Praxis of Alain Badiou

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The Fraxis of Alain Baoiou
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The Fraxis of Alain Baoiou
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British Library Cataloguing in Fublication Data
A cotologoc tccoto fot tlt oool t ocotloolc ftom tlc Bttttl Ltotot,.
National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Fublication entry

The praxis of Alain Baoiou.

Bibliography.
Incluoes inoex.
ISBN q8oq8oo.o.

ISBN o q8oo. o q.

:. Baoiou, Alain. .. Events ,Fhilosophy, - History. .
Ontology - History. . Fhilosophers, Irench. I. Ashton,
Faul, :q- . II. Bartlett, A. ]. ,Aoam ]ohn,.
III. Clemens, ]ustin. ,Series : Anamnesis,.

:::
This publication benenteo from a small grant from the Institute for Community Engagement ano
Folicy Alternatives ,ICEFA, at Victoria University, Australia.
Contents
Aootcctottor ctt
Aclroolcogcmcrt tx
INTRODUCTION
1 Motct C Dtctplc: Irtttottor, Pltloopl,, Ptoxt
Faul Ashton, A. ]. Bartlett 8 ]ustin Clemens
2 1lot t o Pltloopltcol Irtttottor. Ot: Aootc, Ttormttor, Ircttpttor .
Alain Baoiou
SCIENCE
! Tlc Loo of tlc Soocct: Alotr Bootoo, Lottcr Btoooct oro
tlc Ittplcor Arol,c of Fotctrg oro tlc Hc,ttrg Colcolo .
Zachary Iraser
! Tlc Ltmtt of tlc Soocct tr Bootoo Bctrg oro Eccrt ,.
Brian Anthony Smith
Hoo oc oot ootlo croogl, oro ttmc, tlt ooolotc, pltlooplct .o.
]ustin Clemens
LOVE
6 Coort-o-orc, Fotmtrg-trto-orc, Urot, Ttott, S. .,
Lorenzo Chiesa
7 Irttooocttor to Som Gtllcptc .,,
Sigi ]ottkanot
Gtctrg Fotm to It Oor Exttcrcc: Arxtct, oro tlc Soocct of Ttotl .8o
Sam Gillespie
8 Corotttorol ôtc or o ^co Rcpooltc ..o
A. ]. Bartlett
ART
9 Ar Explotcc Gcrcolog,: Tlcottc, Pltloopl, oro tlc Att of Ptccrtottor .,
Oliver Ieltham
10 Ortolog, oro Appcottrg: Docomcrtot, Rcoltm o o Motlcmottcol Tlooglt .
Linosey Hair
11 Cor Ctrcmo Bc Tlooglt. Alotr Bootoo oro tlc Atttttc Corotttor ..
Alex Ling
FOLITICS
12 Toooto or Artltopolog, of Irrttooc: Bootoo oro tlc Poltttcol Soocct o
Nina Fower
1! Tlc Bootgcot oro tlc Ilomtt, ot, Tlc Otlct Soocct of Poltttc
Alberto Toscano
1! Pltloopl, oro Rccolottor: Bootoo Irocltt, to tlc Eccrt ,
Toula Nicolacopoulos ano George Vassilacopoulos
Foll,opl, 88
Dominique Hecq
Btoltogtopl, of 1otl or oro o, Alotr Bootoo tr Ergltl
Cortttootot .
Irocx ..
vii
Abbreviations
C Corotttor
CT Coott ttott oortologtc ttorttottc
D Dclcoc: Tlc Clomot of Bctrg
E Etltc: Ar Eo, or tlc Urocttorotrg of Ectl
EE Lcttc ct lcrcmcrt
BE Bctrg oro Eccrt
HI Horooool of Iroctlcttc
IT Irrttc Tlooglt: Ttotl oro tlc Rctotr to Pltloopl,
LM/LOW Logtoc oc moroc: lcttc ct lcrcmcrt, .
LS Lc Stclc
M Mctopoltttc
MF Mortfcto fot Pltloopl,
NN Lc ômotc ct lc romotc
OB Or Bcclctt
F Polcmtc
SF Sotrt Pool: Tlc Fooroottor of Urtcctoltm
TO Bttcrg Or Exttcrcc: A Slott Ttcottc or Ttorttot, Ortolog,
TC Tlc Ccrtot,
TS Tlottc oo oct
TW Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg
ix
Acknowleogements
The proouction of a collection of essays such as this is a laborious
process at the best of times. When it is an Open Access publication,
howeverthat is, as free as possible from the constraints of commerci-
ality ano the restrictive property ownership regime of copyrightthese
labours multiply signincantly. Consequently, we have relieo on the gen-
erosity ano support of a number of frienos ano colleagues. We woulo like
to thank them here. We thank the contributors for their work, as well as
those who responoeo to our initial call for papers but oio not make the
nnal volume oue to the sheer number of responses. This maoe for many
oimcult choices. We woulo like to thank Helen ]ohnson for the free use of
her image Tlc Ccrttc fot tlc Stoo, of Aoloctoc,: Tlc Ltotot,, which appears
on the cover of this volume, ano the Sutton Gallery in Melbourne for
making this possible. We thank also the thinkers who have contributeo
to the proouction process or ohereo intellectual support in one form or
another. These incluoe Russell Grigg, Sigi ]ottkanot, Dominiek Hoens,
Rachel Hughes, Angela Cullip ano our blino reviewers ,the unnameable
backbone of all such collections,. We woulo like to give a special men-
tion to the Melbourne Baoiou Reaoing Group ,they know who they are,.
Iinally, we thank Alain Baoiou for his permission to translate What is a
Fhilosophical Institution? ano for the terrifying claim that he will reao
every article.
The essays in this book nrst appeareo in the open access journal Co-
mo oro Httot,: Tlc }ootrol of ôtotol oro Soctol Pltloopl, ,C8H,. Faul Ash-
ton, as one of the organizing eoitors of Como oro Httot,, woulo like to
thank the other key organizers of the journal for their work in creating the
context in which projects like this can take place: Arran Gare, Roberto
Schiavo Lena ano Claire Raherty.
Faul Ashton
A. ]. Bartlett
]ustin Clemens
Melbourne .oo6
trttooocttor
1
Masters 8 Disciples:
Institution, Fhilosophy, Fraxis
Discipline, comme tu saignes!
Ren Char
Consequently, a true master |Mcttcr| is at bottom only he
who can provoke the other to transform himself through
his act.
Slavoj iek
I. THE SITUATION
This book, Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo, collects texts nrst publisheo
in a special issue of the online journal Como C Httot,. Our call for
submissions to that issue reao as follows:
To mark the English translation of LEttc ct lcrcmcrt as Bctrg oro
Eccrt, the journal Como oro Httot, will publish a special issue on
the work of the philosopher Alain Baoiou. The approach of this
journal is to publish work that goes beyono the merely exegetical
ano to this eno we woulo like contributors to take up the challenge
Baoiou raises in Bctrg oro Eccrt when he says:
The categories that this book oeploys, from the pure multiple to
the subject, constitute the general oroer of a thought such that it
can be ptocttco across the entirety of the contemporary system of
reference. These categories are available for the service of scientinc
proceoures just as they are for those of analysis or politics. They
attempt to organize an abstract vision of the requirements of the
epoch.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo
We invite contributors to this special issue to respono to Baoious
challenge ano oeploy his categories in thinking a particular
situationbe it political, artistic, scientinc or amorous.
Although it has taken nearly two oecaoes for Bctrg oro Eccrt to become
available in English, there are alreaoy an enormous number of conferences,
articles, translations, introouctions ano monographs oeoicateo to Baoiou
ano his work ,see the bibliography in this volume,. We nno works of
Baoiou translateo oirectly from the Irench eoitions ,Dclcoc, Etltc, Sotrt
Pool, Mctopoltttc, Horooool of Iroctlcttc, Bttcrg or Exttcrcc, Mortfcto fot
Pltloopl,, Bctrg oro Eccrt,, essays or extracts from existing publications,
on a variety of matters ,politics, art, etc., ano appearing in a range of
journals ,e.g., Dtocttttc, Locortor Irl, etc.,, createo or assembleo works not
appearing in such form ,such as Irrttc Tlooglt, Or Bcclctt or Tlcotcttcol
1ttttrg,, interviews ano new pieces written especially for translation ,e.g.,
the many Authors prefaces now available,.
If one casts an eye over the existing commentries, they seem
preponoerantly to fall into a small number of signincant categories.
Iirst, the introouctions, ranging from the extenoeo ano well-informeo
monographs to shorter articles in specialist journals. Secono, the critiques,
which teno to focus either on Baoious general tenoencies, or on particular
claims that he makes ,e.g., Tltrl Agotr, most of the essays in Commortcottor
oro Cogrtttor Vols. 6 8 , ano in Pol,gtopl :, etc.,. Thiro, the assimilation
of Baoious terminology ano themes into more general projects, as a kino
of grab-bag of general concepts for use in varying situations. But what we
were calling for was something a little oiherent, a fourth way: a ,tcmottc
oeployment of Baoious categories.
Its not that this hasnt been attempteo. Oliver Ieltham, the English
translator of Bctrg oro Eccrt, ano a contributor to this collection, has oone
so in regaro to a local Australian political event in Singularity Happening
in Folitics: The Aboriginal Tent Embassy, Canberra :q..
:
But such an
application has been surprisingly rare, to the point where it seems people
might appear chary of being mistaken for a merely uncritical oisciple,
oogmatist, or oinosaur. ,It is noteworthy that such accusations have,
in the Anglophone worlo at least, been nung at Lacanians, a state of
ahairs about which Slavoj iek has often fulminateo,.
.
It has been, as we
:. In Commortcottor C Cogrtttor, vol. , nos. 8 , .oo, pp. ..-.. See also Barbara
Iormis, Event ano reaoy-maoe: Delayeo sabotage, in the same volume, pp. .-.6:.
.. Ior example, see the recent nlm tcl!, in which our eponymous hero has a go at an
oh-screen oeconstructionist on precisely this point.
have saio, much more the case that critics have wanteo to pose oiherent
questions, or try to get oiherent things out of Baoious corpus to oate.
II. MASTERS 8 DISCIFLES IRIENDS 8 ENEMIES
IATHERS 8 SONS
This brings up the rather boring relationship between a masters
writings, a systematic philosophy, oiscipleship ano commentary. Baoious
great treatise Bctrg oro Eccrt has just become available in English, so the
system-builoing volume at the base of his reputation will be accessible to a
new auoience. This aoos to the alreaoy-existing books translateo straight
from the Irench, the anthologies composeo of occasional writings,
exclusive interviews, ano essays extracteo from other volumes, all
subjecteo to the exigencies of commooity-proouction, legal entitlement
ano bio-physical limitations. This situationharoly worth mentioning in
itself, it may seem, simply the banal conoitions of contemporary book
marketingshoulo, on the contrary, force us to reappraise Baoious own
accounts of the oissemination of thought, philosophical thought. Inoeeo,
Baoiou is unooubteoly one of the few contemporary philosophers to factor
in the problem of the oissemination of thought into his thought itself.
A tiny articlewhich, to our knowleoge, roooo, in the Anglophone
worlo has yet translateo, anthologizeo, or even aoequately oiscusseois
crucial here. This article, entitleo, What is a philosophical institution?
Or: aooress, transmission, inscription can be founo in Corotttor.
In this
article of less than eight pages, Baoiou elaborates an entire theory of
the transmission of philosophy. Without an institution, no transmission,
without transmission, no philosophy. How to think, however, this institution
outsioe, nrst, establisheo actualities such as the university which captureo
philosophy after Kant, ano, secono, without simply abstracting from or
returning to classical forms of philosophical institution ,the Acaoemy, the
Stoa, the Garoen, etc.,? Moreover, how to think the role of the otctplc or
of the fttcro of philosophy? Ano so, thiro, how to avoio characterizing a
philosophical institution in the tcltgtoo termshowever aomirable ano
raoicalof a Quaker society of frienos?
Ior Baoiou, a philosophical institution can have no instrumental
value, precisely because one can never apportion enos, aims or nnalities
to philosophy. Fhilosophy must, oespite its most stringent ano rigorous
. Alain Baoiou, Corotttor, Faris, Seuil, :qq., pp. 8-8q. The translation of this essay,
which appears in this volume, was translateo into English with Baoious permission by A.
]. Bartlett for the special Baoiou issue of Como oro Httot,, vol. ., nos. :-., .oo6 pp. q-:.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo 6
conclusions, testify to what he calls the interminable imperative of
continuing.
If philosophy itself institutes nothing but the voio of an aooress, the
transmission of a philosophy requires its oisciples to invent new mooes
of thinking aoequate to supporting the singularity of this empty aooress,
these oisciples work to transform the emergence of this voio aooress into
letters, into marks that subsist ano can circulate along routes ano through
places that previously woulo have founo these marks unthinkable ano/or
unacceptable. Ano these letters can only move as connict, as antagonism,
as committeo incomprehension: a philosophical oisciple ooesnt really
know ,though he or she may oesperately want to know,, ano knows that,
though he or she can never know they know, they must place their names
ano booies behino the work of their own obscure enquiries. The oisciple
often oemanos that the master be the One, even as he poses the master
the most infuriating problems, inouces the master to cover himself further,
to orape the possibility that the garment might gape to revealwhat?
The nothing beneath?
Disciples must fotcc something, illegitimately, into

being.
Yet it is not publicity at which such oisciples ano institutions aim, but
trcttpttor, knotteo, oimcult, forever being oone, unoone, reoone. It is
only by such means that a philosophy becomes what it isin transformeo
institutions by which it can encounter otlct philosophies. Hence a
philosophical institution is not the guaroian of philosophy, but of its
historicity. It is thus the guaroian of philosophies. It is the knotteo plural
of philosophies as resistance in time, which often means: resistance to the
times. It is in such institutions-in-processtruth-booies, perhaps, in the
language of Baoious new book Logtoc oc morocthat oisciples reao,
translate, re-eoit the texts of the master, squabble about the philosophy
in question, relate it to classical problems in the history of thought, relate
it to other philosophies, to the worlo as they nno it transngureo in the
unpreceoenteo oark light of these new little letters, etc.
But, in what one might call this aoherence ,we oont use the woro
noelity, for reasons which will become apparent, of the oisciplean
aoherence which ooes not, of course, precluoe vicious ano unforgiving
attacks on their masters textsthey can teno towaros becoming
policemen of the state of philosophy, the place in which all the clcmcrt of
. See, for instance, Baoious Afterworo, subtitleo Some replies to a oemanoing frieno, in
Feter Hallwaro, ,eo.,, Tltrl Agotr, Lonoon ano New York, Continuum, .oo, pp. ..-.,
ano his Authors Freface, to Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, eo. ano trans. R. Brassier ano A. Toscano,
Lonoon ano New York, Continuum, .oo, pp. xiii-xv.
,a, philosophy, having been torn from their original situations, are turneo
into new sets, verineo, legitimateo, trclooco. Using the terms of Baoious own
schematization of set-theory, one can say that oisciples can eno up ooing
the work of the totc of philosophy, the transformation of whats presenteo
into representation, through their ceaseless unbinoing, ano re-countings
of the philosophers woros. In this sense, the operations of oisciples can
be schematizeo by the power-set ano union operations of set-theory, if
oisciples are the source of philosophys growth ano oissemination, they
are also potential agents of its statincation. The putative universality of
philosophy must always run the risk of the state.
Yet, in his Authors Freface to Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, Baoiou seems to
mooify the position of What is a philosophical institution?
|I|n what sense can this present book really be saio to be one of my
books? Specincally, one of my books of philosophy? Is it not rather
a book by my frienos Ray Brassier ano Alberto Toscano? After all,
they gathereo ano selecteo the texts from several oiherent books,
which for the most part were not strictly speaking works but
rather collections of essays ,xiv,.
If the question of fotm of ottttrg is critical in this context, it is because
a philosophical institution must always bino itself to the singularity of a
philosophers otcto, ano it is thus no accioent that Baoiou himself is very
attentive to such a necessity. Each philosopher invents or constructs his or
her own form ,ano the aforementioneo Freface accoroingly opens with
a list of major philosophical forms,. We want to suggest that, although
Baoiou is a systematic philosopher, his own system is one that complicates
the oiherence between central works ano occasional essays. Certainly,
his major works to oate are Bctrg oro Eccrt ano, now, the just-releaseo
Logtoc oc moroc. Yet, as Baoiou put it in a recent talk in Melbourne,
these books are like atomic bombs, quite useless as ehective weaponry in
themselves. It is their mere existence, or, rather, the ongoing research that
proouceo them, that supports the truly engageo ano ehective interventions
evioent in the shorter books, articles ano interviews.
Fhilosophy woulo be nothing without its masters, yet a master
requires oisciples to be a master at all. Recently, Baoiou has starteo to
refer explicitly to this work of oiscipleship unoer the rubric of frienoship,
a very interesting nominal shift. If its probably a bit rich ,presumptuous?,
for a living philosopher to refer to his living oisciples o oisciples, ano if the
rubric of frienoship itself has an impeccable philosophical peoigree, this
nonetheless opens a question as to the true subjects of thought. In fact, we
oetect a oouble oivision here within Baoious thinking of an institution:
the oivision between motct oro otctplc, on the one hano, ano between
fttcro oro crcmtc, on the other. Both are to be oistinguisheo from fotlct
oro or ,ano not only for the sexist implications of the latter,.
This, however, suggests another way of thinking about the relation
between master ano oisciple, a wavering ano uncertain line of oivision
ottltr philosophy ano its institutions.
Some inoications: :, the oiherence

between frienos ano oisciples, ., the oiherence between philosophy
ano history of philosophy, , the oiherence between situation ano state,
, the oiherence between forms of writing ano their re-presentation.
After all, for Baoiou, the very exemplum of a subject engageo in a militant
noelity to an event is Saint Faul, the greatest of all oisciples, the one
who invents the nrst known universal institution in human history. It is
not Christ who is the hero of subjectivity for Baoiou, but Faul. On the
other hano, as Baoiou notes, explicating St. Faul: Fhilosophy knows only
oisciples. But a son-subject is the opposite of a oisciple-subject, because
he is one whose life is beginning.
6
The problem here is, then, the relation
between oisciples ano frienos.
Since, as Baoiou insists at the beginning of Bctrg oro Eccrt, a
contemporary philosophy must circulate between ontology, mooern
inventions of subjectivity ano its own history, the otctplc oro tlctt ootl mot
oc ttcotco o trtcgtol to tlc cloootottor of pltloopl, ttclf. A philosophy must
atteno to the problem of its own institution, to philosophical institutions,
to the creation of new forms of institution. It must atteno to the problem
of frienos ano oisciples. Iollowing this mobile line takes us oirectly to
questions at the heart of Baoious philosophy, to his refashioneo concept
of ptoxt.
III. THE CONCEFT OI FRAXIS
Ior Baoiou, we say, praxis composes a knot: it is simultaneously
thought, act ano category. The subject, a category that can be oeployeo
across the entirety of the contemporary system of reference, ooes the
work of tying ano retying the stranos of thought ano act. The subject,
whose being is voio, constitutes in ano as itself the locus of praxis which
brings thought ano being together unoer the injunction of the Same.
. This immanent oivision seems to be borne out by Baoiou himself when in What is a
philosophical institution? he suggests that in the circumstances of writing, the master
makes a oisciple of himself , p. 8.
6. Alain Baoiou, Sotrt Pool: Tlc Fooroottor of Urtcctoltm, trans. Ray Brassier, Stanforo,
Stanforo University Fress, .oo, p. q.
Faul Ashton, A. ]. Bartlett 8 ]ustin Clemens q
The subject is what it is to think ano to be at the same timethe junction
of a oisjunction.
Fraxis is in the service of scientinc proceoures, artistic conngurations,
emancipatory politics ano love. But as the knot constituteo of categories,
concepts ano acts, praxis is in no way the preoicate of the functioning
of this knot nor the oeterminant of the existence of its stranos. Rather,
these three stranos of the knot oemano both their compossibility ano their
name. Fraxis is the composition of, ano the name for, the service of the
subject whose proceoure will have been oecioeo by the situation. This
situation ,all situations being founoeo through the event, is that which
enoures oespite the attentive recounting of what it counts by the state. It
is the situation then which oecioes the praxiological conoitions for the
subject. Or, to put it another way, the situation oecioes, qua situation, for
which proceoure the category of the subject is the contingent ano nnite
support.
Like walking slowly, praxis, for the Greeks, was the privilege of free
men. Marx consioereo praxis in a similar way, though perhaps not as
the privilege of free men but more as that which both constituteo ano
supporteo man as free. So our knot knots together thought ano act, the
category of the subject, the situation for which this subject is subject, ano
the free man in the temporality of the fototc ortcttot. But what t a free
man? It is certainly not a subject, ano yet it most certainly is. The trivial
yet compulsive liberal oennition of freeoom attests only to a limitless
oispersal, a casting oh of all that is not the free manthe ,therefore,
sovereign trotctoool. The inoivioual always lroo that which it is not
ano by extension what must not bewhich is why it is sovereign. In
passing we can see that oecioing for the exception is a banal rather than
exceptional concept. The subject, our subject is, as we can see, subject
to the oisciplinethe cruel oisciplineof certain conoitions: the pure
multiple, the event, the situation, the practice of the proceoures ano their
sustaining unoer the category of the same or truth. Our free man,
which is to say man o free, is in truth a subject, whereas the inoivioual,
in truth, is nothing. The subject knows nothing, in the liberal sense of
the woro. Rather, the subject is the extent of its enquiries conoitioneo
absolutely by its conoitions. It has no knowleoge to speak of. It is not a
brioge between preoicate ano eno, just as justice is not locateo at the eno
of a state program. Fraxis, we can say, knows no enos. Its being is innnite
ano the truth for which it is the support is likewise eternal.
So why praxis? Ferhaps symptomatically, we have not yet mentioneo
that category which is critical to any praxis tooay, that of cootogc. What
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :o
ooes this courage amount to? It amounts to continuing. Courage is the
courage to continue in praxis, to act to sustain ano exteno any series of
situateo enquiries across the entirety of a situationa situation that knows
no eno. To be a subject is to be the courageous support of a truth. It
is through the courage of the subject that the thought of truth is given
being as a thought-practice. As such, courage amounts to the practice
of thought. Ano a thought is nothing other than the oesire to have oone
with the exorbitant excesses of the state. Fraxis is thus the courageous
work of a ftcc man unoer the conoition of a truth against the state. Above
all, praxis is a name for risk. It is a throw of the oice by those who are
nothing, but chance to be everything.
IV. IN THIS COLLECTION
One must beware the Sirens yearning to lure the philosophic voyager
onto the rocks, even if one is a Mallarman ano nnos that Sirens have
consioerable poetic appeal. The articles collecteo in this volume certainly
attempt to avoio this oeleterious eno, whether through lashing themselves
to the mast,er,, or through plugging their ears with wax. Here then, without
revisioning summary or summarily re-presenting, we present the names
of those who have practiceo-thought in response to our call: A. ]. Bartlett,
Lorenzo Chiesa, ]ustin Clemens, Oliver Ieltham, Zachary Iraser, Sam
Gillespie, Linosey Hair, Alex Ling, Toula Nicolacopoulos ano George
Vassilacopoulos, Nina Fower, Brian Anthony Smith ano Alberto Toscano.
We also thank Alain Baoiou for permission to publish the essential article
from Corotttor. Anoon the basis that no Flatonist can be alloweo to
escape into Ioeas entirely unscatheo by Foetrywe have incluoeo a
poem by Dominique Hecq, entitleo follysophy, which responos oirectly
to Baoious work. Iinally, we also incluoe a comprehensive bibliography
compileo by Faul Ashton.
If one must be an octtctt ,a militant, in a truth process, the creation
of a philosophical ,tcm is itself a protracteo octano this act itself is
something that scrambles the polarities of closeo ano open, centre ano
margins, structure ano occasion, continuation ano punctuation. As
Baoiou notes early in Sotrt Pool, the hostility of the contemporary worlo to
philosophy is evioent in the repression of the very names of philosophys
conoitions. Thus culture obliterates art, technology obliterates science,
management obliterates politics, ano sexuality obliterates love: The
system: culture-technics-management-sexualitythat has the immense
merit of being homogenous to the market, ano of which all the terms,
Faul Ashton, A. ]. Bartlett 8 ]ustin Clemens ::
at least, oesignate a rubric of commercial presentationis the nominal
mooern recovery of the system art-science-politics-love

Thus the unavoweo system of anti-systematic thought is in some way
homogeneous with the system of the times, oeclarative systematic thought
,philosophy,, as we saio above, attempts to rupture with the system of the
times. Or, again, the latter attempts to take account of the thoughts that
oo attempt such a rupture ,the four conoitions,. Thus system is integral
to philosophy. Not every system is philosophical, of course, but every
philosophy, every true philosophy, must aim at systematicity. Hence the
importance of the ano in the title of Bctrg oro Eccrt, ano is precisely
tlc philosophical injunction, the injunction of system. Clc Baoiou,
being is oealt with by mathematics, while events are the province of the
conoitions. Neither are, strictly speaking, the proper job of philosophy.
What philosophy must oo is construct a way of brioging the gap without
reouction. Fhilosophy is the ompctoro composing a oiscourse of, if we
may, cosmos ano history.
But let there be no confusion: there can be no simple opposition
between a closeo system ano an open becoming. Whether covertly
moralizeo or not, such oenominations are insumcient to treat the novelty
of a philosophical system in act. Baoious system is proouceo in an
enoless circulation through the conoitions, returning to them again ano
again, in oiherent forms ,extenoeo treatises, hanobooks, articles, oral
presentations, etc.,, constantly permitting them to norm ano re-oivert
existing propositions of his philosophy.
It thus seems to us that there is no pttrctplco oiherence between the
original meoitations of ano in Bctrg oro Eccrt ano the varieo articles
re-collecteo in other volumes ano other languages: all are part of the
ongoing oct of ,tcm, whether or not Baoiou himself actually envisageo
these articles one oay sitting together in an English translation. This act
is novelty itself, insofar as no existing names or concepts are aoequate to
capturing the shape or rhythm of its elaboration. This system-act, integral
to the oennition of philosophy, is what tries to valioate the contemporary
compossibility of philosophys conoitionsthat is, their heterogeneous
sheltering, a voio peace of their oiscontinuity.
In other woros, there is no philosophical system without oisciples,
or, at least, a seething ano active host of bizarre patchwork creatures
traverseo by the mobile line of the frieno-oisciple oivision. If they can get
it together, knotting inscriptions against the tenoency to representation,
. Baoiou, Sotrt Pool, p. :.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :.
a new philosophical institution may well emerge. To parooy the jingle
from the popular Australian soap-opera ^ctgloootwith all the horror
that the very woro ano concept may conjure uptlot olcr gooo otctplc
occomc gooo fttcro.
We woulo therefore like to thank our contributors for their oeoication
ano their courage, through which, to again quote Baoiou in Melbourne in
.oo6: nnally, we have always to become the contrary of our masters.
:
2
What is a Fhilosophical Institution?
Or: Aooress, Transmission, Inscription
:
Alain Baoiou
I woulo like to attempt here something of a oeouction in regaro to
the oestiny of all philosophical institutions. I woulo like to explore the
possibility of submitting to the concept our institutional intuition. The
oanger is easily imagineo. It is certainly less than that to which Saint-]ust
was exposeo when he maintaineo that only institutions coulo prevent the
Revolution from enoing with the pure rising of its event. The risk I take
is only this: by reversing a materialist oroer whose own ehect is that of
immersing thought in the oensity of the social ano the organic, I propose
that the oetermination of philosophy as such prescribes an institution ap-
propriate to it.
Whats at stake, uncertain ano brief as it is, is the transcenoental oe-
ouction of any possible philosophical institution. Concerning actual insti-
tutions, of nrst rank ano unique to the worlo being the Collgc trtctrottorol
oc pltloopltc, we accept that their problems, their worries, their internal
competitions ano their electeo authorities, as is reasonable, are anything
but transcenoental.
:. Except for some nnal improvements, this is the text nrst presenteo, in :q8q, as a collo-
quium intervention at the Collgc trtctrottorol oc pltloopltc itself. We know tooay, by way of
its constant reforms ano by way of the aporias that pertain to the name Europe, that the
question of institutions impassions many philosophers. I cannot say that it impassions me,
but, since this injunction exists, I support it, ano so I give my concept.
TN. This text is taken from Alain Baoiou, Corotttor, Faris, Eoitions ou Seuil, :qq., pp.
8-qo. I woulo like to thank ]ustin Clemens for his help in preparing this text ano Alain
Baoiou for his permission to publish this translation.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :
We begin with the negative oialectic. The institutional prescription of
philosophy ooes not take the form of causality. Nor ooes it take the form
of an incarnation. No institution can preteno to be an ehect of philoso-
phy, none can suggest its booy, nor make philosophy into a booy, a Great
Booy, as the specialists of Irench institutional sociology say. Neither ooes
the institution have only instrumental value, in the sense of oirecting phi-
losophy towaro its eno. This for the essential reason that its enos are non-
existent. I oo not say that philosophy is without oestination. But I oont
think that we can oistribute that oestination within the oomain of enos
or nnalities. Fhilosophy, far from proposing enos, means always, in one
way or another, to have oone with enos, ano even to eno with tlc eno.
The greatest virtue of philosophy, however, is that, in not ceasing to con-
cluoe, it attests to the interminable imperative of continuing. It therefore
requires no other means for abolishing enos.
No ehect, no booy, no instrument. What, then, is a philosophical in-
stitution? Of course, we coulo maintain that they oo not exist, but, from
the ancient schools of thought to the college that I extolleo a moment ago,
it is the opposite that is empirically attesteo. Ano on no account will I be
entering into an interminable process of oeconstruction, which woulo es-
tablish at the limit of the concept that these empirical institutions organize
only a forgetting of their oestination. No, these institutions exist ano have
an establisheo connection with philosophy. But what connection?
I maintain that what the institution traces is not a ltrc of causality,
nor the colomc of a booy, ano nor is it the otfocc of a planneo operation.
It is a knot, which the institutions job is to keep tieo, ano the only risk
to this same institution is that this knot might be cut. A philosophical
institution is a proceoure for the conservation of a knot, at risk of the cut
which woulo be the oispersal of its elements. A gooo institution is knot-
teo, opaque, cannot be untangleo: A poor one is segmenteo, oisperseo,
parliamentary. The nrst, the gooo, is tight ano obscure. The secono, oan-
gerous, counts votes ano separates functions in such a way that they can
only reassemble in the barely philosophical form of the colloquium. Being
the guaroian of a knot is haroly compatible with this sometimes pruoent,
sometimes violent, management of factional equilibrium.
What is at stake in this knot? My subtitle oeclares: aooress, transmis-
sion ano inscription. What can be saio of these three stranos of the knot,
each of which holos together the other two that woulo accoro with that
ngure bestoweo on us to contemplate by my master ]acques Lacan?
Iirstly I name aooress not with regaro to who or to what philosophy
aooresses itself but with regaro to the subjective position that is proper to
Alain Baoiou :
its aooress. Yet that which characterizes this position is purely ano simply
coto. As a nrst oennition, then, we can say that philosophy is without spe-
cinc aooress. No community, real or virtual, is in relation to philosophy.
No statement of philosophy is aooresseo as such to anyone. This is what
we mean when we repeat that the question is what matters. The question-
ing is simply a name for the voio aooress. The celebrateo awkwaroness
|molootcc| of philosophyits misaooress |molootcc|is in its essence,
the non-aooress, the absence of aooress. All philosophical texts are in
potc tctortc, ano it is necessary to know in aovance that something can be
founo there even though it has not been crt to you.
Seconoly, I call the transmission of philosophy the operation by which
it propagates itself on the basis of the voio aooress. It is well known that
this propagation is carrieo out by those, few in number, who, against all
evioence, oecioe that it is they who have been aooresseo. Thus, those
who enoure the voio of the aooress form themselves in such a voio. This
small number never constitutes a public, as a public is always precisely
that which nlls the aooress. Fhilosophy cannot be transmitteo by way of
this nlling |pot lc cotc oc cc plctr|, of this over-nlling |ttop-plctr|. As always,
its transmission is not at all oepenoent on the extension of a public, but
on the ngure, restraineo ano unngurable |trgotoolc|, of the oisciple. The
oisciple is whoever enoures this coincioing with the voio aooress. The
oisciple knows it ooes not constitute a public but supports a transmission.
Lastly, I call inscription of philosophy all that changes the voio of the
aooress into a subsisting mark, all that philosophy writes. In itself, philoso-
phy, as voio aooress, is subtracteo from the written, without being for all
that oevoteo to the voice. Fhilosophy is that which, oetaineo in the voio
of the aooress, obeys the temporalizeo injunction of the categories of be-
ing ano event, on this sioe of the voice ano the written. It is by remaining
this sioe of the voice ano the written that we name as always, thought, to
which the voio of the aooress accoros. Inscription is the marking of this
voio, the interminable proceoure of a subsisting suture with the subsistent,
the ehectivity of the voio. Unlike the aooress, which is voio, ano transmis-
sion, which is proposeo to some-ones, inscription is open ano ohereo to
all.
Notice that it may well be that the knot of which I speak cannot be
knotteo. If this is the casehenceforth unoecioablethere may be some
philosophies, but not o philosophy. Only the knot confers on philosophy
the historicity of its existence. Only it oecioes that there is some philoso-
phy that takes the form of a philosophy.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :6
The historicity of philosophy thus oemanos that there be an aooress
,in general this is covereo by the proper name of a philosopher,, that
there are oisciples ,in general covereo by the proper names of other phi-
losophers who, when the time comes, after having enoureo the place of
the voio, will proouce such a place,, ano that there are books, generally
covereo by those public instances which are the sequence of commentary,
publications ano reprints. These three instances are also that of the voio
,the aooress,, that of the nnite ,its oisciples,, ano that of the innnite ,the
inscription ano its gloss,.
Clearly, this knot is Borromean ano therefore we consioer it foun-
oational to the lttottctt, of philosophy. Without the knot, philosophy, re-
ouceo to the voio aooress, woulo be only the point of inoistinction be-
tween thought ano being. In fact only the inscription collects, within time,
the aooress ano the transmission. Ano since it is only encountereo in the
book, inscription is that by which a new oisciple comes to the voio site
prescribeo by an ancient aooress. This book is encountereo precisely as
that which is ohereo to all, ano which accoros to the innnity of inscrip-
tion. It is no less clear that only the aooress brings together transmission
ano inscription, since only it attests to that for which a oisciple is a oisci-
ple, the voio place that the oisciple has occupieo, ano whose inscription
perpetuates existence.
It is thus the voio which, here as elsewhere, sutures the nnituoe of
transmission to the innnity of inscription. Ano nnally it is certain that it is
solely transmission that assembles the aooress ano the inscription, since
the book can only be written from tlc ctco-potrt of tlc otctplc, even if, in the
circumstances of writing, the master makes a oisciple of himself. But very
often as we know ,look at Aristotle, or Hegel, or Kojeve or even Leibniz,
or Nietzsche, or Husserl, check their archives, the transcripts of their les-
sons, the severe oisoroer of their notes ano papers, very often, yes, it is
the nnituoe of oisciples that exposes the voio aooress of philosophy to the
innnity of inscription.
A philosophical institution is a proposition for the preservation of the
knot. It is not the guaroian of philosophy but of its historicity. Therefore it
is the guaroian of philosophies. It is the knotteo plural of philosophies as
resistance in time, which often means: resistance to the times.
What seconoary imperatives are requireo by the nrst? What are the
functions ano the limits of an institution for philosophy such that, in ac-
coroance with its oestination, it preserves the Borromean knot of the ao-
oress, transmission ano inscription: which is also the knot of the voio, the
nnite ano the innnite?
Alain Baoiou :
The nrst oeriveo imperative is evioently that such institutions partici-
pate in the oetection ano existence of the three stranos of the knot taken
separately. Ano this, if I can say so, without separating them.
In what is of concern to the aooress, which is the suture of philosophy
to being, there is nothing of the institution. This is because institutions are
not those for which, as Farmenioes says, The Same, inoeeo is at once to
think ano to be.
.

This same that is at once is unooubteoly the mark of the voio, ano
the voio is precisely oennable as that whose institution is impossible. So
while we unoerstano it as false that nature abhors a voio, we are certain
that institutions oo have this horror. Their unceasing tenoency is towaro
over-nlling |ttop-plctr|, ano this is precisely what gives them their extreme-
ly limiteo natural allure.
But what the philosophical institution can ano thus must oo for phi-
losophers is protect them from their misaooress, which is a consequence
of their voio aooress. It must give the voio an aooress proper to it, it must
be the aooress of the voio aooress. What this means is that this institu-
tion must authorize him to nno himself at home in it, he who nothing
registers |tccommoroc| ano, above all, is neither registereo |tccommoro| nor
registrable |tccommcrooolc|.
How can this institution recognize whoever

presumes to philosophize, ano therefore has no aooress? It cannot, it can
only aooress them. It shoulo, quite simply, test this inoiscernible, provio-
ing its aooress. Fermit me to call this nrst function of an institution for
philosophy a potc tctortc function. It is thanks to this institution, contrary
to that which goes by FTT, that our unregistereo mail chances to arrive
at its oestination.

.. TN. I have chosen to use the translation maoe by Louise Burchill in her translation of
Baoious book on Deleuze. It better accoros with the lines that immeoiately follow. Ior an
explanation of Baoious usage of this excerpt from Farmenioes see Louise Burchills note
in Dclcoc: Tlc Clomot of Bctrg, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Fress, .ooo, p. :,
note : to chapter .
. TN. In this passage Baoiou is playing on the ambiguity of the Irench term tccommoroc.
It is obviously meant to align with the metaphor of the post-omce ano so we have chosen
to use the term register.
. TN. FTT is the acronym for Potc, Tlplorc ct Tlcommortcottor the state service co-
oroinating oelivery ano maintenance of these services. Once upon a time Australia hao
an equivalent: The FMG, Fost-Master General, ahectionately known as Figs, Monkeys
ano Gorillas. Tooay, broken in pieces, oisperseo, neo-liberalizeo, the Figs, Monkeys ano
Gorillas goes by a name somehow meant to evoke intensities, nows ano oesirings for astral
travel ano all the while free-noating on the stock exchangeTelstra!
In that which concerns transmission, it is clear that the institution
must multiply the chances of having oisciples occupy the voio place of
aooress. It must proliferate oisciples. It is necessary therefore that it is an
open house, vacant, where those whose oestinies are tieo to the voio of a
singular aooress can pass through. What this general pass oeclares is that
there is no criterion for presence, or, as is the rule at the Collcgc Irtctro-
ttorol, that participation in the seminars is absolutely free, that cloco semi-
nars oo not exist. Fermit me to call the secono function of a philosophical
institution a clearing-house function.
Iinally, in that which concerns the inscription, it is certain that the
resources of the oroinary eoition cannot sumce. These eoitions reason in
terms of the public, not to say of publicity, ano these oo not conform to
the essence of philosophic inscription, whose innnity is measureo in cen-
turies, ano is not automatically exhausteo in its nrst print run. In essence
my claim is that an institution for philosophy prints, eoits ano oistributes
collections, eoitorials, marks ano books. Ano as it is about the eoiting of
that which is not registereo or registerable, of oistributing voio aooresses
ano of the obscure turmoil of oisciples, all of this being for the public
incalculable ano ooogy |looclc|, at least this is what we hope. Fermit me
then to name this thiro function of a philosophical institution as having
the function of a clanoestine print-works.
Such an institution organizes at its centre a potc tctortc, a clearing-
house ano a clanoestine print-works.
But its secono great task is to be the guaroian of these three stanos of
the knot, tightening, while not, unoer the pretence of its oisparate func-
tions, cutting this borromean knot of the historicity of philosophy. Ior
this, it is necessary that the guarantors of the institution, those who con-
stitute its kernel always exist, ano are themselves able to circulate while
attenoing to the knot, that they have a care ano concern for its holoing
together, that they compreheno for themselves the paraooxical connec-
tions between aooress ano transmission, inscription ano aooress, ano in-
scription ano transmission. Ano that what they know to articulate is not
the nnituoe of neeos ano opportunities, but the triplet of the voio, the
nnite ano the innnite. What they really oesire to be, without oiscontinuity
or visible caesura, are inspectors of the potc tctortc, tenants of the clear-
ing-house ano printers working in secret. I can haroly see for this task any-
thing other than a kino of philosophers convention, convention being
unoerstooo in the sense given to it by the people of the revolution of :q.,
itself a collective booy captive to the seriousness of the oecision, which is
as such the place of the oecision, ano which at the same time oesignates
Alain Baoiou :q
great committees, investeo with great powers, all of which the convention
oversees with gravity. The law of such an assembly cannot be that of ma-
jorities, for this law is that of the knot, of the historicity of philosophy, the
law of the cottcrt momcrt for philosophy. Only this philosophers conven-
tion can avoio the incessant cutting of the knot, the ruin of all historicity,
the risk of the ottcrtrg |mtc o plot| of philosophy, in short, that terrible ano
classic instant where the institution that was for philosophy oeviates into
anti-philosophy. We know the name of this oanger: it is liberalism, which
seeks to unoo everything ano by this ensnares all in oispersion, competi-
tion, opinion ano the oespotism of the public ano publicity.
On one of his gooo oays, Nietzsche noteo that the laws were not maoe
against the criminals, but against the innovators. Unooubteoly the inspec-
tors of the potc tctortc stray, the tenants of the clearing house leave ano the
clanoestine printers are generally taken for criminals. Still, it is these in-
novators that a philosophical institution requires, ano thus they are at risk
of falling unoer the blows of the law, incluoing those which the institution
consioers as its own necessary safeguaros. But the conventional rigorous
oisciplineconvent-like evenof a philosophical institution, supposing it
were gooo, connects what it is to a knot, that one must guaro, tighten, ano
must itself be retieo with new combinations of the voio, of the nnite ano
of the innnite, which are themselves a cruel oiscipline put to the service of
such innovators. Unooubteoly only chance can provioe it. A gooo philo-
sophical institution will therefore be that which proposes, in opposition
to the criminal, who for philosophy can only be the oeclareo enemy of
all thought ano therefore of all being, the very broaoest power of chance,
that is to say the voio power of the aooress.
Let us concluoe as one shoulo, with a wish: when some philosophical
institution is beginning to form its conventions ano to settle as the new
guaroian of the knot, when philosophy is submitteo to the oroeal of a col-
lective oecision, let us wish that no throw of the oice from the criminals
can abolish the chance of its rare occurrence.
Translateo by A. ]. Bartlett
ctcrcc
.
3
The Law of the Subject:
Alain Baoiou, Luitzen Brouwer ano the Kripkean
Analyses of Iorcing ano the Heyting Calculus
Zachary Iraser
There are two labyrinths of the human mino: one concerns
the composition of the continuum, ano the other the nature
of freeoom, ano both spring from the same sourcethe
innnite.
:
G.W. Leibniz
One of the central tasks of Baoious Bctrg oro Eccrt is to elaborate a
theory of the subject in the wake of an axiomatic ioentincation of ontology
with mathematics, or, to be precise, with the Zermelo-Iraenkel axiomati-
zation of classical set theory. In accoroance with this thesis, every presen-
tation of what there isevery ttoottoris helo to be thought in its being
when thought has succeeoeo in formalizing that situation as a mathemati-
cal ct.
.
The formalization of the subject, however, proceeos somewhat
:. Gottfrieo Wilhelm Ireiherr von Leibniz, On Ireeoom, in G.H.R. Farkinson ,eo.,,
Pltloopltcol 1ttttrg, trans. Mary Morris ano G.H.R. Farkinson, Lonoon, ].M. Dent 8
Sons, Lto., :q, p. :o.
.. cf. Alain Baoiou, Bctrg oro Eccrt, trans. Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p.
:o: Set theory, consioereo as an aoequate thinking of the pure multiple, or of the pres-
entation of presentation, fotmoltc any situation whatsoever insofar as it renects the latters
being as such, that is, the multiple of multiples which makes up any presentation. If, within
this framework, one wants to formalize o particular situation, then it is best to consioer o
set such that its characteristicswhich, in the last resort, are expressible in the logic of the
sign of belonging alone, are comparable to that of the structureo presentationthe
situationin question. Iurther citations of this source will be abbreviateo BE.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .
oiherently. Baoiou insists that set theory alone cannot furnish a complete
theory of the subject, ano that for this task one neeos the essentially non-
mathematical concepts of time ano the event. It is nevertheless possible,
Baoiou maintains, to oetermine the set-theoretical form of the subjects
ontological infrastructurethe form of its facticity, to borrow a term
from Sartre.
In Bctrg oro Eccrt, the sought-after structures are oeclareo to

be founo in the two concepts that Faul ]. Cohen oevelops in his work on
the continuum hypothesis: gcrcttctt, ano fotctrg. In a nutshell, a gcrcttc ooct
is one that cannot be oiscerneo by any formula expressible in the mooel
of which it is a subset. Baoiou employs the notion of a generic subset to
formalize the ontological structure of what he calls truths. A truth, in
brief, is a multiplicity that is fully immanent to the situation of which it is
a truth, but which is not inoiviouateo as an element of the situation, ano
cannot be oiscerneo by the linguistic ano epistemic regimes proper to the
situation in question. The point at which the concept of truth oiverges
from the concept of the generic consists in the fact that the elements of a
truth will have been connecteo, through the work of a subject, to an cccrt
,t.c., a rare ontological oysfunction in which the immanent consistency of
a situation is partially unhingeo,. The subject is conceiveo as a tempo-
rally unfoloing, but always nnite, pott of such a truthwhich is, in itself,
always innnite ,as a necessary preconoition of its genericity,. Fotctrg is a
relation oenneo between certain sets belonging to the mooel in which the
generic subset is articulateo, ano statements bearing upon an cxtcrtor of
this mooel, constructeo on the basis of the generic subset in question. Ior
Baoiou, forcing expresses the law of the subject, the abstract form of the
activity through which the subject transforms the situation on the basis
of the truth in which she participates. These concepts provioe Baoiou
with the mathematical framework of a vision of the subject as a ngure
initially subtracteo from language ano from knowleoge, but whose acts
will come to have a transformative ehect on both through its noelity to
the truth that it bears.
. Historically, the term facticity was nrst brought into philosophical currency through
Martin Heioeggers early work. The sense in which I employ it here, however, is essentially
Sartrean. The facticity of the for-itself ,roughly: the subject, is the for-itself insofar as it
t, which is to say, abstracteo from its nihilating ano transcenoing activity. See ]ean-Faul
Sartre, Bctrg oro ôtltrgrc, trans. Hazel Barnes, New York, Fhilosophical Library, :q6,
Fart II, Chapter I, II, pp. q-8. Likewise, the being of the Baoiousian subject is sche-
matizeo by ontology as a nnite part of a generic subset, but the subject must nevertheless
be thought as transcenoing this ontological base, it is always in non-existent excess over
its being, BE p. ..
Zachary Iraser .
Baoiou was not the nrst to conceive of the subject in this way, we
nno a strikingly analogous ooctrine of the subject expresseo in the work
of Luitzen Egbertus ]an Brouwer.
Brouwer, too, envisions the subject as

a temporal process expresseo in mathematical concatenations subtracteo
from law ano language, ano whose manifestations within the bounos ano
in the forms peculiar to this life are irruptions of Truth.
Ior Brouwer,
the truth borne by the subject is none other than temporal unfoloing of
mathematics itselfor, rather, mathematics as it ooglt to be unoerstooo,
once it is recognizeo in its proper essence as an autonomous subjective
construction. This recognition necessitates a thorough transnguration
of existing mathematics, ano results in a new oiscipline of mathematical
thought which Brouwer calls intuitionism. As Brouwer once remarkeo,
some time into the course of this project,
The Intuitionist intervention has hao far-reaching consequences
for mathematics. Inoeeo, if the Intuitionist insights prevail,
consioerable parts of the mathematical structure built so far are
bouno to collapse, ano a new structure will have to be erecteo of
a wholly new style ano character, even the parts that remain will
require thorough reconstruction.
6
An inevitable result of this intervention is that, in the nelo oeployeo by
the intuitionist subject, much of the classical apparatus in which Baoiou
. I am aware of only one other oiscussion in print on the relations between the thoughts
of Baoiou ano Brouwer. It consists in a brief but insightful enonote to Feter Hallwaros
Bootoo: A Soocct to Ttotl, ano is worth reprinting here in full:
Baoious vehement opposition to intuitionism obscures the several things he has in
common with Brouwers original orientation. Like Baoiou, Brouwer insists that there
are no non-experienceo truths ,Brouwer, Consciousness, Fhilosophy ano Mathemat-
ics, in Collcctco 1otl, vol.:, p. 88,. Like Baoiou, Brouwer nrmly separates math-
ematics from mathematical language, in particular from the phenomena of language
which are oescribeo by theoretical logic ,Historical Backgrouno, pp. oq-:o,. Like
Baoiou, Brouwer conceives of genuine thought as subtraction from the petty negotia-
tion of munoane interests. He seeks liberation from participation in cooperative traoe
ano from intercourse presupposing plotoltt, of mtro ,p. 8, |my emphasis|,. Also like
Baoiou, Brouwer pronounces the worloly calculation of security to be unworthy of
thought, ano argues that any genuine philosophy works against cooperation with the
way of the worlo: In particular, |philosophy| shoulo not cooperate with the state ,p.
8,. Hallwaro, Bootoo: A Soocct to Ttotl, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Fress,
.oo, p. q, n....
. L.E.]. Brouwer, Life, Art ano Mysticism, in Collcctco 1otl, Vol. ., Areno Heyting ,eo.,,
Amsteroam, North-Hollano Fublishing Co., :q, p. .
6. Brouwer, Mathematics, Science ano Language, in Faolo Mancosu ,eo.,, Ftom Btoooct to
Htloctt, Oxforo, Oxforo University Fress, :qq8, p. ..
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .6
articulates the material founoation of his ooctrine of the subject is ois-
solveo. Neither the classical noelity of oeouction nor the Cantorian ooc-
trine of actual ano extensionally oetermineo innnities survives intact. In
intuitionistic mathematics, mathematical existence becomes inseparably
fuseo with subjective construction, ano mathematical veracity becomes
one with the oemonstrative trajectory of the intuitionist subject.
Brouwers vision of the nature of mathematical reality is, inoeeo, in
stark opposition to Baoious entire architectonic. In the last instance, how-
ever, this opposition boils oown to a single point, concerning the place of
the subject. Whereas Baoiou axiomatically places mathematical reality
ocfotc the subject, insofar as mathematical reality is the very form of pres-
entation in general, the intuitionist subject gcrctotc this reality through the
course of its temporal existence. Unlike Baoious professeoly materialist
project, Brouwer conceives both mathematics ano its subject along thor-
oughly ioealist lines: rather than being a oiagonal proceoure imbricateo
in an alreaoy-existent, mathematically formalizeo situation, the subject is
the generator of the situation in which it bears its truth.
When I say that the oiherence between the two theories of the subject
is primarily a oiherence concerning the plocc of the subject, I mean this
quite literally. As will be seen, both thinkers envision the fotm of the sub-
ject in strikingly similar terms. Everything hinges on the precise manner
in which the subject is positioneo with respect to the nelo of mathemati-
cal intelligibility, ano on the precise orientation that this positioning gives
to the closely interwoven themes of the subtraction from language ano
the proceoural bearing of truth. We woulo remain in the oark, however,
ano possess little more than rather vague intuitions about this relation
between the two theories, were the stage for their genuine encounter not
presenteo to us by Saul Kripkes grounobreaking work in intuitionist se-
mantics. In his :q6 paper, entitleo Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic
Logic I, Kripke provioes a mooel-theoretic interpretation of intuitionist
logic. Among the results presenteo in that paper is an illustration of how
Cohens forcing-relation is isomorphic to intuitionistic entailment so long
as the forcing conoitions are not generic, in which case the relation be-
haves classically ,obeying the Law of the Excluoeo Mioole,. The generic-
ity of the sequence of forcing conoitions, of course, is contingent on their
forming a completeo, innnite set. This ooes not take place at any point
in the irreoucibly temporal proceoure by which the Baoiousian subject
faithfully aoumbrates its truth.
The purpose of the following enquiry is to elucioate the intuitionist
theory of the subject ano the logical revolt that it proposes in mathemat-
Zachary Iraser .
ics, ano to sheo light on the enigmatic relations that obtain between the
intuitionist ano the Baoiousian ooctrines of the subject, particularly with
respect to their logics, ano the aforementioneo isomorphy that Kripke
oiscovereo between them. I will begin with Brouwer ano his cause.
.
Near the beginning of the twentieth century, classical mathematics
founo itself beset with a number of antinomies, irrupting amiost ehorts
to provioe analysis with a rigorous founoation in mathematical logic ano
a general theory of sets. The ensuing founoational crisis became, in Ba-
oious eyes, an archetypical cccrt for mathematics. A number of oistinct
interventions were taken up in response, each prescribing a careful re-
working of mathematical noelity, that is, of the oisciplinary requirements
necessary in oroer to preserve the integrity ano consistency of mathemati-
cal truth. Among the more prominent schools of thought were that of
logicism, originally heaoeo by Irege ano later championeo by the young
Russell ano Whiteheao in their Pttrctpto Motlcmottco, ano the formalist
school, whose greatest light was ,ano remains, Davio Hilbert. As Michael
Dummett recounts, both sought to remeoy the critical anomalies that hao
surfaceo by supplying classical mathematics, as it currently existeo, with
a rigorous, but supplementary, founoation. The logicists woulo oo this
by prooucing a new logical infrastructure for mathematics, such that the
latter woulo come to be unoerstooo as an extension of logic itself, as the
manhooo of logic as Russell once quippeo.
The formalists sought to sup-

plement mathematics through a painstaking process of axiomatizing the
existing mathematical oisciplines ano installing the resulting axiomatics
within a metamathematical superstructure in which their consistency
woulo be evaluateo.
8
Neither of these interventions cut as oeeply into the
. Mathematics ano logic, historically speaking, have been entirely oistinct stuoies. Math-
ematics has been connecteo with science, logic with Greek. But both have oevelopeo in
mooern times: logic has become more mathematical ano mathematics has become more
logical. The consequence is that it has now become wholly impossible to oraw a line
between the two, in fact, the two are one. They oiher as boy ano man: logic is the youth
of mathematics ano mathematics is the manhooo of logic. Bertrano Russell, Irttooocttor to
Motlcmottcol Pltloopl,, Lonoon, George Allen, :q6, p. :q.
8. Both of these programmes, incioentally, have since oisbanoeo. In both cases, Dummett
recounts,
the philosophical system, consioereo as a unitary theory, collapseo when the respec-
tive mathematical programmes were shown to be incapable of fulnllment: in Ireges
case, by Russells oiscovery of the set-theoretic paraooxes, in Hilberts, by Gooels
tissue of mathematical practice as the one carrieo out by Brouwer.
q
As
Dummett observes,
Intuitionism took the fact that classical mathematics appeareo to
stano in neeo of justincation, not as a challenge to construct such
a justincation, oirect or inoirect, but as a sign that something was
amiss with classical mathematics. Irom an intuitionistic stanopoint,
mathematics, when correctly carrieo on, woulo not neeo any
justincation from without, a buttress from the sioe or a founoation
from below: it woulo wear its own justincation on its face.
:o
What is amiss in classical mathematics, Brouwer conjectureo, is a clear
ontological insight into the nature of mathematical truth ano existence.
Such insight has been systematically obscureo by a logico-linguistic ap-
paratus that has been abstracteo from properly mathematical relations
obtaining within certain nnite systems, ano, by force of habit, come to
acquire the authority ano prestige of a set of o pttott laws.
::
In time, these
laws hao come to usurp genuine mathematical construction, ano men
hao come to believe that mathematical truths coulo be arriveo at, ano
mathematical existences oiscloseo, by what Mill once calleo an artful
manipulation of language.
:.
Classical mathematics hao mistaken the
shaoow for the prey, thought hao suboroinateo itself to theoretical logic,
ano the mathematical stuoy of innnite systems proceeoeo accoroing to
laws appropriate only for nnite collections. Such is Brouwers account of
the roao leaoing to the paraooxes.
:

secono incompleteness theorem. Of course, since the mathematical programmes were
formulateo in vague terms, such as logic ano nnitistic the fatal character of these
oiscoveries was not inescapably apparent straight away, but in both cases it eventually
became apparent, so that, much as we now owe both to Irege ano Hilbert, it woulo
now be impossible for anyone to oeclare himself a whole-hearteo follower of either.
Michael Dummett, Elcmcrt of Irtotttortm, Oxforo, Clarenoon Fress, :q, p. ..
q. Ior an outstanoing historical account of the intuitionist intervention through the lens
of the Kuhnian theory of science, see Bruce Fourciau, Intuitionism as a ,Iaileo, Kuhnian
Revolution in Mathematics, Stootc tr tlc Httot, oro Pltloopl, of Sctcrcc, vol. :, no.., .ooo,
pp. .q-q. Ior a oiscussion on the relations between Kuhnian revolutions ano Baoiou-
sian events, see Feter Hallwaro, Bootoo: A Soocct to Ttotl, pp. .:o-.:.
:o. Dummett, Elcmcrt of Irtotttortm, p. ..
::. cf. Brouwer, Consciousness, Fhilosophy 8 Mathematics, in Collcctco 1otl, p. q..
:.. As quoteo in Gottlob Irege, Tlc Fooroottor of Atttlmcttc, trans. ].L. Austin, New York,
Harper ano Bros., :q6o, :6, p. ...
:. See Brouwer, Historical Backgrouno, Frinciples ano Methoos of Intuitionism, in Col-
lcctco 1otl, p. o8-:.
Zachary Iraser .q

Brouwers intervention began with the gesture that he woulo retro-
spectively refer to as the Iirst Act of Intuitionism. The Iirst Act of Intui-
tionism, in Brouwers woros,
complctcl, cpototc motlcmottc ftom motlcmottcol lorgoogc, tr potttcolot
ftom tlc plcromcro of lorgoogc oltcl otc occttoco o, tlcotcttcol logtc, oro
tccogrtc tlot trtotttortt motlcmottc t or ccrttoll, lorgoogclc octtctt,
of tlc mtro loctrg tt ottgtr tr tlc pctccpttor of o mocc of ttmc, t.c. of tlc
folltrg opott of o ltfc momcrt trto too otttrct tltrg, orc of oltcl gtcc oo,
to tlc otlct, oot t tctotrco o, mcmot,. If tlc too-tt, tlo ootr t otcctco of
oll ooltt,, tlctc tcmotr tlc cmpt, fotm of tlc commor oottotom of oll
too-tttc. It t tlt commor oottotom, tlt cmpt, fotm, oltcl t tlc ootc
trtotttor of motlcmottc.
:
The Iirst Act seeks to wrest mathematical thought away from the reign
of language, ano founo it in the subject, whose primoroial form is given
by a temporally conoitioneo two-ity. The phenomenon of the two-ity,
is unoerstooo as the primitive intuition of trcottorcc tr clorgc or of ortt,
tr moltttooc
:
that manifests itself in time. This phenomenon is absolutely
irreoucible to more primitive terms, neither the One nor the subject itself
is prior to it. Brouwer is quite explicit on this point, arguing that it woulo
be inconceivable to posit the One as primary, in that any pretension of
generating either a thinking subject or the nelo of numericity on the basis
of a single term must begin by installing this term in a ouality that exceeos
it.
:6
On the basis of the twoity unfolos the very being of the subject, whose
initial trajectory consists in the articulation of the innnitely proceeoing
sequence of natural numbers, ano of the laws which govern this sequence.
It is here that arithmetic has its origin, as a movement wholly interior to
the trajectory of the subject.
The absolutely primoroial character of arithmetic is essential for
Brouwer. Arithmetic, as Brouwer unoerstanos it, is virtually consubstan-
:. Brouwer, Historical Backgrouno, Frinciples ano Methoos of Intuitionism, in Collcctco
1otl, p. o8. Brouwers italics.
:. Brouwer, Collcctco 1otl, p. q6.
:6. The nrst act of construction has too oiscrete things thought together ,also accoroing
to CANTOR, Vortage auf oer Naturforscherversammlung in Kassel :qo,, I. Meyer ,Ver-
hanol. internat. Math. Congr. Heioelberg :qo, p. 68, says orc thing is sumcient, because
the circumstance that I think of it can be aooeo as a secono thing, this is false, for exactly
this oootrg ,i.e. setting it while the former is retaineo, ptcoppoc tlc trtotttor of too-tt,, only
afterwaros this simplest mathematical system is projecteo on the nrst thing ano the cgo
oltcl tltrl tlc tltrg, Collcctco 1otl, p. q6, n.:.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo o
tial with the subjects very existence. In a few of his more speculative texts,
Brouwer insists that prior to the apprehension of the two-ity in which
arithmetic is grounoeo, the subject as such has not yet taken form.
:
Brou-
wer legitimates the subtraction of mathematical thought from language by
appealing to the absolute pttottt, of subjective mathematical construction
to the installation of the subject in language. Language itself is conceiveo
as something entirely seconoary to the existence of singular subjects, in
its essence, it is a vast apparatus of will-transmission, ano where it attains
an appearance of stability ano rigouras in the artincial languages em-
ployeo by the sciences, incluoing mathematical logicBrouwer sees only
a crystallization of the social bono, a subtle form of ioeology.
:8
Insofar
as mathematics presents itself as a rigorous ano highly structureo form of
thought that is prior to ano eluoes the ioeological apparatus of language,
it is, moreover, never without a social cause.
:q
When conoucteo rightly
intuitionisticallythis cause is essentially subtractive, insofar as it restores
a rigorous freeoom to thought that transgresses the straightjacket of lan-
guage.
.o
When mathematical practice is falsely suboroinateo to linguistic
artince, however, the causes it serves become bouno up in the apparatuses
of power, making these apparatuses all the more cunning. Along these
lines, Brouwer seeks to invest intuitionism with an ethical impetus.

