the properties are valid, but only HALF. SO NOW, PNB filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not PNB is a party to action for reconveyance and damages? HELD: NO. Remember that there was a previous decision stating that the parcels of land are of conjugal nature o PNB cannot be a proper party thereto. PNB was only included because the subject properties were sold. A mortgaged property should be in the name of the mortgagee, because the assumption is the mortgagee will be in default (eventually). The property is a security for the payment of the loan. PNB relied on the Torrens title, why would they even question the validity of the titles? The titles were in the name of MONTEMAYOR. Therefore, they dont have to look beyond the title. Actions for the recovery of real property and for partition ARE REAL ACTIONS, but they are also actions in personam that bind particular individuals who are parties thereto. o PNB not being a party in said cases is not bound by said decisions PNB was also not aware of the case and the said decision, because of they knew the conjugal nature of the property, they would have required the consent of all the heirs (co-owners). WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint and ordering private respondents to pay attomey's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioner PNB in the amount of P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit. o
MANILA HOTEL V CA (384 SCRA 515) a petition for review on certiorari FACTS: Alcordo was hired by petitioner Manila Hotel on March 23, 1998 as Food and Beverage Director however, his services were terminated on the ground of loss of confidence Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal on the ground that Alcordo, was hired not only to oversee the operations of the restaurants but precisely to improve their profitability. Hence, the failure of private respondent to meet this condition despite regular monthly evaluation by petitioner,

showing the substantial drop in the profitability of the department under his control, justified his dismissal for loss of confidence. Petitioner was ordered to pay private respondents one month salary of P80,000.00 in lieu of the 30-day advance notice of dismissal, plus an indemnity of P5,000.00 for its failure to comply with procedural due process Petitioner appealed to (NLRC) which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter -It ruled that petitioner failed to prove that Alcordo was hired subject to the condition that he would improve the profitability of the restaurants, and that the unsatisfactory performance of said restaurants was due to the fault or negligence of Alcordo A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied. A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals CA dismissed the petition on the following grounds: 1) the petition was not accompanied with copies of the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the position paper of the parties; 2) the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by Atty. Martin B. Isidro, petitioners counsel and Assistant Vice-President, Personnel Department; and 3) the petition was not accompanied with a board resolution authorizing Atty. Martin B. Isidro to act for and in behalf of petitioner. MR was filed with documents that was not attached in petition and claimed that failure to attached those documents was due to oversight. CA denied MR stressing that under Rule 46, Section 3, in relation to Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to append copies of relevant documents is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Hence, petition for review on certiorari praying for a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed Oversight have become an all too familiar and ready excuse on the part of lawyers remiss in their bounden duty to comply with established rules. Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto is required. The application of the Rules may be relaxed only when rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice. THEREFORE, In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown any cogent reason for the Court to be liberal in the application of the rules. G.R. No. 146611 February 6, 2007
TANCREDO REDEA, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEOCADIO REDEA, Respondents. Facts: CFI San Pablo City, Laguna petitioner Tancredo filed an action for partition of their common fathers several pieces of realty, to wit: a residential lot at M. Calim Street, Famy, Laguna; a riceland at Poroza, Famy, Laguna; and another parcel of land at Maate, also in Famy, Laguna, against his older half-brother, herein private respondent Leocadio Court ordered Leocadio to partition only the property located at Maate, Famy, Laguna
RULING: Liberal construction of the rule has been allowed by SUPREME Court in the following cases: (1) where a rigid application will result in manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, especially if a party successfully shows that
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P filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal - The court gave due course to the notice and directed the elevation of the records of the case to the CA whereat petitioners appeal was docketed as CAG.R.CV No. 59641. It is equally settled, however, that this Courts power to liberally construe and even to suspend the rules, presupposes the existence of substantial rights in favor of which, the strict application of technical rules must concede. The facts are borne out by the records pertaining to petitioners purported undivided share in the property at M. Calim Street, Famy, Laguna, and the property in Poroza clearly showed that these two properties had been subject of an agreement (Exh. "1") whereby petitioner recognized respondents rights to said properties. This fact binds this Court, there being nothing on record with the trial court as to the herein alleged fraud against the petitioner. Upon thorough deliberation of the supposed substantial rights claimed by the petitioner with the court below, the Court finds no cogent basis to favorably rule on the merits of the appeal even if it may be given due course which is indispensable to justify this Court in considering this case as an exception to the rules. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed resolutions of the CA are AFFIRMED. Tesorero v. Mathay Held : NO Facts In Hagonoy Market Vendor Association v. Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, G.R. No. 137621, February 6, 2002, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, reminded us that The Rules itself expressly states in Section 2 of Rule 1 that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. Courts, therefore, not only have the power but the duty to construe and apply technical rules liberally in favor of substantive law and substantial justice. Furthermore, this Court, unlike courts below, has the power not only to liberally construe the rules, but also to suspend them, in favor of substantive law or substantial rights. Such power inherently belongs to this Court, which is expressly vested with rule-making power by no less than the Constitution. This is a petition for review on certiorari, with a prayer for a restraining order, seeking the annulment of the decision of the Board of Energy (BOE). Davao Light and Power (DALIGHT) filed an application with the BOE for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its properties and equipment in service. The first appraisal for 339M was made by Technical and Management Service Philippines (TAMSPHIL), and was rejected by the BOE after hearings and an ocular inspection because the TAMSPHIL President was a technical consultant of DALIGHT and there were discrepancies of serious proportion in the appraisal. DALIGHT again filed an application for approval and appraisal, this time conducted by Asian Appraisal Co. in the amount of 309M, but it was opposed by petitioners.
CA no appellants brief filed within the extended period, CA considered the appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissing the same. After 8 months, P filed a motion for reconsideration thereof - CA denied the motion P filed a Petition for Relief praying CA to set aside its dismissal, reinstate his appeal and grant him a fresh period of forty-five (45) days from notice within which to file his appellants brief. Denied P filed special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to SC
Issue: WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for Relief
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The BOE constituted a team to conduct and ocular of DALIGHTs properties, equipment, books and papers related to the appraisal made by Asian, but only approved 282M as a fair and reasonable value. Seventeen (17) days after receipt of the decision, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but were denied, hence the instant petition with Davao city as intervenors. Issue - Is ceritiorari the proper remedy? Ruling There is no question that certiorari is not the proper remedy in this case. The BOE charter provides for an appeal to the Office of the president within seven (7) days from the receipt of a decision or orders. After, final decisions, orders, awards or resolutions of all quasi-judicial bodies other than those specifically excepted are reviewable by the IAC. In the broader interest of justice this Court has given due course to this petition, although the proper remedy is appeal and since litigations should, as much as possible be decided on their merits not on technicalities. The records also indicate that this case will not only affect herein petitioners, but also the consumers of Davao. It is well settled that this Court cannot substitute its judgment or discretion for that of the BOE whose decisions and determinations particularly on matter of fact carry great weight. But, it is equally accepted that exhaustion of remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of exception, as when the question litigated upon is a purely legal one the rule may be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage. On August 7, 1984, (take note of the date) the petitioners filed Civil Case for damages against Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. (Pepsi Cola) and Alberto Alva before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. o The case arose out of a vehicular accident on March 1, 1984, (take note of the date) involving a school bus owned and driven by petitioners, and a truck trailer owned at that time by Pepsi Cola and driven by Alberto Alva. The sheriff of the lower court served the summons addressed to the defendants. It was received by one Nanette Sison who represented herself to be the authorized person receiving court processes as she was the secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola. Pepsi Cola failed to file an answer and was later declared in default. The lower court heard the case ex-parte and adjudged the defendants jointly and severally liable for damages. When the default judgment became final and executory, the petitioners filed a motion for execution, a copy of which was received no longer by the defendant Pepsi Cola but by private respondent PEPSICO, Inc. At that time, the private respondent was already occupying the place of business of Pepsi Cola. Private respondent, a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, USA, held offices here for the purpose, among others, of settling Pepsi Cola's debts, liabilities and obligations which it assumed in a written undertaking executed on CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO, FERNANDO VALENCIA and EDWIN REBOLLIDO, petitioners vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEPSICO, INC., respondents. Facts: Note: Pepsi Cola is the defendant while Pepsico is the Private respondent.
RULE Rule 2, Secs. 1 to 6 G.R. No. 81123 February 28, 1989
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June 11, 1983, preparatory to the expected dissolution of Pepsi Cola. The dissolution of Pepsi Cola as approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission materialized on March 2, 1984, (take note of the date) one day after the accident occurred. Respondent PEPSICO opposed the motion for execution and moved to vacate the judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The private respondent questioned the validity of the service of summons to a mere clerk. Lower court denied the motion of the private respondent holding that despite the dissolution and the assumption of liabilities by the private respondent, there was proper service of summons upon defendant Pepsi Cola. Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with CA to annul and set aside the judgment of the lower court and its order denying the motion to vacate the judgment, for having been issued without jurisdiction. CA granted the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction ruling that there was no valid service of summons. o The appellate court stated that any judgment rendered against Pepsi Cola after its dissolution is a "liability" of the private respondent within the contemplation of the undertaking, but service of summons should be made upon the private respondent itself in accordance with Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. o It remanded the case to the lower court and ordered that the private respondent be summoned and be given its day in court. A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review. Held: Yes. The petitioner posits: o It is Pepsi Cola which is the real party in the case before the trial court because when the accident happened on March 1, 1984 or one day before the date of legal dissolution, Pepsi Cola was still the registered owner of the truck involved. o Being solidarily liable with its driver for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, there appears to be no question that the complaint and summons were correctly filed and served on Pepsi Cola. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that: Parties in interest - Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. ... . S.C. states that a real party in interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party in interest-defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violates the legal rights of the former. For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real party in interest-defendant in the civil case filed by the petitioners not only because it is the registered owner of the truck involved but also because, when the cause of action accrued, Pepsi Cola still existed as a corporation and was the party involved in the acts violative of the legal right of another. The petitioners had a valid cause of action for damages against Pepsi Cola. o A cause of action is defined as "an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are a legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendants and an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
Issue: Whether Pepsi Cola, the dissolved corporation, is the real party in interest to whom summons should be served in the civil case for damages.
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The law provides that a corporation whose corporate term has ceased can still be made a party to a suit. Under paragraph 1, Section 122 of the Corporation Code, a dissolved corporation: ...shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established. In the case at bar, the right of action of the petitioners against Pepsi Cola and its driver arose not at the time when the complaint was filed but when the acts or omission constituting the cause of action accrued, on March 1, 1984 which is the date of the accident and when Pepsi Cola allegedly committed the wrong. Baliwag filed a complaint for damages against the Philippine National Railways, which was held liable for its negligence in a decision rendered on April 6, 1977, by Judge Benigno Puno. Hughes was absolved of any contributory negligence. Hughes claims that soon after the decision against the PNR, he had his driver's license renewed and then sought reinstatement with Baliwag Transit. He repeated his request several times even after the dismissal of the criminal case. He then decided to seek the assistance of Minister Ople, who wrote the petitioner on April 24, 1980, and "implored" the private respondent's re- employment. As this request was also ignored, Hughes finally demanded his reinstatement on May 2, 1980. On May 10, 1980, the petitioner replied to say he could not be reinstated because his driver's license had already been revoked and his driving was extremely dangerous to the riding public." CIV PRO FACTS The private respondent's reaction to this rejection was to file on July 29, 1980, a formal complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment for illegal dismissal against the petitioner, with a prayer for his reinstatement with back wages from May 10, 1980. On January 22, 1981, the complaint was dismissed by Director Francisco L. Estrella, National Capital Region, on the ground of prescription, "it appearing that although the private respondent was separated from the service on 10 August 1974 (date of the accident), it was not until 29 July 1980, or a little less than 6 years thereafter, when he filed the complaint." The regional director was, however, reversed by Minister Ople in his order dated May 21, 1981. The question that has to be settled is the date when the cause of action accrued and from which the period shall commence to run.The contention of Baliwag is that it should be August 10, 1974, when the collision occurred. Hughes insists it is May 10, 1980, when his demand for reinstatement was rejected by the petitioner. SC said Hughes is correct its May 10, 1980.
G.R. No. L-57642 March 16, 1989 BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BLAS F. OPLE, Minister of Labor and Employment, and ROMEO HUGHES, respondents. The petitioner is a duly organized corporation with a valid authorization from the Board of Transportation to operate a bus line. The private respondent was hired by it in 1966 and continued serving therein as a bus driver until the incident in question, when he was relieved of his duties. The incident occurred on August 10, 1974. Romeo Hughes was driving Baliwag Transit Bus No. 1066 when it was stalled at the railroad crossing in Calumpit, Bulacan, because the vehicle ahead of it had stopped owing to a jeep that was making its way into a garage. As thus positioned, the bus was hit at its rear end by an onrushing train of the Philippine National Railways that dragged it several meters. Eighteen passengers died and fifty six others suffered serious physical injuries.
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It is settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has three elements, (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. We hold that the private respondent's right of action could not have accrued from the mere fact of the occurrence of the mishap on August 10, 1974, as he was not considered automatically dismissed on that date. At best, he was deemed suspended from his work. There was no apparent disagreement then between Hughes and his employer. As the private respondent was the petitioner's principal witness in its complaint for damages against the Philippine National Railways, we may assume that Baliwag Transit and Hughes were on the best of terms when the case was being tried. We agree with the private respondent that May 10, 1980, is the date when his cause of action accrued, for it was then that the petitioner denied his demand for reinstatement. Since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legal right of the plaintiff and a correlative obligation of the defendant but also an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right the cause of action does not accrue until the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty. Hughes's complaint was filed not later than three months only after such rejection, there is no question that his action has not prescribed. Corazon and his brother Gonzalo co-owned a property They obtained a loan from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and as collateral, they executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of DBP. They failed to pay their amortizations. DBP foreclosed the real estate mortgage on September 15, 1983. Purportedly, no redemption was made within one year, and thus, DBP consolidated ownership over the subject property. Corazon died her sole heir was her daughter respondent Cristina who asserted ownership over the subject property to the extent of one-half thereof However she discovered that the property was already registered as early as June 13, 1989 in the name of DBP Cristina filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a complaint for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to prevent DBP from conducting any auction sale on the subject property during the pendency of the case RTC granted the TRO DBP moved to lift the TRO arguing that it violates Section 2of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 385which prohibits the issuance of a restraining order, temporary or permanent, against government financing institutions like DBP to enjoin any action taken pursuant to the mandatory foreclosure clause of the decree. Motion was denied and granted respondents plea for an injunctive writ. DBP moved to reconsider the Order and at the same time sought the dismissal of respondents complaint on the sole ground that the same states no cause of action December 23, 1998, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued
DEVELOPMENT BANK v CASTILLO GR 163827 a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 FACTS:
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RTC denied DBPs motion for reconsideration of the denial of its motion for the lifting of the TRO and DBPs motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered DBP to file an answer. DBP moved to reconsider the denial of its motion to dismiss. But even before the RTC could resolve said motion, DBP filed its Answer A manifestation was later filed by DBP indicating that the answer it filed was a mere cautionary measure or what is known as an answer ad cautelam and thus without prejudice to any right of action it may take and without any waiver of any of the grounds for the dismissal of the complaint and any favorable resolution or order that a superior court may issue hereinafter the RTC issued an order denying DBPs motion for reconsideration of its denial and in the same time emphasized that DBP already filed an answer thereby rendering the motion to dismiss moot and academic. DBP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the following issuances of the RTC: TRO against DBP enjoining it from proceeding with the scheduled auction sale of the disputed property; Order denying its motion to lift the TRO and granting the respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction; Order denying DBPs motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the December 14, 1998 Order; and Order denying DBPs motion for reconsideration of the March 8, 1999 order. CA dismissed the petition on procedural grounds. It held that the petition questioning the first three orders was filed late as the petition should have been filed within 60 days from receipt of the assailed orders and stated that DBPs subsequent filing of its Answer to the complaint rendered its motion to dismiss moot and academic. Hence an appeal was filed before SC. DBP claimed that it is evident from the face of the complaint that respondent failed to state a cause of action.
RULLING: A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it arises; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. All the above elements of a cause of action are alleged in the complaint: (1) the legal right of the respondent over the subject property foreclosed premised on the fact that she is the sole heir of one of the owners who is entitled to the right of redemption; (2) the correlative obligation of defendant DBP, as the foreclosing entity, to respect such right of redemption; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right, i.e., the act of DBP and its co-defendant Zarate to cause the ostensible foreclosure of the subject property and the subsequent execution of a deed of conditional sale between the defendants even prior to the lapse of redemption period to deprive respondents mother of her right over the property. THEREFORE, Petition is denied.
G.R. No. L-45350
May 29, 1939
BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.
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ESTEBAN ICARAGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC., defendants-appellees. On June 11 , 1930, defendant, with one Jacinto Figueroa executed a REM in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc a parcel of land in Pagil, Laguna. They also executed a promissory note for one thousand six hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614) as a security for the REMs payment. Promissors defaulted in the payment. CFI Plaintiff filed an action for the collection of the amount due on the note. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. A writ of execution was issued and the provincial sheriff of Laguna levied on the properties of the defendants, including that which has been mortgaged by Esteban Icaragal in favor of the plaintiff. The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of execution issued in civil case No. 88253 of the municipal court of the City of Manila, the property which was the subject of the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, 1933. YES.
SC Section 708 of our Code of Civil Procedure which provides that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, has to elect between enforcing such security or abandoning it by presenting his claim before the committee and share it in the general assets of the estate. Under this provision, It has been uniformly held by this court that, if the plaintiff elects one of the two remedies thus provided, he waives the other, and if he fails, he fails utterly. The same rule applies under the Insolvency Law. But, even if we have no such section 708 of our Code of Civil Procedure, or section 59 of the Insolvency Law, we have still the rule against splitting a single cause of action. This rule, though not contained in any statutory provision, has been applied by this court in all appropriate cases.
In consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied. Plaintiff instituted ANOTHER action to foreclose the mortgage Dismissed Hence, this appeal at SC
The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." It comes from that old maxim nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem cause (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause). And it developed, certainly not as an original legal right of the defendant, but as an interposition of courts upon principles of public policy to prevent inconvenience and hardship incident to repeated and unnecessary litigations In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring personal action will leave open to him all the properties
ISSUE: WON plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment against the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment of which the mortgage was constituted as a security.
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of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. Chu v. Cunanan Facts The Chus executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving five (5) parcels of land in favor of the Cunanans stipulating that ownership would remain with the Chus until complete payment and total compliance with the terms of the deed of sale with mortgage. Thereafter, the Chus executed and SPA authorizing the Cunanans to borrow money from any banking institution and to mortgage the five (5) lots as security, then to deliver the proceeds to the Chus net of the balance of the mortgage and downpayment. The Cunanans were able to transfer the title of the five lots in her name without the knowledge of the Chus and to borrow money with the lots as security without paying the balance of the price to the Chus. She later transferred two of the lots to the Carloses and three to Cool Town Realty, despite the annotation of a vendors lien on the last three lots. The Chus commenced a civil case in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance from the Cunanans. Five (5) years later they amended the complaint seeking annulment of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and the TCTs issued pursuant to the deed with damages. They impleaded Cool Town Realty and the RD of Pampanga. The Carloses had meanwhile sold the two lots to Benelda Estate Development, so the Chus amended the complaint impleading Benelda. Benelda filed its answer with a motion to dismiss, claiming that the amended complaint stated no cause of action because they had acted in good faith in buying the lots. Their motion was denied by the RTC, so they assailed the denial on certiorari in the CA, which annulled the RTCs decision for being tainted with grave abuse and dismissing the civil case against Benelda. The Chus, Cunanans and Cool Town Realty entered into a compromise agreement. The RTC approved it. After, the Chus brought another suit against the Carloses and benelda, seeking cancellation of the TCTs plus damages. They amended this complaint to included the Cunanans. The Cunananas and Benelda moved to dismiss mainly on the reason that the action was barred by res judicata. The RTC denied the motions, holding that the amended complaint stated a cause of action against all defendants; that the action was not barred by res judicata because there was no identity of parties and subject matter with the prior case. On appeal the CA granted the petition for certiorari nullifying the RTCs orders, ruling that the compromise agreement had ended the controversy and that the filing of the case violated the rule against splitting of a cause of action, rendering the case subject to a motion to dismiss on bar by res judicata. Hence, this appeal Issue Was the case barred by res judicata, although Benelda was not a party to the compromise agreement? Ruling Petition denied. The compromise agreement was not limited merely to th three lots sold to Cool Town, it included the two sold to Benelda as it would contravene the object of the civil case to enforce or rescind the deed of sale. It was apparent that petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suit, the purpose of which is to avoid unduly burdening the courts. Their contravention of the policy merited the dismissal of the case on the ground of bar by res judicata. In order that res judicata may be invoked, the following requisites must concur:
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The former judgment must be final; It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties; c. It must be a judgment on the merits; d. There must be between the first and second actions: a. Identity of parties b. Identity of subject matter c. Identity of cause of action Although Benelda was not made a party to the compromise agreement is inconsequential as they were deemed successors in interest of the Cunanans. It has been held that absolute identity of parties is not a condition sine qua non for res judicata to apply because a shared identity of interest sufficed. As both actions involved the same properties the requisite of same subject matter was met, and it is obvious that there has been a final judgment on the compromise agreement. Hence, the Chus are guilty of splitting their cause of action. They should not be allowed to make a single cause of action the basis of several suits. a. b. in their favor were approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of twenty-five (25) years. On November 18, 2000, respondent allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners. On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed MTC in Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible Entry With Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And Damages, against Ernesto M. Treyes, Sr. and respondent. In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for damages against respondent alleging: o That defendant Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. and his armed men forcibly and unlawfully entered the fishponds of the plaintiffs and once inside barricaded the entrance of the fishpond and set up barb wire fence along the road going to plaintiffs fishpond and harvested the milkfish and carted away several tons of milkfish owned by the plaintiffs; o That on succeeding days, defendants men continued their forage on the fishponds of the plaintiffs by carting and taking away the remaining full grown milkfish, fry and fingerlings and other marine products in the fishponds. NOT ONLY THAT, even the chapel built by plaintiff CGR Corporation was ransacked and destroyed and the materials taken away by defendants men . Religious icons were also stolen and as an extreme act of sacrilege, even decapitated the heads of some of these icons; o That the unlawful, forcible and illegal intrusion/destruction of defendant Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and his men on the fishpond leased and possessed by the plaintiffs is without any authority of law and in violation of Article 539 of the New Civil Code. 1) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff CGR Corporation the sum of at least P900,000.00 and to plaintiffs Herman and Alberto Benedicto, the sum of at least P300,000.00 each by
G.R. No. 170916
April 27, 2007
CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO RAMOS, III, HERMAN M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO, Petitioners, vs. ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., Respondent In issue is one of law whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an independent action for damages arising after the act of dispossession had occurred. Facts: CGR Corporation, claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land in Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City, Negros Occidental even before the notarized separate 3 Fishpond Lease Agreements
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way of actual damages and such other amounts as proved during the trial; 2) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 each as moral damages; 3) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages; 4) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to reimburse plaintiffs with all such sums paid to their counsel by way of appearance fees. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners complaint for damages on three grounds litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping. RTC dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of prematurity. o Holding that a complaint for damages may only be maintained "after a final determination on the forcible entry cases has been made." Hence, the present petition for review. use and occupation of the premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires. (Emphasis supplied) The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the property" and attorneys fees and costs. It bears noting that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for damages have no direct relation to their loss of possession of the premises. It had to do with respondents alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even decapitating the heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession had occurred. Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity between the pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners c omplaint for damages. Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and attorneys fees. Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.
Issue: Whether Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages is considered as splitting of a cause of action. Held: No. Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the
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Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action. G.R. No. L-46000 March 18, 1985 The defendant filed an appeal with Branch Ill of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The Court of First Instance rendered a decision. Judgment is hereby required in favor of the defendant. 1. Ordering the plaintiff to pay a) P10,000.00 as moral damages; b) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; c) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
GLICERIO AGUSTIN (Deceased) as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Susana Agustinvs. LAUREANO BACALAN and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CEBU Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned by the late Susana Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentals despite repeated demands an action to eject him was filed. A complaint for ejectment with damages filed by plaintiff-appellant Agustin, as adiministrator of the Intestate Estate of Susana Agustin, against defendant-appellee Bacalan, before the City Court of Cebu. Plaintiff-appellant prayed that Bacalan be ordered to immediately vacate the place in question, to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P2,300.00 representing arrearages in rentals plus the corresponding rentals until he actually vacates the place, attorney's fees, expenses, and costs. Bacalans answer included a counter-claim alleging that the present action was "clearly unfounded and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with malice and bad faith. "That by virtue malicious filing of this action by the plaintiff against the defendant, the latter suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual and moral damages in the amount of no less than P50,000.00; P10,000.00 in concept of exemplary damages. In addition, defendant has been compelled to retain the services of undersigned counsel to resist plaintiffs' reckless, malicious and frivolous claim and to protect and enforce his rights for which he obligated himself to pay the further sum of P3,500.00 as attorney's fees." City Court of Cebu rendered judgment dismissing the counterclaim and ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P3,887.10 as unpaid back rentals and the sum of P150.00 as attorney's fees.
2. With costs against plaintiff The decision lapsed into finality and became executory. A writ of execution was issued by virtue of which a notice to sell at public auction real properties belonging to the estate of Susana Agustin was issued by the Deputy Sheriff to satisfy judgment. Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied. With the aid of new counsel, the Agustin filed a complaint with Branch V, Court of First Instance of Cebu, against the defendant and the Deputy Sheriff of Cebu for the declaration of the nullity of the above-cited decision of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Cebu in the ejectment case on the ground that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was null and void from the beginning for the following reasons: (a) It grants relief in the total sum of P16,000.00 (exclusive of costs) distributed thus: P10,000.00 as moral damages P5,000.00 as exemplary damages P1,000.00 as attorney's fees which is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court of Cebu. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff has no cause of action. The court sustained the defendant and ruled:
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This Court believes that the present complaint fails to allege a valid cause of action. Agustin's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Plaintiff-appellant assails the money judgment handed down by the court which granted damages to the defendant-appellee. By reason thereof, he seeks the declaration of the nullity of the entire judgment. Whether or not the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal, award the defendant-appellee's counterclaim in an amount exceeding or beyond the jurisdiction of the court of origin? SC = No. The Court of First Instance, in the case at bar, having awarded judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate jurisdiction to the extent of P6,000.00 over the maximum allowable award of P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of no effect. Such being the case, an action to declare the nullity of the award as brought by the plaintiffappellant before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V is a proper remedy. The amount of judgment obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal, cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same. Flores v Mallare-Phillips 144 SCRA 144 SCRA 377 an appeal by certiorari Facts: Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus: Flores sued the respondents Binongcol and Callion for refusing to pay him certain amount of money as alleged in the complaint: first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to October, 1981; second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982. Private respondents opposed the action and filed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec 19 of BP 129, the regional trial court had exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than P20,000 and although, the other respondent was indebted in the amount of P10, 212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. The trial court by Judge Mallare (one of the respondents) dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Flores appealed by certiorari in Supreme Court and maintains that lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules. The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows: ... Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. ...
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are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged. He argued that the totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction. THEREFORE, dismissal of complaint is legal. [G.R. No. 140746. March 16, 2005] PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER BUNCAN, petitioners, vs. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE, respondents. Facts: A bus of Pantranco North Express, Inc., petitioner, driven by Alexander Buncan, also a petitioner, hit the left rear side of the jeepney driven by Crispin Gicale owned by his mother Martina Gicale, respondent herein. After hitting the jeep, Buncan sped away. Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera Police Station and respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard), insurer of the jeepney. The total cost of the repair was P21,415.00, but respondent Standard paid only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale shouldered the balance ofP13,415.00. Thereafter, Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded reimbursement from petitioners Pantranco and its driver Alexander Buncan, but they refused. RTC R to filed a complaint for sum of money P specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and averred that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case judgment is rendered in favor of the R CA P filed an appeal but was dismissed
Issue: WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties under the Rules of Court. Ruling: YES The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section 33(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows: Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test and instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
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Ps MOR was also denied P filed petition for review on certiorari to SC In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantrancos bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners. To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would have been presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice. Corollarily, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provides: Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue. Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions: xxx (d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same [8] defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is involved. The issue of whether respondents claims shall be lumped together is determined by paragraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph embodies the totality rule as exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among others, that where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter YES, RTC has jurisdiction SC Petition DENIED
Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since the cause of action of each respondent did not arise from the same transaction and that there are no common questions of law and fact common to both parties. Section 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
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As previously stated, respondents cause of action against petitioners arose out of the same transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims. Respondent Standards claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent Martina Gicale is P13,415.00, or a total of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Clearly, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over the instant case. It bears emphasis that when the complaint was filed, R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts had not yet taken effect. It became effective on April 15, 1994. Sps. Decena v. Sps. Piquero Facts Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC. The Decenas are owners of a parcel of land with a house located in Paranque. They executed a MOA wherein they sold the property to the Piqueros through installments in pst dated checks. They stipulated to oblige themselves to transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of the MOA with the condition that if two (2) postdated checks bounce, the Piqueros would be obliged to return the property. Petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC of Bulacan for the annulment of the sale and recovery of possession with damages. They allege that they did not transfer ownership because the first two checks issued to them were not honored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced by cash. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, and lack of jurisdiction over the subject property. Respondents aver that the principal action for rescission of the MOA, and recovery of possession is a real action, not a personal one; hence, it should be brought to the Paranaque RTC. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, being located in Paranque. After due consideration, we find and rule that Sec 5(c), Rule 2 of the ROC does not apply. This is because the petitioners had only one cause of action against respondents, namely, the breach of MOA upon the refusal to pay, and in turn over the property, as well as the house constructed upon it. The action for the rescission an reconveyance of property is a real action and must therefore have been filed in the proper court where the property was located, in Paranque. Having filed the complaint at the RTC of Bulacan venue was improperly laid; the trial court acted conformably with Sec 1(c), Rule 16 of the ROC when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint. G.R. No. 153829 August 17, 2011 The petitioners claim the action for rescission and damages is a personal one and may be filed in the RTC of their residence, and that their second cause for the recovery of possession, although a real action, may be joined with the rest of their causes under Sec. 5(c), Rule 2 of the ROC. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit and found merit in the petitioners contention that Section 5(c), Rule 2 is applicable. Meanwhile the case was re-raffled to Branch 10 of the Malolos RTC. In a motion the respondents prayed for the reconsideration of the trial courts order. The motion was granted and the complaint was dismissed. It ruled that the principal action was a real one and should have been filed at the RTC of Paranque, where the subject matter was located. Hence, the present recourse. Issue Whether the venue was properly laid. Ruling
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA represented herein by the incumbent Archbishop, Petitioner, vs. EDUARDO SORIANO, JR., EDNA YALUN, EVANGELINA ABLAZA, FELICIDAD Y. URBINA, FELIX SALENGA, REYNALDO I. MALLARI, MARCIANA B. BARCOMA, BIENVENIDO PANGANIBAN, BRIGIDA NAVARRO, EUFRANCIA T. FLORES, VICTORIA B. SUDSOD,
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EUFRONIO CAPARAS, CRISANTO MANANSALA, LILY MASANGCAY, BENJAMIN GUINTO, JR., MARTHA G. CASTRO and LINO TOLENTINO, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 160909 BENJAMIN GUINTO, JR., Petitioner, vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA represented herein by the incumbent Archbishop, Respondent. Facts: The RCA of San Fernando, Pampanga,claimed that it is the owner of a vast tract of land located near the Catholic Church at Poblacion, Macabebe, Pampanga and covered by an OCT issued by the Registry of Deeds of San Fernando on February 21, 1929. The RCA alleged that several individuals unlawfully occupied the subject land and refused to vacate despite repeated demands. Having no other recourse, the RCA filed an ejectment case, before the MCTC of Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga against the alleged intruders, the defendants. Defendants countered that the RCA has no cause of action against them because its title is spurious. o They contended that the subject land belonged to the State, but they have already acquired the same by acquisitive prescription as they and their predecessors-ininterest have been in continuous possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. MCTC ruled in favor of the RCA. o The trial court held that the OCT in the name of the RCA remains valid and binding against the whole world until it is declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction. Defendants appealed to the RTC. Hence, the decision ejecting the defendants from the premises became final. The RCA filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Issuance of a Writ of Execution, which the MCTC granted. Seeking to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and the notice to vacate, Guinto filed the instant Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Meanwhile, during the pendency of the ejectment case at the MCTC, some of the defendants therein, filed Civil Case against the RCA for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of Title before the RTC of Macabebe, Pampanga. o They claimed that they are in actual possession of the land in the concept of owners and alleged that the OCT in the name of RCA is spurious and fake. The RCA moved to dismiss the case on grounds of noncompliance with a condition precedent, laches, and for being a collateral attack on its title. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. o Found that plaintiffs have a cause of action. The RCA filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The RCA filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Filed an M.R. but was denied. Hence, this petition for review. o The appeal was dismissed because of their failure to file the appeal memorandum.
When defendants elevated the case to the CA, their petition for certiorari was not given due course for failure to file the same within the extended period.
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Issue: Whether the action for quieting of title and declaration of nullity of title filed by the defendants should be dismissed for violation of the rule on joinder of actions. Held: No. The RCA submits that an action for quieting of title is a special civil action covered by Rule 63, while an action for declaration of nullity of title is governed by ordinary rules. o It contends that these cases should have been dismissed for violation of the rule on joinder of actions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which requires that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules. Such contention, however, is utterly bereft of merit. Section 6 of Rule 2 explicitly provides that misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proc. No. 2239 was issued by the President withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC. Since certain portions of the subject public land were occupied by private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation, MCFC, LOI No 1277 was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with MCFC for the compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights on the subject land. When negotiations failed, petitioner ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings against private respondent MCFC in the RTC of Iligan City. On 17 September 1983, a writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC in possession and control of the land occupied by MCFC's fertilizer plant installation. The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however, the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired on 11 August 1988. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person. The trial court granted MCFC's motion to dismiss. The dismissal was anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that "only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case." Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration of the trial court's Order, contending that despite the expiration of its term, its juridical existence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be completed. In the alternative, petitioner ISA urged that the Republic of the Philippines, being the real party-in-interest, should be allowed to be substituted for petitioner ISA. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration stating, among other things, that the expropriation is not for public use but for private benefit. Petitioner went on appeal to the Court of Appeals who affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court.
Rule 3, Secs. 1 to 3 G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995 IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION Facts: Petitioner, ISA, was created by PD 272 dated 9 August 1973 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of 5 years counting from 9 August 1973. When ISA's original term expired on 10 October 1978, its term was extended for another ten years by EO 555 dated 31 August 1979. The National Steel Corporation, NSC, then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself
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The CA ruled that the action for expropriation could not prosper because the basis for the proceedings, the ISA's exercise of its delegated authority to expropriate, had become ineffective as a result of the delegate's dissolution, and could not be continued in the name of Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General. alleging that Travel Wide Associated Sales (TWA) and Trans World Airlines, Inc. had failed to comply with their obligations under Travel Pass '73 U.S.A., a package deal consisting of a TWA ticket to Los Angeles, New York and Boston, in the United States, and hotel accommodations, for which the plaintiffs had made the corresponding payment in Manila. TWA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action, RTC ordered the plaintiffs to amend their complaint and particularize their averments. The Plaintiffs complied. TWA and Trans world move to dismiss on the ground that the amended complaint still did not state a cause of action- denied by RTC holding that the allegations were now "sufficiently particular TWA and Trans wold filed a joint answer in which they alleged the special defense that they were not the real parties-in-interest because they had acted only as agents of a disclosed principal Subsequently, they filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Special Defense, which was opposed by the Plaintiffs on the ground that the special defense was barred, not having been raised in the two motions to dismiss the amended complaint- motion was nevertheless granted. After the preliminary hearing, Judge. Fernandez issued his order dismissing the complaint MR was denied Case was elevated to the CA- reversed the trial court and ruled that petitioner should have pleaded the special defense that they were not real parties-in-interest in their motion to dismiss, conformably to the omnibus motion rule. Not having done so, they are deemed to have waived that ground, which therefore could not be used as the basis of the motion to dismiss. Sc- Petinvoke Rule 16, Section 1, of the Rules of Court and argue that "the defense of not being a real party-in-interest" is not one of the grounds enumerated therein for a motion to dismiss. Consequently, they
Issue:
W/N the Republic is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term
Held:
Yes, the Republic is entitled to be substituted for ISA in the expropriation proceedings.
Ratio:
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as "legal personality." In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272. The present expropriation suit was brought on behalf of and for the benefit of the Republic as the principal of ISA. From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired.
Travel Wide Associated Sales vs. CA, 199 SCRA 205 FACTS: Decision Systems Corporation and its President, Manuel A. Alcuaz, Jr., filed a complaint in the RTC-Mla
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could not have pleaded it in their motion to dismiss but only in their answer as a special defense. ISSUE: WON petitioners are real parties-in-interest? RULLING: YES. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Rule 3, Section 2, of the Rules of Court provides explicitly that "every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-ininterest." The party-in-interest is one who prosecutes or defends and is benefited or injured. The term applies not only to the plaintiff but to the defendant, and the suit may be dismissed if neither of them is a real party-in-interest. If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. The Court believes that the evidence, particularly the terms and conditions of the brochure distributed by the petitioners and the significance of the Miscellaneous Charges Order which was issued by TWApoves that petitioners were not mere agents of a disclosed principal and so could be held liable on the complaintand even the trial court observed the active participation of TWA in the promotion of the travel pass plan as an additional source of revenue for its airline business. And even if the petitioners were indeed acting as agents of the passengers, as the brochure stipulates, they could still be held liable under Article 1909 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the petitioners are real parties-in-interest as defendants in the suit below, the motion to dismiss for lack of a cause of action should not have been granted. G.R. No. 78646 July 23, 1991 PABLO RALLA, substituted by his wife and co-defendant CARMEN MUOZ-RALLA, and his legal heirs, HILDA RALLA-ALMINE, BELISTA, RENE RALLA-BELISTA and GERARDO M. RALLA, petitioners, vs. PEDRO RALLA, substituted by his legal heirs, LEONI, PETER, and MARINELA all surnamed RALLA, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Facts: Rosendo Ralla had two sons, Pablo and Pedro. The father apparently loved the former but not the latter. Probate Court Rosendo executed a will disinheriting Pedro and leaving everything he owned to Pablo, to whom he said he had earlier sold a part of his property for P10,000.00. Rosendo himself filed for the probate of the will but pendente lite died on October 1, 1960. On November 3, 1966, the probate judge converted SP 564 into an intestate proceeding. The last will and testament of Rosendo Ralla was allowed on June 7, 1982 On October 20, 1982, the disinheritance of Pedro was disapproved. CA Pablo elevated the October 20, 1982 order to the Court of Appeals In a decision dated July 25, 1986, CA Reversed the trial court and reinstated the disinheritance clause after finding that the requisites of a valid disinheritance had been complied with in the will. The appellate court noted that Pedro had threatened to kill his father, who was afraid of him and had earlier sued him for slander and grave oral defamation. SC Pedro assailed the July 25, 1986 order of CA - dismissed MOR was denied with finality RTC Pedro had filed on May 19, 1972, a complaint to annul the transaction the deed of sale executed by Rosendo Ralla in favor of Pablo over 149 parcels of land on the ground that it was simulated. declared the sale null and void
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upon Pablos MOR, judge held the deed of sale to be valid. CA Upon Pedros appeal, reinstated the original decision invalidating the deed of sale. SC Pablo elevated CAs decision RTC: Tanpingco filed a complaint for payment of disturbance compensation with damages against Horca. Tanpingco was Horca's leasehold tenant over an agricultural riceland. Tanpingco was asked to desist from working on the land because it had been donated to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as a school site. Petitioner claims he was being openly ordered to leave and ousted in violation of law. Petitioner is willing to accept disturbance compensation, but prays to remain as a tenant.
ISSUE: WON sale executed by Rosendo Ralla in favor of Pablo over 149 parcels of land is valid NO. The decision of the CA (previos case) approved the disinheritance of Pedro Ralla and the decision has long since become final. Since then, Pedro Ralla no longer had the legal standing to question the validity of the sale executed by Rosendo in favor of his other son Pablo. The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. As a general rule, one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action. Legally speaking, Pedro Ralla was a stranger to the transaction as he did not stand to benefit from its annulment. His disinheritance had rendered him hors de combat. Reversed CA, complaint dismissed.
The case was called in for pre-trial and Horca filed a motion to dismiss. He alleges that the complaint states no cause of action because he is no longer a party-in-interest having already donated the property. The motion was granted, while petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. IAC: Finding no merit in the appeal the case was dismissed. Hence, the current controversy. Ruling: Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. A corollary proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought against the real party-in-interest, or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein. The real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or be injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
G.R. No. 76225. March 31, 1992. ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and BENEDICTO HORCA, SR., respondents. Facts:
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If the suit is not brought against the real party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action (Section 1 (g), Rule 16, Rules of Court). Hence, the resolution of the dispute hinges upon the determination of whether or not the private respondent is the real party-in-interest against whom the suit should be brought. We agree with the contentions of the private respondent. The petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the party-defendant for as stated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, a donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Under Article 428 of the New Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked title to the land. However, the new owner must respect the rights of the tenant. G.R. No. 75287 June 30, 1987 HOUSE INTERNATIONAL BUILDING TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner-plaintiff, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CENTERTOWN MARKETING CORP., MANILA TOWERS DEVELOPMENT CORP., AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondentsdefendants. RULING: THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST ARE THE TENANTS NOT THE ASSOCIATION. Facts: CA: o AFFIRMED RTCS DECISION. Petitioner House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. (ASSOCIATION) is a domestic non-stock, non-profit civic corporation, whose incorporators, directors and members constitute the great majority of more than a hundred heads of families who are tenants of long and good standing of the 14storey House International Building located at Binondo, Manila. The land and the improvements thereon were formerly owned by Atty. Felipe Ang who mortgaged the same to the GSIS to secure payment of an obligation. After foreclosure of the mortgage and for failure of Ang to exercise his right of redemption over the foreclosed property, the ownership thereof was consolidated with the GSIS which subsequently sold it to CENTERTOWN in a deed of conditional sale, without notice to the tenants of the building and without securing the prior clearance of the then Ministry of Human Settlements. As CENTERTOWN was not authorized by its Articles of Incorporation to engage in the real estate business, it organized a sister corporation, TOWERS, for the primary purpose of engaging in the real estate business. Subsequently, CENTERTOWN assigned to its sister corporation TOWERS all its rights and obligations under the Deed of Conditional Sale, with the consent and approval of the GSIS. RTC: ANNULMENT OF THE DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE. ALLEGATION: DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE IS VOID FOR BEING ULTRA VIRES. o Petitioner filed a complaint against CENTERTOWN, TOWERS and GSIS for THE ANNULMENT OF THE DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE and the subsequent assignment thereof by CENTERTOWN to TOWERS. o Alleged that the Deed of Conditional Sale is null and void ab initio for being ultra vires, since defendant CENTERTOWN is not qualified to acquire real estate property or to engage in real estate transactions. o DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT. o DENIED M.R.
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o DENIED M.R. ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express Liner," Petitioner, vs. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 164747 MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Petitioner, vs. ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express Liner," FELIPE M. LANDICHO and VINCENT D. TECSON, Respondents For review is the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the RTC of QC. FACTS: Cordero is the vice president of Pamana Marketing Corp. He ventured into the business of inter-island passenger vessels with Robinson, an Australian based in Brisbane, Australia and is the managing director of Aluminum Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA). o Robinson appointed Cordero as exclusive distributor of AFFA fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. With every sale, he will get a commission. Cordero offered for sale SEACAT 25. o Landicho and Tecson are lawyers of Go. Go is the owner of ACG Express Liner in Cebu. Landicho, Tecson and Go made negotiations with Cordero to purchase 2 SEACAT 25s. (Dont get confused with many names, basta si CORDERO ang biktima dito, sila LANDICHO, TECSON at GO ay mga kalaban) o Cordero made trips to AFFA with Go and Landicho to monitor the building of the SEACAT 25. Cordero shouldered all the expenses. o Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson. Cordero tried to contact all of the respondents to clear the issue, but they were not answering. o Cordero flew to AFFA to clarify matters with Robinson but Go and Landicho were already there to negotiate sale of the second SEACAT 25. o Cordero wrote a letter to Go and informed him that dealing directly with Robinson violated his exclusive distributorship. ACG Express Liner thru Go, executed
ISSUE: Whether petitioner (the Association) has the personality to sue, on its own, as a corporation representing its members who are tenants of the House International Building. HELD: NONE. In the present case, the real parties in interest are the tenants of the House International Building and not the petitioner ASSOCIATION, which has a personality separate and distinct from that of its members and therefore it has the capacity to sue and be sued although it is composed of the tenants. Petitioner has not shown any real, actual, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action. (Subject matter: Deed of Conditional Sale) In this connection, the Court of Appeals properly observed: Appellant has sued in its name, but has not alleged any right belonging to it that was violated or any wrong that was committed. The reason is obvious, the benefits are not really meant for appellant but for the unnamed great majority" of its members who have allegedly been tenants of long standing of the building in question. And, quoting from the Brief for the respondent-defendant GSIS, the Court of Appeals further said: Assuming arguendo, that the tenants have the alleged right, such rights of the tenants are personal and individual rights which can only be claimed by the tenants who must necessarily be the indispensable and real parties in interest and certainly not the plaintiff-appellant organization. G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010
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fraudulent actuations and misrepresentations that amounted to a breach of Corderos Exclusive Distributorship. o Robinson, in his defense, claimed that the appointment of Cordero was for one transaction only and that Cordero was offered the exclusive distributorship but failed to submit it within reasonable time. o Landicho, Tecson and Go, in response to the letter, said that they are willing to amicably settle. However, it never materialized. o Cordero filed a complaint with the Bureau of Customs to prohibit entry of SEACAT 25 from Australia based on misdeclaration and undervaluation. Civil Case was instituted by Cordero to hold the 4 respondents for conniving and conspiring to violate his exclusive distributorship, thus depriving him of his commissions. o AFFA cancelled the exclusive distributorship agreement. o Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of action. Denied. o Robinson was declared in default for failure to file his answer with the period prescribed. o Go and Tecson filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Denied. o Subsequently, they filed their answer, denying that they had anything to do with the termination of Corderos authority to distribute exclusively. They averred it was Cordero who was mishandling them in the perfection of the sale. o Pre-trial was reset twice to give opportunity to reach a settlement. o The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Cordero. Respondents filed a motion for new trial, claiming that they were unduly prejudiced due to their counsels negligence. DENIED. Respondents moved to reconsider and filed a notice of appeal. Both were DENIED. Notice of appeal was denied for failure to pay docket fee. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and to transmit the records to the CA. Petition for certiorari was filed with the CA. o CA issued a TRO in the execution orders of the trial court. o CA granted the petition for certiorari. o The trial court set aside their orders. o Cordero appealed in a petition for review. DENIED. o CA sustained the trial court in ruling that Cordero is entitled to damages for the breach. o Motion for reconsiderations were DENIED. Supreme Court: Petition for review under Rule 45 were filed by both parties. o According to Go (the relevant issue for CivPro): Cordero is not a real party in interest
ISSUE: Whether Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach? RULING: According to Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is such party as the one to be benefited or injured by the judgment. The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy. A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.
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The Supreme Court agrees with the CA that Cordero is the exclusive distributor. Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero who alone made decisions in the performance of the exclusive distributorship. Go, Landicho and Tecson never raised Corderos lack of personality to sue, they did so only before the CA when they contended that it is Pamana (Corderos Company) and not Cordero, who was appointed and acted as exclusive distributor for AFFA. We find no error committed by the trial court in overruling Robinsons objection over the improper resort to summons by publication upon a foreign national like him and in an action in personam, notwithstanding that he raised it in a special appearance specifically raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of "personal jurisdiction," it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication. Such motion did not state that it was a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Consequently, Robinson having acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial courts jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Court. FACTS: Golangco,(1995) as a complainant initiated a prosecution for libel against the respondent Fung in RTC Allegedly, the respondent had issued an office memorandum dated May 10, 1995 maliciously imputing against the petitioner the commission of bribery and had sent copies of the memorandum to the petitioners superiors in the POEA and to other public officers and personalities not connected with the POEA, causing damage and prejudice to the petitioner. After 6 years, the Prosecution presented only two witnesses (2001) the Prosecution requested that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued to and served on Atty. Oscar Ramos, Resident Ombudsman of the POEA, to compel him to testify in the libel case The hearing of February 20, 2001 was, however, reset to May 23, 2001 due to the unavailability of Atty. Ramos. On Hearing day the Prosecution still failed to present Atty. Ramos as its witness because no subpoena had been issued to and served on him for the purpose. RTC judge issued an order terminating the Prosecutions presentation of evidence Pet. went to CA on certiorari to assail the order and claimed that the RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion for not issuing the subpoena to require Atty. Ramos to appear and testify in the May 23, 2001 hearing. He contended that his prior request for the subpoena for the February 20, 2001 hearing should have been treated as a continuing request for the subpoena considering that the Rules of Court did not require a party to apply for a subpoena again should it not be served in the first time. Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner and dismissed the petition for certiorari Hence , a Petition for review on certiorari was filed in SC
ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for certiorari of the petitioner?YES Golangco vs. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, SEpt. 8, 2009 Petition for review on certiorari RULLING:
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The gross procedural misstep committed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in his action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He ignored that the People of the Philippines were indispensable parties due to his objective being to set aside the trial courts order dated May 23, 2001 that concerned the public aspect of Criminal Case The omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his petition for certiorari. The petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to his petition for certiorari. At the very least, he should have furnished a copy of the petition for certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing. Pet. violated Administrative Code which mandates the OSG to represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. Therefore, the trial judge did not act capriciously, arbitrarily or whimsically in issuing the assailed order. Thus, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari. G.R. No. 178529 September 4, 2009 in favour of one Gabriel Ching. Before the words "With my Marital Consent" appearing in the REM is a signature attributed to Antonios wife Matilde. On October 5, 1998, Antonio executed an Amendment to the Real Esate Mortgage (AREM) increasing the amount secured by the mortgage to P26 Million, also bearing a signature attributed to his wife Matilde above the words "With my Marital Consent." Antonio died on December 26, 1999. RTC petitioner filed in a "Petition for Sale" for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the AREM and the sale at public auction of the lot covered thereby. RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff scheduled the public auction on December 17, 2003. On December 16, 2003, R filed a Complaint/Petition against petitioner and the Clerk of Court-Ex Oficio Sheriff, for annulment of the AREM, injunction with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages AREM is without force and effect, the same having been executed without the valid consent of the wife of mortgagor Antonio C. Tiu who at the time of the execution of the said instrument was already suffering from advance[d] Alzheimers Disease and, henceforth, incapable of giving consent, more so writing and signing her name The RTC issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. P filed a Motion to Dismiss DENIED Ps MOR DENIED CA P filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction- DENIED.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC. (now known as BANCO DE ORO - EPCI, INC.) Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ANTONIO C. TIU, namely: ARLENE T. FU, MICHAEL U. TIU, ANDREW U. TIU, EDGAR U. TIU and ERWIN U. TIU, Respondents. Facts: Antonio C. Tiu (Antonio), executed on July 6, 1994 a REM in favor of petitioner covering a lot located in Tacloban City to secure a P7 Million loan
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ISSUE: WON the complaint filed by respondents-children of Antonio, without impleading Matilde who must also be Antonios heir and who, along with Antonio, was principally obliged under the AREM sought to be annulled, is dismissible for lack of cause of action. YES SC the petition is GRANTED. The AREM was executed by Antonio, with the marital consent of Matilde. Since the mortgaged property is presumed conjugal, she is obliged principally under the AREM. It is thus she, following Art. 1397 of the Civil Code vis a vis Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, who is the real party in interest, hence, the action must be prosecuted in her name as she stands to be benefited or injured in the action. Assuming that Matilde is indeed incapacitated, it is her legal guardian who should file the action on her behalf. Not only is there no allegation in the complaint, however, that respondents have been legally designated as guardians to file the action on her behalf. The name of Matilde, who is deemed the real party in interest, has not been included in the title of the case, in violation of Sec. 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. G.R. No. 157830. November 17, 2005.* DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented by REYMEL R. SAGARIO, petitioner, vs. MARILOU M. PASCUAL, respondent. Upon the other hand, the pertinent provisions of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court (Parties to Civil Actions) read: SEC. 2 Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party wh o stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the caseand shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Facts: RTC: Dante filed a civil case against his sister Marilou, for the annulment of a TCT, Deed of Absolute Sale, and for the reconveyance of property with damages. Dante is a permanent resident of the U.S., who appointed Sagario as his attorney-in-fact through an SPA.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on annulment of contracts reads: Art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Marilou filed a motion to dismiss. There was non-compliance with requirement of the LGC that there must have been a confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or Pangkat, before filing a claim in court. There is no showing that the dispute was referred to barangay court
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before the case was filed. RTC granted the respondent's motion to dismiss. Where real property or interest therein is involved, the dispute shall be filed before the barangay where the property is located, regardless of the residence of the parties. Ordinarily non-compliance with the condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the cause of action and allow the complaint to be vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The court was of the opinion that the attorney-in-fact shall be deemed the real party in interest, he was therefore obliged to bring the case before the barangay. except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;.... In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso, this Court held that where the parties are not actual residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis-a-vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 [B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other. (Italics supplied) To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a real party in interest as defined in Section 2 of Rule 314 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis-a-vis Section 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood by respondent. In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court. The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioners complaint. G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010
SC: Dante elevated the case straight to the SC, questioning the "palpable legal errors' of the RTC. Petitioner argues that, he, not his attorney in fact is the real party in interest, since he resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction.
Ruling: The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read: SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: . (f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., Petitioners, vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, Respondents. RULING: PETITIONERS HAVE NO LOCUS STANDI. 1. Have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.
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2. Failed to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members. There are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests in the questions being raised. Did not show an actual or immediate danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement. None of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law. Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581. Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by their respective officers who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL), Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157. Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region, and individuals followed suit by filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the AntiTerrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon. The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation,
3. 4. 5.
Facts: Petitioners RESPECTIVELY filed a PETITION CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION BEFORE THE S.C. FOR
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, the Human Security Act of 2007, signed into law on March 6, 2007. Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a nongovernment organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective officers who are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554. BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students, Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers, Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers, and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John
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Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements. ISSUE: Whether the various petitioners in this case has locus standi. 1. HELD: NONE. (ALL OF THEM) Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that: 1. it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; 2. the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and o 3. the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. IN THE CASE AT BAR: o The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of petitioners. No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. o None of them faces any charge under RA 9372. KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, allege that they have been subjected to " close security surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the [S]tate." o Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372. Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law. The petition of BAYAN-ST, pleads the same allegations.
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o Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPPNPA consortium and its allied organizations. 3. There are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests in the questions being raised. o Of recent development is the filing of the first case for proscription under Section 17 of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group. o Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.
2.
They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members. While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372. Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan, urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the policy statement of the Aquino Administration of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the government is not 4.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against them. o o The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. Those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered. Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution.
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The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law. o The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing. The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372. 6. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public. Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. o A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding. o RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law. o It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. o Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key. o
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of "political surveillance," also lacks locus standi. o o Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.
Rule 3, Sec 4 to 6 (Parties to a Civil Action) SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON, JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO HENSON, respondents. Facts: Submitted for adjudication in the instant petition for review on certiorari Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda o They have three children but had been most of the time living separately o Romarico bought a parcel of land in Angeles City from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson
5.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, "which must be settled early" and are of "far-reaching implications," without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may be charged. o Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. o Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement.
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Meanwhile, in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check which, however, was dishonored for lack of funds o Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case o Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no estafa was committed by the issuance of the check in payment of a pre-existing obligation Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money also in the same branch of the aforesaid court Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr. filed an answer with counterclaim but only in behalf of Katrina o Atty. Expedite Yumul, who collaborated with Atty. Albino, appeared for the defendants, it is not shown on record that said counsel also represented Romarico After trial, the court promulgated a decisions in favor of the Wongs, which ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay the former A writ of execution was thereafter issued o Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City covered by TCTs in the name of Romarico married to Katrina The public auction sale was first set for October 30 but since said date was declared a public holiday, the sherrif reset the sale to November 11 The property covered by said title was extrajudicially foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Porac, Pampanga on account of the mortgage loan which they obtained form the bank o Santos and Joson were the highest bidders in the sale Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision in as well as the writ of execution, levy on execution and the auction sale therein in the same Court of First Instance. o alleged that he was "not given his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina The lower court issued an order restraining the Register of Deeds of Angeles City from issuing the final bill of sale of Transfer Certificates of Title in favor of the winning bidders (Santos and Joson) Upon motion of Romarico, the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the sheriff from approving the final bill of sale of the land After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered a decision holding that Romarico was indeed not given his day in court o Pursuant to a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court to the effect that the Court of First Instance or a branch thereof, has authority and jurisdiction to try and decide an action for annulment of a final and executory judgment or order rendered by another court of first instance or of a branch thereof (Gianan vs. Imperial) The defendants appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court o said court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court judgment had not attained finality as the decision therein was not served on him and that he was not represented by counsel estoppel may not be applied against him as, not having been served with the decision The appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court but the same was denied for lack of merit Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari o
Issue: W/N Romarico Henson was guilty of laches and may not now belatedly assert his rights over the properties because he and Katrina were represented by counsel Ruling: No Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when Katrina entered into a business deal with Anita Wong. Thus, when that business transaction eventually resulted in the filing of the case, Romarico acted, or, as charged
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by petitioners, failed to act, in the belief that he was not involved in the personal dealings of his estranged wife. That belief was buttressed by the fact that the complaint itself did not mention or implicate him other than as the husband of Katrina. Laches may not be charged against Romarico because, aside from the fact that he had no knowledge of the transactions of his estranged wife, he was also not afforded an opportunity to defend himself There is no laches or even finality of decision to speak of with respect to Romarico since the decision in the case is null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction for failure to observe the notice requirements prescribed by law Failure to notify Romarico may not be attributed to the fact that the plaintiffs in the case acted on the presumption that the Hensons were still happily married because the complaint itself shows that they did not consider Romarico as a party to the transaction which Katrina undertook with Anita Wong. In all likelihood, the plaintiffs merely impleaded Romarico as a nominal party in the case pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3, Section 4 of the Rules of Court Consequently, the writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico as he has not yet had his day in court and, necessarily, the public auction sale is null and void. Moreover, the power of the court in the execution of judgments extends only over properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor Mariano vs. CA, G.R. No. 151283, June 7, 1989 an appeal to decision of CA FACTS: Esther Sanchez file a case against Lourdes Mariano in CFIcaloocan for recovery of the value of ladies' ready made dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued at Esther Sanchez' instance, upon a bond posted by Veritas Insurance Company in the amount of P 11,000.00, and resulted in the seizure of Lourdes Mariano's property worth P 15,000.00. Motion for the discharge of the attachment was filed by Lourdes- denied she went up to CA on certiorari- ordered Trial Court to receive evidence on whether or not the attachment had been improvidently or irregularly issued The Trial Court did so, came to the conclusion that the attachment had indeed been improperly issued, and consequently dissolved it. RTC ruled in favor of defendant Lourdes. Sanchez filed a notice of appeal, an appeal bond and a record on appeal. Pending approval of the record on appeal, Lourdes Mariano filed a motion for the immediate execution of the judgment which the CFI granted. The sheriff garnished the sum of P 11,000.00 from Veritas Insurance Company, and levied on real and personal property belonging to the conjugal partnership of Esther and her husband, Daniel Esther then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, praying for the annulment of the execution pending appeal authorized by the Trial Court- dismissed. Husband filed a complaint for annulment of the execution in the CFI-QC in his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership He alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, moreover, some of the personal property levied on, such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from execution. He also applied for a preliminary injunction pending adjudication of the case on the merits. Lourdes moved to dismiss the complaint- denied She instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the CA to th th enjoin CFI QC-7 div. granted but the 8 div. dismissed th th Lourdes motion.(8 div decided the case cause Justice in 7 th was transferred to 8 he brought the case)
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CA ruled that QC Court had not interfered with the execution process of the Caloocan Court because Daniel Sanchez's action in the former court raised an issue-the validity of the sheriffs levy on the conjugal partnership assets of the Sanchez spouses different from those adjudicated in the Caloocan Court, and Sanchez was not a party to the case tried by the latter. Hence Lourdes filed the present petition in SC. Lourdes contention: Her action against Esther Sanchez was justified, the litigation being "incidental to the ... business in which she is engaged and consequently, the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez was liable for the debts and obligations contracted by Esther in her business since the income derived therefrom, having been used to defray some of the expenses for the maintenance of the family and the education of the children, had redounded to the benefit of the partnership. It was therefore error for the CA to have rule that Husband is not bound by the decision of CFI Caloocan. RULLING:The husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. Whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal assets. For it being established, that Esther had engaged in business with her husband's consent, and the income derived therefrom had been expended, in part at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wife's obligations in the premises cannot be disputed. Therefore, CA decision is reversed and CFI-QC is ordered to dismiss the case. G.R. No. 145222 April 24, 2009 SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, Petitioners, vs. RTC Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO NICOL, Respondents. Facts: Before this Court is a petition for certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47029 and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The case stemmed from the following factual backdrop: RTC Branch 19 Bacoor, Cavite Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) Said action originated from Erlinda Nicols civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners. Ordered Erlinda to pay damages. Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this Court. It became final and executory on 5 March 1992. TC issued a writ of execution Finding Erlinda Nicols personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to put up a sheriffs indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder.
1
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Respondent, alleged that the petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent claimed that his property which was valued at P500,000.00 was only sold at a "very low price" of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution. respondent should have filed the case with Branch 19 where the judgment originated and which issued the order of execution, writ of execution, notice of levy and notice of sheriffs sale. dismissed respondents complaint and ruled that Branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case. MOR denied. If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim. When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose. (Emphasis Supplied) A third-party claimant may also resort to an independent separate action, the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property. If a separate action is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which
CA Reversed the TC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by appellant. Petitioners MOR - denied on 23 August 2000.
SC rule 65 Petitioner filed the instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of CA SC remedy should be appeal but SC decided on the case anyway.
Issue: WON the husband of the judgment debtor may file an independent action to protect the conjugal property subject to execution? YES and Branch 21 has jurisdiction over the case Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.
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the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ.+ This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?" In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals and Sy v. Discaya, the Court stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal property.lawphil.net Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not. partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. The civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda coun NOT have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21. Petitioners failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case to Branch 21 for further proceedings. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. No. L-25916. April 30, 1970. GAUDENCIO A. BEGOSA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHAIRMAN, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION;and MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS,PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, defendants-appellants. Facts: Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain benefits to which he believed he was entitled to under the Veteran's Bill of Rights. He filed a claim for disability, but it was erroneously disapproved due to his dishonorable discharge from the military. The PVA finally approved his claim entitling him to Php 30/month, to begin on Oct 5, 1964.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 16 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime orquasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
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CFI Believing that his pension should have taken effect in 1955, and that he is entitled to a higher pension as an incapacitated person, he filed a case against the PVA. The PVA claims that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case, because, in reality, this is a suit against the government and they invoke the non-suability of the state without its consent. The CFI ruled in Begosas's favor approving the back payments and adjusted amounts. The PVA elevated the matter to the SC on appeal. Ruling: The fourth assignment of error assails what it considers to be the failing of the lower court in not holding that the complaint in this case is in effect a suit against the State which has not given its consent thereto. We have recently had occasion to reaffirm the force and primacy of the doctrine of nonsuability. It does not admit of doubt, then, that if the suit were in fact against the State, the lower court should have dismissed the coinplaint. Nor is it to be doubted that while ostensibly an action may be against a public official, the defendant may in reality be the government. As a result, it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. Such is the present case. The doctrine announced by us in Ruiz v. Cabahug finds relevance: We hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amended complaint, which should be taken on its face value the suit is not one against the Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment and recognition until the contending architects have established their respective rights and interests MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees. RULING: BUREAU OF CUSTOMS CANNOT BE SUED, PROPRIETARY FUNCTION (ARRASTRE SERVICE) IS ONLY AN INCIDENT TO ITS PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTION. Facts: 4 cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville", consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., (Petitioner). The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila and was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee 3 cases only of the shipment. CFI OF MANILA: RECOVER THE VALUE OF THE UNDELIVERED CASE PLUS DAMAGES. o Petitioner filed a suit against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done. As a matter of fact, in an earlier case where we sustained the power of a private citizen claiming title to and right of possession of a certain property to sue an officer or agent of the government alleged to be illegally withholding the same, we likewise expressed this caveat: However, and this is important, where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of said Government. G.R. No. L-23139 December 17, 1966
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o o o o of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages. DEFENDANTS: MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT. ALLEGATION: not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT SUABLE. o a unit of the Bureau of Custom, set up under Customs Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962. It follows that the defendants herein cannot he sued under the first two abovementioned categories of natural or juridical persons.
PETITION FOR REVIEW IN THE SC. CONTENTION: BUREAU OF CUSTOMS IS DISCHARGING PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS AND AS SUCH, CAN BE SUED.
The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. o If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. IN THE CASE AT BAR, The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance, with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. 2. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties.
ISSUE: Whether the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs can be sued. HELD: No. Cannot be sued, such proprietary function is but an incident to its principal government function, thus, Bureau of Customs is immune from suit. The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide: SECTION 1. Who may be parties.Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued. 1. Neither the Bureau of Customs nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the Customs Arrastre Service, is a person. o o They are merely parts of the machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department of Finance; and as stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is
To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations. Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that
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engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end. Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed. It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. From the provision authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease arrastre operations to private parties, Court sees no authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances where it undertakes to conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary. plaintiff has adopted a credit system known as the American Express Credit Card o defendant applied for one such card to the plaintiff at the latter's office in New York City Thereafter and before the card expired was cancelled as of June 20, 1961 the defendant used it in making purchases and obtaining services on credit in various foreign countries plaintiff made demands for payment upon the defendant, and after the latter refused to pay filed the presented suit for collection o
Issue: W/N plaintiff has no cause of action against him, not being a real party in interest. (He alleged that American Express merely introduced him to different establishment, who shouldve brought the suit upon his nonpayment) Held: Ratio: With regard to the proper party filing the suit This corporation pays for the purchase and the defendant has to reimburse such payment to the owner of the credit card; in this case to the plaintiff On the same point the witness also stated that the charge orders of the appellant were in due course of business submitted by the establishments concerned to the appellee for payment and paid by the latter. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the appellee is the creditor of the appellant and as such is the proper party to file this suit for collection No
AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, INC. v CIRIO H. SANTIAGO Facts: This case is on appeal directly to this Court by the defendant from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sentencing him to pay the plaintiff The plaintiff is a foreign corporation with main office in New York City and a branch office in the Philippines which is duly registered and licensed to transact business as a travel agent
With regard to Sec.20 Rule 24 The appellant also objected to the admission of the aforesaid deposition as a whole on the ground that the procedure prescribed in Section 20 of Rule 24 was not followed, particularly that portion which states that the officer who took the deposition shall "promptly file it with the court in which the action is pending or send it by registered mail to the Clerk of Court thereof for filing."
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The non-compliance with this rule, according to the appellant, consists in the fact that it was the appellee's counsel who picked up the deposition from the Department of Foreign Affairs and delivered it to the Clerk of Court instead of its being filed directly with the latter We do not believe that the manner, in which the deposition was delivered to the Clerk of Court, as above related, so affected its integrity as to render it inadmissible. After all there is no pretense here that the appellant did not contract the indebtedness for the collection of which he is being sued or that the same has been paid, the only important issue posed in this appeal being whether or not the appellee is the real party in interest. On this score the finding of the lower court, supported as it is by the evidence before it, is conclusive. Trial Court ruled in favor of Bulawan. Register of Deeds of Legazpi City is ordered to cancel the title. CA: Yan appealed to the CA. Dismissed. Affirmed Trial Court. o The Trial Courts decision became final and executory. Register of Deeds informed Aquende of the trail courts writ of execution. Aquende questioned the trial courts writ of execution. He alleged that he was unaware of any litigation involving his property. He received no Summons or notice, nor was he aware of any adverse claim as no notice lis pendens was inscribed in his title. Respondent filed a third party claim against the writ because it affected his property and he is not bound by the trial courts orders because he is not a party to the suit. Clerk of Court said it was the wrong remedy because his property was not in sheriffs possession nor was it up for auction. Respondent filed a notice of appearance with third party motion. Aquende also filed a Supplemental Motion where he reiterated that he was not a party in the Civil Case and that since the action was in personam or quasi in rem, only the parties in the case are bound by the decision. Trial Court denied Respondents motions. According to Trial Court their jurisdiction was lost when CA affirmed. Aquende filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Aquende alleged that he was deprived of his property without due process of law. Bulawan conveniently failed to implead him despite her knowledge of the existing title in his name and prevented him from participating in the proceedings and protecting his title. Aquende added that he is an indispensable party and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was not impleaded as a party in the case. Trial court went beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the allegations on the complaint because Bulawan did not pray for the cancellation of the TCT. CA ruled in favor of Respondent. o MR was denied. o The Court of Appeals ruled that it may still entertain the petition despite the fact that another division of the Court of Appeals already affirmed the trial courts Decision. The o
Rule 3, Secs 7 to 12 (Parties to a Civil Action) G.R. No. 182819 June 22, 2011 MAXIMINA A. BULAWAN, Petitioner, vs. EMERSON B. AQUENDE, Respondent. Facts:
Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages against Yap and the Register of Deeds. o Bulawan is the owner of a lot bought from Yaptengco Brothers, who claims they inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun. o Petitioner alleged that Yap claimed ownership of the property and caused the issuance of a TCT in Yaps name. o Yap clarified that she asserts ownership of the lot, and that according to an earlier civil case, the trial court declared that the lot of Bulawan was simulated by the Yaptengco Brothers. The trial court ruled that Yap Chin Cun was the rightful owner. o Yap Chin Cun sold the property to the Aquendes (respondent)
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other division of the Court of Appeals was not given the opportunity to rule on the issue of Aquende being an indispensable party because that issue was not raised during the proceedings before the trial court and on appeal. o The CA declared that Aquende was an indispensable party affected by the trial court. Trial court should have impleaded Aquende under Section 11, Rule 3. Jurisdiction was not properly acquired over Aquende, the CA ruling affirming the trial court is void. The Court of Appeals added that the trial courts decision was void because the trial court failed to note that the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Partition, from where the Yaptengco brothers derived their ownership, as heirs of Yap Chin Cun and now being claimed by Bulawan, had already been declared void in an earlier Civil Case. The Court of Appeals also said that a reading of Bulawans complaint showed that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order the nullification of TCT because this was not one of the reliefs that Bulawan prayed for. Hence this petition in the SC assailing the decision of the CA. the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void The trial court should have taken the initiative to implead Aquende as defendant or to order Bulawan to do so as mandated under Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The burden to implead or to order the impleading of indispensable parties is placed on Bulawan and on the trial court, respectively. Even if Aquende were not an indispensable party, he could still file a petition for annulment of judgment. We have consistently held that a person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and that he would be adversely affected thereby. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Bulawan obtained a favorable judgment from the trial court by the use of fraud. Bulawan prevented Aquende from presenting his case before the trial court and from protecting his title over his property. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the 26 November 1996 Decision adversely affected Aquende as he was deprived of his property without due process. Moreover, a person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger. The Petition for Annulment of Judgment is the Propert Remedy as Aquende was affected by the Trail Courts decision even if he was not a party to the case.
Issue: Whether Aquende is the proper party to sue for the annulment of judgment? Ruling: Petition has no merit. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts action in the litigation. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and
Dael vs. Teves, 136 SCRA 199 (1985) Petition for Review on certiorari R 65 FACTS:
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Dael spouses filed in CFI-Misamis Oriental a complaint for: "Ownership, Recovery of Possession & Damages" against the private respondentsEdorot EDOROT filed Answer with Counterclaim The case was set for pre-trial on various occasions to give the parties more chance to arrive at an amicable settlement (the original Judge was Malvar but he was transferred and TEVESone of respondents was appointed to take Malvars place) the case was set for pre-trial before Judge Teves who ordered amendment of complaint to include the heirs or representatives of 2 deceased defendantsHerminigildo and Petra EDOROT filed an Ex- Parte Manifestation, praying that the case be dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for failure of petitioners to file an amended complaintgranted MR- denied Hence direct appeal to SC. Section 2.Parties in interest. Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. All persons who claim an interest in the controversy or the subject thereof adverse to the plaintiff, or who are necessary to complete determination or settlement of the question involved therein shall be joined as defendants. Section 7.Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties . Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. In the case of Garchitorena, et al. vs. de los Santos, et al. No.L17045, June 30, 1962, 115 Phil. 490, citing Bautista vs. Teodoro, 54 O.G. 619; Dizon vs. Garcia, et al., G.R. No. L-14690, November 29, 1960 the SC held that: Where the Court orders the plaintiff to amend its complaint within a certain period of time in order to implead as party defendants one who is not a party to the case but who is an indispensable party, plaintiff's refusal to comply with such order is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Therefore, Heirs of deceased defendants are indispensable parties who should be compulsory joined as defendants in the case and since the petitioners failed to comply with this Order, respondent Judge acted within his prerogative in dismissing the complaint. G.R. No. L-44339 December 2, 1987 CRISANTA F. SENO, CAROLA SENO SANTOS, MANUEL SENO, JR., DIANA SENO CONDER, EMILY SENO and WALTER SENO, plaintiffs, vs. MARCOS MANGUBAT and Spouses FRANCISCO LUZAME and VERGITA PENAFLOR, ANDRES EVANGELISTA and BIENVENIDO MANGUBAT, defendants.
Daels contention: Respondent Judge abused its discretion in ordering them to file amended complaint to include the heirs of deceased defendants. NO RULLING: Petitioners here claim that they are owners of the parcel of land in question while respondents also claim to be the owners and possessors, pro-indiviso by inheritance from their deceased parents, of the subject litigated parcel. Then, deceased defendants have an undivided interest, right and participation adverse to that of the petitioners' in the property in litigation. Since both of them are already even prior to the filing of the complaint against them in the court below and their interest in the property in question having inured by intestacy to their heirs, the latter thereby became the real parties in interest who should be impleaded as defendants without whom no final determination of Civil Case can be had. Sections 2 and 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides-
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Facts: This is an appeal that was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1, dated September 29,1972 in Civil Case No. 12205 dismissing the action for 2 reformation of instrument and annulment of subsequent sale. Plaintiff Crisanta Seno, a widow and herein defendant Marcos Mangubat agreed on a mortgage for the sum of P15,000.00 with a stipulation that as long as the 2% per month interest is being paid, the mortgage over the property will not be foreclosed. On the assurance of defendant Marcos Mangubat, a practicing lawyer, Seno agreed to the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property for a consideration of P5,000.00 in favor of defendant Mangubat and certain Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat on July 17, 1961 On January 8, 1962 Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat executed a Deed of Absolute Sale transferring their share in the subject property to defendant Marcos Mangubat; Someyim in 1963, when plaintiff Crisanta F. Seno failed to pay the monthly interest of 2%, she was sued for ejectment by defendant Marcos Mangubat alleging non-payment of rentals; Seno also learned that defendant Marcos Mangubat sold the subject property in favor of spouses Francisco Luzame and Vergita Penaflor and Sena claimed that the spouses Luzame and Penaflor bought the property in bad faith since they had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the transaction between plaintiff and defendant Marcos Mangubat. Defendant spouses Luzame filed an ejectment case against plaintiff Crisanta Seno for alleged non-payment of rentals. RTC Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking: 1) the reformation of a Deed of Sale executed in favor of defendant Marcos Mangubat and, 2) the annulment of a subsequent sale to defendant spouses Francisco Luzame and Vergita Penaflor of a parcel of land in Barrio Dongalo, Paranaque, Rizal.
On motion of defendant spouses Luzame and Penaflor, TC the inclusion as defendants of Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat on the ground that they are indispensable parties, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint impleading Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat as defendants. The newly impleaded defendants moved for the dismissal of the case against them on the ground of prescription - granted Defendants Luzame, Penaflor and Mangubat in their motion for reconsideration asked the court a quo to dismiss the case against all the defendants- GRANTED court is no longer in a position to grant plaintiffs' demands, principally the reformation of subject Deed of Absolute Sale.
Plaintiffs MOR - denied CA Plaintiffs filed an appeal praying for the reversal of the orders of the TC dismissing the complaint
SC CA certified the instant case to this Court holding that the assignment of errors made by plaintiffs in their appeal raised purely legal questions
ISSUE: WON defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat indispensable parties in the case without whom no action can be properly taken thereon? NO. For the determination of this issue, We find it necessary to consider the distinction between indispensable and proper parties as clearly stated in Sections 7 and 8, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which provide:
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Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. Sec. 8. Joinder of proper parties. When persons who are not indispensable but who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded as between those already parties, have not been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to both service of process and venue, the court shall order them summoned to appear in the action. But the court may, in its discretion, proceed in the action without making such persons parties, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such persons. Under Section 7, indispensable parties must always be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the court cannot proceed without them. Necessary parties must be joined, under Section 8, in order to adjudicate the whole controversy and avoid multiplicity of suits. Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. In the present case, there are no rights of defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat to be safeguarded if the sale should be held to be in fact an absolute sale not if the sale is held to be an equitable mortgage. Defendant Marcos Mangubat became the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the sale to him of the shares of the aforementioned defendants in the property. Said defendants no longer have any interest in the subject property. However, being parties to the instrument sought to be reformed, their presence is necessary in order to settle all the possible issues of tile controversy. Whether the disputed sale be declared an absolute sale or an equitable mortgage, the rights of all the defendants will have been amply protected. Defendants-spouses Luzame in any event may enforce their rights against defendant Marcos Mangubat. In fact the plaintiffs were not after defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat as shown by their non-inclusion in the complaint and their opposition to the motion to include said defendants in the complaint as indispensable parties. It was only because they were ordered by the court a quo that they included the said defendants in the complaint. The lower court erroneously held that the said defendants are indispensable parties. Notwithstanding, defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat not being indispensable parties but only proper parties, their joinder as parties defendants was correctly ordered being in accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3. By the dismissal of the case against defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat, the court a quohad lost jurisdiction over them. We have already pointed out that the joinder of proper parties is necessary in order to determine all the possible issues of the controversy; but if for some reason or another it is not possible to join them, as when they are out of the jurisdiction of the Court, the court may proceed without them, and the judgment that may be rendered shall be without prejudice to their rights. Hence, notwithstanding the absence of said defendants, the court could still proceed with the trial of the case as against the remaining defendants in accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3. Nevertheless, the court is constrained to affirm the dismissal of the complaint against all the defendants as there is merit in the argument raised by defendants-appellees that plaintiffs are barred by laches to bring suit against them. A perusal of the records shows that from the time of the execution of the deed of sale on July 17, 1961 to the time of the filing of the present complaint on August 29, 1969 or a period of 8 years, I month and 12 days, plaintiffs never took any step to enforce their rights which they claim to have despite the several opportunities available to them.
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Defendant Marcos Mangubat filed an ejectment suit against plaintiff Crisanta Seno in 1963 and this fact was admitted by the plaintiffs in their complaint. For failure of plaintiff to appear in the case, a decision was rendered by the 25 trial court ordering plaintiffs to vacate the subject property which decision 26 was duly executed. It further appears from the complaint that plaintiffs were well aware of the transfer of the title from the name of plaintiff Crisanta Seno to the names of defendants Marcos Mangubat, Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat and subsequently to the name of defendant Marcos Mangubat alone as early as 1963 when the ejectment case was filed against plaintiffs, and also they did not do anything about it. In January 1969, plaintiffs learned of the sale of the subject property to defendants-spouses Luzame. but it was only on August 29, 1969 when plaintiffs brought this action and only after an ejectment case was filed by said defendant spouses against plaintiff Crisanta Seno before the Municipal Court of Paranaque, Rizal on August 4, 1969. As defendants-appellees contend, before the nine-year period lapsed, plaintiffs never raised a voice to protest against all these proceedings. They chose to sleep on their rights and to rely on defendants' alleged word that their true agreement would be respected rather than bring their grievances to a court of law. However, when an ejectment case was filed against them just when the 10-year prescriptive period for bringing of their suit was nearly over, they finally decided to stake their claim against the defendants. By the negligence of plaintiffs in asserting their rights for an unreasonable length of time, they are now forever precluded from enforcing whatever right they may have against defendants. Indeed, it is an indicia of the infirmity of their claim. G.R. No. 166302. July 28, 2005 LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC., Petitioners, vs. ERLINDA DELA CRUZ, LEONOR MAMAUAG, LOURDES CAUBA, JOSEPHINE DOMANAIS, ARLENE CAGAYAT, AMELITA YAM, VIVIAN DOMARAIS, MARILYN ANTALAN, CHRISTOPHER RAMIREZ, ARNOLD SAN PEDRO, MARISSA SAN PEDRO, LORELI JIMENEZ, JEFFREY BUENO, CHRISTOPHER CAGAYAT, GERARD CABILES, JOAN ENRIQUEZ, JOSEPH DE LA CRUZ, NELLY CLERIGO, DULCE NAVARETTE, ROWENA BELLO, DANIEL RAMIREZ, AILEEN BAUTISTA and BALTAZAR FERRERA, Respondents. Facts This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying reconsideration thereof. Private respondent (petitioner herein) Lotte Phils., Inc. (Lotte) and 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services ("7J") entered into a contract with private respondent to provide manpower for needed maintenance, utility, janitorial and other services to the latter. However, private respondent dispensed with their services allegedly due to the expiration/termination of the service contract by respondent with 7J. Labor Arbiter Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a labor complaint against both private respondent Lotte and 7J, for illegal dismissal, regularization, payment of corresponding backwages and related employment benefits, 13th month pay, service incentive leave, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees based on total judgment award. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment declaring 7J as employer of respondents. The arbiter also found 7J guilty of illegal dismissal Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) praying that Lotte be declared as their direct employer because 7J is merely a labor-only contractor. In its decision, the NLRC found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the labor arbiter and affirmed its ruling that 7J is the employer of respondents and solely liable for their claims. Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in a resolution dated June 18, 2002. CA
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Undaunted, they filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals against the NLRC and Lotte, insisting that their employer is Lotte and not 7J. Lotte, however, denied that respondents were its employees. It prayed that the petition be dismissed for failure to implead 7J who is a party interested in sustaining the proceedings in court, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In its decision, the Court of Appeals declared Lotte as the real employer of respondents and that 7J who engaged in labor-only contracting was merely the agent of Lotte. Lottes motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition Lotte asserts that 7J is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded in respondents petition in the Court of Appeals. It claims that the petition before the Court of Appeals was dismissible for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 46 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Issue Whether or not the Petition is dismissible for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 46 in relation to Section 5, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Ruling Petitioners contention is tenable. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case". Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest because it will be affected by the outcome of the case. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the employer of respondents. The Court of Appeals however rendered Lotte jointly and severally liable with 7J who was not impleaded by holding that the former is the real employer of respondents. Plainly, its decision directly affected 7J. In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefore. Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, respondents failed to include it in their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over 7J. No final ruling on this matter can be had without impleading 7J, whose inclusion is necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the case and in order to accord all parties with due process and fair play.
G.R. NO. 93010 August 30, 1990. NICENCIO TAN QUIOMBING, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPS. FRANCISCO AND MANUELITA A. SALIGO, respondents. RULING: INCLUSION OF BISCOCHO AS CO-PLAINTIFF WOULD BE USELESS FORMALITY, BEING SOLIDARY CREDITORS, EITHER ONE OF THEM MAY SUE FOR THE RECOVERY OF DEBT.