Any reaoer familiar with Bctrg oro Eccrt will immeoiately notice sever-
al points of resonance between Brouwers intervention ano the Baoiousian
theory of the subject. Gathereo together in a single statement of interven-
tion we nno the familiar themes of a subject subtracteo from language,
an irreoucible ano originary Two, ano a oiscipline of time. It will be pos-
sible to sheo more light on these similarities once we have completeo our
analysis. Ior now, let us make note of a few key points.
Iirst of all, the basis for the intuitionist subjects subtraction from lan-
guage lies in the priority of subjective mathematical constructions to any
linguistic artince. Language only comes to mathematics after the fact,
ano plays no other part than an emcient, but never infallible or exact,
:. cf. Consciousness, Fhilosophy ano Mathematics, in Collcctco 1otl, pp. 8o-q.
:8. Vlaoimir Tasic, Tlc Motlcmottcol Root of Potmooctr Tlooglt, Oxforo, Oxforo University
Fress, .oo:, p. 8. Tasic provioes a well-informeo ano lucio account of Brouwers theory of
language in . of chapter of this text.
:q. Brouwer, Signinc Dialogues, in Collcctco 1otl, p. o.
.o. Tasic, Tlc Motlcmottcol Root of Potmooctr Tlooglt, p. .
Zachary Iraser :
technique for memorizing mathematical constructions, ano for suggest-
ing them to others, so that mathematical language by itself can never
create new mathematical systems.
.:
By contrast, Baoiou conceives of the
subtraction from language in entirely inverteo terms, with the subject
only coming into ehect amiost an alreaoy existent linguistic apparatus.
This subject, moreover, subtracts itself from language, at least in part,
by means of language, in a process of oiagonalization across the nelo of
linguistic oetermination. Ior the Baoiousian subject, the subtraction from
language is grounoeo entirely a posteriori. Ior all his insight into a certain
ethic that unoeniably unoerlies Baoious thought, Hallwaros oiagnosis of
the Baoiousian subject as a singularity that creates the proper meoium
of its existence
..
is thus somewhat inexact. This title is better reserveo for
the Brouwerian subject, the creative subject of intuitionistic mathemat-
ics, who, as we will see, generates the meoium of mathematical existence
in a process reminiscent of the Fythagorean cosmogony, where the In-
oennite Dyao, in a oialectic with the One, gives rise to the entire universe
of Number. Unlike the Fythagorean ooctrine, of course, the intuitionist
cosmogony is immaterial, subjectively generateo, ano possesses the cru-
cial structural oiherence of oeclaring the Dyao prior to the One.
Baoious oivergence from Brouwer, with respect to the subtraction
from language of the truth-bearing subject, is intimately bouno up with
one of the caroinal ambitions of Baoious project: namely, to re-envision
the concept of the subject in a manner homogeneous with the forms that
it has taken in our era,
.
which Baoiou oeclares a secono epoch of the
ooctrine of the Subject ,BE ,. The subject that is presenteo to us in this
epoch, claims Baoiou,
is no longer the founoing subject, centereo ano renexive, whose
theme runs from Descartes to Hegel ano which remains legible in
Marx ano Ireuo ,in fact, in Husserl ano Sartre,. The contemporary
Subject is voio, cleaveo, a-substantial, ano ir-renexive. Moreover,
one can only suppose its existence in the context of particular
processes whose conoitions are rigorous. ,BE ,
.:. Brouwer, Historical Backgrouno, Frinciples ano Methoos of Intuitionism, in Collcctco
1otl, p. ::.
... Feter Hallwaro, Alain Baoiou et la oliason absolue, in Charles Ramon ,eo.,, Alotr
Bootoo: Pcrct lc molttplc: Actc oo Collooc oc Bootocoox ..-. octootc ., Faris, LHarmattan,
.oo., p. .q6.
.. cf. BE, p. .: |I|t will be agreeo that no conceptual apparatus is aoequate unless it is
homogeneous with the theoretico-practical orientations of the mooern ooctrine of the
subject, itself internal to practical processes ,clinical or political,.
It is not oimcult to place the Brouwerian conception of the subject squarely
within the nrst epoch, which is essentially the era initiateo by Descartes.
The Brouwerian subject is essentially prior to the processes in which its
active existence is amrmeo, ano of which it forms the renexive centre as
the guarantor of their valioity ano existence ,t.c., their constructibility,.
The conoitions within which the Baoiousian subject is traceo come es-
sentially ocfotc the subject. They are not given for the sake of the subject,
nor is the subject conceiveo as their centre or guarantor. Hence there is
a funoamental oistinction in Baoiou between the temporal unfoloing of
truth initiateo by a subjective proceoure ano the axiomatically positeo on-
tological context through which the truth-bearing subject proceeos. This
context is conceiveo clotcoll,, as a pre-given ano fully actual backorop
whose ontological structure is expresseo by axiomatic set theory. In con-
trast to the subjective truth proceoures that are exploreo by both think-
ers, this axiomatically positeo nelo has no neeo of being autonomously
constructeo by a subject of truth in oroer to be counteo as existent. On
this point Baoiou holos fast to the strictly anti-Cartesian ano anti-Kan-
tian theory of science that he aovanceo in his youth, that one establishes
oneself within science from the outset. One ooes not reconstitute it from
scratch. One ooes not founo it.
.
Nothing coulo be further from the foun-
oationalist thesis that mathematics is an essentially languageless activity
of the mino having its origin in the perception of a move of time.
.
Inoeeo,
it is not unreasonable to suggest that it is with Brouwer that mathematics
reaches its Cartesian apex. Never before has there been such a concerteo
ehort to oerive the entire eoince of mathematics from pure subjective
introspection.
Certain resonances may also be traceo between the respective roles
playeo by temporality ano the ngure of the Two in the two ooctrines of
the subject. Both Baoiou ano Brouwer unoerstano the subject as a tem-
porally unfoloing existence initiateo in an irreoucible occurrence of the
Two. Here Baoiou once again reverses the oroer of Brouwers terms: the
Two erupts into the pre-subjective fabric of consistent presentation in the
form of an cccrt, ano gives rise to both the subject ano to the temporality
in which the subject articulates ano proouces the truth that it bears.
.6
The
.. Alain Baoiou, Lc Corccpt oc moolc, Faris, Maspero, :q., p. ..
.. Brouwer, Historical Backgrouno, Frinciples ano Methoos of Intuitionism, in Collcctco
1otl, p. :o.
.6. The structure of the event itself, like its extra-intuitive placement in a pre-subjective
ano material reality, bears little resemblance to anything encountereo in the Intuitionistic
nelo. Iormally, it is conceiveo as a non-wellfounoeo multiplicity, a multiple whose ele-
Zachary Iraser
essential oivergence between the two theoreticians on the question of the
twoity that initiates the subject, however, ooes not primarily concern the
oroer of operations. It more concerns the place of the Twos occurrence.
Ior Baoiou, the oyaoic event inaugurating the subject is not an omnipres-
ent intuition, common to all experience. It is a rare ontological oysfunc-
tion that takes place in the remotest corners of certain concrete situations.
Iar from being the founoing intuition of mathematics, insofar as the event
is an ontological oysfunction, it is external to the nelo of mathematical
ontology ,BE :8,, mathematical ontology being, for Baoiou, classical
mathematics itself ,ano particularly set theory,. Insofar as every subject is
initiateo by an event, the events exteriority to mathematics separates Ba-
oious theory of the subject from his mathematical ontology. The Baoiou-
sian subject is thus rot primarily a mathematical structure, any more than
mathematics is a subjective construction. Of course, as I have alreaoy
stateo, Baoiou ooes seek to oetermine what is mathematically structureo
tr the subject, but this cannot coincioe with the Baoiousian subject itself.

Before proceeoing any further in a comparison of the two ooctrines of
the subject, we must examine the intuitionist theory of constructive math-
ematics in greater oetail, for it is there that the logic ano the structure of
the Brouwerian subject, ano the intuitionist theory of truth, are oeployeo
in full. Let us begin by examining what Brouwer means by motlcmottcol
corttocttor. The simplest way of ooing this is to contrast intuitionist math-
ematics with its classical counterpart.
Among the theorems of classical mathematics, the intuitionist recog-
nizes as valio only those which can be maoe evioent through explicit ano
ments consist of those of its site of occurrence X ano of itself ,Baoiou outlines its form in
the inscription c
x
~ {x X, c
x
},. Such a multiple, Baoiou observes, is manifestly non-con-
structible, for the self-membership that characterizes the event requires a certain ante-
ceoence to self that is constructively impossible ,BE o,, one can construct the evental
multiple only on conoition that one has alreaoy oone so. Heyting explicitly rules out the
possibility of non-wellfounoeo sets ,or species, in intuitionism, given that |c|ircular oen-
nitions are excluoeo by the conoition that the members of a species S must be oennable
inoepenoently of the oennition of S, this conoition is obvious from the constructive point
of view. It suggests inoeeo an oroination of species which resembles the hierarchy of types,
Areno Heyting, Irtotttortm: Ar Irttooocttor, ro eo., Amsteroam, North-Hollano Fublish-
ing, :q:, p. 8. My focus, here, however, is not so much the ,para,ontological substructure
of the event, but what Baoiou alternatively calls its essence or its position, ano names the
Two ,cf. BE, .o6,.
nnitely given algorithms. In other woros an assertion can only be helo to
be true once one has provioeo an intuitively acceptable proof, that is, a
certain kino of mcrtol construction.
.
Frovability, truth, ano existence are,
in intuitionistic mathematics, inseparably fuseo together. The intuitionist
oecision to interpret mathematical being as, in every case, a matter of
subjective construction is maoe in oroer to clear away the metaphysical
trappings within which classical mathematics ,as intuitionism unoerstanos
it, has become ensnareo. These trappings, moreover, are helo to be re-
sponsible for the intuitive obscurity ano the antinomies that have come to
haunt the mathematical traoition. As Areno Heyting has it,
|i|f to exist ooes not mean to be constructeo, it must have some
metaphysical meaning. It cannot be the task of mathematics to
investigate this meaning or to oecioe whether it is tenable or not. We
have no objection against a mathematician privately aomitting any
metaphysical theory he likes, but Brouwers program entails that
we stuoy mathematics as something simpler, more immeoiate than
metaphysics. In the stuoy of mental mathematical constructions to
exist must be synonymous with to be constructeo.
.8
What the intuitionist mission of oistilling mathematical existence oown to
what is subjectively constructible gains for mathematics in clarity, it looses
in scope, ano full of pain, the mathematician sees the greatest part of his
towering eoince oissolve in fog.
.q
The intuitionist, content to pluck out the
eye that ohenos him, accepts the ensuing mutilation of mathematics as a
price that must be paio if mathematics is to remain faithful to the intuition
which proouceo it. It can also be seen, renects Heyting, as the excision of
noxious ornaments, beautiful in form, but hollow in substance.
o
Ior the intuitionist, the ioentincation of existence ano subjective con-
struction oeploys a nelo of mathematical thought in which axioms be-
come illusory.
:
Where anything resembling axiomatization appears in
intuitionist mathematics, it is only to provioe a heuristically useful, but
essentially seconoary analytical taskas in Heytings :q. axiomatization
of intuitionistic projective geometry ,which was, incioentally, his oisserta-
tion project ano was written unoer Brouwers supervision,. The intuition-
ist oisaxiomatization of mathematics marks another strong oivergence
.. Dummett, Elcmcrt of Irtotttortm, p. .
.8. Heyting, Irtotttortm, p. ..
.q. Weyl, On the new founoational crisis of mathematics, in Mancosu, p. :6
o. Heyting, Irtotttortm, p. ::.
:. Brouwer, The Ehect of Intuitionism on Classical Algebra of Logic, in Collcctco 1otl,
p. :.
Zachary Iraser
from Baoious thought. While Baoiou, like Brouwer, insists on liberating
mathematics from the superstitious supposition that it concerns objects
that are external to mathematics, ano ioentifying mathematical truth
with the very movement of its thought, for the former, the axiom is pre-
cisely the point at which mathematical intuition in concentrateo. Taking
a position which he sees himself as sharing with both Gooel ano Flato,
Baoiou insists that what we must unoerstano by intuition is precisely a
oecision of inventive thought with regaro to the intelligibility of axioms.
.

Ior Baoiou, the oecisional aspect of mathematical intuition is primary
ano continuous, ano so
it is pointless to try to reouce it to protocols of construction or
externally regulateo proceoures. On the contrary, the constraints
of construction ,often ano confusingly referreo to as intuitionist
constraints, which is inappropriate given that the genuine aovocate
of intuition is the Flatonist, shoulo be suboroinateo to the freeooms
of thinking oecision.
Baoious ioentincation of his position as a Flatonism oeserves some com-

ment here. Baoious reaoing of Flato is at quite a oistance from the pla-
tonism that haunts the textbooks of the philosophy of mathematics ,as
well as a number of the intuitionists essaysDummetts text is a gooo
example
,. This textbook platonism, as Baoiou sees it, simply gets Flatos

thought wrong,
because it presupposes that the Flatonist espouses a oistinction
between the internal ano the external, knowing subject ano known
object, a oistinction which is utterly foreign to the genuine Flatonic
framework. || Flatos funoamental concern is a oesire to oeclare
the immanent ioentity, the co-belonging of the knowing mino ano
the known, their essential ontological commensurability.
In many signincant respects ,which seem to have been as unclear to Ba-

oiou in his appraisal of intuitionism as they have been to Dummett in his
appraisal of Flatonism
6
,, Baoious version of Flatonism mirrors the intui-
.. Baoiou, Flatonism ano Mathematical Ontology, in Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, eo. ano trans.
Ray Brassier ano Alberto Toscano, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. ..
. Baoiou, Flatonism ano Mathematical Ontology, p. ..
. Ior a clear example of the textbook platonism that Baoiou is opposing, cf. Dummetts
synopsis of platonism on page of Elcmcrt of Irtotttortm: |T|he platonist picture is of a
realm of mathematical reality, existing objectively ano inoepenoently of our knowleoge,
which renoers our statements true or false.
. Dummett, Elcmcrt of Irtotttortm, p. q.
6. In a oiscussion of intuitionistic logic that I will examine later in this essay, Baoiou
tionist vision of mathematics. It is nevertheless clear that something quite
oiherent is at stake in Baoious unoerstanoing of the term intuition. In
the last analysis, this oiherence has everything to oo with the funoamen-
tal unity of intuitionist mathematics, ano its rooteoness is the primoroial
intuition of the twoity. The movement of truth proper to intuitionism con-
sists entirely in unfoloing the truth of the twoity, that is, of time. Decisions
which oo not follow from this original intuition are not calleo for, when
new oecisions are necessitateo, it is to more faithfully express this original
ontological event. Cavailles graspeo this oimension of intuitionism quite
clearly, when he wrote that for the intuitionist,
mathematics is an autonomous becoming, more an act than a
becoming, for which a oennition at the origin is impossible but
whose moments in their necessary interoepenoence betray an
original essence. Irom the oyao to the elaborateo theories, there is
continuity ano unpreoictability.
Whereas it is the nature of axioms to be, as far as is possible, separa-

ble from one another, ano thus apprehensible as oiscrete oecisions, every
mooincation imposeo upon intuitionist mathematics is prescribeo by a
noelity to its original essence. It is thus at least conceptually inaoequate
to refer to the Acts of intuitionism as axioms in the classical sense. The
essential unity that the intuitionist seeks to preserve in rejecting the axi-
omatic methoo ooes not trouble the Baoiousian Flatonist, however. Ior
Baoiouwho sees himself as following in Flatos footsteps on this point
mathematical thought requireo no greater unity than what is guaranteeo
for it by the logical exigency of non-contraoictority. Against the intui-
tionist cloverleaf that lashes together being, thought ano constructibility,
Baoiou proposes the classical ,or better, Hilbertian, axiom that ioentines
being, thought ano corttcrc,.
8
The axiomatic leaps ano bounos that
oefy constructibility oo not take leave of this broaoer sphere, which for
the Flatonist, Baoiou writes, is governeo not by an imperative of construc-
tive coherency but by that of maximal extension in what can be consist-
ently thought.
q
writes that intuitionism is a prisoner of the empiricist ano illusory representation of math-
ematical oocct, BE, p. .q.
. ]ean Cavailles, On Logic ano the Theory of Science, in ]oseph ]. Kockelmans ano
Theooore ]. Kisiel ,eos.,, Plcromcrolog, oro tlc ôtotol Sctcrcc, trans. Theooore ]. Kisiel,
Evanston, Northwestern University Fress, :qo, p. 6.
8. Baoiou, Flatonism ano Mathematical Ontology, p. . Emphasis aooeo.
q. Baoiou, Flatonism ano Mathematical Ontology, p. .
Zachary Iraser
One of the most immeoiate ano oramatic consequences of the intui-
tionist position is a rejection of the Cantorian concept of actually innnite
multiplicity, insofar as the existence of such multiplicities can only ever be
the thesis of an axiom.
o
Within intuitionist mathematics, where every ex-
istence is subjectively constructeo by nnite means, all innnity is potential
innnity: there is no completeo innnite.
:
This thesis means, simply, that to
grasp an innnite structure is to grasp the process which generates it, that
to refer to such a structure is to refer to that process, ano that to recognize
the structure as being innnite is to recognize that the process will not
terminate.
.
Such a thesis sets intuitionism at a clear oistance from the set-
theoretical unoerpinnings of Baoious enterprise, in which the primacy
of extensionality ano the ubiquity of actual innnities reign supreme. It is
interesting to observe, however, that the intuitionists frequently oefeno
this thesis on the same grounos upon which Baoiou oefenos the opposite
position, namely, on the grounos that one must not oenature the innnite
by confusing its essence with that of the nnite. Ior the intuitionist, the
Cantorian oestroys the whole essence of innnity, which lies in the concep-
tion of a structure which is always in growth, precisely because the process
of construction is never completeo, in speaking of actual innnities, the
Cantorian speaks of an innnite process as if it were merely a particularly
long nnite one.
Ior Baoiou, it is the aovocates of a strictly potential con-

ception of innnity who oenature the innnite by viewing it only through
the lens of nnituoe. Insofar as it oetermines the innnite within the Open,
or as the horizonal correlate for a historicity of nnituoe,
the intuitionist
oisposition, by Baoious lights, remains enslaveo to the Romanticist traoi-
tion,
a traoition that must be overcome if thought is to unshackle itself

from the cult of nnituoe.
What is at stake in this oispute is, again, the centrality of the subject
in the nelo of mathematical existence. So long as the ,nnite, subject is
conceiveo as the central guarantor of every mathematical existence, the
essence of such existences must be conceiveo with respect to their relation
o. See Meoitation : of BE.
:. Dummett, Elcmcrt of Irtotttortm, p. .
.. Dummett, Elcmcrt of Irtotttortm, p. 6.
. Dummett, Elcmcrt of Irtotttortm, p. ..
. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Mathematics: Innnity ano the Eno of Romanticism, in Tlco-
tcttcol 1ttttrg, p. ..
. Ior an extenoeo analysis of the relations between Brouwers intuitionism ano the Ro-
mantic traoition, see chapter of Vlaoimir Tasics Tlc Motlcmottcol Root of Potmooctr
Tlooglt.
to the subject. Irom this perspective, the innnite t the outstripping of
subjective construction. Ior the Cantorian, the innnite is oeployeo in its
essence irrespective of the subjects position. The subject, here, ooes not
participate in the construction of the innnite, but only its traversal.
6

6
The intuitionist ioentincation of mathematical existence with construc-
tion, ano of truth with oemonstration, has consequences that penetrate
through to the logical structure of mathematical reason itself. Because the
intuitionist ioentines the truth of a statement with the construction that
valioates it, ano the falsity of a statement with the construction that oem-
onstrates its absuroity, he no longer has any grounos for maintaining that
a given statement A is either true or false prior to the ehectuation of the
relevant construction. To upholo the contrary, he woulo have to maintain
that a certain construction hao been constructeo pttot to tt loctrg occr cor-
ttoctco, which is nonsensical.
The most oramatic single ehect of this orientation in thought is intui-
tionisms well-known rejection of the Law of the Excluoeo Mioole ,LEM,.
LEM states that, given a statement A, either A is true or else -A is true,
tctttom ror ootot. The proposition A ot A is thus classically valio for any
A whatsoever. Within an intuitionistic contextwhere a statement must
be proven if it is to be truethe general assertion, A ot A, oemanos
a general methoo to solve every problem, or more explicitly, a general
methoo which for any proposition p yielos by specialization either a proof
of p or a proof of -p. As we oo not possess such a methoo of construc-
tion, we have no right to assert the principle.
The intuitionist rejection of

LEM entails the rejection of its corollary, the principle of oouble negation.
This principle states that --A is true if ano only if A is, ano legitimates a
6. cf. Baoiou, Lc ômotc ct lc romotc, Faris, Eoitions ou Seuil, :qqo, .:: Even if we
can only ttocctc the numeric oomain accoroing to laws of progression, of which succes-
sion is the most common ,but not the only one, far from it,, why must it follow that these
laws are constitutive of the being of number? It is easy to see why we have to pass from
one number to the next, or from a series of numbers to its limit. But it is at the very least
impruoent to thereby concluoe that number is oenneo or constituteo by such passages.
|c. cf. NN, .:8: Certainly, the intuitionists aoopt this impoverisheo perspective.| It
may well be ,ano this is my thesis, that number itself ooc rot po, that it is immemorially
oeployeo in a swarming coextensive to its being. || Ior the oomain of number is rather
an ontological prescription incommensurable to any subject, ano immerseo in the innnity
of innnities.
. Heyting, Irtotttortm, p. :o:.
Zachary Iraser q
methoo of argument ,quite common in classical mathematics, known as
opogogtc or trottcct proof, whereby one takes to oemonstrating the truth of
A by oemonstrating the absuroity of the absuroity of A ,t.c. by oemonstrat-
ing --A,. While intuitionism rejects the universal valioity that classical
mathematics gives to LEM ano its consequences, it ooes, nevertheless,
aomit their legitimacy is certain special circumstances. Iirstly, LEM holos
for A whenever A is alreaoy a negative proposition ,say, A ~ -B,: either
-B or --B must be true, ano ---B implies -B. This is oue to the fact
that the intuitionist accepts as self-evioent the rule that B implies --B as
well as the rule that if we have A B then we also have -B -A. Of
greater theoretical interest is the fact that LEM is also helo to be valio in
cases where one is operating in a strictly nnite oomain. The reason for
this is that
every construction of a bounoeo nnite nature in a nnite
mathematical system can only be attempteo in a nnite number of
ways, ano each attempt can be carrieo through to completion, or
to be continueo until further progress is impossible. It follows that
every assertion of possibility of a construction of a bounoeo nnite
character can be juogeo. So, in this exceptional case, application
of the principle of the excluoeo thiro is permissible.
8

Brouwer argues that the universality ano a priority that have long been
attributeo to LEM are precisely oue to habits acquireo from reasoning
within the bounos of nnite situations.
q
Once mathematics turns to the
8. Brouwer, Historical Backgrouno, Frinciples ano Methoos of Intuitionism, in Collcctco
1otl, p. :o.
q. In Intuitionist Set Theory, Brouwer claims that LEM ano the axiom of solvability
,that every problem has a solution,,
are oogmas that have their origin in the practice of nrst abstracting the system of clas-
sical logic from the mathematics of subsets of a oennite nnite set, ano then attributing
to this system an a priori existence inoepenoent of mathematics, ano nnally applying
it wronglyon the basis of its reputeo a priori natureto the mathematics of innnite
sets. ,Intuitionistic Set Theory, in Mancosu, p. ., n.,
Elsewhere, in Consciousness, Fhilosophy ano Mathematics, he writes that
The long belief in the universal valioity of the principle of the excluoeo thiro in math-
ematics is consioereo by intuitionism as a phenomenon of history of civilization of the
same kino as the olo-time belief in the rationality of or in the rotation of the nrma-
ment on an axis passing through the earth. Ano intuitionism tries to explain the long
persistence of this oogma by two facts: nrstly the obvious non-contraoictority of the
principle for an arbitrary single assertion, seconoly the practical valioity of the whole
of classical logic for an extensive group of tmplc ccct, oo, plcromcro. The latter fact
apparently maoe such a strong impression that the play of thought that classical logic
originally was, became a oeep-rooteo habit of thought which was consioereo not only
investigation of the innniteby which Brouwer always means, that which
is forever incompleteLEM immeoiately loses its intuitive grouno.
Baoiou oevotes a few pages in Meoitation . to a consioeration of
the intuitionist rejection of LEM ano the correlate principle of oouble-
negation. Baoious position on this matter is ,as one might expect, reso-
lutely classical. His argument proceeos by nrst assuming the axioms of set
theory as the common grouno of the oebate. Since every set-theoretical
proposition is essentially reoucible to a statement that is either of the form
a set x exists, such that or of the form a set x, such that ooes not
exist, Baoiou argues that to suppose that a certain statement is neither
true nor false is to suppose that a certain, oeterminate multiplicity is nei-
ther existent nor non-existent. Such a position is insupportable, Baoiou
reasons, insofar as we are unable to oetermine, between non-existence
ano existence, any specinc intermeoiary property, which woulo provioe a
founoation for the gap between the negation of non-existence ano exist-
ence ,BE .o,. There is a subtle but signincant error here. It lies in taking
intuitionist logic to be oeterminately trivalent, that is, to be a logic with
three oeterminate truth values. Only if this were the case coulo there
be any grounos for rejecting intuitionist logic for want of an ontological
founoation for the gap between oouble negation ano assertion. This is
to mistake the very nature of the intuitionist ioentincation of truth with
oemonstration ano of existence with subjective construction. Ior the in-
tuitionist, a negation ,-P, is founoeo by a constructive oemonstration of
absuroity, ano an amrmation ,P, is founoeo by a constructive oemonstra-
tion of veracity. When the intuitionist asserts --P but cannot assert P, it
is because he has proouceo a construction oemonstrating the absuroity
of any construction oemonstrating the absuroity of P, but has not ,yet,
constructively oemonstrateo P. What we have here is an existential foun-
oation for --P alongsioe a locl of fooroottor for P. The existential correlate
of the logical gap between --P ano P is not an oeterminate intermeoi-
ary between existence ano non-existence, but a simple troctctmtrottor of
existence, by which the intuitionist always means subjective construction.
Baoiou elioes this point by situating the argument from the outset in the
context of axiomatic set theory, where existence ano non-existence are
oistributeo universally ano bivalently.
This elision may be permissible within the context of Baoious enter-
prise, which takes as its ontological backorop the entirety of classical set
theory. It is possible to reao Baoious remarks on intuitionistic logic as an
as useful but even aprioristic. Collcctco 1otl, p. q.
Zachary Iraser :
explanation of why the Law of the Excluoeo Mioole, ano consequently the
oeouctive methoo of apogogic proof, is valio within the ,meta,ontological
framework of Bctrg oro Eccrt. What is less acceptable is his rather vacuous
claim that in the rejection of LEM,
intuitionism has mistaken the route in trying to apply back onto
ontology criteria of connection which comc ftom clcolctc, ano
especially from a ooctrine of mentally ehective operations. In
particular, intuitionism is a prisoner of the empiricist ano illusory
representation of mathematical objects. ,BE .q,
The claim that intuitionism oraws its rules from the stuoy of mentally
ehective operations is fair enough, inoeeo, on this point Baoiou is in con-
sensus with most active intuitionists ,incluoing, it seems, both Brouwer
ano Heyting,. The claim that these rules come from elsewhere than the
oomain of ontology, however, simply reasserts Baoious axiomatic thesis
that ontology t classical set theory, in this respect, the claim is a trivial
one, since no one is arguing that intuitionist logic naturally emerges from
classical set theory. But let us not move too quickly hereafter all, the
initial thesis of Bctrg oro Eccrt is that motlcmottc, throughout the entirety
of its historical becoming, pronounces what is expressible of being qua be-
ing ,BE 8,. Whether this mathematics is classical or intuitionistic oemanos
a secono oecision, it is not oecioeo in aovance by Baoious arguments
,which are themselves more like axioms, that the presentation of being
is intelligible only in terms of pure multiplicity. Intuitionist mathematics,
too, proposes an ontology in which every existence is realizeo as multi-
plicity, orawing out a sort of ioealist Fythagorean cosmogony without an
originary One ,but rather a Two,. In any case, the fact that intuitionism
can be saio to oerive its rules from mentally ehective operations ooes not
precluoe the thesis that these rules correctly prescribe what is cxptctolc of
being, the intuitionist ontologist woulo have no oimculty in turning the
tables here, for she is always entitleo to retort that the classical ontologist
applies, onto being, rules which come from a ooctrine of mcrtoll, cccttcc
opctottor tcgototrg rttc collccttor, an accusation which is twice as oamning
when the rights to an ontology of innnite multiples are at stake. Baoious
suggestion, which is not taken any further than what is quoteo here, that
intuitionistic logic remain beholoen to the empiricist ano illusory repre-
sentation of mathematical objects is rather queer. The entire intuitionist
programme takes its point of oeparture in seeking to overcome the ob-
servational stanopoint that hao become the spontaneous philosophy of
mathematicians, ano which treateo mathematical juogments as if they
were juogments concerning oocct.
o
The whole intuitionist ehort is to re-
main faithful to a vision of mathematics as an autonomous activity of the
subject, without reference to any external object. It is strange that Baoiou
neglects to mention this, he shares essentially the same project.
:

The full consequences of the intuitionist position concerning the non-
preoeterminacy of truth can most easily be graspeo by illustrating a moo-
el for this logic, such as Kripke has oone in his :q6 paper, Semantical
Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I. In this text, Kripke oevelops a mooel-
theoretic treatment of Heytings formalization of intuitionistic logic.
.
In
all justice, before proceeoing any further, we must note that both Kripke
ano Heytings enoeavours are, in a certain sense, external to intuitionism
proper. They are formal abstractions maoe on the basis of intuitionist
mathematics, ano, accoroing to the intuitionistic ethos, cannot be taken
as expressing the essence of intuitionist mathematics itself. The remarks
that Heyting makes to this ehect at the beginning of his Iormal Rules of
Intuitionistic Logic are worth repeating here. Intuitionistic mathematics,
he writes,
is a mental activity |Dcrltttglctt|, ano for it every language,
incluoing the formalistic one, is only a tool for communication. It
is in principle impossible to set up a system of formulas that woulo
be equivalent to intuitionistic mathematics, for the possibilities
of thought cannot be reouceo to a nnite number of rules set up
in aovance. || Ior the construction of mathematics it is not
necessary to set up logical laws of general valioity, these laws are
oiscovereo anew in each single case for the mathematical system
unoer consioeration.
Motivateo by the wish to facilitate the penetration of intuitionistic con-

cepts ano the use of these concepts in research,
Heyting nevertheless
proceeos to abstract the general oeouctive structure from intuitionistic
o. Brouwer, Historical Backgrouno, Frinciples ano Methoos of Intuitionism, in Collcctco
1otl, p. o8.
:. This is the nature of Baoious Flatonism, as oiscusseo in above. ,cf. Baoiou, Flaton-
ism ano Mathematical Ontology, pp. q-8.
.. Kripke provioes a mooel for both the propositional ano the preoicate calculus for intui-
tionistic logic. In what follows, however, we will restrict our attention to the propositional
calculus for the sake of simplicity ano brevity.
. Heyting, Irtotttortm, p. ::.
. Heyting, Irtotttortm, p. ::.
Zachary Iraser
mathematics. The result is a propositional ano a preoicate calculus, pre-
senteo in the familiar symbolic style, in which the logical consequences
of the intuitionistic position are systematically unfoloeo. Kripkes project
arose as an ehort to provioe a mooel theory for Heytings logical calculi,
ano in ooing this he veereo even further from the orthooox path of intui-
tionism by constructing his mooel within classical mathematics. But even
the embeooeoness of Kripkes mooel in a classical framework is not the es-
sential problem here. Kripke himself provioes several inoications on how
the construction of the mooel may be conoucteo intuitionistically, ano
his oecision to employ classical proceoures is primarily a matter of expeoi-
ency ,it is almost always simpler to proouce a classical oemonstration than
an intuitionistic one,. It is rather that, for the intuitionist, the entire notion
of a moocl is altogether seconoary. But what is this notion?
Brieny put, the role of a mooel ,in formal semantics, is to oetermine
the veracity ano sounoness of a mathematical or logical system by pro-
oucing a mooel structure in which the sentences of the system can be
shown to be true when they are interpreteo as referring to the objects in
the oomain. A mathematical mooel thus consists of a formally specineo
oomain of objects ,usually sets, subsets ano relations, ano a function of
corresponoence, calleo the trtctptctottor of the mooel, establisheo between
these objects ano the syntactic elements of the system in question. As Ba-
oiou recognizes in Lc Corccpt oc moolc, the mooel-theoretic schematization
of truth as ruleo corresponoence comes oeceptively close to the empiri-
cist or observational paraoigm, which makes of truth a corresponoence
with external objects.
This is precisely the orientation in thought that

intuitionism seeks to overcome by ioentifying truth with the subjective
movement of oemonstrative construction, without reference to any exter-
nal object. Nevertheless, Baoiou, for his part, seeks to rescue the concept
of the mooel from its empiricist appropriation, ano forcefully argues that
what is at issue in the mathematical employment of mooels is in no sense
a reproouction of the observational or empiricist oichotomy between
propositions ano objects. Mooel theory ooes not concern the relation be-
tween mathematics ano its exterior. Essentially, this is because both the
mooel structure ano the interpretation by which the formal system in
question is evaluateo are themselves proouceo entirely ottltr motlcmottc.
Semantics, accoroingly,
is an trttomotlcmottcol relation between certain renneo experimental
apparatuses ,formal systems, ano certain cruoer mathematical
. See Baoiou, Lc Corccpt oc moolc, chapters 8 .
prooucts, which is to say, prooucts accepteo, taken to be
oemonstrateo, without having been submitteo to all the exigencies
of inscription ruleo by the verifying constraints of the apparatus.
6
The use of mooels, in this view, is nothing other than a mooe of math-
ematics historical renexivity, ano is fully immanent to mathematical
thought, nowhere ooes mathematics call upon external objects to ratify
mathematical knowleoge.
Insofar as the use of Kripkes semantical analysis nevertheless oeviates
somewhat from the spirit of intuitionism, this oeviation only facilitates
our own enquiry. It allows us to establish a common mathematical terrain
on which certain formal aspects of both Baoious ano Brouwers theories
of the subject can be orawn out. The presentation that we will give of
Kripkes semantics will, necessarily, be an abbreviateo one.
Like any mooel, Kripkes consists of two oistinct components. Iirst,
we have the moocl ttoctotc, which is oenneo as a set K, a oesignateo ele-
ment G K, ano a renexive, transitive relation R oenneo over K. G is
uniquely specineo as the root of the relation R, so that there exists no H
in K such that HRG ,G is R-minimal in K,. Secono, we have the trtct-
ptctottor forcttor ,P, H,, where P ranges over propositions in the Heyting
calculus ano H ranges over elements of K. The values of this function
range over the set {T, F} ,make no hasty assumptions here!,. We also
impose the conoition that, given any two elements H ano H such that
HRH, ,P,H, ~ T implies ,P,H, ~ T. That is to say, the relation R
preserves truth-values.
We will assume that has assigneo a value from {T, F} to each atom-
ic proposition in the logic. In ooing this, however, it is crucial to note that
while the value T serves to represent intuitionistic truth ,oemonstrability,,
F ooc rot tmmcototcl, tcptccrt trtotttortttc foltt, ,oemonstrable absuroity,.
It signines only the oocrcc of a construction verifying the proposition in
question ,call it P,, an absence which will only crystallize into the knowl-
eoge that P is trtotttortttcoll, folc once it has been ascertaineo that no
H exists such that ,P,H, ~ T but this comes later. The point to be
maoe here is that the exhaustive assignment of truth-values to the atomic
formulae of the logic ooes not contraoict the intuitionist rejection of the
classical vision of pre-oeterminate truth on which LEM rests. The formu-
lae receiving the assignment F are precisely those whose truth has not yet
been oetermineo as either true or false.
6. Baoiou, Lc Corccpt oc moolc, p. .
Zachary Iraser
The semantic values for complex sentences are oenneo by inouction
over the length of formula, in accoroance with the following rules for the
connectives in the logic. These are oenneo as follows:
a. ,A 8 B, H, ~ T ih ,A, H, ~ ,B, H, ~ T, otherwise, ,A 8 B,
H, ~ F.
b. ,A ot B, H, ~ T ih ,A, H, ~ T or ,B, H, ~ T, otherwise ,A
ot B, H, ~ F.
c. ,A B, H, ~ T ih for all H K such that HRH, ,A, H, ~
F or ,B, H, ~ T, otherwise, ,A B, H, ~ F.
o. ,A, H, ~ T ih for all H K such that HRH, ,A, H, ~ F,
otherwise, ,A,H, ~ F.
As Kripke notes, the conoitions for conjunction ,8, ano oisjunction ,ot,
are exact analogues of the corresponoing conoitions on classical conjunc-
tion ano oisjunction ,q,. The conoitions for implication ano negation,
however, signincantly oiher from their classical counterparts. Ior exam-
ple, in oroer to assert the negation of A with respect to such ano such a
structure, it is necessary to ascertain that no possible extension of this
structure is capable of verifying A. This particular point shoulo be born
in mino, we will encounter it again elsewhere. The conoition imposeo
on implication serves to provioe the tf tlcr relation with a certain
intuitive concreteness which, as any unoergraouate stuoent in philosophy
will no ooubt testify, is lacking in classical logic. Intuitionistically, we may
only amrm propositions of the form if A then B when it is possible to
constructively transform any construction verifying A into one verifying
B. In Kripkes semantics, this notion is expresseo by allowing A B to be
verineo by a structure H only when any extension H of H preserves this
implication.
It is possible to illustrate these logical structures, as Kripke ooes, by
means of a oiagram. The tree-like structure in gotc . is an intuitionistic
mooel for a formula A compriseo of the above connectives ano the atomic
sub-formulae P, Q , ano R.
8

. I quote these conoitions almost verbatim from Kripkes text, altering only a few of the
connective symbols to conform to the rest of this paper ano the logical notation useo by
Baoiou.
8. Ftgotc . is taken from Kripke, Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I, p. q8.
P,Q
P,Q ,R
P
P,R
P,Q
G
H
2
H
1
H
4
H
3
gure

In the mooel oiagrammeo above, we have taken G, H
:
, H
.
, H
, ano H
to
be the elements of K. Here, they are the nooes of our tree. The relation
R is representeo by lines of succession in the tree, so that when HRH we
have a pathway proceeoing from H to H. Note that the R-minimal ele-
ment G is at the root of the tree. In the oiagram, the letter of an atomic
formula I is written above a nooe H
n
when we have ,I, H
n
, ~ T, when
,I, H
n
, ~ F, I ooes not appear above H
n
. As Kripke has it,
We inteno the nooes H to represent points in time ,or evioential
situations,, at which we may have various pieces of information.
If, at a particular point H in time, we have enough information
to prove a proposition A, we say that ,A,H, ~ T, if we lack such
information, we say that ,A,H, ~ F. If ,A,H, ~ T we can say
that A has been ccttco at the point H in time, if ,A,H, ~ F, then
A has rot occr ccttco at H. || If H is any situation, we say HRH
if, as far as we know, at the time H, we may later get information
to aovance to H.
q
Kripkes apparatus succeeos in capturing the temporal oimension
that, intuitionism insists, must conoition any logical reasoning aoequate
to subjectively constructeo truths. Truth, which, here, is meant only to
inoex the existence of constructive oemonstrations, is not such that it is
immemorially oecioeo for every possible proposition, propositions receive
truth only when the necessary constructive verincation comes to pass. An
q. Kripke, Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I, p. q8. Kripke goes on to inform
the reaoer of the point we have maoe above. It nevertheless bears repeating:
Notice, then, that T ano F oo not oenote intuitionistic truth ano falsity, if ,A,H, ~ T,
then A has been verineo to be true at the time H, but ,A,H) = F ooes not mean that
A has been proveo folc at H. It simply is not ,yet, proveo at H, but may be establisheo
later. ,p. q8,
Zachary Iraser
interesting feature of the intuitionist notion of logical time ,if we may call
it that,, is that while truth is always something which must be proouceo
through the activity of a subject in time, once proouceo, the truth is helo
to be eternally valio. The language of intuitionist mathematics, as op-
poseo to any metalanguage through which we may wish to analyse it, is
therefore tenseless, oespite the irreoucible temporality of the proceoures
that constitute its truths. Dummett provioes a helpful example on this
point.
6o
Ior the intuitionist, in :88., through the work of Linoemann, the
statement is transcenoental became true. Frior to :88., no such truth
existeo, it is nevertheless inaomissible to claim that in :88:, say, was rot
transcenoental, for to oo so employs a non-constructive form of negation:
no proceoure existeo in :88: that was capable of oemonstrating the non-
transcenoental nature of , nor oio any means exist of oemonstrating that
no proceoure coolo exist that woulo establish that may be transcenoen-
tal. In :88:, neither the statement is transcenoental nor the statement
is not transcenoental were true, but neither were they false. As for the
statement it is inoeterminate whether is transcenoental or notthis is
simply not a mathematical statement.
6:
It is a statement of the metalan-
guage. By aomitting as mathematical statements only those which oeclare
the existence of a constructive proceoure, intuitionism avoios encounter-
ing contraoictions between tenseless propositions concerning temporally
conoitioneo events. In this way, intuitionism proouces a logic of truths
that are at once eternal ano createo.
Dummetts example serves also to illustrate the behaviour of nega-
tion in the Kripke mooel, ano in intuitionistic logic in general. As I have
inoicateo, the reason why, in :88:, it was not legitimate to amrm the non-
transcenoental nature of is that no proceoure existeo that was capable
of showing that Linoemanns proof ,or some other to the same ehect, was
not forthcoming. This state of ahairs is expresseo quite well by the se-
mantic interpretation of negation in Kripkes tree-mooel. To assert -A
intuitionistically in the situation H, Kripke writes,
we neeo to know at H not only that A has not been verineo at H,
6o. The following example is a paraphrase of Dummett, Elcmcrt of Irtotttortm, p. .
6:. cf. Heyting, Irtotttortm: Ar Irttooocttor, p. :q: Every mathematical assertion can be
expresseo in the form: I have ehecteo the construction A in my mino. The mathemati-
cal negation of this assertion can be expresseo as I have ehecteo a construction B in my
mino, which oeouces a contraoiction from the supposition that the construction A were
brought to an eno, which is again of the same form. On the contrary, the factual negation
of the nrst assertion is: I have not ehecteo the construction A in my mino, this statement
has not the form of a mathematical assertion.
but that it cannot possibly be verineo at any later time, no matter
how much information is gaineo, so we say that ,A,H, ~ T ih
,A,H, ~ F for every H K such that HRH. ,qq,
The intuitionist assertion of a negative proposition is thus not merely a
statement of what is not actually the case ,the case being the current
state of what has been constructeo,, it is a statement on what corrot be the
case. This mooality of the negative is characteristic of the intuitionistic
unoerstanoing of truth ano its subjective essence. We will encounter it
again elsewhere.
8
In Meoitation . of Bctrg oro Eccrt, ano again in La mathmatique est
un pense,
6.
Baoiou outlines the three great orientations in thought, ano
oesignates them as Constructivist, Generic ano Transcenoent Thought,
respectively. To anyone familiar with this taxonomy, it is immeoiately
tempting to place intuitionism unoer the rubric of Constructivist Thought.
On a purely mathematical register, there is much to recommeno situat-
ing intuitionism within the constructivist orientation, ano it is common
practice in the literature to use the expressions constructive mathematics
ano intuitionist mathematics more or less interchangeably.
6
Neither the
intuitionist nor the constructivist ,in Baoious sense of the term, recognize
the existence of structures which cannot be constructeo on the basis of
a nnite algorithm, ano both schools of thought insist on the restriction
of all quantincation to oomains of alreaoy-constructeo entities.
6
But we
neeo not reao far into Baoious exposition of constructivist thought to re-
alize that this category is somewhat ill-suiteo to Brouwerian intuitionism.
Constructivist thought, as Baoiou unoerstanos it, is in its essence || a
logical grammar. Or, to be exact, it ensures that language prevails as the
norm for what may be acceptably recognizeo as an existent multiplicity
,BE .8,. Nothing coulo be more anathematic to Brouwers thought. As
we have seen, Brouwers founoing gesture ,the Iirst Act of Intuitionism,
was to announce an uncompromizing secession of genuine mathemati-
6.. Alain Baoiou, Coott ttott oortologtc ttorttottc, Faris, Eoitions ou Seuil, :qq8, pp. q-.
6. cf. Errett Bishop, Fooroottor of Corttocttcc Arol,t, New York, McGraw-Hill, :q6.
6. Ior the constructivist, Baoiou writes, if one says there exists, this must be unoer-
stooo as saying there exists a term nameo in the situation, ano if one says for all,
this must be unoerstooo as, for all nameo terms of the situation ,BE .8,. In this text,
a name is taken to mean a nnite algorithm by which the multiple in question can be
constructeo.
Zachary Iraser q
cal activity from language.
6
This is not the heart of the matter, however.
There are oimculties that must be overcome before placing intuitionism
within or, of Baoious three orientations.
All three major orientations of thought that Baoiou aooresses, insofar
as they can be exhibiteo in mathematics, are oemarcateo accoroing to
their treatment of Cantors continuum problem. This problem concerns
the quantitative relation between the set of natural numbers
o
ano the
real number continuum, or, more generally, between a given transnnite
set
ano the set of its subsets ,
,. The question that it poses is, on the

surface, quite simple: how many points are in a line? Or, equivalently,
how many subsets are incluoeo in the set of natural numbers? In :q6,
Cohen showeo this problem to be unoecioable on the basis of the axioms
of set theory. The quantitative errancy of subsets over elements in any
innnite set cannot be given any measure whatsoever, but nor can it be
sealeo over, Cantors theorem alone tells us that there are unconoition-
ally more subsets in any given set than there are elements. Baoiou, who
in the set-theoretic axioms sees the Flatonic Ioeas of ontology, interprets
this mathematical impasse as a real ano irreoucible gap in being as such,
a gap which can only be provisionally surmounteo by means of a pure,
subjective oecision. The three great orientations in thought each propose
a means of sealing this nssure, or, at the very least, a means of accounting
for its origin ,BE .8,. The Transcenoent orientation searches to nx a
stopping point to errancy by the thought of a multiple such that it organ-
izes everything which preceoes it ,BE .8,, in the context of set theory,
this tenoency is exhibiteo by the invention of axioms instituting the exist-
ence of large caroinals, transnnite numbers vastly outstripping anything
that can be proouceo by means of the oroinary set-theoretic axioms. As
Baoiou unoerstanos it, this practice is a mathematical analogue to hav-
6.

Moreover, the entire statist ioeology that Baoiou seeks to connect to the constructiv-
ist orientation of thought is quite foreign to Brouwer, who only ever helo the state in the
greatest suspicion ano hostility, ano insisteo on a necessary oistance to be helo between
true thought ano the state. cf. Consciousness, Fhilosophy ano Mathematics, in Brouwer,
Collcctco 1otl, p. 8: Of course art ano philosophy continually illustrating such wisoom
cannot participate in the cooperation, ano shoulo not communicate with cooperation, in
particular shoulo not communicate with the state. Supporteo by the state, they will lose
their inoepenoence ano oegenerate ,Collcctco 1otl, p. 8,. The reason why mathematics
is not incluoeo in this prescription is clear enough from Brouwers previous remarks on the
matter: mathematics, by its very nature, subtracts itself from the worloly concerns of the
state. By its very nature, the basic intuition of mathematics is left to free unfoloing. This
unfoloing is not bouno to the exterior worlo, ano thereby to nniteness ano responsibility,
Collcctco 1otl, p. 8.
ing recourse to the eye of Goo. By introoucing such colossal innnities
into the set theoretic axiomatic, one hopes to oeploy the resources that
are necessary for provioing an exact measure of ,
o
,. The Construc-
tive or grammarian orientation proposes a solution to the same problem
through the aforementioneo restriction of the existent to the preoicatively
specinable. In set theory, this orientation is manifesteo in Gooels con-
structible mooel for the axioms. This mooel is a hierarchical construc-
tion, which takes the empty set as its primitive stratum ano generates
each subsequent stratum by taking as elements all subsets of the previous
stratum that can be specineo by a formula restricteo to that stratum.
66

The result is a stanoaro mooel for set theory that valioates the equation
|,
n
,| ~
n-:
, stating that the power set of any transnnite caroinal
n
is
precisely the next largest transnnite caroinal. The thiro orientation, which
Baoiou names Generic Thought, ooes not so much seek to seal the gap in
being so much as it seeks to oisclose the origin of the mystery of excess
,BE .8,. The entire rational ehort of this orientation is to oispose of
a matheme of the inoiscernible, which brings forth in thought the innu-
merable parts that cannot be nameo as separate from the crowo of those
whichin the myopic eyes of languageare absolutely ioentical to them
,BE .8,. The Generic Orientation nnos its mathematical expression in
Cohens work on the continuum problem, which proceeos to show that if
we aomit certain carefully oelineateo inoiscernible or generic sets into
a mooel for set theory, we proouce new mooels in which the power of the
continuum exceeos that of the natural numbers by as much as one likes,
so that the power set of
o
may be assigneo any caroinality at all that is
greater than
o
,with the single exception that the caroinal selecteo not be
connal with
o
, that is, it cannot be
o
,.
6

66. See Meoitation .q of BE for a more comprehensive treatment of Gooels proof. Gooels
own presentation of his results can be founo in volume . of his Collcctco 1otl.
6. Baoiou presents Cohens results in Meoitations , ano 6 of BE. Cohens most ac-
cessible presentation of his work is to be founo in: Faul Cohen, Sct Tlcot, oro tlc Corttroom
H,potlct, New York, W.A. Benjamin, :q66.
Of the three Great Orientations, the Generic Orientation comes closest to Baoious
own project, ano he seizes upon Cohens concept of generic subsets in oroer to provioe
the subject ano the truth that it expresses with its ontological infrastructure. Nevertheless,
Baoiou wishes to oistance himself somewhat from the Generic Orientation as such, ano
sees his own work as pursuing a fourth way, one that is transversal to the three others,
ano which
holos that the ttotl of the ontological impasse cannot be seizeo or thought in imma-
nence to ontology itself, nor to speculative metaontology. It assigns the un-measure
of the state |c. the set of subsets, or the real number continuum when the set unoer
Zachary Iraser :
The chief oimculty that confronts us in placing intuitionism unoer
any of Baoious three ,or four, rubrics is that the impasse to which they
respono, unoerstooo as Cantors continuum problem, is strictly speaking,
is trcttolc to intuitionist mathematics.
68
This is because the problem is
premiseo on the hypothesis that it is legitimate to treat the continuum as
a completeo, transnnite set of oiscrete entities, be they points or subsets
of natural numbers. The intuitionists holo this hypothesis to be inaomis-
sible.
6q
Their position on this matter oraws its force from their insistence
on the unbriogeable nature of the gaps between nnituoe ano the innnite
on the one hano, ano between the oiscrete ano the continuous on the
other.
o
Ior the intuitionist, the classical image of the continuum as an ac-
consioeration is
o
| to the historial limitation of being ||. Its hypothesis consists in
saying that one can only tcroct ottcc to injustice from the angle of the event ano in-
tervention. There is thus no neeo to be horrineo by an un-binoing of being, because
it is in the unoecioable occurrence of a supernumerary non-being that every truth
proceoure originates, incluoing that of a truth whose stakes woulo be that very un-
binoing. ,BE pp. .8-,
68. Fourciau, p. :.
6q. B. Maoison Mount has proouceo an outstanoing essay on Baoious notion of construc-
tivism ano his application of this category to Leibnizs thought. Mount uncovers a state of
ahairs that is not unlike the one we nno here:
The continuum, for Leibniz, is in no way maoe up of points: monaos, which, as Ba-
oiou notes, are sometimes equateo to metaphysical points, are the true substratum
of the spatiotemporal extensa that exist only illusorily. But this ooes not mean, as
Baoiou claims, that the monao is that which can be multiplieo over transnnitely to
reach the continuum, subjugating the oiscontinuities to the commensurable by way
of language.
Insteao || the continuum persists in its incommensurability, its ioeality is not a
simple negation of the real, but a positive quality tr octo which prevents the aoequacy
of any linguistic representation ||. If it is necessary to nno a successor for Leibniz
in mooern philosophy of mathematics, it may be less the constructivist orientation
than the intuitionism of Brouwer ano Heyting, for whom the continuum was para-
ooxically best oescribeo as a ot-corttrott,, a jump beyono numeration for which no
mathematical schema can fully accountthe between, which is not exhaustible by
the interposition of new units ano which therefore can never be thought of as a mere
collection of units.
Brouwer, Intuitionism ano Iormalism, in Faul Bernacerraf ano Hillary Futnam
,eos.,, Pltloopl, of Motlcmottc: Sclcctco Rcootrg, .
no
eo. Cambrioge, Cambrioge University
Fress, :q8, p. 8o. B. Maoison Mount, The Cantorian Revolution: Alain Baoiou on the
Fhilosophy of Set Theory, Pol,gtopl, vol. :, .oo, p. 8.
One is left to wonoer on whose foot the constructivist shoe nts.
o. On the secono of these two gaps, cf. Weyl, On the new founoational crisis of math-
ematics, in Mancosu, p. q: The question whether the continuum is oenumerable cannot
seriously arise in this theory, for, accoroing to it, there is an unbriogeable gulf between the
continuum ano a set of oiscrete elements, a gulf that excluoes any comparison.
tual ano oeterminate, innnite set of points ,or of sets of natural numbers,
is curseo twice over. The question concerning the quantity of such a set
is therefore never raiseo within the intuitionist nelo. It woulo nevertheless
be wrong to assume from this that intuitionism ignores the continuum al-
together, or places it outsioe the legitimate nelo of mathematical thought.
On the contrary, it is with respect to the oloer ano more general problem
regaroing what can be saio of the relation between the continuum ano the
natural numbers that intuitionism has proouceo many of its most signin-
cant innovations. Ano, true to the spirit of Baoious text, it is in this nelo
that intuitionism nnos itself oriven to elaborate its ooctrine of the math-
ematical subject in such a way as to outstrip the grammarian apparatus,
which otherwise, against all intentions, it weakly imitates.
q
In oroer to have a nrmer grasp on what is at stake here, let us examine
a fairly simple numerical mooel of the linear continuum, classically un-
oerstooo. Consioer the binary tree , whose nooes are markeo by either
os or :s, ano whose levels are enumerateo by the natural numbers ,the
elements of
o
,. We will call a otorcl of any sequence of nooes running
from the root of the tree , ~, ano proceeoing innnitely. Subsets of
o
are then oenneo by the branches o
of , accoroing to the following

convention: r if ano only if o
has a o in its r
th
place ,i.e. o
,r, ~ o,. So
long as we are operating within classical mathematics, we may consioer
to be an octooll, trrttc structure, one which has completely traverseo all
of the natural numbers r. Each branch o
thus completely oennes a subset

of
o
,t.c., a subset of the natural numbers,. Now, each subset of
o
can
be maoe to correspono with a sequence of rational numbers oenning a
real ,Cantor has shown that the rationals are oenumerable, so we assume
such a oenumeration has taken place ano correlate each subset of natural
numbers with a subset of the rationals,. Since there are two oistinct pos-
sibilities for extension at every stage of oevelopment for each branch of
the treenamely, o
,r, ~ : ano o
,r, ~ othe number of subsets in

o

must be equal to . * . * . * oo trrttom, or .
o
, a classical formulation
of the power of the continuum.
:
Cantors celebrateo theorem that the
power of any set S is necessary less than the power of the set of subsets of
S tells us that .
o
cannot be quantitatively equal to
o
itself, but beyono
:. I borrow this construction from Mary Tiles, Tlc Pltloopl, of Sct Tlcot,: Ar Irttooocttor
to Cortot Potootc, Oxforo, Basil Blackwell, :q8q, pp. 66-6.
Zachary Iraser
this, classical mathematics reaches a point of profouno inoeterminacy.
Everything hinges on what is taken to be a legitimate subset of
o
, or,
to put it another way, a legitimate pathway through . It is here that the
grammarian-constructivist orientation in set theory woulo impose its re-
striction of the existent to the linguistically constructible, aomitting only
subsets which can be given a preoicative oennition with respect to what
has been constructeo thus far.
The early intuitioniststhose working within the nelo oeployeo by
the Iirst Actas well as a number of pre-intuitionists
.
like Borel ano
Foincar, manageo the real number continuum in a way that was ef-
fectively similar to the grammarian approach, oespite a very oiherent
theoretical motivation. While they accepteo that the intuitive continuum
may well be beyono the reach of mathematical intelligibility, they prag-
matically circumscribeo the limits of what they calleo the reouceo or
the practical continuum, consisting of a set of points oennable by con-
structive means. This limitation was, in part, imposeo by the fact that the
intuitionists coulo only treat multiples ,c.g., subsets of
o
oenning reals, as
being ehectively innnite if a constructively knowable law expresseo their
principle of generation. The point-set that the early intuitionists accepteo
as constructible was even smaller than the continuum outlineo by the
grammarian orientation, its power oio not exceeo the oenumerable ano
so it coulo not be ioentineo, even provisionally, with the power set of the
natural numbers.
It ooes, however, sumce for a limiteo but serviceable

extent of mathematics.
The poverty ano intuitive inaoequacy of the practical continuum was
nevertheless troubling to the intuitionists. The oesolate horizon of the re-
ouceo continuum was, for Brouwer, an obstacle that must be overcome.
His response, rightly calleo revolutionary,
was to overhaul the entire

.. Fre-intuitionist is a term given by Brouwer to a pre-eminently empiricist group of
mathematicians incluoing Foincar, Borel ano others, with whom Brouwer shareo a
number of sympathies, especially prior to the oevelopment of his mature intuitionist pro-
gramme. See Historical Backgrouno, Frinciples ano Methoos of Intuitionism, in Collcctco
1otl, p. oq.
. Mark van Atten, Brouwer, as Never Reao by Husserl, S,rtlcc, vol. :, no. :-., pp.
-:q, p. .
. Hermann Weyl, a German philosopher ano mathematician who was once one of
Brouwers more signincant allies, once famously exclaimeo: Brouwerthat is the revolu-
tion!, Vlaoimir Tasic, Tlc Motlcmottcol Root of Potmooctr Tlooglt, p. . In his article on
intuitionism ano phenomenology, Mark van Atten writes, in a similar vein: Arouno :q:,
two revolutions took place, one fake, ano one true. The true one happeneo in mathemat-
ics, ano consisteo in the introouction of choice sequences by Brouwer, in Brouwer, as
conceptual apparatus in which the problem of the continuum was poseo.
The new theory of the continuum exploits the two funoamental principles
that hao kept intuitionism at a oistance from the classical set-theoretical
treatments of the continuumtheir refusal to treat the continuum as a
point-set of or, power, ano their insistence on the irreoucibly potcrttoltt, of
the continuums inexhaustibly innnite nature. In oroer to oo this, Brouwer
recognizes, it is necessary to surpass the conceptual oisposition proposeo
by the Iirst Act. A Secono Act of Intuition is therefore oeclareo. This
Act
tccogrtc tlc pototltt, of gcrctottrg rco motlcmottcol crttttc:
ttl, tr tlc fotm of trrttcl, ptocccotrg cocrcc p
.
, p
.
, , oloc tctm
otc clocr motc ot lc ftccl, ftom motlcmottcol crttttc ptcctool, ocottco,
tr ocl o oo, tlot tlc ftccoom of clotcc cxtttrg pctlop fot tlc tt clcmcrt
p
.
mo, oc oocctco to o lottrg tctttcttor ot omc follootrg p
c
, oro ogotr
oro ogotr to lotpct lottrg tctttcttor ot cccr oooltttor ot fottlct oococrt
p
c
, oltlc oll tlcc tctttcttrg trtctccrttor, o ocll o tlc clotcc of tlc p
c

tlcmclcc, ot or, togc mo, oc mooc to ocpcro or potolc fototc motlcmottcol
cxpcttcrcc of tlc ctcottrg oocct,
ccorol,, tr tlc fotm of motlcmottcol pcctc, t.c. ptopctttc oppooolc fot
motlcmottcol crttttc ptcctool, ocottco, oro ottf,trg tlc corotttor tlot, tf
tlc, lolo fot o ccttotr motlcmottcol crttt,, tlc, olo lolo fot oll motlcmottcol
crttttc tlot locc occr ocrco to oc cool to tt
The Secono Act oramatically increases the power of intuitionist math-

ematics, ano provioes the grounowork for what Brouwer calls Intuitionist
Set Theory, a oiscipline which, like its Cantorian counterpart, sets itself
the task of charting a course through the labyrinth of the continuum.
Both the path ano the gauge of the Brouwerian trajectory are entirely
oiherent than those chosen by Cantor, however. If the principle challenge
that Cantor selecteo for his theory of sets was that of provioing an exact
quantitative measure of the linear point set with respect to the natural
numbers, the task proper to intuitionist set theory is that of mathemati-
cally thinking the continuum in its very troctctmtroc, ano errancy ct-o-ct
oiscrete numeration, ano to oo this without letting the continuum oissolve
into an unintelligible mystery. The errancy of the continuum, oispelleo by
the grammarian orientation, becomes a locus of mathematical investiga-
Never Reao by Husserl, p. ..
. Brouwer, Historical Backgrouno in Collcctco 1otl, p. ::.
Zachary Iraser
tion in intuitionism, ano nnos expression in the irreoucibly unnnisheo ano
unforeseeable progression of free choice sequences.
In oroer to show how this is possible, it is necessary to specify a few of
the concepts that the Secono Act bequeaths us. The two new structures
which the Act explicitly puts forth are clotcc cocrcc ano pcctc. A species
is essentially a class, ano, conceptually bears little oiherence from the clas-
sical notion, save for what is at issue are classes of intuitionistically aomis-
sible structures. Of choice sequences, there are two essential types. Looltlc
cocrcc are innnitely proceeoing sequences of natural numbersor any
other constructible mathematical structureprescribeo by a oetermi-
nate algorithm or law. The notion is close to what Baoiou calls otcctr-
tolc setsbut we will come to this later. Ftcc clotcc cocrcc are innnitely
proceeoing sequences that are not oetermineo by any law or algorithm.
Between the two, any variety of intermeoiate forms are possible, ano laws
may be imposeo upon ano removeo from free choice sequences at any
stage in their oevelopment as the subject so chooses. A ptcoo is a species
of choice sequences possessing a common root or nrst term, ano which
is governeo by two laws ,which we will often collapse into one for the sake
of brevity,: nrst, there is the ptcoo loo, noteo
X
where X is the spreao
in question. This law oetermines the aomissibility of rttc trtttol cgmcrt
of choice sequences into the spreao. Every spreao law must: ,:, aomit the
empty sequence ~ as the root of the spreao, ,., not aomit any choice se-
quence possessing an inaomissible initial segment, ano ,, for each aomis-
sible initial segment, aomit at least one possible extension of this segment
into the spreao, so that every aomitteo segment may proceeo inoennitely
along at least one path. Iurther restrictions may be imposeo to proouce
spreaos of the oesireo form. The secono law is calleo the complcmcrtot, loo
of the spreao, as is oesignateo
X
. This law permits us to proouce spreaos
of mathematical entities other than the natural numbers by assigning, to
every aomitteo sequence of the spreao, some other intuitionistically con-
structeo structure. The only restriction on this law is that it be ehectively
oecioable for every assignment.
We are now in a position to proouce the intuitionistic construction
of the continuum. Whereas the classical continuum is conceiveo as a oe-
terminate set of real numbers, the intuitionist continuum is composeo of
tcol romoct gcrctotot. There are many possible forms of these, here we will
consioer innnitely proceeoing sequences of rational numbers {t
n
} such
that |t
n
t
n-:
| .
-n
. Real number generators, in intuitionist mathemat-
ics, are analogous to the classical oennitions of real numbers. The crucial
oiherence lies in the fact that they are not conceiveo as completeo inn-
nite sets, but as intensionally oetermineo, innnitely proceeoing sequences.
The intuitionist continuum is now constructeo as follows: we begin by as-
suming an enumeration of the rational numbers t
:
, t
.
, , we then oenne
a spreao of natural numbers by the spreao law
C
: Every natural number
forms an aomissible one-member sequence, if o
:
, , o
n
is an aomissi-
ble sequence, then o
:
, , o
n
, o
n-:
is an aomissible sequence if ano only if
|to
n
to
n-:
| .
-n
.
6
The complcmcrtot, loo for the spreao C, noteo
C
, as-
signs the rational number to
n
to every aomissible sequence o
:
, , o
n
. The
spreao C thus comprises of every possible real number generator that may
be given by lawlike algorithms. Beyono these lawlike generators, however,
there exists an innumerable plurality of unspecineo ano unoeroetermineo
choice sequences which oo not yet oetermine, but which never cease to
approach, real numbers. It is thus that we have here the creation of the
continuum, which, although containing inoivioual real numbers, ooes
not oissolve into a set of real numbers as nnisheo beings, we rather have a
mcotom of ftcc Bccomtrg.
Let us note that this is a meoium createo by the

very subject who traverses it, a subject properly calleo singular.
8

It is in the Secono Act that we can situate a clear break between gram-
marian-constructivism ano intuitionism, within the mathematical frame-
work of the latter. A free choice sequence is an intuitionistically construct-
ible entity that is rot constructible in the grammarian sense. By oennition,
a free choice sequence is oetermineo by any constructible algorithm or
preoicative formula. With respect to the current enquiry, these structures
are signincant for the fact that, even if the subject wholly pervaoes intui-
tionistic mathematics, at no point is it more exposeo than in Brouwers
theory of free choice sequences. Everywhere else, the ioealist manoate
of constructibility has all the same ehects as a fairly weakeneo strain of
grammarian thought. Here alone oo we have a constructive form that
can be generateo orl, by way of subjective oecisions. It is the point where
intuitionism bares its subjective essence beneath its accioentally gram-
marian attire.
Once outsioe of the scope of grammarian thought, the concept of free
choice sequences woulo seem to oirect us, insteao, towaros the Generic
Orientation, insofar as it is the business of free choice sequences to trace
out a ranoom conglomerate in a spreao, unlegislateo by any lawlike pa-
rameters beyono those that oeploy the spreao itself. To be more precise,
6. Heyting, Irtotttortm, p. 6.
. Hermann Weyl, On the new founoational crisis in mathematics, in Mancosu, p. q.
8. cf. Hallwaro, Alain Baoiou et la oliason absolue, p. .q6.
Zachary Iraser
we may say that the oirection in which these sequences leao us more
closely approaches Baoious subject-theoretic employment of the generic
than the thought of the generic itself. In the theory of the subject pre-
senteo in Bctrg oro Eccrt, what we nno is an attempt to meoiate the math-
ematical concept of genericity via a concrete, subjective proceoure that is
innnitely proceeoing in time, but which is at any moment nnite. It is, in
fact, not the generic at all that provioes the most accurate mathematical
schema for the structure of a subjective truth proceoure oo proceoure.
Ior this we must look elsewhere.
:o
A subjects existence, as Baoiou has it, is always temporal, ano, begin-
ning with an act of intervention that forms an inoecomposable oyao with
an event, consists in traversing an innnitely complex situation through an
inexhaustible process that Baoiou calls a ocltt,. The business of a noelity
consists in performing a series of crotttc regaroing the possible connec-
tions that may or may not obtain between such ano such an element of
the situation ,schematizeo as a set, ano the event to which the subject seeks
to remain faithful. A noelity is saio to be a ttotl ptoccootc if the projecteo
innnite subset of the situation consisting of all the elements positively con-
necteo to the event will have been gcrcttc. Brieny put, a generic subset is
one which cannot be separateo or oiscerneo by any formula restricteo to
the situationor, more precisely, restricteo to the mooel structure S in
which the situations ontological form is expresseo. This means that within
the situation, there exists no law that woulo be a necessary ano sumcient
conoition for belonging to the truth. Now, given that the proceoure al-
ways occurs tr ttmc, at every moment, an evental noelity can be graspeo
in a provisional result which is composeo of ehective enquiries in which
it is inscribeo whether or not multiples are connecteo to the event ,BE
.,, ano this provisional result is always rttc. Nothing of the genericity
of the noelity ,its ontological truthfulness, can thereby be graspeo in any
such result, for so long as a set is nnite it is always possible to compose a
restricteo formula that woulo be a necessary ano sumcient conoition for
membership in that set, even if this formula is as ruoimentary as |
:
a
8 8
r
a| where r is the number of elements in a. Only an innnite
set has any chance of being generic, given that a formula can only be of
nnite length ,of course, not oll innnite sets are generic, by any stretch,. If
we wish to capture the mathematical essence of the Baoiousian truth-
proceoure tr tlc oct, then it is clear that a strictly extensional apprehension
of the subjects noelity is insumcient, ano in truth || quite useless ,BE
.,. In oroer to aoequately think the essence of a noelity, we must atteno
to its temporality, ano thus to its non-existent excess over its being ano
the innnity of a virtual presentation towaros which it projects itself.
The essentially intensional ano temporal notion of choice sequences,
as oevelopeo by Brouwer ano his school, is of far greater worth to us here
than anything ohereo by the atemporal ano extensionally oetermineo
lanoscape of classical set theory. So long as we remain within timeas
every subject mustit is possible to capture the ever-incomplete unfolo-
ing of the generic proceoure in terms of an Brouwerian choice sequence.
I now propose to oo just this.
Let us begin by circumscribing the oomain in which the subject will
operate. Accoroing to Baoious exposition, this consists of a set of corot-
ttor, noteo , that is both an element ano a subset of the funoamental
situation S inhabiteo by the subject. Ior the sake of simplicity, let us follow
Baoious initial example ano take to consist of the empty set O, ano
sets of countable, but possibly innnite, oroereo sequences of :s ano os ,al-
though may be of far greater complexity in some cases,. These sets are
calleo the conoitions in . Iollowing Baoious notation, we will inoicate
such sets by the letter , oiherentiating them with numerical subscripts
when necessary. The generic truth that expresses the completeo subjec-
tive proceoure is a form of a more general type subset oenneo over ,
calleo a correct subset. The connguration of these subsets is governeo by
two rules, noteo Ro
.
ano Ro
.
. Ro
.
requires that if a conoition
:
belongs
to a correct subset , then any conoition
.
that is a subset of
:
,that is
oominateo by
:
, as Baoiou puts it, is also an element of . Hence, if we
have {:~, :,:~} , then we must also have {:~} ano O .
Ro
.
requires that the elements of correct sets satisfy a relation a compottotltt,
amongst one another. Two conoitions
:
ano
.
are saio to be compottolc
if ano only if either
:
is a subset of
.
or
.
is a subset of
:
. Ior exam-
ple, {:~, :,o~} is compatible with {:~, :,o~, :,o,:~} ano with
{:~, :,o~, :,o,o~}, but not with {:~, :,:~, :,:,:~}. In oroer
to ensure that all of the elements of a correct subset are compatible with
one another, Ro
.
requires that for every conoitions belonging two there
exists a thiro, also belonging to , of which the nrst two are both subsets.
Iormally, these two rules are written:
Ro
.
: |
:
8
.

:
|
.

Ro
.
: |,
:
, 8 ,
.
,| ,
,|,
, 8 ,
:

, 8 ,
.

,|
Zachary Iraser q
So far we have not yet parteo ways with Baoious own mooe of exposi-
tion.
q
We will oo this now, by oenning a ptcoo of correct subsets over ,
which we will call .
In oroer to capture the incremental oevelopment of the correct sub-
sets, among which those capable of characterizing truth proceoures will
ngure, let us introouce some aooitional notation to Baoious apparatus.
We will write ,r, to inoicate a correct subset with r elements. This r will
also oesignate the oistance of the sequence in question from the root of
the spreao. ,m, will be consioereo an initial sequence of ,r, when ,m,
,r, ano m r. If two sequences are not compatible ,if one is not an
initial sequence of the other,, we will oiherentiate the two by subscripts
,c.g.
:
,r, ano
.
,m,,. As stateo above, a spreao is given to us by its ptcoo
loo ano its complcmcrtot, loo. Here, for the sake of concision, we will con-
nate the two, skipping the construction of a natural number spreao ano
proceeoing oirectly with the formation of a spreao over , our connateo
law will be oenoteo
. What we wish to oo here is to oenne a spreao

whose sequences will all be correct parts of . Its law must, therefore,
imply the two rules of correctness, Ro
.
ano Ro
.
. This law takes the form
of a function, whose oomain is the set of subsets of ,t.c. ,,, ano whose
range is the set {:,o}. This function is constructeo to return a o when its
argument is aomissible, ano a : when it is not. The law

is formulateo
as follows:
,,r,, ~ o t |,r, ~ {O}| or

|,,r-:, ~ o 8 ,r-:, ,r, 8 ,
:
,r-:,,,
.
,r,,,
:

.
,|
,,r,, ~ : otlctotc
It is a fairly simple exercise to ascertain that any sequence ,r, aomitteo by
this law obeys the two rules of correctness stateo above. A small portion
of the resulting spreao is oiagrammeo in gotc ..
q. The entire theory of correct subsets is to be founo in section of Meoitation of
BE.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo 6o
<0,0>
<0,1> <1,0>
<1,0,0>
<0,1,0> <0,1,1>
<1,1,1>
<1,1,0>
<1,01>
<0,0,1>
<0,0,0>
<0>
< >
<1,1>
<1>
gure
The next step in our construction consists in oelineating a potcrttoll,
gcrcttc sequence in . It must be unoerstooo that the genericity of the
sequence must always remain potcrttol, so long as we are operating within
an intuitionist spreao, for only an actually innnite sequence can be truly
generic. This state of ahairs is no oiherent than that which we nno in
any concrete truth proceoure, accoroing to the argument aovanceo in
Bctrg oro Eccrt. The innnite multiplicity proper to a concrete exercise of
noelitya truth-proceoureis always only virtual ,BE .6, or potential.
That this innnity has a fully actual locus of being in the situation itself, as
Baoiou unoerstanos it, ooes not change the fact that the truth-proceoure
itself is internally characterizeo by a potcrttoll, innnite progression, no less
than any intuitionistically aomissible sequence. Even so, a signincant con-
ceptual oiherence between an intuitionistic sequence ano a Baoiousian
truth-proceoure is legible here, namely, that the meoium of the Baoiou-
sian subject is not its own creation.
It is clear that no looltlc sequence is nt to express the concept of a
potentially generic proceoure, since a lawlike sequence is precisely one
whose elements are extracteo from the spreao accoroing to a construct-
ible principle, that is, by a formula restricteo to the ,pre-constructeo, uni-
verse in which the spreao unfolos. Lawlike sequences are, in Baoious
language, essentially otcctrtolc sequences. One may therefore suspect that
all that neeos to be oone to schematize a potentially generic proceoure
in is to oenne that proceoure as a ftcc clotcc cocrcc, a sequence whose
successive choices are entirely unrestricteo, so long as they remain within
the bounoaries set by the spreao law. This too, however, is insumcient, for
nothing guarantees that such an arbitrary sequence will not inaovertently
Zachary Iraser 6:
,t.c. extensionally, fall unoer a lawlike oeterminant, become oiscernible
to the situation, ano fall short of genericity. Neither the anarchic nor the
legalistic mooes of operation will be sumcient for our task. The anarchic
approach ooes, however, come somewhat closer to what we are after here.
The entire problem lies in placing the necessary restrictions on the free-
oom of the sequence, in oisciplining the sequence in a way that ooes not
rob it of its freeoom, but which keeps it at a oistance from the Law. Much
of Baoious own approach to the question of liberty can be gleaneo from
this problematic. Hallwaro is quite correct in observing that Baoiou sees
freeoom as an exceptionally fragile achievement, quite unlike the those
who, from Kant through to Sartre ano Brouwer, see it as a necessary
presumption.
8o
It is not a question, here, of empirical freeoom, the conoi-
tion of not being in bonoage, Baoious thesis is that rarity ano fragility are
characteristic of the ontological ano trans-ontological basis of freeoom
itself: rarity, since the prerequisite unbinoing from being in itself takes
place only in exceptional events, ano fragility, because the freeoom of the
subject can only sustaineo so long as the subject maintains the protracteo
ehort of subtracting itself from the law. Moreover, these two conoitions
support one another in their being, for the event is only possible if spe-
cial proceoures conserve the evental nature of its consequences ,BE .::,.
Only through the genericity of the truth proceoure may an event succeeo
in making its mark on being. No such fragility confronts the Brouwerian
subject, for even the lawlike sequences are conceiveo in terms of choice
sequences constraineo by self-imposeo restrictions.
In oroer to faithfully oistil the bare subjective essence of the free
choice sequence from the pseuoo-grammarian oross that surrounos it,
ano exhibit a structure that expresses the fragile ano oisciplineo freeoom
that characterizes the subjective truth proceoure, we must place certain
restrictions on an otherwise free choice sequence. These must be sum-
cient to oiscipline the sequence in a such a way that it ooes not allow
itself to be ,permanently, captureo by any existing lawlike sequence, with-
out consigning the subject to a newly inventeo lawlike sequence of its
own. The rule that we will impose will be the following: for any lawlike
sequence , if ,r, ~ ,r, then there must exist some m such that ,m,
,m,. Given that is oenumerable ,even when conceiveo as an actually
innnite subset, ano can always be ehectively enumerateo on the basis of
the natural oroer germane to all correct subsets, it follows that wherever
oihers from a oiscernible correct subset, the point at which it oihers can
8o. Feter Hallwaro, Bootoo, p. :6.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo 6.
be inoexeo by a nnite oroinal. The inoex m of this point, moreover, will
always be constructible, since the means for its oetermination are alreaoy
constructively given to us in the comparison of an algorithmically gener-
ateo lawlike sequence ano a subjectively constructeo choice sequence.
An unsettling practical consequence of this prescription, which sum-
ciently captures the potential genericity of any concrete proceoure, is that
a potentially generic proceoure can, consistently, remain lawlike trocrttcl,:
it is always possible to procrastinate its oivergence from any given lawlike
sequence. It has, so to speak, all the time in the worlo to become generic.
It is therefore impossible to oecioe, baseo on empirical evioence, whether
any proceoure is or is not generic. Strictly speaking, the ttotlfolrc of a
proceoure ooes not oisclose itself in extensionally oeterminate evioence, it
can be testineo to only in the interiority of the sequence, with respect to its
projecteo intension. Any oeclaration concerning the existence of a truth
must, therefore, always remain hypothetical ano anticipatory, without the
hope of sumcient evioence ever arriving. Ior as long as a proceoure is
conceiveo as a stepwise concatenation of oiscrete elements of a situation,
it is clear that never will this proceoure achieve historical completion. The
conoition of genericity, like the holiness to which the Kantian subject as-
pires, is a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible worlo is ca-
pable of at any moment in his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is requireo
as practically necessary, if the proceoure is to be amrmeo as a ttotl, it
can only be founo in a ptogtc tr trrttom towaros that perfect accoroance,
or rather that pure otcotoorcc, with the Law.
8:
No less than Kant, Baoiou
is forceo to postulate a form of immortality for the subject. Baoiou ooes
not balk at this exigency, ano insists that in its essence, subjectivation t
immortal.
8.
The immortality avoweo here, however, is not that of the hu-
man animal who bears the truth in question, but the ptogtc tr trrttom of
which the subjective proceoure itself is, in principle, capable, ano which
the truth that it serves oemanos of it. This illuminates a signincant point
concerning the Baoiousian subject that we have not yet mentioneo: the
subject is not ioentical with the inoivioual as such, but with the proceoure
in which the inoivioual is engageo. There may therefore be collective
subjects, just as there may be epochal subjects, whose scope far exceeos
that of any single participant. All this is quite oiherent from Brouwers
8:. See Immanuel Kant, Cttttoc of Ptocttcol Rcoor, trans. T.K. Abbott, Amherst, Frometh-
eus Books, :qq6, p. :8.
8.. Baoiou, Etltc: Ar Eo, or tlc Urocttorotrg of Ectl, trans. Feter Hallwaro, Lonoon,
Verso, .oo:, p. :.. Emphasis mine.
Zachary Iraser 6
occasionally quite solipsistic tenoencies. Nor ooes Brouwers theory of the
subject place any wager on the existence of an actual innnite, but this is
quite in accoroance with his raoically immanentist vision of the subject
ano its mathematical task.
::
The anticipatory nature of genericity ooes not prevent the subject
from orawing conclusions regaroing the postulateo new worlo that
woulo come at the eno of the truth proceoure. This is where the opera-
tion of fotctrg comes into play. Before it is possible, however, it is necessary
to calibrate the initial situation by oenning within it a complex apparatus
of names for the elements of the new worlo, the generic extension S,,
of the initial situation S. These names are oenneo, prior to the exact oe-
termination of their referents, as sets in the initial situation of a certain
kinonamely, as oroereo pairs consisting of conoitions in ano other,
previously constructeo names. In the interest of brevity, I will forgo a oe-
taileo account of how this may be oone, one such methoo is illustrateo
in Meoitation of Bctrg oro Eccrt, another is given in Chapter IV, of
Cohens Sct Tlcot, oro tlc Corttroom H,potlct, ano still others are avail-
able in the existing literature on the topic. As Cohen notes, the precise
methoo chosen for the calibration of names is of no importance as long
as we have not neglecteo any set in the generic extension ,Cohen, ::,.
In empirical situations, moreover, it is certainly to be expecteo that the
methoo shoulo oiher from one specinc truth proceoure to another. In any
case, what is essential is that the referential value of these names is oeter-
mineo by the composition of , more precisely, the referential value of
each name is oetermineo by the membership in of the conoitions which
enter into the composition of the name in question.
The constellation of names is generateo by the subject ngure in what
Baoiou calls the subject-language, an amalgam of the native language of
the situation ano the names whose reference is contingent on the compo-
sition of the generic truth . This language is naturally empty or nonsen-
sical for inhabitants of the initial situation S, since the names it employs,
in general, oo not have a referent in S, the situation to which they refer,
moreover, has not yet fully arriveo, ano even here their referential func-
tion is nltereo through what, for those in S, is entirely inoiscernible.
8
Op-
8. As Baoiou oescribes it, this state of ahairs nnos a peculiar resonance in Brouwers
work. As ]an von Flato observes, Brouwers :q.o papers on intuitionistic mathematics
are populateo with strange ano often esoteric terminology ano notation. This unusual
erating within this new language, the subject is capable of making certain
hypotheses of the form: If I suppose that the inoiscernible truth contains
or presents such or such a term submitteo to the enquiry by chance, tlcr
such a statement of the subject-language |c. bearing on the new situa-
tion, the generic extension S,,| will have hao such a meaning ano will
,or wont, have been verioical ,BE oo,. The hypothetical character of
these statements is graoually, but never completely, resolveo throughout
the course of the generic proceoure, as the elements of the truth become
known to the subject in question ,t.c., as the inoex r of ,r, increases,. Of
the projecteo composition of , the subject solely controlsbecause it is
suchthe nnite fragment maoe up of the present state of the enquiries.
All the rest, we are tolo, is a matter of connoence, or of knowing belief
,BE oo,.
The rational means by which the subject of the generic proceoure
makes such assertions ano hypotheses is governeo by the fotctrg tclottor,
which Baoiou names as the funoamental law of the subject. The onto-
logical form of this relation oerives from Cohens work on the continuum
problem, where forcing is useo to oemonstrate the existence of mooels for
set theory in which the power of the continuum may exceeo
:
by virtu-
ally any oegree at all ,the only restriction being
o
|,
o
,|
o
,. In
the context of Baoious theory of the subject,
|t|hat a term of the situation fotcc a statement of the subject language
means that the veracity of this statement in the situation to come
is equivalent to the belonging of this term to the inoiscernible part
which results from the generic proceoure. It thus means that this
term, bouno to the statement by the relation of forcing, belongs to
the truth ,BE o,.
8
reconnguration of mathematical language, von Flato informs us, has its theoretical mo-
tives in the programme of the Signinc Circle, a philosophical group in which Brouwer
participateo. The circle, he writes, aimeo at moral betterment of humankino through a
socio-linguistic reform. Brouwer himself believeo that olo woros contain moral connota-
tions that can leao to evil thoughts. Ior him, language was in the nrst place a means for
getting power over others. Thus the strange ano specincally intuitionistic vocabulary ,ano
notation, in part still followeo by some intuitionists, is part of a utopian program of lan-
guage revision. ,]an von Flato, Review of Dirk van Dalen, M,ttc, Gcomctct, oro Irtotttortt,
Tlc Ltfc of L.E.}. Btoooct col. .. Tlc Doortrg Rccolottor, in Bollcttr of S,mooltc Logtc, vol.,
no.: March, .oo:, p. 6, Inoeeo, Brouwer consioereo his intuitionist movement to be, in
a subtle but signincant way, of both spiritual ano political importance, ano part of his task
of creating a new vocabulary which aomits also the spiritual tenoencies in human life to
consioerate interchange of views ano hence social organization ,Signinc Dialogues, Col-
lcctco 1otl, p. 8,.
8. In more technical terms:
Zachary Iraser 6
The forcing relation is intimately relateo to the logical notion of tmpltcottor
or crtotlmcrt, as Cohen points out ,Cohen, :::,. It oetermines the states of
ahairs that will arise on the conoition that this or that set belongs to the
generic on the basis of which S,, is constructeo. As Baoiou has it, what
is at stake here is the immanent logic of a subjective truth proceoure. It
is, in several respects, analogous to the logic of beingthat is, the classi-
cal logical calculus by which set theory operates. Where forcing formally
oiverges from classical logic, it ooes so insofar as it is compelleo to oerive
its veracities from an innnite sequence whose total composition is inac-
cessible to any algorithmic oetermination. It is no accioent that these are
precisely the exigencies faceo by the intuitionist subject, when operating
in a oomain that cannot be nnitely specineo.
A oennition for the forcing relation with respect to atomic formulae
cannot be aoequately presenteo within the limits of this paper. The curious
reaoer may nno a thorough treatment in Cohens text, ano an aoequate
gloss of the forcing of atomic formulae in Appenoix of Bctrg oro Eccrt.
What is more signincant for us, in any case, is the logical structure which
the forcing relation takes with respect to compouno formulae. Here, the
structural oivergence of forcing from classical entailment is clearly legible.
With respect to the propositional connectives,
8
the oennition of forcing
is as follows:
a. forces P 8 Q if forces P ano forces Q.
b. forces P ot Q if forces P or forces Q.
c. forces P Q if either forces P or forces Q.
o. forces -P if for all oominating , ooes not force P.
86
As Cohen remarks, these oennitions oo not imply that for ano P we
must have either forces P or forces P. Also, forcing ooes not obey
some simple rules of the propositional calculus. Thus, may force - -P
- if a conoition forces a statement on the names, then, for any generic part such that
, the same statement, this time bearing on the referential value of the names, is
verioical in the generic extension S,,,
- reciprocally, if a statement is verioical in a generic extension S,,, there exists a conoi-
tion such that ano forces the statement applieo to the names whose values
appear in the verioical statement in question. ,BE p. :.,
8. As in the above exposition of Kripkes intuitionistic semantics, I leave out the conoi-
tions for the quantiners ano . Again, this is oone in the interest of brevity. The inter-
esteo reaoer may consult Chapter IV of Cohens text.
86. These oennitions are presenteo in Cohen, p. ::-8. I have altereo some of the nota-
tion to conform to Baoious. This, of course, ooes not ahect the meanings of formulae in
question.
ano yet not force P.
8
To be more precise, the oennitions we have here
oo not obey some simple rules of the clotcol propositional calculus, as
an analogue of entailment, the forcing relation here oenneo is, in fact,
highly suggestive of the trtotttortttc calculus. Consioer the oennition for
negation. As Cohen tells us, it is only possible for a conoition to force
-P so long as no other conoition participating in the generic sequence
forces P. In forcing, Baoiou observes, the concept of negation has some-
thing mooal about it: it is possible to oeny once one is not constraineo to
amrm, the certainty of non-constraint always being oeferreo until the se-
quence is completeo. This mooality of the negative, Baoiou continues, is
characteristic of subjective or post-evental negation ,BE :,just as it is
characteristic of the temporally oeployeo constructions of the intuitionist
subject ,cf. ,. It is not merely a superncial structural similarity that is at
issue here, the formal congruence between the two subjective logics is the
ehect of essentially ioentical requirements. These requirements stem from
the fact that both subjects participate in the articulation of a truth which
nnos its full oetermination only in time. We have seen that Baoious tem-
poralization of the subjective truth proceoure has the ehect of translating
the generic subset in which the subject participates into the intuitionisti-
cally legible form of a potcrttoll, gcrcttc clotcc cocrcc, we see now that this
same temporalization seems to bring the logic of the post-evental subject
into conformity with the logic of intuitionism.
In the same :q6 paper from which we earlier orew the semantical
analysis of intuitionistic logic, Kripke connrms our suspicions ,pp. ::8-
:.o,. He shows that mooel structures of the sort presenteo in can be,
rather straightforwaroly, interpreteo as mooelling the forcing relation in-
steao of the Heyting calculus for intuitionistic logic. Roughly speaking,
this involves assigning fotctrg corotttor to the nooes of the mooel structure
in such a way that R whenever we have . Ior those which are
elements of , we have ,P,, ~ T or ,P,, ~ F, accoroing to whether
forces P or fails to oo so. In this mooel, thus appears as an innnitely long
path through the tree ,in the classical context of Kripkes mooel, we may
consioer this path as a completeo structure,.
Kripke presents us with a fascinating theorem concerning this mooel:
if we say that forces Q whenever there exists a in which forces
Q, then for all Q, forces either Q or -Q, tf oro orl, tf t gcrcttc. This
theorem elegantly brings together the essential law of classical logicthe
point at which its oiherence from intuitionistic logic is concentrateoano
8. Cohen, p. ::8. Notation altereo, see previous footnote.
Zachary Iraser 6
the classical, non-intuitionistic concept pot cxccllcrcc: the actual completion
of a extensionally oetermineo, intrinsically non-constructible, innnite set.
Now, we must recall that throughout the entirety of ,r,s historical
existence, r, which marks both the age of ,r, ano its caroinality, remains
nnite. So long as ,r, is nnite, it is rot ,ct o gcrcttc cocrcc, it is merely potcr-
ttoll, generic, but extensionally consioereo, it is no oiherent than any other
nnite set in this respect. The Law of the Excluoeo Mioole is therefore rot
generally valio for the subject of a truth proceoure, insofar as this subject
remains nnite. The logic of the subject is not classical. It is intuitionistic.
:.
It is now possible to characterize the intuitionist application onto on-
tology |t.c. mathematics| rules of connection which comc ftom clcolctc ,BE
.q, in terms more precise ano more rigorously oevelopeo than the vague
epithets of empiricism ano objectivism with which Baoiou oismisses in-
tuitionistic logic in the .
th
Meoitation. We may now characterize the
logic of the intuitionist subject in terms internal to the conceptual appa-
ratus set out in Bctrg oro Eccrt: the rules of intuitionistic logic are precisely
those prescribeo by the law of the subject, the logic internal to a truth
proceoure. If intuitionist mathematics is justineo in applying these rules
back onto mathematics, it is because intuitionism seizes mathematics o o
ttotl ptoccootc. Conversely, if mathematics t a truth proceoure, then these
rules cannot be saio to be oeriveo from elsewhere, they are proceeo from
the very subjectivity which bears ontology towaros truth.
The paraoox, here, is that throughout Bctrg oro Eccrt, mathematics is
chargeo with a oouble task. It is repeateoly summoneo not only to provioe
the ontological lineaments of the worlo, but also to stano as an exemplary
truth proceoureinoeeo, as the paraoigm for an entire species of truth
proceoures ,the scientinc,. Yet if mathematics is a historical ano concrete
truth proceoure, then its logic is not classical. Ano if mathematics is ontol-
ogy, then either its logic cannot be the intuitionistic logic prescribeo by
the law of the subject, or else this ontology cannot be primarily set-theo-
retical.
Let us tackle one problem at a time: how is it possible for the logic of
the mathematical truth proceoure to be classical, when its subjective law
is intuitionistic? In truth, the problem ooes not confront Baoiou in this
form, for he ooes not make of classical oeouction the loo of tlc ortologtt
oocct. Insteao, oeouction is conceiveo as ontologys opctotot of ocltt,, the
principle whereby the ontologist subject concatenates the elements of the
truth to which it is faithful ,BE meo. .,. Both classical ano intuitionist
oeouction are conceiveo in this way, as two bifurcating regimes of noelity
,BE .q,. Is this interpretation of oeouction legitimate? Unoer the hy-
pothesis that a truth is generic, it woulo seem that it is not. A sequence
of elements concatenateo in such a way that each is ocooctolc from the
series prior to it will not become generic. Insofar as classical mathemat-
ics is helo to express, in its axioms, the laws of being oo being, the laws
which oictate the formal structure of or, ptccrtottor olotoccct, these laws
are necessarily operative in the ontological situation wherein the math-
ematician exercises her noelity. Any sequence there articulateo in accoro-
ance with these laws woulo be a otcctrtolc or looltlc sequence, ano hence
non-generic. Of course, the same problem woulo confront us if we chose
to select trtotttortttc ocooctotltt, as a principle of connection, but this is not
the issue here. Deouction o ocl cannot be the principle of connection for
a generic proceoure. The principle of connection for mathematical truth
proceoures thus remains obscure. Of course, this is consonant with the
nature of generic sequences: by oennition, the operator of noelity cannot
be lawlike. It remains an open question how the operator of mathemati-
cal noelity is to be thought. As for oeouction, it can more consistently be
conceiveo as the subjective law corresponoing to the mathematical truth
proceoure, that is, as a manifestation of the forcing relation. Ano yet, if
this is oone, then oeouction woulo obey an intuitionistic logic, ano ontol-
ogy, if it is a truth proceoure, woulo not be classical.
If we maintain, oespite all oimculties, that mathematics is a truth pro-
ceoure in the sense outlineo in Bctrg oro Eccrt, the next question that we
face concerns its status as ontology. This is a question that is far more pro-
founo ano oimcult that can be aoequately oealt with here. A few, tentative
remarks may be maoe at this point, however.
Iirst of all, if the foregoing speculations are correct, then if math-
ematics is at once a truth ano an ontology, then it woulo be compelleo to
obey an intuitionistic logic. This is not to say that it must be intuitionistic
mathematics as suchas has been mentioneo alreaoy, it woulo be wrong
to reouce intuitionism to its abstract logical form. Nevertheless, this is a
seemingly viable hypothesis. If we oo take intuitionistic mathematics to
be that which expresses the sayable of being, however, then we face the
immeoiate consequence of having unoercut a great oeal of the formal ap-
paratus that has brought us to this point. We lose the concept of the com-
pleteo genericeven if such a ngure never arrives historically, ano we
lose the non-wellfounoeo multiplicity that Baoiou calls the eventeven if
such a structure was alreaoy forecloseo from the classical ontology. Time,
Zachary Iraser 6q
on the other hano, enters into a much more subtle ano organic relation
with intuitionist ontology than it ooes with its classical preoecessor, for
which it appears as a somewhat awkwaro supplement. The question also
arises as to the character of an intuitionistic ontology. There is no neeo to
assume in aovance that it woulo compel an ioealist metaontology, as op-
poseo to the materialist ooctrine that Baoiou sought to oraw out of clas-
sical set theory, Baoiou himself, at least in principle, wishes to oistinguish
between being in itself ano what is o,oolc of octrg.
88
It is possible to upholo
this oistinction by maintaining beyono the scope of constructive thought,
an unconstructeo horizon about which we can, as of yet, say nothing.
Lest we loose the threao we took up at the beginning of this essay,
let us take stock of the following points: Within the immanence of their
proceoures, the intuitionist ano the post-evental subject are inoiscern-
ible from one another. It is their positions which oiher. The post-evental
subject is conceptually oistinct from the intuitionistic subject in that its
form is articulateo within a meoium that it oio not create, ano in that it
proceeos from an aleatory event that is not the root of the ontological ap-
paratus that oelivers this meoium ,like the Brouwerian two-ity,, but an
exceptionsomething less than a saplingthat remains unthought by
this very apparatus. Yet the ontological apparatus is ttclf to be conceiveo
as a subjective proceoure, ano so we are oriven to think the form of the
Baoiousian truth-subject within the nelo oeployeo by another subject of
truth. If the subject of ontology is to formally coincioe with the ontologi-
cal schema of the subject, then we are presenteo with a problem, for the
subject schematizeo by ontology is trcorgtocrt with the subjective form of
ontology as such, insofar as this ontology is classical. If we insist on con-
gruence, we are leo away from classical ontology ano towaros intuition-
ism, but to take this route woulo require reformulating the problem to
which we are responoing.
At this point, the range of possible speculative solutions to these oif-
nculties appears as broao as it is unclear. It seems that it woulo be both
more fruitful ano more cautious to formulate the general questions that
confront us here. There are two:
What woulo it mean for ontology to be a truth proceoure?
What woulo it mean for this not to be the case?
88. cf. BE, p. 8: The thesis that I support ooes not in any way oeclare that being is math-
ematical, which is to say compriseo of mathematical objectivities. It is not a thesis about
the worlo but about oiscourse. It amrms that mathematics, throughout the entirety of its
historical becoming, pronounces what is expressible of being qua being.
It remains to be seen whether they can be answereo within the context in
which they are poseo.
8q
8q. With respect to Baoious thought, I have intentionally restricteo the focus of this paper
to the system put forwaro in Bctrg oro Eccrt ,Lcttc ct lcrcmcrt,, ano have not taken any
consioeration of the oevelopments that this system has unoergone in Baoious .oo6 work,
Logtoc oc moroc: lcttc ct lcrcmcrt .. This is a signincant omission, given that the con-
cept of the subject unoergoes extensive revision in this recent work. Among the changes
bearing on the above enquiry are a reworking of the subject in such a way that it is no
longer simply the nnite fragment of a truth, but participates in a properly innnite system
of operations, as well as an explicit employment of the Heyting algebra for intuitionistic
logic in the context of a theory of appearances that oraws its mathematical support from
category theory. A continuation of the current line of investigation into the terrain covereo
by Logtoc oc moroc is certainly calleo for, but this must await another time.
:
!
The Limits of the Subject in
Baoious Bctrg oro Eccrt
Brian Anthony Smith
The ngure of the subject in Baoious Bctrg oro Eccrt
:
is key to unoer-
stanoing the link between his revival of a systematic ontology, in the form
of set theoretical mathematics, ano his wioer philosophical ano ethical
concerns. Through a critical examination of the subject, as it appears in
Bctrg oro Eccrt, ano an evaluation of the categories of subjective Gooo
ano Evil, oevelopeo in his book Etltc: or Eo, or tlc Urocttorotrg of Ectl
.
,
I hope to probe the limits of this subjective mooel ano to propose a new
subjective ngure that appears possible, but unexamineo, in either of these
works.
My analysis will focus on two main points: nrst, Baoious use of the
Axiom of Choice, as a key factor in his philosophy that allows for the pos-
sibility of a subject, ano, secono, his selective use of set theoretical forc-
ing, which concentrates mainly on the inoepenoence of the Continuum
Hypothesis.
Baoious ethics is baseo on the capacity of inoiviouals to oistinguish
themselves from their rttc animal nature ano to become tmmottol, to be-
come immortal is to become a subject ,E :., :.,. What constitutes this
singular ability, our rationality, is the use of mathematics ,E :.,. Spe-
cincally it is the Axiom of Choice that elevates the human animal to the
:. Alain Baoiou, Bctrg oro Eccrt, trans. Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo ,hence-
forth BE,.
.. Alain Baoiou, Etltc: or Eo, or tlc Urocttorotrg of Ectl, trans. Feter Hallwaro, Lonoon,
Verso, .oo: ,henceforth E,.
level of a potcrttol subject. This axiom expresses an inoiviouals freeoom, a
freeoom equivalent to the amrmation of pure chance.
It is this capacity
that allows an inoivioual to amrm its chance encounter with an event, the
moment of this amrmation is calleo trtctccrttor ano marks the birth of a
subject ,BE Meoitations .o ano ..,.
The importance of the Axiom of Choice is clear, it provioes the con-
nection between the inoivioual, the event ano the subject. It oennes the
inoivioual ano provioes the corotttor unoer which subjectivity is possible.
Baoious appeal to Faul Cohens theory of forcing is preoominately
oirecteo towaro his proof of the inoepenoence of Georg Cantors Con-
tinuum Hypothesis. But in Cohens book, Sct Tlcot, oro tlc Corttroom H,-
potlct, the methoo of forcing is useo equally to prove the inoepenoence
of the Axiom of Choice.
Ior Baoiou, the Continuum Hypothesis is a

restrictive theorem of ontology, it connnes ontology to the merely con-
structible ano neuters the inoivioual by reoucing the power of the Axiom
of Choice ,BE Meoitations .8 ano q,. Unoer such a restriction the Axiom
of Choice loses its inoepenoence as an axiom ano becomes a theorem, a
mere consequence of the system ,BE o-,. Cohens theory of forcing is
important as it shows that it is possible to construct a mooel of set theory
in which the Continuum Hypothesis fails, thus liberating us from its re-
strictive bonos. In the process it not only reinstates the full power of the
Axiom of Choice, the freeoom of the inoivioual, but also, through the use
of this axiom, a oocct emerges.
The mathematical theory of forcing, as it is applieo to the Continuum
Hypothesis, provioes Baoiou with the paraoigmatic mooel for the sub-
jective response to an event. The subjective process cmorctpotc the inoi-
vioual, through a cottcct use of their freeoom in the face of an event, from
some restrictive conoition of their situation. This proouction of a truth
introouces true novelty that expanos, or extenos, the subjects situation.
This forms the basis of Baoious theory of ethics. Subjective enoeavour,
forcing the truth of an event, forms the potttcc concept of the Gooo ano
It is from our positive capability for Gooo that we are to ioentify Evil
,E :6,. The range of types of Evil can be ioentineo with false, abortive or
totalizing activities that try to subvert a truth proceoure, the Gooo being
. Alain Baoiou, Or Soottocttor in Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, eo. ano trans. Ray Brassier ano
Alberto Toscano, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. ::.
. Faul Cohen, Sct Tlcot, oro tlc Corttroom H,potlct, New York, W. A. Benjamin, :q66,
pp. :6-:..
Brian Anthony Smith
the practice of the ctttoc of oiscernment, courage ano mooeration ,E q:,.
The subject remains faithful to the event ano its consequences.
The clarity ano oecisive character of Baoious ethics is refreshing,
but is it the case that the subject is always trtttrtcoll, gooo? What woulo
happen if we examineo the consequences of a valio subjective process,
baseo on the mathematical mooel of forcing, which insteao of liberating
an inoivioual, in the process of their subjective action, conoemneo them?
I think the inoepenoence of the Axiom of Choice provioes such an occa-
sion. What woulo be the consequences of forcing a situation in which the
Axiom of Choice fails, in which the freeoom of the inoivioual is oenieo
ano the competence of the subject questioneo?
To be in a position to evaluate the nature of this possible subject it will
be necessary to fully unoerstano Baoious move to equate ontology ano
mathematics, ano to recognize that his theory of the event is more than a
reouction of philosophy to mathematics.
It will therefore be necessary to examine two main areas: nrst, the
reasons why Baoiou equates ontology ano mathematics, focusing on the
critical oistinctions this allows him to make, ano, secono, the importance
of the Axiom of Choice for the formation of the subject, ano the specinc
relation between the subject ano the event. Special attention will be given
to those concepts that separate the theory of the subject from its onto-
logical existence, namely the matheme of the event ano the concepts of
History ano temporality. Iinally I will consioer Baoious ethics, ano the
types of subjectivity associateo with Gooo ano Evil ano concluoe with an
analysis of the position ano character of a subject baseo on the proceoure
of forcing a situation in which the Axiom of Choice fails.
I. ONTOLOGY, SET THEORY AND THE SFACE OI
THE SUB]ECT
Baoious philosophical claim that mathematics t ontology forms the
central thesis of Bctrg oro Eccrt ,BE ,. One of the main ngures that moti-
vate this approach is Heioegger ano his critique of Western metaphysics.
Like Heioegger, Baoiou believes that philosophy can only be revitalizeo
through a new examination of the ontological question, but he ooes not
agree with his later retreat into poetics ,BE ., q-:o,.
Baoiou sees Heioeggers problem in his refusal to give any legitimacy
to systematic ontology. This refusal is baseo on the belief that systematic
ontology always begins with the move of forcing an ioentity between octrg
ano the orc, or oneness.
This ioentity causes being to split into separate

essential ano existential parts, the history of metaphysics then exhausts
itself in the impossible task of reconciling ano rejoining these two aspects.
6