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Facts: This case stemmed stemmed from a Construction and Service Agreement whereby Nicencio Quiombing and Dante Biscocho jointly and severally bound themselves to construct a house for private respondents Saligo for P137, 940.00 which the latter agreed to pay. Subsequently, Quiombing and Manuelita Saligo entered into a second written agreement whereby the latter acknowledged the completion of the house and undertook to pay the balance of the contract price. Manuelita signed a promissory note for P125, 363.50 representing the amount still due from her and her husband payable on or before December 31, 1984 to Quiombing. RTC: PETITIONER: RECOVERY OF MONEY. RESPONDENTS: MOVED TO DISMISS. ALLEGATION: BISCOCHO WAS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY, SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED AS CO-PLAINTIFF. o On October 9, 1986, Quiombing filed a complaint for recovery of the said amount. o Instead of filing an answer, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Biscocho was an indispensable party and therefore should have been included as co-plaintiff. RTC: MOTION GRANTED, COMPLAINT DISMISSED. o Motion was denied but subsequently reconsidered and granted by the trial court. o Complaint was dismissed but without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint to include the other solidary creditor as co-plaintiff. PETITIONER: APPEALED THE DISMISSAL. ALLEGATION: SOLIDARY CREDITOR, COULD ACT ALONE. o Quiombing appealed the order of dismissal to the CA. o He argued that as a solidary creditor, he could act by himself alone in the enforcement of his claim against the respondents. CA: AFFIRMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether Biscocho should be joined as co-plaintiff in this case. HELD: NO. It did not matter who as between Quiombing and Biscocho filed the complaint because private respondents were liable to either of the two as a solidary creditor for the full amount of the debt. Full satisfaction of a judgement obtained against respondents by Quiombing would discharge their obligation to Biscocho and vice versa. Hence, it was NOT necessary for both Quiombing and Biscocho to file the complaint. Inclusion of Biscocho as a co-plaintiff, when Quiombing was competent to sue by himself alone, would be useless formality. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either one of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even necessary because complete relief may be obtained from either. The participation of Biscocho is not at all necessary, much less indispendable. March 8, 2011
G.R. No. 187714
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, Petitioners, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,Respondents.
Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!" In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act particularly the P200 million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706 and was referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics Committee)
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Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives to the Ethics Committee. After consultation with the members of the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee.Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee, but he promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minoritys decision on the ma tter is final. Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Committee Rules) which was published in the Official Gazette Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villars case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions. Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings. Petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole, questioned the determination of the quorum. petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would constitute the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole Respondent proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706. The Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry with a directive to all Senators to come up with a decision on the preliminary report
Respondent declared that there was substantial evidence to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference was set Petitioners came to this Court for relief In its Comment, respondent argues among others that the instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an indispensable party. In the alternative, the instant petition should be archived until such time that the said indispensable party has been joined or impleaded and afforded the opportunity to be heard
ISSUE: W/N Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an indispensable party in this petition HELD: Indispensable Party Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SEC. 7 Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows: An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward. A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an
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indispensable party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation. In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigals interest. The nature of Senator Madrigals interest in this case is not of the nature that this case could not be resolved without her participation. Petition partly granted.1awphi the Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued a Summary Deportation Order against respondent Scheer respondent, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order o complaint was dismissed BOC did not resolve the respondents motion. The respondent was neither arrested nor deported District Court of Straubing dismissed the criminal case against the respondent for physical injuries. o He was later on issued a regular passport to the respondent BOC still failed to resolve the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed office and upon her orders, Marine operatives and BID agents apprehended the respondent in his residence and held him in custody while awaiting his deportation o Despite entreaties from the respondents wife[21]and his employees, the petitioner refused to release the respondent respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the respondents deportation the Court of Appeals issued a status quo order restraining the petitioner from deporting the respondent on a bond BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution pendente lite denying the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Bail/Recognizance
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioner, vs. HERBERT MARKUS EMIL SCHEER, Respondent.
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision of the Court of Appeals Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt, Germany, applied for avpermanent resident status and the same was granted o An Alien Certificate of Registration was issued in his favor The Vice Consul informed the Philippine Ambassador to Bonn, Germany, that respondent had police records and financial liabilities in Germany respondent was wanted by the German Federal Police; that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him
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petitioner alleged that BOC was an indispensable party to the petition as it was a real party in interest and that petitioners failure to implead the BOC warranted the denial of the petition o petitioner claimed that the fact that Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo was impleaded as the sole respondent was not enough, as she is only one of the four Commissioners Court of Appeals ruled: o There are quite a number of cases in relevant jurisprudence wherein only the Immigration Commissioner was impleaded to decide whether an alien may stay or be deported o the nonjoinder of an indispensable party or the real party interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of the petition. The court before which the petition is filed must first require the joinder of such party. It is the noncompliance with said order that would be a ground for the dismissal of the petition However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action o Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor. o The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.. o Supreme Court has full powers, apart from that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-in-interest. In this case, the CA did not require the respondent to implead the BOC as respondent, but merely relied on the rulings of the Court in some cases o The CAs reliance on the said rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts subject of the petition in the two cases were those of the Immigration Commissioner and not those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a necessary nor even an indispensable party in the aforecited cases
ISSUE: whether the members of the BOC were indispensable parties HELD: Yes BOC was an indispensable party to the respondents petition forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. o The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff
Chua vs. Torres, G.R. No. 151900, Aug. 30, 2005 Petition for ReviewR.45 Facts: Chua filed a complaint for damges in RTC-caloocanimpleading her brother Jonathan Chua as a necessary co-plaintiff against defendants Jorge Torres(owner of Caltex) and Antonio Beltran(employee)
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The complaint alleged that Jonathan issued in favor of the Caltex Service Center his personal RCBC Check (P9,849.20) in payment for purchases of diesel oil. However, the check was dishonored by the drawee bank when presented for payment on the ground that the account was closed. Beltran sent petitioner a demand letter informing her of the dishonor of the check and demanding the payment thereof. Petitioner ignored the demand letter on the ground that she was not the one who issued the said check.Beltran instituted against petitioner a criminal action for violation (B.P. 22) filed in MTC-caloocanissued a warrant of arrest against petitioner. The police officers tasked with serving the warrant looked for her in her residence, in the auto repair shop of her brother, and even at the Manila Central University were she was enrolled as a medical student, all to the alleged embarrassment and social humiliation of petitioner. Respondents move to dismiss the damage suit on the ground that Jonathan did not signed the verification and cerftification against non-forum shopping- granted Chua moved for MR-denied Hence she went to SC via R.45 petitioner. There is no allegation in the complaint alleging any violation or omission of any right of Jonathan, either arising from contract or from law. MISJOINDER OF JONATHAN, EFFECT: A misjoined party plaintiff has no business participating in the case as a plaintiff in the first place, and it would make little sense to require the misjoined party in complying with all the requirements expected of plaintiffs. Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. Misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties, and the dropping of misjoined parties from the complaint may be done motuproprio by the court,at any stage, without need for a motion to such effect from the adverse party. Section 11, Rule 3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while erroneous, may be corrected with ease through amendment, without further hindrance to the prosecution of the suit. It should then follow that any act or omission committed by a misjoined party plaintiff should not be cause for impediment to the prosecution of the case, much less for the dismissal of the suit. After all, such party should not have been included in the first place, and no efficacy should be accorded to whatever act or omission of the party. Since the misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from the court as either an indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it then follows that whatever action or inaction the misjoined party may take on the verification or certification against forum-shopping is inconsequential. Therefore, Jonathans failure to sign the certification against forum shopping was not a ground for dismissal of complaint.
RULING: JONATHAN AS NECESSARY PARTY: Section 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. In this case Jonathan does not stand to be affected if RTC rule either favorably or unfavorably of the complaint. This is due to the nature of the cause of action of the complaint, which alleges an injury personal to petitioner, and the relief prayed for, which is to be adjudicated solely to
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G.R. No. 84895 May 4, 1989 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, JOSE D. CAMPOS, JR., petitioner-intervenor, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, TEODORO Q. PEA, GORGONIO MACARIOLA, ORLANDO PACIENCIA, JESUS TUPALAR SEVERINO DELA CRUZ, and FE CORTEZO, respondents. Facts: Sandiganbayan petitioner filed with respondent Court a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Alfredo (Bejo) T. Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Jose D. Campos, Jr. and forty five (45) other defendants including the above-named private respondents, seeking to 'recover from them ill-gotten wealth at the expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. defendant Jose D, Campos, Jr., filed a 'Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Respect to Jose D. Campos' praying that he be removed as party defendant from the complaint on the grounds that he had: voluntarily surrendered or turned over [any share in his name on any of the corporations referred to, aside from claiming any interest, ownership or right thereon] to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines' and that he was 'entitled to the immunity granted by the Presidential Commission on Good Government pursuant to Executive Order No. 14, under the Commission's Resolution dated May 28, 1986 ... to Mr. Jose Y. Campos (and) his family he 'being a member of the immediate family of Jose Y. Campos.' petitioner (RP) filed with the respondent Court a 'Motion' seeking to drop defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. from the Complaint on the ground that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG for short) had, in a Resolution dated May 28, 1986, granted immunity to Mr. Jose Y. Campos and his family, which immunity necessarily extends to defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. who is the son of said Mr. Jose Y. Campos. private respondents opposed petitioner's motion Sandiganbayan DENIED petitioner's and Jose D. Campos, Jr.'s motions to drop him from the complaint. MOR was also DENIED 1) The PCGG did not then and does not now have the power to grant civil immunity; 2) Even if it did, the grant of immunity itself rendered in the PCGG's resolution dated May 28, 1986 has not been shown to cover the transactions involving the corporations and or properties for which Jose D. Campos, Jr., is now sought to be held accountable, i.e., Metroport Services, Inc.; 3) The fact is that nowhere, either in the original motions or in the Motion for Reconsideration before this Court has it been shown that, save for the alleged unqualified immunity, there no longer exists any demandable claim against Jose D. Campos, Jr., arising from the transactions resulting in his being impleaded thereon. In other words, were it not for the supposed grant of immunity, Jose D. Campos, Jr., would remain liable in the matter of Metroport Services, Inc., and for the 60% which Alfredo (Bejo) Romualdez acquired therein according to paragraph 14 (c) of the Complaint (supra) which does not appear to have been restored or compensated for. (p. 54, Rollo) The petitioner contends otherwise. The Solicitor General asserts that the name of Jose D. Campos, Jr. was included as defendant in the complaint through mistake or oversight and that pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court it has a right to drop him as defendant without prior consent of any party. The Solicitor General also maintains that although the defendants in the case were charged solidarily, Campos, Jr. was not an indispensable party since Article 1216 of the Civil Code allows the petitioner as solidary creditor to choose among the solidary debtors against whom it win enforce collection. Jose Campos, Jr. adds that the petitioner's motion to drop him as defendant should be considered as one filed under section 1, Rule
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17 of the Revised Rules of Court thus giving it the absolute right to dismiss the action by mere notice of dismissal. SC The petitioner (RP) charges the Sandiganbayan with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying its motion to drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as defendant in its complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages filed against Jose D. Campos, Jr. and the other defendants Petition in intervention of Jose D. Campos, Jr. Was allowed. the dropping be 'on such terms as are just-just to all the other parties. There is nothing whimsical or capricious in dropping the petitioner-intervenor from the complaint. Quite the contrary, it is based on sound and salutary reasons. The PCGG's motion to drop Campos, Jr. as defendant in Civil Case No. 0010 has legal basis under Executive Order No. 14. The fact that Campos, Jr. and all the other defendants were charged solidarily in the complaint does not make him an indispensable party. We have ruled in the case of Operators Incorporated v. American Biscuit Co., Inc., [154 SCRA 738 (1987)] that "Solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the creditor 'may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously." There is no showing that the dropping of Jose Campos, Jr. as in defendant would be unjust to the other defendants in the civil case because, the other defendants can still pursue the case and put up their defenses. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is ordered to drop Jose Campos, Jr. as defendant in Civil Case No. 0010. G.R. No. 166519 March 31, 2009 NIEVES PLASABAS and MARCOS MALAZARTE, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former Ninth Division), DOMINADOR LUMEN, and AURORA AUNZO, Respondents. Facts Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the resolution denying reconsideration of the challenged decision.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner (RP) can validly drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as party defendant by virtue of the PCGG's grant of immunity in favor of his father Jose Y. Campos and the latter's family. The PCGG was right when it filed a motion to drop Jose Campos, Jr. as defendant in the civil case. Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states: SECTION 11, RULE 3. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties Misjoinder of parties.-is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any patty or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. ... (Emphasis supplied) We interpreted this rule in the case of Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete 66 SCRA 425 (l975): ... the latter rule does not comprehend whimsical and irrational dropping or adding of parties in a complaint. that it really contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non-joinder and misjoinder of parties. No one is free to join anybody in a complaint in court only to drop him unceremoniously later at the pleasure of the plaintiff. The rule presupposes that the original inclusion had been made in the honest conviction that it was proper and the subsequent dropping is requested because it turned out that such inclusion was a mistake. And this is the reason why the rule ordains that
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RTC Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages before the Court of First Instance. In their complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered confirming their rights and legal title to the subject property and ordering the defendants to vacate the occupied portion and to pay damages. Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners allegation of owner ship and possession of the premises, and interposed, as their main defense, that the subject land was inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas. Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, contrary to her allegations in the complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner of the land. After resting their case, respondents raised in their memorandum the argument that the case should have been terminated at inception for petitioners failure to implead indispensable parties. The trial court, without ruling on the merits, dismissed the case without prejudice. CA Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the CA. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The CA, further, declared that the nonjoinder of the indispensable parties would violate the principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be applied considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reivindicatory action. With their motion for reconsideration denied in the further assailed December 1, 2004 Resolution, petitioners filed the instant petition. Issue: Whether petitioners failure to implead indispensable parties gave rise to a ground for dismissal. Ruling The Court grants the petition and remands the case to the trial court for disposition on the merits. Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as parties. The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiffs/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.
G.R. No. 182585
November 27, 2009
JOSEPHINE MARMO, NESTOR ESGUERRA, DANILO DEL PILAR and MARISA DEL PILAR, Petitioners, vs. MOISES O. ANACAY Respondent. RULING: ANY ONE OF THE CO-OWNERS MAY BRING AN ACTION IN EJECTMENT. RESPONDENTS CHILDREN ARE NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. Facts:
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RTC: RESPONDENT: ANNULMENT OF SALE, RECOVERY OF TITLE WITH DAMAGES. o On September 16, 2003, respondent Moises O. Anacay filed a case for Annulment of Sale, Recovery of Title with Damages against the petitioners and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite. o The complaint states, among others, that the respondent is the bona-fide co-owner, together with his wife, Gloria P. Anacay (now deceased), of a 50-square meter parcel of land and the house built thereon, covered by TCT No. 815595 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. o They authorized petitioner Josephine to sell the subject property; petitioner Josephine sold the property to petitioner Danilo for P520,000.00, payable in monthly installments of P8,667.00 from May 2001 to June 2006; o Petitioner Danilo defaulted in his installment payments from December 2002 onwards. o Respondent subsequently discovered that TCT No. 815595 had been cancelled and TCT No. T-972424 was issued in petitioner Josephines name by virtue of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001; o Petitioner Josephine subsequently transferred her title to petitioner Danilo; TCT No. T-972424 was cancelled and TCT No. T-991035 was issued in petitioner Danilos name. o The respondent sought the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001 and the cancellation of TCT No. T-991035; in the alternative, he demanded petitioner Danilos payment of the balance of P347,000.00 with interest from December 2002, and the payment of moral damages, attorneys fees, and cost of suit. PETITIONER: MOTION TO DISMISS. GROUND: RESPONDENTS CHILDREN AS CO-OWNERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED AS PLAINTIFFS. RESPONDENT: CHILDREN NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES, CAN BE RESOVLED WITHOUT THEIR PARTICIPATION. DENIED MOTION TO DISMISS. M.R. DENIED. CA: PETITIONERS: RULE 65. GROUND: DID NOT DISMISS CASE AFTER RESPONDENT FAILED TO INCLUDE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. CA: DISMISSED PETITION. GROUND: RESPONDENTS CHILDREN NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. M.R. DENIED. HENCE, THIS PETITION. The petitioners submit that the respondents children, who succeeded their deceased mother as co-owners of the property, are indispensable parties because a full determination of the case cannot be made without their presence. They argue that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is a fatal jurisdictional defect. The respondent, on the other hand, counters that the respondents children are not indispensable parties because the issue involved in the RTC whether the signatures of the respondent and his wife in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001 were falsified - can be resolved without the participation of the respondents children.
ISSUE: Whether respondents children are indispensable parties in this case. HELD: NO. When the controversy involves a property held in common, Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "any one of the coowners may bring an action in ejectment." We have explained that the term "action in ejectment" includes a suit for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. That the term "action in ejectment" includes "also, an accion publiciana (recovery of possession) or accion reinvidicatoria (recovery of ownership)."
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We upheld in several cases the right of a co-owner to file a suit without impleading other co-owners, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the respondent, as the plaintiff in the court below, never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. In fact, he recognized that he is a "bona-fide co-owner" of the questioned property, along with his deceased wife. Moreover and more importantly, the respondents claim in his complaint is personal to him and his wife, i.e., that his and his wifes signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner Josephine were falsified. The issue therefore is falsification, an issue which does not require the participation of the respondents co-owners at the trial; it can be determined without their presence because they are not parties to the document; their signatures do not appear therein. Their rights and interests as co-owners are adequately protected by their co-owner and father, respondent Moises O. Anacay, since the complaint was made precisely to recover ownership and possession of the properties owned in common, and, as such, will redound to the benefit of all the co-owners. In sum, respondents children, as co-owners of the subject property, are not indispensable parties to the resolution of the case. him. Thus [de Guzman] sent a demand letter to [the spouses Carandang] for the payment of said total amount. [The spouses Carandang] refused to pay the amount, contending that a preincorporation agreement was executed between [Arcadio Carandang] and [de Guzman], for [Arcadio Carandangs] technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment. [de Guzman] filed his complaint, seeking to recover the sum of money together with damages. The TC rendered in favour of de Guzman. The spouses Carandang appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the courts decision. Issue: W/N the RTC Decision is void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court? Held: No. Ratio: The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC, having been rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In the present case, there had been no court order for the legal representative of the deceased to appear, nor had any such legal representative appeared in court to be substituted for the deceased; neither had the complainant ever procured the appointment of such legal representative of the deceased, including appellant, ever asked to be substituted for the deceased. As a result, no valid substitution was effected, consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over appellant for the purpose of making her a party to the case and making the decision binding upon her, either personally or as a representative of the estate of her deceased mother. In the case at bar, not only do the heirs of de Guzman interpose no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons; they are actually claiming and embracing such jurisdiction. In doing so, their waiver is not even merely implied (by their participation in the appeal of said Decision), but express (by their explicit espousal of such view in both the Court of Appeals and in this Court). The heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of the RTC. In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because of the express
Carandang v Feirs of Quinrino de Guzman, GR 160347, November 2006 Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision. Facts: [Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System. The capital stock of MBS was increased, from P500,000 to P1.5 million and P345,000 of this increase was subscribed by [the spouses Carandang]. MBS again increased its capital stock [the spouses Carandang] yet again subscribed to the increase. [De Guzman] claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were paid by
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waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because there had been, before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzmans counsel. o Petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were: (1) failure to state a cause of action inasmuch as the basis of respondents alleged title is void, since the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was not published and it contained formal defects, the vendors are not the legal heirs of Donata Lardizabal, and respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to question the title of petitioners, because no transaction ever occurred between them; (2) non-joinder of the other heirs of Donata Lardizabal as indispensable parties; and (3) respondents claim is barred by laches. Respondents denied the foregoing affirmative defenses, and insisted that the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was valid. They maintained their standing as owners of the subject parcel of land and the nullity of the 1972 Absolute Deed of Sale. Petitioners served upon respondents a Request for Admission of matters pertaining to the family history of Donata, her heirs, and the validity of the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale. Respondents failed to respond to the Request for Admission, prompting petitioners to file a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses, arguing that respondents failure to respond or object to the Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 26. A hearing on the affirmative defenses had become imperative because petitioners were no longer required to present evidence on the admitted facts. Respondents filed a comment on the Motion, contending that the facts sought to be admitted by petitioners were not material and relevant to the issue of the case as required by Rule 26. RTC denied the motion, because the information that is contained in the Request for Admission had either been pleaded and/or denied. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. Denied.
G.R. No. 186979 August 11, 2010 SOCORRO LIMOS, ROSA DELOS REYES and SPOUSES ROLANDO DELOS REYES and EUGENE DELOS REYES Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO P. ODONES and ARWENIA R. ODONES, Respondents. Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. FACTS: Spouses Odones (respondent) filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title and Damages against petitioners Limos, Delos Reyes and Sps. Delos Reyes before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac. o Sps. Odones are owners of a parcel of land. Obtained from an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale by Donata Lardizabal (She had the original title coz shes awesome) o It took a while before the Odones decided to register their property. However, they found out that their Original Cert. of Title (OCT) was cancelled and replaced by a TCT in the name of the petitioners. (say whut?) o Petitioners subdivide the property among themselves. o Respondents sought to cancel the TCT of petitioners. They claim that Donatas signature was forged in the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale, because Donata died in 1923. ( Im talking about dead people at 1:33am, scary.) o Petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars claiming ambiguity in respondents claim that their vendors are the only heirs of Donata. RTC denied this motion and ordered petitioners to file their answers.
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CA: Petitioners elevated the case to the CA by Special civil action for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. o CA dismissed the petition. Affirmative defenses by petitioners were not indubitable and could be best proven in full blown trial. o Motion for Reconsideration was Denied. Supreme Court:Petitioners contend that the affirmative defenses raised in their Motion are indubitable, as they were impliedly admitted by respondents when they failed to respond to the Request for Admission. As such, a preliminary hearing on the said affirmative defenses must be conducted pursuant to our ruling in Gochan v. Gochan. latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26. In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily vexatious nature of petitioners Request for Admission rendered it ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe the operation of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. A perusal of respondents complaint shows that it was sufficiently clothed with a cause of action and they were suited to file the same. Rule 3, Sec. 13 to 19 Chiang Kai Shek School vs. CA, G.R. No. 58028. April 18, 1989 petition for review on certiorari FACTS: Faustina Oh was employed by petitioner for 33 years as teacher but was dismissed. Oh filed illegal dismissal case against the petitioner school. Petitioner file MD on the ground that the it could not be sued the complaint was amended. Certain officials of the school were also impleaded to make them solidarily liable with the school. CFI- Sorsogon dismissed the complaint On appeal CA- set aside the decision of CFI and ruled that the school is suable and liable while absolving the other defendants. The motion for reconsideration denied The school then came to SCvia petition for review on certiorari
RULING: Pertinent to the issue are the rules on modes of discovery set forth in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. Under these rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized, however, that the application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court. The matters set forth in petitioners Request for Admission were the same affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which respondents already traversed in their Reply. Petitioners sought to compel respondents to deny once again the very matters they had already denied. It will serve no purpose but to delay the proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a mode of discovery. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy. If the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were already admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the
ISSUE raised by petitioner: WON a school that has not been incorporated may be sued by reason alone of its long continued existence and recognition by the government?
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WON a complaint filed against persons associated under a common name will justify a judgment against the association itself and not its individual members? RULLING:SUABILITY OF SCHOOL: the school itself may be sued in its own name Rule 3, Section 1, of the Rules of Court clearly provides that "only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action." It is also not denied that the school has not been incorporated. However, this omission should not prejudice the private respondent in the assertion of her claims against the school. As a school, the petitioner was governed by Act No. 2706 as amended by C.A. No. 180, which provided as follows: Unless exempted for special reasons by the Secretary of Public Instruction, any private school or college recognized by the government shall be incorporated under the provisions of Act No. 1459 known as the Corporation Law, within 90 days after the date of recognition, and shall file with the Secretary of Public Instruction a copy of its incorporation papers and by-laws. Having been recognized by the government, it was under obligation to incorporate under the Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. It appears that it had not done so at the time the complaint was filed notwithstanding that it had been in existence even earlier than 1932. The petitioner cannot now invoke its own non-compliance with the law to immunize it from the private respondent's complaint. There is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which the persons joined in an association without any juridical personality may be sued with such association because the school itself may be sued in its own name. Besides, it has been shown that the individual members of the board of trustees are not liable, having been appointed only after the private respondent's dismissal. Therefore, SC ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed and entitled for damages. G.R. No. 78295 & 79917 April 10, 1989 ATTORNEY CELSO D. LAVIA, REMEDIOS M. MUYOT, SPOUSES VIRGILIO D. CEBRERO and SEGUNDINA MAGNOCEBRERO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFINA C. GABRIEL, respondents. Facts: On April 6, 1983, Maria Carmen Gabriel y Paterno (CARMEN), executed a donation mortis causa of the SAMPALOC PROPERTY (3,081 sqm) in favor of her widowed sister-in-law Josefina C. Gabriel (JOSEFINA).. On August 11, 1983, Carmen, who was already gravely ill with breast cancer, executed a Last Will And Testament in which she leaves the same Sampaloc property to her cousin and companion, Remedios C. Muyot (REMEDIOS), and willed a small lot (240 sqm) in Antipolo, Rizal to Josefina. She named a friend, Concepcion M. De Garcia, as executrix of her will. On August 15, 1983, Carmen executed a General Power of Attorney appointing Remedios, as her attomey-in-fact On November 3, 1983, Josefina registered an adverse claim on the title of the Sampaloc property based on the donation made by Carmen in her favor November 4, 1983, Remedios, as Carmen's attorney- in-fact, hired Atty. Celso D. Lavia, as Carmen's counsel. On November 19, 1983, Carmen thumb-marked an "AFFIDAVIT OF DENIAL" repudiating the donation of the Sampaloc property to Josefina because it was allegedly procured through fraud and trickery. She alleged that in April 1983, she still could sign her name, and that she had no
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intention of donating the property to Josefina who had not done her any favor and in fact abandoned her during her illness. Carmen also thumbmarked a "REVOCATION OF DONATION" November 21, 1983, Remedios, as Carmen's attorney-in-fact, sold the Sampaloc property to Virgilio D. Cebrero. On November 29, 1983, Carmen passed away. On December 1, 1983, the "REVOCATION OF DONATION" was registered on the back of Carmen's TCT of the Sampaloc property RTC Manila Josefina filed a complaint against Carmen's estate and the Register of Deeds of Manila to annul the Deed of Revocation of Donation She alleged that the deed of revocation, made only ten (10) days before Carmen's death, was false and fictitious. She asked the court to appoint an administrator ad litem for the estate of Carmen Josefina caused to be recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on the title of the property Without appointing a special administrator for Carmen's estate, the court caused summons to be served on the estate which was received by Remedios On January 24, 1984, the Cebreros registered the sale of the Sampaloc property to them and obtained TCT No. 158305 in their names Josefina's complaint was amended to implead Muyot and the Cebrero spouses as additional defendants. In addition to the original causes of action, the amended complaint sought the nullification of Muyot's General Power of Attorney and the sale of the Sampaloc property to the Cebrero spouses Atty. Lavia filed an Answer (later an "Amended Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim") for the Estate and Muyot Josefina filed a motion to disqualify Atty. Lavia on the ground that his authority as counsel for Carmen was extinguished upon her death. She also assailed the service of summons to the decedent's Estate through Muyot and reiterated her motion for the appointment of a special administrator for the Estate. Atty. Lavia opposed the motions Josefina's motion to disqualify - denied motion to appoint a special administrator for the Estate denied the deceased left a Will naming an administratrix (executrix) and the latter has accepted the trust Cebrero filed a motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the Sampaloc property
CA Josefina filed a petition for certiorari assailing TCs order Josefina's motion to disqualify Atty. Lavia and praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to stop TC from further proceeding in the case GRANTED restraining order, ordering the lower court to "desist from proceeding with the Case until further orders."
However, on March 16, 1987, in spite of the restraining order, TC Judge Vicencio issued an order cancelling the notice of lis pendens because he believed the Appellate Court's restraining order of February 10, 1987 expired on March 3, 1987, i.e., after 20 days. May 4, 1987 - On motions of Josefina, CA set aside Judge Vicencio's order and required him, as well as his branch clerk of court and Attorney Lavia to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of court. The Court of Appeals held that the 20-day limitation on the life of a restraining order did not apply to it but only to lower court "judges. Sept 15, 1987 - CA rendered the following decision: (2) declaring that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the estate of Maria Carmen P. Gabriel; respondent Remedios Muyot was not capacitated to receive summons for the estate because the general power of attorney constituting her as agent of the deceased became inoperative upon the death of the principal hence the service of summons upon her was void.
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(3) ordering respondent Atty. Celso Lavia to refrain from representing the estate of the deceased Maria Carmen P. Gabriel Attorney Lavia may not appear "as counsel for the estate of Carmen P. Gabriel because his authority as her counsel was extinguished upon Carmen's death" (Art. 1919, Civil Code). (4) declaring that all pleadings, motions and papers filed by Atty. Lavia are sham and ordered expunged from the records of said case. Carmen's death likewise divested Attorney Lavia of authority to represent her as counsel. A dead client has no personality and cannot be represented by an attorney. Petitions for review are dismissed. G.R. No. L-45809 December 12, 1986 SOCORRO SEPULVEDA LAWAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, [as Judge, CFI, Cebu, Branch VIII], and PACIFICO PELAEZ, respondents. Facts This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for certiorari under, Rule 65 of said Rules against respondent Judge Bernardo L. Salas Trial Court Private respondent Pacifico Pelaez filed a Complaint against petitioner's father, Pedro Sepulveda, for ownership and partition of certain parcels of land. Defendant Pedro Sepulveda filed his Answer resisting the claim and raising the special defenses of laches, prescription and failure to ventilate in a previous special proceeding. During the presentation of evidence for the plaintiff, the defendant died, counsels for the deceased defendant filed a notice of death wherein were enumerated the thirteen children and surviving spouse of the deceased. Petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration and she was appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her late father. During trial the respondent trial judge issued orders. The orders substituted the heirs of the deceased defendant, namely, his thirteen children and surviving spouse, as defendants; treated the case submitted for decision, after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case, and directed that said counsels and the fourteen heirs of the deceased defendant be furnished copies thereof.
SC Lavia, Muyot, and Cebrero filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the CAs May 4, 1987 decision Lavia, Remedios Muyot, and the Cebrero spouses appealed by certiorari to this Court assailing the Sept 15, 1987 CAs decision (petitions were consolidated)
ISSUE: WON TC had acquired jurisdiction over the estate of Carmen P. Gabriel NO. The estate of a dead person may only be summoned through the executor or administrator of his estate for it is the executor or administrator who may sue or be sued (Sec. 3, Rule 3, Rules of Court) and who may bring or defend actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court). The general power of attorney appointing Remedios as Carmen's agent or attorney-in- fact was extinguished upon Carmen's demise. Thereafter, Remedios was bereft of authority to represent Carmen. The petitioner's contention that the agency was "constituted in the common interest of the principal and the agent" and that hence it was not extinguished by the death of the principal (Art. 1930, Civil Code) is refuted by the instrument itself which explicitly provided that the powers conferred on the agent were to be exercised for the "sole benefit" of the principal, Carmen P. Gabriel
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The respondent trial judge rendered a decision against the heirs of the deceased defendant. Ten of the children of the deceased defendant, who apparently did not know that a decision had already been rendered, filed an Answer in-substitution of the deceased defendant through their counsel. This was denied admission by the respondent trial judge for being already moot and academic because of the earlier decision. The widow and two other children of the deceased defendant, through their counsel, filed a motion for substitution and for reconsideration of the decision, the respondent trial judge issued an order setting aside his decision and setting the case in the calendar for cross-examination of the plaintiff, with a proviso that said order was applicable only to the three heirs who had filed the motion. The respondent trial judge lifted the order setting aside his decision, despite the verbal petition for postponement of the hearing made by one of the three heirs on the ground of the absence of their counsel. Petitioner, who had been appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased defendant and who was one of the heirs who had filed an Answer filed a motion to intervene and/or substitute the deceased defendant. The respondent trial judge denied the motion for the reason that the decision had already become final. CA Petitioner then filed a special civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the proceedings in the respondent trial court. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. Hence, the present appeal. Issue Whether Ruling The appeal is meritorious. Section 16 of Rule 3 provides as follows: Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party. Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative. The former counsels for the deceased defendant, Pedro Sepulveda, complied with this rule by filing a notice of death on May 21, 1975. They also correctly manifested in open court at the hearing of the case on November 27, 1975, that with the death of their client their contract with him was also terminated and none of the heirs of the deceased had renewed the contract, and the heirs had instead engaged the services of other lawyers in the intestate proceedings. Both the respondent trial judge and the Court of Appeals erred in considering the former counsels of the deceased defendant as counsels for the heirs of the deceased. It was only after that the respondent trial judge issued an order substituting the deceased defendant with his fourteen heirs. This was followed with an order authorizing counsel for the plaintiff to present his evidence in the absence of the deceaseds counsel, and an order treating the case as submitted for decision. Section 17 of Rule 3 provides as follows: Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shag order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the de ceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of
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an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. As this Court has held: ... Under the Rule, it is the court that is called upon, after notice of a party's death and the claim is not thereby extinguished, to order upon proper notice the legal representative of the deceased to appear within a period of 30 days or such time as it may grant. Since no administrator of the estate of the deceased appellant had yet been appointed as the same was still pending determination in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the motion of the deceased's counsel for the suspension of the running of the period within which to file appellant's brief was well-taken. More, under the Rule, it should have set a period for the substitution of the deceased party with her legal representative or heirs, failing which, the court is called upon to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased at the cost of the deceased's estate, and such representative shall then 'immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. Respondent court gravely erred in not following the Rule and requiring the appearance of the legal representative of the deceased and instead dismissing the appeal of the deceased who yet had to be substituted in the pending appeal. Under the said Rule, priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased, that is, the executor or administrator of his estate. It is only in cases of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased. RULING: GENERAL RULE: FORMAL SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS MUST BE EFFECTUATED FOR THEM TO BE BOUND BY A SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENT. EXCEPTION: FORMAL SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS IS NOT NECESSARY WHEN THE HEIRS THEMSELVES VOLUNTARILY APPEARED, PARTICIAPTED IN THE CASE AND PRESENTED EVIDENCE IN DEFENSE OF THE DECEASED DEFENDANT. Facts: COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS: RESPONDENTS: EJECTMENT. GROUND: PERSONAL CULTIVATION AND CONVERSION OF LAND AGAINST PETITIONERS DECEASED HUSBAND. o On July 23, 1970, both private respondents Primitive Nepomuceno and Emerenciana Nepomuceno filed separate complaints with the then Court of Agrarian Relations of Malolos, Bulacan, for ejectment on the ground of personal cultivation and conversion of land for useful non-agricultural purposes against petitioner's deceased husband, Benjamin Salazar. RTC: RULED IN FAVOR OF PROTRACTED PROCEEDINGS) o G.R. No. 121510 November 23, 1995 FABIANA C. VDA. DE SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMITIVO NEPOMUCENO and EMERENCIANA NEPOMUCENO, respondents. RESPONDENTS. (AFTER
After protracted proceedings in the agrarian court and then the Regional Trial Court spanning from 1970 to 1993, the trial court rendered its joint decision in favor of private respondents.
An appeal therefrom was interposed in the name of petitioner's deceased husband on the ground that private respondents herein failed to satisfy the requirements pertaining to personal cultivation and conversion of the landholdings into non-agricultural uses.
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CA: AFFIRMED RTCS RULING. o The Court of Appeals rejected such contention upon finding that the record was replete with evidence justifying private respondents' assertion of their right of cultivation and conversion of their landholdings. Almost a year after the termination of that appeal, the same trial court decision subject thereof was once again assailed before the Court of Appeals through a petition for annulment of judgment. CA: PETITIONER: ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF RTC. GROUND: NO SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS DESPITE DEFENDANTS DEATH. o Herein petitioner assailed the same trial court decision as having been rendered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over her and the other heirs of her deceased husband because notwithstanding the fact that her husband had already died on October 3, 1991, the trial court still proceeded to render its decision on August 23, 1993 without effecting the substitution of heirs in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court thereby depriving her of her day in court. CA: AFFIRMED RTCS DECISION. GROUND: DID NOT ASSERT FRAUD OR COLLUSION IN THE PETITION. M.R. DENIED. Hence this petition. The exception would be that formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated in the case and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant. Although the jurisprudential rule is that failure to make the substitution is a jurisdictional defect, it should be noted that the purpose of this procedural rule is to comply with due process requirements. o The original party having died, he could not continue to defend himself in court despite the fact that the action survived him. o For the case to continue, the real party in interest must be substituted for the deceased. The real party in interest is the one who would be affected by the judgment. o It could be the administrator or executor or the heirs. o In the instant case, the heirs are the proper substitutes. o Substitution gives them the opportunity to continue the defense for the deceased. o Substitution is important because such opportunity to defend is a requirement to comply with due process. o Such substitution consists of making the proper changes in the caption of the case which may be called the formal aspect of it. o Such substitution also includes the process of letting the substitutes know that they shall be bound by any judgment in the case and that they should therefore actively participate in the defense of the deceased. o This part may be called the substantive aspect. This is the heart of the procedural rule because this substantive aspect is the one that truly embodies and gives effect to the purpose of the rule. o It is this court's view that compliance with the substantive aspect of the rule despite failure to comply with the formal aspect may be considered substantial compliance. o Such is the situation in the case at bench because the only inference that could be deduced from the following facts was that there was active participation of the heirs in the defense of the deceased after his death:
ISSUE: Whether the RTCs decision in the ejectment case is null and void due to failure to effect the substitution of heirs in lieu of the defendant who died during the pendency of the case. HELD: NO. The petition is bereft of merit. The general rule is that formal substitution of heirs must be effectuated for them to be bound by a subsequent judgment.
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1. The original lawyer did not stop representing the deceased. It would be absurd to think that the lawyer would continue to represent somebody if nobody is paying him his fees. The lawyer continued to represent him in the litigation before the trial court which lasted for about two more years. A dead party cannot pay him any fee. With or without payment of fees, the fact remains that the said counsel was allowed by the petitioner who was well aware of the instant litigation to continue appearing as counsel until August 23, 1993 when the challenged decision was rendered; 2. After the death of the defendant, his wife, who is the petitioner in the instant case, even testified in the court and declared that her husband is already deceased. She knew therefore that there was a litigation against her husband and that somehow her interest and those of her children were involved; 3. This petition for annulment of judgment was filed only after the appeal was decided against the defendant on April 3, 1995, more than one and a half year (sic) after the decision was rendered (even if we were to give credence to petitioner's manifestation that she was not aware that an appeal had been made); 4. The Supreme Court has already established that there is such a thing as jurisdiction by estoppel. This principle was established even in cases where jurisdiction over the subject matter was being questioned. In the instant case, only jurisdiction over the person of the heirs is in issue. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by the court more easily than jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by the simple appearance of the person in court as did herein petitioner appear; While it is true that a decision in an action for ejectment is enforceable not only against the defendant himself but also against members of his family, his relatives, and his privies who derived their right of possession from the defendant and his successors-ininterest, it had been established that petitioner had, by her own acts, submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. She is now estopped to deny that she had been heard in defense of her deceased husband in the proceedings therein. As such, this petition evidently has no leg to stand on.
Bonifacio v. Dizon (1989)
INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI INVOLVING PURE QUESTION OF LAW FACTS: 1968, OLIMPIO BONIFACIO (decedent) filed before the Court of Agrarian Relations a case for ejectment against private respondent Pastora SAN MIGUEL o It was Bonifacios two hectare agricultural land in Marilao, Bulacan. o The ground was personal cultivation under the Agricultural Land Reform Code 1970, Judge Serapio granted OLIMPIO to eject SAN MIGUEL o SAN MIGUEL was asked to vacate the property and deliver possession to OLIMPIO SAN MIGUEL appealed, and the CA affirmed the lower courts decision o SAN MIGUEL counterclaimed OLIMPIO to pay her P1,376 SAN MIGUEL then sought relief before the SC o During her petition on Aug 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio passed away No notice of death was given to the Court No order for substitution of his heir was made July 31, 1985 the SC denied SAN MIGUELs petition for lack of merit, and affirmed the CA decision
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ROSALINA BONIFACIO and the children (other heirs) moved for the execution of the decision of CAR o This was filed before the RTC of Bulacan. o A write of execution was issued on Feb 1986, and on Mar 1986, the Deputy Sheriff reported that SAN MIGUEL refused to vacate the portion she occupied (her house) But he was able to delivered the subject matter to ROSALINA o SAN MIGUEL moved to quash the writ of execusion o The BONIFACIOs countered with a writ of demolition and an order declaring SAN MIGUEL in contempt of court for re-entering the subject land Judge Dizon ordered that the implementation of the writ of execution based on the CAR decision was null and void o The motion for Demolition was also denied, as well as the petition for contempt. BONIFACIOs contend that Judge Dizon GADLJ in ruling that the CAR case cannot be executed because it was a purely personal action, therefore, the BONIFACIO heirs could not have inherited the favorable ruling. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES o DIZON it is not an ordinary ejectment case, but an ejectment of an agricultural lessee The action is personal to OLIMPIO, as thus, it died with him The non-substitution of OLIMPIOs heirs rendered the proceedings after OLIMPIOs death NULL AND VOID ISSUE: Whether or not the favorable judgment obtained by the decedent is inherited by the compulsory heirs? HELD: YES 1. Judge Dizon is correct in saying that the case is not an ordinary ejectment case, it is an agrarian case. a. HOWEVER, even if public policy is involved, the GENERAL RULE that an ejectment case survives the death of a party b. The problem is the term personal cultivation of RA 3844: Agricultural Land Reform Code. It gave the impression that the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was allowed only when the landowner-lessor opted to cultivate the landholding i. That the right of cultivation pertained EXCLUSIVELY to the landowner-lessor and therefore, his personal right *THIS IS SOOOO WRONG sabi ng Court, it is a misconception 1. Sec 36 of the RA states, Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that: (1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes . . . .
2.
Under the provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee is not only the right of the landowner-lessor BUT ALSO WHEN HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY desires so i. THEREFORE, how can it be personal when the law allows an immediate family member to eject an agricultural lessee ii. Clearly then, the right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate family members evidently to place the landowner-
c.
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lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. In this regard, it must be observed that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of his immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in "personal cultivation." 3. Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the immediate family members of the deceased landowner-lessor as well. a. The right to cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 not being a purely personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-ininterest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the judgment in CAR Case 4. ON THE DUTY OF THE ATTORNEY to inform the court of his clients death a. In case of a partys death, the court, if the action survives shall then order upon proper notice the legal representatives of the deceased to appear and to be substituted within a period of 30 days or the time granted by court. b. The case was compared to the case of FLORENDO vs. COLOMA (almost the same facts) i. But the line of reasoning in the FLORENDO CASE is 1. Petitioners challenged the CA decision after the death of the plaintiff Since no legal representative substituted CA lost jurisdiction therefore, proceedings null 2. But then? The Lawyer failed to inform the court of the plaintiffs death THEREFORE, the supervening death of the plaintiff DID NOT EXTINGUISH her civil personality decision valid REMEMBER in this case, the Court said, even if there was no notice of death, the action is NOT PERSONAL because the substantive law allows immediate family members of the Landowner-lessor to eject an agricultural lessee. The lessees immediate family members are allowed to till the land, so why cant the immediate family members of the lessor eject them? PARITY lang. The Heirs of Vda. De Haberer vs. CA (1981) PETITION FOR REVIEW BY WAY OF APPEAL FROM RESOLUTIONS OF THE CA, DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF THE LATE FLORENTINA VDA DE HABERER (Hehe! Haberber!) FACTS: FLORENTINA VDA DE HABERER filed complaints (ergo, 2 cases) for recovery of possession of the parcel of land situated in Mandaluyong, she was the duly registered owner. She filed the case before the CFI Rizal o She alleged that the private respondents entered and built houses May 26, 1971 The CFI dismissed all complaints On the motion of FLORENTINA the cases were reopened and retied due to newly discovered evidence o September 15, 1972 The CFI still issued an order reviving its previous decision (dismissing all complaints) The 1972 decision was appealed to the CA o The cases were erroneously dismissed in the lower court, for being allegedly filed out of time. Jan 1975, the SC rendered its judgment setting aside the CAs dismissal on appeal and ordered the reinstatement of the case for the proper disposition on the merits. o Because the appeal was perfected in time The cases were remanded to the CA o FLORENTINA was required to file a printed brief within 45 days from her receipt of notice o 3 days before the period was to expire, June 18, 1975, FLORENTINAs counsel requested for an extension of time to file The request was granted, they were given a 90 day extension
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June 1975, the private respondent opposed the extension by filing a Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Extension of Time to File Brief THEN, FLORENTINA DIES on MAY 26, 1975 o Her counsel gave the CA notice of her death on June 28, 1975. Her counsel also asked to suspending the running of the period to file appellants brief pending the appointment of an executor of her Estate in the CFI QC There was already a petition for the probate of her will (meaning, the will was submitted in court, and the court has to determine if it is a valid will.) Guys, when a person dies, her Estate (has a personality), an executor is someone that is named in her will to execute what is stipulated in her will. If the person assigned to execute is a girl shes called an EXECUTRIX o If you get to read ADMINISTRATOR/ADMINIST RATIX, court appointed yun, not named in the will. Respondents then contend that the lawyers of the deceased NO LONGER HAD ANY LEGAL STANDING and could no longer act in her behalf because the client-attorney relationship has been severed (because FLORENTINAs dead) The motion FLORENTINAs counsel gave on June 28, 1975 remained UNACTED and the original extension granted was about to expire. o Sept 18 1975, her counsel filed a motion asking to an extension of 60 days and/or resolution suspending the running of the period. o CA had remained silent o Nov 14, 1975, not certain whether the heirs would retain the counsel, they filed another extension of time to file appellants brief and/or a resolution suspending the running of the period. Nov 24, 1975 the CA DENIED the request for extension and dismissed the appeal o The appellant had 195 days to file the brief Dec 8, 1975, FLORENTINAs counsel filed a MR explaining why they made requests for extension/suspension o Due to the uncertainty that their services may no longer be retained by the heirs or legal representatives of their deceased client BUT felt that they had the right to preserve the right of such heirs pursuant to R 3, S 17 of the Rules of Court, pending the settlement of FLORENTINAs estate o The printed brief for the appellant, wasnt printed for professional ethical considerations pending the courts resolution o They also submitted 2 separate orders issued by The Court of Agrarian Relations CFI Guimba, Nueva Ecija THESE orders granted the deceaseds counsels prayer to hold in abeyance further proceedings therein pending the appointment of an administrator CA denied the reconsideration stating that, litigants have no right to assume that such extensions will be granted as a matter of course o BUT the COURT (SC) says that the CA erred in applying the principle and summarily denying reconsideration o NOTE: The attorney would thereafter have no further power or authority to appear or take any further action in the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and take the necessary steps to safeguard the deceased's rights in the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the client-attorney relationship was terminated by the death of FLORENTINA (deceased-client)? HELD: NO.
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1. The deceaseds counsel properly informed the court of the death of FLORENTINA a. The sought suspension of the proceedings and period for filing appellants brief PENDING THE APPOINTMENT of the executor of the deceaseds estate before CFI QC S 17, Rule 3 sets the rule on substitution of parties in case of death of the parties a. After the notice of a partys death and the claim is not extinguished, to order upon proper notice the legal representative of the deceased to appear within 30 days or the time granted. Since there was no administrator of the estate, the suspension of the running of the period within which to file appellants brief was well-taken. a. THE CA should have set a period for the substitution of the deceased party with her legal representative or heirs i. IF the CA ruled this way, then the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased 1. BUT THEY DIDNT, the CA gravely erred in not following the rule! When a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased a. SINCE NO SUBSTITUTION TOOK PLACE, the trial by the court are NULL and VOID i. Because the court did not properly acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or heirs. The Original 45-day period should have been automatically suspended until the proper substitution of the deceased appellant by her executor or administrator or her heirs. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities a. A liberal, rather than a strict and inflexible adherence to the Rules, is justified not only because appellant (in this case, her estate and/or heirs) should be given every opportunity to be heard but also because no substantial injury or prejudice can well be caused to the adverse parties principally, since they are in actual possession of the disputed land. b. The better and certainly the more prudent course of action in every judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and decide on the merits rather than dispose of a case on technicalities, especially where no substantial prejudice is caused to the adverse party. The dismissal of an appeal based on the appellant's failure to file brief is based on a power granted to respondent Court of Appeals and not on a specific and mandatory duty imposed upon it by the Rules. a. Since it is not MANDATORY i. failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically ii. the Court of Appeals has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss appellant's appeal, which discretion must be a sound one to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case b. prima facie meritorious case which should be properly determined on the merits and "the element of rigidity should not be affixed to procedural concepts and made to cover the matter" On March 19, 1976, counsels submitted with their Manifestation the written authority dated January 20, 1976 individually signed by instituted heirs and/or legal representatives of the testate estate of the deceased Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer granting said counsels full authority to file and prosecute the case and any other incidental cases for and in their behalf, a. Such manifestation and authority may be deemed the formal substitution of the deceased by her heirs, as in fact they appear as petitioners in the title of the case at bar.
2.
7.
3.
4.
8.
5.
6.
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9. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and respondent court's resolutions of November 24, 1975 and January 15, 1976 are set aside. a. The cases are remanded to the CA for further proceedings and proper determination of the appeal on merits 10. SIDE NOTE: counsel for respondents Felipe C. Navarro be disbarred for "gross misconduct and/or malpractice" Super complicatedpero I think the last issue yong related sa discussion natin RGINIA O. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, MAE GOCHAN-EFANN, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN, ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN JR., DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN, FELIX O. GOCHAN III, MERCEDES R. GOCHAN, ALFREDO R. GOCHAN, ANGELINA R. GOCHAN-HERNAEZ, MARIA MERCED R. GOCHAN, CRISPO R. GOCHAN JR., MARION R. GOCHAN, MACTAN REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. RICHARD G. YOUNG, DAVID G. YOUNG, JANE G. YOUNG-LLABAN, JOHN D. YOUNG JR., MARY G. YOUNG-HSU and ALEXANDER THOMAS G. YOUNG as heirs of Alice Gochan; the INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOHN D. YOUNG SR.; and CECILIA GOCHAN-UY and MIGUEL C. UY, for themselves and on behalf and for the benefit of FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION, respondents. Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 FACTS: Gochan Realty, for brevity was registered with the SEC with Felix Gochan, Sr., Maria Pan Nuy Go Tiong, Pedro Gochan, TomasaGochan, Esteban Gochan and CrispoGochan as its incorporators. Felix Gochan Sr.s daughter, Alice, mother of [herein respondents], inherited 50 shares of stock in Gochan Realty from the former. Alice died in 1955, leaving the 50 shares to her husband, John Young, Sr RTC of Cebu adjudicated 6/14 of these shares to her children, herein [respondents] Five days later (25 September) children reached the age of majority, their father John Sr., requested Gochan Realty to partition the shares of his late wife by cancelling the stock certificates in his name and issuing in lieu thereof, new stock certificates in the names of [herein respondents]. Respondent Gochan Realty refused, citing as reason, the right of first refusal granted to the remaining stockholders by the Articles of Incorporation. John, Sr. died, leaving the shares to the [respondents] [respondents] Cecilia GochanUy and Miguel Uyfiled a complaintwith the SEC forissuance of shares of stock to the rightful owners, nullification of shares of stock, reconveyance of property impressed with trust, accounting, removal of officers and directors and damages against respondents the heirs of Alice. A Notice of LisPendens was annotated on real properties of the corporation Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that: (1) the SEC ha[d] no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; (2) the [respondents] [were] not the real parties-ininterest and ha[d] no capacity to sue; and (3) [respondents] causes of action [were] barred by the Statute of Limitations-granted Petitioners filed a Motion for cancellation of Notice of LisPendens-granted Respondents filed MR-denied Res appealed to the SEC en banc denied saying that it was filed 97 days late, beyond the 30-day period for appealsand that motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the 30-day period for appeal because said motion was pro-forma. Respondnet went to CA-ruled that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the case as far as the heirs of Alice Gochan were concerned, because they were not yet stockholders of the corporation. On the
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other hand, it upheld the capacity of Respondents Cecilia GochanUy and her spouse Miguel Uy. It also held that the intestate Estate of John Young Sr. was an indispensable party. Hence petitioner filed petition was filed in SC action dealing with the registration of the shares in the names of the heirs of Alice. Petitioners further claim that the Estate of John Young Sr. was not properly represented. They claim that when the estate is under administration, suits for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased may be brought only by the administrator or executor as approved by the court SC: Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which is cited by petitioner in support of their position, reads: Sec. 3.Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. Section 2 of Rule 87 of the same Rules, which also deals with administrators, states: Sec. 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which survive. - For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an executor or administrator may bring or defend, in the right of the deceased, actions for causes which survive. The Rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait
RULING: Personality of the Spouses Uy to File a Suit Before the SECIssue:
The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. For purposes of resolving a motion to dismiss, Cecilia Uys averment in the Complaint -- that the purchase of her stocks by the corporation was null and void ab initio is deemed admitted. It is elementary that a void contract produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone; it cannot create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers.Thus, Cecilia remains a stockholder of the corporation in view of the nullity of the Contract of Sale. Although she was no longer registered as a stockholder in the corporate records as of the filing of the case before the SEC, the admitted allegations in the Complaint made her still a bona fide stockholder of Felix Gochan& Sons Realty Corporation (FGSRC), as between said parties. Capacity of the Intestate Estate of John D. Young Sr. Issue: (CIV.PRO related take note of this for discussion) Petitioners contend that the Intestate Estate of John D. Young Sr. is not an indispensable party, as there is no showing that it stands to be benefited or injured by any court judgment. SC: One of the causes of action stated in the Complaint filed with the SEC refers to the registration, in the name of the other heirs of Alice Gochan Young, of 6/14th of the shares still registered under the name of John D. Young Sr. Since all the shares that belonged to Alice are still in his name, no final determination can be had without his estate being impleaded in the suit. His estate is thus an indispensable party with respect to the cause of
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for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of John D. Young Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC. Therefore, in view of the effectivity of RA 8799the case should be remanded to the proper regional trial court, not to the Securities and Exchange Commission. G.R. No. 175910 July 30, 2009 The facts, as culled from the records, follow. In a case entitled Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro Gasing/Truck Operator Gasing was ordered to pay Sereno P43,606.47 for illegally dismissing the latter. LA issued an Alias Writ of Execution directing Lavarez, Sheriff II of the NLRC to satisfy the judgment award. On July 23, 1996, Lavarez, accompanied by Sereno and his counsel, petitioner Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba levied a Fuso Truck in the possession of Gasing. On July 30, 1996, the truck was sold at public auction, with Sereno appearing as the highest bidder. RTC Davao del Sur respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaeda, filed a Complaint for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente lite against petitioner, Sereno, the Lavarez and the NLRC of Davao City Respondent alleged that: (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te, the registered owner of the truck (2) Gasing merely rented the truck from her; (3) Lavarez erroneously assumed that Gasing owned the truck because he was, at the time of the "taking," in possession of the same; and (4) since neither she nor her husband were parties to the labor case between Sereno and Gasing, she should not be made to answer for the judgment award, much less be deprived of the truck as a consequence of the levy in execution. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has no legal personality to sue, having no real interests over the property subject of the instant complaint; (2) the allegations in the complaint do not sufficiently state that the respondent has cause of action; (3) the allegations in the complaint do not contain sufficient cause of action as against him; and
ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABA, Petitioner, vs. FE VDA. DE TE, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, FAUSTINO CASTAEDA, Respondents. Facts: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary 2 injunction assailing the Order dated March 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City, Davao del Sur, in Civil Case No. 3488.
1
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(4) the complaint is not accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit and Bond that would entitle the respondent to the delivery of the tuck pendente lite. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration DENIED SC rule 45 Petitioner directly sought recourse from the Court via the present petition involving pure questions of law, which he claimed were resolved by the RTC contrary to law, rules and existing jurisprudence.
NLRC also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. Lavarez filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and ThirdParty Complaint. RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaint does not state a cause of action. Motion to dismiss DENIED petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Case on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants (the Sheriff could not serve a copy of the summons to Sereno, together with a copy of the complaint, because he was already dead.); and (2) to discharge respondent's attorney-in-fact for lack of legal personality to sue.
SUB ISSUE: WON petitioner correctly availed of the mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. NO. The subject of the present petition is an Order of the RTC, which denied petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, for lack of merit. An Order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory. Under Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable. BUT, the SC deemed it best to rule on the issues, not only for the benefit of the bench and bar, but in order to prevent further delay in the trial of the case. Resultantly, SCs relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts is warranted. SUB ISSUE : WON RTC should have dismissed the complaint against all the defendants and that the same should be filed against his estate since Sereno (principal defendant) died before summons was served on him NO. Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other proper court officer, either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant or by substituted service. On the other hand, summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person.
Respondent, Fe Vda. de Te, died on April 12, 2005. RTC (continuation) Respondent filed an Opposition (to the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss), contending that the failure to serve summons upon Sereno is not a ground for dismissing the complaint, because the other defendants have already submitted their respective responsive pleadings. Moreover, respondent's death did not render functus officio her right to sue since her attorney-infact, Faustino Castaeda, had long testified on the complaint on March 13, 1998 for and on her behalf and, accordingly, submitted documentary exhibits in support of the complaint. Petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss DENIED
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The court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over one's person is a defense which is personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against all of the defendants. Failure to serve summons on Sereno's person will not be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint against the other defendants, considering that they have been served with copies of the summons and complaints and have long submitted their respective responsive pleadings. In fact, the other defendants in the complaint were given the chance to raise all possible defenses and objections personal to them in their respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent answers. Failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of the defendants herein does not render the action DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three (3) other defendants, namely, Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, Fulgencio Lavares and the NLRC, were validly served with summons and the case with respect to the answering defendants may still proceed independently. Be it recalled that the three (3) answering defendants have previously filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was denied by the Court. Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno will be DISMISSED and the same may be filed as a claim against the estate of Patricio Sereno, but the case with respect to the three (3) other accused will proceed. CIVPRO ISSUE: WON case should be dismissed since respondent's attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaeda, has no more legal personality to sue on behalf of Fe Vda. de Te, who passed away on April 12, 2005, during the pendency of the case before the RTC. NO. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the actions that survived and may be filed against the decedent's representatives as follows: (1) actions to recover real or personal property or an interest thereon, (2) actions to enforce liens thereon, and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a property. In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the name and address of the latter's legal representative. The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every party's right to due process. It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein. In the case before Us, it appears that respondent's counsel did not make any manifestation before the RTC as to her death. In fact, he had actively participated in the proceedings. Neither had he shown any proof that he had been retained by respondent's legal representative or any one who succeeded her. The proper remedy here is the Substitution of Heirs and not the dismissal of this case which would work injustice to the plaintiff . The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is
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effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The trial court's jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party. SEC. 16, RULE 3 provides for the substitution of the plaintiff who dies pending hearing of the case by his/her legal heirs. As to whether or not the heirs will still continue to engage the services of the Attorney-in-fact is another matter, which lies within the sole discretion of the heirs. The Petition is DENIED. G.R. Nos. 161166-67 February 03, 2005 MAYOR RHUSTOM L. DAGADAG, petitioner, vs. MICHAEL C. TONGNAWA and ANTONIO GAMMOD, respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Facts Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the joint Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals Petitioner was formerly the mayor of the municipality of Tanudan, Province of Kalinga. Michael Tongnawa and Antonio Gammod, respondents, are the municipal engineer and municipal planning and development coordinator, respectively, of the said municipality. Petitioner, while then the mayor of Tanudan, sent respondents a memorandum ordering them to explain within 72 hours why they should not be administratively sanctioned for acts unbecoming of public servants and failure to perform their duties. Respondents submitted to petitioner their respective explanations. Petitioner issued an Executive order creating a Municipal Grievance Committee to investigate the charges against respondents. Guilbert Dangpason, then the vice-mayor of Tanudan, was designated Chairman. After investigation, the Committee found respondents liable for insubordination, non-performance of duties and absences without official leaves (AWOL). Petitioner issued an order suspending respondents from their respective positions for two months. CSC Respondents then appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) contending that their right to due process has been violated. During the pendency of respondents appeal, petitioner issued an ord er dropping them from the roll of employees by reason of their unauthorized absences. Again, they appealed to the CSC. CSC issued a Resolution affirming petitioners order suspending respondents from the service for two months. They moved for reconsideration but were denied by the CSC, prompting them to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. Meanwhile, the CSC issued another Resolution affirming petitioners order dropping respondents from the roll. When their motion for reconsideration was denied by the CSC, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. CA The Court of Appeals, in its joint Decision, granted respondents petitions for review, reversing the CSC challenged Resolutions and reinstating them to their respective positions and ordering the payment of their corresponding back wages. Petitioner filed a joint motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the instant petition. In their joint comment, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal personality to file the instant petition because he had ceased to be the
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municipal mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga; and that the CSC, being the aggrieved party, is the proper party to file this petition. Issue Who may appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals? adversely affect its integrity. Significantly, it has not challenged the assailed Decision. Admittedly, however, petitioner, at the time he filed with this Court the instant petition assailing the Appellate Court Decision, was no longer the mayor of Tanudan. Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is relevant, thus: "Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard." (underscoring ours)
Ruling In resolving the issue, the concept of "real party in interest" becomes relevant. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides: "SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest," as contemplated by the Rules, means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. We hold that the CSC and the mayor of Tanudan are real parties in interest in this case and, therefore, can contest the assailed joint Decision of the Court of Appeals before us. The CSC is the party adversely affected by the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals because it has been mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system. Thus, any transgression by herein respondents of the CSC rules and regulations will
Interpreting the above rule, in Miranda vs. Carreon, Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, and Roque, et al. vs. Delgado, et al., we held that where the petitioner (a public officer) ceases to be mayor, the appeal and/or action he initiated may be continued and maintained by his successor if there is substantial need to do so. If the successor failed to pursue the appeal and/or action, the same should be dismissed. Records show that upon petitioners cessation from public office, his successor did not file any manifestation to the effect that he is continuing and maintaining this appeal. We thus agree with the respondents that petitioner has lost his legal personality to interpose the instant petition.
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G.R. No. 160347 November 29, 2006 De Guzman claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were paid by him, P293,250 for the November 26, 1983 capital stock increase and P43,125 for the March 3, 1989 Capital Stock increase or a total of P336,375. Thus, on March 31, 1992, de Guzman sent a demand letter to the spouses Carandang] for the payment of said total amount. The spouses Carandang refused to pay the amount, contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang and de Guzman, whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration for Arcadio Carandangs technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore, there is no indebtedness on their part. RTC: DE GUZMAN: RECOVERY OF SUM OF MONEY WITH DAMAGES. RULED IN FAVOR OF DE GUZMAN. o On June 5, 1992, de Guzman filed his complaint, seeking to recover the P336,375 together with damages. CA: AFFIRMED THE RTC DECISION. o Spouses Carandang appealed to the CA. M.R. DENIED. SC: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely: MILAGROS DE GUZMAN, VICTOR DE GUZMAN, REYNALDO DE GUZMAN, CYNTHIA G. RAGASA and QUIRINO DE GUZMAN, JR., Respondents. RULING: THE RTC DECISION IS VALID DESPITE THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 16, RULE 3 OF THE ROC, BECAUSE OF THE EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE HEIRS OF PLAINTIFF OVER THEIR PERSONS AND THE CASE WAS SUBMITTED FOR DECISION 7 MONTHS BEFORE PLAINTIFFS DEATH. Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision rendering herein petitioners Arcadio and Luisa Carandang [hereinafter referred to as spouses Carandang] jointly and severally liable for their loan to Quirino A. de Guzman. Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS for brevity), with equities at fifty four percent (54%) and forty six percent (46%) respectively. On November 26, 1983, the capital stock of MBS was increased, from P500,000 to P1.5 million and P345,000 of this increase was subscribed by the spouses Carandang. Thereafter, on March 3, 1989, MBS again increased its capital stock, from P1.5 million to P3 million, the spouses Carandang yet again subscribed to the increase. They subscribed to P93,750 worth of newly issued capital stock.
MAIN ISSUE: Whether the decision of the RTC is void for failing to comply with section 6, Rule 3 of the ROC. HELD: NO. The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC, having been rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of
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his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. The court shall forthwith order the legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. In the present case, there had been no court order for the legal representative of the deceased to appear, nor had any such legal representative appeared in court to be substituted for the deceased; neither had the complainant ever procured the appointment of such legal representative of the deceased, including appellant, ever asked to be substituted for the deceased. o As a result, no valid substitution was effected, consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over appellant for the purpose of making her a party to the case and making the decision binding upon her, either personally or as a representative of the estate of her deceased mother. HOWEVER, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which is conferred by law and is not subject to the discretion of the parties, jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case may be waived either expressly or impliedly. Implied waiver comes in the form of either voluntary appearance or a failure to object. IN THE CASE AT BAR, not only do the heirs of de Guzman interpose no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons; they are actually claiming and embracing such jurisdiction. o In doing so, their waiver is not even merely implied (by their participation in the appeal of said Decision), but express (by their explicit espousal of such view in both the Court of Appeals and in this Court). o The heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of the RTC. o Thus, lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence. In People v. Florendo, where we likewise held that the proceedings that took place after the death of the party are void, we gave another reason for such nullity: "the attorneys for the offended party ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the death of the latter, the principal x x x." Nevertheless, IN THE CASE AT BAR, the case had already been submitted for decision before the RTC on 4 June 1998, several months before the passing away of de Guzman on 19 February 1999. Hence, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzmans counsel were conducted before the promulgation of the RTC Decision. Consequently, de Guzmans counsel cannot be said to have no authority to appear in trial, as trial had already ceased upon the death of de Guzman. In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because of the express waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because there had been, before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzmans counsel. o
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SUB-ISSUE: Whether the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action, considering that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable party, was not included as a partyplaintiff. HELD: NO. SPS. CARANDANGS CONTENTION: o Since three of the four checks used to pay their stock subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the latter should be considered an indispensable party. o Being such, the spouses Carandang claim, the failure to join Mrs. de Guzman as a party-plaintiff should cause the dismissal of the action because "(i)f a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action." SC disagrees with the contention of the sps. Carandangs. The joint account of spouses Quirino A de Guzman and Milagros de Guzman from which the four (4) checks were drawn is part of their conjugal property and under both the Civil Code and the Family Code the husband alone may institute an action for the recovery or protection of the spouses conjugal property. Petitioners erroneously interchange the terms "real party in interest" and "indispensable party." o A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. o On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, in contrast to a necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988. As they did not execute any marriage settlement, the regime of conjugal partnership of gains govern their property relations. Credits are personal properties, acquired during the time the loan or other credit transaction was executed. Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be conjugal property. Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action for the recovery thereof. In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action for the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her not being a party thereto.
Rule 3, Sec 18 to 22 Romualdez v Tiglao GR 51151, July 1981 Facts: Paz G. Romualdez and others sued Antonio Tiglao for the payment of unpaid rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota. Included in the suit were Felisa Tiglao and others who had guaranteed the payment of the rents jointly and severally with Antonio Tiglao. The TC rendered a
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decision in favour of the plaintiffs. The judgment was not satisfied notwithstanding a writ of execution to enforce it. Paz G. Romualdez, et al. filed Civil Case 14424 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Antonio Tiglao and his sureties in order to revive the judgment above quoted. It should be stated that when the suit to revive judgment was filed, Felisa F. Tiglao had died and her estate was being settled. The administratrix of Tiglaos estate questioned the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit to revive judgment. CA ruled for the revival of judgment. Issue: W/N he Estate of Tiglao can be liable? Held: Yes. This argument is simply answered thus: the original judgment has become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years. (Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.) Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action. This is precisely why the appellees have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the Estate of Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep alive said judgment so that the sums therein awarded can be presented as claims against the estate. 20 SCRA 1967 The Board of Liquidators vs Heirs of Maximo Kalaw FACTS: The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO, for short) was chartered as a non-profit governmental organization avowedly for the protection, preservation and development of the coconut industry in the Philippines. NACOCO's charter was amended by RA 5 (yes, ganito na katanda ang kasong ito) to grant that corporation the express power "to buy, sell, barter, export, and in any other manner deal in, coconut, copra, and desiccated coconut, as well as their by-products, and to act as agent, broker or commission merchant of the producers, dealers or merchants" thereof. General manager and board chairman was Maximo M. Kalaw; defendants Juan Bocar and Casimiro Garcia were members of the Board; defendant Leonor Moll. NACOCO, after the passage of Republic Act 5, embarked on copra trading activities. An unhappy chain of events conspired to deter NACOCO from fulfilling these contracts. Nature supervened. Four devastating typhoons visited the Philippines. Coconut trees throughout the country suffered extensive damage. Copra production decreased. Prices spiralled. Warehouses were destroyed. Cash requirements doubled. When it became clear that the contracts would be unprofitable, Kalaw submitted them to the board for approval Kalaw made a full disclosure of the situation apprised the board of the impending heavy losses. No action was taken on the contracts. Then, President Roxas made a statement that the NACOCO head did his best to avert the losses, emphasized that government concerns faced the same risks that confronted private companies, that NACOCO was recouping its losses, and that Kalaw was to remain in his post. The buyers threatened damage suits. Some of the claims were settled, but one buyer, Louis Dreyfus & Go. (Overseas) Ltd., did in fact sue before the Court of First Instance of Manila, upon claims as follows: For the undelivered copra. All settlements sum up to P1,343,274.52. NACOCO seeks to recover the above sum of P1,343,274.52 from general manager and board chairman Maximo M. Kalaw, and directors Juan Bocar, Casimiro Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges Kalaw with negligence under Article 1902 of the old Civil Code and defendant board members, including Kalaw, with bad faith and/or breach of trust for having approved the contracts. During the pendency of the case, Kalaw died. o
ISSUE: Whether the action is enforceable against the heirs of Kalaw? RULING: Yes. The suit here revolves around the alleged negligent acts of Kalaw for having entered into the questioned contracts without prior approval of the board of directors, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff; and is against
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Kalaw and the other directors for having subsequently approved the said contracts in bad faith and/or breach of trust." Clearly then, the present case is not a mere action for the recovery of money nor a claim for money arising from contract. The suit involves alleged tortious acts. And the action is embraced in suits filed "to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal", which survive. Action against the Kalaw heirs and, for the matter, against the Estate of Casimiro Garcia survives. G.R. No. L-18107 August 30, 1962 heirs filed MD- granted on the ground that the legal representative, and not the heirs, should have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein MR-denied, Hence to SC.
MARIA G. AGUAS, FELIX GUARDINO and FRANCISCO SALINAS, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. HERMOGENES LLEMOS, deceased defendant substituted by his representatives, PERPETUA YERRO-LLEMOS, HERMENEGILDO LLEMOS, FELINO LLEMOS and AMADO LLEMOS, defendants-appellees. FACTS: Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly filed an action in the CFI-Samar to recover damages from Hermogenes Llemos Alledging that Llemos had served them by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with notice that the same would be submitted to the said court of Samar that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no such petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mental anguish and undue embarrassment Llemo died before he filed his answer so plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the heirs of the deceased-granted
RULING: Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators:(1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished (Baker vs. Crandall, 47 Am. Rep. 126; also 171 A.L.R., 1395). To maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that party's property (Javier vs. Araneta, L-4369, Aug. 31, 1953). However, parties have arrived at an amicable settlement of their differences, and that they have agreed to dismiss this appeal. CFI-granted. Appeal was dismissed. Rule 4 Venue G.R. No. 156187 November 11, 2004
JIMMY T. GO, petitioner, vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, ANGELO V. MANAHAN, FRANCISCO C. ZARATE, PERLITA A. URBANO and ATTY. EDWARD MARTIN, respondents. Facts: Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-owners of several businesses under the name of Noahs Ark.
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Petitioners applied for a P900,000,000 Omnibus Line accommodation (secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of land) with respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)) Pesos and was favorably acted upon by the latter. The approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to petitioner was subsequently cancelled by UCPB. Go demanded from UCPB the return of the two (2) TCTs covered by Real Estate Mortgages earlier executed. UCPB refused to return the same. RTC Mandaluyong City Respondent UCPB filed an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage for nonpayment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. the public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000. RTC Pasig City Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and damages, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, against respondent bank and its officers Respondent bank filed a motion to dismiss based on different grounds including: 2) that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue; petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction GRANTED. the auction sale, scheduled on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000, was enjoined. (see last bullet RTC Mandaluyong) UCPBs motion to dismiss- DENIED UCPBs MFR DENIED CA UCPB filed a petition for certiorari (Rule 65) directed the trial court to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioners MFR DENIED ISSUE: WON petitioners complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the purpose of determining venue. SC via petitiones petition for review on certiorari.
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue for real actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts -the court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies. Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue for personal actions is likewise the same for the regional and municipal trial courts -- the court of the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4. The cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition, is a real action, considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself. An action for cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real action which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the subject property lies. No. L-44351. May 18, 1978. HOECHST PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. FRAN-CISCO TORRES and the Honorable PROCORO J. DONATO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, respondents. Facts ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition.
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Petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare respondent court without authority to take cognizance of private respondents action for Breach of Contract with Preliminary Injunction and to enjoin said court from further taking any action in said case upon the ground of improper laying of the venue. CFI Private respondent, Francisco Torres, filed with respondent Court of First Instance of Isabela A complaint alleging breach of a distributorship contract on the part of petitioner, Hoechst Philippines, Inc. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that: The contract provides that (I)n case of any litigation arising out of this agreement, the venue of any action shall be in the competent courts of the Province of Rizal. Venue has been improperly laid in respondent court. Respondents Argue: The word shall in the stipulation in question should be construed to be merely permissive and not mandatory. The stipulation as to venue was meant to apply only to suits to be filed by petitioner. It is maintained that there are no words in the contract expressly restricting the venue to the courts of Rizal. It is urged that to give effect to the stipulation in controversy is to serve the convenience and the purpose of the petitioner only. Its effect is to discourage, to deter, to render expensive and uneconomical the filing of suits by small-time company distributors against the petitioner. Ruling The settled rule of jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is that a written agreement of the parties as to venue, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 4, is not only binding between the parties but also enforceable by the courts. It is only after the action has been filed already that change or transfer of venue by agreement of the parties is understandably controllable in the discretion of the court. The agreement in this case was entered into long before the petitioners action was filed It is clear and unequivocal. The parties therein stipulated that (I)n case of any litigation arising out of this agreement, the venue of any action shall be in the competent courts of the Province of Rizal. Change or transfer of venue from that fixed in the rules may be effected upon written agreement of the parties not only before the actual filing of the action but even after the same has been filed. The settled rule of jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is that a written agreement of the parties as to venue, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 4, is not only binding between the parties but also enforceable by the courts. It is only after the action has been filed already that change or transfer of venue by agreement of the parties is understandably controllable in the discretion of the court. The agreement in this case was entered into long before the petitioners action was filed. It is clear and unequivocal. The parties therein stipulated that (I)n case of any litigation arising out of this agreement, the venue of any action shall he in the competent courts of the Province of Rizal. No further stipulations are necessary to elicit the thought that both parties agreed that any action by either of them would be filed only in the competent courts of Rizal province exclusively. Indeed, there may be instances when an agreement as to venue may be so oppressive as to effectively deny to the party concerned access to the courts by reason of poverty. In such an eventuality and depending on the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Court may declare the agreement as to venue to be in effect contrary to public policy,despite that in general, changes and transfers of venue by written agreement of the parties is allowablewhenever it is shown that a stipulation as to venue works injustice by practically denying to the party concerned a fair opportunity to file suit in the place designated by the rules.
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Petition granted. G.R. No. 106920 December 10, 1993 PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. SALVADOR S. TENSUAN, Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 146; CIRCLE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, AVELINO E. DEATO, JR., MIGUEL F. VIOLAGO, BENJAMIN F. SANTIAGO, SOCORRO R. GOMEZ, NERISSA T. GLORIA, FILEMON C. MARQUEZ, DOMINGO SANTIAGO AND HILARIO P. LOPEZ, respondents. RULING: THE STIPULATION AS TO THE VENUE OF ACTION MUST CLEARLY INDICATE THROUGH QUALIFYING AND RESTRICTIVE WORDS THAT THE PARTIES DELIBERATELY INTENDED TO EXCLUDE CAUSES OF ACTIONS FROM THE OPERATION OF THE ORDINARY PERMISSIVE RULES ON VENUE TO THE EXCLUSION OF ANY OTHER COURT. Facts: Petitioner Philippine Banking Corporation (hereafter "Bank") is a commercial banking corporation with principal office at Makati, Metro Manila. RTC MAKATI: PETITIONER: COLLECTION OF SUM OF MONEY o Petitioner Bank instituted a complaint for collection of a sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. o Bank alleges that respondent Circle Financial Co. (hereafter "Circle"), sometime in 1983 and 1984, through its representatives, obtained several loans aggregating P1,000,000.00 from petitioner. o Respondent Circle, for value received, delivered to petitioner Bank four (4) promissory notes, each of which contained the stipulation that: o I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise out of this promissory note. As security for the re-payment by respondent Circle of the sums loaned by petitioner Bank, eight (8) individuals, who were impleaded as defendants in the complaint executed a Continuing Surety Agreement and undertook to pay jointly and severally respondent Circle's obligations. Only five (5) out of eight (8) individual obligors are respondents in present case. On their due dates, Circle failed to pay its obligations under the promissory notes. Petitioner Bank demanded payment from the eight (8) individual sureties conformably with their promises contained in the Continuing Surety Agreement; the individual obligors, however, also failed to pay.
o o o
PETITIONER: ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT. ALLEGATION: CIRLCE BECAME INSOLVENT AND PLACED UNDER RECEIVERSHIP BY CB. o Petitioner moved for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, alleging that respondent Circle had become insolvent and had been placed under receivership by the Central Bank. RTC: GRANTED THE MOTION. o The trial judge granted the motion and issued a writ of preliminary attachment. The sheriff's return indicated, however, that no properties belonging to the respondent Circle and the individual obligors could be found. RESPONDENT: MOTION TO DISMISS. GROUND: VENUE OF ACTION IMPROPERLY LAID, AGREEMENT WAS IN VALENZUELA ONLY. o A motion to dismiss was filed by the respondents (Circle and the five [5] individual sureties served with summons)
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and averred that the venue of the action was improperly laid since an agreement had fixed the venue of actions arising from the promissory notes in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, only. Respondents called the trial court's attention to the stipulation contained in the promissory note, quoted in limine. HELD: NO. THE AGREEMENT WAS PERMISSIVE. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the parties, by written agreement, may change or transfer the venue of an action from one province to another. The relevant task, in other words, is determining the intent of the parties as manifested in the words employed by them and, where such words are less than clear, in other recognized indicators of the will of the contracting parties. A careful reading of the terms of the stipulation "I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise out of this promissory note" shows that the stipulation does not require the laying of venue in Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The plain or ordinary import of the stipulation is the authorizing of, or permission to bring, suit in Valenzuela; there is not the slightest indication of an intent to bar suit in other competent courts. Permissive stipulations like the one here considered have invariably received judicial approval and the Court have declared that either of the parties is authorized to lay venue of an action in the court named in the stipulation. o The stipulation here does not purport to deprive either party of it right to elect, or option to have resort to, another competent court as expressly permitted by Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, should such party choose to initiate a suit. The stipulation here merely operated to confer or confirm a right upon a party to elect recourse to the courts of Valenzuela or, alternatively, to go before any of the tribunals envisaged by the rules on venue, i.e., the courts of Makati, Quezon City and Bulacan. In principle, the stipulation on venue here involved must be distinguished from stipulations which purport to require or compel the parties to lay venue of an action in a specified place, and in that particular place only. o The latter type of venue stipulation must clearly indicate, through QUALIFYING and RESTRICTIVE words, that the parties deliberately intended to exclude causes or
RTC: GRANTED MOTION, CASE DISMISSED. M.R DENIED. HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: o The stipulation contained in the promissory notes is merely an agreement to add the courts of Valenzuela to the tribunals to which the parties may resort. o Petitioner thus insists that the venue stipulation set out in the notes did not restrict or limit the permissible venue of actions arising out of those notes to the courts of Valenzuela, to the exclusion of all the other courts recourse to any one of which is authorized or permitted under the Rules of Court. o Thus, venue was properly laid by petitioner Bank in the place where its principal offices are located: i.e., Makati, Metropolitan Manila. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: o o Aver that the words used in the stipulation here involved are clear and unambiguous. A promise to submit to the jurisdiction of a specific court, without an express reservation of the right to resort to one or more of the tribunals otherwise accessible under the Rules of Court, is an agreement definitely fixing the permissible venue in only one place, i.e., Valenzuela, to the exclusion of other competent courts.
ISSUE: Whether the agreement as to the venue of action was EXCLUSIVE.
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actions from the operation of the ordinary permissive rules on venue, and that they intended contractually to designate a specific venue to the exclusion of any other court also competent and accessible to the parties under the ordinary rules on the venue of actions. Stipulations of this exclusionary nature may, under certain circumstances, be characterized as unreasonable or as contrary to public policy and, accordingly, not judicially enforceable. In the case at bar, neither qualifying nor restrictive words (e.g., "must," "only" or "exclusively") were employed which could yield an intent on the part of the parties mandatorily to restrict the venue of actions arising out of the promissory notes to the courts of Valenzuela only. The case is remanded to the RTC. Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against respondents because the respondents action was unwarranted, unjustified, malicious, abusive and capricious. Respondents moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the venue of the action had been improperly laid in the RTC of Makati. Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss by alleging that their cause of action is not based on the lease contract and, therefore, the case is not covered by the stipulation as to venue. Instead it is governed by the general 3 rule as to venue stated in Rule 4, sec. 2(b). They also alleged that even assuming that the stipulation is applicable, it does not operate to limit the venue to Pasay City but merely provides for an additional forum. The trial court dismissed petitioners' action on the ground of improper venue. MR was likewise denied. Hence this petition GESMUNDO vs.JRB REALTY CORPORATION Issue: Whether venue was properly laid in the RTC of Makati. This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148), dismissing on the ground of improper venue a complaint which the spouses Virgilio B. Gesmundo and Edna C. Gesmundo 2 filed against the JRB Realty Corporation and Jaime R. Blanco. Facts: Petitioner Virgilio B. Gesmundo, as lessee, and respondent JRB Realty Corporation, represented by its president, respondent Jaime R. Blanco, as lessor, entered into a lease contract covering Room 116, Blanco Suites, at 246 Villaruel St., Pasay City, the parties stipulating that the venue for all suits will be the courts of appropriate jurisdiction in Pasay City.Petitioner received a letter terminating their lease. Respondent Blanco told petitioner Gesmundo that the Corporation where Gesmundo works did not pay him his retainer fees and that he did not want petitioner in any of his apartment units. Petitioner asked for reconsideration but was ignored, and instead was forced to vacate the leased premises. Petitioner leased another apartment. Procedural Facts:
1
Held: No. It was improperly laid. We have in the past held stipulations limiting venue as valid and binding on 4 the contracting parties, based on Rule 4, sec. 3 which provides: Venue by agreement. By written agreement of the parties, the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another. In the case at bar, it is clear from the parties' contract that the venue of any action which they might bring are the courts of competent jurisdiction in Pasay City.The language used leaves no room for interpretation. This means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided for in Rule 4, sec. 2(b). This case is different from Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, where in Polytrade there was an absence of any qualifying or restrictive words, while in this case the word all suits plainly restricted the venue.
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The stipulation in this case is similar to that involved in Hoechst Philippines, Inc. v. Torres. [G.R. No. 158138. April 12, 2005] PHILIPPINE BANK OF, COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioner, vs. ELENA LIM, RAMON CALDERON, and TRI-ORO INTERNATIONAL TRADING & MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondents. Thus, venue was properly laid in Manila. A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied. On appeal, the CA ruled that respondents' alleged debt was based on the Promissory Note. The parties' Surety Agreement, though silent as to venue, was an accessory contract.