The solution to this problem is to view metaphysics as something that
must be abanooneo, its positive role can only be to make the question of
being ever more poignant through the oistress that it causes: this oistress
is hearo as the cry eliciteo by the violation of being by metaphysics. The
truth of being can only be unoerstooo as the simple letting be of being,
exemplineo by poetic thought that refrains from all analysis. Here being
is thought of as a simple presencing, where the two aspects of the essential
ano the existential belong together in an unoiherentiateo shining forth,
prior to any separation.
Baoious response to Heioegger is twofolo: to separate philosophy

from ontology ano to propose a systematic ontology not baseo on the
one. This last point gives rise to what he calls his ontological wager: the
one t rot ,BE .,. There is no pure presentation of being, not even the
poetic active ptccrctrg of Heioegger, insteao being is raoically subtracteo
from all presentation ,BE :o,. The problem with the history of philoso-
phy has not been its attempt to present being in a corttcrt ano ,tcmottc
way, but its attempt to present being as a orc. Ior Baoiou, if being is not
a one, then it can only be thought of as a pure multiple: being t, but it is
not one, therefore it must be multiple. Here we have the two key conoi-
tions for ontology: being t multiple ano the one t rot. Ontology must be
the consistent presentation of the pure multiple of being, the problem is
that consistent presentation involves the one, or oneness ,BE .-,. Ba-
oiou avoios conceoing a point of being to the one by conceiving it as a
pure operation, the operation of the count-as-one ,BE .,. The one, for
Baoiou, must remain a process, therefore the one as this operation of the
presentation of the count-as-one is never itself presenteo, it is only the
structure of presentation. It is loo the multiple is presenteo, not olot the
multiple is. Hence oneness is presenteo as the result of the operation of
the count-as-one on the pure multiplicity of being, as Baoiou states: What
will have been counteo as one, on the basis of not having been one, turns
out to be multiple ,BE .,. This move enables Baoiou to make a oeci-
sive oistinction, that between corttcrt ano trcorttcrt multiplicity ,BE .,.
. Martin Heioegger, Cortttoottor to Pltloopl,: ftom Eroortrg, trans. Farvis Emao ano Ken-
neth Maly, Bloomington, Inoiana University Fress, :qqq, p. :6 ::o:.
6. Heioegger, Cortttoottor to Pltloopl,, pp. :-:6 ::o:..
. Heioegger, Cortttoottor to Pltloopl,, pp. :-:6 ::o:..
Brian Anthony Smith
These oistinctions apply to the pure multiplicity of being as it is split apart
by the operation of the count-for-one, into a retroactively oesignateo prior
trcorttcrc, ano a corttcrt result as a presenteo one.
Before examining in some oetail the appeal that Baoiou makes to set
theoretical mathematics in oroer to realize this ontology, it is worth con-
sioering what he hopes to achieve by aoopting such an approach. What
Baoiou is essentially trying to achieve is to move philosophy beyono its
obsession with founoations, origins ano beginnings. Fhilosophy shoulo not
only give up its search for founoations, but also its post-mooern lament
on the impossibility of such origins. Ior Baoiou, the creation of novelty,
in the form of a truth proouceo by subjective enoeavour, ooes not nno
its source in the impossibility of presenting being, an impossibility whose
trace resioes in all presentation, but in noelity to an event ,BE .,. The
subject amrms that something has happeneo ano is prepareo to bare the
consequences, whether the event actually occurreo may be unoecioable
but the situation provioes the subject with the necessary material to not
only oistinguish oiherent events, but also recognize the problem poseo by
the event as oiherent from the problem of founoation.
Baoious aim is to establish two funoamentally oiherent concepts of
non-relation that he feels have been confuseo in philosophy. The nrst
is the type of non-relation oescribeo above: there must be no relation
between being ano the one. This is the unilateral subtraction of being
from presentation: the inconsistent multiple is never presenteo, only ever
a consistent presentation of it. This type of non-relation is a ro-relation,
ontology is a situation that presents a structure, but being has ro structure
,BE .6-,. Relations, or functions, are always consistent ontological pres-
entations, but they oo not always share the same oegree of oetermination
,BE Appenoix .,.
The secono type of non-relation is more of a non-oeterminate rela-
tion. Consistent multiples within Baoious ontology can usually be subject
to two oiherent kinos of presentation, an cxtcrtcc presentation, associateo
with a multiplicitys cototrol magnituoe, ano an trtcrtcc presentation, as-
sociateo with its ototrol oroer. These two types of presentation form two
separate number systems: the caroinal ano oroinal numbers. At the nnite
level these two systems coincioe ano behave ioentically, but at the innnite
level the two systems oiverge ano their relation to each other becomes
inoeterminate. A space is openeo up at the innnite level whereby a mul-
tiplicity of possible relations can be maintaineo between the two systems.
More importantly, for Baoiou, is the possibility unoer certain restricteo
situations for multiples to exist which have no intensive presentation, only
an extensive one: these multiples are calleo non-constructible. Such non-
constructible multiples provioe the material that a subject requires in or-
oer to transform a situation. What is important about this type of multiple
is that it is a form of orotoctco consistent presentation. Consistent pres-
entation is not oepenoent on oroer, it is not constraineo to what can be
constructeo, but can encompass the minimal structure of unoroereo, or
oisoroereo, multiplicity. This lack of structureo oroer is not to be confuseo
with a lack of consistency: the oisoroereo is rot inconsistent.
Ior Baoiou, ontology must be able to make this oistinction between
inoeterminacy, in terms of oisoroer, ano inconsistency. His recourse to
set theory must therefore achieve three things: nrst, it must establish that
an ontology baseo on the pure multiple is possible, secono, that there is
within this system of ontology inoeterminate, or inoiscernible, material
ano, thiro, that this material can be accesseo ano utilizeo by a subject.
The event itself, which motivates a subject, is always outsioe ano excluoeo
from ontology ,BE :8q-qo,. The remainoer of this nrst section will con-
centrate on the nrst two points: axiomatic set theory as a possible ontology
of the pure multiple, ano the signincance of the innnite within set theory
for introoucing the concept of the non-constructible set ano the inoiscern-
ible.
o) Sct Tlcotcttcol Fooroottor
Baoious philosophy stanos or falls on whether set theory actually pro-
vioes an ontology of the pure multiple that avoios the pitfalls of the one.
Only after this possible use of set theory has been accepteo can we begin
to look at how Baoiou uses it in his theory of the subject. The nrst few
meoitations of Bctrg oro Eccrt, which introouce set theory, are motivateo
only by the oesire to oemonstrate that such an ontology is possible.
It is not clear how set theory can provioe a theory of the pure mul-
tiple, which avoios attributing being to the one. Even if we accept that
the count-for-one, as an operation, avoios presenting being as a one, ano
only attributes oneness to the structure of presentation, an ioea that is
not without its critics, this still leaves us with an empty theory.
8
Baoiou
thinks that the formal axiom system of Zermelo-Iraenkel set theory ,ZI,
avoios making what is presenteo in the operation of the count-for-one into
o being by excluoing any formal oennition of a set ,BE o,. What a set t
8. ]ean-Toussaint Desanti, Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology of Alain Baoiou, in
Feter Hallwaro ,eo.,, Tltrl Agotr: Alotr Bootoo oro tlc Fototc of Pltloopl,, Lonoon, Con-
tinuum Fress, .oo.
Brian Anthony Smith
cannot be oenneo, being is never attributeo to the corccpt of a set. A set
might be thought of as the collection of its members into a one, they are
counteo as one, but the sets members are again sets. A set is the presenta-
tion of pure multiplicity, the members of a set are multiples of multiples of
multiples, enolessly. There can be no formal oennition of what a set is, as
our unoerstanoing of it is oepenoent on us alreaoy knowing what a set is,
the alternative, oiscusseo below, is to oesignate atomic entities that are not
themselves sets. The oneness inherent in the presentation of a set is oue to
the operation of presentation, it is not oepenoent on any inherent oneness
in what is being presenteo.
Subsequently the majority of the axioms of ZI oictate rules for the
formal manipulation of sets, but they oo not entail the actual existence of
any set ,BE 6.,. If an axiom cannot be given that either oiscerns or gener-
ates sets then, to prevent the system from being empty, it is necessary for
axioms to explicitly state the existence of certain sets.
Here the oanger of reintrooucing the one can occur, oepenoing on
what type of sets are claimeo to exist. There are many oiherent ways of
introoucing sets axiomatically, but they oo not all provioe a pure theory of
the multiple. It is not sumcient to simply use a formal axiomatic system, it
is also important that the right axioms are chosen. There are many theo-
ries of set theory that introouce atomic trotctoool at the axiomatic level,
which, in Baoious eyes, woulo clearly constitute the presentation of being
as a one.
q
The axioms that oo not conform to simple rules of manipulation
are the two explicitly existential axioms of the Empty Set ano Innnity ,BE
6.,. The Axiom of the Empty Set, nnally, allows Baoiou to claim that set
theory is a theory of the pure multiple. In oroer to unoerstano the signin-
cance of this axiom it will be necessary to introouce some set theoretical
terminology.
Baoious initial introouction of the concept of the pure ptccrtco mul-
tiple, as the result of the operation of the count-as-one, is very close to
Georg Cantors original nave oescription of a set: By a set we are to
unoerstano any collection into a whole M of oennite ano separate objects
m.
:o
Such a set M is written: M ~ {m}, or if M has more than one ele-
ment, M ~ {m
:
, m
.
, m
, m
n
}. A set is therefore a collection of separate
elements, which are saio to oclorg to a set. This relation of belonging is the
q. Michael Fotter, Sct Tlcot, oro tt Pltloopl,, Oxforo, Oxforo University Fress, .oo, pp.
.-, .q:.
:o. Georg Cantor, Cortttoottor to tlc Foorotrg of tlc Tlcot, of Ttorrttc ômoct, trans. Fhilip
]ouroain, New York, Dover, :q:, p. 8.
funoamental non-logical relation that structures all sets, ano is written .
In the set M above, for example, all the elements that appear within the
brackets belong to M: m
:
M, m
.
M, ano so on. Ior Baoiou, the set is the
consistent presentation of its elements. The term element can be some-
what misleaoing, as it seems to suggest that the elements themselves are
ones, thus introoucing oneness into set theory. Baoiou avoios calling these
terms elements ano prefers to call them presenteo terms. I will continue
to call them elements as this is the name that most commonly appears
in texts on set theory. The construction of the elements of sets will make
it clear that they are not atomic inoiviouals, but rather pure multiples,
which are each multiple in their own right.
The initial set, asserteo to exist axiomatically, cannot have any mem-
bers, nothing can belong to it. If it oio, the sets members coulo legitimate-
ly be helo to be atomic inoiviouals. This woulo guarantee that the one
t, contraoicting the wager that the one t rot. Therefore, to begin with,
the only set that can be asserteo to exist, without contraoicting the above
wager, is an empty set. Unsurprisingly, the Axiom of the Empty Set asserts
that just such a set exists. Baoious technical formulation of this axiom is:
,,|,,,,|
This reaos there exists a such that there ooes not exist any which be-
longs to it ,BE 68,. The set is voio, or empty. In his formulation Baoiou
chooses to use the existential quantiner, , there exists, twice rather than
the more usual use of the universal quantiner, , for all. The more usual
formulation of this axiom is:
,,,,,,
::
This woulo reao: there exists a set such that, for all , no belongs to
. The oouble existential form is important for Baoiou: there cxtt such
that there ooc rot cxtt . There is the ptccrtottor of something that is rot
presenteo, for Baoiou this is pure inconsistent multiplicity ,BE 6,.
With this axiom, the nnal requirements of a theory of the pure mul-
tiple, a form of consistent presentation without a one, is achieveo. The
metaontological signincance of this axiom is that the unpresentable is
presenteo, as a subtractive term of the presentation of presentation ,BE
6,. As Baoiou states: If there cannot be o presentation of being because
being occurs in every presentationano this is why it ooes not present
ttclfthen there is one solution left for us: that the ontological situation
be tlc ptccrtottor of ptccrtottor ,BE .,. The Axiom of the Empty Set guar-
::. Mary Tiles, Tlc Pltloopl, of Sct Tlcot,: Ar Httottcol Irttooocttor to Cortot Potootc, Ox-
foro, Basil Blackwell, :q8q, p. :.:.
Brian Anthony Smith q
antees the existence of at least one set, from which other sets can then be
generateo, but this set presents nothing more than presentation itself. The
empty set, written , can be thought of as simply an empty pair of brack-
ets: ~ {}. If a set is the formal operation of presenting its elements, then
if a set has no elements all it presents is this formal operation itself: the
empty set, , presents nothing but presentation itself.
This corttcrt presentation is often assumeo as paraooxical, or a sleight
of hano: the assertion that exists means that the theory is not empty,
only that the cortcrt of this theory t empty. What is being presenteo here is
only the how, of how being can be presenteo: the operation of the count-
as-one. The content of mathematical set theory is empty, although there
is a great richness to the structures of presentation. The empty set in con-
junction with the other ZI axioms can be useo to generate an inoennite
number of other sets, all of which ultimately present nothing. Therefore
the theory is not empty, it is populateo by the variety of empty structures
of presentation, but it is still, nnally, empty.
Here we can see how the two alternative phrasings the one t rot
ano being t multiple are both satisneo by this axiom. Every result of a
count-as-one, a set, is formeo from the empty set, so that although the
presentation is not empty, there is a presentation of structure, rotltrg, that
is no octrg, is presenteo: the one t rot. Being is therefore subtracteo from
all presentation of it as a one, the empty set perfectly expresses this by
presenting nothing, no one, ano if being is not one then it is multiple.
The nnal point to be maoe on this is that the empty sets uniqueness
means that it acts as a proper name, the proper name of being. The empty
set, , is not the presentation of being itself, but only its proper name. The
uniqueness of is immeoiate as rotltrg oiherentiates it, the uniqueness of
the empty set is baseo on its in-oiherence ,BE 68,. The empty set, or voio
set as Baoiou often calls it, is in-oiherent rot inoiscernible. It is not that we
cannot oiscern what is presenteo in the empty set, but rather that there is
rotltrg to oiscern. This point is of vital importance when inoiscernible sets
are introouceo as being central to a theory of the subject.
To concluoe this section, set theory is baseo not on a general oenni-
tion of a set, but on the assertion that a particular set ooes exist. The
empty set, , makes it possible for set theory to be an ontology of the
pure multiple.
o) Tlc Irrttc o tlc Spocc of ôcclt,
Having establisheo that such a form of ontology is potolc, it is now
necessary to show that it is not sterile. The space openeo by set theory
must not be forecloseo against novelty. The fear is that set theory will
present such a formal system that it will be structurally oetermineo ano
closeo. Although this is true at the nnite level, at the innnite level there is
no absolute structure. Ior Baoiou, the notion of the innnite ooes not go
hano in hano with the themes of transcenoence ano totalization, but it is
insteao what makes the inoeterminate ano the unoecioable possible. In
this section I will explore how the concept of the innnite frees ontology
from any single structure, ano allows for the appearance of the inoiscern-
ible, or non-constructible set.
In oroer to make these aims clear it will be necessary to introouce
more of the technical terminology of set theory of Bctrg oro Eccrt.
Cantors initial aim with his theory of sets was to introouce the most
abstract mathematical objects possible: at base they shoulo be pure mul-
tiples abstracteo from both their cortcrt ano their otoct of appearance.
:.

Iree from these two trtttrtc qualities a set was presenteo as a pure cxtttrtc
multiple. This ioea remains in mooern ZI set theory in the form of the
Axiom of Extension, which oennes the ioentity of a set solely in terms of
its elements. A set is nothing more than the collection of the elements that
it brings together, regaroless of how these elements have been collecteo or
arrangeo. The axiom states:
,, |,, ,,| ,~,
This reaos: a set is the same as a set if, ano only if, every element of
is also an element of , ano vice versa. This extensional, or combinato-
rial, concept of a set is vital for Baoiou, a set is a pure multiple oenneo by
nothing more than the multiples that it presents.
Cantor calleo this abstract extensional presentation of a set its pooct
or its cototrol number, but it is also possible to think of a set in terms of its
trtttrtc otoct, thus oenning the sets ototrol type. If a set is ocll otoctco, the
oroinal type of the set becomes its oroinal number. A set is partially or-
oereo if each element can be thought to have a place relative to the other
elements. Ior every m
:
ano m
.
belonging to a set M, ano m
:
m
.
, it must
be the case that either m
:
m
.

or m
.
m
:
. This equates with our general
unoerstanoing of the natural, rational ano, even, the real numbers. Well
oroering is a slightly more strict form of oroer, which restricts well oroer-
ing to the type of oiscrete oroer founo only in the natural numbers, each
:.. Cantor, Cortttoottor to tlc Foorotrg of tlc Tlcot, of Ttorrttc ômoct, p. 86.
Brian Anthony Smith 8:
number always has a oirect successor with no number appearing between
the original number ano its successor.
Two sets ano have the same caroinal number if there is a one-to-
one relation between them, each element of maps onto a unique ele-
ment of ano vice versa. Two sets ano have the same oroinal number
if a similar one-to-one relation exists, but the relation must also preserve
the well oroering of the sets.
It is this oistinction between a sets caroinal ano oroinal character,
ano the relation between these two relations, that lies at the heart of both
Cantors life long obsession with the continuum hypothesis, ano Baoious
interest in set theory ano the innnite.
The oiherence between caroinal ano oroinal numbers is simple to
unoerstano, but the signincance of this oistinction ooes not become obvi-
ous until innnite sets are consioereo. Caroinality measures the magnituoe
of a set, while oroinality is a measure of oegree, baseo on oroer. Take for
example the set ~ {:, ., , }, this set has a caroinal power of four ano
an oroinal oegree of four. It has a caroinal power of four, as it clearly has
four elements. It has an oroinal oegree of four, as the highest rankeo ele-
ment, accoroing to its oroering, is four. If a set has a clear oroer then we
neeo only look for its highest rankeo element in oroer to know its oroinal
number.
At the nnite level every set can be well oroereo, also this oroering is
unique: you cannot change the oroinal value of a nnite set by rearrang-
ing its elements. Every nnite set can only be associateo with one oroinal
number. This oroinal number is also ioentical to its caroinal power, in the
above example the set hao both the oroinal ano caroinal number four.
The concept of an innnite oroinal can only be reacheo through an ex-
tension of the methoo that generates nnite oroinals. This is the seemingly
simple notion of aooing one. Baoious approach to the construction of
the oroinals begins with his oistinction between belonging ano inclusion.
Baoiou claims that this oistinction provioes the source of the originality of
Bctrg oro Eccrt ,BE 8:,.
Given a set ~ {a, b, c, o}, the elements that belong to it are: a, b, c
ano o. But what about sets that share coincioent elements, such as ~ {a,
b} for example? Such a set is saio to be trclooco in , or to be a ooct of
, ano is written: . If all the elements of a set are also elements of
, then is a subset of . The Fower Set Axiom then states that if a set
exists then so ooes the set of all s subsets. Taking the example ~ {a, b,
c}, the power set of is: ,, ~ {{a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a,
b, c}, }. The new set, ,,, has eight, or .
, elements. Ferhaps the only

two surprising inclusions are the empty set ano the set itself. Given the
oennition of a subset above, their inclusion becomes clear. Although the
original set cannot belong to itself, on pain of paraoox ano inconsistency,
it can incluoe itself as it obviously shares all its elements.
:
The empty set,
, has the unique property of being universally incluoeo in all sets, there
is ro element belonging to , which is not also an element of any other
set, as has no elements.
Before continuing, it is worth noting how important the Fower Set
Axiom is for Baoiou. If sets ptccrt their elements, they tcptccrt their sub-
sets. The full representation of a set is equivalent to its power set, ano
Baoiou calls this the State of a situation ,BE q,. The State represents the
situation, ano it will be in the minimal relation between an innnite set/
situation ano its power set/State that novelty will be possible.
Baoious set theoretical universe is, to begin with, sparse, only the
empty set exists. The nrst new set he proouces is ,, ~ {}, a set with
one element, a singleton ,BE q:,. This is not too surprising either, if the
general rule is that the number of elements of a power set are .
r
, where r
is the original number of elements, if r ~ o then .
o
~ :. Irom this Baoiou
oerives the rule that given any set , then its singleton, {}, also exists
,BE q:,.
:
We are now in a position to consioer the construction of the nnite or-
oinals. The voio, or empty set can be consioereo as the nrst natural or-
oinal o, with its singleton {} corresponoing to the oroinal :. The succes-
sor of these two oroinals is the union of these two: {} ~ {, {}},
the oroinal .. The process of succession is to form the unity between the
current oroinal ano the singleton of this current oroinal. The construction
of the oroinal is accomplisheo as follows: the union of {, {}} with its
singleton {{, {}}}: {, {}}{{, {}}} ~ {, {}, {, {}}}.
In general if o is an oroinal the successor of o is o{o}, this is equivalent
to the ioea of aooing one. The interesting feature of this construction
of the oroinals is that all the previous stages of the construction appear
within the current level as elements. Every element of an oroinal is itself
:. Such paraooxes incluoe Russells paraoox etc.
:. Baoiou suggests this as an application of the Axiom of Replacement, where the ele-
ment of the singleton {} is replaceo by an arbitrary set , to form the singleton {}.
It also follows from the Fower Set Axiom, where the singleton can be thought of as the
power set of , minus everything that is not . Ior example, if ~ {a, b}, then ,, ~
{{a}, {b}, {a, b}, }, if we remove the subsets {a}, {b} ano we are left with {{a, b}}
~ {}, the singleton of .
Brian Anthony Smith 8
an oroinal, it is this feature of nesting ano homogeneity that qualines as a
set as ttortttcc:
, 8 ,
This reaos, if belongs to ano belongs to , then belongs to .
:
Ba-
oiou calls such transitive sets rotmol ano recognizes them as the hallmark
of natural situations ,BE :.-,. Every oroinal number is a ttortttcc set,
well oroereo by the relation of belonging.
This methoo can then be useo to generate any nnite number of or-
oinals. But it cannot be useo to create an innnite set, one greater than all
the nnite oroinals. The nature of oroinal numbers means that an oroinal
greater than all the nnite oroinals woulo incluoe all these oroinals as ele-
ments. It woulo be the set of all oroinals that coulo be proouceo using the
methoo of simple succession, the limit of this proouctive proceoure. This
ltmtt oroinal is calleo , ano can only be introouceo via a secono existen-
tial oeclaration ,BE :6,. The Axiom of Innnity states: there exists a set
, such that for any nnite oroinal o, both o ano the successor of o, o{o},
belong to . Although there is a nrst innnite oroinal, there is no last nnite
oroinal ,BE :q,.
There are now two types of oroinal numbers, the nnite oroinals pto-
oocco by means of succession, ano the innnite oroinal , stateo to exist as
the limit of the process of succession. Hence we have successor ano limit
oroinals. It is now possible to examine the profouno oiherences between
an oroinal ano caroinal conception of number.
Oroinal succession can be reintroouceo, without mooincation, at the
innnite level. There is the rcxt oroinal after , which is {}, or -:.
Again, an innnite number of new oroinal numbers can be createo, their
structure being oenneo by the number of times the above two mooes of
generation are useo. Ior example, the set of all the even numbers fol-
loweo by the set of all the ooo numbers, {., , 6, 8 , :, , , q}, uses
in its trtttrtc structure the rule of the limit of the process of succession
twice, its oroinal number is therefore .~. Caroinality, on the other
hano, takes no notice of the intrinsic oroering of a set ano measures the
pure magnituoe in terms of the number of elements. The caroinality of
one set is saio to be equal to that of another if a simple one-to-one rela-
tion is possible between them. This is trivial for the above example, :
woulo map to :, ano . to . ano so one. Therefore the caroinality of the
set of even numbers followeo by the set of ooo numbers is equivalent to
the caroinality of the set of natural numbers. It is no longer the case that
:. Tiles, Tlc Pltloopl, of Sct Tlcot,, p. :.
every oroinal set can be associateo with a unique caroinal number. An
innnite number of innnite oroinals share the same caroinality, all of them
equivalent to . The caroinal number associateo with is
o
, aleph null,
ano all oroinal sets using the nrst two methoos of construction share the
same caroinality.
:6
After the rather benign ano simple relation between caroinal ano oroi-
nal numbers at the nnite level, their oivergence at the innnite level is quite
fascinating. The question now arises: what is the relationship between an
oroinal sets intrinsic oroinal number ano its extensive caroinality?
In oroer to make the oroinal number system a closeo ano coherent
system Cantor aooeo a thiro rule of oroinal generation, to aoo to the two
rules of succession ano taking the limit of a succession.
:
The nrst rule gen-
erates all the nnite numbers, ano these constitute the nrst class of oroinal
numbers ,I,, the combination of the nrst rule with the secono proouces
all the innnite oroinals with a caroinality of
o
, ano constitutes the sec-
ono class of oroinal numbers ,II,. The thiro rule of generation, calleo the
Frinciple of Limitation, states that a new class of oroinal numbers ,III, can
be generateo by taking the aggregate of all the oroinals that can be pro-
ouceo using the nrst two rules. This new oroinal,
:
, has a caroinality that
exceeos
o
, ano is thought of as the next caroinal after
o
calleo
:
.
:8
An
important feature of the oroinal
:
is that, because it cannot be put into a
one-to-one corresponoence with the oenumerable natural numbers, it is
non-oenumerable or uncountable.
This methoo can be useo to generate an inoennite series of oroinal
number classes, the oroinals of each class have the same caroinality as the
aggregate of all the oroinals in the class below. The nrst oroinal of each
class is known as a limit oroinal ano corresponos to a caroinal number:
Limit Oroinals: ,,
:
,
.
,, corresponoing Caroinals: ,
o
,
:
,
.
,.
Although this methoo also proouces new caroinals, it ooes not proouce
them oirectly, they are the result of an oroinal construction. Ior the two
systems to be consioereo as complete number systems it was necessary
to nno a oirect methoo for prooucing innnite caroinal numbers, without
reference to methoos of oroinal generation.
The methoo that Cantor introouceo to oirectly generate new innnite
caroinal numbers is via the use of the power set function. To recall, if is
:6. This leaos to the familiar proofs that the set of even numbers is equinumerous with the
set of ooo numbers, ano that the natural numbers are equinumerous with the rationals.
:. Fotter, Tlc Pltloopl, of Sct Tlcot,, p. :o6.
:8. Fotter, Tlc Pltloopl, of Sct Tlcot,, pp. :o6-:o.
a set with elements then ,, will be a set with .
elements, ano .
~.
Here we have a oirect methoo of prooucing new caroinal numbers. It can
be shown that this holos for innnite caroinal numbers, so ,
o
, ~ .
o
~
o
.
In general, if
is an innnite caroinal number, then ,
, ~ .
.
:q

Having establisheo this separate methoo, the question as to the relation
between these two number systems can be aooresseo.
The obvious choice woulo be to make the two systems completely
commensurate with each other. This coulo be achieveo if ,
o
, ~
:
, a
formulation of Cantors Continuum Hypothesis, or generally if ,
, ~
-:
. But it turns out that the only thing that can be conclusively oecioeo
about ,
o
, is that it has a caroinality greater than
o
. This minimal oeter-
mination can consistently be strengtheneo, both the Continuum Hypoth-
esis ano its generalization can be asserteo, but so can almost any other
value of ,
o
,. Whereas Cantor saw this as a problem within the system
of set theory, the failure of set theory to form a closeo system conoitioneo
by a single set of rules, Baoiou sees it as its saving grace. This realm of
unoecioability opens up an immanent space within set theory for the ap-
pearance of novelty, ano for the subject to act on this novelty. It is Cohens
theory of forcing, proving that the Continuum Hypothesis is inoepenoent,
which opens up this possibility.
If the Continuum Hypothesis holos, then ,
o
,, the set of all possible
subsets of countable, natural, numbers is exhausteo by the oroereo meth-
oos of construction oeployeo by oroinal generation: ,
o
, ~
:
, or ,, ~
:
. The question poseo by this hypothesis is: what woulo it mean to think
of innnite subsets of the natural numbers that were not corttoctco accoro-
ing to the oroinal rules of generation? The intuitive response woulo be
that such sets woulo, in someway, embooy a lack of oroer.
One possible argument woulo be that the existence of such sets is ir-
relevant, as they coulo in no way be ehective. The only way that our nnite
minos can cope with innnite sets is that they oo embooy some oroer that
can be cooineo in a rttc way. We can only know such trrttc sets through
their rttc structure, their members satisfy some property. This ioea recalls
the common philosophical theme of ouality, a set has its intrinsic oroinal
structure, ano its purely extrinsic caroinal magnituoe: an intensive form
ano an extensive content. At the nnite level these two aspects are inois-
tinguishable ano ioentical, but at the innnite level things change. The
Continuum Hypothesis states that the formal aspect takes preceoence
at the innnite level, we can only oiscern innnite sets that embooy some
:q. Fotter, Sct Tlcot, oro tt Pltloopl,, p. .6..
constructible oroer. The extensive caroinal magnituoe is only accessible
through this structureo oroer. If we assert that a non-constructible set can
exist, for example if there exists innnite subsets of which oo not belong
to the secono oroinal number class ,II,, how can we have access to them
without recourse to some constructive property?
In oroer to exploit the potential of non-constructible sets a formal ap-
proach to sets that lack oroer must be oevelopeo. The Axiom of Choice
provioes such an approach, by oeveloping a concept of free choice that
is inoepenoent of any criteria of choice. This axiom amrms freeoom ano
chance, it ooes not necessarily posit non-constructible sets, but it allows
for our manipulation ano use of them shoulo they exist.
In this section I have trieo to show how Baoious approach to ontology
in Bctrg oro Eccrt attempts to answer two funoamental questions: how an
ontology baseo on the one is not is possible, ano, now, how this ontology
is not sterile, it has the potential for real novelty. Novelty can be generateo
immanently within a situation, oue to the minimal relation between a set
ano its power set, or between a situation ano its state representation. All
that can be known is that state representation is greater than the original
situation, the extent of this excess can never be lroor. But in oroer to
fully exploit this excess of the non-constructible sets, which constitute this
unoecioable excess of the state, they must be accessible to a subject. The
subject must be capable of oeploying the consequences of amrming the
existence of a certain number of non-constructible sets, without subject-
ing them to a complete construction or oiscernment.
In the next section I will introouce the ioea of the event, as something
that occurs oottoc mathematical ontology. However, the consequences of
this event can be expresseo as something novel within an ontological situ-
ation by a oocct, this subject oepenos on the proouctive ftcc amrmation of
non-constructible sets. The Axiom of Choice is essential to unoerstanoing
this free amrmation.
II. THE AXIOM OI CHOICE: INTERVENTION AND THE
TIME OI THE SUB]ECT
The central role that the Axiom of Choice plays in the subjective
realization of an events consequences oepenos on Baoious separation of
situations into two funoamental categories, Natural situations, introouceo
above, ano Historical situations ,BE :,.
.o
Natural situations are rotmol,
.o. These are not the only types of possible situation, Baoiou mentions rcottol situations,
this normality is provioeo by their transitive nature. Here the relation be-
tween a sets extensional, caroinal, existence ano its intentional, oroinal,
construction share an absolute minimal relation: everything that exists is
constructible accoroing to the rules of oroinal generation. Here the Con-
tinuum Hypothesis holos, if is the presentation of a natural situation,
then ,, ~
:
is its state representation. Here every subset, or state rep-
resentation, is equivalent to a formal proouction. The state restrictions in
a natural situation oo not allow anything to just happen. Historical situ-
ations, on the other hano, are ab-normal, they represent something oo-
ttoctco from the state representation of a situation ,BE :,. They present
a trgolottt,, something that is presenteo, but not representeo, something
that ooes just happen.
A singular term, for Baoiou, is one that is presenteo in a situation but
not representeo ,BE qq,. The subject of an event will always be a nnite
portion of an innnite proceoure that attempts to represent a singular term,
this proouction is the proouction of a truth. So a singular term is not
strictly a presenteo term that is not representeo, it has a tcmpotol quality
with reference to a subject. It is a term that is rot ,ct representeo, or one
that otll locc occr representeo.
This is a recurrent theme in Bctrg oro Eccrt: Baoiou makes signincant
philosophical oistinctions by oissecting mathematical proofs ano proce-
oures, which are taken mathematically to occur all at once, ano imposing
a temporal structure on them ,BE :o,.
This temporalization is important for Baoious oiscussion of founoa-
tion, which is key to his oistinction between Natural ano Historical situa-
tions. Iounoation is a question of origin, in a natural situation the answer
is simple ano unique: natural situations are founoeo on the empty set, .
Irom this set all the others are explicitly generateo in a strict oroer, this
oroer can always be traceo back to its founoation. This founoation is, of
course, axiomatic. The axiom itself ooes not justify the empty sets exist-
ence it merely asserts it. A situations founoational element is the one that
shares nothing in common with any of its other elements. This inoicates
its generative function, being the element from which all others are gener-
ateo. This ioea is stateo in an axiom, the Axiom of Iounoation:
|, , |,, 8 , ~ ,||
To every non-empty multiple there belongs ot lcot one element that
shares nothing in common with the multiple itself, this is a founoational
in which it is neither a question of life ,nature, nor action ,history,, BE, p. :. As far as I
can tell, he never mentions these situations again.
set. An historical situation is one with at least one non-empty founoational
set. Baoiou calls such a non-empty founoational set the ttc of an event
,BE :,. Clearly such a set shares much in common with the empty set,
both are founoational ano both are subtracteo from the situation, in that
they share nothing in common with it. It is these properties that leao
Baoiou to state that such evental sites are or tlc cogc of tlc coto ,BE :,.
Although they share common properties with the voio, or empty set, they
are oistinguishable from it, if only because they are non-empty. An event
is concerneo with something other than the proper name of being, it is
concerneo with the singular specinc happening of the event itself.
Baoiou reaoily aomits that it is with historical situations that the gap
between ontology ano thought nrst opens up ,BE :88,. Strictly speaking,
historical situations can only appear ontologically if these situations are
given a temporal oimension. In Cohens theory of forcing the set that
is chosen to exteno the stanoaro mooel of set theory is a set whose ele-
ments are non-constructible sets.
.:
Here, if the initial situation is thought
of as , ano its state representation as all the sets constructible from it,
then if is a non-constructible subset of : {} ~ . This lool like a
founoational set, but we must remember that , ano is therefore not
founoational. The next move is typical of the kino of temporality that
Baoiou is introoucing. This potcrttol site ooes not belong to the initial situ-
ation, but it coolo be aooeo to it. The new initial situation woulo be ,
it is clear now that , but equally clear is that {} ~ . So
ocfotc its aooition to the situation it only satisneo one aspect of founoation,
ano after its aooition it only satisnes the other conoition. Only taken as a
temporal entity, not solely as a timeless mathematical entity, can the non-
constructible set constitute a site.
The oecision as to whether this site belongs, or not, is unoecioable. To
amrm its belonging oepenos only on the event actually having happeneo,
ano the trtctccrttor of a subject to begin the process of making it belong.
The augmenteo situation ooes not, therefore, have a site, it is only markeo
by the trace of a oecision. Cohens theory of forcing proouces new situa-
tions, which are extensions of the olo, but these new situations are natural,
they are stanoaro ttortttcc mooels of set theory.
..
To maintain a situation
as historical is to keep a process of forcing continually open by focusing on
the immanent subject within the situation.
.:. Cohen, Sct Tlcot, oro tlc Corttroom H,potlct, p. ::o.
... Cohen, Sct Tlcot, oro tlc Corttroom H,potlct, p. :o.
Brian Anthony Smith 8q
Here the temporal aspect is emphasizeo again. After a subjective in-
tervention, a oecision on the unoecioable belonging of a site to a situation,
the state of this situation is still that of the olo situation pttot to this inter-
vention. It is the work of the subject to play out the consequences of their
intervention through a constant ocltt, to their conviction that the event
occurreo. The post-evental state is never fully completeo, as the innnite
task of the nnite subject to exteno the state of the situation can never be
completeo.
The entire theory of the event rests funoamentally on this situateo
ano temporal appropriation of set theory. This is Baoious philosophical
use of ontology, the concepts of the inoivioual inhabitant of a situation,
ano therefore the subject are rot mathematical/ontological concepts ,BE
::,. Cohens theory of forcing is oevelopeo in the absence of any tempo-
rality, thus of any future anterior, |to| establish the ontological clcmo
of the relation between the inoiscernible ano the unoecioable ,BE :o
my emphasis,.
This helps to explain Baoious peculiar matheme of the event. The
matheme of the event is also rot an ontological statement, it explicitly
covets inconsistency. Baoiou calls the event the ultra-one ano formalizes
it in the following way:
e
x
~ {xX, e
x
}
Here, e
x
is the event occurring at the site X ano it presents not only all
its elements, xX, but also itself. Baoious use of the Axiom of Iounoation
makes such a set impossible within consistent mathematical ontology, it is
beings prohibition of the event ,BE :qo,. Self-belonging is forbiooen with-
in a system of set theory that aoopts the Axiom of Iounoation. The math-
eme acts as an inconsistent supplement outsioe of ontology that lets the
subject know that its task is never complete. The task of the subject is to
make the truth of the event consist within a situation, to builo the relation
between the inoiscernible ano the unoecioable ,BE .8,. In set theoretical
terms, the generic extension of a situation, which utilizes non-construct-
ible/inoiscernible sets, can oecioe previously unoecioable statements.
The key example is the proof of the inoepenoence of the Continuum
Hypothesis, by oemonstrating that there is a consistent situation in which
this hypothesis fails. Ior Baoiou, this process is experienceo immanently
from within the situation, a subject whose enoless task is motivateo ano
completeo by this external supplement.
Central to the philosophical unoerstanoing of an inoivioual or sub-
jects experience within a situation is the Axiom of Choice. It provioes not
only the potential of an inoivioual to become a subject through an trtctccr-
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo qo
ttor, but also the means to maintain subjectivity inoennitely, through the
continueo ocltt, to an event.
o) Tlc Axtom of Clotcc
Intervention is the tllcgol naming of an event, the wager ano oecla-
ration that something, the event, lo happeneo ,BE .o,. The clotcc of
this name is not recognizeo by the current situation, it is a non-choice
for the state ,BE .o,. The current state restrictions oo not encompass
the name of the event, this means that the presentation of the name is
not constructible accoroing to the current state laws. The name ooes not
conform to any state law of representation. By oeclaring that an event
has occurreo, ano thus naming it the state apparatus is interrupteo ano a
subject is born.
The potential subjects of a situation are the inoivioual inhabitants
who occupy it. This potential for subjectivity is what elevates man, as
rational, above the merely animal ,E 8-q, :.,. It is oepenoant on their
use of mathematics, especially the Axiom of Choice, which makes them
capable of intervention. This capacity is haro to oenne ano it seems to
involve the coincioence of many classical ioeas: rationality, freeoom, or-
oer ano chance. What is interesting is that this capacity can be exerciseo,
to the oetriment of the inoivioual, in an autonomous fashion, but it only
transforms an inoivioual into a subject when supplementeo by an event
,BE .o-:,. I shall return to this point in the next section.
In the previous section it was the oeclaration that the site belongeo
to the current situation, which maoe it a founoational set, albeit only in a
temporal sense. This is the oecision of intervention that marks the begin-
ning of the historical transformation of a situation. The subject chooses
to amrm the event, ano names its site ,BE .o,. Before the intervention
the event occurs, later the subject amrms this event by naming its site:
thus only together, an event coupleo with a subjective intervention, can a
founoation be establisheo. Initially the event is unoecioable, it is unpre-
senteo in the site, ano after its nomination it is illegal at the level of the
state representation. It will be the labour of the subject to make this illegal
choice legal, to make the truth of the event consist.
The very term illegal states something outsioe the law, here in an
ontological situation that corresponos to rules of construction. An illegal
presentation woulo be the presentation of something not controlleo or
constructeo accoroing to some clear rule. This ioea was introouceo above
with the ioea of non-constructible sets. All constructible sets are at base
Brian Anthony Smith q:
pure extensive multiples, but they all also posses an intrinsic oennition,
a conoition which all its members satisfy. A non-constructible set is one
that cannot be given such an intrinsic oennition, it can only be consio-
ereo extensively. In some sense the loo governing constructible sets are
seen as necessary if any manipulation of innnite sets is to be meaningful.
They are the conceptual tongs by which innnite sets can be accesseo ano
manipulateo. No such tools are available for non-constructible sets, so
either they are not intelligible entities, or they are inaccessible, or there
is another way in which they can be accesseo. This is what the Axiom of
Choice provioes, a non-conceptual means of clootrg ano manipulating
non-constructible sets. If the laws of constructible sets gocctr ano otctotc
the choice of elements in a set, then the Axiom of Choice states that it is
possible to choose in an ortctttctco way: the choice can be unrestricteo,
free ano arbitrary.
.
The theory of set theoretical forcing works by selecting a set of non-
constructible sets to aoo to a given situation, to expano the number of
possible sets constructible within the situation.
.
This initial selection cor-
responos to the subjects nominative intervention. After this aooition the
number of possible sets constructible from this new, extenoeo, situation
increases. The state representation of the situation is now capable of oe-
cioing things which were previously unoecioable ,BE :6-,. This exten-
sion of the state representation, baseo on the newly chosen ano amrmeo
aooition to the situation, ooes not occur all at once, nor is it ever fully
completeo. Mathematically it ooes happen all at once, baseo simply on it
being possible, but within Baoious philosophy the proceoure of exteno-
ing a situation occurs slowly. The subject is both what proouces this slow
extension, ano the extension itself, the subject is a nnite portion of a truth
proceoure.
This temporal extension of the mathematical proceoure is sustaineo
by the subjects noelity to the event. The impetus to carry on the slow
ano laborious proceoure is given by the meta-ontological matheme of the
event: e
x
~ {xX, e
x
}. The matheme has two terms, the elements of its
site ano its name. These two terms orive subjective noelity: a noelity to
the subjects clotcc of amrming the site, ano a noelity to the name of the
event.
The formal oennition of the Axiom of Choice states that if a set exists
it is possible to construct a new set by selecting a single ototttot, element
.. Tiles, Tlc Pltloopl, of Sct Tlcot,, pp. :qo-:q:.
.. Tiles, Tlc Pltloopl, of Sct Tlcot,, pp. :86-:8
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo q.
from each of the subsets of the original set. To give an example, the subsets
of a set constitute the power set of , ,,. Now there exists a new set,
oenneo by a choice function, which selects one element from each of the
elements of ,,. At the nnite level there is no neeo for this axiom, take
~ {a, b}, then ,, ~ {, {a}, {b}, {a, b}}. There are only two possible
sets constructible by choice, which oo not alreaoy appear in ,,: {a, b,
b} ~ {a, b}, or {a, b, a} ~ {a, b}. At the nnite level there is no ftcc choice,
all such sets coincioe with one of the initial sets constructible subsets.
We can see that the Axiom of Choice is operating to exteno the scope
of the Fower Set Axiom, it is trying to create, or name, rco subsets. If
only constructible innnite sets are alloweo then the limitation on choice
extenos to the innnite level. A supposeo choice function woulo coincioe
with a constructible subset, freeoom woulo be suboroinate to the law.
The power set function marks the excess between a situation ano its
state representation. If this excess is legally conoitioneo by the restrictions
of construction then it forecloses the inoivioual inhabitants of a situation
against novelty. In oroer to interrupt this legal conoitioning an illegal oec-
laration must be maoe, one which amrms freeoom, accesses the novelty
of the non-constructible ano oeploys the consequences by extenoing the
given situation. But the Axiom of Choice ooes not arbitrarily amrm the
existence of oll non-constructible subsets, it amrms the existence only of
those that it chooses. It allows for a certain corttollco anarchy, although it
amrms ano introouces chance it ooes so in a selective ano otoctco way.
A consequence of this oroereo introouction of chaos is that the axiom
has a number of signincant consequences. Ior example, the Axiom of
Choice is equivalent to stating that every set can be well oroereo.
.
This
means that every set can be put into a one-to-one relation with an oroinal
number, which means that it can be constructeo. This might seem to con-
traoict the fact that the axiom seems to introouce non-constructible sets,
but what has to be noteo is that constructability ano non-constructability
are tclottcc to a situation. This is oue, partly, to the fact that the oroinal
numbers oo not in their totality form a set: there is no set of oll oroinal
numbers.
.6
This, for Baoiou, means that although there are natural situa-
tions, there is no such thing as Nature in its totality, Nature ooes not exist
,BE :o-:,. There is no ultimate level that coulo either absolutely amrm
or oeny the non-constructible. Where non-constructible sets are amrmeo
to exist they represent a symptom of the situations limits. The question is
.. Fotter, Sct Tlcot, oro tt Pltloopl,, p. ...
.6. Fotter, Sct Tlcot, oro tt Pltloopl,, p. :8:.
whether this is a oesirable symptom, is it a symptom of oisease? Shoulo
the non-constructible be vieweo as oencient ano lacking, or shoulo it be
amrmeo ano incorporateo?
The limit oroinals cooe, in their structure, a certain oegree of complex-
ity by oenning all the possible sets constructible from a certain number of
rules. Every situation is conoitioneo by a limit oroinal, which restricts the
oegree of constructeo complexity.
.
If only constructible sets can appear
within a situation there is no problem, but the Axiom of Choice can force
sets to appear in a situation that present a greater oegree of complex-
ity than the current situation can conoition. Therefore, in this situation
the construction of these sets cannot be known ano they appear ranoom
ano non-constructible. A further oroinal external to the situation coulo
provioe a rule for construction, but it is not immanently available to an
inhabitant of the current situation.
The Axiom of Choice also greatly simplines caroinal arithmetic, ano
also oictates that every innnite caroinal number is an aleph.
.8
If we recall,
the rules of oroinal generation proouce a limitless succession of oroinal
numbers, each limit oroinal being the nrst number to be associateo with
a new caroinal number, ano these caroinal numbers are calleo alephs.
What the above ioea suggests is that there t a minimal relation between
oroinal ano caroinal number proouction, it might not be the strict rela-
tion of the General Continuum Hypothesis: ,
, ~
-:
. But there is,
nevertheless a relation, the freeoom of the Axiom of Choice still chooses
within limits. Every caroinal is always equivalent to some oroinal.
In this section I have exploreo three oiherent uses of the Axiom of
Choice. Iirst, choice is suboroinate to the current law of the situation.
Anything that appears to be a free choice in fact coincioes with a con-
structible ano legal part of the current situation: nothing new is proouceo.
Secono, a subjective intervention claims that certain freely chosen non-
constructible sets belong to the situation. They cxtcro the current situ-
ation through the novel constructions they allow. Thiro, freely chosen
non-constructible sets are accepteo as non-constructible ano novel within
the current situation, but a rco situation is positeo in which they are con-
structible. Only the secono scenario, the subjective scenario, allows the
illegal sets to retain their non-constructible status. Although, ouring the
course of a truth proceoure, the romc of the non-constructible sets occomc
legal, their non-constructible nature remains. The constructible ano non-
.. Tiles, Tlc Pltloopl, of Sct Tlcot,, p. :8.
.8. Fotter, Sct Tlcot, oro tt Pltloopl,, p. .66.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo q
constructible co-exist. In the nrst case non-constructability is oenieo, ano
in the thiro case it is a ptoolcm solveo through the introouction of a rco
situation with rco rules of construction.
The ranoom aleatory character of non-constructible sets are not con-
sioereo a oenciency by the subject, their chance nature is amrmeo. This
ioea that the subject cxtcro a situation rather than creating a rco situa-
tion is important to Baoiou ,BE :,. A new situation suggests that the
subject performs a transcenoent role. In such a transformation the subject
gains access to an oroinal number outsioe ano beyono the current situa-
tion in oroer to solve the ptoolcm of a multiples non-constructability. This
new oroinal is of sumcient complexity to oenne the construction of the
previously non-constructible multiple. With Baoious theory the subject
remains nrmly within the current situation ano transforms it immanently.
His only appeal to a meta-mathematical concept is to the matheme of the
event. The matheme ooes not provioe a transcenoent multiple necessary
for the transformation, but opens a temporal space in which the subject
operates.
Although the full theory of set theoretical forcing is necessary to ap-
preciate Baoious subject, I believe that it is with this concept of freeoom,
motivateo by the Axiom of Choice, that Baoiou makes his most signin-
cant ethical oistinctions. The three oistinctions, maoe above, all reappear
in Baoious book on ethics. The misuses of freeoom in being suboroinate
to the law, or attempting to transceno a given situation correspono to
Baoious categories of Terror, Betrayal ano Disaster. The gooo is entirely
oenneo by a correct subjective operation. But what if a correct subjective
operation unoermines the freeoom of the subject/inoivioual itself, what
kino of subject woulo that be?
o) Etltcol Cotcgottc
Baoious theory of ethics focuses entirely on a clear oistinction be-
tween Gooo ano Evil, with Evil only being possible on the basis of the
Gooo ,E :6,. The Gooo is oenneo as what results from a correct subjec-
tive response to an event. This involves the occurrence of an event, ano
the proouction of novelty/truth within the situation, as the result of an
initial subjective intervention ano their subsequent faithful labour. Evil
occurs only when some aspect of this complex arrangement goes wrong
,E 6o,. Here, the presupposition that I nno oimcult to accept is that all
events, ano subjective responses are funoamentally Gooo. This might not
seem problematic, amrming the creative free expression of a subject, who
extenos the possibilities of a situation through the proouction of truth,
but these common themes of subjectivity, freeoom ano truth are com-
pletely transformeo in Baoious system. They no longer have their eve-
ryoay intuitive appeal. Rather, the oistinction between Gooo ano Evil is
too convenient, ano seems octtcco from the system of Bctrg oro Eccrt rather
than expressing something true. The theory of ethics oevelopeo by Ba-
oiou seems to be corttcrt with his systematic philosophy rather than with
experience.
Ior me, Baoious ethics appear to be baseo too strongly on the notion
that the theory of forcing, borroweo from Cohen, is essentially a liberat-
ing operation. In provioing the nnal proof of an axioms inoepenoence
from the stanoaro axiom system, set theory is liberateo, or emancipateo,
from the constraint imposeo by it. Baoiou presupposes two things: eman-
cipation from a given axiom liberates the formal system from a constraint,
the system becomes more open as a result, ano the potential of a future
subject remains intact after a process of forcing ,BE :6,. It is this secono
ioea that I want to particularly concentrate on. As I have oemonstrateo
ouring the course of this essay, the Axiom of Choice is essential if a subjec-
tive response is to be possible within a situation. One of the aims of oevel-
oping the theory of forcing was to prove the inoepenoence of the Axiom
of Choice, that is, to force a situation in which it fails.
.q
Baoiou calls the
future anterior situation when a truth otll locc occr forceo, the post-evental
situation. This is an almost Kantian as if projection, to consioer a situa-
tion o tf the truth hao been completely forceo.
o
What is the post-evental
situation if the Axiom of Choice has been forceo to fail by a subject ao-
hering to the strictures of set theoretical forcing in strict noelity to an
event? This situation will be one in which it is impossible for a new subject
to arise, the inoivioual will be strippeo of their freeoom. The Axiom of
Choice wont be in a oormant state suboroinate to the law, as it is in the
restrictive constructivists situation. The Axiom of Choice, ano therefore
the inoiviouals freeoom will have been an inconsistent principle.
In oroer to explore this ioea more fully, I will examine the ethical
categories of Terror, Betrayal ano Disaster in oroer to show that none of
these covers the possibility I have suggesteo. The forcing of the failure of
the Axiom of Choice is a positive example of an unoesirable event ano a
subsequent, fully legitimate, unoesirable subject. This, I think, posses a
.q. Cohen, Sct Tlcot, oro tlc Corttroom H,potlct, pp. :6-:..
o. Baoiou, Truth: Iorcing ano the Unnameable in Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, p. :..
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo q6
signincant problem for the simple oivision of Gooo ano Evil in Baoious
philosophy.
Baoiou nnos the tmoloctom of an event the most oangerous form of
evil oue to its formal similarity to a true event ,E .,. The simulacrum
oeploys its pseuoo-subjectivity in the form of terror. The simulacrum is
potentially the most interesting form of evil as it allows for oegrees of ter-
ror. The concept rests nrmly on the Axiom of Choice ano intervention,
here though, the intervention is the intervention of an inoivioual. What
the inoivioual names as the site of the event, is only what superncially ap-
pears to be the site. Thus the inoivioual remains an inoivioual, ano ooes
not become a subject.
The importance of the site, prior to the subjective intervention, is that
it shoulo share nothing in common with the current situation. If S is the
situation ano X the potential site of an event: SX ~ , X is on the eoge
of the voio. The site is important, as sharing nothing with the situation it
is equally aooresseo to the whole situation, there is no privilegeo subset of
the situation that coulo claim special access to the event ,E ,. In the case
of the simulacra this supposeo site is not empty, it is not on the eoge of the
voio ,E ,. Here the intervention is not baseo on a raoical emptiness of
the site, but on plenituoe.
Essentially if the intersection, SX , is not empty then this inter-
section constitutes an alreaoy existent subset of the situation. A construct-
ible subset alreaoy exists that represents, at least partially, the supposeo
site of the event. The event can then become tocrttco with an alreaoy
establisheo group. In his example of Nazi Germany Baoiou gives the ex-
ample of the concept of German racial purity ,E ,. The question that
arises is, that although the intersection is not empty, woulo it be empty if
the ioentineo subset where removeo? Ior example, if SX ~ , woulo
S,X-, ~ ano, further more, is ,X-, non-empty? Here is the oanger
inherent in simulacra, as if both of these conoitions are fulnlleo, then ,X-
, coulo be a genuine site of an event. Here there are two possible types of
terror, a terror that hijacks an actual event ano one that ooes not.
Iormally or mathematically speaking the simulacra ooes not occur. If
,X-, were a genuine site, then so woulo X. The appearance of woulo
be oismisseo from the formal mathematical approach, it woulo be seen
as the mere repetition of a constructible set ano removeo or ignoreo. But
within the temporal philosophical approach, oevelopeo by Baoiou, this
repeateo subset causes immense problems.
The pseuoo-subject of a simulacrum might well be generating true
novelty, but the organization of this novelty unoer the name of a privi-
legeo subset of the original situation strips it of its truth. The aooress is
no longer universal, it is aooresseo to the preoroaineo chosen ones. Their
oomination of the potentially revolutionary novelty results in a reign of
terror. All true subjects are open to the potential for their event to be-
come a simulacrum, to ioentify its message with a preoetermineo group
or class.
Betrayal is possibly the simplest category of Evil, it is a renunciation
of ones participation in a truth proceoure, ano therefore a renunciation
of ones subjectivity. This renunciation cannot be in the form renouncing
ones trtctct in a certain cause, but must reject the very cause itself as hav-
ing ever been signincant ,E ,. The Axiom of Choice, again, plays a cen-
tral role. Here, with respect to the truth that I useo to believe in, I claim
that its novelty ano uniqueness were merely oerivative. I amrm in my
renunciation that the site, which I took to be composeo of non-construct-
ible multiples, was in fact wholly constructible. The inoivioual accepts
that their freeoom is only ever apparently free from their own perspective,
in actuality it is suboroinate to the law. Their freeoom, embooieo in the
Axiom of Choice, is actually nothing more than a theorem entaileo by a
universe restricteo to constructible multiples: the Axiom of Choice loses
its vital axiomatic status ,E o-,.
Iinally, the Disaster is what Baoiou calls an attempt to name the un-
nameable. Here the full power of the Axiom of Choice is oeployeo, in
an attempt to eraoicate the singularity of the event in favour of the pure
autonomy of the inoiviouals freeoom. There are two ways for the Axiom
of Choice to oeal with the possible appearance of non-constructible sets.
The nrst, forcing, is the methoo chosen by the subject, where the non-
constructible aspect of an events site are maoe to consist in a situation.
The secono uses the fact that the Axiom of Choice allows all sets to be
well oroereo. The oroinal requireo to well oroer the non-constructible
sets are not available within the limitations of the current situation. This
oroinal is an unnameable for the situation, ano a oisaster for truth is when
the inoivioual appeals to his freeoom, in the form of the Axiom of Choice,
in oroer to name this unnameable. As Baoiou claims: Rigio ano oog-
matic ,or blinoeo,, the subject-language woulo claim the power, baseo
on its own axioms, to name the whole of the real, ano thus to change the
worlo ,E 8,.
The ranoom character of the event, which the subject requires in
oroer to ahect an intervention, is abanooneo. The inoiviouals free choice
is exerciseo in an isolateo ano autonomous fashion, which characterizes
the event as a problem to be solveo. In the new situation nothing of the
event is left, or preserveo. This is a oisaster for truth, rather than amrm-
ing the truth of a situation the inoiviouals seek connrmation of their own
autonomy ano power in an appeal to a transcenoent realm. In the mino
of Goo there is no confusion, there is nothing that cannot be constructeo,
the inoivioual neeo only make an appeal to this totalizeo transcenoent
realm in oroer to nno a solution to the problem of the event.
All of these forms of Evil rely, in one way or another, on the misuse
of an inoiviouals capacity for free choice. The inoiviouals inability to cor-
rectly oeploy the Axiom of Choice, in the face of an event prevents them
from making a subjective intervention. But the proof of the inoepenoence
of the Axiom of Choice clearly falls into the correct use of the Axiom of
Choice, it inaugurates a subject through an intervention. It is somewhat
bizarre, though not inconsistent, that the Axiom of Choice is a necessary
axiom in the forcing of its own failure, but this ooes not stop it from being
a valio instance of set theoretical forcing.
:
The forcing of the failure of the Axiom of Choice works by aooing
non-constructible sets of a certain type to a situation. In oroer for the
Axiom of Choice to function in the extenoeo situation, supplementeo by
these non-constructible sets, it is necessary that all the sets constructible
within this situation can be well oroereo. Ior this to be possible the aooeo
sets neeo to be oistinguishable from each other given only a nnite amount
of information. It is possible to clooc non-constructible sets where this
ooes not happen, well oroering of the constructible sets fails ano so too
ooes the axiom of choice.
.
The subject is no longer able to cope with
:. Tiles, Tlc Pltloopl, of Sct Tlcot,, p. :qo. Many of the features of the Axiom of Choices
use, especially in the context of Baoious philosophy, oher parallels with Sartres concept
of bao faith. Here, for example, the Axiom of Choice, as an inoiviouals free capacity to
choose, is employeo ogotrt that very capacity, seeking to unoermine it. But this use still
requires an event to supplement it, unlike Sartre. Closer woulo be the concept of betrayal,
seen above, here freeoom oenies itself as free reoucing itself to a theorem whos results are
governeo by law. This possible relation between these two thinkers is further complicateo
by Sartres later work in the Cttttoc of Dtolccttcol Rcoor, where a similar philosophy of the
event is oevelopeo. Any substantial investigation of this relation between the Axiom of
Choice ano bao faith woulo have to aooress the question of what happens to the concept
of bao faith in Sartres later writings.
.. Cohen, Sct Tlcot, oro tlc Corttroom H,potlct, p. :6. Baoious technical response may
be that the set useo to force the inoepenoence of CH only containeo ocromctoolc non-con-
Brian Anthony Smith qq
the truth that his intervention amrmeo. The subject is not capable, even
potentially, of fully oeploying the truth of the event.
Baoious argument that his theory of the subject, mooelleo by set
theoretical forcing, brings a new rationalism to the stuoy of the subject
is unoermineo at this point. This rationalism is baseo on the subjects
ability to cope with events ano oeploy the consequences. The faith, or
noelity, of the subject is baseo on the Axiom of Choice as it allows, in the
mooel of forcing the inoepenoence of the Continuum Hypothesis, the oif-
ferentiation of the non-constructible sets from any given constructible or
non-constructible set on the basis of a nnite amount of information. The
rttc subjects faith is ottco on the grounos that it can oiherentiate sets on
a rttc amount of information, regaroless of whether it achieves a specinc
oiherentiation within its own lifetime. This faith is unoermineo if such a
oiherentiation is not nnitely possible.
The subject that forces an event that unoermines their subjectivity
ano the tottorol power of the Axiom of Choice to manage ano proouce
oroer has an echo of the sublime about it. In encountering an event of a
specinc kino the subject experiences something beyono the power of his
free rational power to manage. Although here this ooes not strengthen the
subject, but threatens to oestroy it. If the subject holos its noelity to this
event it then enters willingly into this nihilistic enoeavour. Once the Axi-
om of Choice has been unoermineo the minimal relation between the in-
tensive ano extensive character of multiples is lost, every innnite caroinal
is no longer an aleph. Extensive multiples are no longer tieo to intensive
multiples, not even to a range of possible intensive multiples. The relative
simplicity of the set theoretical universe is somewhat complicateo.
I am not sure what the possible consequences of such a subject are
for Baoious philosophy. It ooes complicate his ethics. A self oestructive
subject intent on amrming something beyono reasons control coulo be
seen as an unwelcome return of the irrational, no longer consioereo as in-
consistent but as exceeoing the power of choice, or as a reintroouction of
the sublime ano the Other, something which Baoiou specincally wants to
avoio ,E ch.,. But this subject is not the proouct of a misuse of the Axiom
of Choice, but one formeo accoroing to the mooel outlineo in Bctrg oro
Eccrt. Therefore, to preserve Baoious ethics this subject must be either
oenieo, it is not a subject, ano might possibly constitute a new category
structible elements, whereas the set useo to force the inoepenoence of AC uses ror-ocro-
mctoolc elements. This woulo force Baoiou into accepting a limiteo form of AC, baseo on
coortoolc choice, but in Bctrg oro Eccrt he amrms the full power to the axiom.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :oo
of Evil, or it is a subject ano its activity is to be amrmeo as Gooo. Both
options oo not seem to comfortably nt into the framework as it stanos.
If this subject is amrmeo the consequences of the post-evental situation
neeo to be aooresseo. Although Bctrg oro Eccrt allows for the inoeter-
minacy of non-constructible sets, their inclusion is limiteo to those that
human inoiviouals can cope with. The inoivioual can only allow forms of
presentation that the Axiom of Choice can manipulate, that is, those sets
that can be subjecteo to the inoiviouals rational power. Without this ra-
tional capacity Baoiou feels that man is reouceo to his animal status, ano
incapable of ethical practice. But in the type of situation ano subjectivity
oescribeo above, it coulo be argueo that the subject is in the process of
exceeoing his rational limitations, acting in a selness way in the face of
something that he cannot master. Ferhaps this is a more ntting ngure for
the ethical subject, ano the post-evental situation, although it never ar-
rives, a more interesting ethical situation?
In conclusion, Baoious use of set theory, in his conceptualization of
the subject, allows him to take a truly original approach to both ontol-
ogy ano philosophy. The mathematical approach gives him the ability
to aoo great clarity ano oistinction to otherwise similar concepts, such as
the name of the voio, in general, in the form of the empty set, ano those
entities on the eoge of the voio that constitute evental sites. Here Baoious
philosophy is at its strongest, rejecting the problems of systematic phi-
losophy ano ontology as an enoless problem of grounoing by aoopting
the axiomatic methoo, ano thus explicitly nullifying the problem. The
problem of the grouno, or the Axiom of the Empty Set, ooes not recur in
ontology, what occurs, insteao, are events.
But set theory is also something of a Fanooras box. There are so
many clearly oenneo bizarre entities within this universe that many of the
aspects of philosophy that Baoiou wants to reject, especially in recent con-
tinental philosophy, can return from the realm of inconsistency, where he
banishes them, ano associate themselves with some of these more unusual
ano ohbeat prooucts of mathematics. In this essay I have introouceo the
possibility that the inoepenoence of the Axiom of Choice coulo reintro-
ouce themes of the Other ano the sublime right into the heart of Baoious
philosophy.
What this proves is not that Baoious philosophy is a failure but that
this approach has a huge potential for proouctive work, even if this may
oivert from, or unoermine, Baoious own singular vision for his work.
The central place of the subjective in the proouction of novelty ano truth
Brian Anthony Smith :o:
in Baoious philosophy of events is a position that I think neeos to be
questioneo.
:o.
Hao we but worlos enough, ano time,

this absolute, philosopher
:
]ustin Clemens
We know that mathematicians care no more for logic than
logicians for mathematics. The two eyes of exact science
are mathematics ano logic: the mathematical sect puts out
the logical eye, the logical sect puts out the mathematical
eye, each believing that it can see better with one eye than
with two.
Augustus oe Morgan
FREAMBLE
Alain Baoious most recent book Logtoc oc moroc presents itself as a
sequel to Bctrg oro Eccrt. But what is a philosophical sequel? What are the
conceptual consequences for a philosophy for which a sequel has come to
seem necessary? To answer this question, I begin by ioentifying certain
key features of Baoious position in BE, particularly regaroing the abso-
luteness of philosophys conoitions. These conoitionsscience, love, art
ano politicsprove absolute insofar as they are inseparably corttrgcrt in
:. This article oraws on the following works of Baoiou:
Alain Baoiou, Logtoc oc moroc: Lcttc ct lcrcmcrt, ., Faris, Seuil, .oo6 ,LOW,.
Alain Baoiou, Or Bcclctt, trans. ano eo. N. Fower ano A. Toscano, Manchester, Clinamen,
.oo ,OB,.
Alain Baoiou, Bctrg oro Eccrt, trans. O. Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo ,BE,.
Alain Baoiou, Bttcrg or Exttcrcc: A Slott Ttcottc or Ttorttot, Ortolog,, trans. N. Maoarasz,
New York, SUNY, .oo6 ,TO,.
Alain Baoiou, Corotttor, Faris, Seuil, :qq. ,C,.
Alain Baoiou, Lc Stclc, Faris, Seuil, .oo ,LS,.
Alain Baoiou, Tlottc oo Soct, Faris, Seuil, :q8. ,TS,.
]ustin Clemens :o
their emergence, tmmorcrt to their situations, clf-oppotttrg in their elabo-
ration, trotctcrt to all existing forms of self-interest, cgolttottor in their ao-
oress, ano tcttotrco in their extension. Fhilosophy is a transliteration of the
singular injunctions oelivereo by these conoitions, ano the recomposition
of these ehects in a system. Several aspects of BE, however, harbour cer-
tain oimculties. Ior example, in regaros to the oetails of subjective varia-
tion, the relation between events ano their sites, the local status of booies
ano situations, ano, above all, in leaving asioe the relation between math-
ematics ano logic. In Logtoc oc moroc ,the title translateo here as Log-
tc of 1otlo,, Baoiou confronts these oimculties. Using category theory,
Baoiou tries to forge a Grano Logic able to account for the specincity
of worlos ano the local apparition of events, without abanooning his ooc-
trine of the transmunoane nature of truths. This review argues that the
attemptthough overwhelmingly brilliantis confusing, ano its execu-
tion not altogether ehective. LOW wavers because it revivines, oespite
itself, Hegelian elements that, in the absence of the Hegelian oialectic,
entail treating corotttor as cxomplc. When reouceo to examples, truths
are no longer corotttor of but oocct fot philosophy, as objects, however,
these truths cannot support philosophy in the way that it requires, without
such support, philosophy collapses into a theory of the logic of appear-
ances. Or, to put this another way, LOW is an cxtto-philosophical work,
concerneo to oelineate the possibility of such situations as the ontological,
rather than working oirectly ottl such situations itself. Symptoms of such
a philosophical extraneousness are evioent in the books escalating rhet-
oric, its proliferation of examples, its unclarineo structure, ano its creation
of new problems in the guise of resolving olo ones. In a woro, LOW is at
once too Hegelian ano not Hegelian enough. Unlike BE, LOW no longer
simply attenos to ooolotc, but tarries with cottootltttc.
I. 1ORLDS LOGICS: BEI^G A^D EVE^T 2, OR, FHILOSOFHYS
SEQUELA
The nrst thing you notice about LOW is its size. In its original Irench
eoition, BE was just over 6o pages, beautifully printeo on heavy paper.
LOW is 6o pages long, ano the paper ano printing seem thinner. The
caro of LOWs cover is signincantly more supple than the cover of BE.
You may also be struck that the stark minimalist cover of BE has here
been ornamenteo with the reproouction of a beautiful Hubert Robert
painting, of ngures bathing before a neoclassical folly in oark wooos, the
sky rift by sun behino the angling clouos. BE appeareo in the series Lototc
pltloopltoc, then eoiteo by Iranois Wahl, LOW appears in the same
series, which is now oirecteo by Baoiou ano Barbara Cassin. It may or
may not be of signincance that Seuil were originally retailing BE for .oo
francs, ano LOW for o euros ,though I got mine for .8.o euros,. Times
have clearly changeo.
The oiherences arent oue only to oesign issues ano a major currency
shift. The title reaos: Logtoc oc moroc: Lcttc ct lcrcmcrt, .. This literally
translates as Logtc of ootlo: octrg oro cccrt, .. Initially, I was tempteo to
twist this into 1otlo Logtc. Why? Iirst, because oe in Irench can be
perfectly well renoereo as an English possessive, retaining the irreoucible
ambiguity of the genitive. Secono, 1otlo Logtc is such a rebarbative syn-
tagm that it at once oetains a force of thought ,you oo have to think about
it,, ano, as such, is also a reminoer that this title has a very particular ano
signincant sense. Ior me, it suggests something about the pluralization
of both worlos ano logics that logics of worlos may not. Note the title
proper is without articles, oennite or inoennite. Thiro, it is an opportunity
to oher contemporary reaoers a rare example of the correct use of the
apostrophe. In the eno, however, I have submitteo to the most straight-
forwaro renoering of the title in Englisha renoering that seems to have
been peculiarly unpopular to oatebut which at least mimes the form of
the original ano, as the acronym LOW, is much richer than WL.
.
Translation issues asioe, the next thing you might notice about LOW
is its peculiar organization. If you turn to the Table of contents, you are
immeoiately confronteo by a labyrinth of peculiar oivisions: a Freface,
seven Books ,each titleo, ano a Conclusion, each oivision of noticeably
variable length ano further suboivioeo, there are also scholia, technical
notes, appenoices, avant-propos, information, commentaries ano oigres-
sions, statements, oictionaries, bibliography, inoex ano iconography,
further suboivisions, bristling with titles, sometimes even the same title
repeateo in oiherent books, sometimes numbereo, sometimes not ,e.g.,
Existence, Atomic logic, The inexistent, etc.,.
.. See, for example, A. Toscano ano R. Brassier, Eoitors Note in A. Baoiou, Tlcotcttcol
1ttttrg, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, pp. ix, x, where they speak of Tlc Logtc of 1otlo,
whereas Norman Maoarasz has recourse to 1otlo Logtc in his translation of Baoious Fref-
ace in TO, p. xi. As for Steve Corcoran ano Bruno Bosteels, they give Logtc of 1otlo
in their translation of Logics of the Site in Dtocttttc, vol. , nos. -, .oo, pp. ::-:o.
Moreover, in their unpublisheo Fostface: Aleatory Rationalism ,written .oo, to Tlcotctt-
col 1ttttrg, Toscano ano Brassier oo inoeeo speak of Logtc of 1otlo. This alreaoy gives
us, bizarrely, four possibilities for what seems an eminently straightforwaro title. Davio
Bowie fans will surely appreciate the acronymic allusion here to his magnincent album of
the same name.
]ustin Clemens :o
Ior anyone familiar with the structure ano vocabulary of BE, many of
the heaoings here will appear unfamiliar or anomalous. BE is classically
ano minimally structureo. It begins with an account of the philosophi-
cal conjuncture into which BE is intervening, ano then proceeos, in an
oroerly fashionthat is, at once logically, chronologically ano themati-
callyfrom Flato to Lacan, intersperseo with what is essentially a course
in set theory ontology. LOW, on the other hano, is not oroereo classically,
chronologically, minimally, or, to the nakeo eye, logically. In the Freface
alone, one nnos, alongsioe a polemic opposing oemocratic materialism
ano the materialist oialectic, oiscussions of prime numbers clc the Greeks
ano clc roo, of the painteo horses of the Chauvet-Font-oArc grotto ano
Ficasso, of Virgil ano Berlioz, of raoical Chinese political tracts. It is sure-
ly signincant that LOW ooes not, as oio its preoecessor, situate itself in a
pltloopltcol conjuncture, but in a very generalizeo, global coltotol moment
,that of oemocratic materialism,. As one progresses through the book,
the logic of the presentation of category theory begins to take preceoence,
until, nnally, the formalisms tail oh to eno with propositions entirely in
natural language. There is certainly a kino of structure here, but it is less
clearly rigorous ano less self-evioent than its preoecessors.
I will come back to this question of structure more oirectly below, but I
wish to broach it here by asking a particular, if perhaps unusual, question:
1lot ooc tt mcor to otttc o pltloopltcol cocl. In the case of Hollywooo, the
necessity for a sequel is very clear: it is auoience receipts. In the case of
philosophy, the necessity for a sequel is, on the contrary, highly obscure.
Its not usually sales that oetermine success. As Davio Hume notoriously
remarkeo of his own Ttcottc or Homor ôtotc, it fell oeao-born from the
press. Such a lack of public approbation, however, is haroly an argument
against the value of a book ,especially not one that Immanuel Kant saio
woke him from his oogmatic slumbers,.
Still, asioe from metaphors of

continuing to ruoely awaken people oespite your oemise, its haro to know
what constitutes philosophical success, let alone what sort of philosophi-
cal success might oemano a sequel. If a philosophical work is a success,
surely that ptcclooc a sequel? Youve saio what neeoeo to be saio: you can
now speno the rest of your life reiterating, rewriting, or recanting your
program. If you aoo a proposeo secono volume, that haroly constitutes a
sequel, a systematic work in no matter how many volumes is not a sequel.
. ]on Rohe has alerteo me to the fact that Kant may never have reao Humes Ttcottc, but
relieo on seconoary sources for his information about the problem Hume raises in regaros
to causation. I woulo like to take this opportunity, too, to thank both Rohe ano A. ]. Bar-
tlett for their comments on an earlier oraft of this review.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :o6
In philosophy, a sequel perhaps implies that the original was in some
way a failure, somehow oencient, requiring supplementation or correc-
tionano yet, somehow, tlc intervention you cant help but follow.
You may get something of this sense from Hegels problems with seal-
ing up his system. In his Freface to the Iirst Eoition of the Sctcrcc of Logtc,
he writes:
As regaros the external relation, it was intenoeo that the nrst part
of the S,tcm of Sctcrcc which contains the Plcromcrolog, shoulo be
followeo by a secono part containing logic ano the two concrete
|tcolcr| sciences, the Fhilosophy of Nature ano the Fhilosophy of
Spirit, which woulo complete the System of Fhilosophy. But the
necessary expansion which logic itself has oemanoeo has inouceo
me to have this part publisheo separately, it thus forms the nrst
sequel to the Plcromcrolog, of Sptttt in an expanoeo arrangement
of the system. It will later be followeo by an exposition of the two
concrete philosophical sciences mentioneo.
The philosophical system that presents the Absolute System nnos itself
forceo into a necessary expansion, oetermineo by logic itself . As Martin
Heioegger glosses the transmogrincation:
Soon after the appearance of the Plcromcrolog, of Sptttt in :8o,
Hegel began publishing a work known as the Logtc. The nrst volume
of this work appeareo in :8:./:, ano the secono volume in :8:6.
But the Logtc oio not appear as the secono part of the system of
science. Or is this Logtc, in accoro with the matter at issue therein,
the remaining secono part of the system? Yes ano no.
Yes ano no: what I want to unoerline at this point is that Hegel, a philos-
opher notorious for enforcing a total ano systematic approach to philoso-
phy, is himself forceo to alter his oeclareo presentation so signincantly that
. G.W. I. Hegel, Tlc Sctcrcc of Logtc, trans. A.V. Miller, Atlantic Highlanos N], Humanities
Fress International, :qq6, pp. .8-q.
. M. Heioegger, Hcgcl Plcromcrolog, of Sptttt, trans. F. Emao ano K. Maly, Bloomington
ano Inoianapolis, Inoiana University Fress, :q88, p. .. As Heioegger continues, Why is
the title S,tcm omitteo as early as :8:.? Because between :8o ano :8:., a transformation
was alreaoy unoerway. The sign of the initial transformation in the ioea of the system can
be seen in the fact that the Logtc not only loses the main heaoing but also stanos separately,
by itselfnot because it turneo out to be too oetaileo, but because the Plcromcrolog, is to
take on a oiherent function ano position in the nuctuating arrangement of the system.
Because the Plcromcrolog, is no longer the nrst part of the system, the Logtc is no longer its
secono part, p. . Inoeeo, the entire Introouction is of pertinence here, pp. :-.. I woulo
like to thank Faul Ashton for reminoing me of these passages, as well as for his oetaileo
commentary on these issues ,personal communication,.
]ustin Clemens :o
the system that the original purports to present must itself be reorganizeo
accoroing to new criteria that retrospectively transform its essence. Yet
this very transformation continues to pursue its singular oivagation in the
wake of the original. I will return below to the consequences of Hegels
systemic-reconstruction-in-process. Here, however, I want to mark just
how tightly the problem of the philosophical sequel is articulateo with,
nrst, the problem of the ooolotc ano, secono, with the problem of ,tcm.
One might suggest that sequels teno to force out an impossibility of articu-
lation between the two, as they betray the intervention of new concepts.
A sequel makes its preoecessor the orc that it was not ,or hao not been,.
The wholeor at least its non-existence or its impossibilityis at stake
in a sequel.
Which is why it is not surprising that philosophy begins with a man
who writes nothing but sequels. The same action hero returns, again ano
again, hurling himself enthusiastically into oangerous ano extreme situa-
tions, one reoiscovers familiar ngures ano locations, which are then ren-
oereo uncanny by the events in which they are summoneo to participate,
a battery of narrative special-ehects are placeo in the service of a ceaseless
conceptual warfare. All of which makes the Flatonic oialogues extremely
oimcult to oecipher. Is Socrates the same character throughout the oia-
logues? How ooes he change? Why? How close a resemblance ooes he
bear to the historical Socrates? Especially since this Flatonic character
Socrates oies, then returns to life, to circumstances which are painfully
nctional or rankly impossible. What are the consequences for the elabora-
tion of concepts given this swarming of personae? Ano so on. The com-
plexity of the relation between continuity ano rupture in the presentation
ano capture of concepts is not just implicit, but itself exposeo ano put to
work in ano by such a serial presentation, to the extent that continuity
ano rupture must themselves be re-conceptualizeo in oroer to fulnl the
oemanos of philosophy.
6
Nor is it then surprising, given Alain Baoious oeclareo Flatonism,
that LOW, his most recent book, presents itself as a sequel to his inoisput-
able mogrom opo, BE. As the back cover blurb puts it, LOW is conceiveo
as a sequel |orc ottc| to his previous great book of philosophy. Why?
Baoiou himself notes that, oespite several of his books proving genuine
bestsellers in the wake of BE, this economic success was no inoex of
philosophical triumph. On the contrary, his ooubts only grew about sev-
6. To follow this line of thought, coulo then not Aristotles Pl,tc ano Mctopl,tc be
thought accoroing to a logic of the sequel?
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :o8
eral aspects of his own work. Was Baoiou about to expel himself from his
own paraoise? In the Freface to the new English translation of Coott ttott
oortologtc ttorttottc, Baoiou puts it like this:
Irom the mioole of the :qqos, what slowly grew to become most
evioent to me were the oimculties of my unoertaking. Happy
times were coming to a close. I tolo myself: The ioea of event is
funoamental. But the theory I propose on what the event is the
name of is not clear. Or: The ontological extension of mathematics
is certain. But, then, what about logic? Many other ooubts ano
questions ensueo ,TO, ix-x,.
What is striking about the problems of philosophical sequels ,or, if

youre happy to contract a epioemiological pun, the coclo, is that they
constitute a tctotr to orcclf. ]acques Lacan notoriously calleo for a return
to Ireuo, meaningnot a return to oogmas or ooctrines of the master
but to the tmpoc of the Ireuoian text. It is to the turbulent traces of
Ireuos own faileo solutions to the unpreceoenteo oeaolocks his oiscovery
of the unconscious generateo that Lacan attenos. So when, in BE, Baoiou
proposes the clarion-call of a return to Flato, his call shoulo be taken in
this vein. A return to Flato is not just a return to the Flatonic oogmas, but
to the rifts ano opacities of the Flatonic text, rifts ano opacities, however,
that woulo have been unthinkable before Flatos interruption of poetry
by mathematics.
Yet both Flato ano Ireuo were, for the reasons I have been imply-
ing, oltcoo, caught up in their own process of return to their own earlier
work, ano it is this returningto the impasses thrown up by a founoing
interventionthat constitutes the oevelopment of their work. A return
always returns to return. But it ooes so on the basis of an interruption that
exceeos any sumcient reason. In Flato, this interruption is calleo Socrates,
in Ireuo, it is calleo the symptom. Which makes a sequel oiherent from
just another book by the same author: it is a return to ones own failures to
have thought what renoers possible ano necessary such a return.
8
. See A. ]. Bartletts review of TO in Como oro Httot,, vol. ., no. :-., pp. q-. As
Bartlett ,ano others, have noteo, the English in TO can be imprecise ano confusing.
8. One shoulo then note the perhaps surprising profusion of sequels in contemporary Eu-
ropean philosophy: I think immeoiately of Michel Ioucaults Httot, of Scxooltt, volumes,
as well as Michel Serress Hctm sequence, Deleuze ano Guattaris Artt-Ocotpo ano A
Tloooro Plotcoo, Giorgio Agambens Homo Socct, Rcmrort of Aoclott ano Stotc of Exccp-
ttor, etc. Baoiou himself has a little sequence of volumes entitleo Cttcortorcc ,collections of
little articles that have appeareo elsewhere,, ano speaks of his own temptation to publish a
Corotttor . ,cf. Freface to TO, p. xi,. But its necessary to be careful: not every numbereo
sequence constitutes a sequel in the sense I am speaking of here , nor are unnumbereo
]ustin Clemens :oq
One coulo give this sequaciousness of philosophy a number of oiher-
ent names, such as those that Baoiou himself has exploreo in some oetail
elsewhere. In Lc Stclc, he gives Chapter 8 the title of Anabasis, orawn
from a famous memoir of Xenophon, stuoent of Socrates, contemporary
of Flato. Baoiou writes: In the trajectory it names, anabasis leaves unoe-
cioeo the parts respectively allotteo to oisciplineo invention ano uncertain
wanoering. In so ooing, it constitutes a oisjunctive synthesis of will ano
wanoering. After all, the Greek woro alreaoy attests to this unoecioabil-
ity, since the verb ,to anabase, as it were,, means both to
embark ano to return.
q
If Baoiou here invokes anabasis in the context
of a oiscussion of Saint-]ohn Ferse ano Faul Celan, it is also presentif
not nameo as suchin the oiscussion in LOW, unoer the heaoing of ref-
erents ano operations of the faithful subject:
Lets suppose that, following the revolt of a hanoful of glaoiators
arouno Spartacus in BCE, the slavesor rather, omc slaves,
if in large numbersmaoe a booy, insteao of being oisperseo
in groups. Lets accept that the trace of the revolt-event be the
statement: We, slaves, we want to return home |clc roo|. Is the
subject form the operation by which the new booy of slaves ,their
army ano its oepenoents, joins itself to the trace?Its materiality is
the consequences orawn oay after oay from the evental trace, that
is, from a principle trocxco to tlc potolc: We, slaves, we want to oro
cor return home ,q,.
Once you recognize this operation, you might begin to oiscern it every-
where in Baoiouif unoer a sequence of ever-varying names. In an essay
on Beckett that nrst appeareo in Irench in Corotttor, ano now appears in
English in Or Bcclctt, Baoiou pinpoints a serious shift in Becketts work of
the :q6os. It is from this shift that Baoiou is able to oraw the lesson that
every generic proceoure weaves within its singular ouration these four
functions: wanoering, immobility, the imperative, ano the story ,OB .,.
Ior Baoiou, it is important not to reouce the shift in oroer to oiscern the
titles not necessarily sequels. Baoiou : Let us note that Bttcrg or Exttcrcc. Slott Ttcottc
or Ttorttot, Ortolog, is part of a trilogy, which is alreaoy more tentative than the unity of
the Corotttor volume. Fublisheo simultaneously with it was the Pcttt morocl otrctlttoc.
There was also the Aotg oc mtopoltttoc, TO, p. xi. Moreover, a sequel is not a carefully
orchestrateo succession of works oealing with problems in a clearly oiscernible sequence,
as in Bergson, Authors Freface in Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, p. xiii. Ano a proposeo sequel may
never appear at all: wheres Bctrg C Ttmc .? There is something orplorrco about a philo-
sophical sequel ,or its failure to appear,.
q. A. Baoiou, Lc Stclc, Faris, Seuil, .oo, p. :.:. I am inoebteo to Alberto Toscano for use
of his excellent oraft translation of this book, which I rely on here.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo ::o
return of return, to aoo to our list of pertinent features of the sequel, this
raises the question of ttmc. The sequels oouble-blow, its irreoucible Twon-
ess, cant help but make one think of various utterances of Baoious, e.g.
Timeis intervention itself, thought as the gap between two events ,BE
.:o, or the structure of the ultra-one is the Two ,BE .:o,, or, in LOW,
orawing on the striking examples of Spartacus ano Archimeoes, we will
call this oestination tcottccttor, which reactivates a subject in another logic
of its appearing-in-truth ,,. In any case, the return or resurrection must
be a return to unpreceoenteo possibilities in ano of the present, founoeo
on the contingency of an evaporateo event ano its uncanny trace.
In other woros, it is not the bestselling success of BE that founos the
necessity for a sequel, but, beyono whatever its ,perceiveo, errors, insuf-
nciencies, ano obscurities might be, there is a truth to continue across
the interruption ,i.e., a cleft of non-relation,. As a sequel then, LOW an-
nounces itself as: a tcttctottor of certain ioeas of BE, notably the proposition
that mathematics is ontology, a tccttor of certain claims of BE, notably
the theory of the subject ano event, a tcploccmcrt of certain concepts, no-
tably that of situation by worlo, an cxtcrtor of certain tenoencies of BE,
notably the much fuller account given of logic, ano a opplcmcrtottor of cer-
tain minimal elements of BE, notably in the oescriptions of political ano
artistic processes. Yet there is a nnal aspect: LOW wishes also to complctc
BE, to nll in its holes ano answer its critics. This ,inexpungible but ille-
gitimate, oesire will, as we will see, have serious consequences for LOWs
structure. Reiteration, revision, replacement, extension, supplementation,
ano completion: we nno that Baoiou himself is obsesseo with the problem
of the sequel, which returns throughout his post-BE work unoer an ex-
traoroinary smattering of oiverse names. It is in the scattereo light of this
embarkation-return ano oisciplinary-archiving ,sequel, anabasis, resur-
rection,which, on Baoious own account, always proouces a new booy
ano new possibilitieswe will examine what becomes of BE in LOW.
Whatever else one can say, Hollywooo cinema ano philosophical sequels
clearly oo have something in common. Ior both, sequels are a common
mooality of the generic.
]ustin Clemens :::
II. FHILOSOFHY AS CONDITIONED, CONDITIONS
AS ABSOLUTES
What maoe reaoing Bctrg oro Eccrt such a oeranging experience was
that its author hao clearly toucheo upon an ooolotc.
:o
Even if you eno up
oisagreeing with every proposition in that book, it is nonetheless impos-
sible to reao ano not agree that contemporary philosophy will have to
change in its wakewhether in the guise of amrmation, extension, cri-
tique, resistance, rejection, or some other operation. The asceticism of its
presentation, the assureoness of its oeclarations, the rigour of its structure,
the inevitability of its oevelopment, the universality of its ambition, all
help to renoer BE an event in the thought of being. In this regaro, Ba-
oious account in his Authors Freface to the recent English translation of
BE perhaps errs on the sioe of polttcc:
Soon it will have been twenty years since I publisheo this book
in Irance. At that moment I was quite aware of having written
a great book of philosophy. I felt that I hao actually achieveo
what I hao set out to oo. Not without prioe, I thought that I hao
inscribeo my name in the history of philosophy, ano, in particular,
in the history of those philosophical systems which are the subject
of interpretations ano commentaries throughout the centuries ,xi,.
What makes BE such a great book? Among its major claims are the
following:
::
Flato is the founoing moment of philosophy
Flato founos philosophy insofar as he interrupts poetrys rev-
elation of presence by means of pure mathematics
This interruption also entails the rethinking of love ano poli-
tics
Flato therefore founos philosophy on extra-philosophical con-
oitions
There are four, ano only four, of these conoitions
These conoitions are irreoucible to each other
These conoitions are mathematics, poetry, love ano politics
The conoitions are truth proceoures
The founoation of philosophy was an act that organizeo these
conoitions into a system
:o. See Rohes review of Bctrg oro Eccrt in Como oro Httot,, vol. ., no. :-., pp. .-8.
::. Although it is true that many of these claims are only fully renoereo clear, explicit
ano oistinct in accompanying texts such as Corotttor ano Mortfcto fot Pltloopl,, they are
implicit in BE.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo ::.

To oo philosophy is to remain faithful to this founoing act
Remaining faithful to this founoation entails the construction
of a system accoroing to the contemporary oirections proposeo
by these conoitions
These contemporary oirections enjoin: attenoing to set theory,
attenoing to poetry, attenoing to post-Revolution emancipa-
tory politics, attenoing to psychoanalysis qua love
This attention will result in ioeas, such as mathematics is on-
tology, poetry oelivers the matheme of the event, politics en-
gages the universality of aooress, love is the struggle of the
non-relation.
:.
Although it is necessary to be telegraphic in the present context, there
are a number of oetails that must be clarineo, above all, the concept of
conoition.
The concept is best explaineo by recourse to Baoious claims about
mathematics. Fure mathematics is the paraoigm of oeouctive rationality.
Anyone can oo mathematics, yet anyone who ooes mathematics will be
constraineo to the same results, or, more precisely, to the same points of
unoecioability. Such mathematics has no empirical reference. Mathemat-
ics clarines the problems about which one can rationally speak, ano how
one must speak of them ,i.e., to invoke innnity tooay outsioe of its post-
Cantorian acceptation is mere oto coct or obscurantism,. Its verincation
is tmmorcrt to its practice, inoeeo, verincation ano practice are trcpotoolc
in regaro to mathematics. Mathematics is therefore in this sense inoubi-
table, obeying only its own proceoures. Anyone ooing mathematics must
accoro with these proceoures ano their results. Mathematics is therefore
also cgolttottor: all are literally equalizeo in their submission to its proce-
oures.
Its conoitioning by mathematics means philosophy has an unbreaka-
ble commitment to the most rigorous possible form of rationality. This ra-
tionality is oetacheo from any oirect empirical innuences whatsoever ,i.e.,
not only from history, social mores, sexual, ethnic, religious oiherences,
etc., but from the vicissituoes of natural languages themselves,. Moreover,
the limits of mathematics are rigorously given ottltr mathematics itself.
:.. Signincantly, Baoiou insists that each generic proceoure has an ahect proper to it. In
Or Bcclctt, he writes: Happiness also singularizes love as a truth proceoure, for happi-
ness can only exist in love. Such is the rewaro proper to this type of truth. In art there is
pleasure, in science joy, in politics enthusiasm, but in love there is happiness, p. . He
repeats this schema verbatim in LOW. See the excellent little Tableau :, p. 86 ,reproouceo
below,.
]ustin Clemens ::
These features have further consequences pertinent here. Iirst, one can-
not juoge mathematics by any external criteria, only mathematics is ao-
equate to its own reason. Fhilosophy must follow the leao of mathematics,
not the other way arouno. Secono, philosophy must take reason as far
as it can go, if one starts to follow mathematics, one must follow it to the
bitter eno. Thiro, in ooing so, philosophy must be prepareo to rupture
with all social prejuoices, even ano especially its own. Iour, mathematics
cannot, for all that, be permitteo to totalize what happens, inoeeo, math-
ematics explicitly theorizes ano prohibits its own totalization.
After all, what happens raoically exceeos mathematics. How coulo
one talk of a mathematics of love or politics or, inoeeo, poetry, when it is
precisely their extra-oeouctive character that is essential to these genres?
Ior Baoiou, love, politics ano art are also genres that have a genuinely
thoughtful kernelif the materials ano operations by which they reason
cannot be orttctpotco by oeouction. As we shall see, these genre-conoitions
can ,after the fact, be fotmoltco by mathematical means by philosophy
,e.g., in mathemes,, but their apparition is oue only to ungovernable
Chance ano the process of their oevelopment entirely subjective. Moreo-
ver, each of these genres oeals with a oiherent aspect of human creativ-
ity: art with the problem of being emerging as absent presence, love as
the problem of sustaining an encounter with a non-oialectizable other,
politics as the problem of non-totalizable universality.
:
Ano mathemat-
ics has a particular claim on our philosophical attention. Baoiou notori-
ously oeclares that mathematics is ontology, a statement to which we
will return in the next section of this review. These genres are founoeo in
events, that is, as non-oeoucible, illegal occurrences in a situation whose
consequences may come to bear on the experiences of all. Truths rupture
History. Ior Baoiou, all the genres share the following features. They are:
corttrgcrt in their emergence, tmmorcrt to their situations, clf-oppotttrg in
their elaboration, trotctcrt to all existing forms of self-interest, cgolttottor
in their aooress, tcttotrco in their extension. It is this six-folo aspect that
renoers truths ,or, more precisely, the event-subject-truth process, abso-
lute. Note how contingency ano restraint ,non-totalization, here become
:. How Baoiou oiherentiates these conoitions from text to text is of extreme interest. In
Tlc Ccrtot,, he notes that sciencepossesses problems, it ooes not have a project, while
in Corotttor, he shows how love ano politics begin at each others rear enos, so to speak.
Ior Baoiou, if one conoition comes to oominate one or another ,or inoeeo all, of the oth-
ers, this entails what he calls a suture: unoer such conoitions, philosophy itself oisappears,
ano the conoitions may start to take on the roles that are properly the province of philoso-
phy ,e.g., poetry in the post-Romantic era starts to think Being,.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo ::
part of what it means to be absolute, a raoically untraoitional conception,
note that self-supporting means bearing its reason within itself ano sup-
porteo by a self |subject|, note that inoiherence incluoes excepting itself
from pre-existing forms of temporality, as time is usually practiseo as an
exemplary form of self-interest, note that egalitarian is synonymous with
bearing universal aooress, ano so on.
:
Fhilosophy is to construct a system on the basis of the four conoitions,
ano on these four olorc. Why? As Baoiou reiterates in Logtoc oc moroc:
The fact is that tooayano on this point things have not
shifteo since Flatowe know only four types of truths: science
,mathematics ano physics,, love, politics ano the arts. We can
compare this situation to Spinozas report concerning the attributes
of Substance ,the expressions of Goo,: there are unooubteoly,
Spinoza says, an innnity of attributes, but we, men, know only two,
thought ano extension. Ferhaps there are, we will say, an innnity
of types of truths, but we, men, know only four. However, we know
them truly. In such a way that our relation to truthsis ooolotc
,8o,.
:

I have italicizeo the woro ooolotc in the nnal sentence above, because it
is precisely the status of our relation to the conoitions as absolute that I
want to emphasize here. No other human practices can provioe such an
absolute. This absoluteness is, as I have been concerneo to specify, of a
very precise if peculiar kino. Fhilosophy really must be conoitioneo by
these absolutes. How Baoiou ooes this will become apparent to anyone
:. I believe these features are plausible, even compelling, as a occttpttor of the peculiarities
of these four oiscourses. Empiricist ano anecootal as such a remark may be, I can verify
that English political activists, Italian historians ano Australian artists have also founo
this compelling as a oescription of their practices. It also strikes me that these features
also constitute an immanent philosophical justincationor, to use the more bombastic
term favoureo in recent Irench thought, an amrmationof these practices. Fhilosophy
must amrm the extra-philosophical thoughts that make it possible. Iinally, this coupling
of oescription ano justincation enables a thiro moment, an explanatory one, e.g., math-
ematics is ontology. What such statements present is a purely philosophical seizure of the
status of the particular oiscourse. Description-justincation-explanation: if you will excuse
such teminology, it is still possible to accept that this is one of the knots that philosophy
shoulo tie.
:. The paragraph begins a truth is certainly an experience of the inhuman. However,
our point of view that forges ,in philosophy, the theory of truths ano subjective ngures
has a price: we cannot know if the types of truths we experience are the only possible ones.
Other species, unknown to us, or even our own species, at another stage of its history ,for
example, transformeo by genetic engineering,, can, perhaps, acceoe to types of truths of
which we have no ioea, ano even no image, LOW, p. 8o.
]ustin Clemens ::
who reaos BE carefully: he oirectly transliterates the operations of the
conoitions into philosophical jargon. Theres haroly more to it than that.
The axioms of set theory provioe all the necessities for the ontology, the
operations of poetry provioe the matrix for an extra-rational thought of
the event oo unoecioable ,see, in particular, Meoitation :q on Mallarm,.
By means of such a transliteration, philosophy constructs its own ioeas.
These ioeas are phraseo in such terms as mathematics is ontology. This
means that, as Oliver Ieltham puts it in his Translators Freface to BE,
a philosophical ioea is at once a oecision, a principle ano a hypothesis
,xxii,, one which coulo only have been generateo out of some kino of con-
frontation with conoitions. The absolute forces questioning, not any kino
of belief. Inoeeo, conoition shoulo also be given the logical navour of the
corotttorol for its subjects: tf this event, tlcr what are the consequences?
So Baoious absolute conoitions are clearly not the Hegelian Abso-
lute. There is no Whole, there is no single overarching logic of presenta-
tion, oevelopmental or not, there is no necessity to a truth, nor essence
of truths, there is no temporalization of the concept, etc. In general, it
cannot be philosophys task to try to think everything, inoeeo, for Baoiou,
philosophy is necessarily a precarious oiscourse, for at least three reasons.
The nrst of these, the pragmatic reason, is that, oepenoent as philosophy
is on its conoitions, not all these conoitions are functional in all epochs
ano places: in such cases, philosophy itself must oisappear. The secono
reason, the bao reason, is that philosophy, consistently tempteo to think
outsioe the square, oissolves itself in the temptation to think the non-ex-
istent whole, either ossifying into overweening oogmatism or reoucing
itself to just another way of oescribing the incoherent slew of empirical
happenings ,for example as a glorineo grammarian or sociologue, as a
physicist manqu or psychologist,. The thiro, gooo reason, is that, even
when these conoitions are all available, they are themselves exceptionally
oimcult to grasp, every successful philosophy is therefore, at best, built
on a constitutive instability. There is no totality to think, only the contin-
gent becomings of heterogeneous event-truths ano their subjects. Fhiloso-
phy tries to seize on the ioeas these conoitions inouce, as axioms of ano
for action.
:6
This is the funoamentally otmottcc movement of philosophy.
It is the voio place constructeo by philosophy to enable the heterogene-
ous truths proouceo by its conoitions to meet, that Baoiou refers to as
Truth. The oimculties of ooing so entails that the absolute in philosophy
:6. See A. Baoiou, Irrttc Tlooglt, eo. ano trans. ]. Clemens ano O. Ieltham, Lonoon,
Continuum .oo, p. .
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo ::6
is not something one can relax into, like a warm bath or a reliable security
system, but, on the contrary, involves the savage wrenching-away of every
certainty, the embrace of incalculable risk. Worse still, this savagery of the
absolute is quiet, fragile, almost inoiscernible.
Despite the brevity of this summary, it shoulo be clear how Baoiou
takes his oistance from theology ano analytic philosophy on the one hano,
ano the extreme ahects of religious beliefs, on the other. One must not
unoerestimate this aspect of Baoious work, which, having pure reason as
a paraoigm, inouces him to repuoiate all forms of religious ano theologi-
cal thought. This ooes not mean that he ooes not engage with examples
of such thought. On the contrary, he makes committeo interventions into
such thought, by essaying to oetach what he oc focto treats as the pure
thought of such thinkers from the religious impurities in which they have
become enmireo. In this approach, somebooy like Saint Faul becomes an
exemplary poltttcol militant ano thinker, who ought to be extracteo from
his religious envelope, incluoing from the history of the church.
:
This is why I sometimes characterize Baoious philosophy as a SLAF
philosophy: philosophy not only integrally relies on Science, Love, Art
ano Folitics, but it gives you a slap to awaken you from the nightmare of
history. Moreoverano I apologize for the cheesy sloganizing hereone
can usefully permute these letters as a hanoy mnemonic for Baoious ooc-
trines. The work of noelity can be consioereo long, protracteo, repetitive,
oimcult: its like ooing LAFS. But if one persists, one acquires FALS in
this enterprise, that is, philosophical frienos with whom you also engage
in questioning arouno the status of truths ano Truth. As such, youll attain
the heights of thought in those philosophical ALFS presently icy with for-
getting ano oesuetuoe ,ano maybe get some skiing in while youre there,.
SLAF LAFS FALS ALFS: the permutations of philosophy.
I have begun with a protracteo review of what may now appear, af-
ter many years of commentary, very familiar, even merely introouctory,
platituoes about Baoious system. I oo not, however, believe this to be the
case. One of the oimculties that commentators have so far hao is taking
seriously the concept of conoition. To the extent that they oo so, they
miss Baoious utter reliance on his conoitions. Cantorian set-theory really
t ontology for Baoiou, Mallarms poetry really ooc provioe the matheme
of the event. These are not examples, no matter how subtly one thinks
:. See A. Baoiou, Sotrt Pool: Tlc Fooroottor of Urtcctoltm, trans. R. Brassier, Stanforo,
Stanforo UF, .oo.
]ustin Clemens ::
the problematic of the example. They are ooolotc. As such, they are the
only possible founoations for a philosophical ,tcm.
III. IROM MATHEMATICS TO LOGIC, IROM SITUATIONS
TO WORLDS, IROM BEING TO BEING-THERE, IROM ES-
SENCE TO AFFEARANCE, IROM SUB]ECTS TO OB]ECTS,
IROM CONDITIONS TO TRANSCENDENTALS
As I have noteo, many things remain the same between BE ano LOW.
Mathematics remains the science of being, ano truths remain exceptions
to existence. Baoiou puts it like this: Tlctc otc orl, oootc oro lorgoogc,
cxccpt tlctc otc ttotl, as a kino of slogan of what he here oenominates his
materialist oialectic, to oistinguish it from the common or garoen kino of
oemocratic materialism oominant tooay. The slogans syntax is explicitly
Mallarmanthe stars its oestinationto oemarcate it from the repulsive
mooesties of philosophies of nnituoe. Whereas oemocratic materialism
believes that there are only inoiviouals ano communities, the material-
ist oialectic proclaims that truths are accompanieo by the eclipsing of all
inoiviouation ano community. Truths are eternal, innnite, generic, they
are supporteo by oepersonalizeo, inhuman, subjects. As we have seen,
part of the point of conoitions is to think amrmatively, i.e., proceeo on the
basis of positive constructions alone. BEs proceoure continues in LOW.
As Baoiou says, In no way oo I go back on all this ,,.
What, then, has changeo between BE ano LOW? As the title of this
subsection announces, there are a number of key changes in the vocabu-
lary, argumentation, organization ano references. The aim for Baoiou
is to reconngure his existing concerns in a oiherent framework, that is,
accoroing to the singularity of worlos where |truths| appear ,,. With
this in mino, Baoiou elaborates a fuller account of subjective variation, a
reviseo account of the event, a new account of appearance, a new concept
of objectivity, an extenoeo account of logic ,by shifting from set theory
to category theory,, ano so on.
:8
On his own account, however, the mot
:8. Eilenberg ano Mac Lane createo categories in the :qos as a way of relating systems
of algebraic structures ano systems of topological spaces in algebraic topology. The spreao
of applications leo to a general theory, ano what hao been a tool for hanoling structures
became more ano more a means of oenning them. Grothenoieck ano his stuoents solveo
classical problems in geometry ano number theory using new structuresincluoing to-
posesconstructeo from sets by categorical methoos. In the :q6os, Lawvere began to
give purely categorical oennitions of new ano olo structures, ano oevelopeo several styles
of categorical founoations for mathematics, C. McClarty, Elcmcrtot, Cotcgottc, Elcmcrtot,
Topoc, Oxforo, Oxforo University Fress, :qq., p. :.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo ::8
cortoctoolc tolc of LO1 t to ptooocc o rco ocrtttor of oootc, orocttooo o
ttotl-oootc, ot ooccttoolc oootc ,,. To oo this, however, Baoiou has to
reformulate the status of logic itself. In this new oispensation, logic ano
consistency of appearing are the same thing ,,, ano it is from this
point that he returns to the problem of the subject.
Ior Baoiou, a subject is not a register of experience, a moral category,
or an ioeological nction ,three oominant oeterminations of the subject,,
on the contrary, it is an inoex of the real, born of an event, faithful to the
trace. Though a political subject is as oiherent from a subject of love as
that subject is from a subject of mathematics, etc., each subject must be
fotmoll, thought accoroing to the same concepts. In BE, this subject is a
nnite quantity of truth. Irom the stanopoint of BEs conception, then,
inoiviouals that oiont assent or remaineo inoiherent to the event were
implicitly consioereo by Baoiou to remain mere state agents, agents of
inertia. As such, they were not helo to be, tttcto cro, subjects. In BE, a
political reactionary is not a subject, an acaoemic painter is not part of a
truth process, nor are the surgeons who sneereo at Loro Listers absuro
obsession with hygiene, ano sharpeneo their scalpels on their boots, nor
those who reouce love to a pure biological function or a category of eu-
phemistic illusion. This is a central instance of the binary minimalism of
BE: if there is a subject, it must be amrmative, if it is not amrmative, it is
not a subject. In LOW, however, to this basic mooel of the faithful subject,
Baoiou has aooeo two ,or three, more categories: the reactionary, the ob-
scure ano the resurrecteo. Spartacuss slave revolt is his primary example
in this initial oelineation.
Baoiou has hao to oo this in oroer to explain how, in the responses to
the emergence of a faithful subject, reactionaries too are perfectly capable
of inventiveness ,or, rather, are forceo to be so,. As he writes: To resist the
call of the new, it is again necessary to create arguments of resistance ao-
justeo to the novelty itself. Irom this point of view, every reactive oisposi-
tion is contemporary with the present against which it reacts ,6.,. Whats
typical of such a subject is that it works to extinguish the present that a
faithful subject has openeo, oenying its possibilities ano powers through
the negation of the evental trace. Dont revolt, its not worth it, youll
just eno up getting yourself crucineo on the Appian Way. Or: all things
in mooeration, just slow oown, well set up some committees to look into
glaoiatorial ahairs ano maybe have a sausage-sizzle too. Here Baoiou
invokes Anor Glucksmann ano his cohort of nouveaux philosophes as
contemporary imagos of such reactionary mooeration.
]ustin Clemens ::q
But we also nno an obscure |oocot| subject: What relation can a
patrician of ancient Rome have to the alarming news that assails him con-
cerning the slave revolt? Or a Venoean bishop learning of the oownfall
ano imprisonment of the king? ,6,
:q
Well, what they want is the pure ano
simple conservation of the prior oroer. The obscure subject wants above
all to repress the present, to repel the event in the name of a transcenoent
Booy ,City, Goo, Race,, ano, to this extent, obliterate the event ano its
trace altogether. If the reactive subject wishes to snuh the extremity of the
present, the obscure subject wishes thereafter to shovel it unoer.
So these three ngures of the subject all respono to the ptccrt with oif-
ferent operations: the faithful subject organizes its ptooocttor, the reactive
subject, its ocrtolano the obscure subject, its occoltottor ,o,. One can
immeoiately see how ano why the ooctrines of BE have been altereo,
this new attempt retains the methoo of oouble amrmation ,philosophy
amrms the conoitions because these conoitions are alreaoy amrmative
in the real,, but aims to provioe a fuller ano more nuanceo oescription
of some subjective features evioent in reality. Moreover, it suggests why
no-one can ignore or remain merely inoiherent to or unoecioeo about
events. To pick up on one of Baoious own examples, tooay Goo really is
oeao, ano it is this event ,some might prefer to call it a non-event, that
funoamentalists want to occluoe at all costs. Yet they betray the patency
of Goos oeath in their very attempts at occultation. Whats still miss-
ing from this triple ngure of the subject is a crucial possibility that I have
alreaoy naggeo: its tcottccttor.
The problem is a very serious one for Baoiou: can a truth, once
broacheo, ever be utterly oestroyeo? Take the avatars of Spartacus him-
self. They return in the slave revolt of the Irench Revolution, in the black
Spartacus who is Toussaint-Louverture, they return in Karl Leibnecht
ano Rosa Luxemburg, the Spartacists, they return in Stanley Kubricks
Spottoco, where all oeclaim I am Spartacus, they also return, though Ba-
oiou ooesnt mention it, in Monty Fythons Ltfc of Bttor ,I am Brian, ano
so is my wife,. Spartacus therefore returns in very oiherent worlos, in
very oiherent circumstances. It is the logic of this resurrection that Baoiou
:q. There is absolutely no question that Baoiou has orawn this term oocot from what
must be one of his favourite poems, Mallarms sonnet on Eogar Allan Foe, in which we
reao of the Calme bloc ici-bas chu oun osastre obscur Baoious allusions to this verse
occur in all sorts of contexts: his novel is entitleo Colmc oloc tct-oo, another little volume
on politics is Dor oottc oocot, ano so on ano on. Asioe from the resonances of such allu-
sions, one shoulo unooubteoly hear in oocot, not only unclear, or unknown, but oark
ano gloomy, as well as obscuring ano obscurantist, etc.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :.o
is going to have to explicate, that is, how the multiplicity of worlos can be
articulateo with the invariance of truths. Resurrection is, as I will show,
the key, the crucial, ngure that governs the entirety of LOWin line with
the very essence of sequels.
Ior the moment, however, Baoiou is able to give only the etiolateo
lineaments of this ngure. These lineaments are summarizeo at the eno of
Book I in two ,almost excessively, helpful oiagrams, one of which I repro-
ouce here ,from 86,.
Truths Ontologi-
cal back-
ground
(A)
Evental
trace ()
Body (b) Present
(local)
Aect Present
(global)
()
Politics State ano
people
,representa-
tion ano
presenta-
tion,
A St ,A,
Iixation of
the super-
power of
the State
,St ,A,
~,
Organiza-
tion
New
egalitarian
maxim
Enthusiasm Sequence
Arts Ferceptible
inten-
sity ano
the calm of
forms
F f
What was
formless
can be
form
f f
Oeuvre New
perceptive
intensity
Fleasure Conngura-
tion
Love Sexuateo
oisjunction
m f
Unoeter-
mineo
object
,encounter,
,u, |m
u ano f
u|
Couple
,bi-sexu-
ateo,
New
existential
intensity
Happiness Enchant-
ment
Science Boroer of
the worlo
graspeo or
not by the
letter
l ,w, |
l ,w)
What
rebelleo
against the
letter is
submitteo
to it
l ,w,
l ,w,
Result
,law,
theory,
princi-
ples,
New
Enlighten-
ment
]oy Theory
Toolc .Tlc ttotl ptoccootc oro tlctt trgolot octtcottor
.o
.o. Note that I have tampereo with Baoious mathemes here. The Irench for the Onto-
logical backgrouno of Folitics is, of course, A Et ,A,, that is, A Etat ,A,, thus becoming
A State ,A, in English , for the Arts, le monoe exhibe une forme singuliere oe la tension
entre lintensit ou sensible et le calme oe la forme, p. 8:. I have here translateo sensible
as perceptible, ano hence S f becomes F f . Likewise, m for moroc becomes w for
worlo, ano the c for cotp has become b for booy. I am as yet uncertain of the value of such
]ustin Clemens :.:
The Scholium that immeoiately follows Book I, titleo A musical
variant of the metaphysics of the subject, provioes a very full ano interest-
ing example orawn from the oevelopment of serial music. This section,
moreover, ohers some excellent summarizing propositions of Baoious al-
tereo ooctrine of the subject. Whereas the restraint of BE saw it speak
very little of subjective ahectlimiting itself at most to two, anxiety ano
courage
.:
LOW insists on a quaorature of ahects, terror, anxiety, cour-
age ano justice.
..
Note that all of these ahects are now consioereo internal
ano essential moments of or, truth-process, whereas cocl truth-process
has also its characteristic or signature ahect. As the table above shows,
politics is linkeo to enthusiasm, the arts to pleasure, love to happiness, ano
science to joy. Telegraphic as these assignations coulo appear, it is equally
true that they nno strong support within the philosophical traoition itself
,e.g., think of Spinozas joy, which is very closely linkeo to the practice of
science, or of the pleasure Kant assigns to the arts, etc.,.
a transliteration. In Lacans case, his mathemes were intenoeo to be integrally transmis-
sible, that is, without any translation, e.g., a for oottc shoulo remain so in English ,ano
not become o for other, etc.,.
.:. Note that the question of ahects arises in BE particularly arouno the question of the
status of poetry, ano of the matheme of the unoecioable that Mallarm provioes: Given
that unoecioability is a rational attribute of the event, ano the salvatory guarantee of its
non-being, there is no other vigilance than that of becoming, as much through the orxtct,
of hesitation as through the cootogc of that outsioe-place, both the feather, which hovers
about the gulf , ano the star up high perhaps, BE, p. :q8, my emphasis. It is further
noteworthy that ahects are ioentineo with the subjects of truths, not with philosophy or
philosophers, in fact, I cannot think of any place where Baoiou oiscusses an ahect proper
to philosophy as such.
... Iour ahects signal the incorporation of a human animal to the subjective process of a
truth. The nrst is evioence of the oesire for a Great Foint, of a oecisive oiscontinuity, that
will install the new worlo with a single blow, ano complete the subject. We will name it tct-
tot. The secono is evioence of the fear of points, of a retreat before the obscurity of all that
is oiscontinuous, of all that imposes a choice without guarantee between two hypotheses.
Or, again, this ahect signals the oesire for a continuity, for a monotone shelter. We will
name it orxtct,. The thiro amrms the acceptance of the plurality of points, that the oiscon-
tinuities are at once imperious ano multiform. We will name it cootogc. The fourth amrms
the oesire that the subject be a constant intrication of points ano openings. It amrms the
equivalence, in regaro to the pre-eminence of the becoming-subject, of what is continuous
ano negotiateo, ano of what is oiscontinuous ano violent. It is only there that there are
subjective mooalities, which oepeno on the construction of the subject in a worlo ano the
capacities of the booy to proouce ehects. They are not to be hierarchizeo. War can be as
gooo as peace, negotiation as gooo as struggle, violence as gooo as gentleness. This ahect
by which the categories of the act are suboroinateo to the contingency of worlos, we will
name ottcc, LOW, pp. q6-.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :..
But it is really in Books II, III ano IV that the full project of LOW
gets going. This is La Granoe Logique, which aims to provioe a general
theory of the logic of appearing, of objects ano their relations, subsuming
unoer its gargantuan umbrella the little logic that is the grammatical ano
linguistic analysis beloveo of analytic philosophy ,:o,. In oroer to oo so,
Baoiou has recourseas I have alreaoy naggeo aboveto category the-
ory. If Baoious oeployment of Zermelo-Iraenkel set theory governeo the
entire conceptual presentation of BE, here the presentation is governeo
by the necessities of the algebraic proofs. Both set theory ano category
theory are often consioereo to be rival founoations of mathematics. As
Saunoers Mac Lane, one of the ooyens of category theory, has remarkeo,
the former axiomatizes sets ano their elements, whereas the latter ax-
iomatizes functions, that is, relationsano not elements at all. Ior his
part, Baoiou will continue to amrm that set theory is ontology, but that
category theory founos the logic of appearing.
.
Book II concentrates on the construction of the concept of the tran-
scenoental. This constitutes quite a severe oeparture from the situations
of BE. In BE, being |lcttc| was thought in its raw multiplicity, here, be-
ing is thought in its organizeo localization, as being-there |lcttc-lo| in
a worlo. Every worlo must have a transcenoental organization, arouno
which multiples cohere accoroing to their oihering oegrees of ioentity or
oiherence. It is a classical problemhow to conjoin, in the substance
of the soul of the worlo, the Same ano the Other?ano immeoiately
oemanos a theory of negation or rather, for Baoiou, of the tccctc |crcct|.
.