ISSUE: Whether the action against the sureties is covered by the restriction on venue stipulated in the PN?
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Philippine Bank of Communications filed a complaint against Respondents Elena Lim, Ramon Calderon and Tri-Oro International Trading & Manufacturing Corporation (Tri-Oro) with the Regional Trial Court of for the collection of a deficiency amounting to P4,014,297.23 exclusive of interest. Petitioner alleged therein that [respondents] obtained a loan from it and executed a continuing surety agreement dated November 16, 1995 in favor of [petitioner]. Petitioner granted a renewal of said loan upon respondent's request, the most recent being evidenced by a Promissory Note Renewal in the amount of P3,000,000.00. It was expressly stipulated that the venue for any legal action that may arise out of said promissory note shall be Makati City, 'to the exclusion of all other courts' Respondents allegedly failed to pay said obligation upon maturity. Thus, petitioner foreclosed the real estate mortgage executed by respondents valued at P1,081,600.00 leaving a deficiency balance of P4,014,297.23 as of August 31, 1999. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. The trial court denied said motion asseverating that petitioner had separate causes of action arising from the promissory note and the continuing surety agreement.
RULING: Yes. The cases pertaining to both causes of action are restricted to Makati City as the proper venue. In enforcing a surety contract, the 'complementary-contracts-construedtogether doctrine finds application. According to this principle, an accessory contract must be read in its entirety and together with the principal agreement. The aforementioned doctrine is applicable to the present case. Incapable of standing by itself, the SA can be enforced only in conjunction with the PN. Petitioner approved the loan covered by the PN, partly because of the SA that assured the payment of the principal obligation. It makes no sense to argue that the parties to the SA were not bound by the stipulations in the PN. By inserting the provision that Makati City would be 'the venue for any legal action that may arise out of the Promissory Note, petitioner also restricted the venue of actions against the sureties. The legal action against the sureties arose not only from the SA, but also from the PN. Young Auto Supply vs. CA, 223 SCRA 670
FACTS:
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Young Auto Supply Co. Inc. (YASCO) represented by Nemesio Garcia, its president, Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy, sold all of their shares of stock in Consolidated Marketing & Development Corporation (CMDC) to Roxas.(8M price payable 4M-Dp,4M4postdated check) After the execution of the agreement, Roxas took full control of the four markets of CMDC. However, the vendors held on to the stock certificates of CMDC as security pending full payment of the balance of the purchase price. down-payment, was honored by the drawee bank but the four other checks representing the balance were dishonored Roxas sold one of the markets to a third party. Out of the proceeds of the sale, YASCO received P600,000.00, leaving a balance of P3,400,000.00 Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy assigned all their rights and title to the proceeds of the sale of the CMDC shares to Nemesio Garcia. YASCO and GARCIA filed a complaint against Roxas in the RTC- Cebu City, praying that Roxas be ordered to pay petitioners the sum of P3,400,00.00 or that full control of the three markets be turned over to YASCO and Garcia and prayed for the forfeiture of the partial payment . ROXAS failed to file answer and he was declared in default but was later lifted by court ROXAS filed MD on the grounds that: The complaint did not state a cause of action due to non-joinder of indispensable parties;The claim or demand set forth in the complaint had been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and The venue was improperly laid- Denied RoXas filed another motion for extension of time to submit his answer and MR -denied for being proforma and Roxas was again declared in default, on the ground that his motion for reconsideration did not toll the running of the period to file his answer. Roxas filed an unverified Motion to Lift the Order of Default which was not accompanied with the required affidavit or merit. But without waiting for the resolution of the motion, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals- order dismissal on the ground of improper venue MR-denied, Hence they went to SC
RULLING: CA erred in holding that the venue was improperly laid in Cebu City, they relied on the address of YASCO, as appearing in the Deed of Sale dated October 28, 1987, which is "No. 1708 Dominga Street, Pasay City." This was the same address written in YASCO's letters and several commercial documents in the possession of Roxas. In the Regional Trial Courts, all personal actions are commenced and tried in the province or city where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff [Sec. 2(b) Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court]. There are two plaintiffs in the case at bench: a natural person and a domestic corporation. Both plaintiffs aver in their complaint that they are residents of Cebu City, thus:1.1. Plaintiff Young Auto Supply Co., Inc., ("YASCO") is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal place of business at M. J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City. It also has a branch office at 1708 Dominga Street, Pasay City, Metro Manila. Plaintiff Nemesio Garcia is of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and with business address at Young Auto Supply Co., Inc., M. J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City. . . The Article of Incorporation of YASCO (SEC Reg. No. 22083) states:THIRD That the place where the principal office of the corporation is to be established or located is at Cebu City, Philippines (as amended on December 20, 1980 and further amended on December 20, 1984) ( Rollo, p. 273). A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is applied to a natural person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal office is
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located as stated in the articles of incorporation. The Corporation Code precisely requires each corporation to specify in its articles of incorporation the "place where the principal office of the corporation is to be located which must be within the Philippines" (Sec. 14 [3]). The purpose of this requirement is to fix the residence of a corporation in a definite place, instead of allowing it to be ambulatory. If it was Roxas who sued YASCO in Pasay City and the latter questioned the venue on the ground that its principal place of business was in Cebu City, Roxas could argue that YASCO was in estoppel because it misled Roxas to believe that Pasay City was its principal place of business. But this is not the case before us.With the finding that the residence of YASCO for purposes of venue is in Cebu City, where its principal place of business is located, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether Garcia is also a resident of Cebu City and whether Roxas was in estoppel from questioning the choice of Cebu City as the venue. G.R. No. 159507 April 19, 2006 1st dishonor Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States some time in April 2000. 2nd dishonor occurred when Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance covering the period of March 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were cancelled by respondents on July 20, 2000. Respondent raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte and that Saludo was not a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo. Respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner, vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS, Respondents. Facts: RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers. The complaint alleged that Saludo "is a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, AMEX "is a engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with office at Makati City." The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter.
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Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesSouthern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of one's residence. TC denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid. Respondents MFR DENIED SC The petition is meritorious. Saludo was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding the venue was properly laid Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads: SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954 that 'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
CA Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion TRO was issued which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from conducting further proceedings CA ruled that venue was improperly laid action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal actions basically provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff. Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency Petitioners MFR DENIED
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue
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"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus: 'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.' "Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.) G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.* EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent. G.R. No. 134029. February 6, 2007.* RODOLFO SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent. Facts PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134; and its Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo). During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six children,Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son. However, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce in the United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody. Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, before the Minister of the United Presbyterian in Los Angeles, California. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death. RTC Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. She filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged that: She is the widow of Felicisimo; That the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; That the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. The trial court issued an Order denying the two
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motions to dismiss. Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed her opposition thereto. She submitted: Documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila She presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. She claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo This would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code. Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case. The trial court issued an Order denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. The motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion. Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan. Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based. Judge Tensuan issued an Order granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel. The trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. Edgar manifested that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers. The trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. The petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. Respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. Paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children. Respondent moved for reconsideration and for the disqualification of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. CA Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court. Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Court of Appeals. Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. SC
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Petitioner's Arguments: Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid: Because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, residence is synonymous with domicile which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. Paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. Respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration. Issue Whether venue was properly laid. Ruling The petition lacks merit. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides at the time of his death. In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residenceas contradistinguished from domicileof the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. (Emphasis supplied) It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with domicile. The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between residence for purposes of election laws and residence for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, residence and domicile are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another. In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital indicating the address of Felicisimo at Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa. Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc. Letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and The deceaseds calling cards stating that his home/city address is at Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa while his office/provincial address is in Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional
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Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed in December. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. As petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta would later allege, both corporations were organized pursuant to a contract or arrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name and in the name of his associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of FEMII and UEC with the obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65% of such shares. Several years after, Irene, through her trustee-husband, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, demanded the reconveyance of said 65% stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige. RTC BATAC, ILOCOS NORTE: PETITIONER: 2 COMPLAINTS FOR CONVEYANCE OF SHARES OF STOCK, ACCOUNTING AND RECEIVERSHIP OF UEC SHARES AND RECOVERY OF 65% OF FEMII SHARES. o In March 2000, Irene thereupon instituted before the RTC two similar complaints for conveyance of shares of stock, accounting and receivership against the Benedicto Group with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). o The first, covered the UEC shares and named Benedicto, his daughter, and at least 20 other individuals as defendants. o The second, sought the recovery to the extent of 65% of FEMII shares held by Benedicto and the other defendants named therein. RESPONDENT FRANCISCA: MOTION TO DISMISS THE 1 COMPLAINT. GROUND: IMPROPER VENUE. o Respondent Francisca Benedicto-Paulino, Benedicto's st daughter, filed a Motion to Dismiss the 1 complaint, followed later by an Amended Motion to Dismiss. ND RESPONDENT BENEDICTO: MOTION TO DISMISS THE 2 COMPLAINT. GROUND: IMPROPER VENUE. nd o Benedicto, on the other hand, moved to dismiss 2 complaint, adopting in toto the five (5) grounds raised by Francisca in her amended motion to dismiss. Among these were: (1) the cases involved an intra-corporate
ST
G.R. No. 154096
August 22, 2008
IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, DANIEL RUBIO, ORLANDO G. RESLIN, and JOSE G. RESLIN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JULITA C. BENEDICTO, and FRANCISCA BENEDICTO-PAULINO, respondents. RULING: CO-PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT PRINCIPAL PARTIES TO THE CASE, VENUE OF ACTION MUST BE WHERE THE PRINCIPAL PLAINTIFF RESIDES. Facts: Sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto, now deceased, and his business associates (Benedicto Group) organized Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity Corporation (UEC), respectively.
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dispute over which the Securities and Exchange Commission, not the RTC, has jurisdiction; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) the complaint failed to state a cause of action, as there was no allegation therein that plaintiff, as beneficiary of the purported trust, has accepted the trust created in her favor. To the motions to dismiss, Irene filed a Consolidated Opposition, which Benedicto and Francisca countered with a Joint Reply to Opposition. Upon Benedicto's motion, both cases were consolidated. BENEDICTO AND FRANCISCA: PETITIONER DOES NOT RESIDE IN BATAC, ILOCOS NORTE. o During the preliminary proceedings on their motions to dismiss, Benedicto and Francisca, by way of bolstering their contentions on improper venue, presented the Joint Affidavit of household staff at the Marcos' Mansion in Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte and that Irene did not maintain residence in said place as she in fact only visited the mansion twice in 1999; that she did not vote in Batac in the 1998 national elections; and that she was staying at her husband's house in Makati City. PETITIONER: COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE ISSUED ON 11/07/99 IN CURIMAO, ILOCOS NORTE. o Against the aforesaid unrebutted joint affidavit, Irene presented her PhP 5 community tax certificate (CTC) issued on "11/07/99" in Curimao, Ilocos Norte to support her claimed residency in Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the meantime, on May 15, 2000, Benedicto died and was substituted by his wife, Julita C. Benedicto, and Francisca. RTC: DISMISSED BOTH COMPLAINTS. GROUND: PETITIONER DID NOT ACTUALLY RESIDE IN ILOCOS NORTE, VENUE IMPROPERLY LAID. o On June 29, 2000, the RTC dismissed both complaints, stating that these partly constituted "real action," and that Irene did not actually reside in Ilocos Norte, and, therefore, venue was improperly laid. PETITIONER: M.R. and MOTION TO ADMIT AMENDED COMPLAINT. GROUND: ADDED ADDITIONAL PLAINTIFFS; PETITIONERS TRUSTEES, FROM ILOCOS NORTE. o Pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration, Irene filed on July 17, 2000 a Motion (to Admit Amended Complaint), attaching therewith a copy of the Amended Complaint dated July 14, 2000 in which the names of Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin appeared as additional plaintiffs. o As stated in the amended complaint, the added plaintiffs, all from Ilocos Norte, were Irene's new trustees. RTC: DENIED PETITIONERS M.R. BUT GRANTED MOTION TO ADMIT AMENDED COMPLAINT. GROUNDS: CURED THE DEFECT OF IMPROPER VENUE. o RTC dictated in open court an order denying Irene's motion for reconsideration aforementioned, but deferred action on her motion to admit amended complaint and the opposition thereto. o The RTC predicated its order on the following premises: (1) Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Irene may opt to file, as a matter of right, an amended complaint. (2) The inclusion of additional plaintiffs, one of whom was a Batac, an Ilocos Norte resident, in the amended complaint setting out the same cause of action cured the defect of improper venue. (3) Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4 allow the filing of the amended complaint in question in the place of residence of any of Irene's co-plaintiffs. M.R. DENIED.
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GROUND: PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO AMEND HER COMPLAINTS BEFORE ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING HAS BEEN FILED. CA: RESPONDENTS: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. CA: ISSUED TRO AND WPI ENJOINING RTC FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE COMPLAINTS. CA: SET ASIDE RTC ORDERS AND DISMISSING THE COMPLAINTS. o Respondents went to the CA via a petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the RTC orders. M.R. DENIED. o Irene and her new trustees' motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision was denied through the equally assailed June 20, 2002 CA Resolution. Hence, this petition for review before the SC. Venue essentially concerns a rule of procedure which, in personal actions, is fixed for the greatest convenience possible of the plaintiff and his witnesses. The ground of improperly laid venue must be raised seasonably, else it is deemed waived. o Where the defendant failed to either file a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue or include the same as an affirmative defense, he is deemed to have waived his right to object to improper venue. In the case at bench, Benedicto and Francisca raised at the earliest time possible, meaning "within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint," the matter of improper venue. o They would thereafter reiterate and pursue their objection on venue, first, in their answer to the amended complaints and then in their petition for certiorari before the CA. o Any suggestion, therefore, that Francisca and Benedicto or his substitutes abandoned along the way improper venue as ground to defeat Irene's claim before the RTC has to be rejected. Venue was improperly laid. a. Subject Civil Cases are Personal Actions.
ISSUES: 1.
Whether respondents waive improper venue. HELD: NO.
2.
2.
Whether the venue in this case was improperly laid. HELD: YES.
1.
Private Respondents did not Waive Improper Venue. Petitioners maintain that Julita and Francisca were effectively precluded from raising the matter of improper venue by their subsequent acts of filing numerous pleadings. o To petitioners, these pleadings, taken together, signify a waiver of private respondents' initial objection to improper venue. This contention is without basis and, at best, tenuous.
It is the posture of respondents that the venue was in this case improperly laid since the suit in question partakes of a real action involving real properties located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC in Batac. This contention is not well-taken. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages. Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. In accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1 of Rule 4, the venue of real actions shall be
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the proper court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. The venue of personal actions is the court where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. In the instant case, petitioners are basically asking Benedicto and his Group, as defendants a quo, to acknowledge holding in trust Irene's purported 65% stockownership of UEC and FEMII, inclusive of the fruits of the trust, and to execute in Irene's favor the necessary conveying deed over the said 65% shareholdings. In other words, Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trust arrangement she has with the Benedicto Group. o The fact that FEMII's assets include real properties does not materially change the nature of the action, for the ownership interest of a stockholder over corporate assets is only inchoate as the corporation, as a juridical person, solely owns such assets. o It is only upon the liquidation of the corporation that the stockholders, depending on the type and nature of their stockownership, may have a real inchoate right over the corporate assets, but then only to the extent of their stockownership. The amended complaint is an action in personam, it being a suit against Francisca and the late Benedicto (now represented by Julita and Francisca), on the basis of their alleged personal liability to Irene upon an alleged trust constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. They are not actions in rem where the actions are against the real properties instead of against persons. o SC particularly notes that possession or title to the real properties of FEMII and UEC is not being disputed, albeit part of the assets of the corporation happens to be real properties. b. Interpretation of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3; and Sec. 2 of Rule 4 SC points out at the outset that Irene, as categorically and peremptorily found by the RTC after a hearing, is not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte, as she claimed. The Court perceives no compelling reason to disturb, in the confines of this case, the factual determination of the trial court and the premises holding it together. Accordingly, Irene cannot, in a personal action, contextually opt for Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint. As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court adverts to as the place "where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides" at the time she filed her amended complaint. That Irene holds CTC No. 17019451 issued sometime in June 2000 in Batac, Ilocos Norte and in which she indicated her address as Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is really of no moment. o Let alone the fact that one can easily secure a basic residence certificate practically anytime in any Bureau of Internal Revenue or treasurer's office and dictate whatever relevant data one desires entered, Irene procured CTC No. 17019451 and appended the same to her motion for reconsideration following the RTC's pronouncement against her being a resident of Batac. c. Co-plaintiffs are not principal parties.
Petitioners, in an attempt to establish that the RTC in Batac, Ilocos Norte is the proper court venue, asseverate that Batac, Ilocos Norte is where the principal parties reside. Pivotal to the resolution of the venue issue is a determination of the status of Irene's co-plaintiffs in the context of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4, which pertinently provide as follows: Rule PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS 3
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SEC. 2. Parties in interest. -- A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. -- Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. Rule VENUE OF ACTIONS 4 Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue. o According to the late Justice Jose Y. Feria, "the word 'principal' has been added [in the uniform procedure rule] in order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the venue." o Eliminate the qualifying term "principal" and the purpose of the Rule would, to borrow from Justice Regalado, "be defeated where a nominal or formal party is impleaded in the action since the latter would not have the degree of interest in the subject of the action which would warrant and entail the desirably active participation expected of litigants in a case." Before the RTC in Batac, in the 2 Civil Cases, Irene stands undisputedly as the principal plaintiff, the real party-in-interest. Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil cases ought to be commenced and prosecuted at the place where Irene resides. As earlier stated, no less than the RTC in Batac declared Irene as not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte. Withal, that court was an improper venue for her conveyance action. The Court can concede that Irene's three co-plaintiffs are all residents of Batac, Ilocos Norte. o But it ought to be stressed in this regard that not one of the three can be considered as principal partyplaintiffs in the 2 Civil Cases, included as they were in the amended complaint as trustees of the principal plaintiff. o As trustees, they may be accorded, by virtue of Sec. 3 of Rule 3, the right to prosecute a suit, but only on behalf of the beneficiary who must be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. o In the final analysis, the residences of Irene's coplaintiffs cannot be made the basis in determining the venue of the subject suit.
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. -- All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. There can be no serious dispute that the real party-in-interest plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled beneficiary of the disputed trust, she stands to be benefited or entitled to the avails of the present suit. It is undisputed too that petitioners Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were included as co-plaintiffs in the amended complaint as Irene's new designated trustees. As trustees, they can only serve as mere representatives of Irene.
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o This conclusion becomes all the more forceful considering that Irene herself initiated and was actively prosecuting her claim against Benedicto, his heirs, assigns, or associates, virtually rendering the impleading of the trustees unnecessary. The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Section 1 and 2 thereof clearly state: Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real-estate mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money of the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall govern as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in the power. Section 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the property sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be made is the subject of stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated. The case at bar involves petitioners mortgaged real property located in Paranaque City over which respondent bank was granted a special power to foreclose extra-judicially. Thus, by express provision of Section 2, the sale can only be made in Paranaque City. The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties and sanctioned by Section 4 of the Rules of Court, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because the provision of Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not. With respect to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No. 3135, as amended, applies, it being a special law dealing particularly with extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the general provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions. Consequently, the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant only to actions arising frm or related to the mortgage, such as petitioners complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages.
d.
Principal Plaintiff not a Resident in Venue of Action.
Irene was a resident during the period material of Forbes Park, Makati City. o She was not a resident of Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence has it that one can have several residences, if such were the established fact.
SPS. OCHOA v CHINA BANKING CORP Facts: For resolution is petitioners motion for reconsideration of our resolution denying their petition for review on certiorari for failing to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners insist that it was error for the CA to rule that the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is binding only on petitioners complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages filed before the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, but not on respondent banks Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, which was filed with the same court. Issue: Whether venue of Makati City is binding only on petitioners complaint but not on respondent banks Held: We disagree.
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Motion for reconsideration DENIED. Rule 5 Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts 224 SCRA 557 (1993) BAYUBAY VS CA FACTS: Proceeding at bar traces its origin to an action for ejectment filed by petitioner Bayubay in the MTC of Los Baos, Laguna on the ground of expiration of lease. In his answer, private respondent argued that it had the option to renew the term of the lease contract under such conditions as may be agreed upon by the parties and set up the defense of estoppel. MTC rendered a decision holding that the contract of lease had expired because no extension had been agreed upon by the parties as required by the agreement. Private respondent appealed to the RTC of Calamba, Laguna on the ground that "the MTC violated Secs. 6 and 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure by rendering judgment without ordering the parties to submit their respective position papers and affidavits of their respective witnesses, as a consequence of which, defendant's right to due process was violated." RTC affirmed the appealed decision. However, it was reversed by the CA, which ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings. Petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that: (1) the failure of the MTC to give the private respondent the opportunity to submit its position paper and/or affidavit of witnesses constituted a denial of due process; (2) the questions raised were not only questions of law because the answer contained a counterclaim for reimbursement of improvements allegedly made by the lessee on the premises, and damages; and (3) there was still a necessity for the MTC to issue an order following the close of the pre-trial conference ISSUE: Whether CAs decision to remand the case to the MTC was proper RULING: Yes, it was proper. The Court was merely enforcing the mandatory provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure. The record shows that the Municipal Trial Court failed to take into account the pertinent provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure that require the immediate issuance by the Municipal Trial Court of an order which clearly and distinctly sets forth the issues of the case and the other matters taken up during the preliminary conference. The order is an important part of the summary procedure because it is its receipt by the parties that begins the ten-day period to submit the affidavits and other evidence mentioned in Sec. 7, which reads as follows: Sec. 7. Submission of affidavits. Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of witnesses and other evidences on the factual issues defined therein, together with a brief statement of their petitions setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them. There was no order issued to that effect nor was there any indication of when the position papers were to be submitted for the purpose of discussing the factual questioning raised. Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extra-judicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
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Lucas vs. Fabros, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226, Jan. 31, 2000 FACTS: Gloria Lucas charged respondent, Judge Amelia A. Fabros of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 9, Manila, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion relative to Civil Case No. 151248 entitled "Editha F. Gacad, represented by Elenita F. Castelo vs. Gloria Lucas, for Ejectment". J Lucas was the defendant in Ejectment case, alleged that Judge Amelia A. Fabros issued an Order granting the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the her previous order which dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference. Lucas averred that it is elementary, under Section 19 (c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure, that MR is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the rule, granted. She added that, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in open court that the case is governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure,the judge ordered the revival of the case out of malice, partiality and with intent to cause an injury to complainant. JUDGE FABROS admitted that she granted the motion for reconsideration even if the same is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case in the interest of justice. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for grave abuse of discretion. RULLING: As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, "SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule. (c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial. This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case. Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion for reconsideration subject of the present complaint. Esmsc [G.R. No. 141614. August 14, 2002] TERESITA BONGATO, petitioner, vs. Spouses SEVERO A. MALVAR and TRINIDAD MALVAR, respondents.
FACTS: MTCC The spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that petitioner Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel of land belonging to the said spouses and erected thereon a house of light materials. Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer which the MTCC denied - being proscribed under the Rule on Summary Procedure, and likewise containing no notice of hearing.
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Petitioner filed an answer -disregarded having been filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period. Petitoners motion to dismiss - denied as being contrary to the Rule on Summary Procedure. Ordered petitioner to vacate the land in question, and to pay rentals, attorneys fees, and the costs of the suit. CA Lot referred to in the present controversy was different from that involved in the anti-squatting case. It ruled that MTCC had jurisdiction, and that it did not err in rejecting petitioners Motion to Dismiss. The appellate court reasoned that the MTCC had passed upon the issue of ownership of the property merely to determine possession -- an action that did not oust the latter of its jurisdiction.
RTC The decision was affirmed by respondent RTC judge. Petitioners MFR - GRANTED only insofar as to determine the location of the houses involved in this civil case so that the Court will know whether they are located on one and the same lot or a lot different from that involved in the criminal case for AntiSquatting. In the same order, respondent Judge disallowed any extension and warned that if the survey is not made, the court might consider the same abandoned and the writ of execution would be issued.
ISSUE: WON CA gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Motion to Dismiss was a prohibited pleading
SC - Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 The Petition is meritorious.
The criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim. Case No. 4659) was filed by private respondents Malvar against petitioner Bongato. The case is still pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City. Petitioner filed a motion for extension of the March 29, 1994 deadline for the submission of the relocation survey and to move the deadline to April 15, 1994, as the engineer concerned could not conduct his survey during the Holy Week (*take note) Respondent Judge noted that no survey report was submitted and ordered the record of the case returned to the court of origin for disposal.
Forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession. On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint for ejectment on July 10, 1992. Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the owner of the land, possession thereof cannot be wrested through a summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than one (1) year. Respondents should have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
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A motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is NOT a prohibited pleading, but is allowed under Sec. 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. A courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has been belatedly filed we likewise held in Bayog v. Natino: The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if a defendant fails to answer. It must likewise be pointed out that MAGDATOs defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even been raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) thereof, x x x. In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of erroneously holding that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure Because the Complaint for forcible entry was filed on July 10, 1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was applicable. A.M. No. MTJ-02-1429. October 4, 2002.* FRANCISCA P. PASCUAL, complainant, vs. Judge EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Alcala, Pangasinan, respondent. Facts ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law, Bias and Partiality, Abuse of Discretion and Neglect of Duty. Complainant filed a complaint for forcible entry against a certain Lorenzo L. Manaois. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice for being insufficient in some material allegations, so she filed a corrected complaint. Instead of filing an answer, defendant filed a Motion to Strike Out arguing that the new allegations in the complaint are false. After the period to answer
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. The speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy, and the Rule should equally apply with full force to forcible entry cases, in which possession of the premises is already illegal from the start. For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistently, Section 6 was added to give the trial court the power to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period. However, as forcible entry and detainer cases are summary in nature and involve disturbances of the social order, procedural technicalities should be carefully avoided and should not be allowed to override substantial justice. Pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129, the Court on June 16, 1983, promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases. Under this Rule, a motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however, a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings: SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule: (a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section; xxx x x x
xxx
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lapsed and no answer was submitted, complainant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant opposed the motion. Defendants motion to strike out was granted by respondent Judge. Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order. Based on the foregoing, complainant accused respondent Judge of Neglect of Duty anchored on the following grounds: Defendant should have filed an answer instead of a Motion to Strike Out. Inspite thereof, respondent Judge granted the motion 120 days after its filing, thus defeating the summary nature of the case; The Order granting the motion to strike out is bereft of any findings of fact because no hearing was conducted relative thereon; Respondent Judge exhibited his bias and partiality in favor of the defendant in his Order granting the motion to strike out when he pointed out x x x that the complaint in this case is virtually a rehash of the complaint in Civil Case No. 730 x x x. Complainant asserts that the same is to be expected because the defects or insufficiency in the first complaint were just being rectified in the later one; Her Motion for Summary Judgment remains, until the present, unacted upon. Defendant, taking advantage of the lull in the proceedings, started the construction of a one-storey building on the subject land. To protect her interest, complainant filed an Application for Preliminary Injunction. Acting thereon, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order and set the hearing on the Injunction. On said date, complainant was able to present evidence in support of her application while defendant chose not to present controverting evidence and to just submit a memorandum. On the last day of the effectivity of the TRO, complainant filed an Extremely Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to grant her application for injunction. Defendant filed his memorandum. However, until the present, respondent Judge has not ruled on her application on preliminary injunction. Instead of obeying the TRO, defendant continued with the construction of the building and even started with a new one. Hence, a contempt charge was filed by herein complainant. Defendant moved to dismiss the contempt charge on the ground that it was filed in the same proceedings and the filing fee was not paid. The court motu proprio docketed the complaint for contempt as Civil Case No. 744 the required docket and other fees were paid by defendant. On same date, the court issued an Order furnishing anew the defendants/respondents with a copy of the contempt charge. These, complainant claims, cured the defect cited by defendants/respondents in their motion to dismiss. Respondent Judge still has not resolved the aforesaid motion to the prejudice of herein complainant. In his Comment, respondent denied the allegations in the Complaint he said: Atty. Alejandro V. Peregrino, complainants counsel in the forcible entry case, of having a penchant for filing administrative cases against him instead of appealing decisions before the proper court. None of the charges had any factual or legal bases. His Decision in Civil Case No. 730 had been rendered with utmost good faith, honesty and sound discretion. The OCAs Recommendation After investigation of this case, the OCA found that: Respondent failed to apply the Rule on Summary Procedure, which he ought to have been very conversant with, because it was a common procedure in municipal courts. Accordingly, it recommended that respondent be FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 and warned that the commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Ruling We agree with the findings of the OCA, but increase the penalty, taking note
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that this is respondents second infraction. The Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated precisely to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. Failure to observe the period within which to render a judgment subjects the defaulting judge to administrative sanctions. For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and expressly prohibits, altogether, the filing of motions for extension. In this case, it is very clear that respondent lacks awareness of the relevant provisions on ejectment. He has evidently been remiss in resolving the forcible entry case, pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. judgment should have been rendered based on the allegations of the Complaint and the evidence presented therein, inasmuch as the defendant failed to file his answer after the lapse of ten (10) days from the service of the summons. Section 6 of the Rule allows the trial court to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon failure of the defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period. under Section 10 of the Rule, respondent was duty-bound to render his decision within thirty (30) days from receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing them. This notwithstanding, he has not yet ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment, filed in accordance with Section 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Lack of knowledge of the Rules on Summary Procedure reflects a serious degree of incompetence. When the law is so elementary, as in this case, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A member of the bench must be constantly abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments, bearing in mind that this learning process never ceases. It is indispensable to the correct dispensation of justice. Respondent claimed that if there was any delay on his part in resolving the incidents, it was not intentional but merely brought about by pressure from work. In the present case, the heavy caseload in respondents sala, though unfortunate, cannot excuse him from due observance of the rules. Judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads that prevent them from deciding cases within the reglementary period, may ask for additional time from this Court. Respondent has failed to do so. He ought to know that the speedy resolution of forcible entry cases is a matter of public policy. His inaction for almost three years on complainants Motion for Summary Judgment practically rendered nugatory the whole purpose of summary proceedingsto promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. By tarrying too long in deciding this forcible entry case, he failed to live up to the mandate of the Code of Judicial Conduct to maintain professional competence. WHEREFORE, Judge Eduardo Jovellanos is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is FINED in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000). He is further warned that a repetition of this or similar offenses will be dealt with even more severely. SO ORDERED. A. M. No. MTJ-05-1610 September 26, 2005 DR. JOSE S. LUNA, Complainants, vs. JUDGE EDUARDO H. MIRAFUENTE, Municipal Trial Court, Buenavista, Marinduque, Respondent. RULING: RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING THE BELATED ANSWER OF THE DEFENDANTS, SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS. FACTS: ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST RESPONDENT JUDGE FOR VIOLATION OF RRSP. MTC BUENAVISTA MARINDUQUE: PETITIONER: UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
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In May 2003, Dr. Luna filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, against Florencio Sadiwa and Alex Sadiwa (the defendants) with the Municipal Trial Court of Buenavista, Marinduque presided by respondent. o The defendants filed an unverified answer to the complaint, seven (7) days beyond the reglementary period of ten (10) days from the service of the summons on them. PETITIONER: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. GROUND: SECTION 6 OF RRSP. DENIED. M.R. ALSO DENIED. o Dr. Lunas counsel filed a Motion for Judgment, invoking Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, to which motion the defendants did not file any opposition. o By Order of August 28, 2003 respondent denied the motion. Hence, arose the present administrative complaint against respondent, Dr. Luna asserting that as the defendants answer was unverified and belatedly filed, respondent should have motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiffs rendered judgment as warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, following Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. In his Comment respondent explains that his admission of the defendants unverified, belatedly filed answer was premised on "the spirit of justice and fair play, which underlie[s] every court litigation and serves as the bedrock to preserve the trust and faith of parties litigants in the judicial system;" That the admission was proper because the delay was negligible, it involving only four (4) days as June 13 to 15, 2003 were nonworking holidays (per presidential proclamation in connection with the Independence Day celebration); That the defendants might have believed that the period to file answer was 15 days, which is the usual or common period to file an answer; and that the delay was also excusable as defendants acted pro se, without the benefit of legal assistance, and not dilatory. o ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING THE BELATED ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS. HELD: YES. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peop les faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Such a requirement is especially demanded in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. For forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases involve perturbation of social order, which must be restored as promptly as possible, such that technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided. That explains why the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which governs ejectment, among other cases, lays down procedural safeguards to guarantee expediency and speedy resolution.
Sections 5 and 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provide: Sec. 5. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. xxx Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants. The word "shall" in the above-quoted sections of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure underscores their mandatory character.
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Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of the suits covered thereby. To admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory maneuvers the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. In the present case, respondent gave a liberal interpretation of the above-said Rule. Liberal interpretation or construction of the law or rules, however, is not a free commodity that may be availed of in all instances under the cloak of rendering justice. Liberality in the interpretation and application of Rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. After summons and a copy of the complaint were served, Macalinao failed to file her answer. BPI moved for a judgment pursuant to Sec6 of the Rules of Summary Procedures. MTC ruled in favor of BPI ordering Macalinao to pay P141,518.34 plus 2% per month penalty from Jan. 5, 2004. Macalinao appealed before the RTC. RTC affirmed the decision in toto. She then filed a petition for review with the CA. CA affirmed but with modification, reducing the amount to P126,706.70 plus 3% penalty charge from Jan. 5,2004. She filed a MR, but was denied. Macalinao filed the instant case, arguing that the CA erred in using the P94,843.70 as basis of the recomputation and should have dismissed the case for failure of BPI to prove the exact amount of her obligation.
Issues: W/N the interest and penalty charges of 3% per month were unconscionable and iniquitous. W/N the complaint should be dismissed or remand it to the lower court for failure of respondent to prove the exact amount of the obligation. Held:
Macalinao v BPI Facts: Petitioners contend that neither they nor the private respondent Jaime Blanco reside in Pasay City. This fact is, however, irrelevant to the resolution of the issue in this case since parties do stipulate concerning the venue of an action without regard to their residence. Petitioners claim that their cause of action is not based on the lease contract because it seeks neither its implementation nor its the cancellation. Petitioners' action is for alleged breach of the lease contract which, it is 11 contended, was terminated to spite them. Petitioners view this act of respondents as an abuse of right under arts. 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code, warranting an award of damages. Their cause of action is ultimately anchored on their right under the lease contract and, therefore, they cannot avoid the limitation as to the venue in that contract. The contention of the petitioner that the dismissal of their case based on improper venue is a mere technicality and should not be sustained was
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of CA denying Macalinaos MR Macalinao was an approved cardholder of BPI Mastercard, and as such made some purchases through the use of the said card. She subsequently received a letter from BPI demanding payment of P141,518.34 including the 3% interest per month and an additional penalty of 3% per month for a delay in payment under the terms governing its issuance. The BPI filed a complaint for sum of money with MTC Makati for failure to settle its obligation and prayed for payment of P154,608.78 inclusive of 3.25% finance charges and 6% late payment charges plus 25% attorneys fees.
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without merit, where the court said that procedural rules are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive reasons. Therefore, Petitioners must abide by their agreement. PETITION DENIED Azucena Go and Regena Gloria Siong vs. Court of Appeals and Star Group Resources and Development Inc. This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside and reverse the consolidated decision of the CA, which disallowed the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. (An appeal was entertained by the RTC and CA despite the fact that it is not allowed by the Rules of Court and Summary Procedure. In the defense of the RTC and CA, there was a procedural void wherein walang magiging remedy si respondent at baka tumagal ng tumagal ang kaso niya. Sabi ni SC, sige okay lang, because if strict compliance with rules will result in injustice then the rules may be relaxed. Kawawa naman kasi si respondent kapag suspended yung case niya tapos di niya alam kung kalian matutuloy ito.) FACTS: (Malabo itong kaso na ito, Im trying my best to deliver the best digest possible) Respondent filed with the MTCC of Iloilo an ejectment case against the petitioners. o Upon motion of the petitioners, Court issued an order holding in abeyance the preliminary conference of the ejectment case until after the case for specific performance, involving the same parties shall be decided upon by the RTC of Iloilo. In short, the case for Ejectment will be indefinitely be suspended. (Before the ejectment case kasi, there was a specific performance case filed by the same parties, ito naman sa RTC, yung ejectment sa MTCC.) o An appeal was filed by respondents questioning the order of the court. The appeal was assigned to the RTC. Petitioners filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss the appeal of respondents, on the ground that the order was not yet final and that it is not appealable. DENIED. MR was also denied. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion on denying their motion to dismiss the appeal. (Kasi yung respondents nag file ng motion to appeal dun sa pag suspend ng ejectment case.) Respondent filed with the RTC a motion to resume proceedings in the ejectment case. o RTC granted this motion and directed the remand of the records of the case to the MTCC. o Petitioners filed MR and Clarification. DENIED. Petitioners filed a petition for review in the CA. Alleged therein was the issue that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted the motion to resume proceedings in the MTCC. (Badtrip yung petitioners kasi natuloy yung ejectment case, diba nga sila yung nagpatawag ng suspension nun?) o CA issued a TRO, enjoining RTC from further proceeding with the case. After the TRO lapsed, the RTC remanded the records to the MTCC. Petitioners filed a motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings, with the MTCC. DENIED. MR also DENIED. Petitioners filed a motion for an injunction and ordered respondents to refrain from continuing the ejectment case in the MTCC until the specific performance case has been disposed of. (MTCC = Ejectment Case; RTC = Specific Performance) Court of Appeals: Recognizing that there is a procedural void in the Rules on Summary Procedure, CA sustained the correctness of an appeal as a remedy to challenge the suspension of the Ejectment Suit by the MTCC. o Purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to achieve expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases with regard to technical rules. o The prohibition against petitions for certiorari involving interlocutory orders was included to forestall useless petitions and to avoid delays. o
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The inaction on the MTCCs order of suspension due to the procedural void will defeat rather than promote the speedy disposition of cases. While technicalities have their uses, resort to them should not be encouraged when they serve only to impere the speedy and just resolution of the case. Petitioners elevated the case to the SC. o Under an extraordinary circumstance of having to suffer a procedural void, the court is forced to provide a remedy consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of cases. As held by the CA, the purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. In this case, however respondent challenged the MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit to avoid mischief that may emanate therefrom. SC hold that in situation where summary proceeding is indefinitely suspended, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Respondents, herein, filed an appeal questioning the interlocutory order. This move of the respondents was upheld by the CA and RTC to fill a procedural void. SC affirms this ruling. The said appeal should be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The court said that whenever a procedural void exists, no remedy is sanctioned by law. The court is empowered to promulgate rules according to Section 5, Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution, categorically rules of procedure. The courts are even onligated to suspend the operation of the rules when a rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice that it frustrates rather than promote substantial justice. The power of the court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from their operations whenever the purposes of justice require it, cannot be questioned.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in allowing the appeal of an interlocutory order? RULING: The petition is devoid of merit. In affirming the ruling of the RTC, the CA noted that there was a procedural void in the summary proceedings in the MTCC. (Respondent will not have a remedy based from the procedural rules.) (Summary ng facts na napakalabo) MTCC suspended the preliminary conference of the Ejectment suit, upon motion of the petitioners, until the termination of the pending Specific Performance suit involving the same parties. Respondents appealed to the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that it was an interlocutory order and not subject to an appeal. Court said, the order that was subjected to the appeal was interlocutory, because it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the trial court on the merits of the case. It is obvious that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal. The proper remedy is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Clearly private respondent cannot appeal the order. But neither can it file a petition for certiorari, because the ejectment suit falls under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19 (g), which considers petitions for certiorari as a prohibited pleading.
Rule 6 Kinds of Pleadings Buncayao vs. Fort Ilocandia Property, G.R. No. 170483, Apr. 19, 2010 FACTS: Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. (petitioner) claimed to be one of the two entrepreneurs who introduced improvements on the foreshore area of Calayab Beach in 1978 when Fort Ilocandia Hotel started its construction in the area and later formed
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themselves into the DSierto Beach Resort Owners Association, Inc. (DSierto) 6 parcels of land in Barrio Balacad (now Calayad) where the resort situated were transferred to the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1704 Petitioner and other DSierto members applied for a foreshore lease with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and was granted a provisional permit. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation (respondent) filed a foreshore application over a 14-hectare area abutting the Fort Ilocandia Property, including the 5-hectare portion applied for by DSierto members. DENR Regional Executive Director denied the foreshore lease applications of the DSierto members, including petitioner, on the ground that the subject area applied for fell either within the titled property or within the foreshore areas applied for by respondent. The DSierto members appealed the denial of their applications DENR Secretary denied the appeal on the ground that the area applied for encroached on the titled property of respondent based on the final verification plan. Respondent, through its Public Relations Manager invited the DSierto to discuss common details beneficial to all parties concerned. Atty. Liza Marcos (Atty. Marcos), wife of Governor Bongbong Marcos, was asked by Fort Ilocandia hotel officials to mediate over the conflict among the parties. Atty. Marcos offered P300,000 as financial settlement per claimant in consideration of the improvements introduced, on the condition that they would vacate the area identified as respondents property. A DSierto member made a counter-offer of P400,000, to which the other DSierto members agreed. Petitioner alleged that his son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., who attended the meeting, manifested that he still had to consult his parents about the offer but upon the undue pressure exerted by Atty. Marcos, he accepted the payment and signed the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim1 in favor of respondent. Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract before the RTC- Laoag against respondent alleging that his son had no authority to represent him and that the deed was void and not binding upon him. The issue raised by petitioner was his claim for damages while respondents issue was only his claim for possession of the property occupied by petitioner and damages. RTC Dismissed the claim of plaintiff for and granted the counterclaim of the defendant for recovery of possession of the lot occupied by the plaintiff. Pet went on appeal to CA-affirmed RTC, Hence, petition was filed in SC.
ISSUE: Whether respondents counterclaim is compulsory? RULLING: A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected, with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive.
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The Court has ruled that the compelling test of compulsoriness characterizes a counterclaim as compulsory if there should exist a logical relationship between the main claim and the counterclaim. The Court further ruled that there exists such a relationship when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties. The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive are as follows: (a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim, absent the compulsory rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendants counterclaim? (d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. In this case, Respondent filed three counterclaims. The first was for recovery of the P400,000 given to Manuel, Jr.; the second was for recovery of possession of the subject property; and the third was for damages. The first counterclaim was rendered moot with the issuance of the 6 November 2003 Order confirming the agreement of the parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and to return the P400,000 to respondent. Respondent waived and renounced the third counterclaim for damages. The only counterclaim that remained was for the recovery of possession of the subject property. While this counterclaim was an offshoot of the same basic controversy between the parties, it is very clear that it will not be barred if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case . Respondents second counterclaim, contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is only a permissive counterclaim. It is not a compulsory counterclaim. It is capable of proceeding independently of the main case. The rule in permissive counterclaim is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. In this case, respondent did not dispute the non-payment of docket fees. Respondent only insisted that its claims were all compulsory counterclaims. As such, the judgment by the trial court in relation to the second counterclaim is considered null and void without prejudice to a separate action which respondent may file against petitioner. Therefore, SC DISMISS respondents permissive counterclaim without prejudice to filing a separate action against petitioner. G.R. Nos. 158090 October 4, 2010
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, represented by his daughter, JOCELYN G. CABALLERO,Respondents. FACTS: On March 7, 1968, Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a loan from petitioner GSIS in the amount of P20,000.00. Fernando and his wife likewise executed a real estate mortgage on the same date, mortgaging a residential lot situated at Rizal Street, Mlang, Cotabato as security. Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. Hence, the subject property was foreclosed, and was sold at a public auction where the petitioner was the only bidder. For failure of Fernando to redeem the said property within the designated period, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a new TCT was issued in the name of petitioner.
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On January 16, 1989, petitioner scheduled the subject property for public bidding. On the scheduled date of bidding, Fernando's daughter, Jocelyn Caballero, submitted a bid in the amount of P350,000.00 but since CMTC was the highest bidder (P450,000) it was awarded the subject property. A new TCT was issued in the name of CMTC. RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato Fernando, represented by his daughter and attorney-in-fact, Jocelyn Caballero filed a case against CMTC, the GSIS and its responsible officers. Fernando alleged that there were irregularities in the conduct of the bidding. Petitioner and its officers filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. The GSIS alleged that Fernando lost his right of redemption. He was given the chance to repurchase the property; however, he did not avail of such option compelling the GSIS to dispose of the property by public bidding as mandated by law. In its counterclaim, petitioner alleged that Fernando owed petitioner the sum of P130,365.81, representing back rentals, including additional interests from January 1973 to February 1987, and the additional amount of P249,800.00, excluding applicable interests, representing rentals Fernando unlawfully collected from Carmelita Ang Hao from January 1973 to February 1988. TC dismissed the complaint and granted petitioner's counterclaim; MFR denied CA respondent filed a Notice of Appeal affirmed RTC with the modification that the portion of the judgment ordering Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of P249,800.00, in favor of petitioner, be deleted. Petitioner filed MFR - denied counterclaim which required the payment by gsis of docket fees before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction over said counterclaim. An Ex Parte Motion for Substitution of Party was filed by the surviving heirs of Fernando, who died on February 12, 2002.
SC - petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
The petition of the GSIS seeks the review of the CA's Decision insofar as it deleted the trial court's award of P249,800.00 in its favor representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC. Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando against petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner's counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim. To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory Petitioner's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale
ISSUE: WON CA committed an error of law in holding that GSIS' counterclaim, among others, of p249,800.00 representing rentals collected by private respondent from CMRC is in the nature of a permissive
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and TCT is different from that required to establish petitioner's claim for the recovery of rentals. The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when petitioner became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor. The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. Petitioner further argues that assuming that its counterclaim is permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction to try and decide the same, considering petitioner's exemption from all kinds of fees. In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from "all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds," CANNOT operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. In said case, the Court ruled that: The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails. Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court's independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to "guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy." Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Court's fiscal independence. No. L-28466. March 27, 1971. ALBERTO T. REYES, SATURNINO LIWANAG AND LORENZO HERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND TEODORO KALAW, JR. respondents. Facts Appeal by petitioners-plaintiffs from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Plaintiffs-appellants are lessees of defendants premises located in Manila, where they also conduct their respective businesses. The lease was oral
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and on a month-to-month basis. Plaintiffs have been occupying the premises for a period of from 10 to 15 years as of the filing of the complaint. Defendant started sending out to each of said plaintiffs notices to vacate the premises to give way for the demolition of the old building occupied by them and the eventual construction of a new one. Each of the said notices gave plaintiffs a period of time within which to move out. The last notice gave said plaintiffs 24 hours within which to vacate the premises. modification that plaintiffs should also pay to defendant Kalaw the sum of P50,000.00 as temperate damages. Ruling We must call attention to the fact that the rules, which have the force of law, provide the manner and occasion when issues are to be raised for adjudication. If the rules were to be ignored and We permit litigants to raise issues without order and regulation, confusion would arise. This would certainly happen were we to allow the issues the defendant raised in his answer in the Court of First Instance. The defendant-appellant is not precluded from raising his counterclaim in a separate action if he decides to do so. But in view of the fact that the trial in the Court of First Instance in an appeal is merely a trial de novo, We are constrained to dismiss the counterclaims in pursuance of the dictates and mandate o f the rules. (Emphasis supplied) While said damages arose out of, or are necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence which was the wrongful withholding of possession, they are not a compulsory counterclaim because they exceed the jurisdiction of the inferior court. Decision affirmed with modification The defendant counterclaimed for ejectment and damages for alleged loss of the use and occupation of his premises. The City Court rendered its decision in favor of plaintiffs Defendants counterclaim for want of merit is hereby dismissed. CFI Defendant appealed the aforesaid decision to the Court of First Instance. In a decision, later amended, the said Court dismissed the complaint and all claims and counterclaims, among others. CA Both, parties appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, rendered its decision, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance, with the sole INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Presiding Judge of Branch IX, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, C.F. SHARP, INC. and FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING & INSURANCE CO., INC., respondents RULING: PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM WAS COMPULSORY, THEREFORE THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WITHOUT ITS OBJECTION ALSO DISMISSES THE COUNTERCLAIM, BEING AN ANCILLIARY ACTION.
Defendant started the demolition of the roofing and upper sidings of the building and also the fencing thereof, although the demolition of the back portion actually started earlier. City Court Plaintiffs filed a complaint for forcible entry with the City Court against defendant, praying, among others, for a writ of preliminary injunction (which was granted) and damages.
FACTS: RTC MANILA: SHARP: PROHIBITION WITH WPI.
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On February 10, 1988, Sharp, Inc., the herein private respondent filed a complaint for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Secretary of Transportation and Communications, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), E. Razon, Inc., and the International Container Terminal Services Inc., the herein petitioner. o The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43616 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. RTC: GRANTED WPI. o On March 7, 1988, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting by Sharp of a bond issued by the Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co. in the sum of P10,000,000.00. PETITIONER: ANSWER WITH A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM. o On that same day, the petitioner filed an answer with a compulsory counterclaim against Sharp (PLS. TAKE NOTE) for its unfounded and frivolous action. o The petitioner claimed that as a consequence of the complaint and the writ of preliminary injunction, it had suffered injuries which if monetized (would) amount to more than P100,000,000.00. SC: NULLIFIED WPI. o On March 17, 1988, the writ of preliminary injunction was nullified by this Court in G.R. No. 82218. o We held that Sharp was not a proper party to stop the negotiation and awarding of the contract for the development, management and operation of the Container Terminal at the Port of Manila. PPA: MOTION TO DISMISS SHARPS COMPLAINT. o On March 25, 1988, the PPA, taking its cue from this decision, filed a motion to dismiss Sharps complaint on the above-stated grounds. This motion was adopted by petitioner CCTSI in a manifestation. RTC: DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT AS WELL AS COUNTERCLAIM. o Judge dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. ICTSI: M.R. INSOFAR AS IT DISMISSED ITS COUNTERCLAIM. o CCTSI filed a motion for reconsideration of the order insofar as it dismissed its counterclaim. o Meanwhile, it gave notice to the First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co., Inc. that it was claiming damages against Sharp for the revoked injunction. M.R. DENIED. o The trial court declared in part: x x x indeed a compulsory counterclaim by the nature of its nomenclature arises out of or is so intertwined with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the complaint so that by the dismissal of the latter, the same has to be discarded, specially since the complaint was dismissed without any trial. CA: AFFIRMED RTCS DECISION IN DISMISSING THE COUNTERCLAIM. o The dismissal of the counterclaim was appealed to the respondent court, which upheld the lower court on the following justifications: 1. Compulsory counterclaims for actual damages are not the claims recoverable against the bond. 2. Petitioners manifestation adopting Philippine Ports Authoritys motion to dismiss did not contain any reservation. Hence, Sec. 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court will not apply. The counterclaim for damages being compulsory in nature, for which no filing fee has been paid, was correctly dismissed. 3. Sec. 20 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that such damages (recoverable against the bond) may be awarded only upon application and after proper hearing, and shall be included in the final judgment. The application must be filed before the trial x o
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x x, with due notice to the attaching creditor and his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof. The application contemplated in Sec. 20 is distinct and separate from the compulsory counterclaim asserted in the answer. 4. The filing in court of a claim against the injunction bond, with copy thereof being furnished the surety, was not sufficient notice to the latter of an application against it under this bond. SC: ICTSI: PETITION FOR REVIEW. o The petitioner contends that the respondent court erred in sustaining the said order because: 1. Dismissal of the complaint upon defendants motion did not necessarily entail dismissal of defendants compulsory counterclaim. 2. A claim for damages arising from a wrongfully obtained injunction may be made in a counterclaim. 3. There is no rule requiring a particular form of notice to the surety of petitioners claim against the injunction bond. For its part, the private respondent argues that the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim should be sustained because: 1. The dismissal of the complaint upon petitioners motion necessarily entailed the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim. 2. The compulsory counterclaim raised by petitioner in its answer did not partake of the nature of a claim for damages against the injunction bond. 3. The notice given by the petitioner to the surety was fatally defective and did not comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: WHETHER THE COUNTERCLAIM WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED BY THE LOWER COURT. HELD: YES. The counterclaim for damages alleged that the delay in the award of the MICT contract caused by Sharps complaint and writ of preliminary injunction jeopardized the petitioners timetable to attain the projected volumes in its winning bid and, as well, caused it to incur litigation expenses, including attorneys fees. We have consistently held that a counterclaim is compulsory where: 1. it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing partys claim; 2. it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and 3. the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Tested by these requirements, the petitioners counterclaim was clearly compulsory. The petitioner itself so denominated it. There is no doubt that the same evidence needed to sustain it would also refute the cause of action alleged in the private respondents complaint; in other words, the counterclaim would succeed only if the complaint did not. o It is obvious from the very nature of the counterclaim that it could not remain pending for independent adjudication, that is, without adjudication by the court of the complaint itself on which the counterclaim was based. Rule 17, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2. Dismissal by order of the court. Except as provided in the preceding section, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court may deem proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice.
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The Court notes that, to begin with, the petitioner itself joined the PPA in moving for the dismissal of the complaint; or put passively, it did not object to the dismissal of the private respondents complaint. Secondly, the compulsory counterclaim was so intertwined with the complaint that it could not remain pending for independent adjudication by the court after the dismissal of the complaint which had provoked the counter-claim in the first place. o As a consequence, the dismissal of the complaint (on the petitioners own motion) operated to also dismiss the counterclaim questioning that complaint. assuming this would still be possible. It did neither of these. The petitioner now claims that there is no law requiring that reservation, but there is no law presuming it either.
SUB-ISSUE: WHETHER THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE WRONGFUL ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CAN BE MADE IN THE FORM OF A COUNTERCLAIM. HELD: YES. As held in Raymundo vs. Carpio:
The petitioner cannot simply say now that it intended all the time to preserve its counterclaim when it knew that under Rule 17, Sec. 2 if a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of a motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the Court. The counterclaim was not permissive. o A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of nor is it necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing partys claim. o It is not barred even if not set up in the action. The petitioners counterclaim was within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Most importantly, it had no independent existence, being merely ancillary to the main action. The petitioner knew all this and did not object to the dismissal of the complaint. On the contrary, it actually moved to dismiss that main action, and in so doing also moved, in effect, for the dismissal of its counterclaim.
It would seem that the proper practice to be followed in cases where it is desired to obtain damages by reason of the wrongful issuance of an attachment in favor of plaintiff that an issue would be tendered on the subject by the defendant in his answer in the main case. Such a tender would present the question squarely in that court, and the parties having offered their evidence on the subject, the trial court could dispose of it along with the principal action. It is not necessary that the defendant wait until it is determined by a final decision in the main action that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in order to present the question of his right to damages. All questions which are material to the main action or which are incidental thereto but depending thereon should be presented and litigated at the same time with the main action, so as to avoid the necessity of subsequent litigation and consequent loss of time and money. However, there is no glossing away the fact that it was the petitioner itself that caused the dismissal of its counterclaim when it not only did not object to, but actually moved for, the dismissal of the complaint. The petitioner cannot undo that act. If it wanted the counterclaim to subsist, it should have objected to the dismissal of the complaint or at least reserved its right to prosecute it,
Metals Engineering v.CA Petition for review on certiorari on the decision of the CA dismissing the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition against the petitioner corporation. Facts: An action for the annulment of Agreement to Sell was filed by petitioner corporation Metals Engineering against Jose Plaridel before the RTC. It was the petitioners contention that said contract was defective for having
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no meeting of the minds between the parties as to its terms and payment thus said contract is unenforceable. Despite the fact that the said contract is not perfected, defendant Plaridel prematurely executed the contract which caused the lots subject of the agreement to be sold to the public through an advertisement published in Manila Bulletin. Subsequently, the Plaintiff tendered a check representing the full refund of the earnest money previously delivered by the defendant infavor of the plaintiff inorder to rescind the imperfect contract. Defendant refused to accept the same thus continued with his transaction which caused damages to the petitioner corporation. Defendant/Repondent in his Answer with Counterclaim alleging a compulsory counter claim that due to the non fulfillment of the petitioner, defendant had to incur losses and tarnished reputation. TC upon the defendants motion dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction for non payment of docket fee. Defendant then filed a Motion to set the case for the presentation of evidence in support of his counter claim. Petitioner on the other hand moved that the same be dismissed on the ground that the principal action has been dismissed. TC denied the petitioners MR. Petitioner went to the CA to file a special civil action, certiorari and prohibition. CA dismissed the said special civil action, stating that since the order is merely interlocutory in nature and that at most it is merely an error of judgment, it cannot be corrected by certiorari. Thus this case. Issue: W/N the compulsory counter claim filed by the defendant Plaridel will be dismissed upon the dismissal of the principal action filed by the Petitioner? Held: Yes. A compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a separate action but should be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to it. A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom, inasmuch as it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the complaint. It follows that if the court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case and dismisses the same, then the compulsory counterclaim, being ancillary to the principal controversy, must likewise be dismissed since no jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief under the counterclaim.
184 SCRA 374 (1990) COJUANGCO vs. VILLEGAS Petition for certiorari and prohibition against the order of a co-equal court (yep, shit happens.) FACTS: Cojuangco filed an ejectment case against Villegas before the MTC. TC dismissed the case on the ground that Villegas and her predecessors had been in actual possession of the disputed lot for more than 60 years. Thus Villegas asserted an adverse claim of ownership and transformed the suit into an accion publiciana which is within the jurisdiction of RTC. On appeal with the CFI(RTC) it reversed the decision of the MTC and ordered Villegas to surrender the lot to Cojuangco. On appeal to CA and SC both upheld Cojuangcos right of possession.
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A writ of execution was filed by Cojuangco before the RTC. Villegas did not oppose but asked for a grace period to remove her personal properties and improvements. Before the lapse of the grace period, Villegas filed a separate civil action against Cojuangco and the provincial sheriff for specific performance with TRO and preliminary injunction from enforcing the demolition order the case was raffled before the RTC which enjoined Conjuangco and the sheriff from enforcing the demolition order. FACTS: RTC -BULACAN ESTHERLITA CRUZ-AGANA filed a Complaint for annulment of title with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against B. SERRANO ENTERPRISES, INC.LAGMAN(judge ng RTC) She claims that as the sole heir of one Teodorico Cruz, she is the sole owner of a lot covered by TCT. This lot was fraudulently sold to Eugenio Lopez, Jr. who later on transferred the lot to respondent. Respondent filed its Answer with compulsory counterclaim. AGANA moved to dismiss respondents counterclaim for lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping- DENIED trial court reasoned that respondents counterclaim is compulsory and therefore excluded from the coverage of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner filedMRinvoking the mandatory nature of a certificate of non-forum shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94- granted and dismiss the counterclaim Respondent filed MR arguing that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims following the ruling in Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla- granted and reversed itself and recalled its Order dismissing respondents counterclaim. Petitioner went to SUPREME Court through Rule 65 . His contention was the Courts rulings in Santo Tomas and Ponciano are contrary to the mandate of Administrative Circular No. 04 -94 and other procedural laws.
ISSUE: Whether Villegas separate civil action case for recovery of improvements in RTC Branch XVII is proper despite the ejectment case previously filed by Cojuangco against the former. RULING: No. Villegas' claim to recover compensation for improvements made on the land is essentially in the nature of a counterclaim since it is inter-woven with the fact of possession. Said claim for compensation should have been presented as a counterclaim in the ejectment suit. It is deemed barred if not raised on time and the party in error is precluded from setting it up in a subsequent litigation. The rule on compulsory counter-claim is designed to enable the disposition of the entire conflict at one time and in one action. Rule 9, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on compulsory counterclaim provides the answer. It states: Thus, Villegas should have set forth, simultaneously with the assertion that she was entitled to the parcel of land by right of inheritance, the alternative claim that assuming she was not legally entitled to the disputed lot, at least as a builder in good faith, she has the right to the value of the buildings and improvements which she and her parents had introduced on the land. The adjudication of the issue joined by the parties in the earlier case constitutes res judicata, the theory being that what is barred by prior judgment are not only the matters actually raised and litigated upon, but also such other matters as could have been raised but were not. Agana vs. Lagman, G.R. No. 139018, April 11, 2005
ISSUE: Whether respondents counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. If it is a permissive counterclaim, the lack of a certificate of non-forum
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shopping is fatal. If it is a compulsory counterclaim, the lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping is immaterial. SC RULLING: Petitioner is mistaken.!!!!!!!(galitlngsc?!!)The Constitution expressly bestows on this Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.Procedural matters are within the sole jurisdiction of this Court to prescribe. Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is an issuance of this Court. It covers a matter of procedure. Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is not an enactment of the Legislature. This Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to interpret, amend or revise the rules it promulgates, as long as the rules do not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. This is precisely the purpose of Santo Tomas as far as Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is concerned. In Santo TomasSC clarified the scope of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 with respect to counterclaims. The Court pointed out that this circular is intended primarily to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. In Ponciano v. Judge Parentela, Jr. Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims. The circular applies to initiatory and similar pleadings. A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an initiatory or similar pleading. The initiatory pleading is the plaintiffs complaint. A respondent has no choice but to raise a compulsory counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint. Otherwise, respondent waives the compulsory counterclaim. In short, the compulsory counterclaim is a reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to an initiatory pleading which is the complaint. In this casePetitioners counsel fails or simply refuses to accept the distinction between a permissive counterclaim and a compulsory counterclaim. This distinction was the basis for the ruling in Santo Tomas and Ponciano. .A compulsory counterclaim isany claim for money or other relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiffs complaintIt is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive. Respondents counterclaim as set up in its answer states :3. That because of the unwarranted, baseless, and unjustified acts of the plaintiff, herein defendant has suffered and continue to suffer actual damages in the sum of at least P400,000,000.00 which the law, equity, and justice require that to be paid by the plaintiff and further to reimburse the attorneys fees of P2,000,000.00; It is clear that the counterclaim set up by respondent arises from the filing of plaintiffs complaint. The counterclaim is so intertwined with the main case that it is incapable of proceeding independently. The counterclaim will require a re-litigation of the same evidence if the counterclaim is allowed to proceed in a separate action. Even petitioner recognizes that respondents counterclaim is compulsory. A compulsory counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping because a compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading.
G.R. No. 107356 March 31, 1995 SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, respondents. Facts: Sancho Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed contract with the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) for the period covering April 16, 1980, to April 15, 1981. As part of Aramco's policy, its employees returning to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from Manila are allowed to claim reimbursement for amounts paid for excess baggage of up to 50 kilograms, as long as it is properly supported by receipt. On April 1980,
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Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for his new assignment, with a 50-kilogram excess baggage for which he paid P4,147.50. Aramco reimbursed said amount. In December 1980, Rayos learned that he was one of several employees being investigated by Aramco for fraudulent claims. He immediately asked his wife Beatriz in Manila to seek a written confirmation from SIA that he indeed paid for an excess baggage of 50 kilograms. On December 10, 1980, SIA's manager notified Beatriz of their inability to issue the certification requested because their records showed that only three kilograms were entered as excess and accordingly charged. After 4 months, SIA issued the certification requested by the spouses Rayos only on April 8, 1981, after its investigation of the anomaly and after Beatriz, assisted by a lawyer, threatened it with a lawsuit. On April 14, 1981, Aramco gave Rayos his travel documents without a return visa. His employment contract was not renewed. On August 5, 1981, the spouses Rayos, convinced that SIA was responsible for the non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract with Aramco, sued it for damages. SIA claimed that it was not liable to the Rayoses because the tampering was committed by its handling agent, Philippine Airlines (PAL). It then filed a third-party complaint against PAL. PAL, in turn, countered that its personnel did not collect any charges for excess baggage; that it had no participation in the tampering of any excess baggage ticket; and that if any tampering was made, it was done by SIA's personnel. RTC Ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, sentencing the latter to pay the former judgment totaling P802,435.34. The defendant's counterclaim is hereby dismissed. ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT, the third-party defendant PAL is ordered to pay defendant and third-party plaintiff SIA whatever the latter has paid the plaintiffs. CA-all parties appealed SIA's appeal was dismissed for non-payment of docket fees, which dismissal was eventually sustained by this Court. The Rayos spouses withdrew their appeal when SIA satisfied the judgment totaling P802,435.34. PAL claimed that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against SIA because it was the inefficiency of Rayos which led to the non-renewal of his contract with Aramco, and not the alleged tampering of his excess bagged ticket SIA argued that the only issue in the said appeal is WON it was entitled to reimbursement from PAL granted PAL's appeal and absolved it from any liability to SIA.
SC - petition for review SIA argues that PAL cannot validly assail for the first time on appeal the trial court's decision sustaining the validity of plaintiff's complaint against SIA if PAL did not raise this issue in the lower court. It added that the appellate court should have restricted its ruling on the right of SIA to seek reimbursement from PAL, as this was the only issue raised by SIA in its third-party complaint against PAL.
ISSUE: WON SIA is it was entitled to reimbursement from PAL YES. The petitioner correctly pointed out that the case of Firestone squarely applies to the case at bench. the Court stated: The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby a "third party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as thirdparty plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff's claim.
TC concluded that the excess baggage ticket of Rayos was tampered with by the employees of PAL and that the fraud was the direct and proximate cause of the non-renewal of Rayos' contract with Aramco.
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It must be noted that in the proceedings below, PAL disclaimed any liability to the Rayoses and imputed the alleged tampering to SIA's personnel. On appeal, however, PAL changed its theory and averred that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against SIA on the around that the non-renewal of Sancho's contract with Aramco was his unsatisfactory performance rather than the alleged tampering of his excess baggage ticket. In response to PAL's appeal, SIA argued that it was improper for PAL to question SIA's liability to the plaintiff, since this was no longer an issue on account of the finality and, in fact, satisfaction of the judgment. There is no question that a third-party defendant is allowed to set up in his answer the defenses which the third-party plaintiff (original defendant) has or may have to the plaintiff's claim. There are, however, special circumstances present in this case which preclude third-party defendant PAL from benefiting from the said principle. One of the defenses available to SIA was that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, that is, it had no valid claim against SIA. SIA investigated the matter and discovered that tampering was, indeed, committed, not by its personnel but by PAL's. This became its defense as well as its main cause of action in the third-party complaint it filed against PAL. For its part, PAL could have used the defense that the plaintiffs had no valid claim against it or against SIA. (SEE RULE 6 sec 13 I BELIEVE it is the rule involved but it was NOT exactly mentioned in the case) This could be done indirectly by adopting such a defense in its answer to the third-party complaint if only SIA had raised the same in its answer to the main complaint, or directly by so stating in unequivocal terms in its answer to SIA's complaint that SIA and PAL were both blameless. Yet, PAL opted to deny any liability which it imputed to SIA's personnel. It was only on appeal in a complete turn around of theory that PAL raised the issue of no valid claim by the plaintiff against SIA. This simply cannot be allowed. While the third-party defendant; would benefit from a victory by the third-party plaintiff against the plaintiff, this is true only when the thirdparty plaintiff and third-party defendant have non-contradictory defenses. Here, the defendant and third-party defendant had no common defense against the plaintiffs' complaint, and they were even blaming each other for the fiasco. PAL is NOT solely liable for the satisfaction of the judgment. While the trial court found, and this has not been adequately rebutted by PAL, that the proximate cause of the non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract with Aramco was the tampering of his excess baggage ticket by PAL's personnel, it failed to consider that the immediate cause of such non-renewal was SIA's delayed (4 months after request) transmittal of the certification needed by Rayos to prove his innocence to his employer. Rule 7 Parts of a Pleading No. L-31822. July 31, 1972. JOSE SALCEDO QUIMPO, petitioner, vs. CATALINO DELA VIC-TORIA and FRANCISCA O. DELA VICTORIA, respondents. Facts PETITION TO REVIEW the orders of the Court of First Instance of Davao. Petition to review the following orders of the Court of First Instance of Davao, denying defendant-petitioners motion to dismiss. CFI Plaintiffs-respondents filed a complaint against defendant-petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Davao, for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages. City Court Plaintiffs-respondents filed another case against defendant-petitioner with the City Court of Davao City for forcible entry over the same parcel of land. Plaintiffs-respondents prayed in the later case for the court to order defendant-petitioner to vacate the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the former, and ordering defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of f 500.00 a month as rental and the same to begin from the later part of March, 1968 until possession thereof shall be delivered to the plaintiffs,
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and the amount of P500.00 as attorneys fees. ... * It is pointed out in the first assigned error that since the verification in the complaint for forcible entry does not comply with Section 6, Rule 7, of the Revised Rules of Court, the complaint is void; hence, the City Court, and subsequently the court a quo, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case. Section 6, Rule 7, Revised Rules of Court provides: xxxxx. Verification.A pleading is verified only by an affidavit stating that the person verifying has read the pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own knowledge. Verification based on information and belief, or upon knowledge, information and belief shall be deemed insufficient. Catalino dela Victoria, one of the plaintiffs (now respondents) clearly referred to the allegations in the complaint as having been read by him. However, while he stated that they are true and correct, he omitted to state that said conclusion was reached of his own knowledge. The latter detail, however, is logically inferable since affiant was a party and it does not appear that he was verifying upon information and belief. If petitioner entertained doubt about the true character of the verification, he should have asked that it be made more definite.
In a motion to dismiss defendant-petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry alleging the pendency of Civil Case No. 6005; but the City Court, in its order for the reason that there is no identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for and for the further reason that it does not appear that any judgment which would be rendered on the other action will amount to res judicata in the herein case. The same court order set the case for hearing. Defendant-petitioner was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the forcible entry case and the City Court set the reception of plaintiffsrespondents evidence for the following day. The same court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant-petitioner then moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order denying his motion to dismiss the complaint for forcible entry, and also the decision. However, his motion was denied in the City Court order. CFI Defendant-petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. In a motion, defendant-petitioner reiterated his arguments for the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry as stated in his earlier motion in the City Court. In the meantime, plaintiffs-respondents moved for the issuance of an order for the immediate execution of the City Court decision. The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, and at the same time granted the immediate execution of the City Court judgment. SC His motion for reconsideration having been denied, and his appeal dismissed, defendant filed the herein petition, claiming that the lower court Did not acquire jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry, the verification of the corresponding complaint being void;
Moreover, even if We should find the verification insufficient, that insufficiency would not render the complaint for forcible entry, or the whole proceedings in the court below, void. This Court already held in several decisions that the requirement regarding verification is not jurisdictional, but merely formal. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders appealed from, the same are hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-petitioner. G.R. No. 186045 February 2, 2011
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MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, vs. Heirs of ESTANISLAO MIOZA, namely: The Heirs of FILOMENO T. MIOZA, represented by LAUREANO M. MIOZA; The Heirs of PEDRO T. MIOZA; and The HEIRS of FLORENCIA T. MIOZA, represented by ANTONIO M. URBIZTONDO, Respondents. RULING: INTERVENORS IN THEIR M.R., APPENDED A COMPLAINT-ININTERVENTION WITH THE REQUIRED VERIFICATION AND CERT. OF NON-FORUM-SHOPPING, THE REQUIREMENT OF THE RULE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH. IN GENERAL, AN INDEPENDENT CONTROVERSY CANNOT BE INJECTED INTO A SUIT BY INTERVENTION, SUCH INTERVENTION WILL NOT BE ALLOWED WHERE IT WOULD ENLARGE THE ISSUES IN THE ACTION AND EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE REMEDIES. FACTS: RTC: LEILA: RECONVEYANCE, CANCELLATION OF TITLE, ISSUANCE OF NEW TITLE AND DAMAGES. On July 6, 1998, a Complaint for Reconveyance, Cancellation of Defendants Title, Issuance of New Title to Plaintiffs and Damages was filed by Leila M. Hermosisima (Leila) for herself and on behalf of the other heirs of the late Estanislao Mioza. o The complaint alleged that Leilas late great grandfather, Estanislao Mioza, was the registered owner of Cadastral Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A, located at Banilad Estate, Cebu City. o That the late Estanislao Mioza had three children, namely, Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago, all surnamed Mioza. o In the late 1940s, the National Airports Corporation (NAC) embarked in an expansion project of the Lahug Airport. o For said purpose, the NAC acquired several properties which surrounded the airport either through negotiated sale or through expropriation. Among the properties that were acquired by the NAC through a negotiated sale were Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A. Leila claimed that their predecessors-in-interest, specifically, Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago executed a Deed of Sale on February 15, 1950 conveying the subject lots to the NAC on the assurance made by the latter that they (Leilas predecessors -ininterest) can buy the properties back if the lots are no longer needed. o Consequently, they sold the subject lots to the NAC. o However, the expansion project did not push through. o More than forty years after the sale, plaintiffs informed the NACs successor-in-interest, the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), that they were exercising the buy-back option of the agreement, but the MCIAA refused to allow the repurchase on the ground that the sale was in fact unconditional. The MCIAA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an Answer with Counterclaim. RTC: INTERVENORS: COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION. o On November 16, 1999, before the MCIAA could present evidence in support of its case, a Motion for Intervention, with an attached Complainant-in-Intervention, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, by the heirs of Filomeno T. Mioza, represented by Laureano M. Mioza; the heirs of Pedro T, Mioza, represented by Leoncio J. Mioza; and the Heirs of Florencia T. Mioza, represented by Antonio M. Urbiztondo (Intervenors), who claimed to be the true, legal, and legitimate heirs of the late Estanislao Mioza. o The intervenors alleged in their complaint: (1) that the plaintiffs in the main case are not related to the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono whose true and legitimate children were: Filomeno, Pedro, and Florencia, all surnamed Mioza;
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(2) that, on January 21, 1958, Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago, executed, in fraud of the intervenors, an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono and adjudicated unto themselves the estate of the deceased spouses; and (3) that, on February 15, 1958, the same Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago, fraudulently, deceitfully, and in bad faith, sold Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A to the NAC. o The intervenors thus prayed for the following reliefs: Title Nos. RT-6101 (T-10534) and RT-6102 (T-10026) to be the true and valid torrens titles to Lots 986 and 991-[A]. f. Condemning plaintiffs Leila M. Hermosisima and Constancio Mioza to pay intervenors, moral and exemplary damages. RTC: DENIED MOTION FOR INTERVENTION. o On February 18, 2000, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, issued an Order denying the Motion for Intervention. GROUNDS: 1. OWNERSHIP OF THE LOTS WAS MERELY COLLATERAL. 2. SHOULD BE ASSERTED IN A SEPARATE PROCEEDING. 3. IF GRANTED, WOULD UNDULY DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS. 4. COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION NOT VERIFIED DOES NOT CONTAIN CERTIFICATION OF NONFORUM SHOPPING. o In denying the motion, the trial court opined that the ownership of the subject lots was merely a collateral issue in the action. The principal issue to be resolved was whether or not the heirs of the late Estanislao Mioza whoever they may be have a right to repurchase the said lots from the MCIAA. Consequently, the rights being claimed by the intervenors should be asserted in and would be fully protected by a separate proceeding. Moreover, if the motion was granted, it would unduly delay the proceedings in the instant case. Finally, the complaint-in-intervention was flawed, considering that it was not verified and does not contain the requisite certification of non-forum shopping.
a. Declaring herein intervenors as the true, legal and legitimate heirs of the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono; b. Declaring herein intervenors as the true, rightful and registered owners of Lots 986 and 991-A of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate; c. Declaring the Extrajudicial Settlement executed on January 21, 1958 by the late Adriana Mioza and the late Patricio Mioza and the late Santiago Mioza that they are the only heirs of the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono, who died intestate and without any debts or obligations and adjudicating among themselves the estate of the deceased x x x as void ab initio; d. Declaring the sale of Lots 986 and 991-A of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate executed by the late Adriana Mioza, the late Patricio Mioza and the late Santiago Mioza in favor of the National Airport Corporation on February 15, 1958 as void ab initio; e. Ordering the cancellation of TCTs for Lots 986 and 991-A in the name of the MIAA and restoring Transfer Certificate of
o o
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INTERVENORS: M.R., ATTACHED A COMPLAINT-ININTERVENTION WITH THE REQUIRED VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING. o The intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to which was attached a Complaint-in-Intervention with the required Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. M.R. DENIED. Aggrieved, the intervenors sought recourse before the CA. CA: REVERSED AND SET ASIDE RTCS ORDERS. GROUND: M.R. APPENDED WITH A COMPLAINT-ININTERVENTION CONTAINING THE REQUIRED VERIFICATION AND CERT. OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING AMOUNTED TO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE. o In ruling for the intervenors, the CA ratiocinated that the determination of the true heirs of the late Estanislao Mioza is not only a collateral, but the focal issue of the case, for if the intervenors can prove that they are indeed the true heirs of Estanislao Mioza, there would be no more need to determine whether the right to buy back the subject lots exists or not as the MCIAA would not have acquired rights to the subject lots in the first place. o In addition, to grant the motion for intervention would avoid multiplicity of suits. o As to the lack of verification and certification on non-forum shopping, the CA opined that the filing of the motion for reconsideration with an appended complaint-inintervention containing the required verification and certificate of non-forum shopping amounted to substantial compliance of the Rules. M.R. DENIED. Hence, this PETITION FOR REVIEW. o Petitioner argues that to allow the intervenors to intervene in the proceedings before the trial court would not only unduly prolong and delay the resolution of the case, it o would make the proceedings unnecessarily complicated and change the nature of the proceedings. Furthermore, contrary to the requirements for the allowance of a motion for intervention, their legal interest in the subject properties appear to be merely contingent or expectant and not of direct or immediate character. Petitioner also posits that the intervenors rights can be better protected in another proceeding. The complaint-in-intervention was not verified by all the interested parties or all the heirs of Filomeno Mioza, which still warrants its dismissal.
o o
ISSUE: WHETHER THE RULES ON VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON FORUM-SHOPPING WERE COMPLIED WITH. HELD: YES. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE. At the outset, on the procedural aspect, contrary to petitioners contention, the initial lack of the complaint-in-intervention of the requisite verification and certification on non-forum shopping was cured when the intervenors, in their motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to intervene, appended a complaintin-intervention containing the required verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. In the case of Altres v. Empleo, the Court clarified, among other things, that as to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. Further, a verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
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Moreover, as to the certification against forum shopping, noncompliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rules on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons." Also, the certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. Thus, considering that the intervenors in their motion for reconsideration, appended a complaint-in-intervention with the required verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, the requirement of the Rule was substantially complied with. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court states: SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has: 1. a legal interest in the matter in litigation; 2. or in the success of any of the parties; 3. or an interest against the parties; SUB-ISSUE: WHETHER THE COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION SHOULD BE ADMITTED. HELD: NO. Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. It is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings. 4. or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. Moreover, the court must take into consideration whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors right or interest can be adequately pursued and protected in a separate proceeding. In the case at bar, the intervenors are claiming that they are the legitimate heirs of Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono and not the original plaintiffs represented by Leila Hermosisima. o True, if their allegations were later proven to be valid claims, the intervenors would surely have a legal interest in the matter in litigation. o Nonetheless, this Court has ruled that the interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material,
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o direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. It must be of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable. that of the original parties; the proper course is for the would-be intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit. Intervention is not intended to change the nature and character of the action itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The remedy of intervention is not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial of the action. To be sure, not only will the intervenors rights be ful ly protected in a separate proceeding, it would best determine the rights of the parties in relation to the subject properties and the issue of who the legitimate heirs of Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono, would be laid to rest. Furthermore, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. It is not an absolute right. The statutory rules or conditions for the right of intervention must be shown. The procedure to secure the right to intervene is to a great extent fixed by the statute or rule, and intervention can, as a rule, be secured only in accordance with the terms of the applicable provision.
Moreover, the intervenors contentions that Leilas predecessors -ininterest executed, in fraud of the intervenors, an extra judicial settlement of the estate of the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono and adjudicated unto themselves the estate of the deceased spouses, and that subsequently, her predecessorsin-interest fraudulently and deceitfully sold the subject lots to the NAC, would unnecessarily complicate and change the nature of the proceedings. In addition to resolving who the true and legitimate heirs of Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono are, the parties would also present additional evidence in support of this new allegation of fraud, deceit, and bad faith and resolve issues of conflicting claims of ownership, authenticity of certificates of titles, and regularity in their acquisition. o Verily, this would definitely cause unjust delay in the adjudication of the rights claimed by the original parties, which primarily hinges only on the issue of whether or not the heirs represented by Leila have a right to repurchase the subject properties from the MCIAA. Verily, the allegation of fraud and deceit is an independent controversy between the original parties and the intervenors. In general, an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence, such intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the scope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenors case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency v Santos, et al. Respondents were hired by the petitioner as aluminum products manufacturer operators for Ensure Company Ltd. Of Taiwan under a 1 year employment with a monthly salary of $14,800 The respondents were deployed and able to work for Ensure but were repatriated before the expiration of their contracts. Respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC against Sameer (petitioner) Sameer filed a 3 party complaint against ASBT International Management Service, Inc (ASBT). Sameer claimed that ASBT should be liable because Sameers accreditation was transferred to them
rd
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Dec 29 1999 Labor Arbiter rendered the decision against Sameer Sameer appealed to the NLRC alleging that the LA committed GAD in failing to decide the third-party complaint and insisted that it should have been absolved of any and all liabilities agains respondent workers. July 24, 2001 NLRC: absolved Sameer from liabilities in view of the transfer of accreditation to ASBT and ordered the latter to pay the respondent workers. ASBT moved for reconsideration. NLRC denied it for lack of merit ASBT elevated the case to the CA via PfC under rule 65. CA denied due course and dismissed ASBTs petition because the attached verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by Mildred Santos as president of ASBT without proof of authority to sign for and bind ASBT in the proceedings ASBT filed an MR and submitted the necessary board resolution authorizing Mildred Santos to represent ASBT. Motion was granted and the petition was reinstated. CA ruled in favor of ASBT and ordered Sameer to pay the respondent workers Sameer moved to reconsider but was denied. Hence, here we goooooo! Sameer contends that since the petition and the motion for reconsideration was signed by Mildred Santos as corporate president, and since shes not a member of the bar, the petition and the MR should be considered as unsigned pleadings pursuant to Rule 7, Sec 3. W/N the pleadings were validly signed W/N ASBT violated the prohibition against forum shopping HELD: SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his st address which should not be a post office box. (1 paragraph. Di ko na sinama yung other 2) Obviously, the rule allows the pleadings to be signed by either the party to the case or the counsel representing that party. In this case, ASBT, as petitioner, opted to sign its petition and its motion for reconsideration in its own behalf, through its corporate president, Mildred R. Santos, who was duly authorized by ASBTs Board of Directors to represent the company in prosecuting this case. Therefore, the said pleadings Sameer also submits that ASBT violated the prohibition against forum shopping.
It claims that the transfer of CA-G.R. SP No. 65068 from the Seventh Division of the Court of Appealswhich initially denied due course and dismissed the petition then reinstated the same (upon proof that Mildred R. Santos as duly authorized) in the Former Fourth Division, which gave due course to and granted the petitionwas actually an act of forum shopping. Sameer posits that the grant o of ASBTs July 5, 2001 motion for reconsideration by the Seventh Division, which reinstated the dismissed petition, in effect gave rise to a new petition. Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
ISSUES:
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o There is forum shopping where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) there is identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same set of facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. It expressly prohibited by this Court because it trifles with and abuses court processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congests court dockets. A willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also constitute direct contempt cancelling ... their licenses or permits (as hawkers or street vendors) and threatening the physical demolition of their respective business stalls in the places specified in such licenses or permits. Petitioners claim to be five of about 130 "licensed and duly authorized vendors of ... religious articles, medicine herbs and plants around the Quiapo Church, ... Manila," bringing suit 'for themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves." They allege that their licenses "were revoked or cancelled (by respondent Mayor) for reasons unknown to them which is tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of laws," written notice of such cancellation having been served on them on or about May 30 (actually May 3), 1986; respondent Mayor "had given (them) an ultimatum of 7:00 up to 12:00 o'clock in the afternoon" (of August 5, 1986) to vacate the premises where their respective stalls are situated or suffer physical demolition thereof. The petition must be given short shrift Petition should be abated for the ground of lis pendens It appears that on July 7, 1986 there was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 8636563, a special civil action of "prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Acting Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. It was filed by Samahang Kapatiran Sa Hanapbuhay Ng Bagong Lipunan, Inc." (hereafter, simply "Samahan") composed, according to the petition, of "some 300 individual owners and operators of separate business stalls ... mostly at the periphery immediately 0beyond the fence of the Quiapo Church." The president of the Samahan is Rosalina Buan and its Press Relations Officer, Liza Ocampo. Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo are two of the five petitioners in the case at bar, described in the petition before this Court as suing "for themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves": i.e., vendors "around the Quiapo Church." The three other petitioners also appear to be Samahan members. The petition in Case No. 86-36563 is grounded on the same facts as those in the case at bar. That they were vendors who had been religiously paying the license and permit fees but have been given a written notice advising them of the cancellation of their permits and their possible relocation to another site.
There was no forum shopping. The MR filed praying for reconsideration of the resolution of the CA dismissing the petition on the technical ground of lack of proof of authority by Santos to bind the corporation was just a motion for reconsideration. Sameer cannot insist that it be treated as a new petition to make it fit the definition of forum shopping to evade liability.
G.R. No. 75349. October 13, 1986. Buan vs. Lopez FACTS: (Im sorry guys kung magulo, ang labo talaga ng facts, Ilan beses ko na siya nabasa. Sobrang frustrated ako ditto. Sana maintindihan niyo pa rin.)
On August 5, 1986 petitioners instituted in this Court a special civil action for prohibition to the end that respondent Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., acting as Mayor of the City of Manila, be "perpetually prohibited from arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously revoking or
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There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 Identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the Identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant. The two cases (One with the RTC and the other with the SC) were dismissed for forum shopping o Forum Shopping: The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum shopping, an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice. The rule has been formalized in Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 in connection with the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, specifically with the grant in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 of equal original jurisdiction to the Intermediate Appellate Court to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, etc., and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid Of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the cited Rule provides that no such petition may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate Court 'if another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court' and vice-versa. The Rule orders that "A violation of the rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned." The rule applies with equal force where the party having filed an action in the Supreme Court shops for the same remedy of prohibition and a restraining order or injunction in the regional trial court (or vice-versa). there is between the action at bar and RTC Case No. 86-36563, an Identity as regards parties, or interests represented, rights asserted and relief sought, as well as basis thereof, to a degree sufficient to give rise to the ground for dismissal known as auter action pendant or lis pendens. That same Identity puts into operation the sanction of twin dismissals just mentioned. The application of this sanction will prevent any further delay in the settlement of the controversy which might ensue from attempts to seek reconsideration of or to appeal from the Order of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 86-36563 promulgated on July 15, 1986, which dismissed the petition upon grounds which appear persuasive. The case was also dismissed because of the permits and licenses of the vendors all eventually expired thus making the case moot and academic.
Sto. Tomas University vs. Surla, 294 SCRA 382 (1998) FACTS: RTC-QC SPOUSES SURLA filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Santo Tomas University Hospital predicated on an allegation by the spouses that their son, Emmanuel Cesar Surla, while confined at the said hospital for having been born prematurely, had accidentally fallen from his incubator possibly causing serious harm on the child Petitioner hospital filed its Answer with "Compulsory Counterclaim" asserting that respondents still owed to it the amount of P82,632.10 representing hospital bills for Emmanuel's confinement at the hospital and making a claim for moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees, by reason of the supposed unfounded and malicious suit filed against it. Petitioner received respondents' Reply to Counterclaim which sought, inter alia, the dismissal of petitioner's counterclaim for its non-compliance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring that a complaint and other initiatory pleadings, such as a counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party
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complaint, be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum shopping. RTC dismissed petitioner's counterclaim. Pet. MR-denied CA via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 Dismissed the petition and held: dismissal of the counterclaim, being a final order, petitioner's remedy was to appeal therefrom and, such appeal being then available, the special civil action of certiorari had been improperly filed. Hence Pet went to SC to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated here have been filed. The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim third (fourth, etc.) party complaint or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 01 April 1994, is to curb the malpractice commonly referred to also as forum-shopping. It is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.The language of the circular distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. The rationale of the circular is to sustain the view that the circular in question has not, in fact, been contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by its very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving its substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be appropriately pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for independent resolution except by the court where the main case pends. The proviso in the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, i.e., that the violation of the anti-forum shopping rule "shall not be curable by mere amendment . . . but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice," being predicated on the applicability of the need for a certification against forum shopping, obviously does not include a claim which cannot be independently set up. Petitioner, nevertheless, is entitled to a mere partial relief. The socalled "counterclaim" of petitioner really consists of two segregative parts: (1) for unpaid hospital bills of respondents' son, Emmanuel Surla, in the total amount of P82,032.10; and (2) for damages, moral and
ISSUE: Can a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be dismissed on the ground of a failure to accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping RULLLING: Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provide: 1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
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exemplary, plus attorney's fees by reason of the alleged malicious and unfounded suit filed against it. It is the second, not the first, claim that the Court here refers to as not being initiatory in character and thereby not covered by the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby modified in that the claim for moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees in Civil Case No. Q-9525977 of petitioner is ordered reinstated. G.R. No. 139396 August 15, 2000 EFREN O. LOQUIAS, ANTONIO V. DIN, JR., ANGELITO L. MARTINEZ II, LOVELYN J. BIADOR, GREGORIO FACIOL, JR., petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, and DR. JOSE PEPITO H. DALOGDOG, DR. AURORA BEATRIZ A. ROMANO, MA. TERESITA C. ABASTAR, JESSICA S. ALLAN, MA. TERESA ANIVERSARIO, respondents. Facts: Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao private respondents (officers of the Association of Municipal Health Office Personnel of Zamboanga del Sur who instituted the said complaint in behalf of the 490 members of the said Association) charged herein petitioners (members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the said municipality) with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged failure to give the salary increases and benefits provided in Section 20 of the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers (R.A. 7305) and Local Budget Circulars Nos. 54, 54-A, 56, 60 and 64 for the health personnel of the local government of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur. On the Resolution dated June 29, 1998 (Take note) Investigation Officer II Jovito A. Coresis, Jr. of the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao found "probable cause to conclude that the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 has been committed by respondents Mayor, Vice-Mayor, members of the Sangguniang Bayan and Budget Officer of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur" and that accordingly, the appropriate Information be filed with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with prayer to defer arraignment and pre-trial alleging that they recognize the salary increases of the health personnel as a mandatory statutory obligation but the salary increases could not be implemented because of lack of funds and the municipality had incurred overdrafts and not due to any manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence on their part. Special Prosecution Officer I Ongpauco-Cortel recommended the dismissal of the case Petitioners filed MFR of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao dated June 29, 1998 alleging that there is no probable cause in holding that they violated Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act Special Prosecution Officer I Ongpauco-Cortel recommended the dismissal of the case was disapproved by Ombudsman Desierto Petitioners allege that the order disapproving the dismissal of the case constitutes a denial of their motion for reconsideration.
SC petitioners filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65
ISSUE: WON petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners at SC under rule 65 complies with Section 5, Rule 7 NO In its Comment the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Solicitor General, alleges that the petition does not comply with Section 5, Rule 7 as the Verification and the Certification on Non-Forum Shopping were signed only by petitioner Antonio Din and not by all the petitioners and there is no showing that petitioner Din was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent them in this case; that the petition raise factual issues; and that the municipality had sufficient funds to grant the statutory salary increases and benefits.
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In their Reply, petitioners contend that there was substantial compliance with Section 5, Rule 7 notwithstanding the fact that only one of the petitioners signed the verification and certification on forum shopping; and that the petition does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented. At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification. 1wphi1 There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. The petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. G.R. No. 140153. March 28, 2001.* ANTONIO DOCENA and ALFREDA DOCENA, petitioners, vs. HON. RICARDO P. LAPESURA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch III, Guian, Eastern Samar; RUFINO M. GARADO, Sheriff IV; and CASIANO HOMBRIA, respondents. Facts PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the nullification of the Court of Appeals Resolutions which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition2 under Rule 65 and denied the corresponding motion for reconsideration, respectively. Private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. In a Decision, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners: to vacate the land they have leased from the plaintiff-appellant [private respondent Casiano Hombria], excluding the portion which the petitioners reclaimed from the sea and forms part of the shore, as shown in the Commissioners Report, and to pay the plaintiff-appellant the agreed rental of P1.00 per year from the date of the filing of the Complaint until they shall have actually vacated the premises.
The Complaint in Intervention of Abuda was dismissed. Private respondent Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of the above decision which has already become final and executory. The motion was granted by the public respondent judge, and a Writ of Execution was issued therefor. public respondent sheriff subsequently filed a Manifestation requesting that he be clarified in the determination of that particular portion which is sought to be excluded prior to the delivery of the land adjudged in favor of plaintiff Casiano Hombria in view of the defects in the Commissioners Report and the Sketches attached thereto. After requiring the parties to file their Comment on the sheriffs Manifestation, the public respondent judge, held that x x x no attempt should be made to alter or modify the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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What should be delivered therefore to the plaintiff x x x is that portion leased by the defendant-appellees from the plaintiffappellant excluding the portion that the defendant-appellee have reclaimed from the sea and forms part of the shore as shown in the commissioners report x x x. Pursuant to the Resolution, the public respondent sheriff issued an alias Writ of Demolition. The petitioners filed a Motion to Set Aside or Defer the Implementation of Writ of Demolition. This motion was denied by the public respondent judge in an Order a copy of which was received by the petitioners on December 29, 1998. CA A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals: alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders, and of the sheriff in issuing the alias Writ of Demolition. In a Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the grounds that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No. 803 effective September 1, 1998, and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated September 9, Public respondent judge, in open court, granted the petitioners until January 13, 1999 to file a Motion for Reconsideration. petitioners moved for an extension of the period to file a motion for reconsideration The motion was finally filed by the petitioners, but was denied by the trial court in an Order A copy of the Order was received by the petitioners 1999.17 Hence this petition. Issue The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Ruling The petition is meritorious. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari upon the following grounds, viz.: the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided under Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners. It has been our previous ruling that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient. In the case of Efren Loquias, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. we held that the signing of the Verification and the Certification on Non-Forum Shopping by only one of the petitioners constitutes a defect in the petition. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his copetitioners of any action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition. To merit the Courts consideration, petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. In the case at bar, however, we hold that the subject Certificate of NonForum Shopping signed by the petitioner Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. There are only two petitioners in this case and they are husband and wife. Their residence is the subject property alleged to be conjugal in the instant verified petition. The Verification/Certification on Non-Forum Shopping attached to the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was signed only by the husband who
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certified, inter alia, that he and his wife have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues raised in the petition in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency; that to the best of their knowledge no such action is pending therein; and that he and his wife undertake to inform the Court within five (5) days from notice of any similar action or proceeding which may have been filed. The property subject of the original action for recovery is conjugal. Whether it is conjugal under the New Civil Code or the Family Code, a fact that cannot be determined from the records before us, it is believed that the certificate on non-forum shopping filed in the Court of Appeals constitutes sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. Corollarily, the husband alone may execute the necessary certificate of nonforum shopping to accompany the pleading. The husband as the statutory administrator of the conjugal property could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone, without the concurrence of the wife. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to the petition. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. More important, the signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property. It bears stressing that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions are hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 150865 June 30, 2006
ART FUENTEBELLA, Park-in-Charge, and ROLLING HILLS MEMORIAL PARK, INC., Petitioners, vs. DARLICA CASTRO, Respondent. RULING: A CERTIFICATION WHICH HAD BEEN SIGNED WITHOUT THE PROPER AUTHORIZATION IS DEFECTIVE AND CONSTITUTES A VALID CAUSE FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION. EXCEPTION TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE FOR FAILURE OF ONE OF THE PETITIONERS TO SIGN THE CERITIFICATION: o Petitioners must comply with two conditions: 1. petitioners must show justifiable cause for their failure to personally sign the certification; and, 2. they must also be able to prove that the outright dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly administration of justice. In the present case, we find that petitioners failed to prove the presence of these conditions. FACTS:
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The controversy primarily involves the application of Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court relating to the signature appearing on the certificate of non-forum shopping, and the submission of a false certification. Respondent Darlica Castro is the widow of the late Freddie Castro who died in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. o Respondent engaged the funeral services of petitioner Rolling Hills Memorial Park, Inc. in Bacolod City for the interment of the remains of her husband. o During the burial, when the casket of her deceased husband was about to be lowered into the vault, it was discovered that the dimensions of the vault did not correspond to the measurements of the casket. o As a result, the casket was lifted and placed under the heat of the sun for about one hour in front of all the mourners while the vault was being prepared. o To make matters worse, the employees of petitioner corporation measured the casket by using a spade. Insulted by the events that transpired at the funeral, respondent, through counsel, wrote to the management of petitioner corporation demanding an explanation for its negligence, but the latter did not respond nor attempt to apologize to the former. MTCC: RESPONDENT: DAMAGES. PETITIONER: MOTION TO DISMISS. GROUND: NO JURISDICTION, AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED IS MORE THAN P200K. RESPONDENT: MOTION TO WITHDRAW COMPLAINT. GRANTED. o Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages against the corporation and its Park-in-Charge Art Fuentebella, jointly and solidarily, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City asking for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation costs. o Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the MTCC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case o because the amount of damages claimed is more than P200,000. Respondent subsequently filed a motion to withdraw the complaint, which was granted by the MTCC.
RTC NEGROS OCCIDENTAL: RESPONDENT: DAMAGES. o Afterwards, respondent filed a similar complaint with the RTC of Negros Occidental. o Attached in the complaint was the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping required under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, stating:
That I further certify that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; that to the best of my knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or other tribunal or agency, and that if I should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I shall undertake to report that fact within five (5) days to this Honorable Court. PETITIONER: MOTION TO DISMISS. GROUND: CERT. IS FALSE, RESPONDENT FILED AN IDENTICAL COMPLAINT WITH THE MTCC. o Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the certification is false because respondent had previously filed an identical complaint with the MTCC. DENIED MOTION TO DISMISS. GROUND: REQUIRMENT NOT TO BE INTERPRETED TOO LITERALLY. o The trial court issued the questioned order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, to wit:
x x x, while the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless, the requirement is not to be interpreted too literally
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and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum shopping. PETITIONER: M.R. DENIED. o A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners arguing that the motion to dismiss was not based on the ground that respondent had filed two similar actions at the same time but rather on the submission by the latter of a false certification. The trial court denied said motion in its order, dated July 9, 2001, stating: Monico A. Puentevella, Jr., Corporate Secretary of petitioner corporation, affirming therein the authority of Lourdes A. Pomperada to file the aforementioned petition. (ALSO TAKE NOTE OF THIS.) HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW.
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER HAS COMPLIED WITH THE RULES ON VERIFICATION AND CERITIFICATE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING. HELD: NO. It is obligatory that the one signing the verification and certification against forum shopping on behalf of the principal party or the other petitioners has the authority to do the same.
As can be readily seen from the said provision, the sanction provided by the said rule on the submission of a false certification is not dismissal of the case but [the same] will be considered as an indirect contempt of Court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal action that may be filed against the party concerned. CA: PETITIONER: CERTIORARI WITH WPI AND/OR TRO. DISMISSED. o Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The petition, however, was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in its resolution issued on September 27, 2001, thus:
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides: Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall specify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and, (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
A perusal of the records discloses that the verification and the certification against forum shopping was signed by a certain Lourdes Pomperada without any showing or indication that she is duly authorized by the petitioners to sign for and in their behalf. (NOTE: THIS CONCERNS THE PETITIONERS VERIFICATION AND CERT. OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING NOT OF RESPONDENT ANYMORE.) M.R. DENIED. o A motion for reconsideration of the above resolution was filed by petitioner Rolling Hills Memorial Park, Inc. attaching thereto a Secretarys Certificate signed by
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contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. The above provision mandates that the petitioner or the principal party must execute the certification against forum shopping. The reason for this is that the principal party has actual knowledge whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. o If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. This requirement is intended to apply to both natural and juridical persons as Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court do not make a distinction between natural and juridical persons. o Where the petitioner is a corporation, the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized director or representative. o This was enunciated in Eslaban, Jr. v. Vda. de Onorio, where the Court held that if the real party-in-interest is a corporate body, an officer of the corporation can sign the certification against forum shopping so long as he has been duly authorized by a resolution of its board of directors. Likewise, where there are several petitioners, it is insufficient that only one of them executes the certification, absent a showing that he was so authorized by the others. That certification requires personal knowledge and it cannot be presumed that the signatory knew that his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions filed or pending. Hence, a certification which had been signed without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. IN THE CASE AT BAR, the Court of Appeals accordingly dismissed the petition for lack of proper authorization of the one signing it on behalf of petitioners. o Lourdes Pomperada, the Administrative Manager of petitioner corporation, who signed the verification and certificate on non-forum shopping, initially failed to submit a secretarys certificate or a board resolution confirming her authority to sign for the corporation, and a special power of attorney to sign on behalf of co-petitioner Art Fuentebella, who was sued jointly and solidarily with the corporation in his capacity as officer of the latter. Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court requires that the petitioner shall sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. o In the case of corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed in behalf of the corporate entity by specifically authorized individuals for the simple reason that corporations, as artificial persons, cannot do the task themselves. o However, in the case of natural persons, the Rule requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. o The reason for such a requirement is that the petitioner himself, or in [the] case of a corporation, its duly authorized representative, knows better than anyone else whether a separate case has been filed or pending which involves substantially the same issues. EXCEPTION TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE FOR FAILURE OF ONE OF THE PETITIONERS TO SIGN THE CERITIFICATION: o Petitioners must comply with two conditions: first, petitioners must show justifiable cause for their failure to personally sign the certification; and, second, they must also be able to prove that the outright dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly administration of justice. In the present case, we find that
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petitioners failed to prove the presence of these conditions. SUB-ISSUE: WHETHER RSPONDENTS FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THAT A SIMILAR CASE WAS EARLIER FILED BUT WAS LATER WITHDRAWN FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION CONSTITUTED FALSE CERTIFICATION. HELD : NO. An omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present. Hence, in any event, the trial court correctly held that the submission of a false certification shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal sanctions. This is in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. On December 27, 1996, petitioner filed with the (BIR) a claim for tax refund/tax credit of the full amount of the 20% sales discount it granted to senior citizens for the year 1995, allegedly totaling to PhP 123,083 in accordance with Sec. 4 of RA 7432. Ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals On April 26, 2000, the CTA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for review for lack of merit. pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA 7432, the 20% sales discounts petitioner extended to qualified senior citizens in 1995 should be treated as tax credit and not as deductions from the gross sales as erroneously interpreted in RR 2-94. Ruling of the Court of Appeals On August 31, 2000, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the petition on procedural grounds. The CA held that the person who signed the verification and certification of absence of forum shopping, a certain Jacinto J. Concepcion, President of petitioner, failed to adduce proof that he was duly authorized by the board of directors to do so. ISSUES: Whether the President of a corporation is authorized to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, without need of a board resolution.(In sufficient compliance with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.) Whether the CTA committed reversible error in denying and dismissing petitioners action for refund or tax credit. HELD: that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case. GR: 154704 June 1, 2011
Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Facts: Petitioner, a corporation, is a duly licensed retailer of medicine and other pharmaceutical products. It operates two drugstores, one in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and the other in Roxas, Isabela, under the name and style of Mercury Drug. In compliance with Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 2-94, petitioner treated the 20% sales discounts granted to qualified senior citizens in 1995 as deductions from the gross sales in order to arrive at the net sales, instead of treating them as tax credit as provided by Section 4 of RA 7432.
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NELLIE VDA. DE FORMOSO and her children, namely, MA. THERESA FORMOSO-PESCADOR, ROGER FORMOSO, MARY JANE FORMOSO, BERNARD FORMOSO, and PRIMITIVO MALCABA, Petitioners, vs. PNB, FRANCISCO ARCE, ATTY. BENJAMIN BARBERO (NAKU! MAHIRAP MAGING LAWYER ITO!),AND ROBERTO NAVARRO, Respondents. This is a petition assailing the decision of the CA which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners on the ground that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners. FACTS: Petitioner Nellie and her 5 children executed a SPA in favor of Malcaba, authorizing him to secure all papers and documents and owners copies of the titles of real properties pertaining to a loan with REM from PNB. Nellie and her family sold the property to Malcaba. So Malcaba went to PNB to fully pay the obligation. PNB refused. (insert evil music) Petitioners filed a complaint for Specific Performance in the RTC of Vigan, praying PNB be ordered to accept the payment. o RTC favored the petitioners, however their prayer for damages was denied. o PNB = MR = DENIED. o Petitioners filed a petition for Relief from Judgment questioning the RTC decision their evidence does not warrant an award for damages. DENIED. o Petitioners = MR = DENIED. Court of Appeals: Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari. DISMISSED. o Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by only one of the many petitioners. All petitioners must be signatories to the certification of non-forum shopping, unless the one who signed was empowered to act for the rest. In the case at bar, there was no showing that he was authorized. Certification of non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge of the party who executed it. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. o MR = DENIED Supreme Court: Petitioners argued that they have substantially complied with the requirements on verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioners are of the view that the rule on the verification and certification should be liberally construed, since only questions of law are raised in a petition for certiorari and no factual issues that require personal knowledge of the petitioners. o PNB countered that the mandatory rule on certification against forum shopping requires that all of the 6 petitioners must sign. Malcaba was not a party or signatory to the contract of loan between PNB and Nellie. Neither was there evidence that Malcaba was a coowner.
RULING: Petition lack merit! Hmp! Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as matter of right. The party who seeks to avail of it must strictly observe the rules laid down by law. A PfC is availed of when any tribunal has acted with grave abuse of discretion. A petition shall be accompanied by, among others, a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It shall contain names and addresses of all the parties. The petitioner shall also submit a sworn certification that he has not commenced any other action involving the same issues in the SC or CA. Failure of the petitioner to comply with the requirements shall be sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition. Acceptance of a PfC is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Although the court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a PfC, it does so only when the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion
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and when there are procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of Courts or SC Circulars. In the case at bench the petitioners claim they have complied with the requirements on verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The court disagrees! Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting noncompliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping: 1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping. 2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The Court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. 3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons." 5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. In the PfC in the CA there were 7 petitioners but only Malacaba signed. There was no proof that Malcaba was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them. There was no special power of attorney shown by the Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for review on certiorari. The certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient. The attestation on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of
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the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the current petition. The certification against forum shopping in CA-G.R. SP No. 72284 is fatally defective, not having been duly signed by both petitioners and thus warrants the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. Rule 8 Manner of making allegations in Pleadings CONCEPCION V. VDA. DE DAFFON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LOURDES OSMEA VDA. DE DAFFON, AILEEN DAFFON, JOSELITO DAFFON, JR., ANA VANESA DAFFON, LEILA DAFFON and SUZETTE DAFFON, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Concepcion Villamor was married to the late Amado Daffon, with whom she begot one son, Joselito Daffon. Joselito married Lourdes Osmea, and they bore six children, namely, Aileen, Joselito Jr., Ana Vanesa, Leila, Julius and Suzette. Amado passed away followed by His son, Joselito, between petitioner, on one hand, and the respondents as heirs of Joselito Daffon, on the other hand. Petitioner filed a MD on the grounds of (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action; and (3) waiver, abandonment and extinguishment of the obligation. She argued that the trial court cannot take cognizance of the action for partition considering her claim of absolute ownership over the properties; and that respondents themselves admitted that petitioner has repudiated the co-ownership. Anent the third ground, petitioner alleged that Joselito Daffon filed a complaint against Milagros Marin, who was likewise married to . Amado Daffon, for recovery of a parcel of land in Mandaluyong In said complaint, respondent Lourdes Osmea Vda. de Daffon allegedly admitted that the land sought was the only property of the late Amado Daffon. RTC denied MD. MR was filed by Petitioner-denied Petitioner went to CA via certiorari-dismissed, MR-denied, hence he went to SC ISSUE: WON a complaint fails to state a cause of action?NO RULLING: It should be stressed that in the determination of whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered. Moreover, a defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the defendants. IN THE CASE AT BAR: the complaint sufficiently alleged that defendant (i.e., petitioner herein) was married to Amado Quiros Daffon and [11] that they begot an only son in Joselito Daffon. The complaint further alleged that Joselito Daffon later got married to herein plaintiff Lourdes
RTC- Davao Respondents Lourdes Osmea Vda. De Daffon, together with her six minor children, instituted an action for partition against petitioner Concepcion Villamor Vda. de Daffon Respondents alleged that Amado left several real and personal properties which formed part of his conjugal partnership with petitioner. Joselito being a forced heir of Amado was entitled to at least o ne half of Amados estate, consisting of his share in the said conjugal properties. However, the said properties were never partitioned between petitioner and Joselito. After Joselitos death, petitioners behavior towards respondents, her daughter -inlaw and grandchildren, changed. She claimed absolute ownership over all the properties and deprived them of the fruits thereof. Thus, respondents prayed that the conjugal properties of Amado Daffon and petitioner be partitioned and that the one-half share of Amado be further partitioned
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Osmea and before the former died on October 25, 1990 he sired the six (6) children who are now plaintiffs with their mother. SC: Such allegation was sufficient that Joselito Daffon was a legitimate son of the spouses Amado and Concepcion Daffon; and that plaintiffs (i.e.,respondents herein) were likewise legitimate heirs of Joselito Daffon. Admitting the truth of these averments, there was, therefore, no need to inquire whether respondent minor children were duly acknowledged by the deceased Amado Daffon. To be sure, the illegitimacy of the said children and the lack of acknowledgment are matters which petitioner may raise as a defense in her answer and threshed out by the court during a fullblown trial. In the same vein, there is no need for the complaint to specifically allege respondents claim of co-ownership of the properties. The complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts on which the plaintiffs rely for their claim. The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which [14] the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. THUS, The allegations contained therein are sufficient to establish respondents right to the estate of Amado Daffon. By stating their relationship to the deceased, they established their line of succession as the basis for their claim. Their rights to succeed as heirs were transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. G.R. No. L-57821 January 17, 1985 SEGUNDINO TORIBIO, EUSEBIA TORIBIO, and the HEIRS OF OLEGARIO TORIBIO, represented by his widow, ADELA DE LOS REYES, petitioners, vs. THE HON. JUDGE ABDULWAHID A. BIDIN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance, City of Zamboanga, DALMACIO RAMOS, and JUANITO CAMACHO, respondents. Facts: RTC The petitioners filed a case for recovery of hereditary rights against the respondents alleging that their shares in the inheritance left by their mother were NEVER sold, transferred or disposed to others persons nor to their brother Dionisio Toribio. In their answer, the defendants-respondents alleged that the shares of plaintiffs-petitioners had likewise been sold to Dionisio Toribio, their brother, who, in turn, sold the same to Juanito Camacho and Dalmacio Ramos. The alleged sale from petitioners to Dionisio and the sale from Dionisio to the respondents were evidenced by deeds of sale, xerox copies of which were appended to and made an integral part of the respondents' partition agreement between the respondents and also a xerox copy of the respondents' transfer certificates of title. Petitioners - filed a constancia with a motion for reconsideration DENIED Petitioners contend that the documents submitted by the respondents were merely evidentiary in nature, not a cause of action or defense, the due execution and genuineness of which they had to prove. They alleged that the subject of litigation was the hereditary shares of plaintiffs-petitioners, not any document. They stated that the defense consisting mainly of transfer certificates of titles in the respondents' names originating from the sale from petitioners to Dionisio and from the latter to the respondents were merely evidentiary in nature. They argued that a simple specific denial without oath is sufficient.
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MOR denied documents attached to the respondents' answer and made an integral part thereof were declared to be the very foundation or basis of the respondents' defense and not merely evidentiary in nature. between the co-heirs is also elemental to the defense of the respondents. The first deeds of sale (from petitioners to their brother), to which the respondents were not parties but which they seek to enforce against the parties are also actionable documents. CIVPRO ISSUE: WON Section 7 and 8, Rule 8 applies in the case Hence this petition for review on certiorari. HELD: YES. SUBISSUE: WON the deeds of sale allegedly executed by the petitioners in favor of their brother Dionisio Toribio and appended to the respondents' answer are merely evidentiary in nature or the very foundation of their defense which must be denied under oath by the petitioner? HELD: The deeds of sale are actionable documents hence, the very foundation of their defense. Jurisprudence has centered mainly on a discussion of actionable documents as basis of a plaintiff's cause of action. Little has been said of actionable documents being the foundation of a defense. The Rule, however, covers both an action or a defense based on documents. The respondents anchor their defense on the deeds of sale by virtue of which the hereditary rights of all the petitioners over the disputed lot were sold, transferred, and conveyed in favor of their brother, Dionisio Toribio, who in turn sold the same to herein respondents. The deed of sale executed by the petitioners in favor of their brother Dionisio is an essential and indispensable part of their defense to the allegation that the petitioners had never disposed of their property. The deed of sale executed by Dionisio Toribio in favor of the respondents, by itself, would be insufficient to establish a defense against the petitioners' claims. If the petitioners deny that they ever sold their shares in the inherited lot to their brother Dionisio, a failure to prove the sale would be decisive. For if it can be shown that no conveyance of the property was executed by the petitioners, then Dionisio Toribio had no right to convey what did not belong to him. The respondents could acquire only the rights that Dionisio had over the disputed property. The genuineness and due execution of the deed The petitioners further alleged that this case falls under the exception to Section 8, Rule 8 which provides: SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading. SECTION 8. How to contest genuineness of such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but this provision does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument. The petitioners are themselves parties to the deeds of sale which are sought to be enforced against them. The complaint was filed by the petitioners. They filed suit to recover their hereditary properties. The new owners introduced deeds of sale as their main defense. In other words, the
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petitioners brought the issue upon themselves. They should meet it properly according to the Rules of Court. Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 8, therefore, apply. The proper procedure was for the petitioners to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the questioned deeds of sale and to set forth what they claim to be the facts. However, the oversight or negligence of petitioners' counsel in not properly drafting a reply to the answer and an answer to the counter claim is not necessarily fatal to their cause. The facts of the case and equitable considerations constrain us to grant the petition and to set aside the questioned order of the respondent court. As stated earlier, the reason for the rule is to enable the adverse party to know beforehand whether he will have to meet the issue of genuineness or due execution of the document during trial. While mandatory, the rule is a discovery procedure and must be reasonably construed to attain its purpose, and in a way as not to effect a denial of substantial justice. The interpretation should be one which assist the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, and most important, a just determination of the disputed issues. The petitioners' counsel was obviously lulled into complacency by two factors. First, the plaintiffs, now petitioners, had already stated under oath that they never sold, transferred, or disposed of their shares in the inheritance to others. Second, the usual procedure is for a defendant (NOT the plaintiff) to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of documents set forth in and annexed to the complaint. Somehow, it skipped counsel's attention that the rule refers to either an action or a defense based upon a written instrument or document. It applies to both plaintiffs and defendants. An interpretation of a rule of procedure which would not deny to the petitioners their rights to their inheritance is warranted by the circumstances of this case. WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent court dated July 20, 1981 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court which took over the cases of the respondent court is ordered to receive the petitioners' evidence regarding the genuineness and due execution of the disputed deeds of sale. G.R. No. 13300 September 29, 1919
BASILIA BOUGH and GUSTAVUS BOUGH, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MATILDE CANTIVEROS and PRESBITERA HANOPOL, defendantsappellees. Facts CFI This action was begun in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, pursuant to a complaint by means of which the plaintiffs Basilia Bough and Gustavus Bough sought to have themselves put in possession of the property covered by the deed of sale quoted in the complaint, and to require the defendant Matilde Cantiveros to pay the plaintiffs the sum of five hundreds pesos by way of damages, and to pay the costs. Matilde Cantiveros answered with a general denial and a special defense, not sworn to, in which she asked that judgment be rendered declaring the contract of sale theretofore made between herself and Basilia Bough null. The plaintiffs, thereupon, denied under oath the genuineness and due execution of the so-called donation intervivos set forth in the answer. Presbitera Hanopol was permitted to intervene as a defendant. After trial, judgment was rendered by the Honorable W. E. McMahon, judge of first instance, in favor of the defendants, declaring the deed of sale, Exhibit A, fictitious, null, and without effect, and absolving the defendants from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs. It is from this judgment through the ordinary means of perfection of a bill of exceptions that the case is brought to this court for decision.
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Ruling The first assignment of error reads: "The lower Court erred in permitting the defendants to present evidence, over the objections of the plaintiff, tending to impugn the genuineness and due execution of the document, Exhibit A, and in admitting them to show the circumstances under which it was executed. It is undeniable that this was an action brought upon a written instrument, and that the complaint contained a copy of the instrument, but that its genuineness and due execution were not specifically denied under oath in the answer. Is this fatal to the defense? Section 103 of the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure provides: When an action is brought upon a written instrument and the complaint contains or has annexed a copy of such instrument, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless specifically denied under oath in the answer; and when the defense to an action, or a counterclaim stated in an answer, is founded upon a written instrument and the copy thereof is contained in or annexed to the answer, the genuineness and due execution of such instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless specifically denied under oath by the plaintiff in his pleadings. This section is derived from sections 448 and 449 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, and is to be found in varying form in the statutes of practically all the states of the American Union. The meaning of this portion of the Code, and the intention of the Legislature in enacting it, are easily found. The law says that the genuineness and due execution of a written instrument properly pleaded shall be deemed admitted unless the plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, shall specifically deny the same under oath. When the law makes use of the phrase "genuineness and due execution of the instrument" it means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed. As an example, where the name of a corporation is signed to the document which is the basis of an action, the failure of the defendant corporation to put in issue, by denial under oath, the due execution of the instrument, as required in section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, operates as an admission of the authority of the officer to execute the contract, since the authority of the officer to bind the company is essential to the due execution of its contract. (Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co. and Fernandez [1918], 38 Phil., 634.) But the failure of the party to file an affidavit denying the genuineness and due execution of the document does not estop him from controverting it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, and want of consideration. As section 285 of our Code of Civil Procedure permits a writing to be impeached because of its illegality or fraud, such a defense would not be barred by the provisions of section 103. (Moore vs. Copp [1897], 119 Cal., 429 Brooks vs. Johnson [1898], 122 Cal., 569; Hibberd vs. Rohde and McMillian [1915], 32 Phil., 476.) We hold that although the defendants did not deny the genuineness and due execution of the contract of sale of December 9, 1913, under oath, yet the defendants could properly set up the defenses of fraud and want of consideration. Hibberd vs. Rohde G.R. No. L-8418, December 09, 1915 RULING: FAILURE TO FILE A VERIFIED SPECIFIC DENIAL OF THE GENUINESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF A PROMISSORY NOTE GIVES THE PLAINTIFF A PRIMA FACIE CASE WHICH DISPENSES WITH THE NECESSITY OF EVIDENCE OF ITS DUE EXECUTION HOWEVER IT CANNOT PRECLUDE A DEFENDANT FROM INTRODUCING ANY DEFENSE ON THE MERITS WHICH DOES NOT CONTRADICT THE EXECUTION OF THE INSTRUMENT INTRODUCED IN EVIDENCE. Facts: D.J. McMillian was in the retail liquor business and secured a stock of merchandise valued at P1,200 from Brand & Hibberd. Later Brand & Hibberd filed a complaint of estafa against McMillian.
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The defendant Rohde was a practicing attorney and undertook McMillian's defense in the estafa case. Rohde testified that he was well acquainted with the nature of the transaction between the firm of Brand & Hibberd and McMillian. Later on Rohde agreed to sign the following note if Brand & Hibberd would withdraw the estafa complaint: Baguio, Benget, April 27th, 1911 For value received, we the undersigned parties, jointly and severally agree to pay to thefirm of Brand & Hibberd, of the city of Baguio, P.J., twelve hundred pesos Philippine currency in monthly installments of one hundred pesos per month, beginning with the first day of June 1911. W.M.J. Rohde D.J. McMillian Rohde did this because he did not want his client to remain in confinement pending his trial in the Courts of First Instance. However the CFI found as a fact that the consideration of the note was the compromise of a public offense. Now because Rohde has not entered a verified specific denial of the genuiness and due execution of the note, the plaintiff claims that his special defense of illegality of consideration is cut off. the documents was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defense as that the signature is a forgery; or that it was unauthorized, as in the case of an agent signing for his principal, or one signing in behalf of a partnership, or of a corporation; or that, in the case of the latter, that the corporation was not authorized under its charter to sign the instrument; or that the party charged signed the instrument in some other capacity than that alleged in the pleading setting it out; or that it was never delivered are cut off by the admission of its genuineness and due execution. The effect of the admission is such that in the case of a promissory note a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and entitles him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a special defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the defendant. The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which does not contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence. To so interpret section 103 as to prohibit such a defense as illegality of consideration, which is clearly a defense of new matter, would pro tanto repeal the second paragraph of section 94, which permits a defendant to answer by A statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim. Likewise, section 285 provides that the terms of a writing may be impeached by reason of its illegality or fraud. SC does not understand that such defenses are barred by the provisions of section 103. SC accordingly holds that the special defense interposed by the defendant of illegality of consideration is not barred by his failure to enter a verified denial of the genuineness and due execution of the note set out in the complaint.
Issue: Whether Rohde was barred from questioning the legality of the note due to not having verified specific denial of the genuiness and due execution of the note. Held: No. By the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an instrument is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleadings of the party relying upon it; that
PERFECTO JABALDE, plaintiff-appellant,
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vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellee. Facts: Plaintiff-appellant deposited a sum of money with defendantappellee Philippine National Bank (PNB) Plaintiff filed this complaint, seeking the recovery of said amount (P10,000. First P5,000 Phil currency; Second 5000 Phil currency and Japanese military notes) o Basis: a passbook G.R. No. 169548 March 15, 2010
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and MARTHA S. DAVID, Respondents. FACTS: Manuel and Martha David were spouses who owned lots registered in the latter's name. The spouses separated de facto Manuel discovered that Martha had sold the property to petitioner Titan Construction Corp. for P1.5M through a Deed of Sale Manuel filed a complaint for annulment of contract and reconveyance against petitioner Titan Construction before the RTCQC o The ground was, the sale executed by Martha in favor of titan was made without his knowledge/consent
Defendant filed an answer which was not under oath and admitting the making of the foregoing deposits, but denying the dates indicated in the passbook, o PNB alleged that there were discrepancies in said passbook, likely due to tampering on the part of plaintiff
Issue: W/N defendant PNB's failure to deny under oath the entries in the passbook as 'copied' in the complaint constitutes an admission of the genuineness and due execution of the document Held: NO General rule: such failure is tantamount to such an admission But this rule is inapplicable in the case at bar because the plaintiff submitted evidence indicating what was allegedly the dates of deposit, but did not raise an objection when witnesses testified on different dates of deposit By this omission, the plaintiff waived the defendant's failure to deny under oath the genuineness and execution of the passbook entries Hence, PNB may interpose a defense assailing the genuineness and due execution of the passbook entries
Titans counterclaim stated that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) signed by Manuel which authorized Maria to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses o Titan prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
RTC: declared the deed of sale void ab initio o The SPA authorizing Maria to dispose of the property was void ab initio
CA: affirmed the lower court's decision o MfR denied
Hence the instant PfRC R45
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o Titan contended that the lower court erred in declaring the SPA (and in turn, the deed of sale) void ab initio Ground: Rule 8, which states that when an action/defense is based on a written instrument or document, the genuineness and due execution thereof is deemed admitted unless the adverse party specifically denies them under oath Manuel filed a reply alleging that the SPA was a forgery, but the same was not made under oath Therefore, Manuel cannot assail the genuineness and due execution of the SPA FACTS: lots Nos. 1226 and 1182 of the Cadastral Survey had been sold by C. N. Hodges to Vicente M. Layson.In order that he could use said lots as security for a loan he intended to apply from a bank, Layson persuaded Hodges to execute in his (Layson's) favor a deed of absolute sale over the properties, with the understanding that he would put up a surety bond to guarantee the payment of said balance. Layson executed, in favor of Hodges, a promissory and indicated there in the principal and interest and and the sum of P1,551.60, for attorney's fees and costs in case of default in the payment of the principal or interest of said note. To guarantee the same the Central Surety and Insurance Company (petitioner) through the manager ( MRS.MESA)of its executed in favor of Hodges the surety bond . Layson defaulted in the discharge of his obligation, Hodges demanded payment from the petitioner but Layon failed to settle it. CFI-ILOIOLO NO!!! It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special power of attorney is a forgery was not made under oath. However, the complaint, which was verified by Manuel under oath, alleged that the sale of the subject property executed by his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was without his knowledge, consent, and approval, express or implied; and that there is nothing on the face of the deed of sale that would show that he gave his consent thereto. While Section 8, Rule 8 is mandatory, it is a discovery procedure and must be reasonably construed to attain its purpose, and in a way as not to effect a denial of substantial justice. The interpretation should be one which assists the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, and most important, a just determination of the disputed issues. CENTRAL SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. C. N. HODGES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Hodges file recovery jointly and severally the sum against Layson and petitioner In his answer to the complaint, Layson admitted the formal allegations and denied the other allegations. While petitioner was declared in default. CFI-ruled in favor of HODGE Petitioner filled a MR and a motion for relief under Rule 38-CFI set aside decision against the petitioner and admitted its answer. ANSWER OF PETITIONER :petitioner disclaimed liability under the surety bond in question, upon the ground (a) that the same is null and void, it having been issued by Mrs. Rosita Mesa after her authority therefor had been withdrawn (b) that even under her original authority Mrs. Mesa could not issue surety bonds in excess of P8,000.00 without the approval of petitioner's main office which was not given to the surety bond in favor of Hodges; and (c) that the present action is barred by the provision in the surety bond to the effect that all claims and actions thereon should
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in declaring the deed of sale as void ab initio RULING:
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be filed within three (3) months from the date of its expiration on January 23, 1955. CFI-ruled for Pet. HODGES went to CA-ruled for HODGES hence petitioner went to SC PET contention: they assails the finding of the Court of Appeals to the effect that the petitioner is liable for the full amount of surety bond 17,826.08 despite the fact that it exceeded the sum of P8,000.00 and hence, required, for its validity and binding effect as against petitioner herein, the express approval and confirmation of its Manila office, which were not secured in view of petitioner's failure to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of said bond, copy of which was attached to the complaint G.R. No. 143338 July 29, 2005 THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK), Petitioners, vs. DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO G. MORALES, AND SPOUSE, Respondents. Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16886 entitled, "The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., Narciso O. Morales and Spouse" promulgated on 25 November 1999 and of the Resolution of the appellate court dated 11 May 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Said decision and resolution affirmed the order dated 28 December 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Manila. In a promissory note, respondent Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent corporation) and Morales bound themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner for the P1M granted to them by the latter. Respondent defaulted and failed to pay. RTC Petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for recovery of sum of money against respondents, impleading the spouse of respondent Narciso O. Morales (respondent Morales) in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the Defendants in Default opposed by the defendants upon the ground that they were never served with copies of the summons and of petitioners complaint. Respondent corporation filed a manifestation attaching `its answer to petitioners complaint which states the following:
2
RULLING: Section 8 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court: When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but this provision does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. IN THIS CASE: The parties acted in complete disregard of or wholly overlooked the rule above-quoted. Hodges had neither objected to the evidence introduced by petitioner herein in order to prove that Mrs. Mesa had no authority to issue a surety bond, much less one in excess of P8,000.00, and took no exception to the admission of said evidence. Hence, Hodges must be deemed to have waived the benefits of said rule and petitioner was held liable only for the sum of P8,000.00 and not the entire amount.
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TC - denied petitioners motion to declare respondents in default and admitted their respective answers Respondents filed their respective defenses independently During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner presented as its sole witness, Liberato A. Lavarino (Lavarino), then the manager of its Collection Department. Petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of Exhibit "A" (the promissory note) could no longer be found, petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the promissory note which was identified and marked as Exhibit "E." TC initially admitted into evidence Exhibit "E" and granted respondents motion that they be allowed to amend their respective answers to conform with this new evidence. Respondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order admitting into evidence petitioners Exhibit "E." Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit "E" should not have been admitted as it was immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay evidence . Respondent corporation insists that Exhibit "E" was not properly identified by Lavarino who testified that he had nothing to do in the preparation and execution of petitioners exhibits, one of which was Exhibit "E." Further, as there were markings in Exhibit "A" which were not contained in Exhibit "E," the latter could not possibly be considered an original copy of Exhibit "A." Lastly, respondent corporation claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing on the complaint as Lavarino admitted that Exhibit "E" was not the original of Exhibit "A" which was the foundation of the complaint and upon which respondent corporation based its own answer. Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation with motion to reconsider order admitting as evidence Exhibit "E insisting that the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note were NOT established as far as he was concerned. TC - granted respondents motions for reconsideration with regard to the admission of Exhibit "E. Petitioners MFR denied Respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the similar ground that with the exclusion of Exhibits "A" and "E," petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondents alleged indebtedness. TC dismissed the case CA affirmed TC MFR denied
ISSUE: WON CA gravely erred when it upheld the exclusion of exhibit E, the second original copy of the promissory note, despite the fact that the original of exhibit A (xerox copy of the duplicate original of the promissory note) was actually in the possession of private respondents, thus warranting the admission of secondary evidence. HELD: YES. Respondents were able to generally and specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note, thus: There can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations in the answer (Record, p. 20, 26-27), of both defendants, they denied generally and specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note and by way of special and affirmative defenses herein states that he (MORALES) never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint (Exh. A) in his personal and/or individual capacity. Moreover, what appears in the record (Record, p. 20) was an admission of paragraphs 1 & 2 but they deny generally and specifically the rest of the allegations. It would be considered that there is a sufficient compliance of the requirement of the law for specific denial. The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides: SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an
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oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. Respondents denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as 26 contemplated by law. In the early case ofSongco vs. Sellner, the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, viz.: . . . This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not 27 affecting either. TC and CA erred in ruling that respondents were able to specifically deny the allegations in petitioners complaint in the manner specifically required by the rules. In effect, respondents had, to all intents and purposes, admitted the genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory note and recognized their obligation to petitioner. (sec 11 Rule 8) Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note. This being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the original of said note. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are ordered to pay One Million Pesos to petitioner. NESTORIO MEMITA, Petitioner, - versus RICARDO MASONGSONG, Respondent. Facts This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and of the Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals. The Decision dismissed Nestorio Memitas (Memita) appeal and affirmed the Decision of Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental (trial court), while the Resolution denied Memitas motion for reconsideration. Masongsong, under the business name of RM Integrated Services, was the distributor of San Miguel Foods, Inc.s Magnolia chicken products. Masongsong supplied Magnolia chicken products on a 25-day payment credit to Memitas Vicor Store in Burgos Public Market, Bacolod City. Masongsong filed a complaint before the trial court and alleged that from Memitas credit on goods purchased already reached the amount of P603,520.50. Masongsong made several demands upon Memita to pay before Masongsong filed the complaint. Masongsong even sent a demand letter to Memita, but did not receive any reply. Aside from payment, Masongsong also prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment against Memita. The trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment against Memita, taking into account the following: The allegations of the verified complaint; The testimonies of Masongsong and Joel Go, his sales person; and Masongsongs bond.
According to the sheriffs return of service, the Provincial Sheriff issued a notice of levy on attachment to the Registrar of the Land Transportation Office and a notice of embargo to the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City.
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In his answer, Memita did not deny that he purchased goods on credit from Masongsong. Memita further stated that his refusal to pay was based on the following grounds: Questionable deliveries; Short deliveries and discrepancies; and Possible manipulation of delivery receipts. It is quite obvious that the best evidence of the transaction between [Masongsong] and [Memita] is the Sales Invoice for this document reflects the particulars of the transaction between the parties for a specific day. In this document, [Memita] acknowledges receipt of the deliveries made by [Masongong]. Trial Court Trial proceeded soon thereafter. The trial court found that: The evidence ineluctably show that the transaction between [Masongsong] and [Memita] is documented by the Sales Invoices annexed as Annexes A to TTT of the Complaint. The Sales Invoices were attached as annexes to the Complaint and their genuineness and due execution are deemed admitted for failure of [Memita] to deny them under oath. Defendant failed to point out any particular Sales Invoice which substantiates his claim of short deliveries or questionable deliveries. As [Masongsong] declared, [Memita] belatedly raised the issue of short deliveries and discrepancies after he failed to pay and demands were made on him to pay. Atty. Sabornay manifested that Memitas settlement offer was not acceptable to Masongsong. The trial court thus denied the motion for postponement and deemed the case submitted for decision. Atty. Zamora filed a motion for reconsideration of the 22 January 1998 order. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Portions of the trial courts order read: In his Motion for [R]econsideration, [Memitas] counsel failed to justify his failure to appear in the hearing. The trial court ruled that Masongsong was entitled to the reliefs prayed for in his Complaint.
Appellate Court The appellate court did not agree with Memita. It upheld the trial courts decision intoto. The appellate court identified two issues for its resolution:
To bolster his claim of short deliveries and discrepancies, [Memita] attempted to show to the Court that there were other documents, namely: the Load Order Manifest and the Issue Form wherein the actual deliveries to the defendant are reflected. In so far as the Issue Form is concerned, this document reflects the quantity of goods obtained by [Masongsong] from San Miguel Foods for delivery to [Masongsongs] customers. The Issue Form does not at all show the quantity of goods delivered to each particular customer of [Masongsong]. The Load Order Manifest is [Masongsongs] own document which reflects the quantity of goods to be delivered to the customer.
Whether Memita was deprived of his right to due process when the trial court denied his motion for postponement; and Whether the trial court erred in admitting the sales invoices submitted by Masongsong.
In resolving the first issue, the appellate court reiterated Masongsongs argument that the trial court committed no error in denying Memitas motion to postpone the hearing. The appellate court emphasized that due process demands proper obedience to procedural rules. As to the second issue, the appellate court pointed out that Memita failed to explicitly deny or contest the
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genuineness and due execution of the receipts or any of the signatures on the receipts. The appellate court also stated that Memita failed to discharge the burden of proving his allegations of short or questionable deliveries. Issue Rule 8, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, relied upon by the Honorable Court of Appeals[,] does not apply because the Answer with Counterclaim of [Memita] was verified and under oath. Also, Rule 8, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, is inapplicable as petitioner does not appear to be a party to all of the seventy-two (72) sales invoices admitted in evidence by the lower court. The seventy-two (72) sales invoices should have been excluded and denied admission for failure of [Masongsong] to prove in the course of the trial their authenticity and due execution. Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for inspection of the original instrument is refused. (Emphasis added) Memita, in alleging questionable and short deliveries, in effect alleges that Masongsong committed fraud. As the party invoking fraud, Memita has the burden of proof. Whoever alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and private concerns have been fair and regular. Memita chose to present evidence which did not set forth the facts nor the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Memita chose to present the concepts of the load order manifest and the issue form. He also presented witnesses who are current and former employees of San Miguel Foods, Inc. However, per the explanation of Mr. Alberto Valenzuela, a former issuer/receiver and route salesman of San Miguel Foods, Inc., the load order manifest shows the goods ordered by Masongsong from San Miguel Foods, Inc. But the load order manifest cannot be considered as the only basis of a customers order as the customer is not precluded from calling up the San Miguel Foods, Inc. office and make additional orders. Mr. Reynaldo Geaga, an employee in charge of the warehouse of San Miguel Foods, Inc., explained that the issue form reflects the quantity of goods actually obtained by Masongsong from San Miguel Foods, Inc. San Miguel Foods, Inc. then uses the issue form as basis for billing Masongsong. due execution of any of the receipts nor any of his signatures or that of his authorized representative appearing therein. Section 8 of Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
Ruling The petition has no merit. In his Answer, Memita admitted that he purchased goods from Masongsong. However, without specifying the date of purchase or the receipt number, Memita denied the quantities and value of the purchases. Memita alleged that there were questionable deliveries and questionable number of kilos per crate. Memita further alleged that he discovered short deliveries and discrepancies. Through these unsubstantiated allegations, Memita concluded that Masongsong might have manipulated the delivery receipts. Memita insists that the trial court should not have admitted the sales invoices attached to Masongsongs complaint. In its decision, the trial court stated that [Memita] failed to point out any particular Sales Invoice which substantiates his claim of short deliveries or questionable deliveries. The appellate court reiterated the trial courts position and stated that [Memitas] Answer failed to explicitly deny or contest the genuineness and
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The best evidence of the transaction between Memita and Masongsong are the sales invoices. The sales invoices show that Memita or his representative acknowledged receipt of Masongsongs deliveries without protest. Memita aired his doubts about the amounts only after Masongsong asked him to pay his credit. Moreover, although Memita confronted Masongsong with a check dated 1 July 1996 in the amount of P127,238.40 payable to RM Integrated Services, Masongsong stated that the said amount did not include any transaction in the present case. Memitas evidence reveal that Memita failed to prove fraud on Masongsongs part. Therefore, the trial court is correct in stating that Memita is liable to Masongsong in the amount of P603,520.50 plus interest of 12% per annum as agreed upon by the parties and as stated in the sales invoices. Memita is further liable for attorneys fees in the amount of 10% of the principal claim and costs of litigation. G.R. No. 158819 April 16, 2009 o power plant site in Sta. Rita, Batangas City to Calaca, Batangas. Respondents obligation under the SIA entailed the acquisition of easements of right-of-way over affected lands located along the designated route of the transmission line.
ANTERO LUISTRO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION, Respondents. RULING: PETITIONER FAILED TO STATE WITH PARTICULARITY THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONSTITUTING THE ALLEGED FRAUD. Facts: First Gas Power Corporation (respondent) operates a gas-fired power generating facility by virtue of a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with the Manila Electric Company (Meralco). Respondent sells the electric power generated by its facility to Meralco. Respondent entered into a Substation Interconnection Agreement (SIA) with Meralco and the National Power Corporation (NPC). o The SIA required respondent to design, finance, construct, commission, and energize a 230-kilovolt electric power transmission line, approximately 25 km. in length from its
Respondent entered into a Contract of Easement of Right-ofWay (Contract) with Antero Luistro (petitioner), owner of a parcel of land. o Under the Contract, petitioner granted respondent perpetual easement over a 100-sq. m. portion of his property for the erection of the transmission line tower and a 25-year easement over 2,453.60 sq. m. portion of the property for the right to pass overhead line cables. The Contract covered a total area of 2,553.60 sq. m. for a consideration of P88,608 to cover the easement fee, tower pole, guy occupancy fees and improvements. Respondent then commenced the construction of the transmission line tower and the stringing of overhead transmission line cables above petitioners property covered by the Contract. After a several months, petitioners counsel wrote a letter to respondents president asking for a temporary stoppage of all kinds of work within the vicinity of petitioners residential house pending settlement of petitioners grievance that the house and other improvements lay underneath the transmission wire/line being constructed and would endanger the life and health of the persons in the vicinity. Petitioner also referred the concerns to the NPC in a letter dated 19 April 1999. However, the NPC set aside petitioners concerns and considered the matter closed. RTC: PETITIONER: RESCISSION/AMENDMENT OF CONTRACT WITH DAMAGES. ALLEGATION: BY MEANS OF FRAUD, WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE HIM TO INTO THE CONTRACT. o Subsequently, petitioner filed a complaint for "Rescission/Amendment And Or Modification of Contract
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o Of Easement With Damages," against respondent and First Balfour Beatty Realty, Inc. (defendants). Petitioner alleged that respondent, by means of fraud and machinations of words, was able to convince him to enter into the Contract. Petitioner alleged that while his house was supposed to be 20 to 25 meters away from the transmission wire/line, it turned out after the installation of Posts 97 and 98 that his house was only 7.23 meters directly underneath the transmission wire/line. Petitioner alleged that the powerful 230 kilovolts passing the transmission wire/line continuously endanger the lives, limbs, and properties of petitioner and his family. Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. - In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally. Again, the complaint falls short of the requirement that fraud must be stated with particularity. The complaint merely states: 4. That sometime in the year of 1997, the consolidator-facilitator of the Defendants FGPC and Balfour by means of fraud and machinations of words were able to convince[] the plaintiff to enter into CONTRACT OF EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY wherein the latter granted in favor of the defendant FGPC the right to erect [its] Tower No. 98 on the land of the plaintiff situated at Barangay Maigsing Dahilig, Lemery 4209 Batangas including the right to Install Transmission Lines over a portion of the same property for a consideration therein stated, a xerox copy of said contract is hereto attached as [] ANNEXES "A" up to "A-4" of the complaint; 5. That the said contract, (Annexes "A" up to "A-4") was entered into by the plaintiff under the "MISREPRESENTATION, PROMISES, FALSE AND FRAUDULENT ASSURANCES AND TRICKS" of the defendants[.] Not only did petitioner fail to allege with particularity the fraud allegedly committed by respondent. A review of the Contract shows that its contents were explained to petitioner. The Contract states:
RESPONDENT: MOTION TO DISMISS. GROUND: FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION. o Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner failed to state a cause of action in his complaint. RTC: DENIED MOTION TO DISMISS. M.R. DENIED. CA: RESPONDENT: CERTITIORARI. o Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA: SET ASIDE RTCS ORDERS. GROUND: PETITIONER FAILED TO STATE WITH PARTICULARITY THE CIRCUMSTACES CONSTITUTING THE ALLEGED FRAUD. M.R. DENIED. HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW.
ISSUES: Whether the complaint alleges fraud with particularity as required under Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. HELD: NO. Allegation of Fraud
Bago ko/namin nilagdaan ang kasulatang ito ay ipinaliwanag muna sa akin/amin sa wikang Tagalog/ o sa wikang aking/aming naiintindihan. Ang nilalaman nitoy lubusan ko/naming nauunawaan kayat lumagda kami rito ng kusang loob, walang sinumang pumilit o tumakot sa akin/amin .
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There is clearly no basis for the allegation that petitioner only signed the Contract because of fraud perpetrated by respondent. Sufficiency of Cause of Action In a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action, the question posed to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegation of facts made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, it must be shown that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. In this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint lacked sufficient cause of action. The complaint was based on the alleged breach of the Contract and violation of the undertaking that petitioners house was supposed to be 20 to 25 meters away from the transmission wire/line. Petitioner alleged in the complaint that contrary to what had been "assured and promised," his house turned out to be only 7.23 meters directly underneath the transmission wire/line. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, there was no such undertaking in the Contract. o The Contract only granted respondent a perpetual easement over 100 sq. m. portion of petitioners property, as well as 25 years easement of right-of-way over the property or portions thereof, as indicated in the sketch plan, for the installation and maintenance of wooden poles, steel towers, tower footings, and electric and guy wires. Therefore, the alleged right of petitioner, which respondent supposed to have violated, did not exist in the Contract. 1966, Capitol Motors filed a complaint against Yabut o Yabut executed a promissory note for the sum of P30, 134. 25 Payable in 18 equal monthly installments with 12% interest per annum The note states that if Yabut fails to pay 2 successive installments, the principal would become due and demandable with additional 25% of the principal and interest due (for attorneys fees and costs of collection). o Several demands were made, but Yabut still refused to pay On April 27, 1966, and within the reglementary period, Yabut, through his counsel, filed an answer which reads: DEFENDANT through counsel alleges: 1. Paragraph 1 of the complaint is admitted. 2. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint are specifically denied for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Complaint be dismissed with costs against the plaintiff. On June 16, 1966, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, on the ground that the defendant, not having set forth in his answer the substance of the matters relied upon by him to support his denial, had failed to deny specifically the material allegations of the complaint, hence, must be deemed to have admitted them. o The defendant did not file an opposition to the motion. o On September 13, 1966, after hearing on the motion, the court issued an order granting the said motion and considering the case submitted for decision on the basis of the pleadings; and on January 9, 1967, the court rendered
Capitol Motors, plaintiff-appellee vs. Yabut, defendant-appellant (1970)
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judgment granting in toto the plaintiff's prayer in its complaint. Yabut argues that the court erred in considering him as having failed to deny specifically the material allegations of the complaint o He argues that there are only 3 modes of specific denials (1) by specifying each material allegation of fact in the complaint the truth of which the defendant does not admit, and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial or (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder or (3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of a denial, and he has adopted the third mode of specific denial, his answer tendered an issue, and, consequently the court a quo could not render a valid judgment on the pleadings. defendant's knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue. In National Marketing Corporation vs. De Castro , 106 Phil. 803 (1959) o in his answer to the appellee's complaint, he merely alleged that 'he has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matters contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 so much so that he denies specifically said allegations.' A denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified. o Material averments in a complaint, other than those as to the amount of damage, are deemed admitted when not specifically denied. o The court may render judgment upon the pleadings if material averments in the complaint are admitted. It becomes evident from all the above doctrines that a mere allegation of ignorance of the facts alleged in the complaint, is insufficient to raise an issue; the defendant must aver positively or state how it is that he is ignorant of the facts so alleged. There are two other reasons why the present appeal must fail. o First. The present action is founded upon a written instrument attached to the complaint, but defendantappellant failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the instrument; hence, the same are deemed admitted. (Section 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court o Second. Defendant-appellant did not oppose the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by plaintiff appellee; neither has he filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of September 13, 1966, which deemed the case submitted for decision on the pleadings, or of the decision rendered on January 9, 1967. In Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Company, G.R. No. L-15532, October 31, 1963 (9 SCRA 349), this Court said: It appears that when the plaintiff moved to have the case decided on the pleadings, the defendant interposed no
ISSUE: Whether or not Yabuts answer constitutes a specific denial under the Rules of Court? HELD: NO, BUT it was denied because Yabut did not oppose the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by plaintiff appellee; We agree with defendant-appellant that one of the modes of specific denial contemplated in Section 10, Rule 8, is a denial by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint. The rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted, is so plainly and necessarily within the
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objection and has practically assented thereto. The defendant, therefore, is deemed to have admitted the allegations of the complaint, so that there was no necessity for the plaintiff to submit evidence of his claim. G.R. No. L-61523 July 31, 1986 ANTAM CONSOLIDATED, INC., TAMBUNTING TRADING CORPORATION and AURORA CONSOLIDATED SECURITIES and INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION (Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch II [Sta. Cruz]) and STOKELY VAN CAMP, INC., respondents. This is a Petition for certiorari and prohibition. FACTS: Respondent Stokely Van Camp. Inc. (Stokely) filed a complaint against Banahaw Milling Corporation (Banahaw), Antam Consolidated, Inc., Tambunting Trading Corporation (Tambunting), Aurora Consolidated Securities and Investment Corporation, and United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (Unicom) for collection of sum of money. o In its complaint, Stokely alleged that Comphil undertook to sell and deliver and Capital City agreed to buy 500 long tons of crude coconut oil to be delivered in October/November 1978 at the c.i.f. price of US$0.30/1b. but Comphil failed to deliver the coconut oil so that Capital City covered its coconut oil needs in the open market at a price substantially in excess of the contract and sustained a loss. o On that transaction, Capital city sustained damages. After repeated demands from Comphil to pay the said amount, it still refuses to pay the same. Respondent Stokely further prayed that a writ of attachment be issued against any and all the properties of the petitioners in an amount sufficient to satisfy any lien of judgment that the respondent may obtain in its action. The trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment in favor of the respondent upon the latter's deposit of a bond. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration to reduce the attachment bond. Attached to this motion is an affidavit by the assistant attorney of the respondent's counsel stating that he has verified with the records of Comphil and the SEC the facts he alleged in the prayer for the attachment order. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the respondent, being a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, has no personality to maintain the instant suit. The Trial Court ruled to reduce the attachment bond and denied the motion to dismiss by the petitioners. CA upheld the decision of TC. o The appellate court dismissed the petition stating that the respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in deferring the petitioners' motion to dismiss because the said judge is not yet satisfied that he has the necessary facts which would permit him to make a judicious resolution.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court should not have issued the order of attachment and the appellate court should not have affirmed the same because the verification in support of the prayer for attachment is insufficient? RULING: No. We rule that the defect in the original verification was cured when Renato Calma, the counsel for respondents, subsequently executed an affidavit to the effect that the allegations he made in support of the prayer for
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attachment were verified by him from the records of Comphil and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Moreover, petitioner had the opportunity to oppose the issuance of the writ. As to the merit of the attachment order itself, we find that the allegations in the respondent's complaint satisfactorily justify the issuance of said order. MERRILL LYNCH FUTURES, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and the SPOUSES PEDRO M. LARA and ELISA G. LARA, respondents. FACTS: RTC_QC Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. (simply ML FUTURES) filed a complaint against the Spouses Pedro M. Lara and Elisa G. Lara for the recovery of a debt and interest thereon, damages, and attorney's fees ML FUTURES alleged the following: 4) that in line with the above mentioned agreement and through said Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc., the Lara Spouses actively traded in futures contracts, including "stock index futures" for four 3 years or so, i.e., from 1983 to October, 1987, there being more or less regular accounting and corresponding remittances of money (or crediting or debiting) made between the spouses and ML FUTURES; 5) that because of a loss amounting to US$160,749.69 incurred in respect of three (3) transactions involving "index futures," and after setting this off against an amount of US$75,913.42 then owing by ML FUTURES to the Lara Spouses, said spouses became indebted to ML FUTURES for the ensuing balance of US$84,836.27, which the latter asked them to pay; 6) that the Lara Spouses however refused to pay this balance, "alleging that the transactions were null and void because Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc., the Philippine company servicing accounts of plaintiff, . . had no license to operate as a 'commodity and/or financial futures broker.'" ML FUTURES prayed (1) for a preliminary attachment- issued ex parte and the defendant spouses were duly served with summons. SPOUSE LARA filed MD (2) grounds: (a) that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue, and (b) that the complaint states no cause of action -sustained by RTC, MR_denied
1) that on September 28, 1983 it entered into a Futures Customer Agreement with the defendant spouses (Account No. 138-12161), in virtue of which it agreed to act as the latter's broker for the purchase and sale of futures contracts in the U.S.; 2) that pursuant to the contract, orders to buy and sell futures contracts were transmitted to ML FUTURES by the Lara Spouses "through the facilities of Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc., a Philippine 2 corporation and a company servicing plaintiffs customers; 3) that from the outset, the Lara Spouses "knew and were duly advised that Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc. was not a broker in futures contracts," and that it "did not have a license from the Securities and Exchange Commission to operate as a commodity trading advisor (i.e., 'an entity which, not being a broker, furnishes advice on commodity futures to persons who trade in futures contracts');
CA-affirmed RTC,MR-denied ML FUTURES has appealed to this Court on certiorari. ISSUE: The capacity of a foreign corporation to maintain an action in the Philippines against residents? RULLING:YES The settled doctrine of course is that said ground must appear on the face of the complaint, and its existence may be determined only by the allegations of the complaint, consideration of other facts being proscribed, and any 11 attempt to prove extraneous circumstances not being allowed. The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint as constituting a cause of
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action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court might render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the 12 complaint. Indeed, it is error for a judge to conduct a preliminary hearing and receive evidence on the affirmative defense of failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. The other ground for dismissal relied upon, i.e., that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue may be understood in two senses: one, that the plaintiff is prohibited or otherwise incapacitated by law to institute suit in Philippine 14 Courts, or two, although not otherwise incapacitated in the sense just 15 stated, that it is not a real party in interest. Now, the Lara Spouses contend that ML Futures has no capacity to sue them because the transactions subject of the complaint were had by them, not with the plaintiff ML FUTURES, but with Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner& Smith, Inc. Evidence is quite obviously needed in this situation, for it is not to be expected that said ground, or any facts from which its existence may be inferred, will be found in the averments of the complaint. When such a ground is asserted in a motion to dismiss, the general rule governing evidence on motions applies. The rule is embodied in Section 7, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 7.Evidence on motion. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. SC held: that the Laras did transact business with ML FUTURES through its agent corporation organized in the Philippines, it being unnecessary to determine whether this domestic firm was MLPI (Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc.) or Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner& Smith (MLPI's alleged predecessor). The fact is that ML FUTURES did deal with futures contracts in exchanges in the United States in behalf and for the account of the Lara Spouses, and that on several occasions the latter received account documents and money in connection with those transactions. CASE AT BAR: the last transaction executed by ML FUTURES in the Laras's behalf had resulted in a loss amounting to US $160,749.69; that in relation to this loss, ML FUTURES had credited the Laras with the amount of US$75,913.42 which it (ML FUTURES) then admittedly owed the spouses and thereafter sought to collect the balance, US$84,836.27, but the Laras had refused to pay (for the reasons already above stated), the crucial question is whether or not ML FUTURES may sue in Philippine Courts to establish and enforce its rights against said spouses, in light of the undeniable fact that it had transacted business in this country without being licensed to do so. In other words, if it be true that during all the time that they were transacting with ML FUTURES, the Laras were fully aware of its lack of license to do business in the Philippines, and in relation to those transactions had made payments to, and received money from it for several years, the question is whether or not the Lara Spouses are now estopped to impugn ML FUTURES' capacity to sue them in the courts of the forum. The rule is that a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the "doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to foreign as well as to domestic corporations;" "one who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity." The principle "will be applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract (Sherwood v. Alvis, 83 Ala 115, 3 So 307, limited and distinguished in Dudley v. Collier, 87 Ala 431, 6 So 304; Spinney v. Miller, 114 Iowa 210, 86 NW 317), where such person has acted as agent for the corporation and has violated his fiduciary obligations as such, and where the statute does not provide that the contract shall be void, but merely fixes a special penalty for violation of the statute. . . . DOCTRINE: The general rule that in the absence of fraud of person who has contracted or otherwise dealt with an association in such a way as to recognize and in effect admit its legal existence as a corporate body is thereby estopped to deny its corporate existence in any action leading out of or involving such contract or dealing, unless its existence is attacked for causes which have arisen since making the contract or other dealing relied on as an estoppel and this applies to foreign as well as domestic corporations. CA decision is reversed by SC.
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G.R. No. 165744 August 11, 2008 OSCAR C. REYES, petitioner, vs. HON. RTC OF MAKATI, Branch 142, ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION, and RODRIGO C. REYES, respondents. Facts: Siblings Pedro, Anastacia, Petitioner Oscar, and Respondent Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Respondent Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith). Pedro died in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Although Pedros estate was judicially partitioned among his heirs sometime in the 1970s, no similar settlement and partition appear to have been made with Anastacias estate, which included her shareholdings in Zenith. SEC Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint against Oscar stating that it is "a derivative suit initiated and filed by the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION which are now or formerly in the control, custody, and/or possession of Oscar and to determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar] for himself. In his Answer with Counterclaim, Oscar denied the charge that he illegally acquired the shares of Anastacia Reyes. He asserted, as a defense, that he purchased the subject shares with his own funds from the unissued stocks of Zenith, and that the suit is not a bona fide derivative suit because the requisites therefor have not been complied with. He thus questioned the SECs jurisdiction to entertain the complaint because it pertains to the settlement of the estate of Anastacia Reyes. RA 8799 took effect - SECs exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A was transferred to the RTC designated as a special commercial court. Records of the case then were thus turned over to the RTC. RTC Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit. complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment suit and should, according to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, be dismissed; and that it is not a bona fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the deceased Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a special commercial court. Motion Denied CA Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus Affirmed RTC and denied petitioners MFR
ISSUE: WON fraud has been alleged with particularity in Rodrigos complaint as required by Sec. 5 Rule 8 for the special commercial court to have jurisdiction over the subject matter. HELD: NO. P.D. No. 902-A enumerates the cases over which the SEC (now the RTC acting as a special commercial court) exercises exclusive jurisdiction: SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnership, and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
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and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission. The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action and must specify the relief sought. Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. These rules find specific application to Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A which speaks of corporate devices or schemes that amount to fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the public and/or to the stockholders. In an attempt to hold Oscar responsible for corporate fraud, Rodrigo alleged in the complaint the following: 3. This is a complaintto determine the shares of stock of the deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated for himself [herein petitioner Oscar] ...xxx 3.1. Respondent Oscar C. Reyes, through other schemes of fraud including misrepresentation, unilaterally, and for his own benefit, capriciously transferred and took possession and control of the management of Zenith Insurance Corporation...xxx xxxx 4.1. During the increase of capitalization of Zenith Insurance Corporation, sometime in 1968, the property covered by TCT No. 225324 was illegally and fraudulently used by respondent as a collateral. xxxx 5. The complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes discovered that by some manipulative scheme, the shareholdings of their deceased mother, Doa Anastacia C. Reyes, shares of stocks and [sic] valued in the corporate books at P7,699,934.28, more or less, excluding interest and/or dividends, had been transferred solely in the name of respondent. By such fraudulent manipulations and misrepresentation, the shareholdings of said respondent Oscar C. Reyes abruptly increased and becomes the majority stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation, which portion of said shares must be distributed equally amongst the brothers and sisters of the respondent Oscar C. Reyes including the complainant herein. xxxx 9.1 The shareholdings of deceased Spouses Pedro Reyes and Anastacia C. Reyes valued at P7,099,934.28 were illegally and fraudulently transferred solely to the respondents [herein petitioner Oscar] name and installed himself as a majority stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation [and] thereby deprived his brothers and sisters of their respective equal shares thereof including complainant hereto. xxxx 10.1 By refusal of the respondent to account of his [sic] shareholdings in the company, he illegally and fraudulently transferred solely in his name wherein [sic] the shares of stock of the deceased Anastacia C. Reyes [which] must be properly collated and/or distributed equally amongst the children, including the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes herein, to their damage and prejudice. The charges of fraud against Oscar were NOT properly supported by the required factual allegations. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly committed by him, these allegations are NOT particular enough to bring the controversy within the special commercial courts
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jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of shares can be characterized as "illegal and fraudulent" were not explained nor elaborated on. Rodrigo had twice been given the opportunity to study the propriety of amending or withdrawing the complaint, but he consistently refused. The courts function in resolving issues of jurisdiction is limited to the review of the allegations of the complaint and, on the basis of these allegations, to the determination of whether they are of such nature and subject that they fall within the terms of the law defining the courts jurisdiction. Regretfully, we cannot read into the complaint any specifically alleged corporate fraud that will call for the exercise of the courts special commercial jurisdiction. Thus, we cannot affirm the RTCs assumption of jurisdiction over Rodrigos complaint on the basis of Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A. Case is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the default proceedings, the judgments and the writs of execution of respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, and for prohibition to enjoin the execution of said judgments. Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. Respondents were required to answer and after issues were joined, the parties filed their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument. CFI A fire broke out in the premises of private respondents (Tapia, for short) at No. 245 Roosevelt Avenue, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Being holders of fire insurance policies from different companies, among them the petitioners, and having failed to secure extrajudicial settlement of their claims, they filed corresponding civil actions in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. All of said cases, dealing as they did with the same facts and issues, were assigned to respondent judge, to whom by raffle the first of them had fallen. Petitioner British (for short) was served summons, hence their answers were due on April 13 and 17, respectively.
Rule 9 Effect of Failure to Plead THE PHILIPPINE BRITISH CO. INC. and THE CIBELES INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, THE HON. VICENTE S. OCOL in his capacity as Clerk of Court of First Instance of Quezon City and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of Quezon City and MULTIFIELD ENTERPRISES and MOISES M. TAPIA respondents. Facts
On April 13, 1971, counsel for British filed by mail a motion asking for fifteen (15) days extension of its time to answer, claiming that due to the intervening Holy Week and pressure of other works, he would be unable to prepare his answer within the reglementary period. He was granted only five (5) days. Cibeles in turn filed its own motion for extension on, two days after due date. Obviously, the period could not be extended anymore. Just the same, it filed its answer, which was joint with that of British. In the meanwhile, Tapia filed separate motions in the two cases praying that petitioners be declared in default. Not having received by then any answer of petitioners, (Petitioners did file a joint answer, but as will be seen later, the same was actually received by respondent court late.) an order of default was issued, directing at the same time that plaintiffs' evidence be received by the clerk of court. This reception of evidence was done, the judgments complained of herein were rendered. After being duly docketed, these judgments were released for service by registered mail, addressed to petitioners' counsel, Atty. Alfonso Felix, Jr. at his given address.
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According to the postman assigned in that area, Alfredo E. Sugatan, the first registry notice of said mail matter, Registered Mail No. 13648, was delivered by him actually to counsel's secretary who was known to him personally, a certain Miss Tuliao, in the morning, as he similarly delivered to her subsequently the second and third notices. According to Atty. Felix, Jr., on May 24, 1971, the day he received the order of default in Q-13577 (Par. 12 and Annex C-1 of Petition) he found himself in the respondent court and to his great surprise, in the corresponding expedientes, he found neither (1) his motion for extension of time to file answer in Q-13577 nor (2) the aforementioned joint answer he had filed on behalf of petitioners and that instead he saw therein that orders of default had been issued in both cases and, further, that evidence of the plaintiffs had been received ex-parte. He claims also that on said occasion, when he examined the expedientes of the cases, he did not find therein any copy of any decision. To be noted, however, he does not pretend that he made any inquiry from any of the officials and employees of the court as to what was the exact status of his cases as of that date. Two days later, he filed a joint motion, to lift the order of default, unverified and unaccompanied by any affidavit of merit, which he set for hearing. According to him, "the motion to set aside the Order of Default could not be heard on the day which it was set for hearing for the reason that the day had been declared a public been declared a public holiday, undersigned counsel went to respondent court the next day, consulted the expedients and seeing respondent Judge de los Angeles showed him a copy of the Joint Motion Annex 'D' to lift the Order of Default. Respondent Judge de los Angeles after reading in the presence of undersigned counsel that Joint Motion Annex 'D' asked him to set it for hearing anew and told him that it was always his practice to give parties a chance to present evidence." (Par. 17 of Petition). And so, counsel did as told. Thus, a notice was received by Atty. Felix, Jr. Advising him that the motion had been set for hearing, but respondent judge issued an order cancelling this notice for the reason that "for failure of defendants in the above-entitled cases to comply with the requirement imposed by Section 3 of Rule 18, Rules of Court and pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Court on the matter, this Court can no longer set aside its order dated, so respondent judge issued the order. Pursuant to the writs issued under this order, the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation paid to respondent Sheriff P294,750.00 for the account of British and the First National City Bank of New York the sum of P75,000 for the account of Cibeles (Pars. 30 and 31, Petition), but all the amounts thus paid were returned to the respective banks by virtue of the writ of preliminary injunction of this Court.
Petitioners filed a joint "Petition for Relief from Judgment." But before said petition could be acted upon by the court, the instant petition was filed with this Court and summons, together with the writ of preliminary injunction was served on public respondents. In the meantime, on the same day that the petition for relief was set for hearing, respondent judge found it to be "sufficient in form and substance" and ordered the respondents "to answer the same within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof." Nothing else developed in the trial court later because the injunction of this Court which was served on respondent judge enjoined him from "taking further action" in the two subject cases. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to discuss and resolve a point of procedure before going any further. As may be noted, We could have refused to give due course to the present petition when it was filed, considering that it already avers that a petition for relief from judgment had been filed by petitioners with the trial court, which, pursuant to the usual practice, We could have deemed as an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that constitutes a bar to a certiorari review or any other kind of special civil action. But the petition, on its face, presented the situation that obtained in the trial court in such an alarming manner, to the point of strongly hinting possible irregularities in the actuations of the respondent judge and the employees in his sala, which could involve their honesty and good faith as well as the integrity of judicial records and proceedings that the Court felt it was in the best interest of justice for the Court itself to inquire without further loss of time into what actually happened. Indeed, even after the parties had filed their respective memoranda and the Court had by resolution of October 21, 1971 declared these cases submitted for decision, when the respondents filed their motion to dismiss of September 5, 1972, based precisely on the ground that on July 7, 1971 the trial court had given due
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course to petitioners' petition for relief, We resolved to defer determination of the dismissal motion until this decision on the merits. Ruling The contention of petitioners that they were erroneously declared in default has no merit. From the incontrovertible facts in the record, We cannot see how it can be justly said that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in making such declaration. Counsel suggests that he was not given enough time, considering that there was the Holy Week to take into account, but His Honor ruled that precisely, counsel would have more time because of the holidays. Again, We perceive no grave abuse of discretion in such a pragmatic ratiocination. Anent the motion to lift the orders of default, counsel invites attention to the alleged directive of respondent judge to him to have the hearing of his said motion reset because it is the judge's "practice to give parties a chance to present evidence." We take it, however, that seemingly what happened then must, have been that His Honor was just trying to figure out how counsel could be helped out of his self-imposed predicament, but, evidently, upon further reflection, he must have realized the legal obstacles on the way and consequently found no alternative than to rule that the motion to lift did not have to be reset for hearing anymore. Upon perusing the motion when it was filed, he must have noted that it did not comply, as he so stated in his order, with the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 18. As may be seen, petitioners' joint motion to lift the order of default, Annex D of the Petition, the same is neither under oath nor accompanied by any affidavit of merit. In fact, in view of the omission of petitioners to accompany their motion with any affidavit of merit, the trial court had no authority to consider the same. It is to be noted that the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 18 are practically identical to those of Section 3 of Rule 38 regarding the need to show the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that caused the default and to accompany the motion to set aside with affidavits of merit. Consequently, it is but proper to apply to such a motion the same ruling applicable to petitions for relief under Rule 38. The general rule is that once a matter in issue has been decided by the court, it may no longer be brought again in the form of another objection, and in the guise of a motion under another provision of the rules" (at p. 387). True it is that as a matter of form, under Section 3 of Rule 18 it is not essential that the affidavit of merit be separate from the motion and may instead be incorporated therein, but in the instant case of petitioners' motion, even if it makes general allegations of merit, these allegations are not supported by oath of anyone who has knowledge of the fact. As already stated, not even Atty. Felix Jr. swore to the truth thereof. Accordingly, We find no error in the subsequent action of respondent judge of cancelling the notice of hearing of the joint motion to lift the order of default. Besides, the same section expressly provides that motions to lift orders of default may be filed only before judgment, and petitioners' joint motion was filed only on May 26, 1971, whereas the judgments in question were rendered on April 28, 1971. But counsel would attach importance to another aspect of his motion to lift the default orders, regardless of its legal untenability. He contends that having filed such a motion, he became entitled under Section 9 of Rule 13 to notice "of all further proceedings" and, therefore, the failure of respondents to notify him of the motions for immediate execution of the default judgments fatally vitiated the order granting the same and the writs and levies pursuant thereto. It is quite obvious that counsel's reliance on the provision cited by him is misplaced. Textually, the said section reads thus: SEC. 9. Service upon party in default. No service of papers other than substantially amended or supplemental pleadings and final orders or judgments shall be necessary on a party in default unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default, in which event he shall be entitled to notice of all further proceedings regardless of whether the order of default is set aside or not.