Baoiou gives the reverse three funoamental properties:
The reverse of a being-there ,or, more precisely, of the measure
of apparition |oppottttor| of a multiple in a worlo, is in general a
being-there in the same worlo ,a oiherent measure of intensity
of apparition in that worlo,.
.. In category theory, the initial oata are particularly meager. We merely oispose of
unoiherentiateo objects ,in fact, simple letters oepriveo of any interiority, ano of arrows
,or morphisms, going from one object to anotherthe aim is ultimately for the obejcts
to become mathematical structures ano the arrows the connection between these struc-
tures. But the purely logical initial grasping renoers the oetermination of an objects sense
entirely extrinsic or positional. It all oepenos on what we can learn from the arrows going
towaro that object ,whose object is the target,, or of those coming from it ,whose object is
the source,. An object is but the marking of a network of actions, a cluster of connections.
Relation preceoes Being, TO, p. :.
.. I am translating crcct here as reverse in accoroance with the existing translation in
Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, e.g. pp. .:-.:q. It is possible that one shoulo see some relation to the
mathematics of the inverse, but the woro for this in Irench is, precisly, trcctc.
:.
]ustin Clemens :.
Of both the reverse ano negation it can be saio that a being-
there ano its reverse have nothing in the worlo in common ,the
conjunction of their oegrees of intensity is null,.
In general, the reverse ooesnt have all the properties of classical
negation. In particular, the reverse of the reverse of a oegree of
apparition is not inevitably ioentical to this oegree. Ano again,
the union of an appearing |oppototort| ano its reverse is not
inevitably equal to the measure of apparition of the worlo in its
entirety ,::-::8,.
Baoiou immeoiately proceeos to show that: there is no Whole ,using
an argument oirectly oeriveo from Russells critique of Irege,, that an
existent can only be thought insofar as it belongs to a worlo, that, none-
theless, there has to be some kino of minimum available, which ooesnt
appear in a worlo ,a sort of zero,, there are maximal ano minimum oe-
grees of apparition, ano so on. He gives an excellent account of Hegel,
a formal account of what he calls the three transcenoental operations
,zero, conjunction ano the envelope, of appearing, as well as a brilliant
oemonstration of the superiority of Baoious own Grano Logic over or-
oinary logic. This section is a kino of compresseo tour oe force, in which
the familiar operations of oroinary logic ,ano/or/implication/negation,
the quantiners, are oeriveo from Baoious new categories of minimum,
maximum, conjunction ano envelope. The book concluoes with a notice:
What is a classical worlo? There we nno that such a worlo has oouble
negation ano excluoeo mioole as valio principles, that o clotcol ootlo t
o ootlo oloc ttorccrocrtol t Boolcor ,.oo,, ano thatas Baoiou has saio
elsewhereontology is such a classical worlo.
.
Note the new, subtle ano
formal justincation of set theory as an ontology: a logic is now explicitly
given to this oecision, whereas in Dclcoc, it was still being put oown to a
question of taste.
.6
.. In the Rcrctgrcmcrt at the back of LOW, Baoiou notes: It nnally appears that the
two great Aristotelian principles ,non-contraoiction ano excluoeo mioole,, such as are
proposeo in Mctopl,tc , conoition three logical types ,ano not two, as has been long be-
lieveo,. One can in fact valioate universally the two principles ,classical logic,, or only the
principle of non-contraoiction ,intuitionist logic,, or only excluoeo mioole ,para-consistent
logics,, p. . Baoiou immeoiately continues : the canonical mooel of classical logic is
set theory, that of intuitionist logic, topoi theory, that of para-consistent logics, category
theory. These mooels are more ano more general, ano negation becomes more ano more
evasive, pp. -8.
.6. As Deleuze woulo have saio, in immeoiately taking up again, just as I woulo myself,
the threao of the argument ano the oesire to seouce or to win the other over: it is a ques-
tion of taste, A. Baoiou, Dclcoc: Tlc Clomot of Bctrg, trans. L. Burchill, Minneapolis, Uni-
..
.
Book III proposes an entirely new concept of what an object is ,.o,.
The novelty of this concept oerives from the fact that Baoiou thereby
constructs an object without subject, that is, that the logic of appearing
must be purely ooccttcc. This will be oone through the concept of trocxottor:
if x ano y are two elements of an existent A, ano T is the transcenoental
of the worlo unoer consioeration, inoexation is an ioentity function Id
,x, y, that measures in T the oegree of appearing of x ano y. Otherwise
put, if Id ,x, y, ~ p, this means that x ano y are ioentical to oegree p in
regaro to their power of apparition in the worlo ,.o6,. Having establisheo
the atoms of appearance, the very minimum necessary to appear in a
worlo at all, Baoiou seeks to explore this articulation between the logic
of appearing ano the ontology of the multiple ,.o8,. In BE, Baoiou shows
that the one ooes not exist, being only the self-oissimulating result of
an operation of counting, in LOW, the One is rethought as the atom of
appearing, as the quilting point of appearing in being ,.:,. Appearing
is always localizeo, it is always being-tlctc, ano being-there is inherently
bouno. If love comes in spurts ,as Richaro Hell ano the Voiooios put it,,
then existence comes in oegrees.
Nonetheless, these oegrees of existence are founoeo on something
absolutely real: In a general fashion, an atom is a certain regulateo rap-
port between an element a of a multiple A ano the transcenoental of a
worlo.The postulate of materialism is that every atom is real ,.6,.
,With the proviso, of course, that cxttcrcc is not a category of octrg., This
real synthesis is the key to this book. Whereas Kant cannot ehectively
suture the phenomenal to the noumenal, except at the cost of complex
sophistries or causal leaps, Baoiou will insist that a real atom attests to an
apparition, in appearing, of the being of appearing ,.:,. If this synthesis
ooes not work, then being ano appearance cannot be sewn together by
Baoiou. ,This will evioently be one of the key places for commentators to
intervene in future essays into the worlos of LOW., As for the object, it
receives its oennition at the same time:
Gtccr o ootlo, oc coll or oocct of tlc ootlo tlc cooplc fotmco o, o molttplc
oro o ttorccrocrtol trocxottor of tlt molttplc, or tlc corotttor tlot oll tlc
otom of oppcottrg oloc tcfctcrttol t tlc cortoctco molttplc otc tcol otom
of tlc tcfctcrttol molttplc ,.,.
The object, in other woros, is what brioges being ano existence. Even
quoting such oennitions, which can only hint, in their very oimculty, at
the logical sequences that unoerpin them, it is impossible to convey the
versity of Minnesota Fress, :qqq, p. q..
]ustin Clemens :.
enchaineo rigour of Book III in any aoequate way. It provioes some of
the most oimcult formal passages I have reao in contemporary European
philosophy ,I refer interesteo reaoers to :o if they wish to marvel at the
increoible little box Complete form of the onto-logy of worlos,. Such
passages are leaveneo only by oetaileo evocations of a political rally at the
Flace oe la Rpublique ano of the aforementioneo Robert painting that
graces the cover. Despite the oimculties, you cant help but get the orift:
Existence is at once a logical ano an intensive concept ,.8,. There are
a number of other noteworthy moments, such as the oemonstration that
phenomenology ano vitalism share a non-philosophical enthusiasm for
oeath, an enthusiasm which exposes their weaknesses: just like existence,
oeath is not a category of being ,.8,. No, oeath is a category of appear-
ing ,we will return to some consequences of this below,. Ano the book
concluoes with the aptly-titleo Scholium as impressive as it is subtle, in
which Baoiou gives a stunning example, a logical evaluation of a battle
between Alexanoer the Great ano the Fersian emperor Darius.
Book IV concluoes the Grano Logic part of LOW, with a new
thought of relation. Relation must oepeno on objects, ano not at all the
other way arouno, this is why the Grano Logic moves from object to rela-
tion, ano why there t a purely logical oroer at work in LOW. To alluoe
to a statement of Deleuze, no relation here is prior to or external to its
terms:
A relation is a bono between objective multiplicitiesa function
that creates nothing in the oroer of intensities of existence or in the
oroer of atomic localizations that was not alreaoy prescribeo by
the regime of apparition of those multiplicities ,:,.
.
Ior Baoiou, the very innnity of a worlo ,ontological characteristic, en-
tails the universality of relations ,logical characteristic, ,:8,, ano that
this universality be a consequence ano not a postulate. This books major
examples are orawn from the worlo of Quebec, its objects, politics ano
their relations. But the point is, again, funoamentally technical. Ior Ba-
oiou, every worlo must be consioereo innnite, but its innnity is inacces-
sible, that is, accoroing to the textbook formulation, if the following three
conoitions holo:
.. Ior the non-being of existence means that it is otherwise than accoroing to its being
that being is. It is, precisely, the being of an object. The object exhausts the oialectic of
being ano existence, which is also that of being ano appearing or being-there, or nnally
that of extensive or mathematical multiplicity ano intensive or logical multiplicity, LOW,
p. :6. Note that relation is here given a particular sense by Baoiou, that may signal a gap
between the mathematical ano philosophical notions of relation.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :.6
i. ~
o
,
ii. for any caroinal , there is .
,
iii. the union of less than oroinals, each less than , is less than .
As Baoiou notes, this oennition operates a kino of nnitization of the in-
nnite itself:
o
,aleph-zero, is the smallest innnite caroinal, marking the
caesura between nnite ano innnite, ano, as such, cannot be approacheo
by operations on any natural number, an inaccessible caroinal larger than
o
woulo therefore be really pretty big.nor is it any surprise that the
existence of such a caroinal cannot be proven. The inaccessible innn-
ity of a worlo is absolutely inaccessible from within the worlo itself, ano
any worlo that pretenoeo to less woulo not be a worlo ,,. Secono,
this impossibility is what ensures that a worlo is closeo, without for all
thatbeing representable as a Whole ,.6,. Now, this ontological closure
also ensures logical completeness, it is also the case that any relation in the
worlo must be universally exposeo, objectively available.
It is with Book V The four forms of change that the oemonstra-
tion returns to Baoious more familiar terminology ,multiples, sets, sites,
events, etc.,. But it is a reconngureo account of the site ano event that we
are given here. Ior Baoiou,
The ontology of a site thus allows itself to be oescribeo by three
properties:
a site is a renexive multiplicity, that belongs to itself ano thereby
transgresses the laws of being.
A site is the instantaneous revelation of the voio that haunts
multiplicities, by its transient cancellation of the gap between
being ano being-there.
A site is an ontological ngure of the instant: it appears only to
oisappear ,8q,.
BE organizeo an entirely oiherent oisposition of the site/event couple:
the site, not being a proper subset of the situation ,or worlo,, was the
mtrtmol ehect of structure which can be conceiveo ,BE :, ano provioeo
the conoition of being for the event, the event was consioereo a vanishing
apparition composeo simultaneously of elements from the site ano itself.
Now, we have something like certain preoicates of the site mergeo into
certain preoicates of the event, ano a new hierarchy of possible changes.
Once again, against the minimality of BE ,event v. no event, change v. no
change,, we have a larger array of possibilities:
A mootcottor is the basic form of change as usual, without
:.
..
.
i.
]ustin Clemens :.
requiring a site or any transcenoental mooincation of the
worlo,
A foct is a site whose intensity of existence isnt maximal,
A trgolottt, is a site whose intensity of existence is maximal
,q,.
This is further complicateo by a oivision ottltr singularity. There we nno
weak singularities ,without maximal consequences, or what is now oe-
nominateo the event proper ,a singularity with maximal consequences
for the worlo,. In short: at the level of occomtrg, we can have no real change
,mooincation, or real change ,site,, at the level of cxttcrcc, we can have a
non-maximal existence ,a fact, or a maximal existence ,a singularity,, at
the level of corcocrcc, we have a weak singularity or an event ,see oia-
gram on q, or more technical extension on :,.
.8
The key concept in the case of the event proper turns out to be what
Baoiou calls the inexistent. Inexistence is a concept which comes up rath-
er quickly in LOW, in II.:.:, to oo with the Inexistence of the Whole ,::q-
:.:, ano in II.:., where the subtitle says it all: Inexistence of the Whole:
to amrm the existence of a set of all sets is intrinsically contraoictory
,:6-:6,. But the inexistent of an object is nrst properly oealt with in a
conceptual ano formal manner in IV.:.6 ,8-:,, then again in IV..
,6o-6.,. Its nrst formulation is as follows: oc otll coll tlc ptopct trcxttcrt
of or oocct or clcmcrt of tlc oo-occrt molttplc oloc cxttcrcc coloc t mtrtmol
,q,. Baoiou continues:
Given an object in a worlo, there exists a unique element of
this object that inexists in this worlo. It is this element that we
call the proper inexistent of the object. It proves, in the sphere
of appearance, the contingency of being-there. In this sense, its
,ontological, being has ,logical, non-being as being-there ,:,.
The inexistent is thus a oissimulating avatar in LOW of BEs voio ,or
empty set,, or, at least, it is a oistant relative. So it is no surprise that,
just as in BE, an event is integrally linkeo to the reemergence of the
voio that has been forecloseo from the situation or, in this new concep-
tual framework, to the uprising of the inexistent: Ar cccrt lo fot moxtmoll,
ttoc corcocrcc of tt ;moxtmol) trtcrtt, of cxttcrcc, tlc cxttcrt of tlc trcxttcrt
.8. The four forms of change are formally oenneo on the basis of three criteria: inexist-
ence or not of a site, force or weakness of singularity, the pickup |tclcc| or non-pickup of
the inexistent. An ontological criterion, an existential criterion, ano a criterion relative to
consequences, p. :6.
ii.
iii.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :.8
,q8,.
.q
This returns us to a pre-BE ooctrine, emciently summarizeo by
a Heiner Muller phrase: for something to come, something has to go.
Deathwhich hao in BE been purgeo altogether from the regime of be-
ingis back on the agenoa in LOW at the level of appearing ano, of
course, oisappearing. As Baoiou puts it here, the opening of a space for
creation requires oestruction ,:8,.
This primes us for the nnal two books of LOW, Book VI, The theory
of points, ano Book VII, What is a booy? These books return us, in a
oiherent vocabulary, to some key moments in BE. The point is now
how Baoiou rethinks the proouction of a truth from the point of view of
the subject: A faithful subject is the form of a booy whose organs treat
a worloly situation point by point ,.:,. Whereas in BE the notion of
forcing, of inquiries on the generic set, was employeo to give a well-founo-
eo rational account of the process of a truth, in LOW this is given through
the treatment of points. A point is something that confronts the subject
with a binary choice. There are only two possibilities on which to oecioe,
ano one cannot not oecioe ,contrast this with BE on the ooctrine of the
intervention on the event, e.g., the meoitation on Fascal, BE .:.-...,. To
choose one is to continue in the truth, to choose the other is to abanoon
the truth, if not to oecioe for oisaster: there is a point when, through
an operation that implies a subject ano a booy, the totality of the worlo
is the stake of a coin-toss ,..,. Hence a oecision upon which the worlo
oepenos, the reouction to the Two of innnite multiplicity ,.,. The ex-
amples are, as elsewhere in LOW, rather oiverse: key oecisions in Sartres
plays, the city of Brasilia, Kierkegaaro, among others. Ior Baoiou, a sub-
ject treats points in a worlo, point by point, ano must, as the aovertizing
campaign for a popular battery has it, keep on keeping on, oespite all the
oimculties. Baoiou has never resileo from martial examples: a battle
can be abstractly oenneo as a point of war ,:-.,. Life, as the Emperor
Marcus Aurelius put it in his oiaries, is war, a war, Baoiou might aoo, of
immortals. You cant orop a point, as if it were neither here nor there. Its
immortality or nothing.
So the booy in which Baoiou is interesteo in giving the concept of is
a very peculiar booy, a purineo, new, immortal booy of truth: Foint by
point, a booy reorganizes itself, making more ano more singular conse-
quences appear in the worlo, which subjectively weave a truth of which
.q. Iormally: Gtccr or oocct ;A, Id), oc coll event tlc oppottttor/otoppcotorcc of tlc ttc A ftom
tlc momcrt tlot tlt ttc t o trgolottt,, olctlct EA=M, oltcl tcoll, occt tlc ptopct trcxttcrt of tlc
oocct, ot ;EA E
o
)=M, LOW, p. :6.
]ustin Clemens :.q
one coulo say that it eternalizes the present of the present ,.,. I woulo
like to unoerline here the term reorganize, as it has connotations im-
portant to Baoiou: of novelty ,it is a rco booy that is being proouceo,, of
metamorphosis ,the novelty is tcol,, of oiscipline ,it is an otgortottor, not
simply a oisorganization that is at stake,. In line with his injunctions that
a truth-booy can therefore be neither inoivioual nor communitarian, we
coulo pun that nobooy, newbooy. Its a materialist resurrection. But lo
ctto rooco isnt always lo oolcc ctto. You have to struggle for it. Ano since
were on this renaissance line of allusion, lets continue oown the line. Alco
tc-octo ct: having crosseo the Rubicon of mathematics once, Baoiou has
hao to cast the oice of BE again in oroer to heao for the Capitol of logic,
object ano relation.
IV. BELOW
Why, then, given its increoible range, clarity ano import, can LOW
feel unsatisfactory? There is a clue in one of Baoious own aomissions. In
V..:, unoer the heaoing Variations in the status of formal expositions,
he notes that the Grano Logic aoumbrateo in books II, III ano IV oerives
oirectly from category theory, ano that all this permitteo the ooubling
of the conceptual exposition by a formal exposition supporteo by its con-
cepts, ano homogeneous with certain strata of oeouctive mathematics
,::,. Yet it wasnt so in book I, where the formalizations of the concept of
the subject were, if one can say so, ot gcrctt. Then, he continues, In the
present book, as in books VI ano VII, we have a situation intermeoiary
between book I ,strippeo of para-mathematical apparatus, ano the three
books of the Grano Logic ,homogenous with entire strata of this appara-
tus, ,::-:.,. This thiro variation constitutes a formal exposition that,
although not oeouctive, seeks to nay, by means of its sharply uninterpret-
able literality, the nesh of sense in oroer to expose the bones of truth.
Its clear that Baoiou knows what hes ooing. But thats just it: his self-
knowleoge forces him to present this triple variation, ano it is this vari-
ation that frustrates ano provokes throughout. Baoiou knows it too: one
nnos such apologia scattereo throughout LOW. In the Technical Note
that concluoes the Freface, Baoiou writes: Irom Book II, each movement
of thought is presenteo in two oiherent ways: conceptual ,which means
without any formalism, ano with, each time, examples, ano formal ,with
symbols, ano if necessary, schemas ano calculations,. Objective phenom-
enology ano written transpacency ,o,.
o
I oo not believe this gap is so
easily presenteo as a benent, inoeeo, it is quite not for Baoiou himself,
given the symptomatic proliferation of apologia.
:

In BE, as I have saio, we have the most rigorous minimalism. BE
asks, in the most oirect ano rational fashion possible: what is the minimal
situation of being, what are its elements, ano what are the operations that
can be performeo upon them? This makes BE a founoational work, in
the triple sense that: it takes founoations as its object ,being qua the voio,
the Two, the unoecioable, innnity, etc.,, that it ooes this in a founoational
way ,accoroing to mathematical reason, supplementeo by poetic reason,,
ano it thereby itself becomes founoational ,an act of philosophical foun-
oation,. By contrast, LOW no longer treats of founoational ontology, but
of transmunoane variations of localization, it is no longer simply founoa-
tional, but aims to be more fully oescriptive of what transpires: one can
only fully account for these nuances of appearing through the meoiation
of examples orawn from varieo worlos, ano for the invariance of transcen-
oental operations through the confrontation between the coherence of
these examples ano the transparency of forms ,-8,. Yet the persuasive-
ness of oescriptions varies raoically in this book: the early account of the
painteo horses is miserably oencient compareo to that of Hubert Roberts
painting in Book III.
This isnt a failure of style, far from it. On the contrary, Baoiou is a
master of the peoagogical announcement, the clarineo oennition, the or-
oereo progression, the oirective heaoing, the illuminating instance ano the
recapitulative slogan. I am constantly struck by the oemonstrative rigour
of what may initially seem to be only loose oiscursive gestures, but which
turn out to be highly structureo ano carefully-placeo. The examples given
in LOWs preface are, for example, clearly preliminary, intenoeo only to
give intimations of claims that will be justineo later. They thus provioe a
general rhetorical orientation. They cannot be taken as serious foooer for
refutation, precisely because they serve such a clearly peoagogical func-
o. Ior example, The systematic meoitations of BE are followeo here by an interlacing
of examples ano calculations that oirectly stage the consistent complexity of worlos. The
latter, in fact, innnitely oiversineo ngures of being-there, absorb in a transcenoental frame,
whose operations are invariant, the innnite nuances of qualititative intensities LOW, pp.
-8.
:. Yet another example: in the introouction to Book III, Baoiou notes, Its clear that, by
reason of the extreme rigour of enchainments, the formal exposition is here often more
illuminating than the phenomenological oioactics that preceoe it, p. .oq.
]ustin Clemens ::
tion, moreover, their very variety is oirecteo towaros exposing the haro
formal kernel that stabilizes their profusion.
Still, Baoious oemonstrations in BE were so clear ano precise, so con-
cerneo to ensure the reaoers unoerstanoing of extremely oimcult formal
materials ,just as Descartes taught his manservant mathematics ano wrote
in the vernacular so even women might unoerstano,, that they never felt
excessive or overwhelming. This is not always the case in LOW, where an
enormous amount of formalism is oeployeowith a much higher sym-
bol-to-page ratio than in BEbut not always with the same clarity, nor
to the same ehect. One can see the unavoioability of this state of ahairs.
After all, in the light of LOW, BE is focusseo on the elaboration of one
worlo alone, the classical worlo of ontology, in which non-contraoiction
ano excluoeo mioole reign supreme over their binary empire like Ieroi-
nano ano Isabella over an expansionist Spain. But LOW is concerneo to
speak of ootlo, of the heterogeneity of worlos ,classical, intuitionist ano
para-consistent,, ano this entails much broaoer logical oevelopments. The
algebra is uncircumventable, ano, if one cannot follow it, one cannot seri-
ously intervene in the oescriptions.
Ior a number of reasons, category theory is more oimcult than set
theory. Iirst, there is simply the time-lag: set theory essentially oates from
the eno of the :q
th
century, category theory arises post-WWII. This tem-
poral fact means that weve all just hao more time to oeal with the impact
of set theory ano its innnite innnities. But theres more to it than that.
Category theory is, unooubteoly part of our transition to post-mooernity
,whatever that means,, it is not the accomplice of Mallarm, Lenin ano
Ireuo, but accompanies Celan, Mao ano Lacan. There is a certain oif-
nculty, intensity ano obscurity to this new worlo. Moreover, much of the
philosophy of the .o
th
century has been oirectly inspireo by ano engageo
with set theory in one way or another, from Bertrano Russell through
Luowig Wittgenstein to Michael Dummett. To oo philosophy tooay is
alreaoy to have encountereo, even if inoirectly, a set theory that has inte-
grally shapeo ano been shapeo by philosophy. This has not yet been the
case for category theory, at least not in such a thoroughgoing ano foun-
oational way. Iinally, as Baoiou himself has remarkeo, a crucial oiher-
ence between mathematics ano logic emerges here. Set theory is essential
mathematics: one can, at a pinch, unoerstano the mathematical concepts,
without having to folloo the formal calculations ,e.g., the innumerable
accounts of Russells Faraoox enoemic to nrst-year philosophy courses,.
This ooesnt mean one ooesnt have to oo the maths. Category theory, on
the other hano, bears the essential hallmarks of formal logic ,albeit math-
ematizeo,: as the very name suggests, one cannot quite get it unless one
submits to ano goes through the formal oennitions ano proceoures step
by step.
.
As Baoiou says, logic is oennitional, whereas real mathematics
is axiomatic ,TO ::q,.
Rather, the problem is not so much a problem of style as of substance.
That is, anyone who wishes to reao LOW properly is going to have to
follow the logic. One hopeswithout any real faiththat this fact will
prevent commentators from trying to oismiss Baoious use of logic ano
mathematics as if these were simply rhetorical aoo-ons, merely smart-arse
ways of presenting a message that coulo just as well have been presenteo
in common language without the use of all those symbols. To oate, such
a position remains the most obscurantist response to Baoious work. One
can regularly reao critics ,both for ano against Baoiou, who seem to
think, if they oo not oeclare it oirectly: oh, the mathematics isnt really
important, we can go straight to the ooctrines ano treat them as if they
were like any other philosophical utterances.
One can at least see why

people are tempteo to oefeno such a oeleterious error, given they have
been lucky enough to unoerstano something thanks to the outstanoing
clarity of Baoious conceptual re-presentations. Though it might be going
too far to say something like you oont have to be a poet, mathematician,
militant or lover to unoerstano something about the thoughts they think,
but you cant really get anything about the logic unless you submit to the
algebra, its still tempting to oo soon the basis of the experience of reao-
ing LOW.
This is a consequence of Baoious unrelenting peoagogical ehorts.
Irom maxims to tables, from exegesis to argument, Baoiou coulo not
present his philosophy more clearly or rigorously. In LOW, he introouces
.. Baoiou specines: The mathematics of being as such consists in forcing a consistency,
in such a way that inconsistency is exposeo to thought. The mathematics of appearing
consists in oisclosing, beneath the qualitative oisoroer of worlos, the logic that holos oiher-
ences of existence ano intensities together. This time, it is a question of exposing consist-
ency. The result is a style of formalization at once more geometrical ano more calculative,
taken to the eoge of a topology of localizations ano an algebra of forms of oroer. Whereas
ontological formalization is more conceptual ano axiomatic: it examines ano unfolos oeci-
sions of thought of a very general import, LOW, p. 8.
. If you will forgive the execrable taste involveo in self-citation, please refer on this point
to my Doubles of Nothing: The Froblem of Binoing Truth to Being in the Work of Alain
Baoiou, Ftlooflt cctrtl, vol. XXVI, no. ., .oo, pp. q-:::. Ior a stringent critique of Ba-
oious mathematicsone of the very few that I have seen that goes about such a critique
in an acceptable way, see R. Grigg, Lacan ano Baoiou: Logic of the Po-Toot, in the same
eoition, pp. -6.
]ustin Clemens :
each book with a summary of what is to come, he speaks of his methoo
ano its justincation in oroinary language, he elucioates the technical ele-
ments of logic with an extraoroinary care, ano so on. His inclusion of scat-
tereo scholia ano appenoices, of a list of the books 66 major statements,
of a oictionary of concepts, of an inoex, is testimony to his oesire not to
obscure anything. The Renseignements are of real interest, supplying
unfailingly accessible yet incisive remarks about Baoious references ano
trajectory, his anteceoents ano colleagues, his frienos ano his enemies ,in-
cluoing a note on a genuinely hilarious compact with Slavoj iek, as well
as allusions to two stunning formal interventions by Guillaume Destivere,.
Yet a certain obscurity still emerges in the gap between oemonstration
ano conviction, between oeouction ano rhetoric, in the very variability of
the presentation. It is precisely because Baoiou must have recourse here to
so many cxomplc that his propos seems to waver. The raoically inventive
nature of LOW, which ehects an almost violent technical resignincation of
a wioe range of terms ,logic, appearing, transcenoental, object, relation,
envelope, reverse, maximal, etc.,, is straineo by the very tirelessness with
which Baoiou surrounos the formal expositions with intuitive sketches.
Yet, as Baoiou repeats throughout, the oescriptions are nothing without
the logic ano mathematics, it is the logic that must bring out the consist-
ency binoing the incoherent slew of appearances.
To put this another way, the problem is that the transliteral opera-
tions of BE, which sutureo set-theoretical mathematics ano meta-onto-
logical propositions without meoiation, are shown to be highly locoltco
operations, gooo for one particular classical worlo but not, by oennition,
necessarily for any other kino. In the very attempt to specify a theory of
appearing that is consistent with the theory of being in BE, Baoiou neeos
to nno rco operators between philosophy ano logic that will ensure the
gap between them is not, once again, subjecteo to the ruses of meoiation.
This necessity provokes certain questions that I am not sure have yet been
aoequately answereo by Baoiou. To give some very simple examples: is
the reviseo theory of the event-site given in LOW a more general theory,
one which leaves the account given in BE correct, but only for the ,spe-
cial, restricteo, ontological situation? Or is LOW correcting the theory
of BE toot coott? Or is LOW simply giving the theory of how event-sites
function in appearing, saying nothing about how they function in being?
This is, of course, the return of the problem of the sequel, or, for reasons
I will shortly expano upon, of tcottccttor.
V. KANT OR HEGEL?
As Irieorich Nietzsche pointeo out, not the least charm of certain
theories is that they can be refuteo, everyone believes him- or herself
strong enough for the job. So meoiocrity survives, slipping unrepentantly
from era to era like Rameaus Nephew in search of a few small positions
ano a couple of coins. Certainly, works sometimes survive, not because
of their refutability, but because of their irrefutability. Ano yet is it not
always irrefutability that forces opponents to oiscover or invent entirely
new ways to circumvent great philosophical interventions. It is something
inoiherent to the oistinction refutable ano irrefutable. Thus Kants oi-
vision between noumenal ano phenomenal realms, his circumscription
of the heterogeneous operations of thought, his elaboration of networks
of categories ano conoitions to articulate this heterogeneity, etc., forceo
Iichte, Hegel ano Schelling to unpreceoenteo ehorts in philosophy. If one
can certainly argue with Kant on his own grounos, his establishment of
these grounos completely reconngures the previous terms of philosophical
oiscussion in such a way that hitherto central problems come to look like
false problems or, even when on the right track, are superseoeo by the
Kantian presentation. Even then, if one later out-Kants Kant himself,
he has, as I have saio, forceo such an operation, ano has oone so in such
a way as to ensure what we might call the impossibility of his own obso-
lescence. He may be out of oate. He may be wrong. His ontology may
have been superseoeo by inoepenoent oevelopments. Yet he cannot be
circumventeo. We are back to the problem of the ooolotc.
Of all the philosophers ,ano anti-philosophers, to whom Baoiou oeoi-
cates little sections of LOWincluoing Deleuze, Kierkegaaro, Lacan ano
Leibnizthe two most important are unooubteoly Kant ano Hegel ,it is
illuminating to refer to the inoex to see who gets the most references,. As
we know, this is not an iole coupling. If Baoiou certainly tries to treat them
inoepenoently in his oiscussions, this is not altogether possible. Kant ano
Hegel have ehectively set the terms of post-Romantic philosophy to the
present. The problem in this context is precisely the problem of the logics
of worlos: ooes Baoiou oher a way in LOW to circumvent the stringent
oivision innicteo on being by Kant, without simply sewing it up again, a la
Hegel? Lets examine this question by a kino of inoirect comparison.
Iirst, Kant. If Baoiou oeoicates an entire section of this book to an
interpretation of Kant ,III..,, he notes in his Renseignements that Kant
is exemplarily the author with whom I have not manageo to become fa-
miliar. Everything about him irritates me, ano nrst of all the legalismal-
]ustin Clemens :
ways asking Qoto ott? or Havent you crosseo the limit?combineo,
as in the Uniteo States tooay, with a religiosity all the more oisturbing
for being at once omnipresent ano vague ,6:,. Ior Baoiou, then, just as
for Deleuze ,not to mention Nietzsche,, Kant is a rather unprepossessing
ngure. Yet Baoiou will also accoro Kant a shaoowy granoeur ano, fol-
lowing Lacan, a philosophical saoism.
This ambivalence shoulont hioe the fact that Kant is perhaps the
real interlocutor throughout LOW, precisely because, in aooition to his
setting of the terms that still regulate contemporary philosophy, he is the
philosopher who nrst broacheo the problems of appearing ano of sub-
tractive ontology: Kant is unooubteoly the creator in philosophy of the
notion of object ,.,. Moreover, Kants creation is rigorous ano precise:
The subtractive rationality of Kantian ontology enos up placing the rela-
tion between an empty logical subject ano an object that is nothing at the
founoation of representation ,TO, :8,. Moreover:
What is common to Flato, to Kant ano to my own attempt, is to
state that the rational grasp of oiherences in being-there, or intra-
munoane oiherences, is not oeoucible from the ontological ioentity
of the existents concerneo, because this ioentity tells us nothing of
the localization of the existent ,:.,.
Nonetheless, the Spioer of Konigsberg never arriveo at Baoious own on-
tico-transcenoental synthesis of the gap between the pure presentation of
being in the mathematics of multiplicities on the one hano, ano the logic
of ioentity that prescribes the consistency of a worlo on the other ,.q,.
Ano yet, ano yet.
Against this ambivalent relation to Kant, we can array Baoious al-
together less troubleo relation to Hegel: To my eyes in fact, there are
only three crucial philosophers: Flato, Descartes, Hegel ,.,. In fact, the
ioentincation with Hegel is so strong that Baoiou will even oeclare: Logtc
of 1otlo is to Bctrg oro Eccrt what Hegels Plcromcrolog, of Sptttt is to his
Sctcrcc of Logtc, although the chronological oroers are reverseo: an imma-
nent grasp of the givens of being-there, a local traversal of ngures of the
true ano the subject, ano not a oeouctive analytic of forms of being ,:6,.
A little later, Baoiou will oisplace this comparison again: The historic
companion to the present book is Hegel, thinker par excellence of the
oialectical correlation between being ano being-there, between essence
ano existence. It is against his Sctcrcc of Logtc that we measure ourself here
,::o,. Its Hegel over Kant, any oay.
So Baoious ioentincation is overwhelmingly with Hegel. But in many
ways his intervention is far more Kantian than Hegelian. Like Kant, Ba-
oious most striking philosophical achievements have come relatively late
in his career. This is not simply a biographical oetail, after all, age ano
generation are integral to the oisposition of philosophy ,think, for exam-
ple, of the relation between Flato ano Socrates, or the Romantic exalta-
tion of the ngure of the chilo,. BE was only publisheo in :q88, after a
long succession of extraoroinary works, such as TS ,:q8.,, which remixeo
philosophy, psychoanalysis, political theory, ano poetry in very ooo ways.
But TS is, in my opinion, a philosophical failure. Its not that its not a bril-
liant book. Its ambition, inventiveness, local apercus, ano range of refer-
ence are staggering ,if still restricteo in comparison to BE ano LOW,.
The point is that a book can be brilliant without being a genuine work
of philosophy. Inoeeo, one of the things that makes philosophy unique is
that is it sometimes even permitteo to be ignorant ano stupio. Baoious
oft-stateo appreciation of TS has a merely personal navour to it, the book
ooes not necessarily oeserve such approbation in itself, at least not as phi-
losophy. So the question of the generation of BE must, like the nrst Cttttoc,
entail a kino of mototottor, that is, a leap ano a rupture that is not merely
a supersession. Such maturationI give it this obscene name in honour
of Kants own oennition of Enlightenment as an exit from a self-imposeo
immaturitymust further recognize itself as a leap ano a rupture, at the
very moment that it retains within itself a trace of the confusions of in-
fancy from which it emergeo.
. In fact, oisciples are often reactionary or obscurantist in the guise of noelity. If you be-
lieve that such propositions as Baoiou has always been interesteo in mathematics or the
key to Baoious thought throughout is the oialectic rotm BEs emphasis on conoitions, then
you are a reactionary. BE is thereby ngureo simply an extension of a pre-existing situation,
one in which the attempt to think the materialist oialectic is king. The equation motlcmottc
= ortolog, is thus submitteo to the oictates of an allegeo Ancien Rgime, on such a vision,
BE oio not mark any real rupture at all. This view is tantamount to believing BE t or oo-
otmcrt to ototr a larger, ongoing program. It reouces BE to an extension of categories that
were present from the start, but withoutthe key pointacknowleoging that they have
been totally recast, OB, p. :. Certainly, as Ray Brassier writes, Throughout Baoious
work, mathematics enjoys a privilegeo status as paraoigm of science ano of scientincity
in general. This has been a constant, from his nrst signincant philosophical intervention,
the :q66 article The ,Re,Commencement of Dialectical Materialism, notable for the way
in which it alreaoy prengures his subsequent ,career-spanning, preoccupation with the
relation between set-theory ano category-theory, to his most recent work, wherein Baoiou
nnally establishes a philosophical connection between these two branches of mathemat-
ics by arguing that the ooctrine of being, laio out via set-theory in Bctrg oro Eccrt ,:q88,,
neeos to be supplementeo by a ooctrine of appearance that mobilizes category-theory,
as Baoiou ooes in his forthcoming Logtc of 1otlo, Baoious Materialist Epistemology of
Mathematics, Argclolt, vol. :o, no. ., .oo, pp. :-:o. All this is absolutely true, but it
woulo be false if one believes that this fact bears in any serious way upon the otcocl ehecteo
]ustin Clemens :
It is unooubteoly also signincant that Kant, having seizeo the work of
his maturity, starts to proouce sequels: Cttttoc :, ., ano ,Fure Reason,
Fractical Reason, ano ]uogement,. Ior this maturation also involves an
act of raoical self-restriction. Like Kants great Cttttoc, Baoious BE pe-
rioo works exhibit a certain occttctm. This asceticism is both enacteo ano
thematizeo in the restraineo selection of targets, the style of writing, not
to mention the concepts themselves. Its no accioent that one of Baoious
favourite slogans becomes the Mallarman one of restraineo action. No
less than the problem of maturity, the problem of asceticism is entirely
immanent to the philosophical text.
Like Kantbut unlike HegelBaoiou raoically oenies the existence
of the Whole, the All. Kant is in fact so raoically opposeo to such totality
that he refuses to vitiate the rift between phenomenal ano noumenal. At
best, for Kant the ioea of totality must remain purely regulative. If there
is some of the One, its suboroinateo to its inexistence, to irrecuperable
oivision. Ior his part Baoiou, mounts one argument after another against
the One. In both LOW ano BE, he provioes nifty oemonstrations oeriveo
from Russell. What this inexistence of the Whole in fact entails is a oivi-
sion of being ano being-there. As Baoiou himself says, Kant is the begin-
ning of subtractive ontology: Ior the nrst time really, Kant was the one to
sheo light on the avenues of a subtractive ontology, far from any negative
theology ,TO :q,.
To the extent that the Hegelian Absolute is given

any truck, it is as a foil for the true state of ahairs: Like the Hegelian Ab-
solute, a worlo is the unfoloing of its own innnity. But, in contrast to that
Absolute, it cannot construct in interiority the measure, or the concept, of
the innnity that it is ,.6,.
Iinally, like Kant, Baoiou insists that philosophy is entirely corotttorol.
Ior both philosophers, integral to the work of philosophy is the amrma-
by BE: before BE, Baoiou ,as he himself aomits, was completely unable to give, in all its
power ano clarity, the unpreceoenteo equation motlcmottc = ortolog,, ano push it into the
real. Brassier himself is certainly not proposing that such a continuity trumps the breach,
though others are.
. On the necessity of otcttor: Flato must separate himself from Farmenioes ano ioentify
thought otherwise than by its pure coextension to being. Descartes, by hyperbolic ooubt,
Husserl by the transcenoental epoch, separate immanent renexion from every position
of the object. Kant, all at once, oistinguishes thought ,element in which transcenoental
philosophy proceeos, from knowleoge ,which oetermines particular objects,. Ior my part,
I oistinguish speculative meta-ontology from mathematical ontology, ano mathematical
ontology from the logic of appearing. But, more essentially, I also oistinguish thought ,sub-
jective ngure of truths, ano knowleoge ,preoicative organization of truth ehects,, LOW,
p. ..
tion of the very conoitions it oepenos upon, moreover, they both insist
upon the conoitions irreoucible separation from one another, as well as
their irreoucible exteriority to philosophy. What else is the connict of the
faculties in Kant? What else is the peace of the oiscontinuous in Baoiou?
The conoitions are self-supporting in the peculiar way that I spoke about
above ,e.g., their verincation is intrinsic to their practice,. Fhilosophy, by
contrast, is not self-supporting, being entirely reliant on these conoitions.
This is why so much of Kants text is oeoicateo to what seems to be an
elaborate police operation: yet what is really at stake, as in the famous im-
age of the oove, is that, unlike the biro itself, philosophical night cannot
ignore the resisting air which renoers it possible. Ano this is why so many
of Baoious heaoings have to oo with metaontology, metapolitics, ano
inaesthetics: the ins ano metas are neither an inoex of superiority nor
of negation, but the philosophical stigmata of octrg corotttorco.
6
Maturation, asceticism, oivision, conoition: Kant ano Baoiou, cer-
tainly raoically oiherent in so many ways, are nonetheless aligneo accoro-
ing to these funoamental operators. So Baoious clear ano conscious ioen-
tincation with Hegel not only falsines his far more profouno amliations
with Kantbut tempts him in LOW to vitiate some of the rigour of BE
,LOW reaos very much more like TS than like anything else Baoiou has
written post-:q88, that is, a philosophical omrtcotom, a gargantuan rattle-
bag of interesting phenomena ano brilliant aperus,.
What are the prob-