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We are not prepared to agree with counsel that the right of a party in default to notice of further proceedings which this rule revives as a result of the filing of a motion to set aside the default order is intended by the rule to be so easily reacquired that just by the mere filing of any motion with a prayer to set aside the default, the provision may be deemed as already complied with. Logic and principle dictate that the effects of default may not be treated as lightly as if it were of no juridical essence. While the Court has generally been liberal in giving a party in default a chance to participate in the trial, We cannot sanction any proposition that would so reduce the effect of an order of default that to have it set aside all that has to be done is for the party concerned to file any perfunctory motion therefor. A party who by inaction or negligence allows himself to be declared in default offends the rule requiring him to answer the summons without unnecessary delay to the end that the issues may be duly joined and the litigation be expeditiously terminated. To purge himself of the effects of such offense, it should not be enough for him to just tell the court he has, after all, decided to wake up and take part in the proceedings. It is but proper that he must justify his failure to comply with the rule before he is relieved from the adverse consequences of his emission. Thus, Section 9 of Rule 13 must be read in conjunction with Section 3 of Rule 18. In other words, the motion to set aside default referred to in Section 9 of Rule 13 must be one the contents of which are precisely those provided for in Section 3 of Rule 18. Thus, the filing of such a motion to set aside short of the requirements of this latter provision may not as it cannot produce the revival of the right to notice contemplated in Section 9 of Rule 13. Any other construction in line with the position of petitioners would render the intent and purpose of the pertinent provisions nugatory and ineffective. Considering, therefore, that counsel's joint motion to lift the order of default in the subject cases did not comply with Section 3 of Rule 18, there is no justification at all for his gripe that he was not notified of further proceedings. requisite showing that they have good and valid defenses, We likewise hold that they have failed to do so. It would be idle ceremony to still require respondent court to take further action on the petition for relief, Annex N. The order of respondent judge of July 7, 1971, giving due course to said petition has in effect become functus officio. We are persuaded that the respective situations of the parties can no longer be possibly altered, should We prolong this judicial battle in any way. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the petition in these cases and setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued on July 8, 1971, with the consequence that the executions enjoined thereby may now proceed in accordance with law and the rules, with costs against petitioner. REBECCA T. ARQUERO, Petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Thirteenth Division); EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education; DR. PARALUMAN GIRON, Director, Regional Office IV-MIMAROPA, Department of Education; DR. EDUARDO LOPEZ, Schools Division Superintendent, Puerto Princesa City; and NORMA BRILLANTES, Respondents RULING: A DEFENDANT DECLARED IN DEFAULT RETAINS THE RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT ON THE GROUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS O FTHE COMPLAINT, OR THAT THE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW, EVEN WITHOUT NEED OF THE PRIOR FILING OF A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT. EXCEPT THAT HE DOES NOT REGAIN HIS RIGHT TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE. FACTS:
We reiterate that these circumstances make it unnecessary for Us to adhere to the technical procedure of returning these cases to the trial court for further proceedings and final determination of the issue of whether or not petitioners' petition for relief from judgment should be granted. We find all the proceedings leading to the rendition of the impugned judgments and to the issuance of all the writs of execution thereunder to have been regular and legal. And as to whether or not petitioners have been able to make the
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On October 13, 1989, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 6765, or An Act Integrating Certain High Schools in the City of Puerto Princesa and in the Province of Palawan with the Palawan National School and Appropriating Funds Therefor. Under the law, a number of schools all around the Province of Palawan were converted into national schools and integrated with the Palawan National School (PNS) in the City of Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan. The law provides that the Palawan Integrated National Schools (PINS) shall be headed by a Vocational School Superintendent (VSS) who shall be chosen by the Sec. of DECS and the PNS and each of its units or branches shall be headed either by a Principal or Secondary School Head Teacher to be chosen in accordance with the DepEd Rules and Regulations. However, no VSS was appointed. Petitioner took over as Secondary School Principal of the PNS. On March 18, 1993, then DECS-Region IV Director IV Desideria Rex (Director Rex) designated petitioner as OIC of the PINS. After 9 years, OIC of DepEd. Region Office 4 (OIC) withdrew the designation of petitioner as OIC of the PINS, enjoining her from submitting to the Regional Office all appointments and personnel movement involving the PNS and the satellite schools. On March 28, 2003, then DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus designated Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Norma B. Brillantes (private respondent) in concurrent capacity as OIC of the PINS entitled to representation and transportation allowance, except the salary of the position. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification before the Office of the DepEd Secretary as to the designation of private respondent. On September 18, 2003, the OIC filed a formal charge against petitioner who continued to defy the orders issued by the Regional Office relative to the exercise of her functions as OIC of the PINS despite the designation of private respondent as such. RTC PALAWAN: PETITIONER: PETITION FOR QUO WARANTO WITH TRO AND WPI. o On October 2, 2003, petitioner filed the Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary o Restraining Order and/or Injunctive Writ before the RTC of Palawan against public and private respondents. Petitioner argued that the designation of private respondent deprived her of her right to exercise her function and perform her duties in violation of her right to security of tenure.
RTC: ISSUED TRO AND WPI. Respondents failed to file their Answer. (PLS. TAKE NOTE) Hence, on motion of petitioner, the Court declared respondents in default in an Order dated December 15, 2003. In the same order, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. RTC: RENDERED JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER. CA: RESPONDENT: APPEAL: REVERSED AND SET ASIDE RTCS DECISION. o Respondents filed an appeal to the CA despite being declared in default. (PLS. TAKE NOTE.) HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW. Petitioner insists that respondents could not have appealed the RTC decision having been declared in default. o She explains that the only issue that could have been raised is a purely legal question, therefore, the appeal should have been filed with the Supreme Court and not with the CA.
ISSUE: Whether a party in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default. HELD: Yes, except that he does not regain his right to adduce evidence. Citing Lina v. Court of Appeals the Court enumerated the abovementioned remedies, to wit:
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a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec. 3, Rule 18) b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41) The Court explained that the fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Even after the deletion of that provision under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely on the Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment rendered against him. Moreover, in Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the Court provided a comprehensive restatement of the remedies of the defending party declared in default: Such party declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification or reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the trial court when he was declared in default, and which he failed to have vacated. In this case, the petitioner sought the modification of the decision of the trial court based on the evidence submitted by it only in the Court of Appeals. Undoubtedly, a defendant declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default except that he does not regain his right to adduce evidence. The appellate court, in turn, can review the assailed decision and is not precluded from reversing the same based solely on the evidence submitted by the plaintiff.
JUAN A. GOCHANGCO, HON. FELINO GARCIA, as Presiding Judge of the City Court of Bacolod, Branch I, and DEPUTY PROVINCIAL SHERIFF JOSUE DE JOSE vs THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH IV, SY HO and MILAGROS MINORIA FACTS: Appeal by certiorari governing the modes of acquisition of jurisdiction by a court over the person of a defendant, default, substitution of parties plaintiff, judgment on the pleadings, and execution pending appeal in ejectment cases. An unlawful detainer was filed by C.N. Hodges in the City Court of Bacolod, Branch I, docketed as Civil Case No. 2838. Hodges sought the ejectment from certain parcels of land in Bacolod City titled in his name, of several persons, namely: Basilicio Macanan, Gertrude Nolan, Alejandro Santiago, Jr., Sy Ho, and Milagros Minoria. The cases against Macanan, Nolan and Santiago were all dismissed for some
It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal from the judgment by default and assail said judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law.
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reasons. Cases against Sy Ho and Minora, however continued. Summons was duly served to Minora, though she didnt sign/acknowledge it. Sy Ho, on the other hand was contending that it was not properly served alleging that he that he had never received summons; apparently the summons had been served at the place where he maintained his scrap iron business, which was not his residence and at which he had no representative authorized to receive court processes and notices. During the pendency of the case, Hodges died and was substituted by PCIB (Phil. Commercial Industrial Bank) as court-appointed administrator of Hodgess estate. PCIB filed motion declare Sy Ho in default for failure to answer complaint which court granted. Sy Ho then filed Opposition to the Motion for Default stating the improper service of summons, which the City Court overruled. City Court also ordered Sy Ho to pay monthly rentals corresponding to the premises occupied by him directly to it, instead of to his codefendant, Minoria, who apparently had therefore been acting as caretaker of the property. Later, all the proceedings of this ejectment case were all suspended until 16 or 17 years later by reason of controversies as regards to the administration and hereditary rights over Hodgess estate. The property involve in this case was later on sold to Juan Gochangco, who obtained title therein in due course. Gochangco lost no time in advising Minoria and Sy Ho of his acquisition of the property and demanding their vacation thereof. He also filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Substitution of Plaintiff and Reception of Evidence" dated March 26, 1976, which the City Court granted by Order dated March 26, 1976. Accordingly, Gochangco presented evidence ex-parte on March 30, 1976; this, as regards Sy Ho, who had been declared in default. In his turn, Sy Ho filed a motion to set aside the order of default attaching an affidavit of Merits in which he cl aimed that his failure to file answer to the complaint was due to the fault of his counsel who, according to him, failed to make the "proper follow-up" of the case; and he asked to be excused for his mistake or negligence for 'depending too much on his lawyer who formerly handled his case." Both Minoria and Sy Ho was given a day in court but 1 day before the scheduled appearance, Sy Ho filed MTD stating that the complaint has no cause of action and the case against him had not been prosecuted for an unreasonably long span of time; and the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations under PD No. 20. City Court rendered judgment in favour of Gochangco. Sy Ho filed for MR and second MR which were both denied. Gochangco moved for the execution pending appeal contending that this was proper since the judgment was against a defendant, declared by Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court to be immediately executory. Sy Ho and Minoria thereupon filed a joint petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction discretion with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. CFI of Negros rendered judgment in favour of Sy Ho and Minoria.
ISSUE: WON Sy Ho was properly served with summons as a basis declaring him in default; WON the order authorizing execution of the ejectment judgment against the defendants proper.
RULING: YES! Whatever defect might have existed in the return of the service of summons on Sy Ho was rendered inconsequential by subsequent events, duly entered in the record, demonstrating that service of summons had indeed been effected and Sy Ho had voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the City Court. There was a valid service which is a substituted service, allowed when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time, in which event, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at defendants dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Sy Hos submission to the Court's jurisdiction is necessarily inferred from his act of request for leave to present his answer to the complaint, of voluntarily complying with the City Court's Order for the payment of rentals, and filing various other motions and pleadings. There is, too, his counsel's admission already adverted to, that Sy Ho had really submitted himself to the City Court's jurisdiction. There can thus be no debate about the proposition that jurisdiction of his person had been acquired by the City court by his voluntary appearance and acquiescence.
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The propriety of the order authorizing execution of the ejectment judgment against the defendants also cannot be gainsaid. The order is squarely within the provisions of Section 8, Rule 70 which declares that "(i)f judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant, to stay execution, files a sufficient bond approved by the justice of the peace or municipal court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court to exist. ..." G.R. No. 139371 April 4, 2001 INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION (CHED), respondent. Petition for Review on Certiorari under rule 45 Indiana Aerospace University, formerly Indiana School of Aeronautics was directed by the respondent to desist from using the term University as there was a violation committed by the institution unless the school had complied with the basic requirements of being a university. Respondent was able to verify from the SEC that the petitioner had filed a proposal to change its name (from school to university) which was supposedly favored by the DECS. SEC chairman wrote a letter to the chairman of the respondent saying that their records show that the petitioner has not filed any amended articles of incorporation that changed its corporate name to university. In case the corporate submits an application for change of name, the cease and desist order shall be considered accordingly Respondents offered evidence RTC denied MTD and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of the petitioner. Respondent was directed to file its answer 15 days from receipt of the order (Aug 15) o Writ of Preliminary Injunction Not to publish or circulate any announcement in the newspaper, radio or television regarding its Cease and Desist Order against petitioner Not to enforce the Cease and Desist Order issued against petitioner; To maintain the status quo by not withholding the issuance of yearly school permits and special order to all graduates. Petitioner filed a Motion To Declare Respondent in default pursuant to Section 3, Rule 9 in relation to Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, as amended, and at the same time praying for the Motion to Set for Hearing on October 30, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. Respondent filed a Motion For Extension of Time to File its Answer until November 18, 1998. On November 17, 1998, respondent filed its Answer. December 9, 1998 Judge declared respondents in default In reaction to the order of the respondent, the chairman of the petitioner wrote a letter appealing for reconsideration of the order. Respondent rejected the appeal. Petitioner filed a complaint for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction and TRO against respondent Respondent filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss Petitioner filed its opposition to the MTD. Respondents filed a reply on April 21, 1998. Petitioners formally offered evidence
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February 23, 1999 Respondents filed a PFC with the CA o CAs Ruling Respondent should not have been declared in default, because its Answer had been filed long before the RTC ruled upon petitioner's Motion to declare respondent in default. Thus, respondent had not obstinately refused to file an Answer; on the contrary, its failure to do so on time was due to excusable negligence. Declaring it in default did not serve the ends of justice, but only prevented it from pursuing the merits of its case. ERLINDA GAJUDO, FERNANDO GAJUDO, JR., ESTELITA GAJUDO, BALTAZAR GAJUDO and DANILO ARAHAN 1 CHUA, Petitioners, vs.TRADERS ROYAL BANK, Respondent. FACTS: RTC_QC [Petitioners] filed a against [respondent] Traders Royal Bank, the City Sheriff of Quezon City and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure and auction sale made by [the] city sheriff of Quezon City of a parcel of land covered by TCT the conventional redemption thereof, and prayed for damages and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. ANSWER was filed Case was set for trial however, a big conflagration hit the City Hall of Quezon City, which destroyed, amongst other things, the records of the case. After the records were reconstituted, [petitioners] discovered that the foreclosed property was sold by [respondent] bank to the Ceroferr Realty Corporation, and that the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificate of title of the foreclosed property, had already been cancelled. [petitioners], with leave of court, amended their complaint- TC dismiss the case without prejudice due to [petitioners] failure to pay additional filing fees. [petitioners] re-filed the complaint with the same Court the amended complaint substantially reproduced the allegations of the original complaint. But [petitioners] this time impleaded as additional defendants the Ceroferr Realty Corporation and/or Cesar Roque, and Lorna Roque, and included an additional cause of action, to wit: that said new defendants conspired with [respondent] bank in [canceling] the notice of lis pendens by falsifying a letter sent to and filed with the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, purportedly for the cancellation of said notice. a motion to declare [respondent] bank in default alleging that no answer has been filed despite the service of summons-granted RTC ruled for Pet. Respondent MR-denied.
ISSUE: Whether there was Grave Abuse of Discretion when the respondents were declared in default. RULING: YES
Petitioner was chillax in calling the attention of the Court to the fifteen-day period for filing an Answer. It moved to declare respondent in default only on September 20, 1998, when the filing period had expired on August 30, 1998. The only conclusion in this case is that petitioner has not been prejudiced by the delay. The same leniency can also be accorded to the RTC, which declared respondent in default only on December 9, 1998, or twenty-two days after the latter had filed its Answer on November 17, 1998. Defendant's Answer should be admitted, because it had been filed before it was declared in default, and no prejudice was caused to plaintiff. While there are instances when a party may be properly declared in default, these cases should be deemed exceptions to the rule and should be resorted to only in clear cases of obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect in complying with the orders of the court.12 In the present case, however, no such refusal or neglect can be attributed to respondent.
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CA- reversed decision of RTC and ruled for respondents. Hence a petition was filed in SC via R.45 Petitioners challenge the CA Decision for applying Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court RULING: Sec. 3. of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court:" Default; declaration of(read this section di ko na sinama yong actual rule) Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure which the trial court is directed to take when a defendant fails to file an answer. According to this provision, the court "shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant," subject to the courts discretion on whether to require the presentation of evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets down guidelines on the nature and extent of the relief that may be granted. In particular, the courts judgment "shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages." As in other civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has 19 the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the 20 weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. This principle holds true, especially when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a default order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may 21 be granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133. In Pascua v. Florendo that complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the defendants are declared in default. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting party. In Pascua, this Court ruled that "x x x it would be meaningless to require presentation of evidence if every time the other party is declared in default, a decision would automatically be rendered in favor of the nondefaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not 23 contemplated by the Rules nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause."
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in Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. "Unequivocal, in the literal sense, as these provisions [referring to the subject of default then under Rule 18 of the old Rules of Civil Procedure] are, they do not readily convey the full import of what they contemplate. To begin with, contrary to the immediate notion that can be drawn from their language, these provisions are not to be understood as meaning that default or the failure of the defendant to answer should be interpreted as an admission by the said defendant that the plaintiffs cause of action find support in the law or that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for. "Being declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights except that of being heard and of presenting evidence in the trial court. x x x. "In other words, a defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. While in a sense it may be said that by defaulting he leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules see to it that any judgment against him must be in accordance with law. The evidence to support the plaintiffs cause is, of course, presented in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that which is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a position to object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should be considered against him. If the evidence presented should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint." THUS, while petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte under Section 3 of Rule 9, they were not excused from establishing their claims for damages by the required quantum of proof under Section 1 of Rule 133. Stated differently, any advantage they may have gained from the ex parte presentation of evidence does not lower the degree of proof required. Clearly then, there is no incompatibility between the two rules. WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. DOCTRINE: The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the
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latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would be required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and to present evidence to the trial court. If the evidence presented does not support a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant may not have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence. TERESITA MONZON, Petitioner, - versus SPS. JAMES & MARIA ROSA NIEVES RELOVA and SPS. BIENVENIDO & EUFRACIA PEREZ, Respondents. - versus ADDIO PROPERTIES, INC., Intervenor. September 17, 2008 G.R. No. 171827 Facts: RTC of Tagaytay City Respondents filed an initiatory pleading captioned as a Petition for Injunction against Atty. Ana Liza Luna, Clerk of Court of Branch 18 of the RTC of Tagaytay City, and herein petitioner Teresita Monzon which stated the following: respondents alleged that on 28 December 1998, Monzon executed a promissory note in favor of the spouses Perez for the amount of P600,000.00 payable on or before 28 December 1999. This was secured by a 300-square meter lot in Tagaytay City. Monzon later on executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over lot 2A of Psu-232001 in favor of the spouses Perez. Another claim is that Monzon executed another promissory note, this time in favor of the spouses Relova, and that this loan was secured by a 200 square meter lot. Monzon later on executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over lot 2B of Psu232001 in favor of the spouses Relova. Monzon was also indebted Coastal Lending Corporation which extrajudicially foreclosed the entire property covered by Psu232001, including the portions mortgaged and subsequently sold to respondents. The winning bidder in the extrajudicial foreclosure is Addio Properties Inc. Monzon, in her Answer, claimed that the Petition for Injunction should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. RTC, citing the absence of petitioner and her counsel on said hearing date despite due notice, granted an ex parte presentation of evidence by respondents, BUT petitioner was NOT declared in default (take note) RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Petioner filed an appeal Addio Properties, Inc. filed before the trial court a Motion for Intervention - granted Petitioners appeal dismissed.
CA Affirmed RTC and denied petitioners MFR
Monzon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Issue: WON RTC erred in rendering its decision immediately after the respondents presented their evidence ex parte without giving Monzon a chance to present her evidence. Held: YES. Monzon claims anew that it was a violation of her right to due process of law for the RTC to render its Decision immediately after respondents presented their evidence ex parte without giving her a chance to present her evidence. Monzon stresses that she was never declared in default by the trial court. The trial court should have, thus, set the case for hearing for the reception of the evidence of the defense. She claims that she never waived her right to present evidence.
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It can be seen that despite the fact that Monzon was not declared in default by the RTC, the RTC nevertheless applied the effects of a default order upon petitioner under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.Ifthe defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. (a) Effect of order of default.Aparty in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. In his book on remedial law, former Justice Florenz D. Regalado writes that failure to appear in hearings is not a ground for the declaration of a defendant in default: Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and NOT failure to appear at the hearing, is the sole ground for an order of default, except the failure to appear at a pre-trial conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of the defendant are followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgment based thereon may be rendered against the defendant (Section 5, Rule 18). Also, a default judgment may be rendered, even if the defendant had filed his answer, under the circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29. Hence, according to Justice Regalado, the effects of default are followed only in three instances: (1) when there is an actual default for failure to file a responsive pleading; (2) failure to appear in the pre-trial conference; and (3) refusal to comply with modes of discovery under the circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29. Case is REMANDED to the trial court for reception of evidence for the defense. Rule 10 Amended and Supplemental Pleadings G.R. No. 80001 February 27, 1989 CARLOS LEOBRERA, petitioner vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents. Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pescon & Bengson for petitioner. Leoner, Ramirez & Associates for respondent BPI.
Facts The crux of the present petition for review on certiorari is the propriety of the admission by the trial court of a supplemental complaint filed by petitioner. Sometime in 1980, petitioner Carlos Leobrera (Leobrera for short) was granted an P 800,000.00 credit facility by private respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI for short) consisting of the following: P 200,000.00 revolving promissory note line at 10% interest p.a.; P 100,000.00 export advance line at 12% interest p.a.; and, P 500,000.00 Industrial Guarantee Loan Fund (IGLF) loan at 12% interest p.a. The facility was granted as part of an amicable settlement between BPI and Leobrera wherein the latter agreed to drop his claims for damages against the former for its alleged failure to deliver on time three export letters of credit opened in Leobrera's favor. Aside from the abovementioned credit facility, Leobrera also obtained from BPI a separate three-year term loan in the amount of P 500,000.00
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evidenced by Promissory Note No. 01785/0224-0 . This three-year term loan was secured by a third real estate mortgage. Upon maturity of the 90-day notes [Rollo pp. 67-681 BPI and Leobrera negotiated, albeit unsuccessfully, on the terms of their renewal. No agreement having been reached by them, BPI demanded the full payment of the loan. Leobrera failed to settle his loan account thus BPI prepared to foreclose the real estate mortgages securing the same. RTC Before BPI could institute foreclosure proceedings however, Leobrera filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin BPI from foreclosing the mortgages at the RTC. The trial court issued an order Restraining BPI from foreclosing the real estate mortgages Securing the 90 day loans and, after hearing, Issued a writ of preliminary injunction. BPI then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals, Seeking to annul the court order issued by the trial court and Asking that the latter be prohibited from hearing the petition for injunction prayed for in the supplemental complaint.
Before the Court of Appeals could act on BPI's petition however, the trial court granted the injunction prayed for. The Court of Appeals gave due course to BPI's petition and enjoined the trial judge from enforcing his order, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of BPI. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of BPI. SC Leobrera filed the instant petition for review with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining BPI "from foreclosing the three (3) properties of the petitioner. By this time, BPI had already foreclosed two of the properties. The Court gave due course to the petition and the parties submitted their respective memoranda. Petitioner filed two motions asking for the extension of suspension of the period to redeem the properties but the Court in a resolution denied said motions as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Court merely noted a subsequent manifestation and motion praying that the foreclosure be declared null and void, as it was in effect a second motion for reconsideration.
Leobrera failed to pay the amortization due on the loan, as a result of which, BPI opted to accelerate the maturity and called the entire loan due and demandable. Leobrera likewise failed to remit the amount due and BPI thus threatened to foreclose the real estate mortgage securing the loan. Before BPI could foreclose the mortgage, petitioner filed with the trial court a "Motion to File Supplemental Complaint," attaching thereto the supplemental complaint which prayed for the issuance of an injunction to restrain BPI from foreclosing the third mortgage. The next day, the trial court granted Leobrera's motion to file the supplemental complaint and issued a restraining order enjoining BPI from proceeding with any "Legal, court or other action." BPI filed a motion to set it aside but the motion was denied by the trial court. CA
Issue Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the supplemental complaint.
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Ruling Section 6 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court governing the admission of supplemental pleadings states: Section 6. Matters subject of supplemental pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party should plead thereto, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor. The above rule expressly provides that the Court may allow a party upon motion to serve a supplemental pleading after reasonable notice has been given the other party. The question here then is whether that requirement of a "reasonable notice" has been complied with. The Court of Appeals found, undisputed by petitioner, that petitioner filed the "Motion to File the Supplemental Complaint" attaching thereto a copy of the supplemental complaint. A copy of the motion was sent to BPI by registered mail on the same day but was received by the latter only two days later. A day earlier however, the trial court had already issued an order granting the motion and admitted the supplemental complaint "in the interest of sound administration of justice." The trial judge likewise issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin BPI from proceeding with "Any legal, court or other action against plaintiff (Leobrera) arising from Promissory Note." The undue haste which characterized the trial courts admission of the supplemental complaint is at once apparent as no notice had as yet been received by BPI when the trial court issued the order granting the motion to file the supplemental complaint and restraining BPI from foreclosing the mortgage. BPI learned of the existence of the motion and the order granting it too late for it to contest the motion. The arbitrariness of the trial court's admission of the supplemental complaint is brought to the fore when it is considered that the motion to file the supplemental complaint contained an invalid notice of hearing and lacked proof of its service as required by Section 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is evident from the notice that no time and place of hearing of the motion is indicated. Neither does the record reveal that there was proof of service attached to the motion. The minimum requirements of procedural due process not having been satisfied by the notice, the motion to which it was attached is thus a mere scrap of paper not entitled to any cognizance by the trial court. The Court of Appeals thus committed no reversible error in annulling the order of the trial court tainted as it was with clear grave abuse of discretion. As to the supplemental complaint, what likewise militates against its admission is the fact that the matters involved therein are entirely different from the causes of action mentioned in the original complaint. A supplemental complaint should, as the name implies, supply only deficiencies in aid of an original complaint. It should contain only causes of action relevant and material to the plaintiff's right and which help or aid the plaintiff's right or. The supplemental complaint must be based on matters arising subsequent to the original complaint related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action. It cannot be used to try a new matter or a new cause of action. While petitioner would persuade this Court that the causes of action are interrelated, the record reveals otherwise. The record shows that petitioner's main cause of action in the original complaint filed in Civil Case No. 15644 concerned BPI's threat to foreclose two real estate mortgages securing the two 90 day promissory notes executed by petitione. Petitioner alleges that this threatened foreclosure violated the terms of the amicable settlement between BPI and petitioner. The supplemental complaint on the other hand alleged acts of harassment committed by BPI in unreasonably opting to declare petitioner in default and in demanding full liquidation of the three-year term loan. This three-year term loan, as previously mentioned, was entirely distinct and separate from the two promissory notes. It was independent of the amicable settlement between petitioner and BPI which gave rise to the credit facility subject of the original complaint. Although there is Identity in the remedies asked for in the
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original and supplemental complaints, i.e. injunction, petitioner's subsequent cause of action giving rise to the claim for damages in the supplemental complaint is unrelated to the amicable settlement which brought about the grant of the credit facilities, the breach of which settlement is alleged to be the basis of the original complaint. Petitioner himself in his supplemental complaint admits this. The two causes of action being entirely different, the latter one could not be successfully pleaded by supplemental complaint. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued is hereby LIFTED. G.R. No. L-32162 September 28, 1984 THE PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, THE CITY MAYOR OF DEFENDANT PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, THE MEMBERS OF THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF PASAY ClTY and THE CITY TREASURER OF PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH X and VICENTE DAVID ISIP (doing business under the firm name V.D. ISIP SONS & ASSOCIATES), respondents-appellees. RULING: A SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH AND IN AID OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION SET FORTH IN THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND A NEW AND INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION CANNOT BE SET UP BY SUCH COMPLAINT, EXPECIALLY WHERE JUDGMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN OBTAINED BY HIM IN THE ORIGINAL ACTION. FACTS: On August 12, 1964, respondent V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates represented by Vicente David Isip entered into a contract with the City of Pasay represented by the then Mayor Pablo Cuneta. The contract entitled "Contract and Agreement" was for the construction of a new Pasay City Hall at F.B. Harrison St., Pasay City. Pertinent provision of the said contract is as follows: xxx xxx xxx Whereas one of the conditions set forth in the proposal is that the Contractor shall start the construction of the Pasay City Hall Building as per plans and specifications by stages advancing the necessary amount needed for each stage of work and the Party of the First Part (Pasay City) to reimburse the amount spent on the work accomplished by the Contractor before proceeding on the next stage ... ... xxx xxx xxx 2. That the work shall be done in stages to be determined by the City Engineer considering structural and functional criteria and consistent with funds immediately available for the purpose; 3. That the Contractor shall advance the necessary amount needed for each stage of work; Provided that the Contractor, shall before starting each stage of work, inform the First Party in writing as to the amount necessary to be advanced by the former; ... ... 4. That the Party of the First Part shall reimburse the Contractor the cost of the work completed as estimated by the City Engineer for back stage of work before the Contractor proceed to the next stage; ... ... (pp. 33-34, rec.). The respondent accomplished under various stages of construction the amount of work (including supplies and materials) equivalent to
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an estimated value of P1,713,096.00 of the total contract price of P4,914,500.80. The petitioner paid only the total amount of P1,100,000.00 to the respondent leaving an amount of P613,096.00 immediately due from the petitioner to the respondent. Notwithstanding demands for payment thereof, the petitioner failed to remit the aforesaid amount of P613,096.00 to the respondent. CFI MANILA: RESPONDENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AGAINST PETITIONER. o On May 16, 1968, respondent filed an action for specific performance with damages against herein petitioners before the respondent Court. The parties arrived at a draft of amicable agreement which was submitted to the Municipal Board of Pasay City for its consideration. Subsequently, the Municipal Board of Pasay enacted Ordinance No. 1012 which approved the Compromise Agreement and also authorized and empowered the incumbent City Mayor Jovito Claudio to represent the appellant Pasay City Government, subject to the final approval of the respondent Court herein. CFI approved the said Compromise Agreement including a Manifestation and Addendum thereto. On April 10, 1969, the petitioner filed an urgent motion seeking a declaration of legality of the original contract and agreement dated August 4, 1964 from the respondent Court. On May 10, 1969, the respondent Court issued an order declaring that the original contract is legal and valid. On June 21, 1969, at the instance of the respondent, the respondent Court granted an order of execution (PLS. TAKE NOTE) pursuant to which a writ of execution dated June 25, 1969 was issued. On July 9, 1969, an application for and notice of garnishment were made and effected upon the funds of appellant Pasay City Government with the Philippine National Bank. On July 11, 1969, the petitioner filed an urgent motion to set aside the respondent Court's order of execution and to quash the writ of execution. On July 19, 1969, the respondent Court issued an order stating that inasmuch as the petitioner has not yet paid the respondent as of this date then "the writ of execution and of garnishment are declared to be again in full force and effect ...". On July 22, 1969, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on three grounds, to wit: On July 22, 1969, the respondent Court denied and rejected the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The respondent Court ordered the enforcement of the garnishment already issued to the City Sheriff for Pasay by taking possession of the amount of P613,096.00 from the deposits of Pasay City Government with the Philippine National Bank, Pasay City Branch and delivering the same to the plaintiff. Petitioner filed an appeal from the orders of the respondent Court. The respondent, Vicente David Isip, in the original complaint for specific performance filed an urgent motion for permit to serve a supplemental complaint seeking rescission of the original contract titled Contract and Agreement and of the Compromise Agreement and claiming damages in the sum of P672,653.91 alleging the violations of the defendants specially the Pasay City Government in complying with its obligations incumbent upon it in the compromise agreement. On June 29, 1970, the defendants filed their cautionary answer to the supplemental complaint alleging that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the present supplemental complaint; that the cause of action is already barred by prior judgment; that the principle of res judicata applies; that plaintiff's supplemental complaint states no cause of action and that the present claim of plaintiff has been paid, waived, abandoned and extinguished.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent court was in error when it still entertained the supplemental complaint filed by respondent.
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HELD: YES. RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO MORE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER. Art. 2041. If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand., It is obvious that the respondent did not only succeed in enforcing the compromise but said respondent likewise wants to rescind the said compromise. It is clear from the language of the law, specifically Article 2041 of the New Civil Code that one of the parties to a compromise has two options: 1) to enforce the compromise; or 2) to rescind the same and insist upon his original demand. The respondent in the case herein before Us wants to avail of both of these options. This can not be done. The respondent cannot ask for rescission of the compromise agreement after it has already enjoyed the first option of enforcing the compromise by asking for a writ of execution resulting thereby in the garnishment of the Pasay City funds deposited with the Philippine National Bank which eventually was delivered to the respondent. When a decision has become final and executory, the court no longer has the power and jurisdiction to alter, amend or revoke, and its only power thereof is to order its execution. After the perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over its judgment and cannot vacate the same. Moreover, supplemental pleadings are meant to supply deficiencies in aid of original pleading, not to entirely substitute the latter IN THE CASE AT BAR, the respondent originally asked for specific performance which was later settled through a compromise agreement. After this, the respondent asked for rescission of both the contract and agreement and the compromise agreement using a supplemental complaint. It is clear that the supplemental complaint is not only to "supply deficiencies in aid of original pleading but is also meant as an entirely new "substitute" to the latter. A supplemental complaint must be consistent with and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in the original complaint and a new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by such complaint, especially where judgment has already been obtained by him in the original action.
Torres, petitioner v. CA, respondent PFROC, treated as a special civil action, praying that the judgment rendered by the CA and the Resolution denying the MR and Petition for New Trial be set aside Margarita Torres cohabited Leon Arbole w/o the benefit of marriage o Petitioner Macaria Torres was born on 20 June 1898 Mother died on20 Dec 1931; Father died on 14 Sept 1933 13 Dec 1910 The Government issued to Margarita a Sale Certificate payable in 20 installments o Last installment was on 17 Dec 1936, 3 years after Arboles death 25 Aug 1933 Arbole sold and transferred all his rights and interests to the portion of Lot 551 in favor of Petitioner
ISSUE OF SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT: Having established that the compromise agreement was final and immediately executory, and in fact was already enforced, the respondent Court was in error when it still entertained the supplemental complaint filed by the respondent-appellee for by then the respondent Court had no more jurisdiction over the subject matter. -
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6 June 1953 Vicente Santillan, legitimate child of Margarita, executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot 551 and asking for the issuance of title in his name 7 Nov 1957 The Bureau of Lands issued the patent in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita 3 June 1954 Respondents filed a complaint against Petitioner for Forcible Entry with the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging that Petitioner had entered a portion of Lot 551 without their consent, constructed a house and refused to vacate on demand The ejectment case was decided against Petitioner and then, the latter appealed to the CFI of Cavite 8 June 1954 Petitioner instituted an Action for Partition of Lot 551 before the CFI of Cavite alleging that she is a legitimate child of Margarita Torres; Respondents averred that they are the only heirs and that the complaint for partition be dismissed 20 Nov 1958 The Ejectment Case and Partition Case were jointly tried o Lot 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita 2/3 to Respondents 1/3 to Petitioner Petitioner moved for its Reconsideration 7 Aug 1963 CFI of Cavite granted the Reconsideration o Macaria Torres as a legitimate child o Lot 551 is a conjugal property o 4/6 to Macaria o 2/6 to the other heirs Respondents appealed 2 April 1973 CA rendered a judgment o Macaria Torres is not a legitimate child o Lot 551 is a conjugal property o to Macaria o to the other heirs 16 April 1973 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial o A notarial document, dated 5 March 1930, was presented by Petitioner arguing that it was found only later as it was allegedly found among the belongings of Vicente, alleging that the latter may have tried to suppress o Respondents argued against new trial, arguing that it is not newly discovered evidence which could not have been produced during trial by the exercise of due diligence 24 Aug 1973 Denied both Motions Issue: W/N the CA overlooked to include in its findings of facts the admission made by Vicente Santillan and the Respondents that Macaria and Vicente are siblings with their common mother, Margarita Held: No Without taking account of the notarial document, she cannot be considered a legitimate child o Continuous possession of the status of a natural child will not amount to automatic recognition but that an action for compulsory recognition is necessary; Hence, Petitioner refers to Par. 3 of Respondents original complaint in the Ejectment Case The plaintiffs and the defendants Macaria Torre s are the legal heirs... Petitioner then avers that the statement is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling However, in the Amended Complaint filed by the Respondents, the said portion referred to by the Petitioner was deleted In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The Original is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The Original complaint no longer forms part of the record If Petitioner had desired to utilize the Original complaint, she should have offered it in evidence Having been amended, the Original Complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, requires its formal offer Therefore, there can be no estoppels by extrajudicial admission made in the Original Complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence
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It should also be noted that in the Partition Case, Respondents denied the legitimacy of the Petitioner However, it is the Courts view that the notarial document can reasonably qualify as newly discovered evidence as per Petitioners allegation (that the document was allegedly suppressed) The case is hereby REMANDED to the Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial asked for time to respond to it. The Dionisios filed their amended complaint; Wilfredo maintained his original answer. MTC rendered judgment, ordering Wilfredo to vacate the land and remove his house from it. RTC: On appeal, the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, affirmed the MTC decision, holding that the case was one for forcible entry. CA: On review the CA reversed the decisions of the courts below, and ordering the dismissal of the Dionisios action. The CA held that, by amending their complaint, the Dionisios effectively changed their cause of action from unlawful detainer to recovery of possession which fell outside the jurisdiction of the MTC. Further, since the amendment introduced a new cause of action, its filing marked the passage of the one year limit from demand required in ejectment suits. More, since jurisdiction over actions for possession depended on the assessed value of the property and since such assessed value was not alleged, the CA cannot determine what court has jurisdiction over the action.
G.R. No. 178159
March 2, 2011
SPS. VICENTE DIONISIO AND ANITA DIONISIO, Petitioner, vs. WILFREDO LINSANGAN, Respondent. The case is about amendments in the complaint that do not alter the cause of action FACTS: Cruz owned agricultural lands in San Rafael, Bulacan, that his tenant, Romualdo cultivated. Upon Romualdos death, his widow, Emiliana, got Cruzs permission to stay on the property provided she would vacate it upon demand. The Dionisios bought the property from Cruz. The Dionisios found out that Emiliana had left the property and that it was already Wilfredo Linsangan who occupied it under the strength of a "Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan". The Dionisios wrote Wilfredo, demanding that he vacate the land but the latter declined, prompting the Dionisios to file an eviction suit against him before the MTC of San Rafael, Bulacan. Wilfredo filed an answer in which he declared that he had been a tenant of the land as early as 1977. Pre-trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to amend their complaint. Despite initial misgivings over the amended complaint, Wilfredo
ISSUE: Whether or not the Dionisios amendment of their complaint effectively changed their cause of action from one of ejectment to one of recovery of possession; and whether MTC has jurisdiction? RULING: An amended complaint that changes the cause of action is a new complaint. The action is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended pleading, not on the date of the filing of its original version. Thus, the statute of limitation resumes its run until it is arrested by the filing of the amended pleading. An amendment which does not alter the cause of action but merely supplements or amplifies the facts previously alleged, does not affect the reckoning date of filing based on the original complaint. The cause of action, unchanged, is not barred by the statute of limitations that expired after the filing of the original complaint.
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The original complaint alleges that the Dionisios bought the land from Cruz on 1989; that Romualdo used to be the lands tenant; that when he died, the Dionisios allowed his widow, Emiliana, to stay under a promise that she would leave the land upon demand; that in 2002 the Dionisios discovered on visit to the land that Emiliana had left it and that Wilfredo now occupied it under a claim that he bought the right to stay from Emiliana under a "Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan;" that the Dionisios did not know of and gave no consent to this sale which had not been annotated on their title; that the Dionisios verbally told Wilfredo to leave the property by April 31, 2002; that their lawyer reiterated such demand in writing on April 22, 2002; that Wilfredo did not heed the demand; that the Dionisios wanted to get possession so they could till the land and demolish Wilfredos house on it; that Wilfredo did not give the Dionisios just share in the harvest; and that the Dionisios were compelled to get the services of counsel for P100,000.00. The amended complaint has essentially identical allegations. The only new ones are that the Dionisios allowed Emiliana, Romualdos widow to stay "out of their kindness, tolerance, and generosity;" that they went to the land in 2002, after deciding to occupy it, to tell Emiliana of their plan; that Wilfredo cannot deny that Cruz was the previous registered owner and that he sold the land to the Dionisios; and that a person occupying anothers land by the latters tolerance or permission, without contract, is bound by an implied promise to leave upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy. To determine if an amendment introduces a different cause of action, the test is whether such amendment now requires the defendant to answer for a liability or obligation which is completely different from that stated in the original complaint. Here, both the original and the amended complaint required Wilfredo to defend his possession based on the allegation that he had stayed on the land after Emiliana left out of the owners mere tolerance and that the latter had demanded that he leave. Indeed, Wilfredo did not find the need to file a new answer. The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The RTC characterized the nature of the action as an action for forcible entry, Wilfredo having entered the property and taken over from widow Emiliana on the sly. The problem with this characterization is that the complaint contained no allegation that the Dionisios were in possession of the property before Wilfredo occupied it either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, an element of that kind of eviction suit. Nowhere in the recitation of the amended complaint did the Dionisios assert that they were in prior possession of the land and were ousted from such possession by Wilfredos unlawful occupation of the property. The MTC and the RTC gave credence to the Dionisios version. The Court will respect their judgment on a question of fact. WILFREDO P. VERZOSA and PILAR MARTINEZ, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NICODEMO FERRER, and FE GIRON USON, respondents FACTS: Fe Uson is the owner of a parcel of land in Sual, Pangasinan. She mortgaged the land to Wilfredo Versoza. For failing to pay her obligation, Versoza foreclosed the property. The Provincial Sheriff set the foreclosure sale. To prevent from proceeding with the foreclosure sale, Uson filed for annulment of mortgage with a prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint of Uson was dismissed on the ground that it was not personally verified by Uson. The court granted Usons Motion for Reconsideration and filed an amended complaint with the required verification. In the meantime, Versoza asked the Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure. Uson requested that the sale be deferred since there was a pending action (annulment of mortgage) in court. However, the sale continued and the property was sold to Versoza. After the redemption period, Sheriff issued the Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale. The lot is now under Versozas name. Sometime after, Versoza sold the lot to Pilar Martinez.
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Uson filed her an application for preliminary injunction in her nd 2 amended complaint impleading Martinez and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan as defendants to the case. Trial Court granted the injunction and ordered Martinez to cease and desist from performing acts of ownership over the lot. Versoza and Martinez now claims that the status quo to be nd preserved refers to the point before the filing of the 2 complaint and before Martinez acquired the property. They also contend that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. The judge of the case clarified that the status quo being maintained in this case is the possession of Uson of the land and does not refer to Martinez being the registered owner of the lot. Issue : What constitutes the status quo ante in the application of an injunctive writ, in the event a complaint is subsequently amended? Held:Status quo maintained is from Usons possession of the land. As defined, status quo is the last peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy. Its preservation is the function of the injunctive suit. When the amended complaint does not introduce new issues or causes of action, the suit is deemed to commence on the date when the original complaint was filed. In short, for purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the original complaint is deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only if the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause of action or demand. Hence, it has been held that an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies the facts originally alleged relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations, the period of which expires after service of the original complaint [18] but before service of amendment. It is the actual filing in court that controls and not the date of the formal admission of the amended pleading. The Court in Republic v. Marsman elucidated:While in the procedural sense, especially in relation to the possible necessity of and time for the filing of responsive and other corresponding pleadings, an amended complaint is deemed filed only as of the date of its admission, xxx , the selfevident proposition [is] that for practical reasons and to avoid the complications that may arise from undue delays in the admission thereof, such an amended complaint must be considered as filed, for the purpose of
[20]
such a substantive matter as prescription, on the date it is actually filed with the court, regardless of when it is ultimately formally admitted by the court. After all, the only purpose of requiring leave of and formal admission by the court of an amended pleading after issues have already been joined as to the original ones is to prevent the injection of other issues which ought either to be considered as barred already or made the subject of another proceeding, if they are not anyway indispensable for the resolution of the original ones and no unnecessary multiplicity of suits would result; so, when the court ultimately admits the amendment, the legal effect, for substantive purposes, of such admission retroacts as a rule to the date of its actual filing. In the instant case, the Amended Complaint did not introduce a new or different cause of action or demand. The original Complaint was amended only to rectify the lack of verification and thereafter to implead Martinez, who had purchased the contested property from Verzosa. . Hence, the CA was correct in upholding the trial court that the status quo was the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of the original Complaint. G.R. No. L-34840 July 20, 1982 MARIO RODIS MAGASPI, JUSTINO R. MAGASPI, BALDOMERA M. ALEJANDRO, and MANOLITA M. CORTEZ,petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, ESPERANZA V. GARCIA, Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES LIMITED and/or THE SHELL REFINING COMPANY (Phil.) INC., CENTRAL VISAYAN REALTY & INVESTMENTS CO., INC., CEBU CITY SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION and the GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
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CFI Cebu Petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages against The Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. and/or The Shell Refining Co. (Phil.) Inc., Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings & Loan Association. Upon filing and the payment of P60.00 as docketing fee and P10.00 for sheriff fees, the complaint was assigned Civil Case No. R11882. Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings and Loan Assn filed a motion to compel the plaintiffs to pay the correct amount for docket fee. Respondents contend that the following should be the computation for the payment of DF. Docket fee (JUST TAKE NOTE OF THE FIGURES BECAUSE IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, MARAMING MAWAWALA DITO.) Land and Improvement at P87,280.00 assessed value .................... P100.00 Recovery of Value of the Land and damages: a) P1,250,000.00 Land value b) 500,000.00 Moral Damages c) 500,000.00 Exemplary Damages d) 250,000.00 Attorney,s fees e) 890,633.24 Monthly rentals up to date of filing of complaint 6,632.00 = P3,390,633.24 DF = 6,732.00 On October 14, 1970, RTC judge ordered plaintiffs to pay a filing fee of P6,730.00 on the ground that the total demand of the said plaintiffs (the value of the land, which is P17,280.00, plus the damages amounting to P3,390,633.24 TAKE NOTE) should be the basis for computing the filing fee and not the value of the land alone. On November 3, 1970, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint so as to include the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as a defendant. The amended complaint still sought the return of the lot in question but the pecuniary claim was limited to the following: 8. To order the defendants jointly and solidarily except the Government of the Republic of the Philippines moral damages in such amount as this Court may determine and attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000.00 and the cost of this action; 9. Exemplary damages be imposed on the defendants jointly and solidarily except the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount as this Court may deem just and proper as an example and deterrent to any similar acts in the future. (Complaint was edited in such a way na wala na yung exact figures requested for damages para bumaba yung DF. Ang taba ng utak nung lawyer.) On November 12, 1970, the defendants (herein respondents filed an opposition to the admission of the amended complaint. They based their opposition on the following grounds: 1. That while the only reason given for the amendment of the complaint is the inclusion of the Government of the Philippines as an indispensable party; the plaintiffs have taken the improper liberty of amending portions of the allegations in the complaint and even have eliminated entire paragraph, thus: a) By not mentioning the previously alleged value of the land at P1,250,000.00 in paragraph 19; b) By not mentioning the previously averred to monthly rentals due at P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948, or computed at P890,633.24;
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c) By eliminating completely the claim for moral damages of P500.000.00 and reducing attorney's fees from P250,000.00 to P100,000.00 under par. 21; d) By not mentioning the amount previously claimed as exemplary damages in the sum of P500,000.00, as alleged in par. 21: substituting thereto, the averment that, the amount of these various claims for damages will be proven during the trial of the case; 2. That these amendments are obviously intended to circumvent, it not entirely subvert, the lawful Order of this Honorable Court for the plaintiff to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as docket fee, on the basis of the total amount claimed for damages xxx Held: YES. 4. That the payment of the correct and in this case, by an Order of this Honorable Court of the docket fee, is a condition precedent for the complaint, amended or otherwise, of the plaintiff to be given due course; RTC admitted the amended complaint although the plaintiffs had not yet complied with his Order of October 14, 1970, that they should pay an additional P3,104.00 docket fee. Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed a motion praying that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay the additional docket fee within seven (7) days, otherwise the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice under Sec. 3 Rule 17 of the ROC for failure to follow courts order. We hold that under the circusmtances, Civil Case No. R. 11882 was docketed upon the payment of P60.00 although said amount is insufficient. Accordingly, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular. The next question is in respect of the correct amount to be paid as docket fee. RTC on October 14, 1970, ordered the payment of P3,104.00 as additional docket fee based on the original complaint. However, the petitioners assert as an alternative view, that the docket fee be based on the amended complaint which was admitted on November 14, 1970, also by Judge Canonoy. The above motion was opposed by the plaintiffs on the ground that the amended complaint which had been admitted by the court had replaced the original complaint. RTC ruled that the correct docket fee must be paid before the Court will act on the petition or complaint. The Court of Justice is not called upon to act on a complaint or a petition in the absence of payment of a corresponding docket fee. Before the payment of the docket fee, the case is not deemed registered and docketed. In the light of the above rulings on the matter, the original complaint, up to the present, is not deemed registered or docketed. It follows, therefore, that there is likewise no amended complaint deemed to have been filed and admitted.
The petitioners assail the above order. They insist that they had correctly paid the docketing fee in the amount of P60.00, or in the alternative, that if they are to pay an additional docketing fee, it should be based on the amended complaint. ISSUE: WON the amended complaint should be the basis for the computation of the DF.
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The petitioners have a point. "When a pleading is amended, the original pleading is deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The case stands for trial on the amended pleading only. " On the basis of the foregoing, the additional docket fee to be paid by the petitioners should be based on their amended complaint. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted: the petitioners shall be assessed a docket fee on the basis of the amended complaint; and after all of the lawful fees shall have been paid, the proceedings in Civil Case No. R11882 shall be resumed. No special pronouncement as to costs. METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE CITY OF DAGUPAN, respondents. Facts This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The lower court had declared respondent City of Dagupan the lawful owner of the Dagupan Waterworks System and held that the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, now petitioner Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, was a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to indemnity for the useful improvements it had introduced. Trial Court The City of Dagupan (hereinafter referred to as the CITY) filed a complaint against the former National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (hereinafter referred to as the NAWASA), now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (hereinafter referred to as MWSS), For recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the CITY on the basis of a stipulation of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it. NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses R.A. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership, possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines and As one of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful improvements amounting.
CA NAWASA appealed to the then Court of Appeals and argued in its lone assignment of error that The CITY should have been held liable for the amortization of the balance of the loan secured by NAWASA for the improvement of the Dagupan Waterworks System.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial. SC Petitioner-Appellant MWSS, successor-in-interest of the NAWASA, appealed to this Court. In support of its claim for removal of said useful improvements, MWSS argues that the pertinent laws on the subject, particularly Articles 546, 547 and 549 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, do not definitely settle the question of whether a possessor in bad faith has the right to remove useful improvements The CITY in its brief
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Questions the raising of the issue of the removal of useful improvements for the first time in this Court, inasmuch as it was not raised in the trial court, much less assigned as an error before the then Court of Appeals. on the issue of removability of the improvements and the case was decided on a stipulation of facts. Consequently, the pleadings could not be deemed amended to conform to the evidence. However, We shall overlook this procedural defect and rule on the main issue raised in this appeal, to wit: WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court is affirmed with costs against petitioner. Ruling The procedural objection of the CITY is technically correct. NAWASA should have alleged its additional counterclaim in the alternative for the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful improvements or for the removal of all the useful improvements it had introduced. Petitioner, however, argues that although such issue of removal was never pleaded as a counterclaim, nevertheless it was joined with the implied consent of the CITY, because the latter never filed a counter-manifestation or objection to petitioners manifestation wherein it st ated that the improvements were separable from the system, and quotes the first part of Sec. 5 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court to support its contention. Said provision reads as follows: SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. xxx This argument is untenable because the above-quoted provision is premised on the fact that evidence had been introduced on an issue not raised by the pleadings without any objection thereto being raised by the adverse party. In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever had been introduced by petitioner SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-68636 February 29,1988 NORTHERN CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner-appellant, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED, respondents-appellees. RULING: THE COURT SHOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED FROM AWARDING AN AMOUNT HIGHER THAN THAT CLAIMED IN THE PLEADINGS NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF THE REQUIRED AMENDMENT. CONDITION: EVIDENCE OF SUCH HIGHER AMOUNT HAS BEEN PRESENTED PROPERLY, WITH FULL OPPORTUNITY ON THE PART OF THE OPPOSING PARTIES TO SUPPORT THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTENTIONS AND TO REFUTE EACH OTHERS EVIDENCE. FACTS: In connection with its exportation of cement, NCC contracted the arrastre, stevedoring and other related services of Shipside beginning September 14, 1973. The understanding was that for the latter's "integrated services," the former would pay it at the fixed rate of P0.41 per bag of
Issue Whether MWSS may raise the issue of removal of the useful improvement.
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cement, which amount was, after Shipside had started rendering its services, later increased to P0.46 by agreement of the parties. Subsequently, Shipside advised NCC of another increase in this rate and billed it accordingly, as well as for "regular and overtime stand-by, lighting, equipment rental, gears, empty bags, and other charges." NCC apparently acceded to the new arrangement but about two years later questioned this billing, contending that the agreed integrated rate of P0.46 covered all the services rendered by Shipside and that such rate could not be increased unilaterally. Shipside said that only arrastre and stevedoring services were included; all other services were subject to separate billings; and, moreover, NCC had not earlier objected to the billing. CFI LA UNION: RESPONDENT: RECOVERY OF SUM OF MONEY. o In the end, as no agreement could be reached, Shipside filed its complaint for collection of the amount of P453,347.82 representing arrastre, stevedoring, and other service charges allegedly due from NCC in the Court of First Instance of La Union. CFI: DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT and RULED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM. o The trial court had allowed the refund in the sum of P526,280.53 on the justification that this had been established by the evidence adduced at the trial. IAC: REVERSED THE DECISION OF CFI. o On appeal, however, the respondent court reversed, holding that this refund should be limited to the sum of P31,652.62, which was the amount claimed in the counterclaim. HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW. opposing parties to support their respective contentions and to refute each others evidence. The applicable rule is Rule 10, Section 5, providing as follows: SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. There have been instances where the Court has held that even without the necessary amendment, the amount proved at the trial may be validly awarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos, where we said that if the facts shown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no amendment to the complaint was necessary, especially where defendant had himself raised the point on which recovery was based. The appellate court could treat the pleading as amended to conform to the evidence although the pleadings were not actually amended. Amendment is also unnecessary when only clerical errors or nonsubstantial matters are involved, as we held in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Laguna. In Co Tiamco v. Diaz, we stressed
ISSUE: Whether the court may award an amount higher than that claimed in the pleadings notwithstanding the absence of the required amendment. HELD: YES. But with the condition that the evidence of such higher amount has been present properly, with full opportunity on the part of the
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that the rule on amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party. And in the recent case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that where there is a variance in the defendant's pleadings and the evidence adduced by it at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading as amended to conform with the evidence. It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the abovementioned rule and in light of the decisions cited, the trial court should not be precluded from awarding an amount higher than that claimed in the pleadings notwithstanding the absence of the required amendment. But this is upon the condition that the evidence of such higher amount has been presented properly, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing parties to support their respective contentions and to refute each other's evidence. BROKERAGE, INC., ATTY. ROMULO R. BOBADILA and WEB-HEGG CONSTRUCTION RESOURCES, INCORPORATED, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MANUEL T. DE GUIA and LETICIA MARIANO DE GUIA and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PARAAQUE CITY, METRO MANILA, respondents. In resolving the propriety of the amendment of the complaint in the present case, which motion to amend was filed after the lapse of fifteen years from the filing of the initiatory pleading sought to be amended, this Court painstakingly considered not only the peculiar circumstances obtaining, but also accorded premium to the legal truism that " adjective law is not the counterfoil of substantive law" and that the rules of procedure must not be 1 perverted into engines of injustice. Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari is the 2 decision of the Court of, which nullified and set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 231. The subject orders of the RTC denied private respondents' motion to admit amended complaint. Facts:
In the case at bar, there was a failure of the above-stated condition. In the trial court, NCC was allowed to adduce evidence in support of its claim for refund beyond the amount indicated in its counterclaim, however Shipsides rebuttal evidence was brushed aside on the ground that it was not permitted by the stipulation of facts earlier entered into by the parties, besides being hearsay and self-serving. On appeal, the respondent court admitted all the evidence adduced by Shipside, however, it did not gave NCC the chance to refute them. To this end, the Court finds it necessary to remand this case to the respondent court in accordance with Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 for the reception and a more careful evaluation of the evidence, from both the petitioner and the private respondent, regarding the claimed excess payments and, if necessary, for the corresponding amendment of the pleadings.
SPOUSES JOVITO VALENZUELA and NORMA VALENZUELA, SPOUSES ALFREDO QUIAZON and BELLA GONZALES QUIAZON, SPOUSES EDUARDO DE GUZMAN and JULIETA DE GUZMAN, DE GUZMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SKYFREIGHT
Herein private respondents spouses Manuel and Leticia De Guia filed a complaint for specific performance and damages (Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P from now on Civil Case A) against herein petitioners spouses Jovito and Norma Valenzuela before the then CFI of Rizal in Pasay City. The complaint prayed that the Spouses Valenzuela be ordered to execute in favor of private respondents the necessary deed of sale covering the two (2) parcels of land allegedly subject of a contract to sell between said parties. Private respondents spouses De Guia, upon discovering that the subject real properties were sold and transferred by the spouses Valenzuela to herein co-petitioners spouses Alfredo and Bella Gonzales Quiazon, filed for annulment of sale, cancellation of title and damages (Civil Case No. PQ 9432-P from now on Civil Case B), against spouses Valenzuela, spouses Quiazon, and the Register of Deeds of Pasay City. In the complaint, private respondents spouses De Guia prayed specifically for the annulment of the deed of sale executed by the spouses Valenzuela in favor of the spouses Quiazon, cancellation of TCT Nos. 39396 and 39397 in the name of spouses Quiazon,
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and the reinstatement of TCT No. 39142 in the name of the spouses Valenzuela, or in the alternative, the reconveyance of the subject properties by the spouses Quiazon to spouses Valenzuela. Private respondents spouses De Guia amended their complaint in Civil Case B, impleading Webb-Hegg Construction Resources, Inc. as additional defendant. Spouses De Guia filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint in Civil Case B, impleading as additional defendant Gerardo Villacorta. Prior to the resolution of such pending motion, Civil Case B was transferred to the RTC of Makati, Branch 133 pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129. As a result, Civil Case No. B was redocketed as Civil Case No. 2723 (From now on still Civil Case B). The RTC of Makati, Branch 133 issued an order admitting the second amended complaint. Upon motion of the defendants therein, however, Civil Case B was returned to RTC-Pasay, where herein private respondents spouses De Guia filed a motion to admit third amended complaint seeking to implead spouses De Guzman, De Guzman Development Corporation, Skyfreight Brokerage, Inc. and Lawyer Romeo Bobadilla, as additional defendants. 7 The RTC-Pasay issued an omnibus order denying the motion to admit the third amended complaint and declaring as automatically vacated the order of RTC-Makati, Branch 133, which admitted the second amended complaint. Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, private respondents spouses De Guia then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the appellate court which was also dismissed. Private respondents spouses De Guia appealed the dismissal of said case before the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the lower court. Aggrieved, private respondents spouses De Guia filed a petition before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. The High Court dismissed the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Private respondents moved to reconsider. The motion was denied. Upon motion of spouses Quiazon in Civil Case A and B, the lower court issued an order directing the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens and the Adverse Claim on two TCTs in the name of spouses Quiazon. Private respondents sought to reconsider the trial court's order and filed a motion to admit another amended complaint in Civil Case A. Prior to the resolution of the two pending motions, private respondents filed a motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge of Branch 117, RTC-Pasay. The court granted the motion for inhibition resulting in the re-raffle of Civil Case A to Branch 231, presided by Judge Cesar Z. Ylagan. Judge Ylagan denied the motion to admit amended complaint prompting herein private respondents spouses De Guia to file a motion for reconsideration which the lower court denied. Private respondents elevated the lower court's order denying the motion to admit amended complaint to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and mandamus, and ordered respondent to admit petitioners amended complaint. 8 The RTC-Pasay, Branch 231 issued an order admitting the amended complaint. Herein petitioners filed with the lower court a manifestation with 9 motion to reconsider to the effect that they would file a "petition for review on certiorari" before the Supreme Court, to which manifestation private respondents filed an opposition. Petitioners then filed a reply to the opposition. The lower court decreed "that the admission of the amended complaint and service of summons are hereby held in abeyance until after the Supreme Court has resolved the case before it which has effectively placed this court on notice." Herein petitioners filed the instant petition where this Court is tasked in the main to resolve the propriety of the amendment of the complaint in Civil Case A.
Issue: (a) Whether or not the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure can be applied retroactively? (b) Whether or not the amendments can be introduced? Held: Yes to both.
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Ratio: (a) Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent . The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from procedural laws. (b) Section 1, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides: "SECTION 1. Amendment in general. - Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner." (emphasis ours) Equally important is Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules: "SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. - Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard." The contention of the petitioners that the introduction of the amendments would radically change the cause of action is untenable. Interestingly, 11 Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the 12 former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the 13 cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure, after all, are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial 15 justice, the Supreme Court is empowered to suspend their operation. This Court will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just. True enough, the delay that has so characterized the adjudication of the merits of this case which original complaint was filed practically two decades ago has not escaped the attention of this Court. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, this Court allows the introduction of amendments to the complaint so as to afford the party-litigants the full and genuine opportunity to substantiate their respective claims and defenses and for the trial court to finally resolve the matters relating to the merits of the case. Besides, the defendants sought to be impleaded in Civil Case No. PQ-9412P are not left without justifiable recourse. To this end, the law in no uncertain terms provide for the necessary legal implements and the adoption of effective means and defenses sanctioned by the Rules, wherein both parties in the controversy may very well advance and protect their respective legal interests. By sanctioning the introduction of amendments to the complaint, the issues shall at last be viewed, so to speak, in the clear light of day and substantial matters therein shall not anymore be lost in the abyss of technicalities and procedural jargon. Petition is Granted G.R. No. 169551 January 24, 2007 SPOUSES ORLANDO M. LAMBINO and CARMELITA C. LAMBINO, Petitioners, vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 172, Valenzuela City, and BPI FAMILY BANK, Respondents. Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The CA affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, which denied the motion of petitioners to admit the supplemental complaint. FACTS:
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Petitioners Orlando M. Lambino, a lawyer, and his wife, Carmelita C. Lambino, secured a housing loan of P600,000.00 from private respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. (BPI). o Petitioners executed a Mortgage Loan Agreement (MLA) over their property as security for the loan. Petitioners failed to pay the monthly amortizations from January to May. Private respondent filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the MLA with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the MLA. They alleged therein that private respondent had released only P555,047.19 on a staggered basis out of their P600,000.00 loan. The court issued a TRO and the sale at public auction was reset. On April 1996 petitioners offered to settle the balance of their loan. However, private respondent rejected the offer. In the meantime, the court suspended pretrial to enable the parties to settle the matter amicably. o The pretrial proceeding was terminated. Petitioners filed a Motion to Admit their Supplemental Complaint wherein they alleged the following: o The plaintiffs were forced to litigate due to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage filed by defendant bank and unlawful imposition of escalating and arbitrary rate of interest without the consent of the plaintiffs and not authorized under the Real Estate Mortgage Contract o The unauthorized deductions and advance interest charges were known by plaintiffs only for the first time at the Pre-Trial Brief of defendants. o Aside from the unauthorized deductions and advance interest payment made, defendant bank also imposed escalating and arbitrary rate of interest. The trial court issued an Order denying the motion of petitioners in its finding that the alleged escalating and arbitrary rate of interest and other charges imposed by private respondent had accrued long before the complaint was filed. It held that under Section 6, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, only transactions, occurrences, or events which accrued after the date of the complaint may be set forth in the supplemental complaint. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The court issued an Order denying the motion of petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking to nullify the Orders of the RTC. o Petitioners reiterated that they came to know of the escalating and arbitrary charges, liquidated damages, and attorneys fees only when they received the statements of account dated June 5, 1996, November 15, 1996, and August 15, 1998, after the filing of their original complaint; hence, they could not have been alleged as an integral part of their causes of action in their original complaint. CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners Motion to Admit their Supplemental Complaint can be granted? RULING: NO!!! The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court is Section 6 of Rule 10 which reads: Sec. 6: Matters subject of supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party, the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The rule is a useful device which enables the court to award complete relief in one action and to avoid the cost delay and waste of separate action. A supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the latter. The supplemental complaint must be based on matters arising subsequent to the original complaint related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action.
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Before they filed their original complaint, petitioners were already aware of the deductions made on the proceeds of the loan, for interest charges, MRI premium, and fire insurance premium in the total amount of P44,952.88. They received notices on the following dates: July 25, 1994, September 5, 1994, October 24, 1994, and November 15, 1994. And because petitioners had alleged all these charges in the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure sale, it behooved petitioners to have incorporated in their original complaint as a cause of action the alleged "illegal/unauthorized and unconscionable" charges for MRI, escalating interest charges, liquidated damages, attorneys fees, and foreclosure expenses. They should have sought to nullify such charges in the original complaint, but they did not. They are thus proscribed from incorporating the same via a supplemental complaint. HOME GUARANTY vs. R-II BUILDERS INC. AUTHORITY, Respondents FACTS (mahaba talaga tong case!) A Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was entered into between respondents National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders) for the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP). JVA was aimed at implementing a two-phase conversion of the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite into a habitable housing project inclusive of the reclamation of the area across Radial Road 10 (R-10). NHA and R-II Builders, alongside petitioner Housing Guaranty Corporation (HGC) as guarantor and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as trustee, entered into an Asset Pool Formation Trust Agreement On the same date, the parties likewise executed a Contract of Guaranty whereby HGC, upon the call made by PNB and conditions therein specified, undertook to redeem the regular SMPPCs upon maturity and to pay the simple interest thereon to the extent of 8.5% per annum RTC MANILA- Special Commercial Court (SCC). R-II Builders filed the complaint against HGC and NHA which was CORPORATION, Petitioner, and NATIONAL HOUSING CONTENTION: HGCs failure to redeem the outstanding regular SMPPCs despite obtaining possession of the Asset Poolballooned the stipulated interests and materially prejudiced its stake on the residual values of the Asset Pool, that the DAC should be rescinded since PDB exceeded its authority in executing the same prior to HGCs redemption and payment of the guaranteed SMPPCs; that while the estimated value of Asset Poolamounted to P5,919,716,618.62 as of 30 June 2005, its total liabilities was estimated at P2,796,019,890.41; and, that with the cessation of PDBs functions as a trustee and HGCs intention to use the Asset Pool to settle its obligations to the Social Security System (SSS), it was best qualified to be appointed as new trustee in the event of the resolution of the DAC. the complaint sought the grant of the following reliefs: (a) a temporary restraining order/preliminary and permanent injunction, enjoining disposition/s of the properties in the Asset Pool; (b) the resolution or, in the alternative, the nullification of the DAC; (c) R-II Builders' appointment as trustee pursuant to Rule 98 of the Rules of Court; (d) HGCs rendition of an accounting of the assets and the conveyance thereof in favor of R-II Builders; and, (e) P500,000.00 in attorneys fees writ of preliminary injunction was issued Petitioner filed its answer and move for the conduct of a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which included such grounds as lack of jurisdiction, improper venue and the then pendency before this Court of G.R. No. 164537, entitled Francisco Chavez vs. National Housing Authority, et al., a case which challenged, among other matters, the validity of the JVA and its subsequent amendments. R-II Builders, in turn, filed a motion to admit its Amended and Supplemental Complaint which deleted the prayer for resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in its original complaint and introduced causes of action for conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, for NHA to pay the Asset Pool and additional works on the project and for an increased indemnity for attorneys fe es.-ADMITTED by Court subject to payment of docket fees R-II Builders filed again motion to admit it Second Amended Complaint, on the ground that its previous Amended and Supplemental
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Complaint had not yet been admitted in view of the non-payment of the correct docket fees and it notably resurrected R-II Builders cause of action for resolution of the DAC, deleted its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, reduced the claim for attorneys fees , sought its appointment as Receiver pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of Court and, after an inventory in said capacity, prayed for approval of the liquidation and distribution of the Asset Pool in accordance with the parties agreements.--GRANTED HGC filed MD R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint on the ground that respondent RTC had no jurisdiction to act on the case until payment of the correct docket fees and that said pleading was intended for delay and introduced a new theory inconsistent with the original complaint and theAmended and Supplemental Complaint. --DENIED R-II Builders also filed anUrgent Ex-Parte Motion for Annotation of Lis Pendens on the titles of the properties in the Asset Pool, on the ground that HGC had sold and/or was intending to dispose of portions thereof, in violation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in the premises-NOTED MR by HGc_denied while respondents application for appointment of receiver was granted. CA- HGC filed petition via R.65 denied Ground: (one of grounds related sa rule 10) R-II Builders need not pay any deficiency in the docket fees considering its withdrawal of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint; MR- denied. Hence a petition in SC via R45 RULLING: jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach. Applying the rule that "a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court" in the landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals , Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional. IN CASE AT BAR: R-II Builders manifested its intent to evade payment of the correct docket fees by withdrawing its Amended and Supplemental Complaint and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended Complaint which deleted its cause of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, reduced its claim for attorneys fees, sought its appointment as Receiver and prayed for the liquidation and distribution of the Asset Pool. In upholding the admission of said Second Amended Complaint in respondent RTCs assailed Order, however, the CA clearly lost sight of the fact that a real action was ensconced in R-II Builders original complaint and that the proper docket fees had yet to be paid in the premises. Despite the latters withdrawal of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, it cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that respondent RTC had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the case for nonpayment of the correct docket fees. While R-II Builders styled its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as one primarily for the resolution and/or declaration of the DAC, it simultaneously and unmistakably prayed for the conveyance, possession and control of the Asset Pool. Alongside the fact that HGC has consistently questioned the sufficiency of the docket fees paid by R-II Builders, estoppel cannot be said to have set in since, the lapse of more than five years from the commencement of the complaint notwithstanding, it appears that the case has yet to be tried on the merits. Having admitted that its original complaint partook the nature of a real action and having been directed to pay the correct docket fees for its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, R-II Builders is, furthermore, clearly chargeable with knowledge of the insufficiency of the docket fees it paid. Unmistakably manifesting its intent to evade payment of the correct docket fees, moreover, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental Complaint after its admission and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended Complaint on the ground that said earlier pleading cannot be considered admitted in view of its non-payment of the docket and other fees it was directed to pay. In so doing, however, R-II Builders conveniently overlooked the fact that the very same argument could very well apply to its original complaint for which given its admitted nature as a real action - the correct docket fees have also yet to be paid. The importance of filing fees cannot be over-emphasized for they are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of
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each case. The payment of said fees, therefore, cannot be made dependent on the result of the action taken without entailing tremendous losses to the government and to the judiciary in particular. For non-payment of the correct docket fees which, for real actions, should be computed on the basis of the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant, respondent RTC should have denied admission of R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint and ordered the dismissal of the case. R-II Builders which not only failed to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint but also clearly evaded payment of the same by filing its Second Amended Complaint. Hence, with jurisdiction over the case yet to properly attach, HGC correctly fault the CA for upholding respondent RTCs admission of R -II Builders Second Amended Complaint despite non-payment of the docket fees for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as well as the clear intent to evade payment thereof. DOCTRINE: transfer of possession was sought by respondent R-II Builders since the very start and the successive amendments betraying the deft maneuverings to evade payment of the correct docket fees. Rule 11 When to file Responsive Pleadings G.R. No. 72566 April 12, 1988 DELBROS HOTEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT [FIRST SPECIAL CASES DIVISION], HILTON INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, ACHIM IHLENFELD as successor to RICHARD CHAPMAN and FLAVIANO MOSQUERA JR., the latter two in their respective capacities as former General Manager and Comptroller of the Manila Hilton International Hotel, respondents. Facts: DELBROS financed, built, furnished and equipped "Manila Hilton," and the operation and management of which was granted to HILTON; for their respective undertakings, DELBROS was to receive a share in the gross operating profit [GOP] of the hotel, while HILTON was entitled to a management fee equivalent to five percent [5%] of the gross revenues and an incentive fee equivalent to ten percent [10%] of the GOP of the hotel. In violation of the terms of the agreement, HILTON a] refused, despite repeated demands, to remit to DELBROS its share in the GOP; b] transferred, without DELBROS' prior approval, a portion of the reserve funds to its operating funds; and, c] used said operating funds for capital expenditures without the consent of DELBROS and in addition, HILTON grossly mismanaged the hotel and breached the trust and confidence reposed upon it by DELBROS; thereby causing DELBROS to default in its amortizations to the GSIS RTC Civil Case No. 85-29489 On February 27,1985, petitioner a complaint for termination of agreement and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against private respondents Hilton Hotels International and Richard Chapman, in his capacity as General Manager of Manila Hilton. (TAKE NOTE OF THE DATES HERE) In their Answer*** with Compulsory counterclaim, therein defendants HILTON and Chapman specifically denied the allegations of DELBROS and set forth affirmative defenses On April 12,1985 DELBROS filed a motion to admit Supplemental Complaint. Complaint impleaded as an additional defendant Flaviano Mosquera, Jr., in his capacity as Comptroller of the Manila Hilton and sought the confirmation by the trial court of the termination of the Management Contract effected by DELBROS through the service upon HILTON of the five-day notice of termination provided thereunder, as well as the payment of DELBROS' share in the GOP of the hotel for the months of January and February 1985 and other damages. On June 14, 1985 -Supplemental Complaint ADMITTED On July 6, 1986, an ex-parte motion for an extension of 12 days to answer the supplemental complaint was filed in behalf of all
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the three defendants, HILTON, Chapman and Mosquera. Said motion, sent by registered mail, was not reserved by the trial court until July 16, 1985. On July 9, 1985, DELBROS had filed a motion to declare defendants HILTON and Chapman in default with respect to the supplemental complaint. - Granted and DELBROS was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte in support of its supplemental complaint. !!! - On July 15, 1986, the lower court rendered a judgment by default, confirming as legal and valid the termination as of March 31, 1985 of the Management Agreement HILTON, et al. filed their Answer to the Supplemental Complaint, and on July 24, 1985, filed a notice of appeal from the judgment by default. DELBROS moved for the execution of the judgment GRANTED on September 3, 1985 thru Special Order
(SC resolved the case on a different angle, NOT based on the Petitioners contention with the TRO. It went back to the RTCs order of default.) Issue: WON Private respondents HILTON and Chapman should be declared in default for failure to file an answer to the Supplemental Complaint (see July 15, 1986 Order) Held: NO. This is a reversible error. Fundamentally, default orders are taken on the legal presumption that in failing to file an answer, the defendant does not oppose the allegations and relief demanded in the complaint. In the case at bar, however, no such presumption can arise vis-a-vis the Answer filed by HILTON and Chapman to the original complaint; their vigorous opposition to the admission of the supplemental complaint under consideration, of which the trial judge had full knowledge and notice, should have cautioned him from precipitately rendering the default order as well as the default judgment. "A supplemental pleading is not like an amended pleading substitute for the original one. It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand, and the issues joined under the original pleading remain as issues to be tried in the action. " While it is conceded that there is authority in support of a default judgment being predicated upon defendant's failure to answer a supplemental complaint, the same cannot apply here. The reason is that although in the supplemental complaint, the relief prayed for was altered from termination of the management contract to judicial confirmation of its termination, the basic and principal issue of whether or not petitioner was entitled to terminate the management contract, remained. As this basic issue had been previously traversed and joined by the Answer filed by HILTON and Chapman, there was no necessity for requiring them to plead further to the Supplemental Complaint. Consequently, the trial judge did not have a legal ground for declaring
IAC (this part is not important in our topic but for the sake completing the story, I still added it) HILTON, et al. instituted a petition for certiorari with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction, docketed as AC-G.R. No. SP-07020, to assail the Special Order of September 3, 1985 for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. September 5, 1985 a TRO enjoining the implementation and/or enforcement of the Special Order of September 3, 1985 was issued On September 11, 1985, the First Special Cases Division of the IAC issued a resolution reiterating 'the continuing efficacy of its restraining order dated September 5, 1985, enjoining the parties to conform to the restraint against the execution/implementation of the Special Order dated September 3, 1985 ..." DELBROS forthwith filed on September 25, 1985 an urgent motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated September 24, 1985. When more than a month had elapsed without the IAC acting on its motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition (to SC) assailing as null and void the three orders issued in ACG.R. No. SP-07020.
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them in default for such failure to plead. (because respondents already answered the initial complaint which is just basically reiterated in the supplemental complaint ***) Another factor which the trial judge should have considered is that the supplemental complaint brought in an additional defendant, Flaviano Mosquera, Jr. On this score, it would have been more prudent under the liberal construction rule provided in Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, for the trial court to have treated the supplemental complaint as an amended complaint, and the original answer thereto as sufficient; or otherwise to have waited for the answer of the newly-impleaded defendant before acting on the motion to declare the original defendants in default and rendering the default judgment, considering that a common cause of action has been asserted against the three defendants, so that the answer of Mosquera, Jr. could inure to the benefit of the original defendants. As it turned out, the Answer filed on July 18, 1985 was for and in behalf of all the defendants. Hence, under Sec. 4 of Rule 18, the court shall try the case against all upon the answer filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented. Indeed, no prejudice wouId result to petitioner had the trial judge taken a more prudent and judicious course of action as above suggested. Acting as the trial judge did, grave, irreparable and serious damage caused to private respondents. Such prejudice is compounded by the issuance of the Special Order of September 3, 1985 decreeing the execution pending appeal of the default judgment at a time when defendant Mosquera was not yet declared in default. Consequently, any defense set up by him for himself and for the benefit of his co-defendants was rendered practically inutile by the execution of the default judgment. Time and again, this Court has expressed disfavor toward default judgments for the reason that: A default judgment does not pretend to be based on the merits of the controversy. Its existence is justified by expediency. It may, however, amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant. The possibility of such serious consequences necessarily requires a careful examination of the circumstances under which a default order was issued. And when no real injury would result to the interests of the plaintiff by the reopening of the case, the only objection to such action would, therefore, be solely on a technicality. On such an infirm foundation, it would be a grevious error to sacrifice the substantial rights of a litigant. Upon these considerations, the order of default dated July 9, 1985, the default judgment of July 15, 1985 as well as the Special Order dated September 3, 1985, should be, as they are hereby set aside. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The default order of July 9, 1985, the default judgment dated July 15, 1985 and the Special Order of September 3, 1985 issued in Civil Case No. 85-29489 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila are hereby annulled and set aside. SPOUSES GEORGE BARRAZA and YOLANDA GATCHALIANBARRAZA, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., Presiding Judge, Br. XXX, CFI-Rizal, Pasay City, 7th Judicial District, and RENATO GATCHALIAN, respondents.
Facts PETITION for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The petition at bar evolved from a dispute between brother and sister over the use of the business name or style GATCHALIAN-THE HOUSE OF NATIVE LECHON. CFI Private respondent filed a Complaint for damages based on defendants (petitioners herein) use of plaintiffs (now private respondent) trade name and style of GatchalianThe House of Native Lechon and Restaurant, with prayer for preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance.
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Petitioners were properly served with summons together with the corresponding complaint and annexes thereof. Petitioners as defendants therein filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for extension of time of 15 days within which to file an Answer which the Court granted in its order. Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of fifteen (15) days, defendants filed through their counsel, a Motion to Dismiss Complaint Together With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction. Said motion moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: That the complaint states no cause of action; That venue is improperly laid; and That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, namely for Infringement of Trade Name before the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. Defendants were denied of their rights of procedural due process and Defendants were also denied of their day in court. Plaintiffs opposed the motion for reconsideration. The Court denied defendants motion for reconsideration.
Upon an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the Court in its Order granted the motion and caused the issuance of a writ of execution. Defendants through a new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that The Order of the Court declaring the defendants as in default, the proceedings held on the strength thereof and the decision rendered in the case at bar be set aside and that the defendants be given three (3) days from receipt of the corresponding order within which to file their answer in the case at bar.
The same motion was set for hearing, notice thereof served to counsel for the plaintiff and the Clerk of Court. Private respondent filed an ExParte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default on the ground that the defendants failed to file an answer within the reglementary period allowed by the Rules of Court. The Court finding the reasons stated in the Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default filed by plaintiff, through counsel to be well -taken, granted said motion and allowed the plaintiff to present evidence. The hearing before the commissioner was held whereat plaintiff presented his evidence, testimonial and documentary, ex-parte. Respondent judge rendered his decision in favor of the plaintiff; judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants.
Opposition having been filed by the plaintiff, the Court denied defendants Omnibus Motion in its Order. SC Defendants now come before Us on a Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order to restrain the execution of the decision, particularly the sale of the petitioners properties. After hearing to render the preliminary injunction permanent with the annulment of all the proceedings held and conducted by the respondent judge from the declaration of default, the rendition of the decision based thereon, the levy, etc. and enjoining said respondent judge to rule and decide the petitioners motion to dismiss or in the alternative, to allow the petitioners to file their answer. Issue
Defendants through counsel moved for the reconsideration of the courts order declaring defendants in default and of the decision on the ground that:
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Whether the Order of respondent Judge declaring defendants, now the herein petitioners, in default for failure to file their answer within the reglementary period provided by law, was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. before the expiration of the period as extended by the court. This is clearly allowed under Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Private respondents argument that although a motion to dismiss interrupts the running of the period within which to file an answer, this refers to the original period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the responsive pleading and not to the extension of time within which to file the answer, is without merit. There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or indirectly, that the interruption of the running of the period within which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed and pending before the court, refers only to the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to the extension of time to file the answer as granted by the court. It may be true that under Section 4 of Rule 16, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if the termination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the time prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period. This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the defendant to file his answer not only within the original fifteen (15) days period but also within a different period (as) fixed by the court. Without resolving petitioners Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, respondent Judge declared defendant in default in his Order. This is clearly in contravention of the Rules for under Section 3, Rule 16, and the court after hearing may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of pleading, or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable. And it is only from the time that the movant receives notice of the denial or deferment of the motion to dismiss that the period within which he shall file his answer is computed, which period is prescribed by Rule 11, unless the court provides a different period.
Ruling The applicable provisions of the Revised Rules of Court state: Rule 11, Section 1. Time to answer.Within fifteen (15) days after service of summons the defendant shall file his answer and serve a copy thereof upon the plaintiff, unless a different period is filed by the court.
Section 7. Extension of time to plead.Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead provided in these rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these rules. Rule 16, Section 1. Grounds.Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the following grounds: x x x
Section 4. Time to plead.If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period. Under the facts of the case at bar, respondent judge had granted petitioners an extension of fifteen (15) days to file their answer. Instead of filing the answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, one (1) day
Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners were denied their day in court; there was lack of due process. Consequently, the decision rendered by respondent Judge is null and void and must be set aside. The writ of execution issued by
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respondent Judge and the levy made by the Sheriff on the properties of the petitioners and all orders and acts proceeding or emanating therefrom are hereby declared of no legal force and effect. Petitioners Motion to Dismiss the Complaint must be resolved by the trial court and if the Motion to Dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, petitioners shall file their answer pursuant to Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED. January 30, 2009 his wife Marissa David, and the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. Private respondents alleged that petitioner fraudulently exceeded his special power of attorney to cause the conversion of their agricultural lands to those for residential, commercial and industrial purposes by registering in his name some of the lands, mortgaging others, failing to remit and account any money received from any transaction involving their lands, and absconding. Service of summons failed as petitioner was abroad. RTC ordered service by publication. Thereafter, private respondents moved that petitioner be declared in default since he failed to answer within 60 days from date of last publication on March 19, 2005. On July 14, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for extension of 15 days within which to file Answer, with opposition to the motion to declare him in default. In its Order dated July 15, 2005, the RTC declared petitioner in default. The RTC noted that the period to file petition ers Answer lapsed on May 19, 2005, 60 days after the last publication on March 19, 2005, and that petitioner failed to answer despite the "many opportunities" given to him. The RTC also denied petitioners motion for extension to file Answer. Petitioner moved to lift the order of default and sought another extension of 15 days within which to file Answer. o Petitioner stated that declarations of default are frowned upon, that he should be given the opportunity to present evidence in the interest of substantial justice, and that he has meritorious defenses. The RTC denied the motion in its September 21, 2005 Order. o The RTC ruled that while judgments by default are generally looked upon with disfavor, petitioners motion to lift the order of default was fatally flawed under Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. o The RTC noted that petitioners motion was not under oath; unaccompanied by an affidavit of merit; and
G.R. No. 170427
ROBERTO R. DAVID, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE CARMELITA S. GUTIERREZ-FRUELDA, Honorable Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, VICENTE L. PANLILIO, ROBERTO L. PANLILIO, REMEDIOS P. PAPA, ADELWISA P. FERNANDEZ, and LOURDES D. PANLILIO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT AND ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF, VICENTE L. PANLILIO, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA, Respondents. RULING: DID NOT COMPLY WITH SEC. 3 RULE 9 OF THE ROC. PETITIONERS MOTION WAS NOT UNDER OATH AND THERE WAS NO ALLEGATION THAT HIS FAILURE TO FILE AN ANSWER OR ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING WAS DUE TO FRAUD, ACCIDENT, MISTAKE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE. FACTS: RTC SAN FERNANDO: RESPONDENTS: ACCOUNTING, RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES. o On September 17, 2004, private respondents filed a complaint for accounting, reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against petitioner,
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without any allegation that his failure to file Answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. o The RTC also ruled that it was not sufficient for petitioner to merely allege that he has a meritorious defense. HENCE, THIS PETITION UNDER RULE 65. b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 1 of Rule 38; and d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41). Moreover, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is also available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. Petitioner used the first remedy. But the RTC denied his motion to lift the order of default. Indeed, default orders are not viewed with favor. But in this case, petitioner failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The motion was not under oath. There was no allegation that petitioners failure to file an Answer or any responsive pleading was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Petitioner merely stated that declarations of default are frowned upon, that he should be given the opportunity to present evidence in the interest of substantial justice, and that he has meritorious defenses. Unfortunately, his claim that he has meritorious defenses is unsubstantiated. He did not even state what evidence he intends to present if his motion is granted.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to lift order of default. HELD: NO. Petitioner belabors his complaint on the alleged defects in the service of summons by publication. He ignores his voluntary appearance before the RTC when he filed two motions for extension to file Answer. His voluntary appearance was equivalent to service of summons. It has cured any alleged defect in the service of summons. We also note that petitioners motions were not motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person. On the contrary, the motions invoked the RTCs jurisdiction while seeking the following affirmative reliefs: to grant extension, deny the motion to declare petitioner in default and lift the order of default. Thus, petitioner waived any defect in the service of summons by publication or even want of process because for the RTC to validly act on his motions, it necessarily acquired jurisdiction over his person.
One declared in default has the following remedies: a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3(b), Rule 9);
RULE 12 BILL OF PARTICULARS
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JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner, vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents. FACTS: Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married in church rites on January 25, 1986. A year later their union turned sour. They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselitas psychological incapacity. The petition for annulment was filed in January 7, 1992 before the RTC of Quezon City. The petition alleged that sometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars and argued that the assertion in the bill of particulars is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioners counsel and not an averment of ultimate facts, as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may be properly be inferred. The trial court found the Bill of Particulars adequate and directed Joselita of file her responsive pleading. Joselita was not convinced and she filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The SC referred the same to the Court of Appeals. The CA denied due course to her petition. It was the view of the CA that the specification more than satisfies the Rules requirement that a complaint must allege the ultimate facts constituting plaintiffs cause of action. Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fails to point out the specific essential marital obligations she was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husbands cause of action. Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute the ultimate facts which the Rules of Court requires.
ISSUE: Was the Bill of Particulars submitted by respondents of sufficient definiteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading. HELD: The Bill of Particular filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action and to requirement more details from private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. A complaint only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause or causes of action. Ultimate facts has been defined as those facts which the expected evidence will support. The Bill of Particular specified that *** at the time of marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession that of a verily qualified Doctor of Medicine upon petitioners time and efforts sot that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to loss his job. Consequently, the SC has no other recourse but to order the immediate resumption of the annulment proceedings which have already been delayed for more than 2 years now, even before it could reach its trial stage. Whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated should be immediately determined. There is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after coming
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out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other. G.R. No. L-15808 April 23, 1963 FAUSTA AGCANAS, JUAN MIGUEL, JUANITA MIGUEL, assisted by her husband ULPIANO PASION, assisted by her husband JUAN PASCUAL, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. BRUNO MERCADO and ANTONIO DASALLA, defendants-appellants. This is an appeal by defendants Mercado and Dasalla from the CFI-Isabela on a question of law FACTS: Plaintiffs Agcanas, et al, filed an action to recover portions of parcels of land in Isabela against defendants Mercado and Dasalla Defendants filed a motion for a bill of particulars Notice of hearing was made on 8 Dec. 1956 The CFI received the motion only on 12 Dec. 1956 denial of the motion to dismiss The defendants filed a record of appeal before the Supreme Court But because they subsequently filed a petition for relief from the judgment of default, they asked that consideration and approval of the record on appeal be held in abeyance until said petition had been resolved The request was granted The petition for relief was denied
The motion for reconsideration on such denial was also denied Hence, this appeal
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in declaring the defendants in default RULING: YES Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of particulars interrupt the time to file a responsive pleading In a situation where: motions to dismiss and for a bill of particulars are filed; the resolution of the bill of particulars is held in abeyance; and the motion to dismiss is denied,
The CFI set it for hearing on 22 Dec. 1956 17 Dec. 1956: defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and set the hearing thereof on 22 Dec. 1956 22 Dec. 1956: the court issued an order postponing 'consideration' of both motions to 29 Dec. 1956 7 Mar. 1957: the court denied the motion to dismiss; ordered the defendants to file an Answer Defendants failed to file an Answer; on motion of the plaintiffs, the court issued an order declaring defendants in default Upon learning of the order of default, the defendants filed a motion asking that the court set aside the order of default and resolve the motion for a bill of particulars The court denied said motion; it explained that the defendants had "tacitly waived their right to push through with the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars," because of their failure to set it for hearing or to ask the clerk of court to calendar it after
the period to file an Answer remains suspended until the motion for a bill of particulars is denied (or if it is granted, until the bill is served on the moving parties) CAB: The motion for a bill of particulars had yet to be resolved. The defendants did not tacitly waive their right to the resolution thereof by failing to set it for hearing since it was already set for hearing (22 Dec 1956, postponed to 29 Dec 1956)
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Therefore, the period to file an Answer was still suspended. Since said period was still suspended, their failure to file an Answer could not result in a ground for default Hence, the lower court erred in declaring the defendants in default The allegations must state the facts and circumstances from which the fraud, deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats may be inferred as a conclusions In his complaint, the appellant merely averred that all the documents sought to be annulled were all executed through the use of deceits, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentations, threats, and other fraudulent means without the particular-facts on which alleged fraud, deceit, machination, or misrepresentations are predicated. Hence, it was proper for the trial court to grant the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars, and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint. RULE 13 FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS G.R. No. 143791 January 14, 2005
JOSE SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LORENZO J. LIWAG, defendant-appellee. FACTS: CFI Jose Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo J. Liwag seeking the annulment of certain documents, attached to the complaint and marked as Annexes "A", "B", and "C", as having been executed by means of misrepresentations, machination, false pretenses, threats, and other fraudulent means, as well as for damages and costs. LiWAG moved for bill of particulars for him to prepare an intelligent and proper pleading necessary and appropriate in the premises GRANTED with respect to the paragraphs specified in defendant's motion", and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the court, acting upon previous motion of the defendant, dismissed the complaint with costs Hence, the present appeal. RULLING: The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous order. CASE AT BAR complaint is without doubt imperfectly drawn and suffers from vagueness and generalization to enable the defendant properly to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify issues and aid the court In an orderly and expeditious disposition in the case.
PETER D. GARRUCHO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 148, Makati City), SHERIFF RENATO C. FLORA (in his capacity as Branch Sheriff), and RAMON BINAMIRA, respondents. Facts: Secretary of the Department of Tourism and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) petitioner Peter D. Garrucho requested then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Andrea Domingo to issue Hold Departure Orders against Ramon Binamira and Faustino Roberto. Commissioner Domingo granted the request and issued Hold Departure Order Nos. 333 and 334 against Binamira and Roberto.nt RTC Makati Roberto filed a complaint for prohibition and damages against petitioner Garrucho and Commissioner Domingo. Binamira, for his part, filed a complaint-in-intervention in the case. Petitioner Garrucho was represented by private practitioners Remollo &
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Associates, whose offices were located at Suite No. 23, Legaspi Suites, 178 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. RTC held that the Hold Departure Order No. 333 is found to be void ab initio, unconstitutional and illegal, the preliminary injunction is hereby declared permanent. PTA as early as January 9, 1991 and was no longer holding office thereat. Since then, he had gone back to the private sector and held office at 417 Benpress Building, Meralco Avenue corner Echague Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. His counsel failed to receive his copy of the CA resolution because he transferred his office at Suite No. 23, Legaspi Suites, 178 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, and his residence to Dumaguete City, Negros Occidental. He further alleged that the CA and the RTC were obliged to take judicial notice of his resignation as Tourism Secretary and the appointment of his successor, his appointment as Executive Secretary by President Fidel E. Ramos in July 1992, and his resignation from the said position in August/September 1992.l Petitioner points out that his present office was not difficult to locate, considering his stature in business and politics in the country. He avers that there was no reason why the copies of the assailed resolutions and order could not be sent to him at the same office since the sheriff was able to locate his office on July 12 and 17, 2000.
CA The petitioner and Commissioner Domingo appealed to CA. On March 9, 1999, the CA sent a notice by registered mail to the petitioners counsel directing the latter to file his brief as appellant. However, the notice was returned to the court. The envelope containing the said notice was stamped, thus: "Return To Sender, Moved Out." CA resent the notice dated March 5, 1999 to the petitioner at his office at the Department of Tourism building, Agripino Circle, Manila. The notice was returned to the CA on May 5, 1999, again, having been "unclaimed." On June 23, 1999, CA declared the service of notice on the petitioner was complete as of May 5, 1999. A copy of the said resolution was sent by registered mail to the petitioner in the Department of Tourism. On November 26, 1999, CA dismissed the appeal of the petitioner for his failure to file his brief. A copy of the resolution was sent by registered mail to the petitioners counsel, but the said resolution was returned to the court with a notation stamped on the envelope "Return To Sender, Moved Out." The CA then had a separate copy of the notice served by registered mail on the petitioner at his office address, but the same was returned to the CA with the notation "Unclaimed." SC Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 CA and RTC erred in issuing the assailed resolutions and order because he never received copies of the assailed CA resolutions which were sent to him at his former office at the Department of Tourism. He averred that he had resigned as Secretary of the Department of Tourism and Chairman of the
ISSUE: WON petitioner was deprived of his right to due process when the CA dismissed his appeal because of his failure to file appellants brief Held: NO. The records show that the counsel of the petitioner in the trial court was the law firm of Remollo & Associates with offices at Suite No. 23, Legaspi Suites, 178 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. Under Section 2, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the counsel of the parties in the court of origin shall be considered as their counsel in the CA. Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel unless served upon the party himself is ordered by the trial
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court. Notice or service made upon a party who is represented by counsel is a nullity. Notice to the client and not to his counsel of record is not notice in law. The rule admits of exceptions, as when the court or tribunal orders service upon a party or when the tribunal defendant is waived. In the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on record. It is the duty of the party and his counsel to device a system for the receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the duty of the counsel to inform the court officially of a change in his address. It is also the responsibility of a party to inform the court of the change of his address so that in the event the court orders that an order or resolution be served on the said party to enable him to receive the said resolution or order. Petitioners counsel of record, moved out from their office at the Legaspi Suites to Dumaguete City without informing the court of such fact. Based on its records, the CA believed that the law office of the petitioners counsel was still at the Legaspi Suites and sent copies of its resolutions to the counsel of the petitioner at the said address. Neither did the petitioner inform the court of his home or office address after his resignation as Secretary of the Department of Tourism where copies of the said order or resolution could be sent. Notwithstanding his stature in the business community, the CA cannot take judicial notice of the petitioners home address or his office address after his departure as Secretary of the Department of Tourism or as Executive Secretary of the President. Indeed, the petitioner has nobody but himself to blame. It was his responsibility to check the status of his appeal in the CA from time to time, from his counsel or from the CA. True enough, the party-litigant should not rely totally on his counsel to litigate his case even if the latter expressly assures that the formers presence in court will no longer be needed. No prudent party will leave the fate of his case entirely to his lawyer. Absence in one or two hearings may be negligible but want of inquiry or update on the status of his case for several months (four, in this case) is inexcusable. It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the progress of his case. Petitioner simply claims that he was busy with his gravel and sand and trading businesses which involved frequent traveling from Manila to outlying provinces. But this was not a justifiable excuse for him to fail to ask about the developments in his case or to ask somebody to make the query for him. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence; hence, his plea that he was not accorded the right to due process cannot elicit this Courts approval or even sympathy. No. L-27211. July 6, 1977.* EUSEBIA BARRAMEDA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ENGRACIO CASTILLO, defendant-appellee. Facts APPEAL from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Quezon ProVince. MTC Eusebia Barrameda sued Engracio Castillo in the municipal court of Lopez, Quezon Province. A copy of the courts decision, which was adverse to Barrameda, was sent by registered mail to her lawyer at San Pablo City. That mail was received in the city post office on the following day. The city postmasters office supposedly sent to Barramedas counsel three notices regarding the registered mail. Barramedas lawyer did not claim that mail. It was returned to the municipal court and was received there as unclaimed mail. Eusebia Barrameda must have been informed that the adverse decision could not be served upon her lawyer. She received personally a copy of the decision. CFI
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Through a lawyer, Barrameda filed a notice of appeal. Castillo did not interpose in the municipal court any objection to her appeal. The court gave it due course. Castillo filed in the Court of First Instance a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. His theory was that the fifteen-day reglementary period within which Barrameda could appeal should be counted from the expiration of five days from the date of the first notice sent by the postmaster to Barramedas lawyer. In this case, the supposed first notice was sent, when the mail in question was received in the San Pablo City post office. The five days counted from that date expired when the second notice was allegedly sent to Barramedas lawyer. Eusebia Barrameda opposed Castillos motion to dismiss her appeal. She contended that Castillo failed to prove that her counsel actually received the supposed three notices sent by the postmaster. She argued that because in the municipal court Castillo did not object to her appeal, his motion could no longer be entertained in the Court of First Instance. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. It assumed that the fifteen-day period should be counted from the date of the third notice and the period had already expired, according to the trial courts computation. SC Eusebia Barrameda appealed to this Court. She Specified that she was going to question the legality of the order of dismissal. Ruling Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 7. Service of final orders or judgments.Final orders or judgments shall be served either personally or by registered mail, x x x. SEC. 8. Completeness of service.Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. x x x Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time. In service by registered mail, the general rule is that service is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. The exception is that when the addressee does not claim his mail within five days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, then the service takes effect at the expiration of such time. As illustrated by Justice Cesar Bengzon, if the first notice is received by the addressee on December 1, and he gets his mail on December 3, the service is complete on December 3. But if the addressee gets his mail only after 15 days, service is deemed complete 6 days after or five days from receipt, the date of the first notice (exception). If the addressee never gets the mail, service is also deemed complete on th the 6 day, as provided in the exception to the general rule. If he receives his mail two months after it is registered and there is no proof of the first notice, then service is complete on the date of actual receipt, following the general rule. Bearing in mind that the exception in service by registered mail refers to constructive service, not to actual receipt of the mail, it is evident that the fair and just application of that exception depends upon conclusive proof that a first notice was sent by the postmaster to the addressee. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed should not be applied to such a situation. Therefore, to obviate injustice, it is incumbent upon a party, who relies on constructive service or who contends that his adversary was served with a copy of a final order or judgment upon the expiration of five days from the first notice of registered mail sent by the postmaster to prove that that first notice was sent and delivered to the addressee. A certification from the postmaster would be the best evidence of that fact. The ma ilmans testimony may also be adduced to prove that fact..
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The postmasters certification as to the sending of the first notice should include the data not only as to whether or not the corresponding notices were issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery thereof was made. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the first notice was sent to Barramedas lawyer and that it was delivered to him or should have been received by him. The envelope containing the unclaimed mail was presented in court. The face of the envelope contains the notation Returned to sender. Reason: Unclaimed. Above the stamp, on the back of the envelope, with the legend City of San Pablo, Philippines are written the dates. Written also on the back of the envelope are the following: R to S, notified 3/3/66. Relying on those notations on the envelope, the trial court literally and rigidly applied the presumption as to constructive service. It did not require appellee Castillo to present the postmasters certification that a first notice was sent to Barramedas lawyer and that the notice was received by the latter. Under those circumstances, the trial courts order dismissing Barramedas appeal is fraught with injustice. G.R. No. 63201 May 27, 1992 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASIG BRANCH XXI, PRESIDED BY JUDGE GREGORIO G. PINEDA, CHUNG SIONG PEK @ BONIFACIO CHUNG SIONG PEK AND VICTORIA CHING GENG TY @ VICTORIA CHENG GENG TY, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, PASIG, METRO MANILA AND/OR HIS DEPUTIES AND AGENTS, respondents. Facts: Private respondents are the registered owners of three parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila covered by certificates of title of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. On March 1, 1954, private respondents entered into a contract of lease with Philippine Blooming Mills, Co., Inc., (PBM for brevity) whereby the latter shall lease the aforementioned parcels of land as factory site. This leasehold right of PBM covering the parcels of land was duly annotated at the back of the above stated certificates of title. PBM introduced on the land, buildings, machineries and other useful improvements. These constructions and improvements were registered and annotated at the back of the respondents' certificates of title. On October 11, 1963, PBM executed in favor of PNB, a deed of assignment, conveying and transferring all its rights and interests under the contract of lease which it executed with private respondents. The assignment was for and in consideration of the loans granted by PNB to PBM. The deed of assignment was registered and annotated at the back of the private respondents' certificates of title. On November 6, 1963 and December 23, 1963 respectively, PBM executed in favor of PNB a real estate mortgage for a loan of P100,000.00 and an addendum to real estate mortgage for another loan of P1,590,000.00, covering all the improvements constructed by PBM on the leased premises. These mortgages were registered and annotated at the back of respondents' certificates PBM filed a petition for registration of improvements in the titles of real property owned by private respondents docketed as Case No. 6530. Private respondents filed a motion in the same proceedings which was given a different case number to wit, LRC Case No. R-2744, because of the payment of filing fees for the motion. The motion sought to cancel the annotations on respondents' certificates of title pertaining to the assignment by PBM to PNB of the former's leasehold rights, inclusion of improvements and the real estate mortgages made by PBM in favor of PNB, on the ground that the contract of lease entered into between PBM and respondents-movants had already expired by the failure of PBM and/or its assignee to exercise the option to renew the second 20year lease commencing on March 1, 1974 and also by the failure of PBM to extend its corporate existence in accordance with law.
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The motion also states that since PBM failed to remove its improvements on the leased premises before the expiration of the contract of lease, such improvements shall accrue to respondents as owners of the land. Respondent court issued an order directing the cancellation of the inscriptions on respondents' certificates of title. Petitioner PNB filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Private respondents filed a motion for entry of final judgment and issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent court granted the aforesaid motion for entry of final judgment and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the entries on respondents' certificates of title stated in the order. Petitioner PNB filed an omnibus motion to set aside the entry of judgment as ordered by the respondent court on the ground that it has no prior notice or knowledge of the order of respondent court which denied its motion for reconsideration and that while there was a certification from the Bureau of Posts that three registry notices were sent to petitioner's counsel, there was no allegation or certification whatsoever that said notices were actually received by the addressee. The respondent court deniedS the omnibus motion. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. PNB's counsel at the PNB Building at Escolta, Manila which is his address of record in this case. Consequently the entry of judgment Order of September 14, 1982. xxx xxx xxx The respondent PNB's counsel at the hearing of said incidents admitted that the aforesaid registered notices could have been received by PNB's regular Receiving Section at the PNB Building at the Escolta but could not have been forwarded by said Receiving Section to said counsel's Litigation and Collection Division, Legal Department at an upper floor of the same building. Thus the presumption that official duty was regularly performed by the postmaster was not overcome, as most recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in Feraren vs. Santos promulgated on April 27, 1982, 113, SCRA 707 . . . (p. 195, Rollo) Section 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time. The fair and just application of that exception depends upon the conclusive proof that the first notice was sent by the postmaster to the addressee. The best evidence of that fact would be the certification from the postmaster (Barrameda v. Castillo, L27211, July 6, 1977, 78 SCRA 1). In the instant case, the respondent court found that the postmaster's certification stated that three (3) notices of the registered mail which contained the order denying the motion for reconsideration were sent to petitioner PNB's counsel at Escolta, Manila which is the address stated in the record of the case. The factual findings of the trial court bear great weight and are binding upon this Court. Hence, as between the denial of the petitioners' counsel that he received the notice of the registered mail and the postmaster's
Issue: Whether there is a need to allege or certify that said notices were actually received by the addressee. Held: No. In resolving this matter, the respondent court stated in the questioned order of January 12, 1983 as follows: The respondent PNB filed a motion to set aside the order of the court. This was denied by the court. Then the movants filed a motion of August 25, 1982 for entry of judgment, based on the postmaster's certification that not only one but three notices of the registered mail containing a copy of the order was sent to respondent
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certification that said notices were sent to him, the postmaster's claim should prevail. The postmaster has the official duty to send notices of registered mail and the presumption is that official duty was regularly performed (Aportadera, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41358, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 695). on August 9, 1967, Petitioners' notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal were filed and they filed a "Motion to Amend Record on Appeal" on August 18, 1967 respondent judge refused to act upon this because, according to him, his order of probate had already become final he held that from May 3 to May 17, petitioners consumed 14 days, and if the resumption of their period to appeal is to be computed from July 24, 1967, when their counsel actually received delivery of the order of denial of June 29, 1967, August 9, 1967 would appear to be the thirtieth day of said period, there being 16 days from July 24 to August 9, 1967 respondents on the other hand contended that petitioners filed mere scraps of paper entitled notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond and that the purported notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond were filed much beyond the period within which to perfect an appeal they argue that: (1) petitioners' motion of May 17, 1967 to set aside the order of probate is pro-forma, and did not, therefore, suspend the period for appeal (2) assuming the contrary, the period for appeal of petitioners, after the order of denial of June 29, 1967, should be considered as having been resumed on July 10, 1967, when the first notice, as aforestated, was "issued" by the Manila Post Office and not from July 24, 1967 when petitioners actually received delivery of said order
G.R. No. L-28296 November 24, 1972 Hernandez vs. Navarro Petition for mandamus to compel respondent judge to give due course to the appeal of the petitioners on April 24, 1967, respondent Judge Navarro Pasig CFI issued an order admitting to probate the will of the deceased Maximo C. Hernandez, Sr., father of petitioners on May 3, 1967, notice thereof was served on petitioner
on May 17, 1967, petitioners filed a motion to set aside said order on June 29, 1967, respondent judge denied said motion pertinently holding that the motion to set aside order of probate filed by petitioner did not amount to a Motion for New Trial under the Rules of Court Notice of this denial order was served on petitioner' counsel by registered mail According to the certification: the registered mail containing said order and "addressed to Atty. Andres R. Narvasa at 232 Madrigal Building, Escolta, Manila was delivered on July 24, 1967 to Cometa Villaflor for the addressee upon presentation of the third notice issued on July 19, 1967" and that "the first notice was issued on July 10, 1967."
ISSUE: whether or not petitioners took their appeal on time by filing their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal on August 9, 1967
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HELD: Yes Section 8 of Rule 13 Completeness of service. Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time. the period for appeal of petitioners should be deemed to have resumed upon the expiration of five days from July 10, 1967, the date the first notice was "issued", as certified by the post office, and not from July 24, 1967, when the registered mail containing the denial order was actually received by petitioners' counsel respondents do not point to any evidence proving the date when the first notice from the Manila Post Office was actually delivered to the address of petitioners' counsel. All that appears in the record before Us is that the said notice was issued by the Post Office on July 10, 1967 proof should always be available to the post office not only of whether or not the notices of registered mail have been reported delivered by the letter carrier but also of how or to whom and when such delivery has been made when the post office makes a certification regarding delivery of registered mail, such certification should include the data not only as to whether or not the corresponding notices were issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery thereof was made. the certification in the case at bar that the first and second notices addressed to Atty. Narvasa had been "issued" can hardly suffice to requirements of equity and justice. It was incumbent upon the post office to further certify that said notices were reportedly received When there are several related acts supposed to be performed by a public officer or employee in regard to a particular matter, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions would not arise and be considered as comprehending all the required acts, if the certification issued by the proper office refers only to some of such acts, particularly in instances wherein proof of whether or not all of them have been performed is available under the law or office regulations to the officer making the certification the omission of some of the acts in the certification may justify the inference that from the proof available to the officer there is no showing that they have also been performed
Where the certification is worded in general terms that reasonably comprehend performance of all the related acts, the presumption of irregularity holds as to all of them G.R. No. 138500 September 16, 2005 ANDY QUELNAN, Petitioners, vs. VHF PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the decision dated September 17, 1997 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. SP-41942, and its resolution dated April 27, 1999, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. FACTS:
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Respondent, VHF Phil. Inc. filed an ejectment suit against petitioner, Andy Quelnan, involving a condominium unit at the Legaspi Towers which respondent claimed to have been leased by petitioner. MTC of Manila found that 'summons together with a copy of the complaint was served on petitioner thru his wife on August 25, 1992 by substituted service and that petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. November 23, 1992 it rendered judgment in favor of respondent, ordering Quelnan to vacate the premises of the unit and pay for back rentals, etc. Copy of the aforementioned decision was served on petitioner by registered mail but the same was returned unclaimed on account of petitioner's failure to claim the same despite the postmaster's three (3) successive notices on November 25, 1992, December 7 and 11 of year 1992. No appeal having been taken by the petitioner, the MeTC decision became final and executory. May 18, 1993, a writ of execution, a notice of levy and a notice to vacate were served on petitioner's wife who acknowledged receipt thereof. May 24, 1993, petitioner Quelnan filed with the Manila RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or temporary restraining order, alleging that: o He was never served with summons' and was' completely unaware of the proceedings in the ejectment suit, o He learned of the judgment rendered thereon only on May 18, 1993 when a notice of levy on execution came to his knowledge. o He thus prayed the RTC to annul and set aside the MeTC decision and the writs issued in connection therewith. June 3, 1996, the RTC granted petitioner's petition for relief and set aside the MeTC decision. The RTC explained that petitioner had been unduly deprived of a hearing and had been prevented from taking an appeal for the reason that petitioner's wife, in a fit of anger, tore the summons and complaint in the ejectment suit in the heat of a marital squabble. To the RTC, this constituted excusable negligence as would justify the filing of the petition for relief from judgment. Respondent sought reconsideration of the RTC decision but its' motion was denied by said court in its order of July 5, 1996. Respondent directly went to this Court on a petition for review, which petition was remanded by this Court to the Court of Appeals (CA), whereat the same was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41942. September 17, 1997, CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and reinstated that of the MeTC. Petitioner filed MR but CA denied in April 27, 1999.
ISSUE/S: If a party fails to claim his copy of the adverse decision which was sent through registered mail, when is he deemed to have knowledge of said decision? Will the presumption of completeness of service of a registered mail matter under Rule 13, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure apply in relation to the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 3 of the Rules?
RULING: Petition is denied and the CA decision is affirmed. 1. Petitioner: He contends that the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief from judgment must be reckoned from the time a party acquired knowledge of the judgment. Hence, prescinding from his premise that he became aware of the MeTC decision only on May 18, 1993 when a notice to pay and vacate was served on him by the sheriff, petitioner submits that his petition for relief from judgment was timely filed on May 24, 1993. SC: Section 3 of Rule 38 reads: Time for filing petition; contents and verification. ' A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied
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with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within: (a) 60 days from knowledge of judgment, order or other proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. o These two periods must concur. o Both periods are also not extendible and never interrupted. o Strict compliance with these periods stems from the equitable character and nature of the petition for relief. Relief is allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. A petition for relief is actually the 'last chance given by law to litigants to question a final judgment or order. And failure to avail of such last chance within the grace period fixed by the Rules is fatal. receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the Rules, service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. However, if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice, service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days therefrom. There arises a presumption that the service was complete at the end of the said five-day period.
This means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given by the postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have received and to have been notified of the judgment at that point. [G.R. No. 143424. August 8, 2001] AMEN-AMEN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. (Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45) FACTS: NLRC- illegal suspension and dismissal Danilo Amen-Amen filed a complaint for illegal suspension and th dismissal, separation pay, 13 month pay, performance incentive pay and sick leave pay against Toyota Davao City, Inc./Duratrak Corp. and/or Jose A. Lim, III, President. LA- decided in favor of complainant Respondent appealed to NLRC- reversed the appealed decision and ruled that petitioner's dismissal from employment was for a just cause and with due process of law MR by petitioner-Denied CA- petitioner elevated the matter via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
2. The records clearly reveal that a copy of the MeTC decision was sent to petitioner through registered mail at his given address on November 25, 1992. It should be noted that petitioner was not represented by counsel during the proceedings before the MeTC. The first notice to him by the postmaster to check his mail was on November 25, 1992. Subsequent notices were sent by the postmaster on December 7, 1992 and December 11, 1992. A certification that the registered mail was unclaimed by the petitioner and thus returned to the sender after three successive notices was issued by the postmaster. Service of said MeTC decision became effective five (5) days after November 25, 1992, or on November 30, 1992, conformably with Rule 13, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads: Completeness of Service. Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual
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Dismissed the petition for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure HENCE TO SC Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent COMELEC en banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy on the ground that petitioner, who was then twentyone years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila. (TAKE NOTE) Acting on the petition sent by facsimile as mentioned above, on May 2, 1996, COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election. (TAKE NOTE) On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground of lack of explanation of service by registered mail? NO RULLING: It is not disputed that petitioner's Petition for Certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals did not contain an explanation why resort was made to other modes of service of the petition to the parties concerned. "Sec. 11.(RULE 13)Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed." Pursuant to the above-quoted section, service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable, be done personally. To underscore the mandatory nature of this rule requiring personal service whenever practicable, said section gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997 LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents. FACTS:
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Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996 (Because her proclamation was still suspended). ISSUE: WON COMELEC en banc erred when it issued the disputed order based on a petition sent by facsimile HELD: YES. COMELEC failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail. In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed with the COMELEC. Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail. A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing the questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the petition filed by registered mail. STILL, the petition is dismissed because petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan. G.R. No. 175334. March 26, 2008.* SPS. DOMINGO M. BELEN and DOMINGA P. BELEN, herein represented by their attorney-in-fact NERY B. AVECILLA, petitioners, vs. HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 87,
Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten (10) legible copies. However, when there is more than one respondent or protestee, the petitioner or protestant must file additional number of copies of the petition or protest as there are additional respondents or protestees. Sec. 2. How Filed. The documents referred to in the immediately preceding section must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally, or, unless otherwise provided in these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is the date of filing and the requirement as to the number of copies must be complied with. Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. (a) All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be printed, mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper and shall be in English or Filipino. xxx xxx xxx Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with
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Rosario, Batangas and all other persons acting under his orders and SPS. SILVESTRE N. PACLEB and PATRICIA A. PACLEB, represented herein by their attorney-in-fact JOSELITO RIOVEROS, respondents. Facts This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The appellate courts decision dismissed the petition for certiorari which sought to nullify the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas, denying herein petitioners motion to quash writ of execution and their motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decis ion. RTC The instant petition originated from the action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment against herein petitioners, spouses Domingo and Dominga Belen, filed by private respondent spouses Silvestre and Patricia Pacleb, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Joselito Rioveros, before the RTC of Rosario, Batangas. The complaint alleged that private respondents secured a judgment by default rendered by the Superior Court of the State of California. The summons was served on petitioners address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna, as was alleged in the complaint, and received by a certain Marcelo M. Belen. before the branch clerk of court. Before the scheduled ex parte presentation of evidence, Atty. Alcantara filed a motion to dismiss, citing the judgment of dismissal issued by the Superior Court of the State of California, which allegedly dismissed the case. The RTC held in abeyance the ex parte presentation of evidence of private respondents and the resolution of Atty. Alcantaras motion pending the submission of a copy of the judgment of dismissal. For failure to present a copy of the alleged judgment of dismissal, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Through a motion, Atty. Alcantara sought the reinstatement of the motion to dismiss by attaching a copy of the said foreign judgment. For their part, private respondents filed a motion for the amendment of the complaint. The amended complaint attached to the motion averred that private respondents were constrained to withdraw their complaint against petitioners from the California court because of the prohibitive cost of litigation. The answer to the amended complaint raised the defenses of lack of cause of action, res judicata and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of the defendants since the amended complaint had raised an entirely new cause of action which should have been ventilated in another complaint. Petitioners and Atty. Alcantara failed to appear at the rescheduled pre-trial conference. Thus, the RTC declared petitioners in default and allowed private respondents to present evidence ex parte. Atty. Alcantara passed away without the RTC being informed of such fact until much later. The RTC rendered a Decision, ordering the defendants are hereby directed to pay the plaintiffs. A copy of the RTC decision intended for Atty. Alcantara was returned with the notation Addressee Deceased. A copy of the RTC decision was then sent to the purported address of petitioners in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna and was received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla. Meanwhile, immediately after the promulgation of the RTC decision, private respondents
Atty. Reynaldo Alcantara entered his appearance as counsel for petitioners. Atty. Alcantara subsequently filed an answer, alleging that Contrary to private respondents averment, petitioners were actually residents of California, USA. The answer also claimed that petitioners liability had been extinguished via a release of abstract judgment issued in the same collection case. In view of petitioners failure to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference, the RTC ordered the ex parte presentation of evidence for private respondents
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filed an ex parte motion for preliminary attachment which the RTC granted in its Order. Private respondents sought the execution of the RTC decision. In its Order, the RTC directed the issuance of a writ of execution. Upon the issuance of a writ of execution, the real properties belonging to petitioners were levied upon and the public auction. Atty. Carmelo B. Culvera entered his appearance as counsel for petitioners. He then filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution (With Prayer to Defer Further Actions). He also filed a Notice of Appeal from the RTC Decision averring that he received a copy of the decision late. The RTC denied the motion seeking the quashal of the writ of execution. Subsequently, the RTC denied Atty. Culveras motion for reconsideration of said order. CA Thus, petitioners filed a Rule 65 petition before the Court of Appeals, imputing on the RTC grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision although it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over their persons in view of the improper service of summons; On 31 July 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari., it issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. SC In a Resolution, the Court denied the petition because it is not accompanied by a valid verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioners sought reconsideration, which the Court granted in a Resolution dated. The Court also ordered the reinstatement of the petition and the filing of a comment. Issue The instant petition raises two issues, thus: whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners through either the proper service of summons or the appearance of the late Atty. Alcantara on behalf of petitioners and whether there was a valid service of the copy of the RTC decision on petitioners.
Ruling As a general rule, when a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law. The exception to this rule is when service upon the party himself has been ordered by the court. In cases where service was made on the counsel of record at his given address, notice sent to petitioner itself is not even necessary. The following provisions under Rule 13 of the Rules of Court define the proper modes of service of judgments: SEC. 2. Filing and service, defined.x x x
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. x x x SEC. 5. Modes of service.Service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers shall be made either personally or by mail. SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party. SEC. 6. Personal service.Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has
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no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the partys or counsels residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein. SEC. 7. Service by mail.Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the post office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail SEC. 8. Substituted service.If service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and other papers cannot be made under the two preceding sections, the office and place of residence of the party or his counsel being unknown, service may be made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. The service is complete at the time of such delivery. In the instant case, a copy of the RTC decision was sent first to Atty. Alcantara, petitioners counsel of record. However, the same was retur ned unserved in view of the demise of Atty. Alcantara. Thus, a copy was subsequently sent to petitioners last known address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna, which was received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla. Undoubtedly, upon the death of Atty. Alcantara, the lawyer-client relationship between him and petitioners has ceased, thus, the service of the RTC decision on him is ineffective and did not bind petitioners. The subsequent service on petitioners purported last known address by registered mail is also defective because it does not comply with the requisites under the aforequoted Section 7 of Rule 13 on service by registered mail. Section 7 of Rule 13 contemplates service at the present address of the party and not at any other address of the party. Service at the partys former address or his last known address or any address other than his present address does not qualify as substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 7, Rule 13. Therefore, service by registered mail presupposes that the present address of the party is known and if the person who receives the same is not the addressee, he must be duly authorized by the former to receive the paper on behalf of the party. Since the filing of the complaint, petitioners could not be physically found in the country because they had already become permanent residents of California, U.S.A. It has been established during the trial that petitioners are former residents of Alaminos, Laguna, contrary to the averment in the complaint that they reside and may be served with court processes thereat. The service of the RTC decision at their former address in Alaminos, Laguna is defective and does not bind petitioners. In view of the foregoing, the running of the fifteen-day period for appeal did not commence upon the service of the RTC decision at the address on record of Atty. Alcantara or at the Laguna address. It is deemed served on petitioners only upon its receipt by Atty. Culvera on 29. Therefore, the filing of the Notice of Appeal is within the reglementary period and should be given due course. G.R. No. 166216 March 14, 2012
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO, NOEL ETABAG, DANILO DELA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JASMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN BENJAMIN SEGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN, and REBECCA TULALIAN, Petitioners, vs. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1LT. RAUL BACALSO, M/SGT. BIENVENIDO BALABA and "JOHN DOES," Respondents. Facts:
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On 25 January 1983, several suspected subversives who were arrested and detained by the military filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Quezon City against respondents. In their complaint, the petitioners alleged that they were arrested and detained by Task Force Makabansa, a composite group of various intelligence units of the AFP, on the strength of defective search warrants; that while under detention and investigation, they were subjected to physical and psychological harm, torture and other brutalities to extort from them confessions and other information that would incriminate them; and that by reason thereof, they suffered actual and moral damages. The trial court granted respondents motion to dismiss and ordered the case dismissed. Petitioners filed a motion to reconsider and set aside the order of dismissal. However, the trial court declared the order final. Petitioners again filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court denied the motion. Petitioners went to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul and set aside the orders of the trial court. While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, the so-called EDSA revolution took place. As a result, the respondents lost their official positions and were no longer in their respective office addresses as appearing in the record. On April 15, 1988, the Supreme Court rendered a decision annulling and setting aside the assailed orders and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. However, trial could not proceed immediately because on June 11, 1988, the record of the case was destroyed when fire razed the City Hall of Quezon City. It was only on October 9, 1989 when petitioners sought a reconstitution of the record of the case. On August 15, 1990, petitioners filed a motion praying that respondents be required to file their answer. However, the record as reconstituted did not show who are the lawyers of the respondents considering that Estelito Mendoza, who had represented them in his capacity as Solicitor General, was no longer holding that position. Furthermore, respondents were also no longer occupying the positions they held at the time the complaint was filed. Thus, petitioners were directed to report to the trial court the addresses and whereabouts of respondents so that they could be properly notified. Instead of complying, petitioners filed a motion to declare respondents in default. The trial court denied petitioners motion to declare respondents in default, emphatically pointing out that respondents were not duly notified of the decision of the Supreme Court. In the same order, the trial court directed petitioners to comply with the order within ten (10) days from notice, with a warning that the case [would] be archived and eventually dismissed if petitioners failed to furnish to the court the addresses of respondents. Petitioners moved to reconsider but the trial court denied the motion, stating that "without actual notice of the judgment of the Supreme Court xxx the defendants-appellants herein would not be aware that they should file a responsive pleading" and that, therefore, "to consider the defendants-appellants in default would be tantamount to lack of due process xxx." For failure of the petitioners to comply with the orders, the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice in its order dated March 7, 1991. Subsequently, however, in an order dated June 4, 1991, the trial court set aside the order of dismissal and reinstated the case. It also approved petitioners request to serve the notice to file answer or responsive pleading by publication. (Pls. take note of this) Petitioners informed the trial court that the following notice was published in the Tagalog newspaper BALITA in its issues of August 29, 1991 and that no answer was filed by respondents within the period stated in the notice. On motion of petitioners, the trial court declared respondents in default and directed petitioners to present their evidence ex-parte.
Ruling of the RTC
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RTC handed down a decision in favor of the petitioners, whereby respondents are ordered to pay the former almost P500k by way of damages. Some of the respondents filed their Omnibus Motion praying that the order of default be reversed and set aside, that the entire proceedings be declared null and void and be given a chance to file their answer and present evidence. One respondent filed a petition for relief from judgment averring that the decision rendered was without the benefit of notice in gross violation of his right to due process. However, these were all denied by the trial court. Aggrieved, they elevated their case to the CA. o The fourth error was committed when the respondents were declared in default because they were not duly notified and, therefore, were denied due process.
The petitioners come to this Court praying for the reversal and setting aside of the CA decision.
Issue: Whether due process was properly observed. Held: No. In the case at bench, the respondents were completely deprived of due process when they were declared in default based on a defective mode of service service of notice to file answer by publication. The rules on service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers were not strictly followed in declaring the respondents in default. The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC committed procedural lapses in declaring the respondents in default and in allowing the petitioners to present evidence ex-parte. As correctly observed by the CA, the RTCs order requiring petitioners to report the addresses and whereabouts of the respondents was an attempt to serve a notice to file answer on the respondents by personal service and/or by mail. These proper and preferred modes of service, however, were never resorted to because the OSG abandoned them when the petitioners failed to comply with the RTC order requiring them to report the addresses and whereabouts of the respondents. Nevertheless, there was still another less preferred but proper mode of service available substituted service - which is service made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. Unfortunately, this substitute mode of service was not resorted to by the RTC after it failed to effect personal service and service by mail.
The Ruling of the CA The CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the RTC decision and ordering the case remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. The CA ruled, among others, that the RTC committed four (4) errors in declaring the respondents in default and proceeding to hear the case. o The RTC committed its first error when it abandoned the proper modes of service of notices, orders, resolutions or judgments as the petitioners failed to comply with its order directing them to report the addresses and whereabouts of the respondents so that they could be properly notified. o The second error was the failure of the RTC to avail of substituted service after failing to effect personal service or service by mail. o It perpetrated its third error when it authorized service by publication after dismissing the case for failure of the petitioners to furnish the current addresses of the respondents. The CA reasoned out that there was nothing in the rules which would authorize publication of a notice of hearing to file answer and for what was authorized to be published were summons and final orders and judgments.
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Instead, the RTC authorized an unrecognized mode of service under the Rules, which was service of notice to file answer by publication. Considering the fact that the OSG could no longer represent the respondents, the RTC should have been more patient in notifying the respondents through personal service and/or service by mail. It should not have simply abandoned the preferred modes of service when the petitioners failed to comply with its order with the correct addresses of the respondents. More so, it should not have skipped the substituted service prescribed under the Rules and authorized a service of notice on the respondents to file answer by publication. The RTC should have instead directed the petitioners to exert diligent efforts to notify the respondents either personally or by registered mail. In case the preferred modes were impractical, the Court should have required the petitioners to at least report in writing why efforts exerted towards personal service or service by mail failed. In other words, a convincing proof of an impossibility of personal service or service by mail to the respondents should have been shown first. The RTC, thus, erred when it ruled that the publication of a notice to file answer to the respondents substantially cured the procedural defect equivalent to lack of due process. The RTC cannot just abandon the basic requirement of personal service and/or service by mail. At any rate, the Court is of the view that personal service to the respondents was practicable under the circumstances considering that they were well-known persons who used to occupy high government positions. To stress, the only modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers allowed by the rules are personal service, service by mail and substituted service if either personal service or service by mail cannot be made, as stated in Sections 6, 7 and 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Nowhere under this rule is service of notice to file answer by publication is mentioned, much less recognized.
SERVICE BY SUMMONS
PUBLICATION
ONLY
APPLIES
TO
SERVICE
OF
The Court would like to point out that service by publication only applies to service of summons stated under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court where the methods of service of summons in civil cases are: (1) personal service; (2) substituted service; and (3) service by publication. Similarly, service by publication can apply to judgments, final orders and resolutions as provided under Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court As correctly ruled by the CA, RTCs third error was when it authorized service by publication after initially dismissing the case for failure of petitioners to furnish the current address of defendants-appellants. o There is, however, nothing in the Rules that authorizes publication of a notice of hearing to file answer. o What is authorized to be published are: (1) summons, and (2) final orders and judgments. The above-quoted provision cannot be used to justify the trial courts action in authorizing service by publication. o Firstly, what was published was not a final order or judgment but a simple order or notice to file answer. o Secondly, even granting that the notice to file answer can be served by publication, it is explicit in the Rule that publication is allowed only if the respondents was summoned by publication. The record is clear that respondents were not summoned by publication. The basic rules on modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers are mandatory in nature and, therefore, must be strictly observed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
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SO ORDERED. RED ALERT (GR 168973) **BIANCA MADE A DIGEST** Notice of Lis Pendens: G.R. No. 154018 April 3, 2007 be abated by the Municipal Mayor unless it is specially injurious to a private person. Respondent appealed to the RTC and the decision of the MTC was reversed. The RTC declared the house as a nuisance. The RTC denied the petitioners MR. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA, which was dismissed OUTRIGHT for failure of the petitioners to include in their petition the required explanation on why personal service upon the respondent was not resorted to pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners filed a MR attaching a Certification from the Postmaster that the pleading in question had been actually received by the respondent as well as a letter to the CA Clerk of Court stating that if the docket fee is insufficient, counsel for the petitioners shall remit the balance immediately, if any. MR was denied stating that petitioners subsequent compliance with the Rules does not cleanse the petition of its infirmity. Hence the instant Petition.
MARTIN PEOSO and ELIZABETH PEOSO, Petitioners, vs. MACROSMAN DONA, Respondent.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1 Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated March 22, 2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69472, which dismissed the appeal before it because Martin Peoso and his mother Elizabeth Peoso (petitioners) failed to submit a written explanation why service of pleading was not done personally as required under Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 2 Rules of Court and to pay the requisite docket fees; and, the CA Resolution dated June 3, 2002 which denied petitioners Motion for R econsideration. FACTS: Macrosman Dona (Respondent) filed a complaint against petitioners for Abatement of Nuisance with the MTC, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro which was tried and decided under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Respondent claims that in front of their house is a barangay road where the petitioners constructed their house against the objection of the respondent. o They claim that the house is a public nuisance. The petitioners defend that the house was constructed by the late Praxido Penoso, way ahead before the respondent arrived and that they have no action to file the case. MTC ruled in favor of petitioners on the ground that respondent has no cause of action against petitioners and that the house may only
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for failure of the petitioner to include in their petition the required explanation on why personal service upon the respondent was not resorted to pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and on the ground that docketing fees was short?
RULING: The CA erred.
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating
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from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed. Jurisprudence holds that the rule that a pleading must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally is mandatory However, in Ello v. Court of Appeals, the Court defined the circumstances when the court may exercise its discretionary power under Section 11 of Rule 13, viz: However, such discretionary power of the court must be exercised properly and reasonably, taking into account the following factors: (1) "the practicability of personal service;" (2) "the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein;" and (3) "the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. x x x" Considering the prima facie merit of the pleading involving the issues whether the petitioners house is a public nuisance; whether the subject house is constructed on an abandoned road; and whether the alleged nuisance is specially injurious to respondent; and, considering further the fact that the MTC and the RTC decisions are conflicting, the CA had valid grounds to refrain from dismissing the appeal solely on technical grounds. Furthermore, considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, the shortage of the payment of the docketing fee cannot be used as a ground for dismissing petitioners appeal before the CA. It is undisputed tha t they and their counsel are living in a remote town and are not aware of the exact amount of the lawful fees for petitions for review. Hence, it is understandable why they place sheer reliance on the Rules of Court, notably, Section 1 of Rule 42, which only specifies the amount of P500.00 for the appeal cost in question. Petitioners sent P500.00 with a request from the Clerk of Court for notification of any insufficiency which will be sent immediately if there is any. The deficiency in payment was not at all intentional. The petitioners acted in good faith and substantially complied with the Rules.
9
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is directed to REINSTATE the petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69472, for further proceedings. Rule 13: Filing a pleading by fax is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court.
Top Management Programs Corp. vs. Fajardo, G.R. No. 150462, June 15, 2011 (certiorari R.45) FACTS: (MAGULO MADAMING FACTS) CFI RIZAL- 2 applications for registration of title Gregorio filed an application for registration of title (case 1) over Lots 1 to 4 of Plan Psu-204785 and the court thereafter issued an order declaring as abandoned the reserved oppositions of Jose T. Velasquez and Pablo Velasquez Velasquez filed an application for registration of title(Case 2) over six lots denominated as Lots 7 and 9 of Psu-80886, Ap-5538, and Lots 1, 7, 9 and 11 of Psu-56007 Amd., Ap-11135before the same court. CFI (case 1)rendered a decisiondeclaring Gregorio to be the absolute owner of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 described in Plan Psu-204785, the decree of registration was issued and become final. The same court (case 2) adjudicate Lots 1, 7, 9 and 11 of Psu56007-Amd, plan Ap-11135, and Lots 7 and 9 of Psu-80886 (Ap5538) to Velasquez. The decree of registration was issuedand become final. LRA informed the CFI that Lots 1 and 7 of Psu-56007-Amd (Ap11135) had been amended by the Bureau of Lands to exclude therefrom portions covered by Lot 2, Psu-64894, Psu-96904, and Lots 1 to 4, Psu-204785 of Gregorio Velasquez petitioned the CFI to set aside the award earlier made in favor of Gregorio in case 1 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and to give due course to his application over the said lots
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CFI ruled that the application of Velasquez be given due course insofar as Lots 1 and 7 of Ap-11135 which are identical to Lots 1 to 4, Plan Psu-204785, and the first decision in favor of Gregorio respecting the same lots as null and void. Pet. Top Management Programs Corporation sought the annulment of the CFI RIZAL orderreinstating the order directing the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of Trinidad and Fajardo, on the ground of extrinsic fraud. Petitioner claimed that by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Saledated November 29, 1988 which was notarized on January 9, 1989, the heirs of Gregorio sold to it Lot 1-A Psd-293076, being a portion of Lot 1, Psu-204785 covered by TCT No. T-463. CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition for annulment and held that there existed no extrinsic fraud which would justify the annulment of the questioned orders. SC- Petitioner sought the reversal of the CA ruling via a petition for certiorari. By Decisiondated May 28, 1993-dismissed the petition and affirmed the CA judgment. RTC-MAKATIPetitioner filed for Quieting of Title With Damages dismissed; CA- Pet. appealed- denied; Hence to SC. ISSUE; WON CA erred in affirming the validity of private respondents TCT despite the clear nullity of its mother title which was issued pending the appeal filed by Velasquez from the decision of the appellate court in CA- to SC. NOOO Petitionerasserts that the entries in his TCT contain errors and insists that TCT actually emanated from the application for registration of Emilio Gregorio in LRC Case pursuant to the Order of the Regional Trial covering lots also in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio by way of implementing the final judgment of said court in the case between Gregorio and Velasquez, as affirmed by the CA and this Court.
CA- Gregorio appealed the decision of CFI- reversed It attains finality on February 1, 1972however, a petition for review had been filed by Velasquez in SC-denied SC decision attained its finality on March 2, 1984 as per entry of judgment however, on October 31, 1972 decree over Lots 1, 3 and 4 of Plan Psu-204785 were issued by the LRA in the name of Gregorio in compliance with the order of CA
CFI-RIZAL Gregorio sought the annulment of the deed of sale over the said lots in favor of Luciana Parami-dismissed Gregorio appealed to the CA -which reversed the CFI and ordered the cancellation of certificate of title in the name of the Paramis and issuance of an OCT in favor of Gregorio covering Lots 1, 3 and 4, Plan Pasu-204785. On November 20, 1979, the court in the same case issued an order declaring the children (Ana, Paz, Carmen, Remedios and Rolando, all surnamed Gregorio) of the deceased Emilio Gregorio as his compulsory heirs to substitute the said plaintiff. Pursuant to the said decision, OCT No. 9587 in the name of Emilio Gregorio was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. S-91911 in favor of his heirs was issued
RTC-PASIG (hndna CFI) heirs of Emilio Gregorio filed an ex-parte motion for executiongranted this results to the duplication of titlesboth in the name of the same owners
ETO NA YONG TOP MANAGEMENT
RULLING: (Lispendensyong topic ng case) The premature issuance of the decree in favor of Emilio Gregorio and the corresponding original certificate of title in his name did not affect his acquisition of title over the subject land considering that Velasquezs petition was eventually dismissed. Neit her can
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petitioner, by reason alone of defective issuance of OCT, claim a right over the subject land superior to that acquired by the private respondent. properties are in litigation, petitioner merely stepped into the shoes of its vendors who lost in the case. Such vested right acquired by the private respondent under the final judgment in his favor may not be defeated by the subsequent issuance of another certificate of title to the heirs of Gregorio respecting the same parcel of land. For it is well-settled that being an involuntary transaction, entry of the notice of lispendens in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such claim. It is to be noted that the notation of the lispendens on the back of the owners duplicate is not mentioned fo r the purpose of constituting a constructive notice because usually such owners duplicate certificate is presented for the purpose of the annotation later, and sometimes not at all until [it is] ordered by the court. Strictly speaking, the lispendens annotation is not to be referred to as a part of the doctrine of notice; the purchaser pendente lite is affected, not by notice, but because the law does not allow litigating parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute so as to prejudice the opposite party. The doctrine rests upon public policy, not notice. Thus we have held that one who buys land where there is a pending notice of lispendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in interest. G.R. No. 104769 September 10, 2001
A reading of the annotations of encumbrances at the back of TCT which were carried over from TCT in the name of the Heirs of Gregorio,would show that during the pendency of Civil Case filed before the CFI of Rizal by private respondent and Trinidad, the latter caused the annotation of a Notice of LisPendensinvolving the same properties of the defendants therein, the heirs of Emilio Gregorio. The notice of lispendens was registered as Entry No. 21398on TCT Lispendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lispendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. The filing of a notice of lispendenshas a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. Once a notice of lispendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. CASE AT BAR:Petitioner being a mere transferee at the time the decision of the RTC of Pasig in Civil Case had become final and executory on December 6, 1988, it is bound by the said judgment which ordered the heirs of Emilio Gregorio to convey Lots 1, 2, 3 & 4, Psu-204875 in favor of private respondent and Trinidad. As such buyer of one of the lots to be conveyed to private respondent pursuant to the courts decree with notice that said
AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., INVESTCO, INC., and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA,respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 135016 September 10, 2001
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SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. INVESTCO, INC., substituted by ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent. If we allow provisional annotations as a valid form of annotation of notice of lis pendens, we would be eroding the very value of the indefeasibility of the torrens system. In the present case, there could be no valid annotation on the titles issued to AFPMBAI because the case used as basis of the annotation pending with the trial court was an action for collection of a sum of money and did not involve the titles to, possession or ownership of the subject property or an interest therein. This Court, in its final decision on the case categorized the action initiated by Investco, Inc. against Solid Homes, Inc. (Civil Case No. 40615 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila) as: "An action for collection of sums of money, damages and attorneys fees was filed with the Regional Trial Court (Civil Case No. 40615) of Pasig by private respondents Investco, Angela Perez Staley and Antonio Perez, Jr. against petitioner Solid Homes, Inc." Unquestionably, such action did not directly involve titles to, ownership or possession of the subject property, and, therefore, was not a proper subject of a notice of lis pendens. "The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent." Prevailing jurisprudence recognizes that "All persons dealing with property covered by the torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title." "The buyer is not even obligated to look
Facts: What is before the Court is Solid Homes, Inc.s MFR of the decision promulgated on March 3, 2000, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the titles issued to petitioner AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. (AFPMBAI), declaring it as buyer in good faith and for value. We find the motion without merit. 1. Solid Homes, Inc.s position is anchored on the preposition that a notice of lis pendens was duly annotated on the vendors title that must be deemed carried over to the titles issued to AFPMBAI, subjecting it to the final result of the litigation as a transferee pendente lite. The Revised Rules of Court allows the annotation of a notice of lis pendens in actions affecting the title or right of possession of real property, or an interest in such real property. We further declared that the rule of lis pendens applied to suits brought "to establish an equitable estate, interest, or right in specific real property or to enforce any lien, charge, or 7 encumbrance against it x x x." Pencil markings, which Solid Homes admits to be provisional, are not an accepted form of annotating a notice of lis pendens. The Court cannot accept the argument that such pencil annotation can be considered as a valid annotation of notice of lis pendens, and thus an effective notice to the whole world as to the status of the title to the land. The law requires proper annotation, not "provisional" annotation of a notice of lis pendens.
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beyond the certificate to investigate the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate." Hence, we ruled that AFPMBAI is a buyer in good faith and for value. Consequently, we reject movant Solid Homes, Inc.s contention that AFPMBAI is a transferee pendente lite of Investco, Inc. RULE 14 SUMMONS, SEC. 1 TO 14 Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation, Petitioner, - versus ORLANDO VILLA and LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA, Respondents. Facts: Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation (petitioner) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . . mandamus and damages against several defendants including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa (respondents). After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, Gregorio Zapanta (Zapanta), court process server, resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon respondents househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names. Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer, prompting petitioner to file a Motion to Declare Defendants[-herein respondents] in Default which the trial court granted. More than eight months thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, claiming that they officially received all pertinent papers such as Complaint and Annexes. Motion to Dismiss of the Solicitor General and the ORDER granting the Motion to Declare [them] in Default. And they denied the existence of two women helpers who allegedly refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they contended that assuming that the allegation were true, the helpers had no authority to receive the documents. By Order, the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein respondents five days to file their Answer. Respondents just the same did not file an Answer, drawing petitioner to again file a Motion to declare them in default, which the trial court again granted by Order. Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid service of summons. The trial court denied respondents Omnibus Motion by Order and proceeded to receive ex-parte evidence for petitioner. Respondents, via certiorari, challenged the trial courts Orders before the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, the trial court, by Decision, rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. By Decision, the appellate court annulled the trial courts Orders declaring respondents in default for the second time stating: A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution, it comes to the Court via petition for review on certiorari, arguing in the main that respondents, in filing the first Motion to Lift the Order of Default, voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit.
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It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of th e latters voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. Citing Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et al. It is clear that: (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.[7] (italics and underscoring supplied) In their first Motion to Lift the Order of Default dated January 30, 2006, respondents alleged xxxx 4. In the case of respondents, there is no reason why they should not receive the Orders of this Honorable Court since the subject of the case is their multimillion real estate property and naturally they would not want to be declared in default or lose the same outright without the benefit of a trial on the merits; 5. It would be the height of injustice if the respondents is [sic] denied the equal protection of the laws[;] 6. Respondents must be afforded Due process of Law as enshrined in the New Constitution, which is a basic right of every Filipino, since they were not furnished copies of pleadings by the plaintiff and the Order dated May 3, 2005; x x x x[9] Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision of April 29, 2008 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. G.R. No. L-68037 July 29, 1992 PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO M. JAPZON, Presiding Judge, Br. 36, RTC, Manila; City Sheriff and Deputy Sheriffs Nestor Macabilin & Teodoro Episcope, public respondents, JOSE LARA and ARSENIO PAED, private respondents. ROMERO, J.: Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary 1 injunction is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 dated August 30, 1983 in Civil Case No. 82-4416 entitled "Jose Lara and
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Arsenio Paed v. Willy Garcia, Emilio Macasieb, Domingo Natividad, Willy Manuel, and Paramount Insurance Co. Inc." ordering petitioner to pay private respondents an aggregate sum of P175,000.00 as insurer of a motor vehicle owned by Domingo Natividad despite the absence of jurisdiction over its persons. Facts: It appears that on May 27, 1978, Jose Lara contracted the services of a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Garcia, to transport his family, relatives and friends from Manila to Pangasinan. The said jeepney was then driven by Macasieb. On the very same date, within the vicinity of Barangay Parsolingan in Gerona, Tarlac, a Ford truck owned by Natividad, then driven by Manuel, while cruising the National Highway on its way to Manila, overtook an unidentified motor vehicle and in the process hit and sideswept the said passenger jeepney then driven by Macasieb. As a consequence of such mishap, the two (2) passengers of the jeepney, namely: Lara and Paed sustained physical injuries of varying degrees. The insurer of said truck is herein petitioner Paramount Surety and Insurance Co. Inc. On or about June 5, 1978, Lara and Paed filed a criminal case against Manuel for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Damage to Property. Accordingly, Lara and Paed filed on September 17, 1978 a civil case for damages against Garcia, Macasieb, Manuel, Natividad, and impleaded Paramount, the latter as insurer of the Ford truck. A certain Atty. Segundo Gloria filed a notice of appearance dated November 16, 1978 where he informed the court that he was appearing for and in behalf of the defendants Natividad, Manuel and Paramount. Subsequently, on December 14, 1978, he filed an answer with crossclaim and counterclaim. During the trial of the criminal case, accused Manuel pleaded guilty to the crime charged on, and was accordingly, sentenced to imprisonment of six months. In the interim period, a fire gutted the City Hall of Manila on November 19, 1981 and the records of the case were burned to ashes. Subsequently, on January 25, 1982, Lara and Paed filed a petition for reconstitution of the judicial records of the case which was approved without any opposition in the order of the court dated November 4, 1982. On February 17, 1983, the court reiterated its order before the reconstitution of the judicial records declaring defendants Natividad, Manuel and Paramount in default in view of their continued failure to appear during the trial of the case and allowed the Lara and Paed to make a formal offer of exhibits and considered the case submitted for decision. After protracted proceedings which lasted for almost five years, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lara and Paed, ordering the defendants to pay the former P175k by way of damages, attorneys fees and cost of the suit. A copy of the said decision was served on the petitioner's counsel, Atty. Segundo Gloria, on October 5, 1981. o No appeal from the judgment having been filed within the reglementary period or up to October 20, 1983, the same became final and executory. So, Lara and Paed, now private respondents, filed an ex-parte motion for execution of the said judgment and the trial court granted the same on July 10, 1984. It was only on March 3, 1984 that Paramount, now petitioner, filed a motion to set aside the Decision raising the issue that the court has not validly acquired jurisdiction over its person.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. Petitioner now claims that the Decision of the trial court dated August 30, 1983, should be set aside since the court has not validly acquired jurisdiction over its person, not having been validly served with summons and a copy of the complaint nor did it actively participate in the said proceedings.
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It alleged that Atty. Segundo Gloria was not its retained counsel at that time nor was he authorized by petitioner to act for and in its behalf; and that private respondents' claims for moral, exemplary and compensatory damages as well as attorney's fees are not recoverable from petitioner. Issue: Whether the court validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. Held: Yes. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons is intended to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against it. o The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Consequently, petitioner's contentions that it was not properly served with summons and that Atty. Segundo Gloria was not authorized to appear for and in its behalf are untenable. In the case at bar, although petitioner questioned the propriety of the service of summons, it however failed to substantiate its allegation that it was not properly served with summons. Hence, the disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed prevails. The records of the case, however, showed that all the pleadings, including the answer with crossclaim and counterclaim filed by Atty. Segundo Gloria stated that he represented the defendants Natividad, Manuel and Paramount. In fact, he even filed a notice of appearance informing the court that he is representing the said defendants. It is worth noting that this is not the first time petitioner raised the issue of warrant of jurisdiction over its person as well as warrant of authority of a lawyer to appear for and in its behalf. In the case docketed as G.R. No. 68066 entitled "Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna," this Court had the opportunity to rule that "the mere filling of the answer with crossclaim raised a presumption of authority to appear for petitioner Paramount Insurance Corporation . . . in accordance with Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Such presumption is rebuttable, but only by clear and positive proof. In the absence of such clear and positive proof, the presumption of authority . . . should prevail over the petitioner's self-serving denial of such authority.
SYJUCO, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE P. CASTRO Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus FACTS: After being served of Supreme Courts decision, Lims caused the filing with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of still another action, the third, also designed, like the first two, to preclude enforcement of the mortgage held by Syjuco. This time the complaint was presented, not in their individual names, but in the name of a partnership of which they themselves were the only partners: "Heirs of Hugo Lim." QC Judge Castro issued restraining order and summons of which Syjuco claims not to have received.Then, Sheriff Perfecto G. Dalangin submitted a return of summons to the effect that on December 6, 1982 he .. served personally and left a copy of summons together with a copy of Complaint and its annexes x x upon defendant's office formerly at 313 Quirino Ave., Paranaque, Metro-Manila and now at 407 Dona Felisa Syjuco Building, Remedios St., corner Taft Avenue, Manila, through the Manager, a person of sufficient age and discretion duly authorized to receive service of such nature, but who refused to accept service and signed receipt thereof. Lims through Atty. Canlas filed an ex-parte motion to declare Syjuco in default which was granted and by virtue of which the trial
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court held void the mortgage in question because it was executed by the Lims without authority from the partnership which was and had been since March 30,1959 the exclusive owner of the mortgaged property, and making permanent an injunction against the foreclosure sale that had issued on January 14,1983. Syjuco filed this petition praying that the default judgment rendered against it by Judge Castro in said Civil Case No. Q-36485 be annulled on the ground of lack of service of summons, res judicata and laches, and failure of the complaint to state a cause of action strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court
lacking such valid service, the Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner Syjuco, rendering null and void all subsequent proceedings and issuances in the action from the order of default up to and including the judgment by default and the order for its execution ELISEO BOTICANO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL CHU, JR., respondent. FACTS:
ISSUE: Was there a valid service of summons? HELD: The sheriffs return creates grave doubts about the correctness of the Judge's basic premise that summons had been validly served on Syjuco.
RATIO: the return is unspecific about where service was effected No safe conclusion about the place of service can be made from its reference to a former and a present office of Syjuco in widely separate locations, with nothing to indicate whether service was effected at one address or the other, or even at both failure to name the person served who is, with equal ambiguity, identified only as "the Manager" of the defendant corporation (petitioner herein) Since the sheriffs return constitutes primary evidence of the manner and incidents of personal service of a summons, the Rules are quite specific about what such a document should contain:SEC. 20. Proof of service The defective sheriffs return thus being insufficient and incompetent to prove that summons was served in the manner prescribed for service upon corporations, there is no alternative to affirming the petitioner's claim that it had not been validly summoned in Civil Case No. Q-36485
EFFECT OF INVALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS:
Petitioner Eliseo Boticano is the registered owner of a Bedford truck with plate No. QC-870, T-Pilipinas '77 which he was using in hauling logs for a certain fee. While loaded with logs, it was properly parked by its driver Maximo Dalangin at the shoulder of the national highway, it was hit and bumped at the rear portion by a Bedford truck owned by private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. and driven by Jaime Sigua, the former's co-defendant in this case. Manuel Chu, Jr. acknowledged ownership thereof and agreed with petitioner to shoulder the expenses of the repair of the damaged truck of the latter When Manuel Chu, Jr. failed to comply with aforesaid agreement as well as to pay damages representing lost income despite petitioner's demands, the latter (plaintiff in the lower court), filed a complaint on November 24, 1977 at the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VII at Cabanatuan City, against private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. (truck owner) and Jaime Sigua (his driver) both as defendants in Civil Case No. 6754 "Eliseo Boticano v. Manuel Chu, Jr. and Jaime Sigua" for damages. Summons was issued on December 12, 1977 but was returned unserved for defendant Jaime Sigua because he was no longer connected with San Pedro Saw Mill, Guagua, Pampanga, while another copy of the summons for Manuel Chu, Jr. was returned duly served on him thru his wife Veronica Chu at his dwelling house.
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On February 15, 1978 petitioner moved to dismiss the case against Jaime Sigua and to declare Manuel Chu, Jr. in default for failure to file responsive pleadings within the reglementary period. The motion was granted by the lower court in an Order dated September 4, 1978, allowing petitioner to adduce his evidence ex parte on October 17, 1978. Trial Court: From the evidence adduced by the petitioner the trial court November 28, 1978 found that private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. is responsible for the petitioner. On March 19, 1979 private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. filed with the trial court a "Notice of Appeal" and an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to file Record on Appeal which was granted by the trial court on the same date On March 26, 1979, Atty. Hermenegildo D. Ocampo, counsel of record of private respondent, filed a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel" while the new counsel Atty. Wilfredo G. Laxamana entered his appearance on April 18, 1979 and filed his record on appeal on the same date On May 4, 1979 petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for execution which was set for hearing on May 14, 1979 wherein private respondent's counsel personally appeared and opposed petitioner's motion while on the latter date petitioner filed his reply to opposition, On May 16, 1979 the trial court issued an order denying aforesaid motion, while on May 22, 1979, the trial court issued another order approving private respondent's Record on Appeal. CA the appealed judgment is hereby set aside, for being null and void. This case is directed to be remanded to the court of origin; that appellant be properly served with summons and a copy of the complaint; and that the necessary and appropriate proceedings or action be taken thereafter, as the circumstances and the case win warrant.With costs against appellee. o On April 20, 1981, petitioner filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration and on June 3, 1981 a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. On August 28, 1981 o respondent Court of Appeals issued an order denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration There is no dispute as to the facts of this case, as shown by the admission of private respondent to the extent of making an agreement with petitioner to shoulder the expenses of the repair of the damaged truck of the latter and the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's evidence fully supports the findings of facts of the trial court as well as its judgment under appeal. Neither does private respondent deny receipt of the summons in question. The bone of contention appears to be in the manner of service of said summons on the wife of private respondent at their dwelling instead of on private respondent himself personally. Petitioner contends in favor of validity of such service while private respondent maintains the opposite view which was sustained by respondent Court of Appeals to the effect that the Sheriff resorted to substituted service under Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, without first complying with the mode of personal service required under Section 7 of the same Rule.
ISSUE: Whether the question of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be raised for the first time on appeal. RULING: NO The question has been answered in the negative by the Supreme Court in a long line of decisions. In fact, one of the circumstances considered by the Court as indicative of waiver by the defendant-appellant of any alleged defect of jurisdiction over his person arising from defective or even want of process, is his failure to raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance and at the first opportunity. It has been held that upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even absence of process may be waived by a failure to make seasonable objections. Jurisdiction was properly acquired by the trial court over the person of respondent thru both service of summons and voluntary appearance in
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court; he was therefore properly declared in default for not having filed any answer; despite respondent's failure to file a motion to set aside the declaration of default, he has the right to appeal the default judgment but in the appeal only the evidence of the petitioner may be considered, respondent not having adduced any defense evidence; We agree with the findings of fact by the trial court. In fact, one of the circumstances considered by the Court as indicative of waiver by the defendant-appellant of any alleged defect of jurisdiction over his person arising from defective or even want of process, is his failure to raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance and at the first opportunity. It has been held that upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even absence of process may be waived by a failure to make seasonable objections. It has been pointed out that during the stages of the proceedings in the court below, defendant-appellant could have questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court but he did not. Private respondent voluntarily appeared thru counsel in the trial court. He filed a Notice of Appeal, Appeal Bond, Motion for Extension of Time to File Record on Appeal, Record on Appeal, Motion for Withdrawal of Appearance, Notice of Appearance and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Not only did he submit pleadings and motions, but he likewise appeared in person, thru counsel in the hearing held on May 14, 1979 at 8:30 a.m. and orally argued in open court on the pending incident. In the case at bar, there is no question that summons was timely issued and received by private respondent. In fact, he never denied actual receipt of such summons but confined himself to the argument that the Sheriff should prove that personal service was first made before resorting to substituted service, WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City in Civil Case No. 6754 "Eliseo Boticano v. Manuel Chu, Jr. and Jaime Sigua" is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. PAN-ASIATIC TRAVEL CORP., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. AMANTE S. PURISIMA, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, and DESTINATIONS TRAVEL PHIL., INC., respondents. Facts: * DESTINATIONS) filed a complaint against PAN-ASIATIC) for the refund of the price of alleged unutilized airplane tickets issued by the latter for passengers recruited by the former, which refund allegedly totalled P48,742.33 * DESTINATIONS filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. *After receipt of said Motion, PAN-ASIATIC, by way of special appearance, filed a Motion to Dismiss for the sole purpose of objecting to the trial court's jurisdiction over its person on the ground that it was not properly served with summons. *Two days after the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, DESTINATIONS filed on June 25, 1980 an amended complaint increasing its claim for reimbursement of refunds to P103,866.35. At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, PANASIATIC was informed of the filing of the amended complaint; hence, it withdrew its Motion to Dismiss. *a copy of the amended complaint and summons were served on PANASIATIC.However, instead of filing an Answer, it filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars which was granted by the trial court. *DESTINATIONS did not file a Bill of Particulars. Instead, on May 9, 1981, it served and filed a Motion to Admit attached "Second Amended Complaint" * Said Second Amended Complaint-admitted by the trial judge in an Order dated May 28, 1981, which Order was served on petitioner on June 9, 1981. However, no new summons was served on petitioner. *On July 15, 1981 DESTINATIONS filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default-granted *TC ruled for DESTINATIONS ,PAN-ASIATIC, received a copy of decision *On February 24, 1982, petitioner filed its Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Default and to Vacate Judgment by Default, alleging that the trial court's decision was rendered without jurisdiction because petitioner was never served with summons on the Second Amended Complaint, and that it was
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deprived of its day in court on account of fraud, accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence. DENIED *Motion for Reconsideration of the Order was filed and While the MR was pending, petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the same time withdrew its Motion for Reconsideration which withdrawal was granted by the trial court. * DESTINATIONS filed a Motion for Execution-granted while the appeal of PAN-ASIATIC, was Dismissed on the ground that the Decision had become final and executory and that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period. CA * PAN-ASIATIC filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals -dismissed,hence pet. Went to SC. SC: Petitioner contends that the Second Amended Complaint introduced new causes of action not alleged in the original nor in the first amended complaint. Hence, it is argued that new summons had to be served on petitioner, for the court to acquire jurisdiction over its (petitioner's) person. RULING: The Second Amended Complaint does introduce new causes of action. For while in the first amended complaint, DESTINATIONS prayed for reimbursement of refunds for unutilized airplane tickets only, in the Second Amended Complaint, there were claims for commissions and incentives, although the total amount of the claims was the same as the amount claimed in the first amended complaint. Summons on the first amended complaint was properly served on PANASIATIC. After which, the company filed several motions for extension of time within which to file responsive pleading, and then a Motion for Bill of Particulars, all of which motions were granted by the trial court. With the filing of these motions, PAN-ASIATIC had effectively appeared in the case and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, no new summons on the Second Amended Complaint was necessary, ordinary service being sufficient. In cases where a complaint is amended, the Rules of Court provide for the period within which the defendant must answer thus: SEC. 3. Answer to amended complaint.If the complaint is amended, the time fixed for the filing and service of the answer shall, unless otherwise ordered, run from notice of the order admitting the amended complaint. An answer filed before the amendment shall stand as an answer to the amended complaint, unless a new answer is filed within ten (10) days from notice of service as herein provided. THUS, PAN-ASIATIC was properly served with a copy of the Second Amended Complaint and that on June 9, 1981, it received a copy of the Order admitting said Second Amended Complaint. Since it failed to serve and file its Answer within fifteen (15) days from June 9, 1981, the trial court was correct in declaring the company in default, in holding trial ex parte, and in eventually rendering judgment by default. (Old rule pa yung gamit nila dito kaya IBA yung numbering ng sections sa Rule 14 in this case.) G.R. No. 79374 October 2, 1992 TOMAS G. MAPA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH LIII, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 82986 October 2, 1992 TOMAS G. MAPA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
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The validity of a substituted service of summons upon the petitioner is raised as the common issue in these two (2) cases. High Peak Mining, through its duly authorized corporate officers Encarnacion C. Tittel and Juergen Tittel, borrowed P11M (P5M, 3M and 3M) from the private respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) The loans are evidenced by 3 Promissory Notes executed on different dates. High Peak failed to pay the said loans. The first note become the subject matter of a complaint for the recovery of a sum of money with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment filed against High Peak, Mapa, in his personal capacity and as Chairman of High Peak's Board of Directors, and the abovenamed signatories to the promissory notes. This is the case involved in G.R. No. 79374. Civil Cases Nos. 142400 = G.R. No. 79374 RTC Branch 53 Deputy Sheriff Flores certified that on the 10th day of November 1982, he has served copies of summons with complaint and annexes upon the defendants High Peak Mining Exploration Corporation, Tomas G. Mapa, Encarnacion C. Tittel and Juergen Tittel, thru SUSAN O. DELA TORRE, a person of suitable age and discretion working therein, who claims to be the person authorized to received processess (sic) of this nature and who acknowledged the receipt thereof at second (sic) floor, First Midland Condominium Bldg., Gamboa Street, Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro-Manila. No answer was filed by the defendants so they were declared in default and ordering the LBP to present its evidence ex-parte. rendered a decision against the defendants; the latter's liability for the amount adjudged was made joint and several petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Set Aside Judgment on the ground that service of summons upon him and High Peak was fatally defective because it was not made in accordance with law. Defense: the sheriff's return did not show that the sheriff exerted efforts to personally serve the summons; thus, substituted service pursuant to Section 7 and 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court was not warranted. Even granting that the substituted service was proper, the actual service upon Susan O. dela Torre cannot be considered valid because (a) it was left not at defendant Mapa's residence and dela Torre was not residing therein, and (b) that he (Mapa) was not holding office or regular place of business at the second floor, First Midland Condominium Bldg., Gamboa St., Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila; he holds office in his residence. Petition DENIED, MFR DENIED.
CA petition for certiorari Petition Denied It ruled that the service of summons upon Susan O. dela Torre, an employee of the corporation, may be regarded as service upon an agent of a corporation within the meaning of Section 13 of Rule 14. MFR DENIED
The second and third Promissory Notes became the subject matter of a complaint for the recovery of a sum of money in G.R. No. 82986. Civil Case No. 82-13465 = G.R. No. 82986 RTC Deputy Sheriff Flores (AGAIN) certified that on the 10th day of November 1982, he has served copies of summons with complaint and annexes upon the defendants High Peak Mining Exploration Corporation, Tomas G. Mapa, Encarnacion C. Tittel and Juergen Tittel, thru SUSAN O. DELA TORRE. Mapa was again declared in default and was found liable.
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He filed Motion to Dismiss and Set Aside Judgment (AGAIN) on the ground that service of summons to him and the corporation was fatally defective reiterating the same arguments he raised in the similar motion he filed on the abovementioned case. 4 May 1987- partly granted the said motion by setting aside the decision because no jurisdiction was acquired over both the petitioner and High Peak. The court held that there is no showing that efforts were exerted by the sheriff to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner; the former immediately resorted to substituted service upon Susan O. dela Torre who cannot be considered a competent person in charge of the office. With respect to High Peak, Miss dela Torre, a mere employee thereof, is not one of those explicitly authorized to receive summons in behalf of a corporation under Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. However, if personal service cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service, as provided for in Section 8 of the abovementioned Rule 14, may suffice: Sec. 8 Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. This provision is a reproduction of Section 8, Rule 7 of the 1940 Rules of Court except that, inter alia, the work "promptly" in the latter was changed to "within a reasonable time" in the former. Of course, "within a reasonable time" contemplates a period of time longer than that demarcated by the word "prompt", and presupposes that a prior attempt at personal service, within a justifiable time frame as would be necessary to bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court, had failed. It is not shown when the summonses in Civil Cases Nos. 142400 and 8213465 were actually issued. What was shown is that in both cases, summons were served on 10 November 1982, these returns do not show that prior attempts at personal service were made by the Sheriff and that such attempts had failed, prompting the latter to resort to substituted service. In Keister vs. Navarro, this Court described how the impossibility of personal service should be shown: Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
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CA set aside (a) the 4 May 1987 Order of Branch 10 of the RTC of Manila in Civil Case No. 82-13465 reversing its earlier decision on the ground that the herein petitioner was not validly served with summons and (b) the 16 October 1987 Order denying the motion for reconsideration of the latter.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid substituted service of summons to MAPA in both cases? Held: NO Both are unquestionably actions in personam. Jurisdiction over the petitioner, as defendant therein, can therefore be acquired either by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction, as when he appears in court, or by service of summons upon him. Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court explicitly requires personal service of summons which is accomplished "by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him."
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service. It has been held that this method of service is "in derogation of the common law"; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be "used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute." . . . (72 C.J.S. 1053). The proof of service alluded to is the return required by Section 6 of Rule 14 which reads: Sec. 6. Return. When the service has been completed, the server shall give notice thereof, by registered mail, to the plaintiff or his counsel, and shall return the summons to the clerk who issued it, accompanied with the proof of service. The sheriff's returns in Civil Cases Nos. 142400 and 82-13465 are patently wanting it particulars that would justify the substituted service. Accordingly, it is fatally flawed and defective; on that basis alone, therefore, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. It must nevertheless be emphasized that the absence in the sheriff's return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Proof of prior attempts at personal service may be submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service. Unfortunately in these instant cases, the private respondent failed to present evidence during the hearings of the petitioner's separate motions to dismiss and set aside judgment to prove that substituted service of summons was indeed effected in strict compliance with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. During such hearings, the private respondent could also have presented evidence to show that the petitioner did in fact receive from Susan O. dela Torre the summonses, together with copies of the complaints, in both cases. If indeed the petitioner received the same, the requirement of due process would have been complied with. Petitioner never alleged that he did not in fact receive the summonses, such circumstance by itself cannot warrant the conclusion that he actually received from Susan dela Torre the said summonses and copies of the complaints. In the absence of a categorical admission no such inference to the contrary could be drawn. It was thus incumbent upon the private respondent to prove that Susan dela Torre delivered to the petitioner copies of both the summonses and the complaints. There was a valid service of summons on High Peak. Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides for the manner in which service of summons upon a private domestic corporation shall be made. It reads: Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, services may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The rationale for the above rule is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such a person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other words, the rule is meant to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. The summonses for High Peak in Civil Cases Nos. 142400 and 82-13465 were received by Susan O. dela Torre. While petitioner categorically admits that this Susan O. dela Torre is an employee of the corporation, he does not disclose her specific duties and responsibilities. Until rebutted by competent evidence, these returns would have to stand in the meantime for they enjoy the presumption of regularity. Susan O. dela Torre may thus be deemed an agent of High Peak for purposes of the aforesaid Section 13 of Rule 14. It is then logical to presume that she delivered the copies of the summonses and complaints to the corporation, considering especially the fact that she was working in the office of the said corporation as indicated in the complaints.
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G.R. No. 149380 July 3, 2002 FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, Petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and AURORA ROSARIO A. ORETA, Respondents. Facts: Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing HRET Resolutions Nos. 01-081 and 01-118. Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were candidates for the lone congressional district of Malabon-Navotas during the May 2001 national elections. Respondent Oreta filed with HRET an election protest against petitioner. The protest assailed the alleged electoral frauds and anomalies in one thousand three hundred eight (1,308) precincts of the Malabon-Navotas District. On 4 June 2001 HRET issued the corresponding summons for service upon petitioner. On 7 June 2001 HRET Process Server Pacifico Lim served the summons by substituted service upon a certain Gene Maga who signed the process servers copy of the summons and indicated thereon his position as "maintenance" along with the date and time of his receipt thereof as 7 June 2001 at 1:25 p.m. On 12 July 2001 HRET issued Resolution No. 01-081 which took note of petitioner Sandovals failure to file an answer to the election protest within ten (10) days from date of service of the summons on 7 June 2001 and entered in his behalf a general denial of the allegations set forth in the protest. The HRET also ordered the parties to proceed to preliminary conference. On 18 July 2001 the HRET ordered both petitioner and respondent to file their respective preliminary conference briefs. Petitioner received the order on 20 July 2001 as shown by the rubber stamp bearing his name and his district office in Navotas and indicating the time and date of receipt as well as the person with corresponding position, i.e., administrative staff, who received the order. Initially, on 1 August 2001, it was only respondent Oreta who filed the required preliminary conference brief. Instead of filing a preliminary conference brief, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 01-081 and prayed for the admission of his answer with counter-protest. He argued that the substituted service of summons upon him was improperly effected upon a maintenance man Gene Maga who was "neither a regular employee nor responsible officer at [petitioners] office." In Resolution No. 01-118, the HRET denied reconsideration of the assailed resolution and admiss ion of petitioners answer with counter-protest. Petitioner Sandoval filed the instant petition with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction questioning Resolutions Nos. 01081 and 01-118 and assailing the HRETs jurisdiction over his person. In due time, we denied the plea for injunctive writs. Petitioner was constrained to file his preliminary conference brief ad cautelam and to attend the preliminary conference, which had been postponed several times upon his request. Respondent Oreta filed her Comment to the instant petition. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment. The Solicitor General found that the substituted service of summons upon petitioner was faulty and thus recommended favorable action on the petition. HRET also submitted a Manifestation and Motion In lieu of Comment manifesting that as a nominal party in the instant case it was not filing a "separate comment" from the Solicitor Generals pleading. Issue: Was substituted service of summons validly effected on herein petitioner Federico S. Sandoval II in the election protest filed by herein respondent Aurora Rosario A. Oreta before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)? Ruling: It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant (i.e., petitioner herein) must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If however efforts
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to find him personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, i.e., by leaving copies of the summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. In our jurisdiction, for service of summons to be valid, it is necessary first to establish the following circumstances, i.e., (a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time, (b) efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and, (c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein or some competent person in charge of his office or regular place of business. It is also essential that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or officer's return itself and only under exceptional terms may they be proved by evidence aliunde. Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the respondent. We find no merit in respondent Oreta's austere argument that personal service need not be exhausted before substituted service may be used since time in election protest cases is of the essence. Precisely, time in election protest cases is very critical so all efforts must be realized to serve the summons and a copy of the election protest by the means most likely to reach the protestee. Hence, as regards the hierarchy in the service of summons, there ought to be no rational basis for distinguishing between regular court cases and election protest cases pending before the HRET. It is truly unfortunate that the purported substituted service of summons upon petitioner Sandoval was irregularly executed. Except for the time and place of service and the signature of the "maintenance" man who received the summons, there is absolutely nothing in the process server's affidavit of service indicating the impossibility of personal service of summons upon petitioner within a reasonable time. We can take judicial notice of the fact that petitioner is a very visible and active member of Congress such that to effect personal service upon him, all it would have taken the process server was a few hours more of a little extra work. Regrettably, the affidavit of service, indeed the entire record of this case, does not specify the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally upon petitioner. Upon this ground alone, the assailed service of summons should already fail miserably. Moreover, we do not find in the record, much less in the affidavit of service executed by the process server, that the summons and a copy of the election protest were served on a competent person in charge of petitioner's office. It must be emphasized that Gene Maga, the recipient of the summons, was merely a "maintenance" man who offered his services not only to petitioner but to anyone who was so minded to hire his assistance. His occupation as a freelance service contractor, not as employee of petitioner Sandoval, is very clear not only from the assertion of petitioner in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 01-081 that Maga was "neither a regular employee nor responsible officer at [petitioners] office" but also from Maga's own adverse admission under oath. Clearly, the fact that Maga was not an employee of petitioner as Representative of the Malabon-Navotas Congressional District but an independent contractor for odd maintenance jobs deserves credence since it is petitioner and Maga themselves who would be in the best position to verify the latter's professional status. It follows from this that Maga, not being an employee thereof, would be an incompetent person to receive the summons in petitioner's behalf. The mere fact that Maga allegedly identified himself to the process server as "member of the staff of [petitioner] Rep. Federico S. Sandoval II," does not ipso facto render him competent to receive the summons. By this alleged statement, Maga did not communicate any assurance that he could take delivery of the summons effectively to justify the process server to assume such authority. Even in the affidavit of service, which should have proved first hand the pertinent facts justifying substituted service, Maga's indisputable representation was only that of a "maintenance" man, an affirmation which should have immediately alerted the process server to the fact that he had no authority to receive the summons for petitioner Sandoval.