lems that Baoious total curiosity, not to mention his avoweo ioentincation
with Hegel, ano his oisavoweo ioentincation with Kant, get him into?
Here are three problems that I see as oeriving oirectly from the Kant-
Hegel imbroglio: :, the materialist oialectic, ., the temptation of the whole,
, the theory of change. These problems are all linkeo. Symptomatically,
one can see the return of triaos throughout LOW. Ior example, the oia-
lectic of presentation of the logic of the concept of booy proceeos like this:
our trajectory can be summarizeo thus: subjective formalism ,without
object,, object ,without subject,, objectivity of the subject ,booies, ,.o,.
Then are the three forms of the subject ,faithful, reactive, obscure,, the
6. The woros inaesthetic, transitional ontology, metapolitics are coineo against
aesthetics, epistemology ano political philosophy respectively in oroer to inoicate
the twisteo relation of the conoition/evaluation pairing, ano, if possible, in oroer to oeny
oneself the temptation to rely on the renection/object relation, Alain Baoiou, Freface to
the English Eoition, Mctopoltttc, trans. ]. Barker, Lonoon, Verso, .oo, p. xxxiii.
. As A. ]. Bartlett has suggesteo to me, LOW might even be better consioereo a ptcocl
rather than a cocl to BE, given the number ano intensity of LOWs links to TS ,private
communication,.
]ustin Clemens :q
three funoamental operators of objectivity ,localization, compatibility, or-
oer,, the three themes of the Grano Logic ,transcenoental, object, rela-
tion, ano so on. When you start oealing with Triaos, one bao guy is still
the big boss, ano thats Hegel. Even if you aoo a fourth strut to each, that
is, as Zizek has often noteo, Hegelian too.
Ior Baoiou, because there is no One, nothing binos the inconsistency
of worlos. The problem is: how is it that, given the patency of incommen-
surables, a truth can be saio to be the same? This is also the problem of
time. Ior Baoiou, a truth-proceoure must aim at the present, a present
that is such only as a future anterior, ano is, thereby, immortal ,or eter-
nal,. The two issues are linkeo. Take the little oemonstration on prime
numbers ,:8-.,. Here Baoiou reiterates:
Must it be oeouceo that all is culture, incluoing mathematics? That
universality is only a nction? Ano perhaps an imperialist, even
totalitarian, nction? Irom the same example we will, completely
to the contrary, amrm:
that an eternal truth is envelopeo in oiherent linguistic ano
conceptual contexts ,in what we will call, on the basis of Book II,
oiherent worlos,,
that a subject of the same type nnos itself implicateo in the
oemonstrative proceoure, whether it be Greek or contemporary
,whether it belongs to the worlo Greek mathematics or to the
worlo mathematics after Cantor,
The key point is that the truth subjacent to the innnity of prime
numbers is not so much this innnity itself as what is oeciphereo there
regaroing the structure of numbers: that they are all composeo
of prime numbers, which are like the atomic constituents
inoecomposableof numericity ,.o-.:,.
This can only work if one takes mathematics to be one worlo, love an-
other worlo, politics another, art yet anotherano that these worlos are
not the worlos we think of when we think Greek theatre or mooernist
theatre. Against relativism ,oemocratic materialism,, Baoiou has then,
on the one hano, to amrm eternal truths, on the other hano, there is
no totality, so worlos are really oisjunct. The oimculty is then to explain
how eternality can emerge from ottltr a worlo, ano how this eternality
then communicates octoccr worlos: I believe in eternal truths ano in their
fragmenteo creation in the present of worlos. My position on this point
is completely isomorphic to that of Descartes: truths are eternal because
they have been createo, ano not because they have been there forever
,,. But this is to restate the problem in the guise of a conviction, sup-
porteo, moreover, by an appeal to authority.
Fart of the oimculty is that it isnt simply that a theory of change is
lacking, its nice to have a more elaborate theory of worlo-transformation,
sure, but such a theory only forces out the problem more clearly. I was im-
presseo with the account given in BE, as I am impresseo with the oiherent
account of change ,ano the possibility of change, in LOW.
8
But perhaps
it isnt enough. Its that a really convincing concept of eternity is lacking.
It seems to me the kernel of the problem is this: how to seize ano present
tlc lttottctt, of tlc ctctrtt, of corttrgcrc,, the fact that eternity emerges in
worlos in time. Kant woulont see the neeo to oo it, Hegel coulo oo it, but
because he believeo in the Whole. It may well be a trap to think that a
materialist oialectic, an account of specincity routeo through category
theory, or a better typology of subjective variations is going to help with
this oeaolock. On the contrary, we have so much trouble thinking contin-
gency ptcctcl, occooc of tlc trcloctootltt, of tlc otolccttc.
A tcottcctco truthwhether that of prime numbers or the oepiction of
horsesmust leap the gap between heterogeneous worlos, but a truth can
only be the truth of o worlo. It is this sequelization of truth that I have not
yet unoerstooo in LOW.
VI. CONCLUSION
It may not be enough to pair the rigorous formal oemonstrations with
quasi-phenomenological talk of battles ano oemonstrations ano paint-
ings. But only time will tell: I have never reao anything quite like LOW
before, ano, given that it was omcially publisheo barely a half-year ago
,March .oo6,, I have been unable to nno any substantial responses to it.
None of the existing accounts have given the slightest evioence that they
8. As Oliver Ieltham notes, BE can provioe a theory of both the multiplicity of structures
ano contingent astructural change. What Baoious philosophy aoos is basically: :, The
contingency of structural incompleteness or instability: not every structure permits global
change. ., The possibility of anomalous events that occur in the register of the real, outsioe
structure ,they are not grounoeo in any external reality/context,, ano which can initiate
change if there are. , The elaboration of structural preconoitions for transformation
someone recognizes ano names the event as belonging to the situationIinally, , A new
way of thinking subjects of change, subjects who, over time, participate in the invention
of a new symbolic oroer by means of hypotheses ano enquiries concerning the belonging
of the anomalous event to a structure, Enjoy your stay : Structural Change in Seminar
XVII, in ]. Clemens ano R. Grigg ,eos.,, }ococ Locor oro tlc Otlct Stoc of P,cloorol,t,
Durham, Duke University Fress, .oo6, p. :q..
]ustin Clemens ::
have so far oealt aoequately with the formal logic, let alone with the real
ambitions of the book. Inoeeo, LOW will probably prove to be among
the most ambitious ano wioe-ranging works of philosophy of the .:
st
cen-
tury. Who else in contemporary philosophy anywhere in the worlo shares
Baoious range ano oepth of knowleoge ,mathematics, logic, philosophy,
great moments in politics, key oevelopments in contemporary music, the
history of theatre, etc.,, let alone the ability to articulate these knowleoges
in such an unpreceoenteo fashion?
Still, I cannot see whats at stake in amrming a materialist oialectic
tooay against oemocratic materialism. These are terms from the strug-
gles of a previous era, one that still helo out hope for the Whole, even in its
negation or loss ,e.g., the Whole is the untrue, the eno of metanarratives,
anti-oialectics, etc.,. Nothing intrinsic justines this as a materialism ,why
not just call it a realism?,, other than olo fononesses. Ioealism, material-
ism: this has become a oistinction without oiherence in a worlo where
founoational physics invents incommensurable ano untestable string-the-
ories that are nonetheless each consistent, where the legacy of political
activism engages local struggles that haroly require any kino of ooctrine
or praxis of materialism for their organization or ehects. Whats in this
oialectic tooay thats worth saving? Whats in this materialism thats not
a mere slogan? LOW is certainly BE., a genuine sequel in the sense of
which I spoke above. But it is in some fashion also a recoiling, a kino of
return to the gooo olo oays of Baoious pre-BE struggles. So I think the
guioing opposition that opens this book, between oemocratic material-
ism ano materialist oialectics is misleaoing. The challenge is rather to
surpass oemocracy, materialism ano oialectics, without succumbing to
fascism, ioealism ano lassituoe. The slogan one might branoish insteao is
ttorlttctol ooolottm.
I think this is what one shoulo ask of philosophy: to ioentify, to an-
nounce, to harbour, to amrm, to practice the ,or an, ooolotc. A philosophy
can certainly oomicile regional theories within it, but it is itself not simply
a theory, or agglutination of theories. Nor can philosophy be reouceo to
a quasi-Wittgensteinian oissolution of false problems, though oissolution
can certainly sometimes in itself provioe some kino of absolute. But the
point is that true philosophy may require no theory at all. ]ust an absolute.
An absolute, moreover, that can even be evanescent, innrm, inoiscern-
ible.
This is what an attention to the conoitions of philosophy enableo Ba-
oiou to oo in BE. Baoious unooubteo personal geniusevioent from Lc
Corccpt oc moolc to Pcot-or pcrct lo poltttoc.was curbeo by conoitions
to proouce the terrible beauty of BE. There, there is no real rhetoric at
all, as he is reouceo to presenting the founoational interventions of other
oiscourses, mathematics ano poetry above all. BEs philosophical power
oerives from its Flatonic attention to the incommensurable absolutes ano
their articulation, which hao to be oone in a non-oialectical fashion. BE is
very explicit on this point: it is not logical negation, contraoiction, antago-
nism, or other familiar philosophemes that are up to the mathematical
thought of the foreclosure of the inconsistency of the voio. Its set theory,
ano set theory alone. Moreover, its not just that Baoious philosophical
ambitions can only be fulnlleo by being brutally curbeo, rather, every-
ones ambitions are curbeo as they are oelivereo into their secular eternity.
Flato is an absolute, but, coming before Cantor, must fail to think being as
innnity, having to take recourse to the ngure of a oream, Rousseau is an
absolute, who, oespite his anti-philosophical tenoencies, forges an eternal
oistinction between the totality of wills ano the general will.
All this can be oone precisely because, in the terms that LOW ohers,
BE largely restricts itself to a worlo, to a single worlo, the worlo of ontology
,ano to its fracturing through events,. LOW, however, is about the logics
,irreoucibly plural, of worlos ,also plural,. It thus sets itself a task so grano
that self-comparisons to Hegel arent going to cut it: in the last instance,
LOW provioes neither the unbearable ontological intrication of the Sct-
crcc of Logtc, nor the hallucinatory cavalcaoe of the Plcromcrolog, of Sptttt.
Why? Frecisely because there is no Whole for Baoiou, the worlos can be
given no overarching arch, no principle, no absolute reason. What in BE
were not examples, in any sense of the woro, but conoitions, that is, the
supports for the philosophical snatch ano grab, in LOW turn once more
into examples. To reao LOW after BE is to reao a jumbleo work of gen-
ius, teeming with inventiveness at all levels. But its genius can also seem
tenoentious, precisely because its only restraint is to gesture towaros pos-
sible exemplincations of the logical structure. What has happeneo to the
absolutely central ooctrine of such books as BE ano C, where philosophys
historically invariant oennition involves the construction of a place in
which science, love, art ano politics can all encounter each other? Is this
still the case? In LOW, everything verges on a Borgesian oream, moving,
with a oelirious energy, from prime numbers to cave paintings of horses
to Spartacus to contemporary music to.
So if LOW must be reao, its propositions, even when irrefutable, of-
ten appear far from absolute. Nonetheless, it never gives up on what the
stakes are tooay for philosophy. These are, as I suggesteo above, to attain
to a ttorlttctol ooolotc by taking reason to the very points at which it breaks
]ustin Clemens :
oown ano is transformeo into something unpreceoenteo. To literality, not
materiality, to contingency, not sumciency, to absolution, not oialectics,
to submission, ano not to surrenoer.
locc
:
o
Count-as-one, Iorming-into-one, Unary Trait, S:
Lorenzo Chiesa
Let us give Lacan his oue: he was the nrst to make a sys-
tematic use of numericality.
Alain Baoiou
INTRODUCTION
Accoroing to Alain Baoiou, psychoanalysis thinks the amorous pro-
ceoure, one of the four proceoures for the sake of which the abstract
categories of his Bctrg oro Eccrt have been formulateo.
:
Baoiou invites
psychoanalysts ano psychoanalytic theorists to practice these categories
in their own nelo.
.
Against the backgrouno of such an invitation, in this
paper, it is my intention to outline a possible application of some of the
most important conceptual propositions aovanceo in the nrst two parts of
Bctrg oro Eccrt to the key psychoanalytic issue of the ioentincation of the
,conscious ano unconscious, subject as expounoeo by ]acques Lacan in
his ninth Seminar, Ltocrttcottor. More specincally, I aim to show how Ba-
oious notions of the count-as-one ano the forming-into-one can pront-
ably be put to work in oroer better to unoerstano Lacans notions of the
unary trait ano the S:, the master-signiner. What is at stake in both cases
is the relationship between structure ano metastructure, presentation ano
:. I woulo like to thank Ana Alvarez Velasco, a true ror-working mathematician, for her
invaluable aovice. I am also grateful to Alberto Toscano for his Baoiouian comments on
an early oraft of this article.
.. Alain Baoiou, Lcttc ct lcrcmcrt, Faris, Seuil, :q88, p. :o. The English translation, which
is otherwise excellent, curiously omits this reference to psychoanalysis, replacing it with
a reference to artwhich ooes not appear in the original, Alain Baoiou, Bctrg oro Eccrt,
trans. Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. ,henceforth BE,.
representation, starting from the common premise that the one, which is
not, solely exists as opctottor ,BE ., ,Baoiou,, as an instrument ,Lacan,
which is not the one of Farmenioes, nor the one of Flotinus, nor the one
of any totality.
It shoulo be noticeo that, although Ltocrttcottor argu-

ably remains one of Lacans most abstract Seminars, it is nevertheless the
case that the topics it oiscusses have vast repercussions for basic technical
questions concerning the cure, such as the hanoling of the transference
ano the emergence of anxiety. Applying Bctrg oro Eccrt to the practice of
psychoanalytic thought will thus also implicitly inoicate its relevance to
the practice of psychoanalytic treatment.
In Bctrg oro Eccrt, Baoiou enoeavours to think philosophically, that is
meta-ontologically, what cttcolotc between the mooern theories of the
subject, tr pttmt the Lacanian one, ano ontology unoerstooo as axiomatic
set-theory ,BE ,. As ]ustin Clemens ano Oliver Ieltham rightly remark,
Baoiou ooes not merge ontology into the theory of the subject, rather, the
tcrtor between the two orives his investigations.
This tension is what ap-

pears to be annulleo when one practices Baoious categories across Laca-
nian psychoanalysis. While a signincant amount of research has recently
been carrieo out that carefully investigates the similarities ano oiherences
between Baoiou ano Lacans theories of the subject,
less attention has

been paio to the ottcct relationship between the latter ano Baoious set-
theoretical ortolog,. Baoious ontology of the One ano the Multiplethe
o pttott conoitions of any possible ontologyrelies on the law that the
one t rot ,BE ., .8,. By Baoious own aomission on page : of Meoitation
One of Bctrg oro Eccrt, this law is closely associateo to Lacans pathbreak-
ing principle accoroing to which there is |,mooltc| Oneness ,BE .,or
. Lesson of .q/::/6: from ]acques Lacan, Scmtrot IX ;..-..): Ltocrttcottor, unpub-
lisheo ,henceforth Seminar IX,.
. Alain Baoiou, Irrttc Tlooglt: Ttotl oro tlc Rctotr to Pltloopl,, eo. ano trans. ]ustin Cle-
mens ano Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. 6.
. See, for instance, Slavoj iek, Tlc Ttclltl Soocct: Tlc Aocrt Ccrttc of Poltttcol Ortol-
og,, New York, Verso, .ooo, pp. :.-o, Slavoj iek, Ioreworo to the Secono Eoition:
Enjoyment within the Limits of Reason Alone, Fot Tlc, Iroo ôt 1lot Tlc, Do: Ero,mcrt
o o Poltttcol Foctot, .no, Lonoon, Verso, .oo., pp. lxxxi-lxxxviii. See also Bruno Bosteels,
Alain Baoious Theory of the Subject: The Recommencement of Dialectical Material-
ism? ,Fart I,, Plt: 1ototcl }ootrol of Pltloopl,, no. :., .oo:, pp. .oo-.q, pp, ..o-q. ano
Bruno Bosteels, Alain Baoious Theory of the Subject: The Recommencement of Dia-
lectical Materialism? ,Fart II,, Plt: 1ototcl }ootrol of Pltloopl,, no. :, .oo., pp. :-.o8,
pp. :q-.o8, Eo Fluth ano Dominiek Hoens, What if the Other Is Stupio? Baoiou ano
Lacan on Logical Time, in Feter Hallwaro ,eo.,, Tltrl Agotr: Alotr Bootoo oro tlc Fototc of
Pltloopl,, Lonoon, Continuum Books, .oo, pp. :8.-qo.
Lorenzo Chiesa :q
better, there is orl, symbolic Oneness. What Baoiou fails to emphasize in
this context is that this principle is, for Lacan, connneo to a theory of the
subject: in spite of proposing important hypotheses about being, Lacan
never really oevelopeo any ontology inoepenoently of his notion of sub-
jectivity.
6

My consioerations shoulo therefore always be measureo against the
threat of a short circuit in Baoious mogrom opo, which I oo not inteno to
investigate any further in this occasion. On the one hano, Baoious theory
of the subject-event in Bctrg oro Eccrt may rightly be labelleo as beyono
Lacanas the title of Fart VIII of the book suggestsoue to his rigor-
ous philosophical appropriation of Faul Cohens mathematical notion of
forcing. On the other hano, in spite of its reliance on the raoical thesis ac-
coroing to which ontology || is nothing other than mathematics itself
,BE xiii,, Baoious solio ontological eoince is itself amply anticipateo by
Lacans own theory of the subject. The latter is inoeeo baseo on the prin-
ciple that there is only symbolic Onenessor, aoopting a formula closer
to Baoious own terminology, there is no One except in mathematics
albeit in an often hesitant ano imprecise manner. Thus, the least we can
say is that, in practising the ortologtcol categories maoe available by Bctrg
oro Eccrt across Lacanian psychoanalytic notions, we will not be surpriseo
to oiscover a high oegree of compatibility between them. The ioeal result
of such a practice woulo be nothing less than an accurate set-theoretical
formalization of the relation between consciousness ano the unconscious,
succeeoing there where Lacans courageous attempts to oemonstrate that
mathematical topology t structureano meta-structurefaileo.
8
COUNT-AS-ONE, ONE, FHANTOM OI INCONSISTENCY
Everything turns on mastering the gap between the presupposition
,that must be rejecteo, of a being of the one ano the thesis of its there is
,BE .,. Ior Baoiou, the one is not, yet it exists as an operation, the count-
as-one. The count-as-one is not a presentation either: what presents itself,
6. Ior a oiscussion of Lacans ethics as an ontological ethics, see Lorenzo Chiesa ano
Alberto Toscano, Ethics ano Capital, Ex Nihilo, Umot;o): A }ootrol of tlc Urcorctoo,, no.
:, .oo, pp. q-.. Ano Chapter of Lorenzo Chiesa, Locor oro Sooccttctt,: A Pltloopltcol
Irttooocttor, Cambrioge, MIT Fress, .oo.
. Lesson of ://:q. from ]acques Lacan, Scmtrot XIX ;.,.-.,.), Oo pttc, unpub-
lisheo.
8. Topology is not maoe to leao us to structure. Topology is this structure ]acques
Lacan, Ltouroit, Aottc cttt, Faris, Seuil, .oo:, p. 8.
a situation, is multiple. However, every situation is ttoctotco by means of
the operation of the count-as-one. Thus, the relation between the multi-
ple ano the one is tcttoocttcc: the multiple will have preceoeo the one only
after having necessarily been structureo by means of the count-as-one.
As Baoiou puts it, the count-as-one ,the structure, installs the univer-
sal pertinence of the one/multiple couple for any situation ,BE .,. This
amounts to saying that, with regaro to presentation, the one is also an
operational tcolt ,BE ., my emphasis,. A concomitant splitting occurs
on the sioe of the multiple: inconsistent multiplicities, multiples that are
retroactively unoerstooo as non-one as soon as being-one is a result, are
to be oistinguisheo from consistent multiplicities, multiple|s| as several-
ones counteo by the action of structure ,BE .,. We can thus concluoe
that the law that the one is not is at the same time the law that the one
is a law of the multiple ,BE .,.
It is vital to stress that, accoroing to Baoiou, what is normally pre-
senteo in any situation is the fact that the one t: all that is presenteo in
a situation is counteo-as-one, which is to say that the principle the one
is not cannot be presenteo in it. At this level, inconsistent multiplicity is
solely the presupposition that prior to the count the one is not ,BE .,.
Having saio this, we shoulo also keep in mino that the one is an opera-
tional result, ano that for this reason, there must be something of the
multiple |that| ooes not absolutely coincioe with the result ,BE ,. In
other woros, in situations, which are as such always structureo, a remain-
oer exceeos the one of consistent multiplicities, ano this can be nothing
other than the very operation, the law of the count-as-one, from which
the one results. With regaro to a given situation, inconsistent multiplici-
ties, the pure multiple, are therefore incluoeo as an exclusion: aoopting a
quasi-psychoanalytic terminology whose Lacanian amnities, as we shall
later see, are remarkable, Baoiou suggests that this inclusive exclusion is
what causes the structureo presentation to waver towaros the plortom
of inconsistency ,BE , my emphasis,. This phantom, a retroactive by-
proouct of the count-as-one, cannot itself be presenteo, yet it is trclooco in
the situation in the name of what woulo be the presentation itself, the
presentation in-itself , if what the law ooes not authorize to think was
thinkable: that the one is not ,BE ,. Fut oiherently, from the structureo
situational stanopoint for which the law is the one is a law of the multiple,
the phantom of inconsistency amounts to the excluoeo law that the one
is not.
More specincally, the pure multiple, unpresentable insofar as it is ex-
cluoeo by the law the one is a law of the multiple, is rotltrg from the
Lorenzo Chiesa ::
stanopoint of the situation. As Baoiou observes, being-nothing is oiherent
from non-being: Tlctc t a being of nothing, as form of the unpresentable.
The nothing is what names the unperceivable gap || between ||
the one as result ano the one as operation ,BE , my emphasis,. But be-
ing-nothing t rot, just as the one is not: the tlctc t of being-nothing ooes
not instigate any search for tlc nothing, ano thus avoios falling back into
an ontology of presence: The nothing is neither a place nor a term of the
situation. Ior if the nothing were a term that coulo only mean one thing:
that it hao been counteo as one ,BE ,. Rather, the nothing is the non-
one of any count-as-one, or, the phantom of inconsistency is the name
nothing, which is not a-nothing |or-ttcr|. At this stage, it is important to
emphasize that, for Baoiou, the nothing is both the pure unpresentable
multiple, the name of unpresentation in presentation, oro the operation of
the count, that which exceeos the one-result.
q
The nothing, or better the
voio as its localyet unlocalizableoccurrence, has a oool status.
Let us consioer this question further. Being oo octrg is neither one rot
multiple, although being is certainly ptccrtco as multiple, being inoeeo
occurs in every presentation, being ooes not present ttclf ,see BE .,: be-
ing oo octrg is what presents ,itself, ,BE .,, ano, it is as such, in being
forecloseo from presentation ,BE .,, that it is sayable. Thus the voio is
the name of being insofar as the voio inoicates precisely that nothing is
presenteo, by means of the voio, presentation gives us the non-access to
an unpresentable ,see BE 6,. However, in aooition to naming being as an
unpresentable, a non-one that wanoers in the presentation in the form of
a oottocttor, the subtractive face of the count ,BE , my emphasis,, the
voio also concomitantly names being in the very operation of the count-
as-one which, in exceeoing the presentable one-result, ototc a situation
to its being ,a suture is quite literally an operation,. Again, the voio is the
name of being in two inextricable ways. Both excluoe the possibility that
the voio may be localizeo ano thus encountereo in the normal regime of
structureo situations: Baoiou believes that, from the situational stanopoint,
the voio as name of being is equivalent to an absolute unconscious of
the voio |trcorctcrcc oo ctoc| ,BE 6,. The phantom of inconsistency can-
not be conscious.
q. The law of the count as conoition for existence, which renoers presentation possible
by precluoing the presentation of inconsistent multiplicity ,i.e. being itself,, is ultimately
inoiscernible from the ontological inconsistency whose presentation it forecloses, Ray
Brassier, Fresentation as Anti-Fhenomenon in Alain Baoious Being ano Event, Corttrcr-
tol Pltloopl, Rcctco, .oo6, |available on-line at: http://www.springerlink.com/content/
kr68.o6o::.q/?p~:66:6.o8oa:bf8e8oocfoq8pi~|
UNICITY, IORMING-INTO-ONE, ANXIETY OI THE VOID
Baoiou states that there are four meanings concealeo beneath the
single signiner one ,BE 8q,. The nrst two oistinguish the count-as-one
from the one: as we have alreaoy seen, the one, which is not, can only be
the retroactive ano cttcc ehect of a structural count, the count-as-one.
Since being is always presenteo as multiple, multiple of multiples, what is
tcoll, counteo as one through the nominal seal |ccoo| of the count-as-one
is the multiple-of-multiples ,BE qo,: multiples are counteo by the count-
as-one as one-multiples, consistent multiplicities, multiples as several
ones. In other woros, the couple one/multiple installeo by the count-
as-one oo structure shoulo ultimately be unoerstooo as the couple one-
result/one-multiple.
The thiro meaning of the signiner one is, for Baoiou, unicity. Unic-
ity is not a being, but a preoicate of the multiple ,BE qo,. Multiples are
unique: this simply means, a multiple is oiherent from any other ,BE
68,. What oiherentiates a multiple from all other multiples is its proper
name, that is, being counteo as one-multiple by the nominal seal of the
count-as-one. A notion of unicity that has oone with any nliation from
the being of the one ano only accepts the one as result, is what allows us
to think the relationship between the same ano the other in a new way:
given that the one is not, it is in regaro to themselves that the others are
Others ,BE ,. A multiple is Other than any other multiple only oue to
its unicity. Or, the Other || cannot oesignate the gap between the one
ano the others-than-one |oottc-oc-lor|, because the one is not ,BE
trans. mooineo,. Fut simply, the Other is coextensive to the unicity of the
others, not the one.
Iinally, there is a fourth meaning of the signiner one, which Baoiou
oesignates as forming-into-one |mtc-cr-or|. This is basically a ccoro
count, a count of the count ,BE 8- my emphasis,, which shoulo be
unoerstooo in two inextricable ways accoroing to the two sioes of the cou-
ple one-result/one-multiple installeo by the nrst count, the count-as-one.
Inoeeo, the forming-into-one inoicates the concomitant possibility of both
count|ing| as one an alreaoy counteo one-multiple ano apply|ing| the
count to the one-result of the count ,BE qo,. Such an operation is possible
insofar as, after the nrst count, the one is not really oistinguishable from
the multiple: given that the one is the result of the structuring count that
makes the multiple consist, it remains immanent to presentation, which,
as such, can present only multiples. Diherently put, the orc-multiple re-
Lorenzo Chiesa :
sults from the count-as-one, ano for this very reason the one-tcolt can
only itself be a multiple.
If we now consioer that the count-as-one is, as we have alreaoy re-
markeo, a law that proouces a namethe proper name of each multiple
as uniqueit also follows that the forming-into-one will be nothing other
than submitting to the law the names that it proouces ,BE qo,. It is im-
portant to emphasize that the resulting multiple of names ,BE q:,, the
proouct of the forming-into-one, is itself a multiple: even after the secono
count has taken place, the one is solely a retroactive nction, albeit a more
elaborate one, since it now transcenos presentation into representation.
At this level, the one as representation can be oistinguisheo from presen-
tation as multiple, yet it remains a tc-presentation of a multiple ano thus
a nction. On the other hano, notice that retroactive representation will
necessarily have a retroactive ehect on retroactive presentation: it is also
in this sense that I unoerstano Baoious suggestion accoroing to which
forming-into-one is not tcoll, oistinct from the count-as-one ,BE q:,.
The relation between the two counts, the counting-as-one of pres-
entation ano the forming-into-one of representation, is to be conceiveo
of in terms of a relation between structure ano metastructure, situation
ano the state of the situation. Although Baoiou insists on oiherentiat-
ing the two countsthey are absolutely oistinct ,BE 8,he also af-
nrms that the reouplication of the count is necessaryevery structure
call|s| upon a metastructure ,BE 8,ano consequently structure ano
metastructure, situation ano its state, are not really oistinct. The reason
for this necessity is countering the oanger of the voio, waroing it oh from
structureo presentation ,BE 8,: all situations are thus oenneo by an in-
evitable anxiety of the voio |orgotc oo ctoc| ,BE q,. As we have seen,
the unpresentable ano unlocalizable character of the voio as the name of
a situations ,inconsistent, being is what guarantees the consistency of this
very situation, the emergence of consistent multiplicity. That is to say, it is
only insofar as a structureo presentation ooes not encounter its own voio
that the situational one is not ruineo. However, we have also seen that,
within presentation, something exceeos the count: the very operation of
the structural count-as-one oo nothing. This means that the errant voio
coulo nx itself in the guise of structure: It is || possible that, subtracteo
from the count, ano by consequence a-structureo, the structure itself be
the point where the voio is given ,BE q,. In oroer to counter the oanger
of the voio, it is therefore necessary to structure the structure or that the
there is Oneness be valio for the count-as-one ,BE q,.
Signincantly, accoroing to Baoiou, this reooubling, the secono count,
shoulo be unoerstooo as an tmogtrottottor of the nrst: if the count-as-one
as a ,symbolic, operation retroactively proouces a nctional ,imaginary,
one-result, the counts unoergoing, in turn, the operation of a count
is equivalent to the nctionalizing of the count via the imaginary being
conferreo upon it ,BE q,. Fut simply, while the nrst count symbolically
proouces the one, the secono count, the count of the count, imaginarily
t one.
UNARY TRAIT AS TRAIT UNIQUE, OR LA MULTIFLICITE
ACTUELLE
The central notion of Lacans ninth seminar is arguably what, in an
explicit attempt to echo the function of the one in set theory, is oesig-
nateo as the unary trait |ttott orottc|.
:o
Generalizing ano elaborating on
Ireuos notion of the ctrtgct _og,
::
Lacan believes that ioentincation is
ultimately baseo on ioentincation with the signiner, ano the unary trait
is what all signiners have in common, their support.
:.
More precisely,
the one as unary trait is the trttomcrt
:
by means of which ioentincation
is maoe possible: the unary trait is not a one but an operation, a count,
that constitutes the fooroottor of the one of ioentincation with the signi-
ner.
:
Simply put, the unary trait shoulo be unoerstooo as what proouces
a stroke, /, not a unity, let alone a totality:
:
Lacan openly oenies that
he is taking into consioeration any of the many signincations of the one
proposeo by philosophical traoition, rather it is a question of the : || of
the primary teacher, the one of pupil X, write out a hunoreo lines of :s
for me!, namely strokes |which have| always been sumcient for minimal
notation.
:6
In oescribing the unary trait as a count, ano even as a nrst count, the
count-as-one, that as such is to be oistinguisheo from a secono count, I
:o. Seminar IX, lesson of 6/:./6:.
::. Accoroing to Ireuo, in omc cases, ioentincation is || partial || ano only borrows a
single trait from the person who is its object, Sigmuno Ireuo, Group Fsychology ano the
Analysis of the Ego, Tlc Storooto Eotttor of tlc Complctc P,clologtcol 1otl of Stgmoro Ftcoo,
vol. XVIII, Lonoon, The Hogarth Fress ano the Institute of Fsychoanalysis, .oo:, p. :o.
:.. Seminar IX, lesson of ../::/6:.
:. Seminar IX, Lesson of .q/::/6:.
:. Seminar IX, Lesson of ../::/6:.
:. See Seminar IX, lesson of .q/::/6:.
:6. Seminar IX, Lesson of .q/::/6:.
Lorenzo Chiesa :
am far from forcing Lacans own terminology. The unary trait begins the
function of counting: this initial activity of counting |that| begins early
for the subject shoulo not be confuseo with the activity of establishing
collections.
:
In other woros, the count-as-one of the unary trait is what
proouces the one, many ones, as strokes ///, however, at this stage, there
is no secono count, or oootttor, that can count the strokes as :s, or put oif-
ferently, that can count the operation of the nrst count as or operation. As
Lacan observes, the unary trait || supports || one plus one ano one
again, the plus being meant there only to mark well |a| oiherence, where
the problem begins is precisely that one can aoo them together, in other
woros that two, that three have a meaning.
:8
In oroer to stress how / - /
- / is not the same as : - : - :, Lacan goes as far as suggesting that a chilo
may well be able to count up to two ano three ottloot being able to oper-
ate with numbers: two ano three are in this case nothing but a repetition
of the / proouceo by the unary trait, ano shoulo be oistinguisheo from the
number . ano unoerstooo as : - : ano : - : - :. This early counting is
inehective when oealing with numbers higher than : we shoulo therefore
not be surpriseo when we are tolo that certain so-calleo primitive tribes
along the mouth of the Amazon were only recently able to oiscover the
virtue of the number four, ano raiseo altars to it.
:q
What is at stake in the
gap that separates these two counts is nothing less than the birth of the
subjects ioentincation as mooern Cartesian subject split between con-
sciousness ano the unconscious.
.o
In what precise sense ooes the - of the / - / - / mark a oiherence
between the strokes proouceo by the count-as-one of the unary trait? This
question certainly has to oo with the fact that, throughout Seminar IX,
Lacan inoiscriminately alternates the phrases ttott orottc ano ttott ortoc:
put simply, a unary trait is a trglc trait. If the unary trait, as instrumental
operation, is the most simple structural trait in the sense that it presents
no variations,
.:
its sole property will be its ortctt,. That is to say, the -
separating / from / oenotes the singleness of the ttott as such, the absence
of any qualitative oiherence in it,
..
ano thus works as an inoicator of sig-
:. Seminar IX, Lesson of //6..
:8. Seminar IX, Lesson of //6..
:q. Seminar IX, Lesson of //6..
.o. Ior a oescription of the Cartesian Goo as the cogttos unary trait, see lesson of
../::/6:.
.:. Seminar IX, Lesson of ../::/6:.
... Seminar IX, Lesson of 6/:./6:.
nifying oiherence, oiherence in the pure state.
.
Or, every count, every /
is absolutely oiherent from any other / without its ever being a question of
counting the trait as a qualitatively oiherentiateo :: as we have just seen,
the unary trait preceoes number tttcto cro.
.

Two crucial specincations shoulo be maoe. Iirstly, the unary trait
motl oiherence as such,
.
which ooes not mean it t oiherence as such.
This is a straightforwaro way to oistinguish the unary trait from the full-
neogeo signiner which it supports. While the unary trait is a stroke, ano,
signincantly enough, it is as letter that it can be oiherentiateo from all
other strokes,
.6
the signiner is the one as oiherence, that is, following
Saussure, simply being what the others are not.
.
Thus, unlike the unary
trait, the signiner implies |the| function of the ortt || oo pure oiher-
ence.
.8
Accoroing to Lacan, the orc as oiherence, the emergence of the
one |which| as such is the Other,
.q
that is the nctional big Other, neces-
sitates the secono count.
Seconoly ano most importantly, at its nrst appearance, the one mani-
festly oesignates actual multiplicity |molttpltctt octocllc|.
o
The count-as-
one of the unary trait as ttott ortoc proouces nothing other than consist-
ent, that is actual, multiplicity: Lacan also refers to it as a oistinctive
unity |ortt otttrcttcc|.
:
In oroer to illustrate this last point, he evokes a
scene of everyoay pre-historic life:
I am a hunter || I kill |an animal|, it is an aoventure, I kill another
of them, it is a secono aoventure which I can oistinguish by certain
traits characteristic of the nrst, but which resembles it essentially
by being markeo with the same general line. At the fourth, there
may be some confusion: what oistinguishes it from the secono, for
.. Seminar IX, Lesson of 6/:./6:.
.. Lacan amrms that the signiner as such serves to connote oiherence at its purest, ano,
we can aoo, it is all the purer because it preceoes even number, M. Safouan, Locortoro: Lc
mtrottc oc }ococ Locor * .-., Faris, Seuil, .oo:, p. :q.
.. Seminar IX, lesson of 6/:./6:.
.6. Seminar IX, Lesson of 6/:./6:.
.. Seminar IX, Lesson of .q/::/6:.
.8. Seminar IX, Lesson of .q/::/6:.
.q. Seminar IX, Lesson of .q/::/6:.
o. Seminar IX, Lesson of 6/:./6:.
:. Safouan even names this concept oistinctive one |or otttrcttf|, Safouan, Locortoro: Lc
mtrottc oc }ococ Locor * .-., p. .o.. To the best of my knowleoge, Lacan never
uses this expression in Seminar IX. In the lessons of :/:./6: ano .o/:./6: he also refers
to the oistinctive trait, which I take to be synonymous with unary trait.
Lorenzo Chiesa :
example? At the twentieth, how will I know where I am?
.

Like a chilo who counts without numbers, our primitive man can ini-
tially oistinguish the secono aoventure from the nrst by certain imagi-
naryintuitively qualitativetraits that are then symbolically presenteo
as a stroke / on an animal rib-bone. Yet, as soon as this occurs, his two
aoventures are markeo by the same general line, the same kino of stroke
which leaos to signifying sameness, //. Although qualitative oiherence
is never eliminateo completely, the fact that each aoventure is, for a
limiteo time, intuitively experienceo as new proves to be all the more
seconoary inasmuch as quality is precisely what is overshaooweo by the
signifying in-oiherence of the traits //.
Irom a slightly oiherent perspec-

tive, all this amounts to saying that the oistinctive unity of the unary trait
is still tmmorcrt to the situation it counts, ano thus runs the risk of becom-
ing inoistinguishable from the non-situation of a primitive man who is still
lacking any methoo of location.
Thus, marking signifying oiherence as

such results in nothing other than signifying sameness, in-oiherence, if the
count is not itself counteo, if the actual multiplicity /, the one-multiple
that presents the hunters aoventure, is not itself representeo as :. We can
then unoerstano why Lacan pays so much attention to the later appear-
ance in pre-history of a cttc of strokes carveo on an animal rib-bone
Iirst two, then a little interval ano afterwaros nve, ano then it recom-
mences.
It is only at this level, that of the count of the count, where : -

: retroactively replaces //, that the properly human symbolic oimension
begins: this is the subjects own ioentincation with the signiner.
Iinally, it is quite remarkable that, in this context, Lacan himself oraws
a comparison between the use of the / maoe by the primitive hunter ano
the notion of the one with which set theory operates. Against what we
are taught at schoolYou cannot aoo up oranges ano apples, pears with
.. Seminar IX, lesson of 6/:./6:.
. Lesson of 6/:./6:. Lacan conceoes that, while the function of the unary trait is linkeo
to the cxttcmc reouction || of qualitative oiherence, even just at the level of the imaginary
appearance of the stroke itself, it is quite clear that there will not be a single |trait| like
another. Commenting on this point, Safouan rightly observes the following: It is clear
that the function of these notches is not more relateo to their |qualitative| oiherences than
it is to the elimination of these oiherences. It is not because the traits are oiherent that they
work oiherently, but because signifying oiherence is oiherent from qualitative oiherence,
Safouan, Locortoro: Lc mtrottc oc }ococ Locor * .-., pp. :q.-.
. Seminar IX, lesson of 6/:./6:.
. Seminar IX, Lesson of 6/:./6:.
carrots ano so on
6
the primitive hunter counts as one a multiple ao-
venture maoe by irreconcilable objects ano things. In the same way, in
set theory, you can very well aoo up what you want.
More technically,
Lacan acknowleoges that in what one calls the elements of sets, it is not
a matter of objects, or of things, it is rather a question of the multiples of
a multiple. In other woros, at the level of presentation, the set is a one-
multiple, what Lacan refers to as actual multiplicity: the count-as-one of
the unary trait presents a multiple-of-multiples, or to put with Baoiou, a
multiple as several ones ,BE .,.
In oroer to appreciate better the proximity between Baoious consist-
ent multiplicity ano Lacans oistinctive unity we shoulo not lose sight of
the following convergence. Baoious consistent multiplicity, the one-mul-
tiple, is initially oetermineo solely by its unicity, in all cases, unicity is
tlc property of consistent multiplicity oo counteo-as-one, inoepenoently
of any other possible property of o situation ,or set,. What matters at the
level of presentation without representation is the ptopct romc olplo, a letter
that seals the multiple, rather than the extension of what is being pre-
senteothe terms or elements of the situation. Inoeeo, extension is not
properly oenneo before the secono count takes place ano the state of the
situation is establisheo retroactively: only at that stage, the one-multiple
will have been counteo as o situation ,or, ontologically, oll the parts of a set
will have formeo the elements of o set as the powerset,. A situation is not
ioentical to what is being presenteo in it. Iollowing Ray Brassier, another
way to put this woulo be to say that presentation as such, presentation
without representationthe prehistoric hunters aoventureis an anti-
phenomenon.
8

LETTER AND FROFER NAME, OR A IS NOT A
The most basic formula of ioentincation is A is A. Lacan believes that
its apparent simplicity conceals a number of problems. It is therefore only
insofar as we question this formula that we can really grasp the oimcul-
ties involveo in ioentincation. This questioning is strictly relateo to the
|signifying| function of the one ano, conversely, the extenoeo use of the
6. This amounts to a very aovanceo oennition of aooition which supposes a number
of axioms which woulo be enough to cover the blackboaro ,Seminar IX, Lesson of
6/:./6:,.
. Seminar IX, Lesson of 6/:./6:.
8. See Brassier, Fresentation as Anti-Fhenomenon in Alain Baoious Being ano Event.
Lorenzo Chiesa :q
signiner in mathematics.
q
More specincally, for Lacan, A is A presup-
poses nrst of all the existence of A, the emergence of the lcttct, which, as
we have seen, shoulo be unoerstooo as a unary trait, a nrst count. Lacans
bolo propositions accoroing to which A is A is a belief ano There is
no tautology are thus always to be consioereo against the backgrouno of
the oimension of the letter. It is not insofar as the nrst A ano the secono A
mean oiherent things that I say that there is no tautology, it is in the very
status of A that there is inscribeo that A cannot be A,
o
A is not A means
that A is not ioentical to ttclf, or, to use a well-known Lacanian locution,
A is barreo, not that A is actually B: more precisely, the letter A as unary
trait counts as one but is not o one.
Lacans theory of the proper name ano his theory of writing aim to
show how the true nature of the proper name is the letter as unary trait,
which in turn is inextricable from the written mark. The proper name
cannot be unoerstooo as a woro for particulars, a oennition proposeo by
Bertrano Russell: this woulo soon leao us to paraooxes such as Socrates
not being a proper name since, for us, it is no longer a particular but
an abbreviateo oescriptionSocrates is inoeeo Flatos master, the man
who orank the hemlock, etc.or, conversely, the oemonstrative this is a
particular ano coulo therefore be oesignateo as ]ohn. Relying in part on
the linguist Alan Garoiner, Lacan believes that a proper name functions
on the basis of the oistinction between meaning ano signifying material
,signineo ano signiner,, however, oeparting from him, he specines that it
shoulo not be ioentineo with a oistinctive souno to which the subject pays
particular attention o souno. Irom a structuralist stanopoint, it is inoeeo
a matter of fact that all language is baseo on the oiherentiality of oistinc-
tive sounos, or phonomes, what is more, it is absolutely not true || that
each time we pronounce a proper name we are psychologically aware
of the accent put on the sonant material as such.
:
In other woros, the
problem with Garoiners notion of proper name is that he relies on a psy-
chologically substantialist ioea of the subject: the subject is for him simply
someone who pays attention to signiners when they are proper names.
On the other hano, for Lacan, the subject can be oenneo only with ref-
erence to signiners, not as someone unoerlying their functioning,
.
the
central role playeo by proper names in the subjects ioentincation shoulo
q. Seminar IX, lesson of .q/::/6:.
o. Seminar IX, Lesson of 6/:./6:.
:. Seminar IX, Lesson of .o/:./6:.
.. Seminar IX, Lesson of .o/:./6:.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :6o
thus be explaineo solely in terms of the signiner, especially accoroing to
its most basic appearance, the unary trait of the letter. There cannot be a
oennition of the proper name except in the measure that we are aware of
the relationship between the naming utterance ano something which in
its raoical nature is of the oroer of the letter.
Most importantly, the proper names relation to the letter as unary

trait is itself oepenoent on the logic of the written mark. Lacan plainly
points out that the characteristic of the proper name is always || linkeo
to || writing.
As Aaron Schuster remarks in his elegant commentary

on the fourth lesson of Seminar IX:
The crucial point for Lacan is that writing emerges nrst as the
isolation of the signifying trait ,unary trait, which then becomes
again, retroactivelythe basic support for the phoneticization
of language, i.e. the treasury of signiners proper. Iar from being
simply the translation of a more original speech, it is speech itself
that ultimately nnos its basis in the exteriority of the written mark.
What results from this, Lacan aoos, is that the proper name qua
brano || ought to be linkeo not with souno a la Garoiner, but
with writing. The proof of this is founo in the oecipherment of
unknown languages: one always begins by looking for proper
names since they remain the same across all languages ||. Ir tlc
ptopct romc, orc tlo tcotcocct ottltr tlc ,rcltortc otoct of lorgoogc o
tgrtct tr tt potc totc, o totc tcptccrtco tr otocltortc ;ptc-)lttot, o, tlc
pttmtttcc lortct rotclco oorc.

Let us owell on these issues. It is ooubtless the case that mans vocal
utterings preceoeo writing, chronologically speaking, however, language
tttcto cro as oetermineo by the function of the signiner is, for Lacan,
ultimately retroactively oepenoent on writing. Conversely, the letter as
writing potential was waiting to be phoneticizeo: this is what we have at
a nrst stage in prehistory, the simple traits, or strokes, of primitive bone
etchings. Lacan is careful in specifying that, as we have alreaoy seen,
the letter as unary trait always involves an initial imaginary oimension
something ngurativethat is soon ehaceo:
6
this is valio both for the
simple stroke / carveo on an animals ribwhich originally markeo the
image of an aoventureano, even more so, the more sophisticateo traits
. Seminar IX, Lesson of .o/:./6:.
. Seminar IX, Lesson of .o/:./6:.
. A. Schuster, Commcrtot, or Locor Scmtrot IX LIocrttcottor, .o Dcccmoct .., unpub-
lisheo ,my emphasis,.
6. Seminar IX, lesson of .o/:./6:.
Lorenzo Chiesa :6:
useo in ioeographic notationthe schematic representation of the heao *
of the animal I killeo ouring my aoventure still functions as a unary trait.
At a secono stage, the writing of the traitthat oesignates something
imaginaryis accompanieo by the utterance of a phoneme, but, for the
time being, the utterance m is not as yet oetacheo from the image rep-
resenteo by the trait *. Fut oiherently, phoneticization here oepenos on
the oesignation of an object via the marking of the trait. In a thiro ano
nnal stage, which oetermines the retroactive passage from prehistory to
history, we witness the reversal of this relation: now the marking of the
trait oepenos solely on phoneticization. This is writing proper: the letter
is retroactively transformeo into a signiner ano, being an element in a
oiherential structure of other signiners, acquires a life that is completely
inoepenoent of the object it useo to oesignate.
Irom a slightly oiherent perspective, we can say that writing proper
ano language tttcto cro with itonly really begins when the marking
of the trait * is phoneticizeo o ttott, that is, romco o ocl. At that point, *
becomes the support of the phoneme m which was previously the mere
souno of the object oesignateo by *the mooing heao of the animal I
killeo. We retroactively move from theultimately animalicsouno m
to thehumanphonematic signiner m only when m can cccr be re-
garoeo as a ptopct romc M. As Lacan has it, It is a fact that letters have
names, a is nameo alpha.
We shoulo pay particular attention to this

apparently trivial remark which, in its expanoeo form, reaos as follows:
it is orl, insofar as a has a name, insofar as A is a proper name, that the
letter a can be saio to be a, that a is ioentical to itself ,albeit as part of
a oiherential sonant structure,. The ioiotic character
8
of the proper
nameits meaninglessness, the fact that, as alreaoy noteo by ]ohn Stuart
Mill, it is not the meaning of the object that it brings with it
q
is nothing
less than the preconoition of ioentincation: Lacan is Lacan only if Lacan
is a proper name.
More specincally, the proper name || specines as such || the
rooting of the subject precisely insofar as it is more specially linkeo than
any other, not to phonematicization as such, the structure of language,
but to what in language is alreaoy reaoy || to receive this informing by
the trait.
o
The proper name is closer to the letter than to the symbolic
. Seminar IX, Lesson of :o/:/6..
8. Seminar IX, Lesson of .o/:./6:.
q. Seminar IX, Lesson of .o/:./6:.
o. Seminar IX, Lesson of :o/:/6..
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :6.
proper: it approaches the unary trait by reooubling its operation, the ioi-
otic in-oiherence of its count, ano in this way guarantees the consistency
of the structure of language, the oiherentially phonematic chain of signin-
ers. In other woros, the proper name make|s| us question ourselves about
what is at stake at this raoical, archaic point that we must necessarily sup-
pose to be at the origin of the unconscious, that is, primary repression.
:

Ano this in two complementary ways: the proper name as the reooubling
of the letter, the unary trait, raises the issue of the attachment of language
to the tcol,
.
as well as that of rcgottor as oirectly involveo in the genesis of
language in the guise of an cxttcrttol relationship.
If the letter as unary

trait is that which retroactively makes the real object exist as negateo ,be
it the killeo animal or the mothers breast,, the proper name is that which,
operating retroactively on the letter, allows the subjects own ioentinca-
tion by naming this very negation.
O ~ THERE EXISTS A NEGATION
Although the origins of writing lie outsioe the concerns of Baoious
general ontological eoince, it is nevertheless prontable to begin to accom-
mooate Lacans renections on the proper name to the notions maoe avail-
able by Bctrg oro Eccrt. Using Baoious terminology, we coulo suggest that,
for Lacan, the proper name can be situateo on two oiherent levels, that
of the situation ano that of the state of the situation, while preserving
the same sealing function. The proper name as letter, the stroke / on
the primitive hunters bone that counts as one the multiple of the hunt-
ers aoventure works exactly like the proper name tttcto cro, the name
Lacan: inoeeo, the latter forms-into-ones the multiple|s| of names
,BE q:, ,bluntly put, the multiples p.s.y.c.h.o.a.n.a.l.y.s.t., o.o.c.t.o.r.,
b.u.f.f.o.o.n., f.r.e.n.c.h., b.o.u.r.g.e.o.i.s., s.q.u.e.a.k.y., s.m.o.k.i.n.g.,
e.t.o.u.r.o.i.t. etc., maoe of proper names as letters. We coulo also sug-
gest that the proper name tttcto cro is equivalent to structure tr the
metastructure, presentation tr representation. It amounts to the insistence
of the unary trait of the nrst count in its meaningless unicity, the insistence
of the letter, within the state of a situationwhere number ano meaning
:. Seminar IX, Lesson of :o/:/6..
.. Seminar IX, Lesson of :o/:/6.. But what is it that inscribes |the fact| that a real ex-
ists? It is the symbolic as such. Thus, we will say that : is the oigit of the symbolic. The :
is the orot, ttott, that is to say, the minimal possible Other for the pure letter of the real,
Alain Baoiou, Ur, Dcox, Ttot, Qoottc, ct oot _to, unpublisheo.
. Seminar IX, Lesson of :o/:/6..
Lorenzo Chiesa :6
as such are now possible. Consequently, the proper name accounts for
the fact that the state of the situation can either be saio to be separate ,or
transcenoent, or to be attacheo ,or immanent, with regaro to the situation
ano its native structure ,BE q8,.
At this point, there is a question we cannot postpone any longer: how
ooes Lacan account for that which is being counteo, ano thus nameo, by
the unary trait of the letter? What is involveo in early countingwith
regaro to both the phylogenetic aoventure of the primitive hunter ano
the ontogenetic emergence of number in the chilois nrst ano foremost
the functioning of the sensorium.
This means that it is only with the /

of the unary trait that something really exists for the subject, that the
juogement of existence begins.
Yet, one shoulo note that the unary trait

is always necessarily associateo with the retroactive ehect of negation:
the in-oiherent notch on the bone presents the primitive mans aoven-
ture as ehaceosignincantly enough, unoer the sign of a killingjust
as the early counting of the chilo marks a proto-symbolic relation with
an object insofar as he has been frustrateo of it. In opposition to what he
terms Bergsons nave realism,
6
Lacan believes that negation is not the
negation of a primoroial amrmation which woulo amrm the existence of
a real that is immeoiately given. It is ooubtless the case that negation sup-
poses the amrmation on which it is baseo but this ooes not in the least
entail that such an amrmation is the amrmation of something of the real
which has been simply removeo,
amrmation ooes not preceoe negation,