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In the absence of even the barest compliance with the procedure for substituted service of summons outlined in the Rules of Court, the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions does not apply. This violates the rule granting absolute preference to personal service of summons and, only secondarily, when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person and after compliance with stringent formal and substantive requirements, permitting resort to substituted service. In light of the defective and irregular substituted service of summons, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and consequently the period within which to file his answer with counter-protest did not start to run. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED and MODIFIED, the Answer with Counter-Protest of petitioner Federico S. Sandoval II is admitted to form part of the record of the election protest filed by respondent Aurora Rosario A. Oreta. G.R. No. 152776 October 8, 2003 HENRY S. OAMINAL, petitioner, vs. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and GUIA S. CASTILLO, respondents. Facts: Petitioner Henry Oaminal filed a complaint for collection against respondents Pablito and Guia Castillo with the RTC of Ozamis City. The complaint prayed that respondents be ordered to pay P1,500,000.00 by way of liquidated damages and P150,000.00 as attorney's fees. The summons together with the complaint was served upon Ester Fraginal, secretary of respondent Mrs. Castillo. On 06 June 2000, respondents filed their 'Urgent Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective' alleging that the Sheriff's Return has failed to comply with Section (1), Rule 14 of the Rules of Court or substituted service of summons. On 19 October 2000, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Declare Respondents in Default and to Render Judgment because no answer was filed by the latter. Respondents forthwith filed the following: a. Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim; b. Urgent Motion to Dismiss; c. Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim. The judge denied respondents' Motion to Dismiss, but admitted their Answer. RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondents filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order (TRO). In the main, they raised the issue of whether the trial court had validly acquired jurisdiction over them. The CA ruled that the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over respondents, because the summons had been improperly served on them. o It based its finding on the Sheriff's Return, which did not contain any averment that effort had been exerted to personally serve the summons on them before substituted service was resorted to. Hence, this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of respondents, because the latter never denied that they had actually received the summons through their secretary. Neither did they dispute her competence to receive it. Moreover, he argues that respondents automatically submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss or Admit Answer, a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and litis pendentia, and an Answer with Counterclaim.
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On the other hand, respondents insist that the substituted service of summons on them was improper. Thus, they allege that the trial court did not have the authority to render its Decision. Cubao, Quezon City thru MS. ESTER FREGINAL, secretary, who is authorized to receive such kind of process. She signed in receipt of the original as evidenced by her signature appearing on the original summons. "That this return is submitted to inform the Honorable x x x Court that the same was duly served." Nonetheless, nothing in the records shows that respondents denied actual receipt of the summons through their secretary, Ester Fraginal. o Their "Urgent Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective" did not deny receipt thereof; it merely assailed the manner of its service. o In fact, they admitted in their Motion that the "summons, together with the complaint, was served by the Sheriff on Ester Fraginal, secretary of the defendants at No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City on 30 May 2000." Moreover, respondents did not raise in their Motion to Dismiss the issue of jurisdiction over their persons; they raised only improper venue and litis pendentia. Hence, whatever defect there was in the manner of service should be deemed waived.
Issue: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondents. Held: Yes. Trial court acquired jurisdiction over the respondents. In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter's voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for by Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service. Resort to the latter is permitted when the summons cannot be promptly served on the defendant in person and after stringent formal and substantive requirements have been complied with. For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is necessary to establish the following circumstances: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's office or regular place of business. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances are stated in the proof of service or officer's return. In the present case, the Sheriff's Return failed to state that efforts had been made to personally serve the summons on respondents. Neither did the Return indicate that it was impossible to do so within a reasonable time. It simply stated: "THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the 30th day of May 2000, copies of the summons together with the complaint and annexes attached thereto were served upon the defendants Pablito M. Castillo and Guia B. Castillo at their place of business at No. 7, 21st Avenue,
Voluntary Appearance and Submission Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such flaw was cured and respondents are deemed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an Omnibus Motion to Admit the Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim, an Answer with Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration and Plea to Reset Pretrial. The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief -- to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration -- are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
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Having invoked the trial court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief, respondents cannot -- after failing to obtain the relief prayed for -- repudiate the very same authority they have invoked. April 22, 1999 RTC rendered its decision in favor of Sps. Mason and rescinding, terminating and cancelling the contract of lease. Decision became final on May 12, 1999. The following day, private respondent filed a motion to lift order of default, which was opposed by petitioners. RTC ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, without waiting for the same, the trial court on May 26, 1999, denied the motion to lift order of default because the decision rendered by RTC on April 27, 1999 has become final and executor on May 12, 1999. The motion for execution was granted in favor of Sps. Mason. Private respondent filed MR, which was denied. Private respondent filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution. It was denied for being dilatory. The branch sheriff was directed to proceed with the enforcement of the decision. CA ruled in favor of Columbus. It ordered the court a quo to require petitioner to file its answer and conduct further appropriate proceedings with reasonable dispatch. o CA held that the trial court erred when it denied private respondents motion to lift order of default. o Since private respondent was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an Answer. o Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that service of summons upon domestic private juridical entity shall be made through its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Since service upon private respondent was made through a certain Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk in private respondents office, as evidenced by the latters employment record, such service cannot be considered valid. o Consequently, the subsequent proceedings, including the order of default, judgment by default and its execution, were also invalid because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent.
MASON vs. CA This petition for review assails the decision, dated May 12, 2000, of the Court of Appeals and its resolution dated August 25, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54649 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The decision set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, in Civil Case No. 98-1567 and directed said court to conduct further proceedings on the complaint for rescission of lease contract. FACTS: Petitioners, Sps. Efren and Digna Mason owned two parcels of land located along Epifanio delos Santos Avenue in Pasay City. March 30, 1993 petitioners and private respondent Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation (Columbus) entered into a lease contract, under which Columbus undertook to construct a building worth ten million pesos (P10,000,000) at the end of the third year of the lease. Columbus failed to comply with this stipulation. November 13, 1998 petitioners filed a complaint for rescission of contract with damages against private respondent before Pasay RTC. Summons was served upon private respondent through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriffs return described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes. Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading, hence petitioners filed a motion to declare private respondent in default. The motion was granted and petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex-parte. The case was submitted for decision.
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o Judgments by default are not favored, especially so when there is a prima facie showing that the defaulting party has a meritorious defense, which in this case was grounded on the contract of lease sued upon, said the Court of Appeals. respondent did not question the validity of the service of summons but explained in paragraph three thereof that its failure to answer the complaint was due to its impression that the case would not be pursued by petitioners because the corporation already made payments to them. Private respondent counters that: Nowhere in the Millenium case did this Court expressly state or remotely imply that we have not abandoned the doctrine of substantial compliance. The Millenium case held that as a general rule, service upon one who is not enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14 of the then Rules of Court is invalid, according to private respondent. An exception is when the summons is actually received by the corporation, which means that there was substantial compliance with the rule. The case law applicable in the instant case, contends private respondent, is Villarosa which squarely provides for the proper interpretation of the new rule on the service of summons upon domestic corporation, thus: The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule. According to private respondent, service through Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk of private respondent and not one of those enumerated above, is invalid. *In short the supreme court sides with the respondents, Columbus. Ayreen Rejalde is not one of those enumerated to validly accept summons. JOSE vs. BOYON (2003) (Ang haba ng hayop na kaso na ito, sorry if its too long.)
ISSUE/S: a. Whether there was valid service of summons on private respondent for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction. (main issue) Whether private respondents motion to lift order of default was in order.
b.
HELD: Petition denied. CA decision is affirmed. RATIO: 1. Petitioners contend that while Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly specifies the persons authorized to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical entity, said provision did not abandon or render inapplicable the substantial compliance rule. a. Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation v. Tan effectively ruled that said provision is the statement of the general rule on service of summons upon corporation and the substantial compliance rule is the exception. b. Also, SC has upheld the substantial compliance rule when it allowed the validity of the service of summons on the corporations employee other than those mentioned in the Rule where said summons and complaint were in fact seasonably received by the corporation from said employee. c. Petitioners insist that technicality must not defeat speedy justice. d. Petitioners stress that even though the summons was received by a mere filing clerk in private respondents corporation, there was substantial compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 because the summons actually reached private respondent. This can be gleaned from private respondents motion to lift order of default where private
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Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 26, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS: Petitioners Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance against respondents Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. o This case was lodged to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa Issued summons to the respondents o Substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the BOYONs failed. o JOSEs filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. o Public respondent issued an Order granting the Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. o The respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring herein BOYONs in default for failure to file their respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, petitioners were allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte. Spouses Helen and Romeo Boyon are directed to execute the necessary document with the effect of withdrawing the Affidavit of Loss they filed and annotated with the Register of Deeds of Makati City so that title to the parcel of land subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Plaintiffs be transferred in their names. Also directed to pay Plaintiffs actual expenses in the amount of P20,000 and attorneys fees of P20,000 including costs of this suit Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United States of America, was surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth Boyon, of the resolution issued by the respondent court. o BOYONs filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. o The public respondent (le Judge) issued an Order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted BOYONs supposed loss of standing in court. MR, denied JOSEs moved for the execution of the controverted judgment which the respondent judge ultimately granted BOYONs filed before the CA, petition for certiorari under Rule 65 o The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and Orders. the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon them First, the sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of substituted service of summons, because he did not specify in the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate them and the impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them by personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by publication was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit for specific performance and therefore an action in personam. Consequently, the Resolution and the Orders were null and void, since the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction over respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that the proceedings in the lower court are null and void due to invalid and defective service of summons and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondents?
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RULING: No. Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that the service of summons on respondents was invalid. They submit that although the case filed before the trial court was denominated as an action for specific performance, it was actually an action quasi in rem, because it involved a piece of real property located in the Philippines. o in actions quasi in rem involving ownership of a parcel of land, it is sufficient that the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res. the summons by publication, which they effected subsequent to the substituted service of summons, was allegedly sufficient. Respondents conclude that even granting that the service of summons by publication was permissible under the circumstances, it would still be defective and invalid because of the failure of petitioners to observe the requirements of law, like an Affidavit attesting that the latter deposited in the post office a copy of the summons and of the order of publication, paid the postage, and sent the documents by registered mail to the formers last known address.1awphi1.n In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of 2 Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant
Respondents maintain that the proceedings in the trial court were null and void because of the invalid and defective service of summons. The Return of Summons issued by the process server of the RTC failed to state that he had exerted earnest efforts to effect the service of summons. He allegedly tried to serve it personally on them on July 22, 1998 at No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang He, however, resorted to substituted service on that same day, supposedly because he could not find respondents in the above address. They further allege that the person to whom he gave the summons was not even a resident of that address. Respondents argue that the case filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance and, therefore, an action in persona. The summons by publication was insufficient to enable the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondents.
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It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective. Defective Personal Service of Summons In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons. The service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective Summons by Publication Improper It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against the thing itself instead of against the defendants person; in the latter, an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject that individuals interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it. In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in personam. Having failed to serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process demands that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void.
A review of the records reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents. While the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process server obtained the information on their whereabouts. The pertinent portion of the Return of Summons is reproduced as follows: "That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon defendants Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon were made but the same were ineffectual and unavailing for the reason that defendant Helen Boyon is somewhere in the United States of America and defendant Romeo Boyon is in Bicol thus substituted service was made in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court." The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents.
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FILOMENA DOMAGAS, petitioner, vs.VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN, respondent. ( petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45) FACTS: MTC * Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC. * The summons and the complaint were NOT served on the respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her (the respondents) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondents house at No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, who received the same. * TC rendered judgment in favor of DOMAGAS * The respondent failed to appeal the decision and a writ of execution was issued. RTC * JENSEN filed annulment of decision of MTC against the petitioner on the ground that due to the Sheriffs failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. Respondents allegations: the service of the complaint and summons through substituted service on her brother, Oscar Layno, was improper because of the following: (a) when the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed, she was not a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, but of Oslo, Norway, and although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the summons and the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales; (b) she was in Oslo, Norway, at the time the summons and the complaint were served; (c) her brother, Oscar Layno, was merely visiting her house in Barangay Buenlag and was not a resident nor an occupant thereof when he received the complaint and summons; and (d) Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the summons and the complaint for and in her behalf. * In her answer the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the subject premises where Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons and complaint; that the service of the complaint and summons by substituted service on the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879, was proper since her brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for and in her behalf. * TC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. CA -affirmed the decision with modification - The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. -The CA ruled that the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. - since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of court and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the respondent, the defendant in Civil case. SC The petitioner assails the decision of the CA, alleging that the appellate court erred in holding that the respondents complaint for ejectment is an action quasi in rem. The petitioner insists that the complaint for forcible entry is an action in personam; therefore, substituted service of the summons and complaint on the respondent, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, is valid. The petitioner, likewise, asserts that Oscar Layno is a resident and a registered voter of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan; hence, the service of the complaint and summons on the respondent through him is valid. RULING: In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the
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country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficientThus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.33 In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. This can be gleaned from the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 1992 in which she declared that she was a resident of said barangay. Moreover, in the Real Estate Mortgage Contract dated February 9, 1999, ten days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed, the petitioner categorically stated that she was a Filipino and a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regul ar place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.The statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective. The Return of Service filed by Sheriff Eduardo J. Abulencia on the service of summons do not show that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latters residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return. Therefore, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void. G.R. No. 161417 February 8, 2007
MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, Respondent.
FACTS: Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in the Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank as evidenced by promissory notes. Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land in favor of the bank as a security for the loans. The real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco. Ernesto failed to settle the loans. RTC Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank) located at Jofelmor Bldg., Mortola Street, Cagayan de Oro City
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Ernesto received the summons but failed to file an answer. Hence, the spouses Biaco were declared in default Rendered a decision ordering defendants spouses BIACO (BOTH) to pay plaintiff bank. Hence, the property was forclosed of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is NOT a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court, such as petitioner in this case, must be personally served with summons as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If she cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be effected (1) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (2) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Petitioner sought the annulment of the RTCs decision contending that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made. CA denied petition for annulment of judgment, MFR DENIED
The Court of Appeals considered the two circumstances that kept petitioner in the dark about the judicial foreclosure proceedings: (1) the failure of the sheriff to personally serve summons on petitioner; and (2) petitione rs husbands concealment of his knowledge of the foreclosure proceedings. On the validity of the service of summons, the appellate court ruled that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. ISSUE: WON TERESA was denied due process when she was ordered to pay the bank along with his husband despite the lack of personal service of summons to her? HELD: YES The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature of the action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court likewise apply according to the nature of the action. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead
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There is a dimension to this case though that needs to be delved into. Petitioner avers that she was not personally served summons. Instead, summons was served to her through her husband at his office without any explanation as to why the particular surrogate service was resorted to. The Sheriffs Return of Service dated March 21, 2000 states: xxxx That on March 16, 2000, the undersigned served the copies of Summons, complaint and its annexes to the defendants Sps. Ernesto R. & Ma. Teresa Ch. Biaco thru Ernesto R. Biaco[,] defendant of the above-entitled case at his office EXPORT & INDUSTRY BANK, Jofelmore Bldg.[,] Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City and he acknowledged receipt thereof as evidenced with his signature appearing on the original copy of the Summons. Petitioner was denied due process and was not able to participate in the judicial foreclosure proceedings as a consequence. The violation of petitioners constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of summons on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial court. The trial court granted respondent PCRBs ex-parte motion for deficiency judgment and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against the spouses Biaco to satisfy the remaining balance of the award. In short, the trial court went beyond its jurisdiction over the res and rendered a personal judgment against the spouses Biaco. While the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on the res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing petitioners personal liability. In doing so without first having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did, the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered in the case. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. G.R. No. 169116 March 28, 2007 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, vs. SPS. IRENEO M. SANTIAGO and LIWANAG P. SANTIAGO, CENTROGEN, INC., REPRSENTED BY EDWIN SANTIAGO, Respondent. Facts: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, enjoining the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-131382 registered under the name of Spouses Ireneo and Liwanag Santiago. Petitioner BPI is a banking institution duly organized and existing as such under the Philippine laws. Private respondent Centrogen, Inc. (Centrogen) is a domestic corporation engaged in pharmaceutical business, duly organized and existing as such under the Philippine laws and represented in this act by its President, Edwin Santiago, son of private respondents Spouses Ireneo M. Santiago and Liwanag P. Santiago. On several occasions, private respondent Centrogen obtained loans from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) in different amounts, the total of which reached the sum P4,650,000.00, as evidenced by promissory notes executed by Edwin Santiago. As a security for a fraction of the loan obligation, Ireneo M. Santiago executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-131382 registered under his name and located at Sta Cruz, Laguna. The mortgage secured the principal loan in the amount of P490,000.00. Later on, the same property secured another loan obligation in the amount of P1,504,280.00. Subsequently, however, Centrogen incurred default and therefore the loan obligation became due and demandable.
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Meanwhile, FEBTC merged with BPI, with the latter as the surviving corporation. As a result, BPI assumed all the rights, privileges and obligations of FEBTC. RTC: BPI filed an Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property before the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. In order to validly effect the foreclosure, a Notice of Sale was issued by the Provincial Sheriff. On the same day, the Spouses Santiago were served with the copy of the Notice of Sale. copy of the summons to the Branch Manager of BPI Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch, as evidenced by the Sheriffs Return. Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and other procedural infirmities attendant to the filing of the complaint. In its Motion to Dismiss, BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch, was not one of those authorized by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court9 to receive summons on behalf of the corporation. The summons served upon its Branch Manager, therefore, did not bind the corporation. In addition, it was alleged that the complaint filed by the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen lacked a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping and was therefore dismissible. Finally, BPI underscored that the person who verified the complaint was not duly authorized by Centrogens Board of Directors to institute the present action as required by Section 23 of the Corporation Code.
Upon receipt of the Notice of Sale, the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Final Injunction and in the alternative, for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI. The complaint alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of P490,000.00, including interest thereon was fully paid as evidenced by a Union Bank Check in the amount of P648,521.51 with BPI as payee. Such payment notwithstanding, the amount was still included in the amount of computation of the arrears as shown by the document of Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage filed by the latter. In addition, the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen asseverated that the original loan agreement was for the amount of Five Million Pesos. Such amount will be supposedly utilized to finance the squalene project of the company. However, after the amount of Two Million Pesos was released and was accordingly used in funding the erection of the structural details of the project, FEBTC, in gross violation of the agreement, did not release the balance of Three Million Pesos that will supposedly finance the purchase of machineries and equipment necessary for the operation. As a result, the squalene project failed and the company groped for funds to pay its loan obligations. BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer to the Complaint filed by Spouses Santiago and Centrogen. On the same day, the Sheriff served a
In an Order, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and emphasized that the nature of the case merited its removal from the purview of Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Based on the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court,13 the RTC declared that the instant Order is still valid and binding despite non-compliance with the provisions of Section 11, Rule 14 of the same Rules. After summary hearing on the Spouses Santiago and Centrogens application for Temporary Restraining Order, the RTC, issued an Order enjoining the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the subject property until the propriety of granting a preliminary injunction is ascertained. The RTC ordered the service of new summons to BPI in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court.
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Issue: In compliance with the aforesaid Order, the Branch Clerk of Court caused the issuance of a new summons, a copy of which was served upon the Office of the Corporate Secretary of the BPI, as evidenced by the Sheriffs Return. The RTC issued an Order granting the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen. It enjoined the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the subject property pending resolution of the main action for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage or until further orders of the trial court. In issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, it rationalized that to allow the foreclosure without hearing the main case would work injustice to the complainant and since Spouses Santiago and Centrogen claimed that the first loan in the amount of P490,000.00 secured by the property subject of the extra-judicial sale had long been paid by Centrogen through a Union Bank Check presented as evidence. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by BPI was denied by the RTC in its Order. CA: Aggrieved, BPI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking the reversal of the adverse Orders of the RTC. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the assailed Orders of the RTC and dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by BPI. The Court of Appeals declared that jurisdiction was acquired upon the service of new summons. Before the assailed Orders were therefore issued, the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of BPI. Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of BPI when the original summons was served upon the branch manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch. Ruling: We are not persuaded. Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. Applying the aforestated principle in the case at bar, we rule that the service of summons on BPIs Branch Manager did not bind the corporation for the branch manager is not included in the enumeration of the statute of the persons upon whom service of summons can be validly made in behalf of the corporation. Such service is therefore void and ineffectual. However, upon the issuance and the proper service of new summons, before the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued, whatever defect attended the service of the original summons, was promptly and accordingly cured. It bears stressing, that the Branch Clerk of Court issued a new summons which was properly served upon BPIs Corporate Secretary, as evidenced by the Sheriffs Return. The subsequent service of summons was neither disputed nor was it mentioned by BPI except in a fleeting narration of facts and therefore enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The Process Servers Certificate of Service of Summons is a prima facie evidence of facts set out in that certificate.
Undaunted, BPI filed this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. BPI vehemently insists that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over its person and consequently, the Order issued by the RTC, permanently enjoining the foreclosure sale, was therefore void and does not bind BPI.
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Inarguably, before the Order granting the application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued, the RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the person of BPI by virtue of the new summons validly served on the Corporate Secretary. The fact that the original summons was invalidly served is of no moment since jurisdiction over BPI was subsequently acquired by the service of a new summons. In the case of G&G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,2 this Court made the following pronouncements: In explaining the test on the validity of service of summons, Justice Florenz Regalado stressed that substantial justice must take precedence over technicality and thus stated: The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of summons is whether the same and the attachments thereto where ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances that no undue prejudice is sustained by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full opportunity to present its responsive pleadings. This is but in accord with the entrenched rule that the ends of substantial justice should not be subordinated to technicalities and, for which purpose, each case should be examined within the factual milieu peculiar to it. In any event, as it is glaringly evident from the records of the case that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was validly acquired by the court by the valid service of a new summons before the writ of preliminary injunction was issued and guided by jurisprudential pronouncements heretofore adverted to, we hold that the proceedings attendant to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction were regular. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision, and the Resolution, rendered by the Court of Appeals, are hereby AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 147937 November 11, 2004 THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE & GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 10, and MILAGROS P. MORALES, respondents. Facts: The petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized under Philippine laws with principal address at the Philamlife Building, United Nations Avenue, Ermita, Manila, and with a regional office in Davao City. Respondent Milagros P. Morales filed a Complaint for damages and reimbursement of insurance premiums against the petitioner with the RTC of Davao City. o The complaint specifically stated that the petitioner could be served with summons and other court processes through its Manager at its branch office located at Rizal St., Davao City. Thereafter, Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon the petitioner's Davao regional office, and was received by its Insurance Service Officer, Ruthie Babael. Afterwards, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of summons. o It contended that summons was improperly served upon its employee in its regional office at Davao City, and that the said employee was not among those named in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom service of summons may be properly made. The respondent filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that summons and other court processes could also be served at its principal office at the Philamlife Building, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, through the president or any of its officers authorized to receive summons.
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RTC denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss and directing the issuance of an alias summons to be served at its main office in Manila. The RTC held that the improper service of summons on the petitioner is not a ground for dismissal of the complaint considering that the case was still in its initial stage. o It ruled that the remedy was to issue an alias summons to be served at the principal office of the petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order. o In the meantime, the petitioner received an Alias Summons together with a copy of the amended complaint. The RTC denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and supplemental oral motion to strike out the amended complaint. o The RTC reiterated that it would be improper to dismiss the case at its early stage because the remedy would be to issue an alias summons. The petitioner filed with the CA a special action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, assailing the orders of the RTC. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the RTC. o The CA held that the service of the alias summons on the amended complaint upon the authorized officers of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila vested the RTC with jurisdiction over its person. The CA, likewise, denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review. to Sec. 1(a), Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondents contention: The respondent, for her part, avers that the receipt of the amended complaint together with the alias summons by the petitioner cured the defects in the first service of summons. She argues that any procedural defect on the service of alias summons is not sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the case.
Issue: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner as defendant therein. Held: Yes. The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner due to lack of jurisdiction over its person. A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a Court complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served on said defendant. The Rules on Civil Procedure provide that the amended complaint supersedes the complaint that it amends. Contrary to the petitioners claim, the summons issued on the amended complaint does not become invalid. In fact, summons on the original complaint which has already been served continues to have its legal effect. o Thus, where the defendant has already been served summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint may be served upon him without need of another summons.
Petitioners contention: The petitioner avers that Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is strict as to the persons upon whom valid service of summons on a corporation can be made. o The petitioner argues that where summons is improperly served, it becomes ministerial upon the trial court, on motion of the defendant, to dismiss the complaint pursuant
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Conversely, when no summons has yet been validly served on the defendant, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on him. In the instant case, since at the time the complaint was amended, no summons had been properly served on the petitioner and it had not yet appeared in court, new summons should have been issued on the amended complaint. Hence, the CA was correct when it held that, technically, the trial court should have ordered the issuance of an original summons, not an alias summons. After all, an alias summons is merely a continuation of the original summons. In this case, however, there was no sense in issuing an alias summons on the original complaint since the complaint had already been amended. The trial court should have instead issued a new summons on the amended complaint. Nonetheless, the CA deemed it necessary to treat the alias summons as a matter of nomenclature, considering that the rationale behind the service of summons to make certain that the corporation would promptly and properly receive notice of the filing of an action against it has been served in this case. The CA held that it would be a great injustice to the respondent if the complaint would be dismissed just because what was issued and served was an alias summons; that she would be made to file a new complaint and thus, incur further monetary burden. o The complaint alleged that Pacleb secured a judgment by default from California Superior Court ordering the petitioners to pay $56,204.69 as loan repayment and share in the profit. The summons was served on petitioners' address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna, as was alleged in the complaint, and received by a certain Marcelo M. Belen. Atty. Alcantara entered his appearance on behalf of the petitioners and filed an answer to the complaint and alleged that the petitioners were actually resident of California, USA contrary to respondents averments. He also claimed in his answer that pe titioners liability was extinguished by the release of an abstract judgment in the same collection case. For petitioners failure to attend the pre-trial conference, the RTC ordered an ex-parte presentation of evidence in favor of respondents. However, before the scheduled presentation of evidence, Atty. Alcantara filed a motion to dismiss citing the judgment of dismissal issued by the Court of California. The RTC suspended the said presentation pending the submission of the order of the Court of California. But Atty. Alcantara failed to present the said order of dismissal. Subsequently, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. The respondents then filed an amended complaint and explained that they were forced to withdraw the case in California for high cost of litigation. Petitioners claimed in their answer the defenses of lack of cause of action, res judicata, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of the defendants. Petitioners failed to appear on the pre-trial conference, and were declared in default. Atty. Alcantara passed away without the RTC being informed at such fact until much later. And the copy of the order intended for Atty. Alcantara was returned with notation Addressee Deceased. And on Aug. 14, 2003, it wa s then sent to the purported address of the petitioners and was received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla. Upon the motion of the respondents, the RTC issued a writ of execution. On 16 December 2003, Atty. Carmelo B. Culvera entered his appearance as counsel for petitioners. On 22 December 2003, Atty. Culvera filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution (With Prayer to
Sps. Belen v Chavez Petitioner: SPS. DOMINGO AND DOMINGA BELEN
Respondents: HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, SPS. SILVESTRE AND PATRICIA PACLEB Facts:
A petition for review on certiorari which sought to nullify the RTC decision. Sps. Pacleb filed an action for enforcement of foreign judgment against Sps. Belen before the RTC of Batangas.
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Defer Further Actions). On 6 January 2004, he filed a Notice of Appeal from the RTC Decision averring that he received a copy thereof only on 29 December 2003. The RTC denied the motion to quash as well as the MR. On appeal under Rule 65, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and the subsequent MR. present address of the party is known and if the person who receives the same is not the addressee, he must be duly authorized by the former to receive the paper on behalf of the party. In this case, since the filing of the complaint, petitioners could not be physically found in the country because they had already become permanent residents of California, U.S.A. It has been established during the trial that petitioners are former residents of Alaminos, Laguna, contrary to the averment in the complaint that they reside and may be served with court processes thereat. The service of the RTC decision at their former address in Alaminos, Laguna is defective and does not bind petitioners. Santos vs. PNOC Exploration Corp., G.R. No. 170943, Sept. 23, 2008 Rationale: As a general rule, when a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law . The exception to this rule is when service upon the party himself has been ordered by the court. In cases where service was made on the counsel of record at his given address, notice sent to petitioner itself is not even necessary. In this case, the Court ruled that upon the death of Atty. Alcantara, the lawyer-client relationship between him and petitioners has ceased, thus, the service of the RTC decision on him is ineffective and did not bind petitioners. The subsequent service on petitioners' purported "last known address" by registered mail is also defective because it does not comply with the requisites under Section 7 of Rule 13 on service by registered mail. It contemplates service at the present address of the party and not at any other address of the party. Service at the party's former address or his last known address or any address other than his present address does not qualify as substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 7, Rule 13. Therefore, service by registered mail presupposes that the This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA. FACTS: Dec. 23, 2002. PNOC filed a complaint before the RTC Pasig for collection of sum of money from the unpaid balance of car loan Santos obtained while he was still a member of its board of directors. Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known address. Subsequently, on respondent's motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the advertising manager of Remate and an affidavit of service of respondent's employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner's last known address. The petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, and upon motion from respondent the case was set for ex parte reception of evidence. After presentation by PNOCs evidence, the case was deemed submitted for decision on October 15, 2003. On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer." He alleged that
Issue: W/N there was a valid service of the copy of the RTC decision on the petitioners. NO. Held: Petition was GRANTED. The notice of appeal was GIVEN DUE COURSE.
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the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due process as he was not notified of the ex parte presentation of evidence order. The RTC denied the MR and held that the rules did not require the affidavit of service by mail to be executed by the clerk of court. Further, due process was properly observed. And it also denied the admission of the answer of Santos for filing beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner appealed before the CA, but the court sustained the RTC orders. And the subsequent MR was also denied. diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order. The Court said that the in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only. However, this has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. 2. Whether the affidavit of service of the copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court. NO. Whether the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner for improper service of summons. NO. RULING: Petition was DENIED. 1. The Court ruled that since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication. Sec. 14 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. - In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by The Rules of Court provides that service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the defendant's last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address." The Court said the rules do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication. 3. The Court ruled that the petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer." This was equivalent to service of
ISSUES: Whether the rule on service by publication applies only in actions in rem. NO.
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summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Sec. 20 Rule 14 Rules of Court Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. ALEXANDER TAM WONG, Petitioner, vs.CATHERINE FACTORKOYAMA, Respondent. (For Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 ) Facts: RTC * a Complaint for specific performance, sum of money, and damages, filed with by Catherine Factor-Koyama (Koyama) against Wong, * RTC issued summons addressed to Wong at his residence, No. 21 West Riverside Street, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. However, the original summons and the accompanying copy of the Complaint and its Annexes were eventually returned to the RTC by Sheriff IV Renebert B. Baloloy (Sheriff Baloloy), who indicated in his Sheriffs Return that said court process should already be deemed "DULY SERVED." According to his Return, Sheriff Baloloy had repeatedly attempted to serve the summons at Wongs residential address on 27 July 2007, 8 August 2007, and 10 August 2007, but Wong was always not around according to the latters housemaids, Marie Sandoval (Sandoval) and Loren Lopez (Lopez). Sheriff Baloloy then attempted to leave the summons with Criz Mira (Mira), Wongs caretaker, who is of legal age, and residing at the same address for two and a half years, but Mira refused to acknowledge or receive the same. * Koyama moved for the RTC to declare him in default, and to allow her to present her evidence ex parte and/or to render judgment in her favor granted * Wong subsequently filed with the RTC, by registered mail sent on 5 October 2007, a Manifestation claiming that he did not receive any summons from said court. According to him, he was only informed unofficially by a tricycle driver on 27 September 2007 regarding papers from a court in Caloocan City, which the tricycle driver returned to the court after failing to locate Wong. This prompted Wong to file an inquiry12 dated 28 September 2007 with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Caloocan City as regards any case that might have been filed against him. In response, the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Caloocan City issued a Certification dated 3 October 2007 bearing the details of Civil Case which Koyama had instituted against him. Wong asserted that he would not hesitate to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, should the proper procedure be observed -denied * Wong, by special appearance of counsel, then filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. asserting, among other grounds, that there was no service of summons upon him, hence, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; and that he was not given the opportunity to oppose Koyamas Motion to have him declared in default-DENIED CA * Wong went to CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 insisting that there was no valid service of summons upon him, and that he was not notified of Koyamas Motion to have him declared in default -DISMISSED * MR- DENIED SC Wong avers herein that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person since he was not served the summons. RULING :Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. In a civil action, jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is null and void. Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant through the judgment of a court,and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner described in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provide: SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
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SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by leaving the copies at the defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. It is well-established that a summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished.The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself. Service of summons in person of defendants is generally preferred over substituted service.Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another to whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. The Court requires that the Sheriffs Return clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service.Proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective. IN THE CASE AT BAR: Sheriff Baloloys Return dated 14 August 2007 described the circumstances surrounding the service of the summons upon Wong. The Court, after a careful study of Sheriff Baloloys Return, finds that he improperly resorted to substituted service upon Wong of the summons for Civil Case. Apart from establishing that Sheriff Baloloy went to Wongs residence on three different dates, and that the latter was not around every time, there is nothing else in the Sheriffs Return to establish that Sheriff Baloloy exerted extraordinary efforts to locate Wong. During his visits to Wongs residence on 27 July 2007 and 10 August 2007, Sheriff Baloloy was informed by the housemaids that Wong was at his office. There is no showing, however, that Sheriff Baloloy exerted effort to know Wongs office address, verify his presence thereat, and/or personally serve the summons upon him at his office. Although Wong was out of town when Sheriff Baloloy attempted to serve the summons at the formers residence on 8 August 2007, there was no indication that Wongs absence was other than temporary or that he would not soon return. Evidently, the Return failed to relay if sufficient efforts were exerted by Sheriff Baloloy to locate Wong, as well as the impossibility of personal service of summons upon Wong within a reasonable time. Sheriff Balolo ys three visits to Wongs residence hardly constitute effort on his part to locate Wong; and Wongs absence from his residence during Sheriff Baloloys visits, since Wong was at the office or out-of-town, does not connote impossibility of personal service of summons upon him. It must be stressed that, before resorting to substituted service, a sheriff is enjoined to try his best efforts to accomplish personal service on the defendant. And since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. NEVERTHELES even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. Section 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court recognizes that: Section 20. Voluntary Appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong by virtue of his voluntary appearance before it in Civil Case by virtue of an Order dated 20 November
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2008 (while this petition is pending in SC) allowing Wong to cross-examine Koyama. Wong, through his counsel, took advantage of the opportunity opened to him by the said Order and aggressively questioned her during the 23 January 2009 hearing, despite his knowledge that the RTC had not yet lifted the 25 September 2007 Order declaring him in default. By actively participating in the 23 January 2009 hearing, he effectively acknowledged full control of the RTC over Civil Case and over his person as the defendant therein; he is, thus, deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of said trial court. The Court further stresses the fact that the RTC already rendered a Decision in Civil Case on 8 July 2009. Wong filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal on 10 August 2009. Given these the Court deems it unnecessary to still address the issue of whether Wong was improperly declared in default by the RTC in its Order dated 25 September 2007. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner. G.R. No. 177007 July 14, 2009 present in the courtroom. The counsel of respondent spouses Mogol took hold of the summons and the copy of the complaint and read the same. Thereafter, he pointed out to the process server that the summons and the copy of the complaint should be served only at the address that was stated in both documents, i.e., at 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City, and not anywhere else. The counsel of respondent spouses Mogol apparently gave back the summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server and advised his clients not to obtain a copy and sign for the same. As the process server could not convince the respondent spouses Mogol to sign for the aforementioned documents, he proceeded to leave the premises of the courtroom. the process server of the MeTC of Manila issued a Return on Service of Summons - UNSERVED, declaring that: This is to certify that on October 3, 2000, the undersigned tried to serve a copy of the Summons issued by the Court in the above-entitled case together with a copy of Complaint upon defendant Leodegario Mogol[,] Jr. and Alicia Mogol doing business under the name/style of "Mr. Homes Appliance" (sic) at MTC (sic) Branch 24 Ongpin (sic) (courtroom) as requested by plaintiff counsel, but failed for the reason that they refused to received (sic) with no valid reason at all. Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default alleging that respondent spouses Mogol at the refusal to accept the summons for no valid reason at all constitutes a valid service of summons. Respondent spouses Mogol filed an Opposition to the Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default. They posited that Section 3, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court requires that the complaint must contain the names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, the process server should have taken notice of the allegation of the complaint, which referred to the address of respondent spouses Mogol wherein court processes may be served. If such service, as alleged in the complaint, could not be complied with within a reasonable time, then and only then may the process server resort to substituted service.
SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ALICIA AND LEODEGARIO MOGOL, JR., Respondents. FACTS: RTC Petitioner Sansio alleged that respondent spouses Mogol purchased from petitioner air-conditioning units and fans worth P217,250.00 and P5,521.20, respectively. Respondent spouses Mogol apparently issued postdated checks as payment therefor, but said checks were dishonoured. Petitioner Sansio filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against respondent spouses Mogol for their failure to settle their obligation. The process server of the MeTC of Manila served the summons and the copy of the complaint on respondent spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24. Respondent spouses were in the said premises. Respondent spouses Mogol referred the same to their counsel, who was also
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RESPONDENTS were declared in default it ruled that Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not specify where service is to be effected. For obvious reasons, because service of summons is made by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, the same may be undertaken wherever the defendant may be found. Respondent spouses Mogol were, thus, validly served with summons and a copy of the complaint. For failing to file any responsive pleading before the lapse of the reglementary period therefor, the Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default filed by petitioner was declared to be meritorious. respondent spouses Mogol Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Injunction DISMISSED SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself, wherever he may be found; that is, wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines. There was already a valid service of summons in the persons of respondent spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24. The act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy of the complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was done with the latters behest and consent. Already accomplished was the operative act of "handing" a copy of the summons to respondent spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was already acquired by the MeTC of Manila, Branch 25. That being said, the subsequent act of the counsel of respondent spouses of returning the summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server was no longer material. Furthermore, the instruction of the counsel for respondent spouses not to obtain a copy of the summons and the copy of the complaint, under the lame excuse that the same must be served only in the address stated therein, was a gross mistake. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not require
CA Reversed RTCs decision - no valid service of summons to the respondent spouses because after the MTC incident, there was no longer any attempt to serve the summons to the spouses
ISSUE: WON the said summons was actually served upon the defendant. HELD: YES. A summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. In a civil action, jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction, or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is null and void. Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant through the judgment of a court, and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which read:
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that the service of summons on the defendant in person must be effected only at the latters residence as stated in the summons. Respondent spouses Mogol principally argue that Section 6 of Rule 14 cannot be singled out without construing the same with Section 7. They posit that, in a civil case, summons must be served upon the defendants personally at the designated place alleged in the complaint. If the defendants refuse to receive and sign the summons, then the process server must tender the same to them by leaving a copy at the residence of the defendants. If the summons cannot be served in person because of the absence of the defendants at the address stated, then the same can be served by (1) leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or (2) leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Said arguments must fail, for they have no leg to stand on. Axiomatically, Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court cannot be construed to apply simultaneously. Said provisions do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons, which can either be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience to the parties. Under our procedural rules, service of summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred over substituted service. Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method, since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit, even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the partys residence or upon a competent person in charge of the partys office or place of business. B. D. LONG SPAN BUILDERS, INC., Petitioner, - versus -
R. S. AMPELOQUIO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., Respondent.
Facts: This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 14 July 2005 and Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 78259. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 206 (RTC). Petitioner B. D. Long Span Builders, Inc. and respondent R. S. Ampeloquio Realty Development, Inc. are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Petitioner and respondent entered into an Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to render rip rapping construction services at respondents Ampeloquio International Resort in Ternate, Cavite, for the contract price of P50 million. On the same day, the parties entered into a second Agreement for the same construction project, stipulating a contract price of P30 million, hence bringing the total contract price of the project to P80 million. Both Agreements required petitioner to deposit with respondent a cash bond of one percent (1%) of the contract price, to be returned to petitioner upon completion of the project. In compliance, petitioner deposited with respondent a cash bond amounting to P800,000. Respondent failed to fulfill its obligations under the Agreements, resulting in the cancellation of the project. Petitioner demanded the return of the P800,000 cash bond, but respondent refused to do so. Petitioners legal counsel sent two (2) demand letters to respondent, but the latter still refused to return the P800,000 cash bond.
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RTC: Petitioner (plaintiff) filed with the RTC a complaint for rescission of contract and damages against respondent (defendant). Summons and a copy of the complaint were served on respondent, through its staff member, Romel Dolahoy. Respondent failed to file an Answer or any responsive pleading to the complaint. Upon motion of petitioner, the RTC issued an Order, declaring respondent in default, and allowing petitioner to present evidence ex parte. Judgment is rendered declaring the aforesaid contracts entered into by plaintiff with defendant, for the rip rapping construction project at the Ampeloquio International Resort in Ternate, Cavite, as RESCINDED. CA: Upon receipt of the RTC decision, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. After considering the pleadings filed by petitioner and respondent, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was invalid service of summons upon respondent, and hence the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over said respondent. Ruling: We find the appeal without merit. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. In case of a domestic private juridical entity, the service of summons must be made upon an officer who is named in the statute (i.e., the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel), otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. However, if the summons cannot be served on the defendant personally within a reasonable period of time, then substituted service may be resorted to. Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective. In this case, the Return by Process Server provides: This is to certify that: On October 17, 2002 at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning, undersigned tried to cause the service of the Summons together with the attached complaint & its annexes in the above-entitled case to the defendant at his given address on record. Mr Romel Dalahoy, a staff of said Realty received the said Summons with the attached complaint & its annexes as evidenced by the former's
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signature as appearing on the original copy of the aforesaid Summons. Henceforth, the said Summons with the attached complaint & its annexes to Atty. Evangeline V. Tiongson, Clerk of Court V, this Court, is respectfully returned, DULY SERVED, by substituted service. October 17, 2002, Muntinlupa City Angelito C. Reyes Process Server Clearly, the summons was not served personally on the defendant (respondent) through any of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14; rather, summons was served by substituted service on the defendants staff member, Romel Dolahoy. Substituted service was resorted to on the servers first attempt at service of summons, and there was no indication that prior efforts were made to render prompt personal service on the defendant. Moreover, nothing on record shows that Romel Dolahoy, the staff member who received the summons in respondents behalf, shared such relation of confidence ensuring that respondent would surely receive the summons. Thus, following our ruling in Orion, we are unable to accept petitioners contention that service on Romel Dolahoy constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service. Petitioners contention that respondents filing of Notice of Appeal effectively cured any defect in the service of summons is devoid of merit. It is wellsettled that a defendant who has been declared in default has the following remedies, to wit: he may, at any time after discovery of the default but before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense; if judgment has already been rendered when he discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; if he discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and he may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. Thus, respondent, which had been declared in default, may file a notice of appeal and question the validity of the trial courts judgment without being considered to have submitted to the trial courts authority.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 78259. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings upon valid service of summons to respondent. G.R. No. 171916 December 4, 2009
CONSTANTINO A. PASCUAL, substituted by his heirs, represented by Zenaida Pascual, Petitioner, vs. LOURDES S. PASCUAL, Respondent. Facts: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Damages before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan against respondent. The process server, in his Return of Service dated May 21, 2002, reported, among others that: The undersigned Process Server of this Honorable Court went at defendant's given address at No. 4 Manikling St., Talayan Village, Quezon City on May 20, 2002 to serve the summons and copy of the Complaint
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together with the annexes thereto connection with the above-entitled case. in defendant's residence but the undersigned was not permitted to go inside her house and was given information by her maid that the defendant was not there. The defendant's car was parked inside her house and inquiries/verification made on her neighbors revealed that the defendant was inside her house at the time of service of said summons and probably did not want to show-up when her maid informed her of undersigned's presence. WHEREFORE, the undersigned court process server respectfully returned the alias summons dated May 29, 2002 issued by the Hon. Court "UNSERVED" for its information and guidance. Malolos, Bulacan, May 30, 2002. WHEREFORE, the original summons and copy of the complaint is hereby returned to the Honorable Court NOT SERVED. Malolos, Bulacan, May 21, 2002. Thereafter, an alias summons was issued by the RTC and, on May 29, 2002, the following report was submitted: The undersigned, on May 29, 2002, made a 3rd attempt to serve the alias summons issued by the Hon. Court relative with the above-entitled case at the given address of the defendant. The undersigned, accompanied by the barangay officials of the said place, proceeded at Subsequently, on August 14, 2002, the process server returned with the following report, stating that a substituted service was effected: This is to certify that on the 14th day of August, 2002, I personally went at Dr. Lourdes Pascual's residence at #4 Manikling Street, Talayan Village, Quezon City, to serve the copy of the Summons dated August 12, 2002, together with a copy of the Complaint and its annexes thereto. Defendant Dr. Lourdes Pascual was out during the time of service of the said summons and only her housemaid was present. The undersigned left a copy of the same to the latter who is at the age of reason but refused to sign the same.
At the time of the service of the said summons, the defendant was not at her home and only her maid was there who refused to receive the said summons [in spite] of the insistence of the undersigned. The undersigned, upon his request with the Brgy. Clerk at the said place, was given a certification that he really exerted effort to effect the service of the said summons but failed due to the above reason. (Annex "A"). The following day, May 21, 2002, the undersigned went back at defendant's residence to have her receive the subject summons but again the above defendant was not at her house.
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WHEREFORE, the undersigned respectfully return the service of summons duly served for information and guidance of the Honorable Court. Malolos, Bulacan, August 14, 2002. For failure of the respondent to file a responsive pleading, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default to which the respondent filed an Opposition, claiming that she was not able to receive any summons and copy of the complaint. The RTC declared respondent in default and allowed petitioner to file his evidence ex-parte. Respondent filed an MR but was denied. Consequently, trial court found in favor of the petitioner. Respondent then filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, with the argument of non-service of summons upon her. This was denied by the RTC. Respondent filed an MR which was denied. Aggrieved, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 which was granted by the same Court. Hence, this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioner insists that there was a valid substituted service of summons and that there should be a presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Respondent claims that there was no proper service of summons as the maid who was purportedly served a copy thereof was illiterate and has denied being served in a sworn statement executed before a notary public and, thus, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. In a case where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. o A plain and simple reading of the above provisions indicates that personal service of summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted service.
Requirements to effect a valid substituted service: 1. Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service o The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service.
2. Specific Details in the Return o The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return.
3. A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion o If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons.
o Issue: Whether there was a proper and valid substituted service of summons. Held: No.
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o "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. again the above defendant was not at her house. xxxx Similarly, in the Return of Service dated May 30, 2002, pertinent details were wanting, as it reads: xxxx The undersigned accompanied by the barangay officials of the said place proceeded at defendant's residence but the undersigned was not permitted to go inside her house and was given information by her maid that the defendant was not there. The defendant's car was parked inside her house and inquiries/verification made on her neighbors revealed that the defendant was inside her house at the time of service of said summons and probably did not want to show-up when her maid informed her of undersigned's presence. xxxx Lastly, the Return of Service dated August 14, 2002 was no different. It reads: xxxx Defendant Dr. Lourdes Pascual was out during the time of service of the said summons and only her housemaid was present. The undersigned left a copy of the same to the latter
4. A Competent Person in Charge If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. A cursory reading of the three Officer's Returns does not show any compliance with the said requisite. The Return of Service dated May 21, 2002 inadequately states that: o xxxx At the time of service of the said summons, the defendant was not at her home and only her maid was there who refused to receive the said summons [in spite] of the insistence of the undersigned. The undersigned, upon his request with the Brgy. Clerk at the said place, was given a certification that he really exerted effort to effect the service of the said summons but failed due to the above reason. (Annex "A"). The following day, May 21, 2002, the undersigned went back at defendant's residence to have her receive the subject summons but
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who is at the age of reason but refused to sign the same. xxxx The above Return of Summons does not show or indicate the actual exertion or any positive steps taken by the officer or process server in serving the summons personally to the defendant. The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons. The necessity of stating in the process server's Return or Proof of Service the material facts and circumstances sustaining the validity of substituted service was explained by this Court in Hamilton v. Levy, from which we quote: manner of substituted service by the process server was apparently invalid and ineffective. As such, there was a violation of due process. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, "any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void."
RP v DOMINGO Respondent Alberto A. Domingo filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Domingo alleged that he entered into seven contracts with the DPWH Region III for the lease of his construction equipment to said government agency. The lease contracts were allegedly executed in order to implement the emergency projects of the DPWH Region III Despite repeated demands, Domingo asserted that the DPWH Region III failed to pay its obligations. Domingo was, thus, compelled to file the above case for the payment Thereafter, summons was issued by the RTC. The Proof of Service of the Sheriff dated May 9, 2002 Domingo filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default in view of the failure of the DPWH Region III to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period The motion was deemed submitted for resolution. Counsel for Domingo timely filed a Manifestation, showing compliance with the order of the trial court. RTC declared the DPWH Region III in default and thereafter set the date for the reception of Domingos evidence ex parte. After the ex parte presentation of Domingos evidence, the RTC rendered judgment on February 18, 2003, finding that: o From the evidence presented by [Domingo], testimonial and documentary, it was convincingly proven that [Domingo] is entitled to the relief prayed for.
x x x The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer's Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective. Applying the above disquisitions, the jurisdiction over the person of the respondent was never vested with the RTC, because the
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Domingo filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of [15] Execution, asserting that the DPWH Region III failed to file an appeal or a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration despite its receipt of a copy of the RTC decision granted Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic [20] Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision, but the Court of Appeals denied the same Jurisprudence further instructs that when a suit is directed against an unincorporated government agency, which, because it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency's [30] principal, i.e., the State. In the similar case of Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat [31] v. Court of Appeals, where summons was served on the Bureau of Telecommunications which was an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, we held that: Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure provides: SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct. It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service of summons must be made on the Solicitor General. The BUTEL is an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications created under E.O. No. 546 on July 23, 1979, and is in charge of providing telecommunication facilities, including telephone systems to government offices. It also provides its services to augment limited or inadequate existing similar private communication facilities. It extends its services to areas where no communication facilities exist yet; and assists the private sector engaged in telecommunication services by providing and maintaining backbone telecommunication network. It is indisputably part of the Republic, and summons should have been served on the Solicitor General.
ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic. HELD: Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through coercive process, generally by the service of summons issued by the court, or through the defendant's voluntary [29] appearance or submission to the court.
Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states that: SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct. (Emphasis ours.)
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We now turn to the question of whether summons was properly served according to the Rules of Court. Petitioners rely solely on the sheriff's return to prove that summons was properly served. We quote its contents, viz: THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the 19th day of May 1999, the undersigned caused the service of Summons and Complaint upon defendant J.A. Development Corporation at the address indicated in the summons, the same having been received by a certain Jacqueline delos Santos, a person employed thereat, of sufficient age and discretion to receive such process, who signed on the lower portion of the Summons to acknowledge receipt thereof. Likewise, copy of the Summons and Complaint was served upon defendant Bureau of Telecommunications at the address indicated in the Summons, a copy of the same was received by a certain Cholito Anitola, a person employed thereat, who signed on the lower portion of the Summons to acknowledge receipt thereof. It is incumbent upon the party alleging that summons was validly served to prove that all requirements were met in the service thereof. We find that this burden was not discharged by the petitioners. The records show that the sheriff served summons on an ordinary employee and not on the Solicitor General. Consequently, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over BUTEL, and all proceedings therein are null and void. (Emphases supplied.) In the instant case, the Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Domingo specifically named as defendant the DPWH Region III. As correctly argued by the Republic, the DPWH and its regional office are merely the agents of the former (the Republic), which is the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Thus, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the summons in this case should have been served on the OSG.
Quite inexplicably, the Court of Appeals failed to apply, nay, to even consider, the provisions of Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in rendering its assailed Decision. A perusal of the Decision dated May 19, 2006 shows that the appellate court mainly dissertated regarding the functions and organizational structures of the DPWH and the OSG, as provided for in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, in an attempt to demonstrate the relationship between the DPWH and its regional offices, as well as to refute the claim that the service of summons upon the Republic should be made exclusively upon the OSG. Such an oversight on the part of the Court of Appeals is most unfortunate given the relevance and materiality of Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to the instant case, in addition to the fact that the Republic itself quoted the aforesaid provision in its petition [33] before the appellate court. The Court, nonetheless, subscribes to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in the case at bar in view of the alleged entry of appearance of the OSG, in behalf of the Republic, in the other civil cases supposedly filed by Domingo against the DPWH Region III. As held by the appellate court, the other civil cases presumably pertained to transactions involving Domingo and the DPWH Region III, which were totally different from the contracts involved in the instant case. The fact that the OSG entered its appearance in the other civil cases, notwithstanding that the summons therein were only served upon the DPWH Region III, has no bearing in the case now before us. All this indicates is that, despite the improper service of summons in
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these other civil cases, there appeared to be notice to the OSG and voluntary appearance on the latters part. RULE 14 SEC. 15 TO 20 G.R. No. L-48375 August 13, 1986 JOSE C. CARIAGA, JR. AND MARIETA CARIAGA, petitioners, vs. THE HON. ANTONIO Q. MALAYA, CAROLINA ALMONTE CARIAGASOON AND ANA ALMONTE CARIAGA, respondents. (Guys sobrang hinigsian ko nalang, mahigsi rin kasi yung kaso) This is a petition for certiorari to review and to set aside two orders of the respondent Judge dated January 16, 1978 and April 11, 1978 giving validity to the service of summons by registered mail upon the defendants Jose C. Cariaga, Jr. and Marieta Cariaga-Celis (petitioners herein), who are residing abroad. Petitioners aver that the issuance of said orders by the respondent Judge is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: Plaintiffs Cariaga-Soon (herein private respondents) filed an action for Recovery of Real Property with Damages against defendants Cariaga (petitioners) before the CFI of Laguna. Upon motion of the plaintiffs, the court granted them leave to effect extra-territorial service of summons through registered mail upon defendants on the ground that the latter were residing abroad. Defendants then filed a motion to set aside said summons in the trial court The trial court denied said motion Thereafter, the defendants filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (R45) Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper: 1.) When the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; 2.) When the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; 3.) When the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and 4.) When defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court). In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in three ways: 1.) by personal service; 2.) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; and 3.) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. The third mode of extra-territorial service of summons was substantially complied with. MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS, petitioner, vs. ABELARDO B. LICAROS, respondent. Facts: * Abelardo Licaros (Abelardo, for short) and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros (Margarita, hereafter) were lawfully married but later agreed to separate from bed and board. *Margarita left for the United States and there applied for divorce- granted on August 6, 1990 *August 17, 1990, Abelardo and Margarita executed an Agreement of Separation of Properties and was followed-up by a petition filed on August 21, 1990 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the dissolution of the RULING: Oh yeah!!!
ISSUE: Whether the summons were properly served upon defendants
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conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses and for the approval of the agreement of separation of their properties- granted onDecember 27, 1990 * on June 24, 1991, Abelardo commenced for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Margarita, based on psychological incapacity under the New Family Code. As Margarita was then residing at 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A. * Abelardo moved that summons be served through the International Express Courier Service -DENIED and Instead, it ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. Respondent was given sixty (60) days after publication to file a responsive pleading. * On July 15, 1991, Process Server, Maximo B. Dela Rosa, submitted his Officers Return which states that Summons were received thru Pat G. Martines receiving Clerk of Department of Foreign Affairs a person authorized to receive this kind of process. * On November 8, 1991, TC declared the marriage between Abelardo and Margarita null and void. CA 9 years after....Margarita commenced a petition the petition when she received a letter dated November 18, 1991 from a certain Atty. Angelo Q. Valencia informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family name Licaros inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati Margarita' ground B) THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. CA RULING: The Court of Appeals also rejected Margaritas claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for improper service of summons on her. The case involves the marital status of the parties, which is an action in rem or quasi in rem. The Court of Appeals ruled that in such an action the purpose of service of summons is not to vest the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but only to comply with due process. The Court of Appeals concluded that any irregularity in the service of summons involves due process which does not destroy the trial courts jurisdiction over the res which is the parties marital status. Neither does such irregularity invalidate the judgment rendered in the case. Thus, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment. Hence MArgarita went to Sc via petition for review on certiorari SC Issue: I. Whether Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo? Ruling: Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.[9] As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15,[10] Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.[11] Actions in personam[12] and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.[13] At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing in the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial court considered Margarita a nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The term personal status includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife.[14] Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service
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in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines. In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendants last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient. Applying the foregoing rule, the trial court required extraterritorial service of summons to be effected on Margarita in the following manner: x x x, service of Summons by way of publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time, furnishing respondent copy of this Order as well as the corresponding Summons and copy of the petition at her given address at No. 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., thru the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of petitioner.[15] (Emphasis ours) The trial courts prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to any other means that the judge may consider sufficient. The Process Servers Return of 15 July 1991 shows that the summ ons addressed to Margarita together with the complaint and its annexes were sent by mail to the Department of Foreign Affairs with acknowledgment of receipt. The Process Servers certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate.[16] Before proceeding to declare the marriage between Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the trial court stated in its Decision dated 8 November 1991 that compliance with the jurisdictional requirements hav(e) (sic) been duly established. We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition to annul judgment is AFFIRMED. G.R. No. L-34314 May 13, 1975 SOFIA PASTOR DE MIDGELY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PIO B. FERANDOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX and LEWELYN BARLITO QUEMADA, Special Administrator of the Testate and Intestate Estate of ALVARO PASTOR Y TATO, respondents. Facts: Alvaro Pastor, Sr. was allegedly the owner of properties and rights in mining claims located in Cebu and supposedly held in trust by his son, Alvaro Pastor, Jr. Pastor, Sr. died on June 5, 1966. He was survived by his two legitimate children, Mrs. Midgely and Alvaro Pastor, Jr. Respondent Quemada claims to be his illegitimate child. As administrator and as heir of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., Quemada filed in the CFI a complaint against the spouses Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Maria Elena Achaval, Mrs. Midgely, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation and Caltex (Philippines), Inc. to settle the question of ownership over certain real properties and the rights in some mining claims. Quemada's theory is that those properties and income belong to the estate of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. Allegedly, without complying with the requirements of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Quemada caused extraterritorial service of summons to be made in that case through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Embassy in Madrid, Spain, which effected the service of the summons by registered mail upon Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses at their respective address in Alicante and Barcelona, Spain. Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Mrs. Midgely, in their respective letters to the Philippine Embassy dated February 11 and 12, 1971, acknowledged the
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service of summons but reserved the right to contest the courts jurisdiction over their persons. Through counsel, Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses entered a special appearance and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They contended that as nonresidents they could be summoned only with leave of court and that the requirements laid down in section 17 of Rule 14 should have been observed. As additional ground they alleged that the complaint does not show that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as required in article 222 of the Civil Code in suits between members of the same family (See sec. 1[j], Rule 16, Rules of Court). Quemada opposed the motion to dismiss. Respondent Quemada alleged that the service of summons upon Mrs. Midgely was not for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over her person but merely as a matter of due process. RTC MTD DENIED (there is jurisdiction over her person and properties) article 222 was inapplicable to the case because Quemada's civil status was involved and article 2035 of the Civil Code prohibits a compromise on a person's civil status. MFR DENIED action filed by Quemada was for the recovery of real properties and real rights. The lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Mrs. Midgely by reason of her voluntary appearance. The reservation in her motion to dismiss that she was making a special appearance to contest the court's jurisdiction over her person may be disregarded because it was nullified by the fact that in her motion to dismiss she relied not only on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person but also on the ground that there was no showing that earnest efforts were exerted to compromise the case and because she prayed "for such other relief as" may be deemed "appropriate and proper". Having shown that Mrs. Midgely had voluntarily submitted to the lower court's jurisdiction when she filed her motion to dismiss (see sec. 23, Rule 14, Rules of Court), the inevitable conclusion is that it did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying her motion to dismiss. The petitioner argued that the lower court does not have jurisdiction over the res, a contention that is palpably baseless. Quemada's action against Mrs. Midgely may be regarded as a quasi in rem action where jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is not necessary and where service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with the requirement of due process. An action quasi in rem is an action between parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein. Quemada's action falls within that category. With respect to the extraterritorial service of summons to a nonresident defendant like Mrs. Midgely, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:t.hqw SEC. 17. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been
The petition for certiorari herein was filed on November 3, 1971. ISSUE: WON RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Midgely's motion to dismiss based on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction over her person and (b) lack of a showing that earnest efforts were exerted to effect a compromise. Held: YES
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attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer. Under section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines, and (4) when defendant nonresident's property has been attached within the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court). In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in three ways: (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, and (3) service of summons may be effected in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. That third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was substantially complied with in this case. The subject matter of the action for reconveyance consists of properties of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. Mrs. Midgely claims an actual interest in those properties. She has been receiving a share of the income therefrom. Therefore, the extraterritorial service of summons upon her was proper. As already noted, the action against her is quasi in rem.. The record does not show whether Judge Ferandos was consulted by the Clerk of Court and by Quemada's counsel when the service of summons was effected through the Philippine Embassy in Madrid. But although there was no court order allowing service in that manner, that mode of service was later sanctioned or ratified by Judge Ferandos. He corrected the defect in the summons by giving Mrs. Midgely the sixty-day reglementary period for answering the complaint. This Court clarified that in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is not essential. The service of summons by publication is required "merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process". The judgment of the court in the case would settle the title to the shares of stock and to that extent it partakes of the nature of a judgment in rem. Consequently, the lower court had jurisdiction to try the case even if it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Idonah Slade Perkins. The judgment would be confined to the res. No personal judgment could be rendered against the non-resident. G.R. No. L-48955 June 30, 1987 BERNARDO BUSUEGO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE LAZARO, ROMEO LAZARO and VIVENCIO LOPEZ, respondents. Facts:
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In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner asks us to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, declaring null and void the judgment by default and the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. Petitioner Bernardo Busuego commenced action before the Pasig Court of First Instance against Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro, Ernesto Lazaro, and Vivencio Lopez, to recover possession of a parcel of land and a three (3) unit apartment house standing in Bo. Jesus de la Pena Marikina, Rizal. Immediately thereafter, summons was issued in the name of the four defendants and per sheriff's return, was personally served at the address given in the complaint, upon the defendants "through [defendant] Dr. Ernesto Lazaro, personally." Defendants, through Atty. Gerardo B. Roldan, Jr., filed a motion for an extension of fifteen (15) days to file answer, stating that "his [Atty. Roldan's] services was (sic) secured by the defendants formally only the other day," and that he "need[ed] sufficient time to study the case, before filing any responsive pleading or pleadings." The motion was granted by the lower court. Defendants through Atty. Roldan asked for another extension of ten (10) days to answer, as "[Atty. Roldan] has not yet conferred with all of [the four (4) defendants] which [was] necessary before any responsive pleading [could be] filed by him." The lower court granted this second extension. Notwithstanding the extensions granted, no answer was filed by the defendants, for which reason, and upon motion of plaintiff Busuego, the lower court declared the defendants in default. Subsequently, plaintiff's case was heard and his evidence received, and on the basis of that evidence the trial court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff. Almost two years later, plaintiff filed before the lower court an ex parte motion for execution of the default judgment, which the lower court granted. Romeo Lazaro, one of the defendants and a respondent herein, "on his [own] behalf and on behalf of other defendants," filed a motion to hold execution in abeyance praying that "for humanitarian reasons, an extension of 30 days, within which to vacate the premises [be allowed] to give them sufficient time to look for another place where the five families composed mostly of little children, can reside. The lower court granted Romeo's motion and accordingly, the execution of the default judgment was held in abeyance. The defendants through Atty. Roldan filed with the lower court a motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default and/or to dissolve the writ of execution, solely on the ground that neither the defendants nor their counsel were ever furnished a copy of the judgment by default. This motion was verified by Romeo Lazaro who described himself as "one of the defendants in the-case" and as "representing them [the defendants] in the instant pleadings. Upon opposition of petitioner, the lower court denied the motion, finding the above-motion to be purely dilatory in nature and plain harassment on the part of the defendants. The respondents, through their new counsel, Atty. Oliver Lozano, filed with the same court an omnibus motion, which included a motion to lift the order of default, a second motion for reconsideration and a motion to quash the writ of execution issued pursuant to the default judgment, alleging for the first time that their failure to answer was due to lack of notice. Petitioner opposed vigorously the above motion contending that, the defendants could not pretend absence of proper notice after they, through counsel, had filed the two motions for extension of time to answer.
The lower court denied the omnibus motion, holding the motion for extension of time to vacate filed by respondent Romeo Lazaro for all the defendants to be equivalent to waiver of service of summons. Defendants, through their new counsel, filed what in effect was a third motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default, alleging that: the lower court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons because of lack of proper service of summons; and that the motion for extension of time to vacate the premises, filed by their co-defendant Romeo Lazaro, after the judgment by default had become executory, was not equivalent to waiver of summons.
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The third motion for reconsideration having been denied, defendants brought a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, asserting that the orders, judgment and writs complained of were all void for want of jurisdiction over theirpersons. The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, 8 basically upholding the respondents' contention and providing: (a) insofar as the petitioner Ernesto Lazaro is concerned, dismissing the petition; and (b) insofar as the petitioners Romeo Lazaro, Jose Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez, are concerned, granting the petition and the writs prayed for, declaring null and void the order of default, judgment by default, order of execution, writ of execution, notice to vacate, and making permanent the restraining order heretofore issued in these proceedings. In the present case, it appears that the sheriff had availed of substituted service in seeking to serve the summons upon all the defendants by serving a copy thereof "through Dr. Ernesto Lazaro personally." Perusal, however, of the sheriff's return reveals that the sheriff failed to specify therein what prior efforts, if any, had been exerted to serve summons upon the other defendants personally within a reasonable period of time, and the lack of success of such efforts, before proceeding to substituted service. Such specification in the sheriff's return is essential for enforcement of the rule under the Revised Rules of Court that substituted service may be resorted to only where it is not possible to serve the defendant or defendants promptly in person. We therefore uphold the respondent appellate court's finding that, while Ernesto Lazaro was validly served, with respect to respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez, there was no valid service of summons effected. We are, nonetheless, unable to sustain its conclusion that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the said respondents. As earlier noted, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can also be acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, for voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons. In the case before us, the defendants appeared before the trial court a number of times without raising any objection to the improper service of summons: the defendants, through Atty. Gerardo Roldan, appeared in court and filed two successive motions for extension of time to file an answer to the complaint; more than two years after rendition of the judgment by default by the trial court, defendants, through their co-defendant Romeo Lazaro, filed a motion for extension of time within which to vacate the premises involved and to look for another place to live in, raising no question concerning the jurisdiction of the trial court over the persons of the defendants; and the defendants, through their counsel Atty. Roldan, moved for reconsideration of the judgment of the trial court and for dissolution of the writ of execution, again without contesting the jurisdiction of the court over their persons.
Hence, the petition before us.
Issue: Whether jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the court a quo over the persons of the respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro and Vivencio Lazaro.
Ruling: Basically, there are two (2) ways by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent: (a) by service of summons upon the defendant; and (b) by voluntary appearance of the defendant in court and his submission to its authority.
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numerous claimants, titled and untitled alike, each either pressing to own a piece of it, or striving to protect one's right as a titled owner. We hold that by anyone or more of these acts, and certainly by the whole series of acts, the defendants, respondents herein, effectively waived the initial lack of jurisdiction over their persons and submitted to the authority of the trial court. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as concerns respondents Romeo Lazaro, Jose Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez. With respect, however, to defendant Ernesto Lazaro, same decision is hereby AFFIRMED. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondents. Furthermore, Atty. Gerardo B. Roldan, Jr. and Atty. Oliver O. Lozano are hereby required to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why they should not be subject to disciplinary action for abusing court proceedings. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 91486 January 19, 2001 Petitioners herein are World War II veterans, their dependents and successors-in-interest. Together, they filed a class suit primarily for Quieting of Title before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, In particular, petitioners claimed that the real property, which has an aggregate area of 502 hectares, were part of forest lands belonging to the government; that they and their predecessors-ininterest have occupied said property continuously, adversely, and exclusively for more than thirty (30) years; and that they have accordingly filed applications for land titling in their respective names with the appropriate government agency. While petitioners claim that the land in dispute was part of the public domain, they named as respondents several persons and corporations who are titled owners of subdivided parcels of land within the subject property. One of those so impleaded as a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision (Vil-Ma). The individual lot owners of the said subdivision, however, were not specifically named. Since personal service of summons could not be effected on Vil-Ma and some of the other named respondents, petitioners moved for leave of court to serve summons by publication which was granted. Accordingly, the summons was published in the "Metropolitan Newsweek", a periodical edited and published in the City of Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan. (PLS. TAKE NOTE) Some of the named respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings, while the others, including Vil-Ma, failed to answer, and were thus declared in default. Consequently, petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte against the defaulted respondents. RTC rendered a Partial Decision in favor of petitioners, declaring some of the parcels of land as owned by the petitioners and declaring the certificates of title of some of the private respondents null and void.
ALBERTO G. PINLAC, ATTY. ERIBERTO H. DECENA, RODOLFO F. REYES, FELIPE BRIONES, JUANITO METILLA, JR., FELIPE A. FLORES, HERMINIO ELEVADO, NARCISO S. SIMEROS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS RULING: The court orders relied upon by petitioners did not specify the place and the length of time that the summons was to be published. In the absence of such specification, publication in just any periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements of the rules. Facts: The instant case springs from a contentious and protracted dispute over a sizeable piece of real property situated in what is now known as Old Balara, Sitio Veterans, Barrio Payatas and Silangan, all of Quezon City. There are
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CA On May 17, 1989, or exactly one (1) year and fifty-seven (57) days after the above-quoted judgment by default was rendered, a Petition for Annulment of Judgement with Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was brought before the Court of Appeals by the titled owners of the subdivided lots within Vil-Ma. They assailed the default judgment which nullified all their titles, arguing that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over them and their respective titled properties. They also alleged that they only came to know of the adverse judgment when petitioners sought the execution of the judgment by attempting to dispossess some of the titled owners of the lots and making formal demands for them to vacate their respective properties. They were never made parties to the Civil Case, nor were their lots described in the complaint, published summons, and Partial Decision. Named defendant was VIL-MA, a totally separate and independent entity which had already ceased to exist way back in January of 1976. Moreover, the summons, as well as the Partial Decision was not published in a newspaper or periodical of general circulation. (PLS. TAKE NOTE) Thus, the defective service of summons to said defendant did not place the individual lot owners under the trial court's jurisdiction, nor are they bound by the adverse judgment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and annulled the Partial Decision in the Civil Case based on its finding that the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents. Petitioners' MR was denied. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. SC agrees with the CAs conclusion that the Partial Decision is null and void insofar as private respondents are concerned since the latter were not duly served summons or notified of the proceedings against them. The summons and the Partial Decision were published in a local newspaper edited and published in Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan. However, the Court of Appeals found the publication in said newspaper, namely the "Metropolitan Newsweek," to be invalid because the said periodical is not considered a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City where the subject property is located, as required by Presidential Decree No.1079, Section 1. While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the approval of the trial court, it does not cure the fatal defect that the "Metropolitan Newsweek" is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City. The Rules strictly require that publication must be "in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order." The court orders relied upon by petitioners did not specify the place and the length of time that the summons was to be published. In the absence of such specification, publication in just any periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements of the rules. (PLS. TAKE NOTE) The incomplete directive of the RTC coupled with the defective publication of the summons rendered the service by publication ineffective. The modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons. It cannot be over emphasized that the statutory requirements of service of summons, whether personally, by substituted service, or by publication, must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service other than that prescribed by the statute is considered ineffective.
Issue: Whether the publication of the summons was legal, valid and proper. Held: NO.
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Gonzales v. State Properties (2001) PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTTIORARI ASSAILING THE DECISION OF THE CA FACTS: State Properties filed a complaint for Recovery of Property, based on ownership against Gonzales as well as his brothers and sisters. The complaint also had a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction (PI) The case was raffled to Branch 253 of the RTC Las Pias and summons was duly served to Gonzales o Gonzales filed an Omnibus Motion praying that there be another raffle because the other defendants (his brothers and sisters) did not receive any notice of raffle (there was an Admin Circular requiring it) o State Properties then filed a Motion for Service of Summons BY PUBLICATION on all defendants except the petitioner, for the reason that their (the brothers and sisters) residences could not be ascertained. This motion was granted by the court They also received a Notice of Raffle During the Raffle, Gonzales and his counsel appeared by opposed the holding of the raffle since the other defendants were likewise NOT notified of the raffle (they invoked Admin Circular No. 20-95) o The court granted o State filed an MR which was granted Citing Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court before the court can act on the motion for leave to serve summons by publication? HELD: 1. NO. In the present case, respondent was able to show that the whereabouts of the other defendants were unknown, and that summons could not be served personally or by substituted service. Hence, it cannot be required to serve such summons prior to or contemporaneous with the notice of raffle. The raffle, therefore, may proceed even without notice to and the presence of the said adverse parties.
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 which provided for the requisites of a raffle of cases, has been incorporated into Section 4 (c), Rule 58 of the 1997 3 Rules of Civil Procedure. The pre-requisites for conducting a raffle when there is a prayer for a writ of PI or TRO are: a. b. c. Notice to Presence of the adverse party or person to be enjoined. Notice shall be preceded or accompanied by a service of summons to the adverse party or person to be enjoined.
The prior or contemporaneous service of summons may be dispensed with in the following instances: i. When the summons cannot be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts ii. When the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom iii. When the party is not a non-resident
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the CA acted with GADLEJ in holding that if summons COULD NOT be personally served, raffle could be held without notice to parties? Whether or not the CA GADLEJ in holding that in a case where the parties are unknown, the case will have to be raffle first
2.
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The requirement of notice of the raffle to the party whose whereabouts are unknown does not also apply x x x because the case will have to be raffled first before the court can act on the motion for leave to serve summons by publication. The second paragraph of Section 4 (c) of Rule 58 clearly provides that the service of summons may be dispensed with "where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts." 2. NO. In ordinary suits, notice of a raffle is given to the parties in order "to afford [them] a chance to be heard in the assignment of their cases." According to Justice Feria, the raffle of cases is done in open session with adequate notice, "so that parties or their counsel will be prevented from choosing judges to hear their case." FACTS: Complaint was filed against petitioner Purita de la Pea by Pedro R. de la Pea, Benjamin P. Briones, spouses Julia de la Pea and Jose Alberto, Godofredo de la Pea, Virginia de la Pea and Maria de la Pea in the RTC of Balanga, Bataan, seeking: (a) the annulment of the deed of sale and deed of extrajudicial partition executed between Fortunata de la Pea and Purita de la Pea; (b) the partition of the estates of Fortunata de la Pea and Gavina de la Pea, and; (c) the award in their favor of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of the suit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars praying that all the heirs of Gavina and Fortunata and the entire estate of each be properly included and defined. GRANTED. The bill of particulars was filed. Petitioner Purita de la Pea filed her Answer with Counterclaim. On 27 July 1988 and 21 September 1988 the parties entered into partial compromise agreements. They agreed to settle their respective claims regarding Lot No. 524 and to dispense with the intervention earlier filed by Danilo Cruz. Judge Vivencio S. Baclig dismissed the complaints. Respondents herein as plaintiffs before the trial court received copy of the aforesaid decision on 2 July 1993. On 15 July 1993, plaintiffs filed their MR which is now being assailed as pro forma since it did not contain a notice of hearing. DENIED. No cogent and compelling reason to warrant the reversal or modification of the decision sought to be reconsidered. Consequently, on 20 August 1993, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal and/or Extension of Time to File Appeal. DENIED!!! Period to appeal had already lapsed as it was not tolled by the motion for reconsideration earlier filed, the latter being pro forma for lack of a notice of hearing. With regard defendant's motion for execution, the court a quo found no necessity to issue a writ considering its earlier ruling dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and defendant's counterclaim.
Petitioner has no ground to object, since he himself had been given notice prior to the holding of the raffle. Furthermore, he has no standing to complain on behalf of the other parties, because he does not claim to represent them. In any event, the other defendants had been located and served summons. In fact, the case was subsequently raffled on December 8, 1999, and a pretrial conducted on May 9, 2000. The other defendants have not complained of any impropriety in the raffle. Their silence on this question demonstrates the utter lack of merit of petitioner's contention. RULE 15 MOTIONS PURITA DE LA PEA, JUDGE VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, RTC-Br. 2, Balanga, Bataan, petitioners, vs. PEDRO R. DE LA PEA, BENJAMIN P. BRIONES, SPOUSES JULIA DE LA PEA and JOSE ALBERTO, GODOFREDO, VIRGINIA, and MARIA, all surnamed DE LA PEA, and the COURT OF APPEALS-Fourth Division, respondents. Petition for review on Certiorari
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The Court of Appeals: null and void the order of the trial court declaring private respondents' motion for reconsideration pro forma. Petitioner moved to reconsider the ruling of the Court of Appeals and reiterating her claim that a motion for reconsideration without a notice of hearing was a mere scrap of paper hence it did not warrant the attention of the court. DENIED! The motion for reconsideration was not a mere scrap of paper so that the notice of appeal was timely filed. FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., respondents. FACTS: * respondent corp filed a complaint for a sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, against a land in Quezon City owned by Manacop Construction President Florante F. Manacop for failure to pay the subcontract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner's corporation and private respondent. * respondent submitted an amended complaint intended to substitute Manacop Construction with Florante F. Manacop as defendant who is "doing business under the name and style of F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.". *summons to the substituted defendant below was granted *petitioner filed his answer to the amended complaint * Petitioner filed Omnibus Motion on September 5, 1990grounded on (1) irregularity that attended the issuance of the disputed writ inspite the absence of an affidavit therefor; (2) the feasibility of utilizing the writ prior to his submission as party-defendant, and (3) exemption from attachment of his family home- denied CA A petition for certiorari w filed by petitioner-dismissed; MR- denied Hence he went to Sc..
ISSUE: Whether the motion complied with the requirements stated in Section 4 & 5, Section 15 of Rules of Court? RULING: NOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO! The requirements laid down in Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If not religiously complied with, they render the motion pro forma. As such the motion is a useless piece of paper that will not toll the running of the prescriptive period. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs did not contain any notice of hearing. It was therefore pro forma, hence it did not suspend the running of the prescriptive period. The copy of the decision was received on 2 July 1993. Consequently, respondents had until 17 July 1993 within which to file their notice of appeal. Since they filed their Notice of Appeal and/or Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal on 20 August 1993 or 49 days after receipt of the decision, the appeal was clearly filed out of time. On that date the decision of the court a quo already attained finality 34 days earlier, hence, could no longer be reviewed much less modified on appeal. The filing of the Notice of Appeal and/or Extension of Time to File Appeal was a futile exercise. There was no longer any period to appeal nor a decision that could still be appealed.
ISSUE:Did respondent court err in dismissing the challenge posed by petitioner against the denial of his omnibus motion?
RULING: NO Petitioner harps on the supposition that the appellate court should not have pierced the veil of corporate fiction because he is distinct from the personality of his corporation and, therefore, the writ of attachment issued against the corporation cannot be used to place his own family home in custodia legis. This puerile argument must suffer rejection since the doctrine in commercial law adverted to and employed in exculpation by petitioner, during the pendency of his petition for certiorari in the appellate court and even at this stage, may not be permitted to simply sprout from nowhere for such subtle experiment is prescribed by the omnibus motion rule under Section 8, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
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A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the movant to raise all available exceptions for relief during a single opportunity so that multiple and piece-meal objections may be avoided. petitioner also seeks to capitalize that ipso facto took place when the complaint against him was amended. He proffers the idea that the extinction of a complaint via a superseding one carries with it the cessation of the ancilliary writ of preliminary attachment. We could have agreed with petitioner along this line had he expounded the adverse aftermath of an amended complaint in his omnibus motion. But the four corners of his motion in this respect filed on September 5, 1990 are circumscribed by other salient points set forth by Us relative to the propriety of the assailed writ itself. This being so, petitioner's eleventh hour effort in pressing a crucial factor for exculpation must be rendered ineffective and barred by the omnibus motion rule. G.R. No. L-51458 July 19, 1982 MANUEL YAP, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RAYMOND AND LYDIA TOMASSI, respondents. Facts: RTC On September 11, 1973, Respondents spouses Tomassi, filed a complaint for Damages against petitioner Manuel Yap. Yap filed his Answer with Special Defenses and Counterclaim. On January 31, 1978, TC ordered Yap to pay respondents. Copy of the Decision was received by petitioner-defendant on February 10, 1978. He filed, on March 2, 1978, a Notice of appeal, and on March 7, 1978, a Cash Appeal Bond and Motion for Extension of twenty days from March 13, 1978 (or until April 2, 1978) within which to file his Record on Appeal. Said Motion was not acted upon by the TC. On March 30, 1978 - petitioner submitted his Record on Appeal and also filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution alleging that the Decision had already become final and executory as petitioner's Motion for extension of time to file Record on Appeal failed to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court on Motions, and therefore, did not toll the running of the period to perfect an appeal. On April 24, 1978 - TC disapproved petitioner's Record on Appeal. MR denied
CA CA dismissed Petition for "Certiorari and Mandamus" Record on Appeal as the same was filed beyond the prescribed period. MR denied
SC - Petition for Review on Certiorari
ISSUE: WON the Motion for extension should mandatorily comply with the requirements of the Rules on Motions (RULE 15) before the same may be acted upon by the TC? HELD: NO. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 provide: Section 4. Notice.-Notice of a motion shag be served by the applicant to all parties concerned at least three days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and other papers accompanying it. The Court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on
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shorter notice, specially on matters which the Court may dispose of on its own motion. Section 5. Contents of Notice.-The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion. Section 6. Proof of service to be filed with motion.-No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice hereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected. As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. The threeday-notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion. The Motion in question does not affect the substantive rights of private respondents as it merely seeks to extend the period to file the Record on Appeal, which extension may be granted by the Trial Court upon application made prior to the expiration of the original period. Neither was there any claim that said Motion, which was grounded on justifiable reason, was interposed to delay the appeal. Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon as the policy of the Court is to encourage the hearing of appeals on the merits. Litigants should be afforded every opportunity to establish the merits of their cases without the constraints of technicalities. IGMEDIO AZAJAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division) and CHAM SAMCO & SONS, INC., respondents. Contending that such a notice was fatally defective and rendered the Motion to Dismiss incapable of tolling the period to answer, Azajar filed a motion to declare Cham Samco in default, which the Court granted. The Court pronounced Cham Samco in default and allowed Azajar to present evidence ex-parte. Facts: PETITION to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner seeks reversal of the Resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals setting aside the judgment by default rendered against private respondent by the Court of First Instance, and directing that said respondent be allowed to file its answer to the complaint and after joinder of issues. This case originated from a complaint filed by petitioner Igmedio Azajar against respondent Cham Samco and Sons, Inc., in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. Azajars claim, briefly, is that he had purchased from defendant (Cham Samco), thru the latters agent, 100 Kegs of nails of various sizes, specified in one of Cham Samcos printed order forms, and had given to the agent Pl8,000.00 in full payment thereof; but in breach of contract, Cham Samco had offered to deliver only a part of the quantity ordered. Cham Samco filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: failure of the complaint to state a cause of actionthe complaint's language indicating not a perfected sale but merely an offer to buy by plaintiff that was partly accepted by defendant, and failing to show that as explicitly required by the order form, prices had been confirmed by Cham Samcos Manila Office," and that venue was improperly laidCham Samcos invariable condition in transactions of this nature, as Azajar well knew from many such transactions in the past, being that any legal action thereon must be instituted in the City of Manila."