negation ano amrmation occur concomitantly by means of rcgottor. Fut
oiherently:
There is no more, ano not at all less, in the ioea of an object
conceiveo of as not existing, than in the ioea of the same object
conceiveo of as existing, because the ioea of the object not existing
is necessarily the ioea of the object existing with, in aooition, the
representation of an exclusion of this object by the present reality
taken as a whole.
8
To cut a long story short, accoroing to Lacan, what is being counteo
by the unary trait is the possibility of the real ,its amrmation, through
. Seminar IX, lesson of //6..
. Seminar IX, Lesson of //6..
6. Seminar IX, Lesson of :/:/6..
. Seminar IX, Lesson of :/:/6..
8. Seminar IX, Lesson of :/:/6..
the preservation of the rights of the nothing.
q
In opposition to the false
axiom for which anything real is possible, one shoulo always start with the
axiom for which the real takes its place only from the not possible: the
possibility of amrming that something exists always relies on a law that
safe-guaros the nothing. But if the real, or better reality, only originates
in the not possible, this not possible, presenteo as such by negation, is tlc
real. Here, Lacan uses the term real in two ways: a, as the possible that
follows the not possible, b, as the not possible that originates the possible.
But it is in fact possible to think these two acceptations together: the real
oo reality takes its place only from the pototltt, of the not possible, the
possibility of the real as such. Inoeeo, this real exists, Lacan says, as ex-
ception or exclusion.
6o
In other woros, there is not only the not possible
at the origin of any enunciating, but also the possibility of the not possible:
the origin of any enunciating is the crorctottor of tlc rotltrg,
6:
the amrma-
tion of negation accomplisheo by the unary trait.
Baoious philosophy thinks meta-ontologically a set theoretical ontol-
ogy which relies on the very same axiom, the axiom of the empty set,
which formalizes existence at its most basic level. As he writes in Bctrg
oro Eccrt, the axiom of the empty set states, in substance, that tlctc cxtt
o rcgottor ,BE 86 my emphasis,, it is necessary that the absolutely initial
existence be that of a negation, the existence of an inexistent ,BE 6,.
What negation as the absolutely initial existence negates is belonging: no
elements belong to the voio-set, not even the voio. If, for Baoious set the-
oretical ontology, the voio presents the unpresentable as that which alone
in-exists ,BE 6q,, for Lacans theory of the subject, the possibility of the
not possible amrms the real that ex-sists as exclusion. If for Baoiou, the
in-existent voio subtractively sutures a situation to its being ,inconsistent
multiplicity,, for Lacan the ex-sistent, or ex-timate, realthe real-of-the-
symbolicretroactively reminos a subject of the unoeao ,an inconsistent
real which was ano will be not-one, barreo tr ttclf, before ano after the
presence of the symbolic,.
6.
If, nnally, for Baoiou, the voio as set is abso-
q. Seminar IX, Lesson of //6..
6o. Seminar IX, Lesson of //6..
6:. Seminar IX, Lesson of //6..
6.. Although the notion of the unoeao has been employeo prontably by iek in a number
of ways, Lacan appears to oelimit it within a particular oomain: the unoeao refers to the
closeo worlo of the animal as that which is always alreaoy oeao from the perspective of
the inoivioual ano immortal from that of the species or nature, see for instance ]acques
Lacan, Tlc Scmtrot of }ococ Locor. Bool I, Ftcoo Popct or Tcclrtoc, .-., trans. ]ohn
Iorrester, ]acques-Alain ,eo.,, :st American eo., New York, W.W. Norton, :q88, pp. :.:,
Lorenzo Chiesa :6
lutely in-oiherent in the sense that nothing oiherentiates it, its unicity
is not baseo on a oiherence that can be attesteo ,BE 68,, for Lacan, the
real-of-the-symbolic is the other sioe of a oistinctive unity whose unicity
precisely resolves itself, as we have seen, into in-oiherence. ,It is important
to bear in mino that the count of the unary trait is two-sioeo. Moreover,
this two-sioeoness is somehow unbalanceo towaros one sioe, that of the
nothing/voio: just as, for Baoiou, the voio as name is both unpresentation
in presentation oro the operation of the count, which as such exceeos the
one-result, so for Lacan the enunciation of the nothing is both the real-
of-the-symbolic as the possibility of the not possible oro the very operation
of the unary trait, which as such exceeos the oistinctive unity,.
We must then take seriously Lacans provocative remark accoroing to
which A is A signines nothing.
6
Initially, there exists a negation, non-
A, no element belongs to the empty set o: in oroer for the set olplo to exist,
in oroer for A to be A as a set to which at least one element belongs, the
nothing must nrst be enunciateo, signinerizeo. At this stage, it is crucial
to emphasize that if the primal fact
6
is the enunciation of the noth-
ingthe voio as name, the voio-setthen we witness here nothing less
than the collapse of the traoitional categories of unity ano totality. Lacan
explains this point quite clearly: Unity ano totality appear in the traoition
as solioary || totality being totality with respect to units |ano| unity be-
ing || the unity of a whole, such a solioarity is what is being shattereo
by the other meaning of unity he proposes, that of oistinctive unity, the
-: brought about by the enunciation of the nothing.
6
Irom now on, any
possible cmolorcc of totality ,or unity for that matter, can only be baseo on
the -:, since the primal fact is that the one is not. Note that this is exactly
what is ultimately at stake from a philosophical, or better, metaontologi-
cal, perspective in the revolutionary contribution of axiomatic set-theory.
As Baoiou remarks:
It woulo not be an exaggeration to say that the entirety of speculative
ontology is taken up with examinations of the connections ano
oisconnections between Unity ano Totality. It has been so from
the very beginnings of metaphysics, since it is possible to show that
Flato essentially has the One prevail over the All whilst Aristotle
maoe the opposite choice.
:.
6. Seminar IX, lesson of 6/:./6:.
6. Seminar IX, Lesson of //6..
Set theory sheos light on the fecuno frontier between the whole/
parts relation ano the one/multiple relation, because, at base, it
suppresses both of them. The multiple || for a post-Cantorian
is neither supporteo by the existence of the one nor unfoloeo as
an organic totality. The multiple consists from being without-one
,BE 8:,.
Interestingly enough, in this context, it is Baoiou himself who benos
his funoamental ontological thesis accoroing to which the one is not to-
waros a formulation, being ottloot-orc |or-or|, that is reminiscent of
Lacans -:, the one-less. Unity ano totality, the particular ano the uni-
versalor better their semblancescan only be conceiveo of if one be-
gins from the multiple, which initially un-presents itself in the voio-set as
being without-one. The fact that both elements ano sets are multiples-
of-multiples ano thus become inoistinguishable collapses the traoitional
oistinction between unity as an element of a totality ano totality as a set
of unities. Using natural language paraooxically, we coulo suggest that a
particular unity is always alreaoy a one-molttplc whilst being an element
of a universal totality which is never as yet a orc-multiple. Thus, there
is only one possible relation between sets ano elements, oclorgtrg, which
inoicates that a multiple is counteo as element in the presentation of an-
other multiple ,BE 8:,. Besioes this, all we can oo is count the multiple
accoroing to its pott. This is the relation of trclotor, which inoicates that
a multiple is a sub-multiple |or part| of another multiple ,BE 8:,. Such
a relation is oealt with by the axiom of the powerset, the set of subsets,
among others: this amrms that between belonging ano inclusion there is
at least the correlation that all the multiples trclooco in a supposeoly exist-
ing olplo |the initial set| oclorg to a octo |its powerset|, that is, tlc, fotm o
ct, o molttplc coortco-o-orc ,BE 8. my emphasis,. Let us owell on this last
point, which is crucial for Baoiou. Accoroing to axiomatic set-theory, the
following can be stateo:
inclusion is oeriveo from belonging as the sole primitive relation
between sets ano elements, yet belonging ano inclusion are
oistinct,
the fact that inclusion ano belonging are oistinct entails that there
is an excess of inclusion over belonging, the powerset over the set,
this excess is an excess in belonging: there is always at least one
element of the powerset which ooes not belong to the initial set,
nothing belongs to the voio, not even the voio itself,
:.
..
.
Lorenzo Chiesa :6
the voio is a subset of any set: by the very fact that nothing belongs
to the voio, the voio is incluoeo in everything,
the voio possesses a subset, the voio itself, hence, the powerset of
the voio must also exist,
the powerset of the voio is the set to which the voio alone belongs,
since everything incluoeo in the voio belongs to the powerset of
the voio, tlc coto, ot octtct tt romc, t tlctcfotc or clcmcrt of tlc pooctct
tt fotm oltlc tt t rot or clcmcrt of ttclf.
Baoiou can thus concluoe that the powerset of the voio, the set to
which the name of the voio alone belongs, is the nrst set that is able to
count-as-one the result of the nrst count, the relation of belonging. Thus,
the powerset of the voio is what gives us the forming-into-one: inoeeo, it is
only once || the forming-into-one of o || is gootortcco via the power-
set axiom applieo to the name of the voio |that| the operation of form-
ing-into-one is uniformly applicable to any multiple supposeo existent
,BE q: my emphasis,. If, on the one hano, what is presenteo by the form-
ing-into-one is always the multiplethe ehect of its operation is again a
one-multiple, the same as on the level of the count-as-oneon the other
hano, it is nevertheless the case that the powerset of the voio accomplishes
something quite remarkable, namely coorttrg tlc romc of tlc coto, tlc -., o
or clcmcrt, o .. In this way the powerset of the voio operates against what
Baoiou calls the errancy of the voio, the fact that, after the nrst count,
the voio is incluoeo in all sets ottloot belonging to them. As a consequence
of this, it is inevitable that we consioer the secono count as an operation
which, by turning the -: into or element, representing the name of the
voio, somehow preserves the cmolorcc of the oistinction between unity as
an element of a totality ano totality as a set of unities, even though what
is being counteo are multiples-of-multiples.
This in no way means that, after the secono count has taken place,
the voio ooes not continue to err on the level of the nrst count, after all,
the state of a situation can be saio to be separate ,or transcenoent, with
regaro to the situation. While the retroactive ehect of the forming-into-
one on the count-as-one oennitely makes the voio take place in a part
|that| receives the seal of the one ,BE q,, its errancy is far from being
interrupteo within this circumscribeo partial place. Here, it woulo cer-
tainly be reouctive, if not misleaoing, to regaro the situation as a mere
part of the state of the situation, since, in a sense, the state is attacheo ,or
immanent, to its structure ,the powerset is still a set,, rather, we shoulo
.
.
6.
acknowleoge the following: the situation as situation characterizeo by the
errancy of the voio takes place in a part of the situation as state of the situ-
ation. Irom a slightly oiherent perspective, we can propose that both the
initial counting of the multiple in the set ano the secono counting, that of
the parts of the set as elements of the powerset, both structureo presenta-
tion ano metastructureo representation, ultimately rely on the voio-set
the initial multiple as absolutely initial point of being ,BE 8,which
shoulo always remain errant. As a matter of fact, what shoulo be avoioeo
at all costs as the catastrophe of presentation, is a nxation of the voio, the
presentations encounter with its own voio ,BE q-q,.
It shoulo be stresseo that Baoiou himself seems implicitly to oistin-
guish the errancy of the voio in a situation o ocl, the potc errancy of the
voio ,BE q6 my emphasis, from the errancy of the voio ot tlc lcccl of the
situation after the state of the situation has been establisheo: this secono,
impure errancy is nothing other than what he refers to as the unconscious
of the voio. Given Baoious oeliberate choice to employ psychoanalytic
terms to oescribe the basics of his meta-ontological eoince, I oo not think
I am forcing his argument in nnally suggesting that the unconscious of
the voio amounts to the unconscious status of the situation unoer state
control, or put simply, the states unconscious. Tlc orcorctoo of tlc coto, ot,
tgrtcortl, croogl, tlc plortom of trcorttcrc,, t tlc romc tcttoocttccl, tmpoco
or tlc romc coto, tlc lcttct o, o, totc tcptctor. Having saio this, it must be
observeo that Baoiou fails to emphasize the following: as long as the state
of a situation ,consciousness, remains both separate from the situation ,the
unconscious, ano attacheo to it, tcpcttttor is the movement that prevents
the taking place of the voio in the phantom of inconsistency from oegen-
erating into a nxation of the voio.
66
66. Baoious failure to account for the function of repetition in the phantom of inconsist-
ency gives rise to terminological ambiguity when he oescribes the oiherence between the
taking place of the voiowhich waros it ohano its nxationthat is, the ruin of the
One ,BE q,: how ooes the nxation of the voio, its becom|ing| localizable ,BE 6,, oiher
from its taking place if one ooes not specify that the latter still entails ,repetitive, circular,
movement? In Sotrt Pool, Baoiou seems to suggest that repetition shoulo rather be ooctotco
with nxation, a nxation of the subjects oesire which is, however, a nxation of the law ,ano
not aimeo against it,: The law is requireo in oroer to unleash the automatic life of oesire,
the automatism of repetition. Ior only the law xc the object of oesire ||, Alain Baoiou,
Sotrt Pool: Tlc Fooroottor of Urtcctoltm, trans. Ray Brassier, Stanforo, Stanforo University
Fress, .oo, p. q. Beyono terminological confusion, shoulo we not ioentify such a repeti-
tive nxation of the law with what Bctrg oro Eccrt oennes as the taking place of the voio?
Ior a recent critique of Baoious unsatisfactory notion of repetition with regaros to the
political subject, see Slavoj iek, Baoiou: Notes Irom an Ongoing Debate, Irtctro-
Lorenzo Chiesa :6q
THE SUB]ECT AS AN ERROR OI COUNTING
Lacans breaking of the solioarity between unity ano totality allows
him to work with parts. Repuoiat|ing| the reference to totality ooes not
prevent one speaking about the partial, rather, from the inexistence of
totality as a one follows the possibility of thinking the part as partial sys-
tem. This system is, for Lacan, the unconscious.
6
At this stage, it woulo
not be exaggerateo to suggest that the Lacanian unconscious can properly
be unoerstooo accoroing to a thiro set-theoretical axiom, that of separa-
tion ,Ior any multiple supposeo given, there exists the sub-multiple of
terms which possess the property expresseo by the formula ,o,, ,BE 6,.
Faraphrasing Baoious explanation of this axiom, we coulo propose that,
for Lacan, language separates out, within a oppoco given existencethe
unoeao real as not-onethe existence of a sub-multiple, the unconscious
as partial system. This partial ,tcm is constituteo from terms which vali-
oate language, that is follow its metonymic ano metaphoric lawsthe
famous thesis accoroing to which the unconscious is structureo like a
language. Against common accusations of ioealistic structuralism, for La-
can, language cannot inouce existence, solely a split within existence,
his notion of the unconscious breaks with the ngure of ioealinguistery
ano is therefore materialist ,BE ,. We are now able to see why Baoiou
himself brieny refers to Lacans notions of the symbolic ano the real as an
exemplincation of the axiom of separation: the supposeo given existence
of the unoeao real as not-one anticipates what language, the symbolic,
retroactively separates out from it as implieo existence, the unconscious
partial system. Such an implication corcomttortl, entails conscious reality, a
semblance of existence which, rather successfully, attempts to totalize the
partial unconscious, turning the systemthe structureinto the mirage
of a one/whole.
Applying both the axiom of separation ano that of the empty set, it is
important to emphasize that the existence of the unconscious as partial
system ultimately relies on the in-existence of the voio, or, more specincal-
ly, the cxttcrcc of the voio as pott that tr-cxtt as element. Inoeeo, the most
basic sub-multiple that languagethe unary trait as nrst countsepa-
rates out from the unoeao real as not-one is the voio which un-presents it-
self as the pott oocct, the object o. Unsurprisingly, Lacan ioentines the voio
as part with the breast, the primal fact, which, for what we have seen,
ttorol }ootrol of tcl Stootc, vol. :, no. ., .oo6, http://ics.leeos.ac.uk/zizek/article.
cfm?io~.:8issue~.
6. Seminar IX, lesson of ./:/6..
shoulo also be conceiveo of as the primal existence, is the enunciation
of the nothing as the -: of the absent mommo. In this way, a funoamental
un-presentation functions as the raoical support for any relationship of
inclusion. More precisely, Lacan explains how we can formulate a oenni-
tion of the traoitional category of classif you really want to guarantee
it its universal status
68
only by means of the un-presentation of the -::
the mammalian class can only be postulateo on the basis of the absence
of the mommo.
There is nrst of all the absence of the mommo ano |then| one says:
it cannot be that the mommo is missing, here is what constitutes the
mammalian class. || The zoologist, if you allow me to go this far,
ooes not carve out the mammalian class in the assumeo totality of
the maternal mommo, it is only because he oetaches the mommo that
he can ioentify the absence of the mommo.
6q
The in-existence of the un-presenteo mommo which nevertheless exists as
voio-part oetermines both the particular existence of the mommo ano the
representation of the possible absence of the mommo with regaro to the
mammalian class taken as a ololc. However, Lacan immeoiately specines
that, if the construction of the whole relies on the un-presentation of the
-:, then it is the proouct of an cttot of coorttrg, ano consequently univer-
sality can be regaroeo only as a cmolorcc, in oroer to obtain the universal,
the enunciation of the nothing, the voio-set as -:, must necessarily be
primally represseo.
More precisely, Lacan believes that it is tlc oocct who necessarily
makes an error of counting: there is a constituting necessity |that| the
subject shoulo make an error in the count.
o
This count is a secono count
for the subject since, on an initial level, he is nothing other than what
ois-counts itself by means of the unary trait, the very un-presentation of
the -:. Fut oiherently, initially, the subject as such is minus one
:
insofar
as he ioentines with the absent object, nrst ano foremost the mommoIn
the |nrst form of the| ioentincation relationship || what the subject as-
similates || is him in his frustration.
.
It is only at a secono stage, which
works retroactively on the nrst ano carries out ioentincation proper, the
splitting between the unconscious ano consciousness, that we are going
68. Seminar IX, lesson of //6..
6q. Seminar IX, Lesson of //6..
o. Seminar IX, Lesson of //6..
:. Seminar IX, Lesson of //6..
.. Seminar IX, Lesson of ./:/6..
Lorenzo Chiesa ::
to reoiscover the subject |as| nrst of all establisheo as minus one || as
|himself| cctootfcr, primally represseo.
Ioentincation proper is then the

subjects retroactive counting of himself, a - :, as a :. More specincally,
the secono count concomitantly brings about in a retroactive way the
conscious subjects primal repression of himself as the un-conscious un-
presenteo -: oro his unconscious seeking ,or, oesiring, himself as that
very same un-conscious un-presenteo -:, that is, the enunciation of the
nothing, the voio-set. ,Strictly speaking, what preceoes the secono count
is not unconscious: the unconscious, just like consciousness, is a retroac-
tive ehect of the secono count on structure oo count of the unary-trait,.
Lacan clearly states that, with regaro to the subject, the fact that
shoulo most interest philosophers ano psychoanalysts is that his inaugural
mistake is what allows him to express, or name, himself as o subject. Thus,
it will not be a matter of simply rectifying the means of knowing in oroer
to avoio the mistake: what is ultimately involveo in it is the subjects con-
scious access to reality ,the re-presentation of structure, ano, at the same
time, his enoless unconscious search for the real oo not possible
since, as we have seen, the real is precisely what in-exists as enunciation

of the nothing. The secono count has therefore a retroactive ehect on the
original counting of the un-conscious unary-trait ///, more specincally,
the latter shoulo now be unoerstooo in terms of unconscious repetition,
in the precise sense of a compulsion to repeat something which is as such
unrepeatable.
Consequently, repetition is characterizeo by unicity, the

unicity as such of |each| circuit of repetition, just like the counting of the
un-conscious unary trait ///.
6
As Lacan puts it, repetition in the uncon-
scious is absolutely oistinguisheo from any natural cycle, in the sense that
what is accentuateo is not its return, the sameness of the cycle, what is
accentuateo is rather the original unary trait /the initial enunciation of
the nothing as the real oo not possiblewhich has markeo the subject
as -:.
Each circuit of repetition is unique since repetition, the making of

/ always anew, amounts to the impossibility of repeating the signifying
uniquity of the nrst /, the un-presentation of the part-object.
The subjects conscious access to reality, his knowleoge |corrotorcc|,
presupposes a mistake, an error of counting, about which he knows noth-
ing, ano which moreover forces him into an enoless unconscious search
for what preceoeo it. It is important to remark that this mistake, bluntly
put, the turning of -: into :, originates at the very moment the initial
enunciation of the nothing, the voio-set, is turneo into the absence of the
part-object, the voio as part. In Bctrg oro Eccrt, Baoiou clarines precisely
this point when he oiscusses the operation from which the property the
voio is a subset of any set is obtaineo, the fact that the voio is omni-
present in all structureo presentation, its errancy. As Baoiou has it, this
funoamental ontological theorem is oeouceo as a particular case of the
logical principle cx folo cottot oooltoct: if a statement A is false ,if I have
non-A, ano if I amrm the latter ,if I posit A,, then it follows that anything
,any statement B whatsoever, is true ,BE 86-8,. The voio as part which
is universally trclooco in all sets supposeo given follows from a folo, it relies
on the negation of the true negative statement aovanceo by the axiom of
the empty set, that is, there is a negation, or nothing belongs to the voio,
not even the voio itself. The voio as incluoeo part tacitly presumes the
existence of an element that belongs to the voio.
This kino of negation of negation is precisely the error, or folo, on
which Lacans symbolic structureo like a nction, the big Other oo one as
oiherence, is baseo. As we have seen, for Lacan, initially we have non-A,
which is why taking A is A as the basis of ioentincation is so problematic,
the A of lAottc is barreo ano tautology is possible only at the price of mak-
ing a mistake. More specincally, in Lacans theory of the subject, the voio
as part of all sets supposeo givenwhose existence as formeo-into-one is
itself amrmeo only starting from the in-existence of this part as universally
incluoeoshoulo be locateo on the level of what he calls the symbolic
object. During the oialectic of frustration between the mother ano the
chilo at the beginning of the Oeoipus complexthe time of the un-con-
scious counting of the unary trait ///, of structure without metastruc-
turethe symbolic object is the object which the chilo oemanos beyono
the object of neeo, the object as graspeo in what it lacks. Remarkably
enough, Lacan also specines that the symbolic object t rot rotltrg since it
has the property of octrg there symbolically,
8
the part-object as there t
the nothing as part, the voio-part, results from the falsity of the negation
of the initial true enunciation of the nothing, the voio-set. The mistaken
falsincation of truth as the real oo not possible is what allows any amr-
mation whatever to be symbolically true, nrst of all that which proclaims
8. ]acques Lacan, Lc mtrottc ltctc IV. Lo tclottor oooct, .-.,, Faris, Seuil, :qq, p. :
,my emphasis,.
Lorenzo Chiesa :
the existence of the voio as part. This error will then be aggravateo ret-
roactively by the secono count, an operation ,a metaphor, which Lacan
refers to as the Name-of-the-Iather, through the Name-of-the-Iather, the
part-object as the errant, ano thus potentially oangerous, voio-part itself
receives the seal of the one, taking its place as o part in the phantasy S-o.
The Name-of-the-Iather operates on the extimate part-object in which
the subject ioentines himself as vanishing in the same way as the forming-
into-one operates on the in-existent part of a situation that initially ooes
not belong to it.
NOUS NOUS COMFTONS COMFTANT
While Baoiou only hints at the oistinction between the metastruc-
tureo state of the situation ano the structureo situation as a oistinction
between consciousness ano the unconscious of the voio, Lacan attempts
to oelineate the two concomitant sioes of the secono count, the Name-of-
the-Iather, in a more elaborate manner. He ooes this precisely by think-
ing consciousness as both immanent ano transcenoent with regaro to the
unconscious: just as the situation will have been the unconscious of the
voio of the state of the situation, so the un-consciousthe count of the
unary trait as structurewill have been consciousnesss unconsciousthe
phantasy S-o as the represseo structure of repetition. The phantasy S-o to
be reao as the subject split by the signiner in relation to the object o is
the unconscious result of the operational metaphor of the Name-of-the-
Iather. Insofar as it seals as orc the phantasy as unconscious structure,
the Name-of-the-Iather can also be oesignateo as the S:, the master-sig-
niner. Concomitantly, the subjects proper name, which is equivalent to
the possibility of saying I, having an ego, will be nothing other than the
conscious ,metastructural, sioe of the Name-of-the-Iather.
Note that the S: as the metastructure that structures the unconscious
signifying chain amounts to a resumption of the unary trait at another
level. Fut oiherently, the un-conscious unary trait as structure will have
been the S:, the structural, that is unconscious, sioe of the metastructure.
It woulo also be correct to suggest that the S: is the unary trait as re-
presseo. Lacan himself stresses the similarity between the unary trait ano
the S: when, in Seminar XI, the nrst seminar to introouce the notion of
the master-signiner, he openly refers the S: to the notch maoe by primi-
tive hunters on sticks in oroer to signify the killing of an animal.
q

q. ]acques Lacan, Tlc Foot Foroomcrtol Corccpt of P,cloorol,t, Lonoon, Vintage, :qq8,
Let us concluoe with the following remarks:
Initially, the subject in-exists as -:, it is what ois-counts itself by
means of the original unary trait as enunciation of the nothing,
more precisely, at this level, the subject shoulo be regaroeo as the
gap, or cut, between the structureo presentation of signiners, or
more precisely letters, which signify the subjects in-existence, ano
their inextricable voio, the symbolic object. After the operation
of the Name-of-the-Iather, the secono count, has taken place, the
subject as -: counts himself as :, this : shoulo rather be unoerstooo
as a new gap between the structureo presentation of letters, now
turneo into the signiners of the unconscious, ano metastructureo
representation, that is, conscious oiscourse.
8o
The nrst gap, between structure ano its voio, which causes the
latters errancy, oesignates the metonymic oimension of oemano,
the unstoppable slioing of the symbolic object ,the object of love,
beneath the objects of neeo. On the other hano, the secono gap,
between structure ano metastructure, oesignates the metaphoric
oimension of oesire. In oroer to pass from the gap of oemano
to the gap of oesire the subject must carry out a positivizing
organization of the voio: the voio must take place within the
phantasy S-o by means of the metaphor of the Name-of-the-
Iather.
The subject that counts himself as : is equivalent to the subject as
the gap of oesire who is tcptccrtco in the unconscious phantasmatic
object o as enunciation of the nothing, that is, the subject is :
in the unconscious insofar as he appears there as not-one, -:.
8:

More precisely, the subject corttroc to make : in the unconscious
phantasy precisely because, as enunciation of the nothing, he
is not-one. Diherently put, the subject can name himself I in
p. ::.
8o. The gap between o ,which counts-as-one the belongings, or elements, ano ,o, ,which
counts-as-one the inclusions, or subsets, is || the point in which the impasse of being
resioes. || I saio that o ano ,o, were oistinct. In what measure? With what ehects? This
point, apparently technical, will leao us all the way to the Soocct ano to truth ,BE 8-8,
my emphasis,.
8:. See especially lesson of /6/:qq from ]acques Lacan, Scmtrot VI ;.8-.), Lc ott
ct or trtctptctottor, unpublisheo.
:.
..
.
Lorenzo Chiesa :
consciousnessano thus value himself |c comptct|only because
he repeats the act of counting himself |c comptct| as not-one in
the phantasythere where in fact the object o functions as a lost
name.
8.
The subjects naming of himself as I is what allows him to
count numbers, :,.,,,, this counting is nothing other than
the conscious sioe of the unconscious repetitive circuit traceo
by the phantasy ano sealeo as one by the S:. While the latter
manages to accomplish an organization of the voio, this by
no means amounts to saying that the voio is eliminateo: the
organization of the voio is thus represseo ano this operation can
be consioereo as an error of counting. At the synchronic level of
the unconscious, the ioentifying representation of the subject as
: in the object o necessarily preserves the -: ano thus gives rise to
the repetitive series //// in which each count is starteo anew,
each go is absolutely unique. On the other hano, at the level of
consciousness, the subjects naming of himself as I mistakenly
aoos : - : - : - : ano obtains ., , , which is to say, the
oiachronic temporal continuity of his liveo experience.
The fact that the subject as : is, at the same time, a subject
as gap means nothing other than that the subject is himself a
one-molttplc.
8
The two counts retroactively oiherentiate three
levels of the multiple: the inconsistent unoeao real as not-one,
the consistent multiplicity given by the metonymic slioe of the
objects of oemano ,markeo as letters,, the subject as split between
conscious signineo ano unconscious signiner. The split subjects
multiplicity is an empirical fact attesteo by the existence of the
formations of the unconscious, such as symptoms, jokes, ano slips
of the tongue. However, the subjects multiplicity is represseo by
the secono count, just as the inconsistency of the multiple is un-
presenteo by the nrst count. The secono count both symbolizes
the voio ano carries out, through repression, an imaginarization
of the nrst count, that of the letters as pure signiners, the voio is
symbolizeo as phantasmatic oesire, but oesire is itself represseo
ano can be approach|eo| |consciously| only by means of some
8.. Seminar VI, lesson of /6/:qq.
8. Fut oiherently, negation is irreoucible ,Seminar IX, lesson of ./:/6.,.
.
.
sort of oemano.
8
Iinally, the phantasy where the voio takes
place shoulo also be consioereo as a picture in which anxiety is
frameo ano thus tameo, placateo, aomitteo.
8
8. ]acques Lacan, Lc mtrottc ltctc V. Lc fotmottor oc ltrcorctcrt, .,-.8, Faris, Seuil,
:qq8, p. o.
8. ]acques Lacan, Lc mtrottc ltctc X. Lorgotc, ..-., Faris, Seuil, .oo, p. q:. Ior a
oetaileo analysis of the three logical times of anxiety with regaros to phantasy, see Chapter
of Chiesa, Locor oro Sooccttctt,: A Pltloopltcol Irttooocttor.
:
7
Introouction to Sam Gillespie
Sigi ]ottkanot
Sam Gillespie, as ]oan Copjec wrote in her moving tribute to him in
Umot;o) ,.oo,, was one of the most gifteo ano promising philosophers
of his generation ano this juogment has only become more pronounceo
with the posthumous appearance of various publications in the interven-
ing years since his suicioe in August .oo.
Sam was a leaoing ngure in introoucing Baoiou to the English-speak-
ing worlo. A key member of the original Umot;o) collective at SUNY Buf-
falo, he instigateo the special Baoiou issue that publisheo translations of
Descartes/Lacan, Hegel, Fsychoanalysis ano Fhilosophy ano the hugely
innuential What is Love? His intellectual ano aesthetic innuence on the
journal were profouno, ano he continueo to help set its eoitorial oirection
long after he left Buhalo, contributing essays, selecting texts by Baoiou for
translation, ano oesigning the arresting covers that have helpeo to make
Umot;o) such an outstanoing occasion of resistance to what Copjec, in her
opening manifesto, nameo tooays archival racism.
To re-reao his contributions to that nrst issue is to be struck again by
how intensely focuseo Sam alreaoy was on the questions that woulo later
make up the core of his Fh.D.,the nature ano source of novelty in the
objective worlo, the oiherences between the materialism of Deleuze ano
Baoiou, the limits of thoughtpaying witness to the remarkable intellec-
tual seriousness with which he approacheo his early acaoemic enoeavors.
It goes without saying that what one inevitably misses in such written
leavings is the electric wit ano saroonic humour of this anti-oemocratic
but never inegalitarian inoivioual who inaugurateo our traoition of num-
bering each issue of Umot;o) as Onenot only as a token of what he once
calleo the arouous proceoure of counting to Two but also as a formal
expression of noelity to what hao escapeo the previous issues count. A
warm ano oeeply generous man, Sam was constitutionally unable to tol-
erate what he perceiveo to be injustice, ano one of the last oays of his life
was spent protesting the imminent Iraq war with his partner Mike ano
frieno ]ason Barker who tells me that long after everyone else hao given
it up as futile, ano the number of protestors owinoling to a trickle, Sam
woulo be on the phone, rounoing people up, never ceasing to call power
on its abuses.
The essay publisheo here for the nrst time is a chapter from Sams ois-
sertation at the University of Warwick which his brother Chris Gillespie,
his partner Michael Mottram ano I eoiteo ano submitteo for the oegree
of Doctor of Fhilosophy, awaroeo in .oo. The longer work from which it
is taken, provisionally titleo Tlc Motlcmottc of ôcclt,: Bootoo Mtrtmoltt
Mctopl,tc, is unoer review at SUNY Fress. A full list of his publications
appears below, several of which are available as post-prints from the open
access archive CSeARCH http://www.culturemachine.net/csearch.
Electronic copies of Sams oissertation can be sent on request. Flease
email sigijpanoora.be
FUBLICATIONS:
Slavoj Your Symptom!, UMBR;o), no. :, :qq, pp. ::-q.
Subtractive, UMBR;o), no. :, :qq6, pp. -:o, ,available from
CSeARCH,.
Hegel Unsutureo ,an Aooenoum to Baoiou,, UMBR;o), no. :, :qq6, pp.
-6q ,available from CSeARCH,.
Baoious Ethics: A Review, Plt: Tlc 1ototcl }ootrol of Pltloopl,, no. :.,
.oo:, pp. .6-6.
Neighborhooo of Innnity: On Baoious Deleuze: The Clamor of Being,
UMBR;o), no. :, .oo:, pp. q:-:o6 ,available from CSeARCH,.
Flacing the Voio Baoiou on Spinoza, Argclolt: }ootrol of tlc Tlcotcttcol
Homortttc, vol. 6, no. , .oo:, pp. 6-.
Beyono Being: Baoious Doctrine of Truth, Commortcottor oro Cogrtttor,
vol. 6, no. :-., .oo, pp. -o ,available from CSeARCH,.
Tlc Motlcmottc of ôcclt,: Bootoo Mtrtmoltt Mctopl,tc, FhD., University
of Warwick, Warwick, .oo.
Get Your Lack On, UMBR;o), no. :, .oo, pp. q-:q.
Sigi ]ottkanot :q
TRANSLATIONS:
Baoiou, Alain, Hegel, trans. Marcus Coelen ano Sam Gillespie, UMBR;o),
no. :, :qq6, pp. .-.
Baoiou, Alain, On a Contemporary Usage of Irege, trans. ]ustin Clemens
ano Sam Gillespie, UMBR;o), no. :, .ooo, pp. qq-::.
:8o
Giving Iorm to Its Own Existence:
Anxiety ano the Subject of Truth
Sam Gillespie
Ior anyone willing to accept the two primary theses of Bctrg oro
Eccrtthat mathematics is ontology, ano that there is an inconsistency
that cannot be exhausteo by presentationa number of questions imme-
oiately follow. To accept that mathematics is ontology may prove useful
for one particular set of problems ,for example, nnoing the most aoequate
means of unoerstanoing multiplicity,, but this only opens the ooor to a
whole series of other problems. To give only the most general ano obvious
example, there is an uncertainty surrounoing the particular relation be-
tween mathematical being ,inconsistent multiplicity, ano its manifestation
in particular situations. Baoiou maintains that the relations between a
situation ano its latent being are purely subtractive insofar as presentation
is an operation that presents particular beings o molttplc ano not multi-
plicity as such. What we are left with, then, is not so much a relation that
follows from the inherent limitations of either presentation or language
,however limiteo they may in fact be,, but rather an axiomatic presup-
position that the nothingness that escapes presentation is an inaugural
existence. Being, in other woros, is not inferreo from presentation, but
axiomatizeo.
:
Ano as Deleuze has shown in his reaoing of Spinoza, axi-
:. The axiomatization of being, while itself being an axiomatization of nothing, nonethe-
less inaugurates certain properties ,say, of multiplicity or equality, which can proouce oe-
cisive ehects in situations. This is nowhere more true than in politics as a truth proceoure
for Baoiou. The Lacanian, ]oan Copjec, extenos from Baoious neeo for an axiomatic in
her recent writing. One must start from the notion of innnity because it is impossible to
introouce it by the path of the nnite. Ano one must begin with an axiom of equality rather
than foolishly trying to bring it into being through some Other who woulo recognize
ano valioate inoivioual pleasures. One coulo, in a Baoiouian move, substitute Copjecs
pleasures with interest. See ]oan Copjec, Imogtrc Tlctc ô 1omor: Etltc oro Sooltmottor,
Cambrioge, MIT Fress, .oo., p. :.
Sam Gillespie :8:
oms can just as reaoily generate positive manifestations ,or expressions,
of being.
.
This creates problems if Baoiou wishes to create an ehective
connection between axiomatizeo being ano its manifestation in situations
,through presentation or forcing,.
The oimculty of an axiomatization raises a set of particularly puzzling
questions concerning why Baoiou confers existence onto nothing ,a sup-
position that, for Cunningham, is the acme of nihilism
,. Iurthermore,
it also overlooks any inquiry into the particular process that informs the
manifestation of being-qua-being in possible or particular situations. Of
course, when this is poseo as a problem, what is overlookeo is the fact
that Baoiou accoros an extreme importance to the operations of both
presentation ,the count, ano representation as the means by which par-
ticular situations ano worlos are formeo. The oimculty, however, is that
for Baoiou, presentation is not a oirect presentation of being-qua-being,
it is rather a constitution of a situation from which being-qua-being is
subtracteo. Ano with respect to the fact that presentation is simply the op-
eration of the count as one, Baoiou maintains that the one ooes not exist
at all: it is purely the result of an operation. What this assumes is that only
sets have an existential valioityoperations oont. As a theory, this haroly
seems consistent with ]ohn Van Neumanns belief that an axiomatic set
theory can oepart from the existence of functions alonethe existence of
sets will follow from them.
My aim here is not to argue for an ontological principle of unity in

Baoiou but to ask why the operation of the count, the material support of
number, has any less ontological valioity than the existence of the voio?
The operations of thought, for example, are certainly capable of proouc-
ing thoughts that together constitute a multiplicity, but this is very oif-
ferent from positing thought as something that is irreoucibly innnite. In
the process of the constitution of thought, singular thoughts come nrst. It
becomes oimcult, furthermore, to separate an ontological theory of mul-
tiplicity from any unifying principle of presentation if we interrogate the
.. Gilles Deleuze, Exptctortm tr Pltloopl,: Sptroo, trans. Martin ]oughin, New York,
Zone Books, :qq:.
. Cunningham has written that Baoious philosophy is an attempt to have the nothing as
something, to be without being. See Conor Cunningham, A Gcrcolog, of ^tltltm: Pltloo-
pltc of ôtltrg oro tlc Dtctcrcc of Tlcolog,, Lonoon, Routleoge, .oo., p. ..
. || it is formally simpler to base the notion of set on that of function than conversely.
]ohn Von Neumann, An Axiomatization of Set Theory, in ]ean Van Heijenoort ,eo.,,
Ftom Ftcgc to Goocl: A Sootcc Bool tr Motlcmottcol Logtc, .8,-.., Cambrioge, Harvaro Uni-
versity Fress, :q6, pp. q-:, p. q6.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :8.
status of the term inconsistency. In a strict set-theoretical sense, nothing
is inconsistent in ano of itself: something is inconsistent only insofar as it
cannot follow a principle of well-oroering which oeparts from a principle
of presentation ano oroering unoer the count as one. Irom this perspec-
tive, it is oimcult to then grant multiplicity an ontological primacy over
ano against the one. My basic starting point for the following will be that
the situation, the subject ano the event are categories of experience that
oepeno upon a theorization of the one as much as they oo upon any no-
tion of transnnite innnity. Baoious oisplacement of a theory of the one
runs the risk of contempt of those oomains of experience on which his
philosophy ultimately oepenos.
What is missing is thus an account, on the one hano, of the process
through which possible situations or possible worlos are formeo, as well
as the various categories that are transitive to both ontology ano the situ-
ation itself, on the other. This is not to say that mathematics ooes not
provioe an aoequate founoation for ontology, ano by extension, a philo-
sophical system. It is rather that something is requireo in aooition to that
framework that can come to constitute situations, subjects ano events.
Baoious mathematical formalism, which is perfectly capable of weaving
complex multiplicities ano rules out of nothing, is simply an empty game
of manipulating symbols. The problem is not simply that of giving the op-
eration of presentation the same ontological valioity as sets, rather, what
is neeoeo is an analysis of why being must oepeno upon presentation as
its material support, ano what sort of framework may be necessary for
such a oepenoency. One can put this more simply: in talking about mate-
rial objects ,a chair, say,, one woulo not say that it is a presentation of a
chairit is a chair. Fresentation, that is, is not a oirect presentation of the
inconsistency of being, but rather the material instantiation of being. This
holos even for a number, for which there is no ontic/ontological ooubling
between the being ano its Being. In other woros, being-qua-being is noth-
ing apart from its material instantiation, ano this nothing then becomes
the ruoimentary means through which being can be mathematically or-
oereo by set theory. Even the number zero is not a oirect presentation of
nothing, but a mark of that nothing that enables it to become oroereo as
multiplicity. This is where Baoious reaoer enters a quanoary: if there is an
excess of inconsistency which is, in itself, nothing, can it become manifest
over ano above presentation? This, I believe, is where Baoiou was leo to
posit his theory of the event. The only oirect presentation there coulo be
is the event, which is simply the eruption of nothing into the situation.
The pressing question, then, is how nothing comes to announce itself.
Sam Gillespie :8
If we are to make any kino of move from ontology to particular situ-
ations, or from truth proceoures to particular truths, then various ques-
tions that concern the status of particular situations, or particular truths
ano the ehects that ensue from them inevitably follow. In his small but
important book Etltc, Baoiou observeo that a generalizeo ethics ,of hu-
man rights or life, for example, equates man with a simple mortal animal,
it is the symptom of a oisturbing conservatism, anobecause of its ab-
stract, statistical generalityit prevents us from thinking the singularity
of situations.
The statement is startling, not least because it foregrounos

a weakness in Baoious own thought: no one woulo argue that set theory,
a pure multiplicity of nothing, allows one to think particular situations. In
fact, Baoious precise point is that set theory is purely rationalit is ontol-
ogy irrespective of any applicability to experience. Nor woulo one expect
the singularity of situations to be the starting point for human action,
since the event from which subjective action emanates is, as I unoerstano
it, perfectly generalizable ano transitive to any situation: the inclusion of
the voio, in fact, follows not from situations but from a set-theoretical axi-
omatic. Ano from this perspective, taking the singularity of situations as a
starting point for subjective actions is immeoiately questionable. As I see
it, Baoiou oevises his own protocol for ethical action by replacing one set
of general tropes ,life, human rights, respect for others, with a mathemati-
cal framework that is resolutely inoiherent to the singularity of situations
altogether.
This is only one particular manifestation of a very general problem
for Baoiou. How can a philosophy with minimal founoations that are
grounoeo, in ehect, opor rotltrg, account for novelty in any ehective sense?
Baoious philosophy may provioe a cohesive system that is purely founoa-
tional for subjective action ano the various truths that result from it, but
any kino of criteria for speaking about particular situations orperhaps
more importantlypreoicting, in the present, the foreseeable change that
results from subjective commitment seems altogether absent from the sys-
tem outlineo in Bctrg oro Eccrt. What makes Baoious thought what it is
results from the fact that it is inoepenoent of experience. Certainly, think-
ers such as Kant ano Hegel oepart from purely formal, if not empty, foun-
oations, but these are altogether oiherent from what Baoiou proposes, if
these formal founoations can provioe the possible conoitions of experi-
ence ,as in Kant, or oetermination as a proceoural operation ,as in Hegel,.
. Alain Baoiou, Etltc: Ar Eo, or tlc Urocttorotrg of Ectl, trans. Feter Hallwaro, Lonoon,
Verso, .oo:, p. :6.
If there is to be a possible movement in Baoious philosophy beyono the
sterility of the system put forth in Bctrg oro Eccrt, two supplementary tra-
jectories are requireo.
On the one hano, there neeos to be some sort of possible application
of the categories of being ano truth to the situations that can be thought
in a manner other than subtraction. Ano seconoly, there neeos to be
some possible phenomenology of subjectivity that coulo serve as a unify-
ing principle to relate the particularity of situations to the various actions
ano evaluations ,which ultimately are purely mathematical, that oenne
subjective engagement. The nrst approach woulo lean towaros Ioucaults
various attempts to oenne ano engage with historically specinc situa-
tionswith the particular problems that certain situations establisheo for
themselves as their transcenoental, albeit historical, conoitions of possibil-
ity. Ano, as for the latter question of subjectivity, it is Lacan who may pro-
vioe the framework for speaking of a subjects relation to the inconsistent
presentation of an event.
As regaros the nrst problem ,the specincity of situations,, I will put
Ioucault asioe ano insteao examine a question internal to Baoious phi-
losophy. I askeo whether there is any way of thinking the relation between
being ano the situation apart from subtraction. This question was cer-
tainly not left unanswereo by Baoiou, given the centrality of the category
of the event. The event, insofar as it is not oeriveo from any given term of
the situation, is neither a category of presentation or representation. To
put it schematically, it is an unpresentation. The status of this unpresenta-
tion rests upon a problematic circularity, since events are events insofar
as they are nameo ano put into play in situations, which seems to be the
exact same operation that informs presentation. Fresentation presents,
ano this is constitutive of situations, while the naming of events is what
is constitutive of truth proceoures, but in both cases what is presenteo or
nameo is purely nothing: what presentation presents is neither more nor
less inconsistent than the events that are nameo. Being, in this instance, is
univocal. But this leaves us with a problem. The only manner in which we
can oistinguish the appearance of inconsistent multiplicity ,qua presenta-
tion ano representation, from the appearance of inconsistent multiplicity
,qua event, is through a rather cruoe recourse to experience. That is,
we can assume that presenteo multiples are more or less recognizeo by
everyone ,given a proper paraoigmatic framework,, whereas events are
presenteo or seen only by those subjects who oeclare it ano recognize it as
such. The oistinction, then, hinges upon the ability of a select number of
human beings to recognize events.
Sam Gillespie :8
I emphasize this as a problem not simply because it necessarily falls
back upon a purely empirical account for oistinguishing presentation
from events. What I nno surprising is the fact that Baoiou ooes not ap-
pear to think that the conoitions unoer which events occur require any
other founoation than naming ano recognition as such. The problem with
this is that it is tautological: subjects constitute events at the same time
that subjects are miraculously constituteo by the naming ano recognition
of events.
6

Given that events ano subjects are coextensive with one another ,in-
sofar as it is impossible to have events without subjects or subjects without
events,, it is oimcult to nno a thiro term to account for their coextensive
relation, which is why Baoiou grounos the possibilities for each in the
possible oisjunction between presenteo multiples ano the representative
practices of the state: those singular multiples that events name. The fun-
oamental ontological characteristic of the event is to inscribe, to name,
the situateo voio of that for which it is an event.
Here Baoiou seems to refer the term voio to something that is situ-
ateo. This is very oiherent from the inherent inconsistency of a situations
latent being that is subtracteo from presentation. To be subtracteo is to
not be situateo at all. But the question is what the situateo voio is, if it
is neither a presenteo multiple among others, subtracteo being, nor the
event itself ,insofar as the event is what inscribes the situateo voio,? As
previously stateo, singular multiples are presenteo but not representeo
they provioe the site for events at an ontological level. But at the same
time, there seems to be the event itself, which names not simply that voio,
but the ooccttcc corotttor unoer which that voio will be taken up in a truth
proceoure. To establish the event both as the inconsistency of the situa-
tion ano a part of the situation itself, Baoiou is forceo to oivioe the event
in two: part of it is oirecteo towaros that situateo voio, ano part is oirecteo
towaros that aspect of the event that escapes the situation. If exclusive
emphasis is placeo on the former part of the event, then it simply becomes
another version of the state: it is simply a non-statist way of counting in-
oiscernible elements. In oroer to avoio ooubling the event with the state,
another part of the event is neeoeo which exceeos the situation, ano in so
ooing, calls upon nothing other than itself for its own valioity. It is this part
6. |. . .| only an interpreting intervention can oeclare that an event is present in the situ-
ation, as the arrival in being of non-being, the arrival amiost the visible of the invisible,
Alain Baoiou, Bctrg oro Eccrt, trans. Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. :8:.
. Baoiou, Etltc, p. 6q.
of the event that instigates subjective action. The event now supplements
the situation ano it is this, rather than presenteo or unpresenteo multiples,
that is the true catalyst for subjective action or noelity. Such principles,
along with the oennitions of the subject ano the event, are supplementary
to the rather closeo connection between ontology ano truth, as Baoiou is
well aware insofar as he believes that, beyono the static presentation of
multiplicity set theory makes available, something must happen in oroer
for there to be a transformation, in oroer for there to be truth. In ontol-
ogy, I woulo argue, nothing happens, things simply are.
By focusing on the set theoretical founoations of Baoious philosophy,
one overlooks the fact that events emerge in an unpreoictable manner,
ano thus require a possible framework outsioe ontology to explain how
they happen. This is not to say of course that events are not engageo
with unknown multiplicities that have their grounoing in a mathematical
ontology: it is to say, rather, that events ano their subjects are what force
the plastic univocity of being to assume new or unforeseeable trajectories,
new truths ano mooalities of existence. This, at bottom, is novelty in Ba-
oiou. But in oroer to ehect a possible movement from ontology to truth,
Baoious system must aoo an aooitional step that is extrinsic to ontology.
Notably, when Baoiou speaks of something that happens, his terms reveal
an uncharacteristic oisplay of sentiment. In a personal quote in reference
to the events of May of :q68 in Faris, for example, he stateo that: for what
was taking place, yes, we were the genuine actors, but actors absolutely
seizeo by what was happening to them, as by something extraoroinary,
something properly incalculable.
8
What is initially so striking about this quote ,ano others like it that
one nnos periooically in Baoiou, is that it makes recourse to personal
experiences that are otherwise entirely absent in Baoious philosophy. In
particular, here Baoiou seems to be appealing to categories of ahect that
presuppose a subject of experience who is grippeo or seizeo by some-
thing incalculable, who becomes a catalyst for all possible action. What
seems to be potentially overlookeo, then, within the overall sterile, formal
framework of the ontology of Bctrg oro Eccrt is any possible theory of af-
fect that coulo account for that very act of gripping the subject. This ab-
sence is telling when it comes to aooressing the manner in which subjects
are grippeo by events.
If this objection seems to imply a reproach that is entirely at ooos
with what makes Baoious philosophy what it is ,a minimalist metaphys-
8. Baoiou, Etltc, p. :..
Sam Gillespie :8
ics,, consioer the following two points. Iirst, it seems necessary to fall
back upon some category of ahect if we are to account for the processes
through which subjects ano events mutually enable one anther.
q
That is,
there may neeo to be something of a necessary engagement with the pos-
sible conoitions that seize ano grip subjects in the constitution of events,
ano which may oenne a political mooe of subjectivity. I woulo be arguing
here for noelity as a certain orive that propels a subject forwaro in the
pursuit of truths.
The secono consioeration is even more ambitious. In Baoious
thought, there are four conoitions unoer which truth can occur, art being
one among others. It seems, however, that a classical philosophical en-
gagement with art is impossible in Baoious systemthere is no possibility
for aesthetics for Baoiou. Given that the mathematization of ontology en-
tirely strips being of any notion of ahect, ano given that it is precisely ahect
or sensation that aesthetics stuoies, the only possibility for a philosophical
engagement with art in Baoious philosophy is through troctlcttcthat
is, the means through which philosophy can oversee the possible creation
of truths in the arts. Art, in other woros, is one instantiation of the voio
as truth. Now, this is only one instance of what occurs when Baoiou sub-
oroinates a possible arena of human action ano engagement to the foun-
oations that philosophy sets for it through science. In other woros, art is
philosophically important only insofar as it is capable of prooucing truths
that are subject to various conoitions establisheo by mathematics ,ano, by
extension, science,. I have argueo elsewhere, by looking at Deleuze, that
it is possible to have a theory of novelty that is not necessarily subjecteo to
a criterion of truth.
:o
One coulo say that, oespite its concessions to science,
Deleuzes philosophy is an aesthetic philosophy through ano through. By
making a move to Lacan, however, one nnos a possible vocabulary for
speaking of artistic proouction that is, on the one hano, compatible with
Baoious overall theory of the new, while nonetheless being inoepenoent
of the criterion of truth.
To summarize the argument so far. I am claiming that Baoiou neeos
a framework through which one can speak of how subjects are grippeo
by events. Lacan, I suggest, provioes such a conception in his relation of
the subject to its inoiscernible being, its own real. The catalyst for action
q. As Harot ano Negri observe, this coulo be part of a wioer politics of accounting for af-
fect in politics. Michael Harot ano Antonio Negri, Empttc, Cambrioge, Harvaro University
Fress, .oo:.
:o. Sam Gillespie, Tlc Motlcmottc of ôcclt,: Bootoo Mtrtmoltt Mctopl,tc, FhD., Univer-
sity of Warwick, Warwick, .oo.
,what Baoiou calls noelity, will be founo in Lacans notion of the orive
the means through which subjects create new mooalities of relating to,
or experiencing, being. Ano the orive, my argument will go, can also
provioe a framework for artistic proouction that thinks action through an
impersonalization of being at the same time that it is inoepenoent of the
category of truth as such.
This move becomes necessary because it strikes me that the conoition
of art is the most problematic for Baoious philosophy in terms of the cate-
gory of truth. There certainly can be various movements in art that estab-
lish formal groupings that resemble Faul Cohens process of constructing
a generic set, but it woulo seem unnecessarily restrictive to suboroinate
these formal groupings to generic conoitions set to it by this aooenoum
to Cantorian set theory. In other woros, one is left with a rather brute
minimalism to account for what truth can be in artistic practice. Ior this
reason, there can only be inaesthetics in Baoious philosophy. What a psy-
choanalytic notion of the oriveano, by extension, sublimationmight
entail is a broaoening of the protocol that Baoiou uses for subjective ac-
tion ,a response to the inoiscernibility of being, that is not necessarily
connneo to truth. Whether or not such an aesthetics can be philosophi-
cal is an altogether oiherent question: it may be that such an aesthetics
is a properly psychoanalytic ahair. All the same, it may be necessary to
explore such an option so as to accomplish two things: one, to think the
proper framework that oetermines subjective action ano two, to think
through the problematic category of art as a truth conoition.
THE VOID: SUB]ECT OR BEING?
Lacans innuence upon Baoiou is evioent. One coulo compile a book
length stuoy on the subject, but perhaps it is more useful here to take the
primary oiherences between the two as our point of oeparture. Baoiou has
been prominent in stating that he proposes a oiherent localization of the
voio than Lacan ano that, unlike for Lacan, being for Baoiou is separate
from the real. The implication of this is that philosophy ano psychoanaly-
sis presuppose oiherent points of oeparture: one oeparts from being as a
founoation, while the other starts with the position of a subject immerseo
in language. The question that immeoiately arises, then, is whether the
voio is localizeo in being, for which it is an ontological category, or is it the
place from which the subject speaks?
If Lacan aligns himself with the latter position, Baoiou unhesitatingly
opts for the former. It shoulo be clear that Baoious voio is inhuman ano
Sam Gillespie :8q
asubjective, whereas for Lacan, on the contrary, the voio is the main core
of subjectivity. The barreo subject, S, is the voio that is markeo as a sub-
ject of lack, a subject alienateo from its own being through the meoiation
of the signiner. The inscription of such a lack ,voio, in a linguistic chain of
signiners is what makes the subjects ability to relate to the worlo through
the shifting of signiners possible.
::
The subject that those signiners repre-
sent, however, is nothing but the mark of an excluoeo existence insioe an
inert symbolic framework that is necessary for experience. The subject is
that voio that emerges oeao on arrival in the symbolic register.
One can almost immeoiately take issue with this oistinction. Irom a
Lacanian perspective, it is not entirely certain that the subject is simply a
voio toot coott. The subject as voio exists only insofar as it is markeo ano
oesignateo by the signiner, ano not as some sort of substantial absence
that can be uncovereo through a proceoural stripping away of material
signiners. The voio is always staineo or tainteo by the signiner that oesig-
nates the subject as lack. The subject, in such a perspective, is as material
as it is empty. ]uoith Butler, among others, has consistently argueo that the
Lacanian category of the real oepenos upon some instantiation of a kernel
that resists symbolization, ano this is what makes it an ahistorical ano op-
pressive category. She asks: On the one hano, we are to accept that the
Real means nothing other than the constitutive limit of the subject, yet
on the other hano, why is it that any ehort to refer to the constitutive limit
of the subject in ways that oo not use that nomenclature are consioereo a
failure to unoerstano its proper operation?
:.
Butlers argument extenos to
argue that conceiving the real as the constitutive limit to the social ,which
is the place of the subject, amounts to oetermining the subject as outsioe
the social. This is how Butler qualines her Hegelianism: the real is simply
an empty voio of oetermination. In other woros, to use the terms from
the Baoiou of Tlcot, of tlc Soocct, to refer to the subject as voio overlooks
the fact that lack is more likely the result of a structural law of placement
rather than an excess of lack over ano above that system. Thus, lack is a
thoroughly immanent category.
The crucial point that Butler misses in her argument, however, is that
it is precisely the point that the real ooes not oesignate something outsioe
the socialit is rotltrg outsioe language. In other woros, Butlers criti-
::. The classically psychoanalytic statement I feel like a motherless chilo is possible on the
basis of substituting one signiner, I, for another, motherless chilo.
:.. ]uoith Butler, Competing Universalities, in ]uoith Butler, Ernesto Laclau ano Slavoj
iek, Corttrgcrc,, Hcgcmor,, Urtcctoltt,, Lonoon, Verso, .ooo, pp. :6-8:, p. :..
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :qo
cism overlooks the fact that speaking subjects oesignate their own real in
ano through the materiality of language ano the limits it presupposes,
not through some oeterminate process of exclusion. The Lacanian sub-
ject is the place of that nothing outsioe language, just as Baoious voio is
the name for the nothing that exceeos particular instantiations of either
thought or being. Ior the Lacanian subject, then, there is nothing outsioe
the history that the signiner inouces ano the place of this nothing is the
voio of the subject. The voio of the subject is not something that exists
outsioe the symbolic chain. Rather, the unique position of the subject
extenos from the fact that there is rotltrg outsioe the symbolic chain. This
is what makes the Lacanian subject a structurally oeterminate category:
the impasses that renoer the closure of the symbolic impossible woulo
result in a failure to oetermine the symbolic as a structureo system were
it not for the fact that a speaking subject nlls that empty place of inoeter-
mination. In other woros, the failure of the symbolic to inscribe itself as a
closeo totality is constitutive of the failure of the subject to be fully present
to itself through the meoium of speech.
This has, I believe, oirect implications for Baoious theory of the sub-
ject. Ior it asks how is it that a subject can be propelleo to act through
something that is manifest only through negation? Whether that negation
oesignates the place of the subject or the place of being is a moot point:
the fact of the matter is that it is a question of a oeterminate nothing. To
interrogate the relation between the two thinkers, it will be necessary to
retrace certain steps in Baoious thought. We coulo start with a primary
text of Lacans theory of the subject. In his seminal essay Suture, Lacans
oisciple ]acques-Alain Miller proouceo a comparative reaoing of Laca-
nian psychoanalysis with Ireges logic, which functioneo as an implicit
critique of the logical assumption that one can have existence without
a subject.
:
Given that Irege founoeo his thought of numbers upon the
exclusion of any psychological subject of renection, the subject was ex-
cluoeo from Ireges systematic account of the genesis of numbers through
a purely logical necessity. This was a simple assertion that the existence
of numbers ooes not oepeno upon the existence of a subject who thinks
them. Accoroing to Miller, however, the subject reemergeo in his system
at that very point where Irege sought to oerive an existence through logic
alone. In Ireges system, zero was the primary logical number, insofar
as it was the only number that coulo be attributeo to a purely logical,
:. ]acques-Alain Miller, Suture ,Elements of the Logic of the Signiner,, Sctccr, vol. :8,
no. , :q-8, pp. .-.
Sam Gillespie :q:
non-empirical concept. The point, for Miller, is that the assignation of
the number zero to the lack of an illogical object is the very relation that
oennes the subjects relation to the signifying chain. In other woros, zero
is the marking of the subject as a lacking subject who tries to compensate
for its own lack of being through a substitution of one signiner for another
,in the same way that the number : in Irege marks the number o as the
number assigneo to the concept not-equal-to-itself ,. What makes Mill-
ers essay more than a simple analogy between Lacan ano Irege is that
it also aims to be an explicit critique of science itself. Science, which is
presumeo to exist inoepenoently of a subject, must reintroouce a subject
in oroer to sustain the progression of number. We are left to assume, then,
that a psychoanalytic theory of the subject is the very sustenance of a logi-
cal ,or scientinc, system.
In an early essay, Marque et manque, Baoiou took issue with this
very assumption insofar as he remaineo skeptical that science requires
a concept of either a subject or of suture.
:
Given the tenets of Gooels
theorem of incompletion, there was no neeo for a logical system to be
closeo in upon itself in oroer to function as a consistent system for pro-
oucing knowleoge. Science, that is, oio not neeo closure in oroer to func-
tion. Stratineo to innnity, regulating its passages, science is a pure space,
without an outsioe or mark, or place of what is excluoeo.
:
This position
entails that if there is no neeo to mark what is excluoeo from a scientinc
oroerinsofar as in science the not-substitutable-with itself is forecloseo
with neither recourse or mark
:6
then there is no subject of science. This
is, of course, in striking contrast to the position he woulo oevelop in Bctrg
oro Eccrt where subjects only exist in ano through truth proceoures, of
which science is one part. But this ooes not mean that Baoiou saw suture
as a useless category: it founoeo a subjects relation to ioeology. Departing
from a classically Althusserian oistinction between science ano ioeology,
Baoiou puts forth the theory that psychoanalysis has nothing to say about
science, ano that this is the negative oetermination of the oesire that is
operative in ioeology. The negative oetermination of oesire in psychoa-
nalysis is a oirect ehect of the impossibility of giving a oistinctly scientinc
account of the structural relations that make that oesire possible. That
is, the psychoanalytic oennition of oesire as lack is a oesire for a scien-
:. Alain Baoiou, Marque et manque: a propos ou zero, Coltct poot lorol,c, vol. :o, :q6q,
pp. :o-.
:. Baoiou, Marque et manque, p. :6:.
:6. Baoiou, Marque et manque, p. :.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :q.
tinc knowleoge that can account for a subjects conoitions of possibility at
the same time that, at the level of that oesire, such an account is strictly
speaking impossible. The subject who passes from representation ,ioeol-
ogy, into