The motion to dismiss contained a notice addressed to the Clerk of Court. It is this notice that has given rise to the controversy at bar.
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Defendant thru counsel, instead of filing an answer to the complaint, filed a Motion to Dismiss which, in legal contemplation, is not a motion at all because the notice therein is directed to the Clerk of Court instead of to the party concerned without the requisite notice of time and place of hearing the filing thereof did not suspend the running of the period to file the required responsive pleading. That seventeen (17) days had lapsed and defendant failed to file any responsive pleading. The Trial Court rendered judgment by default against defendant Cham Samco. Cham Samco filed a Motion for New Trial. It contended that its failure to observe the rules governing notice of motions was due to excusable negligence, because the grounds alleged in the Motion to Dismiss were all in such nature and character that addressed themselves to a motu proprio resolution by the court and thus rendered a hearing dispensable. It also alleged certain defenses available to it which if duly alleged and proven, would absolve it from all liability. This motion was denied. Court has been that a failure to comply with the requirement is a fatal flaw. Such notice is required to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion, as well as to determine or make determinable the time of submission of the motion for resolution.
Ruling: Cham Samcos belief that it was not necessary that its motion to dismiss be set for hearing was avowedly engendered by two factors, namely:
1) the fact that while the Rules of Court specify the motions which can be heard only with prior service upon adverse parties,"15 said Rules do not point out which written motions may be ex parte, preferring, it appears, to leave to the court, in motions other than those specified, the discretion either to ex parte resolve* * or to call the parties to a hearing * *;and 2) the further fact that its motion to dismiss was based on two grounds on which a hearing was superfluous, the first, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, being determinable exclusively from the allegations of the complaint and no evidence being allowable thereon; and the second, that venue is improperly laid, being resolvable exclusively on the basis of documents annexed to the motion.17
Cham Samco went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari asserting that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in declaring it in default and then rendering judgment by default. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit by the Court of Appels But on motion for reconsideration seasonably presented, the Court of Appeals reversed itself. It set aside the Trial Courts order of judgment by default, and Order denying Cham Samcos motion for new trial, and directed the lower Court to allow Cham Samco to file its answer to the coinplaint and upon due joinder of issues, to try and decide the case on the merits. It was wrong, of course, for Cham Samco to have failed to set its motion to dismiss for hearing on a specified date and time. The law explicitly requires that notice of a motion shall be served by the appellant to ail parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it; and that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, stating the time and place for the hearing of the motion. The uniform holding of this
These considerations, to be sure, did not erase movants duty to give notice to the adverse party of the date and time of the hearing on its motion, the purpose of said notice being, as already stressed, not only to give the latter time to oppose the motion if so minded, but also to determine the time of its submission for resolution. Without such notice, the occasion would not arise to determine with reasonable certitude whether and within what time the adverse party would respond to the motion, and when the motion might already be resolved by the Court. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant, not on the Court.
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Withal, the reasons for Cham Samcos erroneous notion of the dispensability of a hearing on its motion to dismiss are not utterly without plausibility. This circumstance, taken together with the fact, found by the Intermediate Appellate Court and not disputed by petitioner Azajar, that Cham Samco has meritorious defenses which if proven would defeat Azajars claim against it WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals appealed from, are affirmed. Costs against petitioner. G.R. No. 167471 February 5, 2007 On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed the appeal. Respondent moved for the Reconsideration. But was denied by the RTC. In the main, respondents Motion for Reconsideration is premised on the argument that she filed a timely "Motion for Extension of Time To File Memorandum," dated and filed on June 3, 2003, but that her motion was not acted upon by this Court. o She adds that her appeal memorandum was filed well within the period sought by her in her "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum" so that her appeal should not have been dismissed. RTC stated that it did not take cognizance of defendant-appellants "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum," and rightly so, because it did not contain a notice of hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, an omission for which it could offer no explanation. Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was granted. The appellate court nullified and set aside the orders of the RTC and ordered the reinstatement of respondents appeal. Consequently, respondents appeal memorandum was admitted and the case remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
GLICERIA SARMIENTO, Petitioner, vs. EMERITA ZARATAN, Respondent. Facts: On 2 September 2002, petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court. On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 223. In the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum. Respondents counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within which to file the requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood compounded by the grounding of the computers because the wirings got wet. But the motion remained unacted.
Issue: Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the motion is a worthless piece of paper. Held: No. Procedural due process was substantially complied with by respondent. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to include a Notice of Hearing in her Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the latters motion is a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect.
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The three-day notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion. o Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard. o The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. As it appears, respondent sought extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum was subsequently filed within the requested extended period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in question. Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time x x x is not a litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties." As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said that "ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion." Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims. As has been the constant rulings of the Court, every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities. Parenthetically, it must be noted also that when the appeal was dismissed on 19 June 2003, the memorandum was already filed in court on 9 June 2003.
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case. The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The required extension was due to respondents counsels illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the appeal.
ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. LANDEX DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT Facts:
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Aneco filed an injunction case with damages before the RTC inorder to restrain Landex from constructing a concrete fence on its lot claiming that they were deprived access to their property. Landex on its Answer claimed that said fence does not deprive Aneco access to their property since the initial subdivision plan agreed by Aneco and its original owner FHDI, will no longer be continued as also defined in the Deed of Sale. RTC- Ruled infavor of Aneco. Landex moved to reconsider but failed to include a notice of hearing. RTC set a hearing for the said MR. Aneco failed to attend. RTC gave Aneco additional time to comment. RTC- issued an order denying Anecos motion for execution. RTC- issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration of Landex and dismissed the complaint of Aneco. Aneco appealed to the CA. CA- affirmed the decision of the RTC on the ground that Aneco is aware that the lots sold to them is no longer a subdivision lot thus the road in dispute ceases to be a road lot. Aneco moved for reconsideration. Denied. Hence this appeal under Rule 45 Issue: W/N CA erred in liberally applying Section 5 of Rule 15 regarding notice of hearing when it admitted Landex motion despite its lack of notice of hearing. W/N Aneco may enjoin Landex from constructing a concrete wall on its own property. It must be stressed that there are no vested right to technicalities. The requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is part of due process of law. The notice alerts the opposing party of a pending motion in court and gives him an opportunity to oppose it. What the rule forbids is not the mere absence of a notice of hearing in a contested motion but the unfair surprise caused by the lack of notice. It is the dire consequences which flow from the procedural error which is proscribed. If the opposing party is given a sufficient opportunity to oppose a defective motion, the procedural lapse is deemed cured and the intent of the rule is substantially complied. Rules of procedure, and this includes the three (3) days notice requirement, are liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court). Court made it clear that lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure may be overlooked when they have not prejudiced the adverse party and have not deprived the court of its authority.
2. No. Aneco failed to prove any legal right to prevent, much less
restrain, Landex from fencing its own property. Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the limitations and restrictions provided by law G.R. No. 169135 June 18, 2010 Petitioner,
Held:
1. No. In the absence of any palpable error, RTC and the CA

exercised their discretion in opting for a liberal rather than a strict application of the rules on notice of hearing.
JOSE DELOS REYES, vs. JOSEPHINE ANNE B. RAMNANI, Respondent.
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FACTS: 1977 RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent 1978 writ of execution was issued and a bidding and auction sale over a certain property was conducted. o respondent was the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued and annotated in favor of the respondent. 2004 respondent filed a motion for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final certificate in her favor. Petitioner opposed stating that: o Subject motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing o 1977 decision cannot be executed as it is barred by prescription ISSUE: Whether the subject motion was defective for lack of a notice of hearing? RULING: NO! Motion was valid. The subject motion is a non-litigious motion. While, as a general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4 Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the same. The subject motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions. FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR., vs. MANILA SOUTHCOAST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, FACTS: **MTC-Batangas > petitioner Fausto R. Preysler, Jr. filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Manila Southcoast Development Corporation. > the MTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate the disputed land ** RTC > Respondent appealed to RTC which reversed the MTC decision and dismissed petitioners complaint > MR was filed by petitioner which was set for hearing on 26 February 2004 a copy of the MR was sent to respondents counsel by registered mail on 23 February 2004. >During the 26 February 2004 scheduled hearing of the motion, the RTC judge reset the hearing to 2 April 2004 because the courts calendar c ould not accommodate the hearing of the motion. All the parties were notified of the schedule for the next hearing. > 3 March 2004, or 6 days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, that respondents counsel received a copy of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.The rescheduled hearing on 2 April 2004 was again reset on 7 May 2004 because the RTC judge was on official leave. >The 7 May 2004 hearing was further reset to 6 August 2004. >After the hearing, respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004,claiming that non-compliance with the three-day notice rule did not toll the running of the period of appeal. > On 4 October 2004, the RTC denied petitioner's MR for failure to appeal within the 15 days reglementary period and ruled MR was fatally flawed for failure to observe the three-day notice rule. >Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Order-denied CA Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion for petitioners alleged failure to observe the three-day notice rule. > CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the three-day notice rule under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is mandatory and noncompliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma. > MR denied , henceforth petitioner went to SC
ISSUE: WON 3 day notice rule is absolute?NO
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RULING: (read sections 4,5,6, of R.15) The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority,[14] the Court held that despite the lack of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process where the adverse party actually had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The Court held under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. >> three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. >>>>WON RTC erred in dismissing MR which was affirmed by CA?YES RTC gave petitioner ten days within which to comment on respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion on November 26, 2001. In its 14-page Opposition, it not only pointed out that the Motion was defective for not containing a notice of hearing and should then be dismissed outright by the court; it also ventilated its substantial arguments against the merits of the Motion and of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Notably, its arguments were recited at length in the trial courts January 8, 2002 Joint Resolution. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to deny the Motions on the sole ground that they did not contain any notice of hearing. The requirement of notice of time and hearing in the pleading filed by a party is necessary only to apprise the other of the actions of the former. Under the circumstances of the present case, the purpose of a notice of hearing was served. Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice rule because although respondent received petitioners Motion for Reconsideration six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, the said hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was only on 6 August 2004, or more than five months after respondent received a copy of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly, respondent had more than sufficient time to oppose petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004. THUS, there was substantial compliance with procedural due process. Instead of dismissing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration based merely on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should have resolved the motion based on the merits. >>>>WON RTC Erred in dismissing Omnibus Motion? YES RTC erred in dismissing petitioners Omnibus Motion for allegedly failing to comply with the three-day notice requirement. The RTC found that the notice of hearing of petitioners Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 was received by respondent on 9 November 2004. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that [e]very written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. Thus, the date of the hearing should be at least three days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the petitioners Omnibus Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to comply with the notice requirement, respondent should have received the notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November 2004, which is 9 November 2004. Clearly, respondents receipt on 9 November 2004 (Tuesday) of the notice of hearing of the Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 (Friday), was within the required minimum three-days notice. As explained by Retired Justice Jose Y. Feria in his book, Civil Procedure Annotated, when the notice of hearing should be given: The ordinary motion day is Friday. Hence, the notice should be served by Tuesday at the latest, in order that the requirement of the three days may be complied with.
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If notice be given by ordinary mail, it should be actually received by Tuesday, or if not claimed from the post office, the date of the first notice of the postmaster should be at least five (5) days before Tuesday. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. RULE 16 MOTION TO DISMISS (This is a VERY long case... yung other issue is about the validity of search warrant which the SC upheld pero di ko na nilagay dahil obiter dictum lang yun for our civ pro topic) G.R. No. 110318 August 28, 1996 COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and WARNER BROTHERS, INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A. PELINDARIO, respondents. Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners should have such license to be able to maintain an action in Philippine courts. In so challenging petitioners' personality to sue, private respondents point to the fact that petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion pictures or films, and also to the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as their attorney-in-fact, as being constitutive of "doing business in the Philippines" under Section 1 (f)(1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of Investments. As foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines, Section 133 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies them the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in the absence of a license to do business. Consequently, they have no right to ask for the issuance of a search warrant. The Corporation Code provides: Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
FACTS: Petitioners are foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines. Complainants (herein petitioners) lodged a formal complaint with the NBI for violation of PD No. 49 (Decree on Protection of Intellectual Property), as amended, and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Among the grounds of respondents for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action.
ISSUE: WON case should be dismissed for petitioners lack of legal capacity to sue? Held: NO. (It is merely respondents procedural tactic) Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims.
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On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. Correspondingly, "lack of capacity to sue" can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue (Rule 16 Section 1(d)); whereas the term "lack of personality to sue" can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. (Rule 16 Section 1(g)); The ground available for barring recourse to our courts by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines should properly be "lack of capacity to sue," NOT "lack of personality to sue." Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights have been violated is undeniably such, if not the only, real party in interest to bring suit thereon although, for failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts. This Court's REJECTS the common procedural tactics of erring local companies which, when sued by unlicensed foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines, invoke the latter's supposed lack of capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on failure to first acquire a local license is based on considerations of public policy. It was never intended to favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous establishments or nationals in case of breach of valid obligations or violation of legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or entities simply because they are not licensed to do business in the country. G.R. No. 152496. July 30, 2009.* SPOUSES GERMAN ANUNCIACION and ANA FERMA ANUNCIACION and GAVINO G. CONEJOS, petitioners, vs. PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA and GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, respondents. Facts: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. This is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Decision, and the Resolution, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65516. The CA decision affirmed the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. 00-98813 which dismissed the complaint for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of TCT No. 122452 of petitioner Spouses German Anunciacion and Ana Ferma Anunciacion and their co-petitioner, Gavino G. Conejos. Petitioners filed before the RTC, Manila, a complaint for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of TCT No. 122452, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-98813. The complaint averred that defendants (respondents) may be served with summons and legal processes through Atty. Rogelio G. Pizarro, Jr., with office address at 2830 Juan Luna St., Tondo, Manila. The summons, together with the copies of the complaint, were then served on Atty. Pizarro. The record shows that before the filing of the said complaint, Atty. Pizarro wrote a demand letter on behalf of respondents and addressed to petitioner German Anunciacion, among others, demanding that they vacate the land owned by his clients (respondents), who needed the same for their own use.
Respondents, through their counsel, Atty. Norby C. Caparas, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action. Petitioners filed their Comment on the Motion to Dismiss. A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the Motion to Dismiss was filed by respondents, alleging an additional ground that petitioners failed to pay the required filing fee. The petitioners filed, their
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Opposition to the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Comment to the Reply to the Comment on the Motion to Dismiss. Thereafter, respondents filed a Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Manifestation citing the following grounds: 1.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party. 2.) 3.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action. that the service made to Atty. Rogelio Pizarro, Jr. was deemed service upon respondents/defendants. In the case at bench, service upon Atty. Pizarro did not fall under the aforequoted rule and therefore cannot qualify as substituted service. Since the service made by Petitioners was defective, the Public Respondent court never did acquire jurisdiction over the persons of defendants and therefore correctly ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the decision but it, too, was denied by the CA in its Resolution. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners then filed their Additional Comment on the Motion to Dismiss, Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Comment on the Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. The trial court sustained the respondents and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents as defendants. Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, seeking the nullification of the RTC Orders, on the ground that the said orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In compliance, the respondents filed their Memorandum, while the petitioners filed their Memorandum.
Ruling: We find merit in the petition. Respondents, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss, with only one ground, i.e., that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action. Under this ground, respondents raised the issues quoted hereunder: I. Defendants anchored their complaint on a WRONG Decree of Registration; II. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines has recognized the authenticity of TCT No. 122452; and III. Plaintiffs do NOT have the legal personality to quiet the title of the subject property. The filing of the above-mentioned Motion to Dismiss, without invoking the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents, is deemed a voluntary appearance on the part of the respondents under the aforequoted
The CA dismissed the petition upon finding that there was no waiver of the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondents in the form of voluntary appearance. Applying Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the CA held that although the grounds alleged in the two (2) earlier Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss were lack of cause of action and failure to pay the required filing fee, the filing of the said motions did not constitute a waiver of the ground of lack of jurisdiction on their persons as defendants. The CA then concluded that there was no voluntary appearance on the part of respondents/defendants despite the filing of the aforesaid motions. The CA also rejected petitioners contention
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provision of the Rules. The same conclusion can be drawn from the filing of the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the Motion to Dismiss which alleged, as an additional ground for the dismissal of petitioners complaint, the failure of plaintiffs to pay the required filing fee again but failed to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the respondents. We likewise cannot approve the trial courts act of entertaining supplemental motions to dismiss which raise grounds that are already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiffs cause of action. To be sure, a trial court should be cautious before dismissing complaints on the sole ground of improper service of summons considering that it is well within its discretion to order the issuance and service of alias summons on the correct person in the interest of substantial justice. Accordingly, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing the petition and affirming the challenged orders of the RTC which dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents who were the defendants. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The CAs Decision and the Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 65516 affirming the Orders of the RTC in Civil Case No. 00-98813 are reversed and set aside. Consequently, Civil Case No. 00-98813 is hereby ordered REINSTATED. G.R. No. 176014 Quite apart from their voluntary appearance, respondents Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss were clearly in violation of Rule 15, Section 8 in relation to Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules. Respondents failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their persons in their very first motion to dismiss was fatal to their cause. They are already deemed to have waived that particular ground for dismissal of the complaint. The trial court plainly abused its discretion when it dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants. Under the Rules, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in the motion to dismiss or answer, are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations. September 17, 2009
It was only in respondents Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss dated November 27, 2000 that respondents for the first time raised the courts lack of jurisdiction over their person as defendants on the ground that summons were allegedly not properly served upon them. The filing of the said Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss did not divest the court of its jurisdiction over the person of the respondents who had earlier voluntarily appeared before the trial court by filing their motion to dismiss and the supplemental motion to dismiss. The dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents after they had voluntarily appeared before the trial court clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.
ALICE VITANGCOL and NORBERTO VITANGCOL, Petitioners, vs. NEW VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., MARIA ALIPIT, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Respondents. Facts: Subject of the instant controversy is lot in the name of Maria A. Alipit and Clemente A. Alipit, married to Milagros. On June 18, 1989, Maria and Clemente A. Alipit, with the marital consent of the latters wife, executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) constituting Milagros A. De Guzman as their attorney-in-fact to sell their property.
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Pursuant to her authority under the SPA, De Guzman executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to New Vista Properties, Inc. (New Vista) a parcel of land with an area of 242,540 square meters situated in Calamba, Laguna. In the deed, however, the lot thus sold was described as lot no. 1702. Following the sale, New Vista immediately entered the subject lot, fenced it with cement posts and barbed wires, and posted a security guard to deter trespassers. SC interpose at this point the observation that the property delivered to and occupied by New Vista was denominated in the SPA as Lot No. 1735, while in the deed of absolute sale in favor of New Vista the object of the purchase is described as Lot No. 1702. The controversy arose more than a decade later when respondent New Vista learned that the parcel of land it paid for and occupied, i.e., Lot No. 1702, was being claimed by petitioners Vitangcol on the strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot No. 1702 entered into on August 14, 2001 by and between Vitangcol and Maria Alipit. New Vista lost no time in protecting its rights by, first, filing a notice of adverse claim over the certificate of title, followed by commencing a suit for quieting of title before the RTC. Vitangcol moved to dismiss the complaint which New Vista duly opposed. An exchange of pleadings then ensued. On June 27, 2003, or before Maria Alipit and Vitangcol could answer, New Vista filed an amended complaint, appending thereto a copy of the 1989 deed of absolute sale De Guzman, as agent authorized agent of the Alipits, executed in its favor. Thereafter, Vitangcol filed a motion to dismiss, followed by a similar motion interposed by Maria Alipit which New Vista countered with an opposition. Unlike in its original complaint, New Vistas amended complaint did not have, as attachment, the SPA. (PLS. TAKE NOTE) It, however, averred that Clemente and Maria Alipit had ratified and validated the sale of Lot No. 1702 by their having delivered possession of said lot to New Vista after receiving and retaining the purchase price therefor. Ruling of the RTC The trial court denied Vitangcols and Maria Alipits separate motions to dismiss the amended complaint. As there held by the RTC, the amended complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. From the above order, Vitangcol sought reconsideration. RTC granted reconsideration and dismissed the amended complaint. In reversing itself, the RTC made much of the fact that New Vista did not attach the SPA to the amended complaint. To the RTC, this omission is fatal to New Vistas cause of action for quieting of title, citing in this regard the pertinent rule when an action is based on a document. Aggrieved, New Vista interposed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA CA reversed the RTC Order, reinstating New Vistas amended complaint for quieting of title, and directing Vitangcol and Maria Alipit to file their respective answers thereto. CA denied Vitangcols motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether lack of cause of action is a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the ROC. Held: No. Lack of cause of action is not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. For the determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that mode is FAILURE OF THE COMPLAINT TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
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Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion may be made on the ground "that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action." The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiffs complaint. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as a rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. However, this principle of hypothetical admission admits of exceptions. Among others, there is no hypothetical admission of conclusions or interpretations of law which are false; legally impossible facts; facts inadmissible in evidence; facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded; allegations which the court will take judicial notice are not true; and where the motion to dismiss was heard with submission of evidence which discloses facts sufficient to defeat the claim. New Vistas threshold contention that De Guzmans SPA to sell should not be considered for not having been incorporated as part of its amended complaint is incorrect since Vitangcol duly submitted that piece of document in court in the course of the June 7, 2004 hearing on the motion to dismiss. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion in considering said SPA relative to the motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The trial court, however, erred in ruling that, taking said SPA into account, the amended complaint stated no cause of action. Indeed, upon a consideration of the amended complaint, its annexes, with the June 18, 1989 SPA thus submitted, the Court is inclined, in the main, to agree with the appellate court that the amended complaint sufficiently states a cause of action. Facts: The petition at bar evolved from a dispute between brother and sister over the use of the business name or style "GATCHALIAN THE HOUSE OF NATIVE LECHON Alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Presiding Judge, spouses-petitioners, through the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court, prayed for the annulment of the latter's judgment by default Private respondent filed a Complaint for damages based on defendants' (petitioners herein) use of plaintiff's (now private respondent) trade name and style of "Gatchalian-The House of Native Lechon and Restaurant" Petitioners as defendants therein filed an "Urgent Ex- Parte Motion" for extension of time of 15 days within which to file an Answer which the Court granted Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of fifteen (15) days, defendants filed through their counsel, Atty, Esmeraldo M. Gatchalian, a "Motion to Dismiss Complaint Together With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction o That the complaint states no cause of action o That venue is improperly laid o That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action Private respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default" on o that the defendants failed to file an answer within the reglementary period Court finding the reasons stated in the "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default" filed by plaintiff, through counsel to be welltaken, granted said motion and allowed the plaintiff to present evidence exparte Respondent judge rendered his decision in favor of the plaintiff Defendants through counsel moved for the reconsideration of the court's order o defendants were denied of their rights of procedural due process o defendants were also denied of their day in court
Barraza v Campos
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Court denied defendants' motion for reconsideration Upon an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution", the Court in its Order granted the motion and caused the issuance of a writ of execution Defendants through a new counsel, Atty. M. Castillo, filed an "Urgent Omnibus Motion" o Court denied defendants' Omnibus Motion Hence this petition 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the defendant to file his answer not only within the original fifteen (15) days period but also within "a different period (as) fixed by the court. " Without resolving petitioners' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, respondent Judge declared defendant in default in his Order of December 1, 1978. This is clearly in contravention of the Rules for under Section 3, Rule 16, the court after hearing may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of pleading, or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable. And it is only from the time that the movant receives notice of the denial or deferment of the motion to dismiss that the period within which he shall file his answer is computed, which period is prescribed by Rule 11, unless the court provides a different period Simeon Mandae, plaintiff and appellant, vs. Eustaquio Gumarad and Regino Lagundino, defendants and appellees "It appearing that the motion to dismiss was filed before the expiration of the period for filing defendants' answer as extended by the court, there was no legal reason for declaring defendants in default. " Epang vs. Ortin de Layco "The petitioner having filed a motion to dismiss, he was entitled to have that motion resolved before being required to answer, since a motion to dismiss interrupts the time to plead. It follows, therefore, that the petitioner was incorrectly declared in default, and the holding of the trial of the case on the merits in his absence, without notice to him of the day of the hearing, was a denial of due process. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations was invalid and must be set aside." CARMELITA T. PANGANIBAN, petitioner,
Issue: W/N instead of filing an answer, the act of filing a motion to dismiss the compliant was proper
Held:
This is clearly allowed under Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court
A motion to dismiss is the usual, proper and ordinary method of testing the legal sufficiency of a complaint. The issue raised by a motion to dismiss is similar to that formerly raised by a demurrer under the Code of Civil Procedure A motion to dismiss under any of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 8 (now Sec. 1, Rule 16) of the Rules of Court, must be filed within the time for pleading, that is, within the time to answer Private respondents' argument that although a motion to dismiss interrupts the running of the period within which to file an answer, this refers to the original period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the responsive pleading and not to the extension of time within which to file the answer, is without merit. There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or indirectly, that the interruption of the running of the period within which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed and pending before the court, refers only to the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to the extension of time to file the answer as granted by the court. It may be true that under Section 4 of Rule 16, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if the termination thereof is deferred, themovant shall file his answer within the time prescribed by Rule
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vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondent. FACTS: Petitioner entered into a Sublease and Dealer Agreement (SLDA) with Respondent o Respondent leased a gasoline station o Respondent is not the owner of the lot subject of the lease; Respondent is only leasing the lot from the owner, Serafin Vasquez, pursuant to a lease agreement effective for 15 years. In a letter, private respondent notified petitioner that the SLDA was expiring. Believing that the SLDA had not yet expired and was still effective until December 31, 2002, petitioner continued to pay rentals for the gasoline station. o Private respondent refused to accept the payments. Petitioner filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Makati o Respondent filed an Answer. Respondent filed an Unlawful Detainer case against Petitioner with the MTC of Caloocan o 8 months after filing its Answer, Respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss. Private respondent claimed that the issue of the renewal of the lease should be raised in the unlawful detainer case pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings since the other case filed with the Regional Trial Court involved the same parties and issues. DENIED MTC decided in favor of the Respondents (Unlawful Detainer case) o Ordered Petitioner to vacate the premises and surrender possession thereof and to pay Respondents Petitioner appealed from the said decision which is now pending with the RTC of Caloocan RTC ordered the dismissal of the Petition for Declaratory Relief Considering that there has been a breach of the SLDA and that an ejectment case has been filed, this petition is no longer proper RTC denied the MR of Petitioner for failure of the latter to appear at the hearing Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court o SC issued a Resolution referring the said Petition to the CA CA denied the petition o Denied the Petition for Declaratory Relief on the ground of litis pendentia The case of Declaratory Relief should be abated in favor of the case for Unlawful Detainer o With regard to Petitioners contention that it is this Court which has jurisdiction over her petition, the CA pointed out that it was merely yielding to the Courts order; Accordingly, the CA has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and there is no special reason for this Court to take Cognizance of the case o
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the case on the ground of litis pendentia which was filed long after the Respondent filed its Answer? RULING: Close but no cigar. NO! The Court of Appeals applied Rosales and University Physicians Services, Inc. in sustaining the dismissal of the action for declaratory relief to give way to the ejectment suit. o Rosales Case: Lessee filed an action for continued enforcement of the lease contract Lessor filed a case for unlawful detainer Lessor filed a MTD the complaint of the Lessee because of the pendency of the ejectment case
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Lesse filed a MTD for the dismissal of the ejectment case also on the ground of litis pendentia contending that the case he file earlier should be entertained first Court held that if the plaintiff has any right to the extension of the lease at all, such right is a proper and legitimate issue that could be raised in the unlawful detainer case because it may be used as a defense to the action.' In other words, the matter raised in the Court of First instance of Cavite may be threshed out in the ejectment suit, in consonance with the principle prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer case was filed later, would not change the situation to depart from the application of the foregoing rule University Physician Services Case: The issue of whether private respondent had the right to occupy the subject apartment unit should therefore be properly threshed out in an ejectment suit and not in an action for damages where the question of possession is likewise the primary issue to be resolved In this case, the bona fide existence of litis pendentia is beyond dispute. Requisites of litis pendentia: (1) The identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (2) The identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; (3) The identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other Petitioner questions the preference given by the RTC and the CA to the unlawful detainer case filed by private respondent. Petitioner maintains that based on priority in time, the action for declaratory relief, the case filed earlier, should not have been abated in favor of the ejectment suit, a case filed much later. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of actions and that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. We have set the relevant factors that a court must consider when it has to determine which case should be dismissed given the pendency of two actions: i. The date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained ii. Whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the latter action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal iii. Whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties The mere fact that the action for declaratory relief was filed earlier than the case for unlawful detainer does not necessarily mean that the first case will be given preference.
The requirement that a motion to dismiss should be filed within the time for filing the answer is not absolute. Even after an answer has been filed, a defendant can still file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) Lack of jurisdiction, (2) Litis pendentia, (3) Lack of cause of action, and; (4) Discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal Litis pendentia is also one of the grounds that authorize a court to dismiss a case motu proprio.
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In Cruz v. Court of Appeals, we have ruled that the earlier case can be dismissed in favor of the later case if the later case is the more appropriate forum for the ventilation of the issues between the parties. Clearly, the interpretation of a provision in the SLDA as to when the SLDA would expire is the key issue that would determine petitioner's right to possess the gasoline service station. When the primary issue to be resolved is physical possession, the issue should be threshed out in the ejectment suit, and not in any other case such as an action for declaratory relief to avoid multiplicity of suits. Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court had already resolved the unlawful detainer case in favor of private to respondent even before the Regional Trial Court dismissed the action for declaratory relief. It would have been an exercise in futility for the Regional Trial Court to continue the proceedings in the action for declaratory relief when the Metropolitan Trial Court had already ruled that the term of the SLDA was for only five years. Also, the decision of the MTC would amount to res judicata should it attain finality. Laches definitely had not yet set in when private respondent filed the unlawful detainer case 269 days after the expiration of the SLDA. Private respondent did not sleep on its right when it filed the unlawful detainer case well within the prescriptive period for filing the action Private respondent therefore shall one year or 365 days from July 31, 1995 to file the case for unlawful detainer; The expiration of the term of the lease immediately gives rise to a cause of action, of which a demand is no longer necessary. BA finance v hon. Pineda cfi- rizal judge and Antonio sy respondents FACTS: CFI- NUEVA ECIJA (1st case) Private respondent Antonio Sy was adjudged liable in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case for damages resulting from a vehicular accident involving a cargo truck supposedly owned by him. CFI-RIZAL (2nd case) magulo na facts... -SY filed civil case which was assigned to the sala presided over by the respondent Judge (di sinabi sa case kong anung cv case )Claiming that the adverse decision in 1st case was due to the mishandling of the same by the counsel who represented him therein -defendants 2nd case were petitioner BA Finance Corporation whom private respondent claims to be the real owner of the cargo truck involved in the accident; the Metro-Taisho Insurance Corporation, which issued the insurance policy covering the same; Atty. Ireneo Calderon, the counsel who represented him in 1st case; and Robert Chua, the driver of the other vehicle that figured in the accident -Petitioner BA Finance Corporation was served summons , Eleven days later, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion for extension of time to file answer and/or motion to dismiss -the respondent Judge gave the petitioner a period of 15 days, counted from January 2, 1982 and to expire on January 18, 1982 (sic), within which to file its answer or motion to dismiss the complaint. -On January 13, 1982, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action- DENIED, for being "devoid of merit." -Petitioner filed MR of the order dated March 1, 1982. - respondent filed motion to strike out the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the alleged ground that the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. It was argued by counsel for the private respondent that when the petitioner filed its motion to dismiss on January 13, 1982, it had already used 11 days out of the 15 days' extension granted to it by the Court in the order of January 4, 1982; that having received the order denying its motion to dismiss on March 8, 1982, the petitioner had only the remainder of 4 days or up to March 12, 1982 within which to file its answer to the complaint; consequently, the filing of the motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982 was already beyond the reglementary period for filing the answer- granted and petitioner was declared in default. -On April 19, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion to lift order of default- denied - petitioner filed MR of default order- granted and ordering it to file its answer to the complaint within 15 days from notice thereof. The petitioner had by then, or on May 11, 1982, already filed its answer. -MR- judge reversed its decision on default The proceedings taken subsequent thereto are not clear from the record. RTC ruled that for respondents and ordered the defendants therein, including herein petitioner, but excluding Atty. Ireneo Calderon, to pay unto the private respondent the total sum of P 228,255.64 as moral and
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exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. the provision in question, Section 4 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court SEC. 4. Time to plead. If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period. by the petitioner against the denial of its motion to dismiss is a mere scrap of paper for lack of proof of service; and (2) the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner against the order of May 4, 1982 which denied the petitioner's motion to lift order of default is pro-forma for being Identical to petitioner's opposition to the plaintiff's motion to declare the petitioner in default. The lack of palpable merit of said grounds leads to a natural impression that the respondent Judge was determined to prevent the petitioner from being given a chance to defend itself in the case filed against it by the private respondent, contrary to repeated exhortations and pronouncements from the Supreme Court frowning upon judgments by default on purely technical grounds. The new arguments resorted to by the respondent Judge were not even mentioned in the motion of the private respondent to strike out the answer, nor were they mentioned by the respondent Judge in his first order declaring the petitioner in default. The motion to strike out filed by the private respondent and the order of respondent Judge dated April 5, 1982 declaring the petitioner in default made reference only to the alleged fact that the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss was filed beyond the reglementary period. Such ground, as aforementioned, had been acknowledged by the respondent Judge himself in his order of July 14, 1982 to be erroneous. The allegation that the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner lacks the requisite notice of hearing and proof of service is a factual distortion. On page 4 of said motion for reconsideration which has been attached as Annex "F" of the petition ,it clearly appears that the petitioner's counsel set the said motion for hearing on April 16, 1982 and that a copy of the same was sent by registered mail to the counsel for the private respondent on March 17, 1982. The private respondent filed a motion to strike out the said motion for reconsideration thereby showing that private A. respondent had notice of the motion for reconsideration long before the scheduled hearing thereof on April 16, 1982. The imputation that the motion to reconsider the order of May 4, 1982 which denied the petitioner's motion to lift order of default is pro-forma reveals a misconception of the concept of pro-forma motions for reconsideration. It is not every motion for reconsideration that reiterates grounds or arguments aired in a previous motion that may be declared pro-forma. It will be noted
ISSUE:WON judge erred in declaring petitioner in default?YES RULING: It is undisputed that the petitioner was given an extension of time within which to file its answer which was to expire on January 18, 1982. On January 13, 1982, it filed a motion to dismiss which was denied, and notice of which was served on the petitioner on March 8, 1982. When the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982, it was well within the 15-day period within which to file the answer counted from the date it received notice of the denial of its motion to dismiss which was on March 8, 1982. Yet, on the erroneous belief that the petitioner had only to its credit the balance of the period to answer that it did not consume by the time it filed its motion to dismiss, the respondent Judge ruled that the filing of the motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982 was already beyond the reglementary period and forthwith declared tile defendant in default. After declaring the petitioner in default in the order of April 5, 1982 and after denying the motion to lift order of default in the order of May 4, 1982, the respondent Judge made a complete turnabout in his order of June 10, 1982 by setting aside the default declaration of the petitioner, giving no reason therefor except the catch phrase "in the interest of justice." Then, another change of mind on the part of the respondent Judge was manifested in his order of July 14, 1982 which reiterated the order of April 5, 1982 declaring the petitioner in default. This time, the respondent Judge woke up to his mistake and ruled that the petitioner had 15 days from the date it received notice of tile denial of its motion to dismiss on March 11, 1982 within which to file its answer respondent Judge stubbornly persisted in maintaining his view that the answer of the respondent to the complaint was filed out of time by alleging two new grounds, namely: (1) the motion for reconsideration filed
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that the motion for reconsideration herein involved is of an interlocutory order, and not of a final judgment or final order. There should be a distinction in determining whether a motion for reconsideration may be declared proforma depending on whether it is directed against a final judgment or order, or only against an interlocutory order. In the case of the former, a repetition of arguments or grounds already sufficiently discussed in prior incidents may properly be categorized as being merely for purposes of delay. In the case of interlocutory orders, a reiteration of the ground or argument previously advanced is not necessarily indicative that the movant filed the motion merely for gaining delay. It must be remembered that, normally, when an interlocutory order is sought to be reviewed or annulled by means of any of the extra legal remedies of prohibition or certiorari, it is required that a motion for reconsideration of the question order must first be filed, such being considered a speedy and adequate remedy at law which must first be resorted to as a condition precedent for filing of any of such proceedings (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 65, Rules of Court). There is no similar requirement in taking an appeal from a final judgment or order should the questioned interlocutory order be subject to attack only on one ground, as in the case of the default declaration herein involved, a motion for reconsideration against the order complained of would necessarily and inevitably contain a repetition of the ground previously alleged. In so doing, the movant is praying the court to give his motion a second look, in the hope that the court would realize its supposed error, correct the same, and thereby preclude the necessity of seeking relief in a higher tribunal. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. G.R. No. 94733 February 17, 1993 --------- I added this discussion about rule 15 kasi baka biglang itanong-----MUNICIPALITY OF BIAN, LAGUNA, represented by Hon. Bayani Alonte, Municipal Mayor of Bian, Laguna, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JESUS M. GARCIA, respondents. Facts: On September 27, 1989, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 2473 for unlawful detainer, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, against RTC granted petitioner's motion for discretionary execution and issued a writ of execution On December 29, 1989, respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing the aforesaid order of execution pending appeal on the ground that petitioner failed to furnish private respondent with a copy of the motion contrary private respondent alleging that it was no longer amenable to the renewal of its 25-year lease contract because of its pressing need to use the subject lot for national and provincial offices. In respondents answer, he contends that the contract of lease had not yet expired and, assuming that it had expired, he has exercised his option to stay in the premises for another 25 years as expressly provided in the said contract. Petitioner filed its reply to private respondent's answer. On October 16, 1989, private respondent filed this time a "Motion for Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to Dismiss Has Been Filed" on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, reiterating its argument that the original term of 25 years stipulated in the contract of lease had not yet expired and that, at any rate, under said contract he has the exclusive option to renew the same for another 25 years. On October 26, 1989, MTC - ordered respondent to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case. On November 8, 1989, private respondent filed a "Manifestation/Motion" before said trial court praying that the issues raised in the motion for preliminary hearing, apparently because it was in the nature of a motion to dismiss, be first resolved instead of rendering judgment on the pleadings. Thereafter, on November 10, 1989, private respondent received a copy of the October 26, 1989 decision of the MTC, hence he filed a notice of appeal to the RTC.
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to Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, hence the invalidity of the lower court's order which granted the writ of execution. CA - set aside the questioned order for being violative of the requirement in Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which provides that no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of prior notice thereof to the adverse party. MR denied. ----------- RTC and CA ruled only on the issue under rule 15 so petitioner filed this certiorari in SC------ISSUE: WON MTC committed a grave abuse of discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction when it failed to conduct a preliminary hearing, as prayed for in private respondent's "Motion for Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to Dismiss Has Been Filed," before summarily rendering judgment on the merits of the case HELD: NO. The said motion of private respondent is anchored on the ground that the complaint allegedly states no cause of action since the original term of 25 years stipulated in the contract of lease had not yet expired and assuming that it had expired, private respondent had made known to petitioner his exclusive option to renew it for another 25 years. Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (old rule pa to...) pertinently provides: Sec. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. Any of the grounds for dismissal provides for in this Rule, except improper venue, preliminary hearing MAY be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. The aforequoted provision allows the grounds for a motion to dismiss to be set up as affirmative defenses in the answer if no motion to dismiss has been filed. However, contrary to the claim of private respondent, the preliminary hearing permitted under the said provision is NOT mandatory even when the same is prayed for. It rests largely on the sound discretion of the trial court. The use of the word "may" in said provision shows that such a hearing is not a matter of right demandable from the trial court. Where the provision reads "may," this word shows that it is not mandatory but discretional. It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and possibility. G.R. No. 109068. January 10, 1994.* GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, AND PEDRO G. HERNANDO, respondents. Facts: PETITION for review of the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte. Filed by petitioner as an accion publiciana against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brothers-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise. Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest efforts towards a compromise and that the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only at the pre-trial conference, that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to halfsisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge gave petitioner five (5) days to file his motion and amended complaint to allege that the parties were very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently, respondent Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.
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Guerrero moved to reconsider the Order claiming that since brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in his answer. Respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding that [f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. He warned that unless the complaint was amended within five (5) days the case would be dismissed. The 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his complaint, respondent Judge dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal however to be without prejudice. Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review the dismissal by the court a quo. He raises these legal issues: (a) whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained; and, (b) whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Further, Art. 151 is complemented by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which provides as a ground for a motion to dismiss (t)hat the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made. But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the abovequoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gay on v. Gayon that the enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend sisters-in-law. In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that sisters-in-law (hence, also brothersin-law) are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of members of the family, we find no r eason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit. In his Comment, Hernando argues that x x x x although both wives of the parties were not impleaded, it remains a truism that being spouses of the contending parties, and the litigation involves ownership of real property, the spouses interest and participation in the land in question cannot be denied, making the suit still a suit between half-sisters x x x x
Ruling: Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word No, the requirement is mandatory that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that, [i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
Finding this argument preposterous, Guerrero counters in his Reply that his wife has no actual interest and participation in the land subject of the xxx suit, which the petitioner bought, according to his complaint, before he married his wife. This factual controversy however may be best left to the court a quo to resolve when it resumes hearing the case. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, or whichever branch of the court the case may now be assigned, is directed to continue with Civil Case No. 10084-16 with deliberate dispatch. SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. L-45107 November 11, 1991 BENEDICTO RAMOS, petitioner, vs. HON. ELVIRO L. PERALTA, Presiding Judge, Branch XVII, Court of First Instance of Manila, SPOUSES JUVENCIO ORTANEZ and JULIANA S. ORTANEZ, MINDANAO INSURANCE CO., INC. and P. R. ROMAN, INC., respondents. Facts: Petitioner started occupying the Salgado fishpond in 1964 by virtue of a lease contract executed in his favor by private respondents spouses Juvencio and Juliana Ortanez. Unknown to petitioner, title to said property was in the name of Philippine International Surety Co., Inc., a corporation founded, organized and 99.5%-owned by the Salgado spouses. Later renamed Mindanao Insurance Co., Inc., said corporation was placed under receivership and liquidation on June 20, 1968. Thereafter on February 23, 1976, respondent P. R. Roman, Inc. purchased from Mindanao Insurance the Salgado fishpond. The deed of sale was signed by the receiver and duly approved by the liquidation court. Apparently due to this development, the spouses Ortanez refused to accept from petitioner the advance rentals on the fishpond due on March 15, 1976 in the amount of P30,000.00. On or about May 1, 1976, petitioner received a letter from Don Pablo R. Roman informing him of the latter's acquisition of the fishpond and intention to take possession thereof. In his letter-reply, petitioner reminded Mr. Roman of his lease contract over the fishpond and refused to consent to the intended take over. Notwithstanding petitioner's objection, P. R. Roman, Inc. took over possession of the fishpond. On August 2, 1976, petitioner filed before the CFI of Manila an action against private respondents Juvencio and Juliana Ortanez, Mindanao Insurance and P. R. Roman, Inc. for consignation of the sum of P70,000.00 representing advance rentals on the fishpond which he had previously tendered to, but refused by the spouses Ortanez and Pablo Roman. P. R. Roman, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that venue was improperly laid, the complaint states no cause of action and the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action or suit. In its motion to dismiss, P. R. Roman, Inc. cited the pendency before the then CFI of Bataan of Civil Case No 4102 instituted by P.R. Roman, Inc. against petitioner Benedicto Ramos on August 13, 1976 to quiet its title over the Salgado fishpond. (PLS. TAKE NOTE) Respondent CFI of Manila issued an order dismissing consignation case. o for the reason, principally, that there is already a case pending between the same parties and for the same cause in Court of First Instance of Bataan, which is precisely for the ownership of the subject matter of the property allegedly leased to the plaintiff herein. o In the said case, the defendant therein, Benedicto Ramos, who is the plaintiff in the case at bar, filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the spouses surnamed Ortanez and the Mindanao Insurance Company Inc. o All the issues respecting the fishpond, including the lease contract, are necessarily involved in the case pending now in Bataan. o Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was unsuccessful. Hence this petition FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI. 1. The respondent court erred in not holding that the only issue in consignation of funds is whether the defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment or not.
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2. The respondent court erred in not holding that the prerogative of choosing the proper venue belongs to the plaintiff. 3. The respondent court erred in holding that the subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 4102 before the Court of First Instance of Bataan is a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 103647 before it. Petitioners contention: Held: No. Petitioner contends that the Bataan quieting-of-title case cannot serve as a bar to his Manila consignation Civil Case because they involve different issues. Quieting of title case deals with the question of ownership while the only issue involved in his consignation case is whether or not the defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment. In fact, petitioner posits, the action to quiet title is a useless futile exercise as he does not question P. R. Roman Inc.'s ownership of the fishpond under consideration, but merely wishes to assert his leasehold and possessory rights over said property under the "Kasunduan sa Pag-upa." He further contends that compelling him to litigate before the Bataan court would render nugatory his right as a plaintiff to choose the venue of his action. Besides, Consignation case was filed on August 2, 1976, ahead of Quieting of title case which was filed on a much later date, August 13, 1976, after the Manila CFI had already acquired jurisdiction over the consignation case. Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be invoked as a ground for the dismissal of an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. These requisites are present in the case at bar. It is worthwhile mentioning that in his basic petition for review, one of the assigned errors of petitioner is that the respondent court erred in not holding that the parties in quieting of title case are not the same as the parties in the consignation case. o However, in his brief, no further mention of this assigned error was made; a clear indication of petitioner's admission of the identity of parties in quieting case and consignation case, particularly as he filed a third party complaint in the quieting case against the spouses Ortanez and Mindanao Insurance. and binding effect of the lease contract and the existence of the supposed obligor-obligee relationship. They further contend that a plaintiffs right of choice of venue is not absolute, but must invariably bow to the dismissal of the case because of litis pendentia which, in refutation of petitioner's argument, does not require that there is a prior pending action, merely that there is a pending action.
Issue: Whether petitioners contention is meritorious.
Respondents contention: Private respondents counter that while it may be true that theoretically, the main issue involved in a consignation case is whether or not the defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment, in the consignation case brought by petitioner, other issues were pleaded by petitioner himself, such as the validity
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Anent the second element, petitioners contention that the only issue in a consignation case is whether or not the defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment is true only where there is no controversy with respect to the obligation sought to be discharged by such payment. o His consignation case, however, is not as simple. While ostensibly, the immediate relief sought for in his consignation case is to compel therein defendants to accept his advance rentals, the ultimate purpose of such action is to compel the new owner of the fishpond to recognize his leasehold rights and right of occupation. o In the last analysis, therefore, the issue involved in the consignation case is the right of possession over the fishpond intertwined with the validity and effectivity of the lease contract. o This is the same issue involved in quieting case. o Although an action for quieting of title refers to ownership, P. R. Roman, Inc. in its complaint in the quieting case also raised its right of possession over the fish pond. But this right given to the plaintiff is not immutable. It must yield to the greater interest of the orderly administration of justice, which as in this case, may call for the dismissal of an action on the basis of litis pendentia to obviate the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by two different courts. The Rules of Court are not perfect. It does not pretend to be able to make everyone happy simultaneously or consecutively or all the time. Even the Rules of Court has hierarchy of values; thus, the choice of venue may bow to dismissal of the case because of litis pendentia. At any rate, petitioner cannot complain of any inconvenience arising from the dismissal of the consignation case. Being the defendant in the quieting of title case, he cannot but litigate before the Bataan court, and bringing his consignation case before the same court would actually save him time, effort and litigation expenses.
LITIS PENDENCIA Finally, the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to the earlier case. What is required merely is that there be another pending action, not a prior pending action. Considering the broader scope of inquiry involved in the quieting of title case and the location of the property involved, no error was committed by the lower court in deferring to the Bataan court's jurisdiction.
RES JUDICATA Whatever decision may be handed down in The Quieting case would constitute res judicata in the consignation case is beyond cavil. Should the Bataan court rule that the lease contract is valid and effective against P. R. Roman, Inc., the petitioner can compel it to accept his proffered payment of rentals; otherwise, he may not do so.
Universal Robina Corporation vs Albert Lim GR 154338 October 5, 2007 Facts:
VENUE Petitioner next contends that the dismissal of the consignation case deprived him of his right to choose the venue of his action. Verily, the rules on the venue of personal actions are laid down generally for the convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses.
Petitioner sold to respondent grocery products in the total amount of P808,059.88. After tendering partial payments, respondent refused to settle his obligation despite petitioners repeated demands.
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Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Quezon City, a complaint against respondent for a sum of money. The trial Court issued an Order dismissing the complaint motu proprio on ground of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue because the plaintiff corporation has its principal office at Pasig City and the defendant is from Laoag City. Petitioner filed a MR together with an amended complaint alleging that the parties agreed that the proper venue for any dispute relative to the transaction is Quezon City. The trial court granted the motion and admitted petitioners amended complaint. Summons was served upon respondent but failed to file an answer seasonably. Upon motion of the petitioner, the trial court issued an Order declaring him in default and allowing petitioner to present its evidence ex parte. However, the trial court was still unsure whether venue was properly laid, thus it issued an order directing petitioner to file a memorandum of authorities on whether it can file a complaint in QC. Subsequently the trial court again issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue for the reason that there is no connection whatsoever between QC and the parties. The official place of business is Pasig and the defendants residence is Laoag City were all stipulated in the Complaint. But the stipulation of the proper filing is at the back of the delivery receipt saying that the venue shall be in QC was not stated in the complaint nor admitted to have been signed by the defendant. Petitioner filed a MR but was denied by the trial court. Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for review. But it was dismissed due to petitioners failure to attach an explanation why copies of the petition were not served by personal service but by registered mail, in violation of Sec. 11, Rule 14 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner filed a MR but it was also denied. Hence, this petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Held: No trial court cannot motu proprio dismiss petitioners complain on the ground of improper venue. Clearly, in personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in the place of his or her residence or the place where the defendant resides. However, the parties may agree to a specific venue which could be in a place where neither of them resides. Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the same Rules provides for instances when the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a claim, thus: Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that a trial court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue because justice and fairness take primary importance and the fact that the defendant failed to challenge the venue in a motion to dismiss, thus he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. In Rudolf Lietz Holdings Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of Paraaque , the Court likewise held that a trial court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue, thus: Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. The court may only dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata and prescription. Therefore, the trial court in this case erred when it dismissed the petition motu proprio. It should have waited for a motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading from respondent, raising the objection or affirmative defense of improper venue, before dismissing the petition. Petition for Review is Granted G.R. No. 156164 September 4, 2009
Issue: W/N the trial court may dismiss motu proprio petitioners complaint on the ground of improper venue.
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SPS. LEONARDO AND MILAGROS CHUA, Petitioners, vs. HON. JACINTO G. ANG, DENNIS R. PASTRANA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CITY AND ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR OF PASIG, RESPECTIVELY, FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN L. SOBREPEA, NOEL M. * CARIO, ROBERTO S. ROCO, ALICE ODCHIQUE-BONDOC, ROMULO T. SANTOS AND ENRIQUE A. SOBREPEA, JR., Respondents. (Guys ang labo ng case na to it did not mention anything about Rule 16.) Petition for certiorari filed by the spouses Leonardo and Milagros Chua. FACTS: Petitioners (as buyers) and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI, as developers) executed a Contract to Sell a condominium unit. Despite the lapse of 3 years, FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted condominium unit to the petitioners. Petitioners filed on September 3, 2002 a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City accusing the private respondents, as officers and directors of FEPI, of violating P.D. No. 957. The petitioners alleged that the private respondents did not construct and failed to deliver the contracted condominium unit to them and did not register the Contract to Sell with the Register of Deeds. Of the 7 private respondents, only private respondent Alice Odchique-Bondoc filed a Counter-Affidavit. She countered that the City Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the case since it falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis R. Pastrana and Pasig City Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang (public respondents), dismissed the complaint for being premature. o The Resolution held that it is the HLURB that has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices. Nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests the HLURB with jurisdiction to impose the Section 39 criminal penalties. What the Decree provides is the authority of the HLURB to impose administrative fines under Section 38. We hold that the public respondent prosecutors should have made a determination of probable cause in the complaint before them, instead of simply dismissing it for prematurity. The implementing rules themselves expressly acknowledge that two separate remedies with differing consequences may be sought under the Decree, specifically, the administrative remedy and criminal prosecution. The determination of the criminal liability lies within the realm of criminal procedure as embodied in the Rules of Court. Petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction over criminal complaints for violation of P.D. No. 957. Present case requires prompt action because public interest and welfare are involved in subdivision and condominium development. We stress that the immediate recourse to this Court that this Decision allows should not serve as a precedent in other cases where the prosecutor dismisses a criminal complaint, whether under P.D. No. 957 or any other The public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaints for violation of P.D. No. 957 on the ground that jurisdiction lies with the HLURB. ISSUE: Whether the jurisdiction to entertain criminal complaints is lodged with the city prosecutor and that the jurisdiction of the HLURB under P.D. No. 957 is limited to the enforcement of contractual rights, not the investigation of criminal complaints? RULING: Yes.
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law. Recourse to (a) the filing a motion for reconsideration with the City or Provincial Prosecutor, (b) the filing a petition for review with the Secretary of the DOJ, (c) the filing a motion for reconsideration of any judgment rendered by the DOJ, and (d) intermediate recourse to the CA, are remedies that the dictates of orderly procedure and the hierarchy of authorities cannot dispense with. Only the extremely peculiar circumstances of the present case compelled us to rule as we did; thus our ruling in this regard is a rare one that should be considered pro hac vice. SUSIE CHAN-TAN v JESSE C. TAN, FACTS: * Petitioner and respondent were married but later petitioner filed a case for the annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties submitted to the court a compromise agreement - approved * RTC -rendered a decision declaring the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity of the parties. The trial court incorporated in its decision the compromise agreement of the parties on the issues of support, custody, visitation of the children, and property relations. *petitioner left the country bringing the children with her. *Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the children. The evidence presented by respondent established that petitioner brought the children out of the country without his knowledge and without prior authority of the trial court; petitioner failed to pay the P8,000,000 remaining balance for the Megaworld property which, if forfeited would prejudice the interest of the children; and petitioner failed to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latters name -GRANTED *Petitioner filed MR alleging denial of due process on account of accident, mistake, or excusable negligence-DENIED which was filed beyond the 15day reglementary period. It also declared petitioner in contempt of court for non-compliance with the partial judgment and the 17 May 2004 resolution. *petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution. She claimed she was no longer interested in the suit. Petitioner stated that the circumstances in her life had led her to the conclusion that withdrawing the petition was for the best interest of the children. She prayed that an order be issued vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at the status quo ante the filing of the suit-DENIED It held that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution had become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. The Courts Ruling: The petition has no merit. *** Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in applying to her motion to dismiss Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Petitioner argues that if indeed the provision is applicable, the same is unconstitutional for setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family. ***Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared in court at the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on petitioners motion to dismiss. SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer. The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all possible defenses in an answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so that judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a statute, the purpose or object of the law is an important factor to be considered. Further, the letter of the law admits of no other interpretation but that the provision applies only to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only a respondent in a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage files an answer where any ground that may warrant a dismissal may be raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to the provision. The only logical conclusion is that Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to a motion to dismiss filed by the party who initiated the petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage. Since petitioner is not the respondent in the petition for the annulment of the marriage, Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to the motion to dismiss filed by her. Section 7 of the Rule not being applicable, petitioners claim that it is unconstitutional for allegedly setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family is without basis.
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Section 1 of the Rule states that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage. In this connection, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court allows dismissal of the action upon notice or upon motion of the plaintiff, to wit: Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. x x x Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. x x x (Emphasis supplied) However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution may no longer be disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by petitioner. The trial court was correct in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. RULE 17 DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS G.R. No. 156470 April 30, 2008 On November 23, 2001, petitioner Frederick Dael filed a Complaint for breach of contract and damages against respondent-spouses Beltran. In his complaint, petitioner alleged that respondents sold him a 3 hectares parcel of land. Petitioner alleged that respondents did not disclose that the land was previously mortgaged. Petitioner further alleged that it was only on August 6, 2001 when he discovered that an extrajudicial foreclosure over the property had already been instituted, and that he was constrained to bid in the extrajudicial sale of the land conducted on August 29, 2001. Possession and ownership of the property was delivered to him when he paid the bid price of P775,100. Petitioner argued that respondents' nondisclosure of the extrajudicial foreclosure constituted breach of contract on the implied warranties in a sale of property as provided under Article 1547 of the New Civil Code. He likewise claimed that he was entitled to damages because he had to pay for the property twice. On January 10, 2002, respondents filed a MTD on the ground that petitioner had no cause of action since the contract to sell stated that the vendor was Benedicto Beltran and the vendee was Frederick George Ghent Dael, petitioners son. The RTC on the same day ordered petitioner to clarify whether or not he and Frederick George Ghent Dael were one and the same person; whether or not they were Filipinos and residents of Dumaguete City; and whether or not Frederick George Ghent Dael was of legal age, and married, as stated in the Contract to Sell. Petitioner did not comply. Instead, petitioner filed a Notice of Dismissal on February 20, 2002. On May 28, 2002, the RTC dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Arguing that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice based on respondents' Motion to Dismiss, and not without prejudice based on his Notice of Dismissal, petitioner filed a MR but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
FREDERICK DAEL, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES BENEDICTO and VILMA BELTRAN, respondents. Facts:
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ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint for breach of contract and damages based on the motion to dismiss filed by herein respondents and not on the notice of dismissal promptly [filed] by herein petitioner before respondents could file a responsive pleading, under rule 17, section 1 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure. HELD: YES. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: G.R. No. 58986. April 17, 1989.* SECTION 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. - A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. Under this provision, it is mandatory that the trial court issue an order confirming such dismissal and, unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice and could be accomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to approval by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the notice. The trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of the ground. Respondents argue that the Motion to Dismiss they filed precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed by petitioner and hence, the trial court correctly gave it precedence and ruled based on the motion. This argument is erroneous. Section 1 of Rule 17 does not encompass a Motion to Dismiss. The provision specifically provides that a plaintiff may file a notice of dismissal before service of the answer or a motion for summary judgment. Thus, upon the filing of the Notice of Dismissal by the plaintiff, the DANTE Y. GO, petitioner, vs. HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, Judge, etc., CITY SHERIFF OF CALOOCAN CITY, and CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CO., INC., respondents. Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents became moot and academic and the trial court should have dismissed the case without prejudice based on the Notice of Dismissal filed by the petitioner. Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice would erroneously result in res judicata and imply that petitioner can no longer file a case against respondents without giving him a chance to present evidence to prove otherwise.
Facts: PETITION for certiorari to review the restraining order issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
California Manufacturing Co., Inc. (hereinafter, simply, California) brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Dante Go, accusing him of unfair competition. The gravamen of Californias complaint was that Dante Go, doing business under the name and style of Sugarland International Products,and engaged like California in the manufacture of spaghetti, macaroni, and other pasta, was selling his products in the open market under the brand name, Great Italian, in packages which were in colorable and deceitful imitation of Californias containers bearing its own brand, Royal. Its complaint contained an application for preliminary injunction commanding Dante Go to immediately cease and desist from the further manufacture, sale and distribution of said products, and to retrieve those already being offered for sale.
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About two weeks later, California filed a notice of dismissal with the Court. from proceeding with the case of unfair competition filed in his office by California against Dante Go.
Four days afterwards, California received by registered mail a copy of Dante Gos answer with counterclaim, which had been filed with the Court.
A fire broke out at the Manila City Hall destroying among others the sala of Judge Tengco and the records of cases therein kept, including that filed by California against Dante Go.
California filed another complaint asserting the same cause of action against Dante Go, this time with the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City. This second suit was docketed as Civil Case No. C-9702 and was assigned to the branch presided over by Judge Fernando A. Cruz.
Dante Gos thesis is that the case filed against him by California in the Manila Court remained pending despite Californias notice of dismissal. According to him, since he had already filed his answer to the complaint before California sought dismissal of the action three (3) days afterwards, such dismissal was no longer a matter of right and could no longer be effected by mere notice in accordance with Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, but only on plaintiffs motion, and by order of the Court; hence, the Caloocan Court acted without jurisdiction over the second action based on the same cause. He also accused California of forum shopping, of selecting a sympathetic court for a relief which it had failed to obtain from another.
Ruling: The petitioner is in error. What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendants answer with the Court (either personally or by mail) but the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for summary judgment. This is the plain and explicit message of the Rules. The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers with the court, according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, means the delivery thereof to the clerk of the court either personally or by registered mail. Service, on the other hand, signifies delivery of the pleading or other paper to the parties affected thereby through their counsel of record, unless delivery to the party himself is ordered by the court, by any of the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e., by personal service, service by mail, or substituted service.
Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order directing the defendant x x to immediately cease and desist from the further manufacture, sale, promotion and distribution of spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta products contained in packaging boxes and labels under the name GREAT ITALIAN, which are similar to or copies of those of the plaintiff, and x x recall x x all his spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta products using the brand, GREAT ITALIAN.
On the day following the rendition of the restraining order, Dante Go filed the present petition for certiorari, etc. with this Court praying for its nullification and perpetual inhibition. This Court, in turn, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining California, Judge Cruz and the City Sheriff from enforcing or implementing the restraining order, and from continuing with the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction in said Civil Case No. C9702. The scope of the injunction was subsequently enlarged by this Courts Resolution to include the City Fiscal of Manila, who was thereby restrained
Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila Court after the filing of Dante Gos answer but before service thereof. Thus havin g acted well within the letter and contemplation of the afore-quoted Section 1
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of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, its notice ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila Court, without need of any order or other action by the Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected without regard to whatever reasons or motives California might have had for bringing it about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, without prejudice, the contrary not being otherwise stated in the notice and it being the first time the action was being so dismissed. Sometime in April, 1960, private respondents Porferio Ytoriaga and Consolacion Lopez filed against Ana Hedriana and petitioner Fermin Jalover a complaint in the CFI of Iloilo. The action involves the possession and ownership of an accreted land. Respondents prayed that they be declared the owners of the increased portion of land and petitioners to vacate the premises and restore possession to the former. The case was set for trial. On September 4, 1963, private respondents, formally offered documentary evidence, and upon the admission thereof, they rested their case. (PLS. TAKE NOTE) Whereupon, continuation of trial was ordered transferred until further assignment. Trial was postponed many times stretching to a period of more than 6 years, until January 26, 1970, when the case was called for trial, and the Presiding Judge dismissed the case, for failure of private respondents to appear in court, in an order which reads: The complaint was filed on April 6, 1960 up to the present the trial of the case has not been finished. The counsel of record for the plaintiff is Atty. Amado Atol who since several years ago has been appointed Chief of the Secret Service of the Iloilo City Police Department. Plaintiff did not take the necessary steps to engage the service of another lawyer in lieu of Atty. Atol. Two years later, private respondents' lawyer, Atty. Amado B. Atol, filed an MR of the order dismissing the case. Atty. Atol alleged that the said respondents did not fail to prosecute because, during the times that the case was set for hearing, at least one of said respondents was always present, and the record would show that the transfers of hearing were all made at the instance of petitioner or his counsel; and, moreover, private respondents had already finished presenting their evidence.
There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second action in the Caloocan Court of First Instance based on the same claim. The filing of the complaint invested it with jurisdiction of the subject matter or nature of the action. In truth, and contrary to what petitioner Dante Go obviously believes, even if the first action were still pending in the Manila Court, this circumstance would not affect the jurisdiction of the Caloocan Court over the second suit. The pendency of the first action would merely give the defendant the right to move to dismiss the second action on the ground of auter action pendant, or litis pendentia.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner. The temporary restraining order, and the amendatory Resolution are SET ASIDE. G.R. No. L-35989 October 28, 1977 FERMIN JALOVER, petitioner, vs. PORFERIO YTORIAGA, CONSOLACION LOPEZ and HON. VENICIO ESCOLIN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch V, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, respondents. Facts:
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Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that the order of dismissal issued two years before was an adjudication on the merits and had long become final. Respondent Judge denied the MR on the ground that the order of dismissal had become final long ago and was beyond the court's power to amend or change. Private respondents then filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment. The petition for relief was given due course, and respondent Judge set aside the order of dismissal by the CFI, and setting the continuation of the trial for September 15, 1972. The reasons stated by respondent Judge in support are: 1. While respondent Porferio Ytoriaga was furnished with a copy of the dismissal order, his counsel, Atty. Atol, was never served with a copy thereof, hence, pursuant to the settled rule that where a party appears by attorney, a notice to the client and not to his attorney is not a notice of law, the said order of dismissal never became final; and (PLS. TAKE NOTE) 2. The order of dismissal was without legal basis, considering that private respondents had already presented their evidence and rested their case on September 4, 1963, and the hearing scheduled for January 26, 1970 was for reception of petitioner's evidence; Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present special civil action. respondents themselves, and not upon their as attorney of record, Atty. Amado B. Atol, and that there was no court order directing that the court's processes, particularly the order of dismissal should be served directly upon private respondents. It is settled that when a party is represented by counsel, notice should be made upon the counsel, and notice upon the party himself is not considered notice in law unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. The term "every written notice" used in Section 2 of Rule 13 includes notice of decisions or orders. Private respondents' counsel of record not having been served with notice of the order dismissing the case, the said order did not become final. It will also be noted that, as found by respondent Judge, private respondents adduced their evidence and rested their case on September 4, 1963, or more than six years before the dismissal of the case. It was, therefore, the turn of petitioner, as defendant, to present his evidence.
Respondents absence at the hearing waived only right to crossexamine and not Failure to Prosecute. In the premises, private respondents could not possibly have failed to prosecute they were already past the stage where they could still be charged with such failure. As correctly held by respondent Judge, private respondents' absence at the hearing scheduled on January 6, 1970 "can only be construed as a waiver on their part to cross-examine the witnesses that defendants might present at the continuation of trial and to object to the admissibility of the latter's evidence." The right to cross-examine petitioner's witnesses and/or object to his evidence is a right that belongs to private respondents which they can certainly waive. Such waiver could be nothing more than the "intentional relinquishment of a known right," and as such, should not have beer taken against private respondents.
Issue: Whether the case has long become final and executory. Held: No. Order of Dismissal served to respondents, not to their counsel of record. It is uncontroverted that the order dismissing the case for private respondents' "failure to Prosecute," was served upon private
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To dismiss the case after private respondents had submitted their evidence and rested their case, would not only be to hold said respondents accountable for waiving a right, but also to deny them one of the cardinal primary rights of a litigant, which is, corollary to the right to adduce evidence, the right to have the said evidence considered by the court. The dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute, when in truth private respondents had already presented their evidence and rested their case, and, therefore, had duly ,prosecuted their case, would in effect mean a total disregard by the court of evidence presented by a party in the regular course of trial and now forming part of the record. The ends of justice would be better served if, in its deliberative function, the court would consider the said evidence together with the evidence to be adduced by petitioner. On 11 September 1972, another complaint entitled "Recovery of Possession" was lodged by Rabanes before the same court against the same defendants in the action for injunction. Two (2) days later, or on 13 September 1972, the action for injunction was ordered dismissed by the trial court. After trial in the second action involving recovery of possession, the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, on 24 September 1976, rendered judgment declaring Rabanes as the rightful owner of the land and ordered petitioners to vacate the same. On 18 September 1980, the appellate court rendered judgment, affirming in toto the trial court's judgment.
Petition for relief from judgment A petition for relief is available only if the judgment or order complained of has already become final and executory; but here, as earlier noted, the order of dismissal never attained finality for the reason that notice thereof was not served upon private respondents' counsel of record. The petition for relief may nevertheless be considered as a second motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial based on fraud and lack of procedural due process.
ISSUE: Whether the first suit, although styled as for "Injunction", had for its actual primary purpose the recovery of the land in dispute and, therefore, after its dismissal, no other action for recovery of possession of the same land and against the same parties could be pursued by the same complainant
HELD: The defense of res judicata was unavailing to the petitioners, because the prior injunction suit against them, which was dismissed, was merely an ancillary and not a main action. Under Sections 1 & 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it can be clearly deduced that a writ of injunction presupposes the pendency of a principal or main action. There being no main action when the 7 July 1971 suit for injunction was filed, the latter was correctly dismissed. Accordingly, there could be no prior judgment on the merits to speak of that resulted in res judicata from such dismissal of the injunction suit on 13 September 1972.
BENJAMIN VALLANGCA, RODOLFO VALLANGCA and ALFREDO VALLANGCA, petitioners vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NAZARIO RABANES, respondents FACTS: Since Ana Billena and her three (3) sons were in possession and actual cultivation of the land in question, Rabanes filed against them on 7 July 1971 an injunction suit.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal order of 13 September 1972, in the injunction suit, not having been made without prejudice, bars the second action for recovery of possession
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HELD: Under Sec. 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, when the court issues, upon the plaintiff's instance, a dismissal order that is silent as to whether it is with or without prejudice, such as in the case at bar, the presumption is, that it is without prejudice. G.R. No. 134171 November 18, 1998 THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, petitioners, vs. RICHARD J. GORDON, ANACLETO M. DIAS, and ORLANDO E. MENDIOLA, respondents. This is a petition to declare respondents Richard J. Gordon, Anacleto M. Diaz, and Orlando E. Mendiola in contempt of court. FACTS: The case was filed in the SC because of respondent Gordon's apprehension that he would be removed and replaced as chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) upon the change of administration. The petition was for prohibition to prevent Gordon's ouster as chairman of the SBMA on the ground that he had a fixed term of office of six years which would not expire until February 10, 2004. o President Erap issued Administrative Order No. 1, canceling the appointment of Richard J. Gordon as Chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority for a term of 6 years. Instead of a temporary restraining order, respondent Gordon fried (yes, FRIED ang nakalagay sa original case, LOL!) a "Notice of Withdrawal of his Petition. o On that same day, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC of Olongapo City. The filing of the case in Olongapo gave rise to the present petition to declare respondents in contempt of court filed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora and Arturo C. Lomibao. o The petition is filed against respondents because having filed the case in the RTC after filing a notice of withdraw the case pending in the SC. Petitioners charge that "the act of respondents in filing 2 petitions involving the same issues before the SC and the RTC, both pending, constitutes forum-shopping and contempt of court." Citing Rule 7, Sec. 5 of the RoC.
The SC granted respondents' prayer for leave to withdraw their petition. Respondents deny the charge against them. They contend that they complied with Rule 7, Sec 5 by disclosing in the certification of non-forum shopping attached to their petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC, the existence and subsequent withdrawal of their petition for prohibition before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents are guilty of forum shopping? RULING: We find for respondents. Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. In the case at bar, although respondent Dick Gordon filed a petition for prohibition before the SC and, after two days, filed the same petition before the RTC, the fact remains that (1) before filing his petition in the RTC he first filed a notice of withdrawal of his petition which the SC granted and (2) he withdrew his petition for the following reason: Due, however, to the present policy of the Court requiring parties and their counsel to adhere strictly to the hierarchy of courts and in order to obviate any technical objection on this ground, petitioner has deemed it fit to withdraw, as he hereby withdraws, the instant petition so that it may be
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filed in the proper court where it can be ventilated on its merits. It is clear from respondents' actions and explanation that they had no intention of disregarding court processes. They in fact complied with R7 S5 of the Rules. To reiterate, respondent Gordon filed a notice of withdrawal of his petition before the SC prior to the filing of his petition in the RTC as the appropriate forum. While it is true he and his counsels did not wait for the Court to act on the "Notice of Withdrawal of Petition" filed by them before filing substantially the same petition in the RTC. To be sure, respondents could have apologized at the very least for the time of the Supreme Court which they had taken and made an effort to explain why they have to refile their case without awaiting the Court's resolution on their notice of withdrawal of the petition. Because those people from the SC are narcissistic douchebags. G.R. No. L-27187 July 22, 1971 ANTONIO MONTEJO and CONSOLACION BIBERA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. VICENTA UROTIA, as heir of JUANA BIBERA, ET AL., defendantsappellees. These are appeals from orders of dismissal for failure to prosecute. Inasmuch as the issues therein are substantially the same, these nine (9) cases are herein decided jointly. (9 cases sya pro yong Kay montejo lng nilagay ko) CASE 1- CFI Antonio Montejo and Consolacion Bibera seek: a) to prevent the foreclosure of a mortgage on several parcels of land they claim to own in common with the defendants, as well as on several personal properties allegedly belonging exclusively to plaintiff Antonio Montejo; b) to have said parcels of land partitioned among its co-owners; c) the release, from the aforementioned mortgage, of the said personal properties and of plaintiffs' shares in said land; and d) the collection of certain sums of money allegedly due from the defendants to plaintiff Antonio Montejo. -There were 24 defendants under the original complaint, which was amended to include 20 additional defendants. 17 defendants had not been summoned a -CFI issued an order directing the plaintiffs to exert efforts to cause said defendants to be summoned. -Over two years later the court dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiffs to comply with said order.
RULING: Section 3 of Rule 17 of the present Rules of Court Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court. Construing this provision, it was held in Smith Bell & Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 5 and this view was reiterated in subsequent cases, 6 that "... (t)he dismissal of an action pursuant to this rule rests upon the sound discretion of the court ... ." . As to what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time," within the purview of the above-quoted provision, We have ruled that it "depends upon the circumstances of each particular case"; that "the sound discretion of the court" in the determination of said question "will not be disturbed, in the absence of patent abuse"; and that "the burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is upon appellant since every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the court's action." 7
CASE 1: MONTEJO assails the order of dismissal appealed from upon the ff. grounds: FIRST GROUND:a) that the duty to serve summons upon the defendants devolves upon the clerk of court, not upon the plaintiffs; a The appellants contend that under sections 1, 2, and 3, of Rule 31, Rules of Court, it is the duty of the clerk of court and not of the plaintiff to include a case in the trial calendar after the issues are joined and that it is also the duty of the clerk of court and not the plaintiff to fix the date for trial and to
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cause a notice to be served upon the parties. SUPREME COURT SAID: But the duty imposed upon the clerk in these sections of the Rules does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently, for the non-performance of that duty by plaintiff is by section 3 of Rule 30 made an express ground for dismissing the action. If the clerk, therefore, in the present cases had been negligent, it was plaintiff's duty to call the court's attention to that fact so that the administration of justice would not suffer delay. SECOND GROUND: that service of summons by publication is not feasible in this case. The second ground did not justify plaintiffs' inaction for three (3) years. If there was no means of summoning any of the defendant's, plaintiffs should have so informed the court and moved for their exclusion from the complaint, within a reasonable period of time, so that the case could be disposed on one way or another instead of being left pending indefinitely, the contributing to the clogging of our court dockets. Besides, plaintiffs could have asked that the defendants be summoned by publication, pursuant to sections 16 and 17 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the action being one for partition of real properties in the Philippines. CASe 2: Appellant in L-29098 alleges that the failure of his counsel to appear at the pre-trial, on January 4, 1968, was due to the fact that he then had to attend the trial of another case; that he had filed, on December 27, 1967, a motion for postponement of said pre-trial upon such ground; and that, although the motion was denied on December 29, 1967, notice of the order to this effect was not received by him until January 12, 1968, or eight (8) days after the scheduled pre-trial. These reasons are insufficient to warrant a reversal of the order appealed from. Appellant was represented by the "Achacoso, Ocampo and Simbulan" Law Firm, on behalf of which Atty. Sabino P. Palomares, Jr. had appeared. If Atty. Palomares had another case set for trial on January 4, 1968, any of the three (3) members of the law firm could have and should have appeared at the pre-trial of the case at bar. Moreover, in the absence of an order granting said motion for postponement, appellant's counsel was not justified in assuming that the motion would be granted. The fact that the plaintiffs had filed a motion for continuance ... does not entitle the plaintiffs to presume that their motion for continuance would be granted. Motions for postponement are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and unless there be an abuse of such discretion this Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. ... 14 CASE 3: As regards L-29373, having been rendered pursuant to a compromise between plaintiff Bolivar and defendant Bandayrel, who has not assailed the validity of said compromise, the judgment of the City Court was not appealable. Regardless of whether or not Bandayrel had failed to exercise reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal, the same was, therefore, dismissed properly. CASE4: with respect to L-29454, that from March 24, 1961, when the case was set for trial, to December 8, 1966, when it was dismissed, over five (5) years and eight (8) months had elapsed, during which plaintiff had done nothing to prosecute the case, and that, in its order of March 17, 1964, the lower court had already warned the parties "that no further postponement shall be granted," it is clear that the order of dismissal therein appealed from was fully justified. CASE 5: in L-29542 it does not show that there was a patent abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for failure on his part, as plaintiff therein, to prosecute it for over eleven (11) months considering that the subject matter of the litigation was a small sum of money 16 and that appellant's claim therefor had been found by the city court to be groundless. 17 CASE 6: In L-30711, both parties were notified, on August, 8, 1966, that the record of the appeal taken by the plaintiff therein from the judgment of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of General Santos had been received by the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. Yet, up to January 30, 1969, when the case was ordered dismissed, or for about two (2) years and a half, plaintiff-appellant had taken no step whatsoever to prosecute its claim. The excuse given by counsel for the plaintiff is that he was waiting for the clerk of the court of first instance to issue the proper notice of pre-trial, without which the case would not be ready for trial. This excuse is untenable. In the language of the Smith Bell case: ... (T)he duty imposed upon the clerk ... does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently, for the non-performance of that duty by plaintiff is by section 3 of Rule 30 made an express ground for dismissing the action. If the clerk, therefore, in the present cases had been
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negligent, it was plaintiff's duty to call the court's attention to that fact so that the administration of justice would not suffer delay. CASE 7: the order of dismissal for the inaction of plaintiff in L-30744, from August 14, 1967 when she filed her reply, with an answer to the defendant's counterclaim to January 23, 1969 or for over seventeen (17) months when said order was issued was, likewise, justified. Appellant's argument to the effect that the case was not ready for trial, no pre-trial having as yet been held, is for the reasons adverted to in relation to L-30711 devoid of merit. CASE 8: in L-30933, more than five (5) years having elapsed from the submission of appellants' record on appeal on April 14, 1962, to August 11, 1967, when the appeal was dismissed. Appellants maintain that their duty to see to it that the record on appeal was transmitted and certified to the appellate court starts only from its approval. It is their duty as appellants to exercise diligence in the prosecution of their appeal. Obviously this duty includes that of securing the approval of the record on appeal and its transmittal to the appellate court. CASE 9: the mistake allegedly committed by the office secretary of appellant's counsel, in L-31072, in making the entry for the hearing of the case, on February 6, 1969, in the space for February 11, 1969, in his new pocket calendar, is too flimsy to warrant a reversal of the order of dismissal complained of, apart from being difficult to believe. At any rate, the sworn statement of appellant Olilang, attached, by way of affidavit of merit, to his motion for relief, does not satisfy the requirements therefor, it being no more than a general, abstract assertion of a conclusion that he has "a valid and meritorious cause of action against the respondents" therein, without any fact in support thereof. WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from in each one of these nine (9) cases are hereby affirmed, with costs against the respective appellants, except appellant in L-30711, which is the Government. It is so ordered. G.R. No. 166356 February 2, 2010 BENEDICTA M. SAMSON and MARCIAL M. SAMSON, Petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE GERALDINE C. FIEL-MACARAIG, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., ATTY. JULIA CECILY COCHING-SOSITO, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR MARIKINA CITY,Respondents. Facts: Petitioners obtained a loan amounting toP10,000,000 from FEBTC. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage. When petitioners failed to comply with the terms of the loan agreement, FEBTC extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties. On 8 June 2000, only one bidder, FEBTC, submitted its bid, thereby causing the sheriff to postpone the public auction sale to 29 June 2000, in accordance with SC AM No. 99-10-05-0 and the Notice of Sheriff's Sale which states, inter alia: In the event that there are less than two (2) participating bidders in the original date of auction sale as afore-stated, the same shall be postponed to June 29, 2000 at the same time and place without need of republication and reposting [of] this notice. On 29 June 2000, the mortgaged real properties were sold at public auction to FEBTC as the highest bidder, and a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the bank. Almost two years later, petitioners, together with Pepito, Zenaida, Julieta, Edgardo, Rolando, Rempson, and Rocky, all surnamed Samson, filed a case for "Annulment of Extra-judicial Foreclosure and/or Nullification of Sale and the Certificates of Title, plus Damages and with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction." They questioned the validity of the 29 June 2000 auction sale for alleged lack of posting and publication requirements.
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RTC - denied plaintiffs application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On 20 June 2003, RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. MR denied on 22 December 2003. CA dismissed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. MR denied. ISUUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for plaintiffs failure to prosecute despite the fact that one of the defendants, Ex-Officio Sheriff Julia Cecily Coching-Sosito, had not yet submitted her responsive pleading hence, the issues were not yet joined and it was still premature for petitioners to move for a pre-trial of the case. HELD: NO. RTC dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which states, thus: Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. The RTC Order dated 20 June 2003 was a final judgment which disposed of the case on the merits. This was even clarified in the subsequent RTC Order of 22 December 2003 (which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration) wherein the lower court stated that: "Therefore, the dismissal was with prejudice or a dismissal that had the effect of adjudication upon the merits in accordance with Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court." The failure of the Ex-Officio Sheriff to file her Answer should not have prevented petitioners from performing their duty under Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides: Section 1. When conducted. After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial. Petitioners could have availed of other remedies, such as the filing of a motion to declare Ex-Officio Sheriff in default, to avoid unnecessary delay in court proceedings.
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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

SC - P filed petition for prohibition

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

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RULE Rule 2, Secs. 1 to 6 G.R. No. 81123 February 28, 1989

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G.R. No. L-45350

May 29, 1939

BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.

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G.R. No. 170916

April 27, 2007

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Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon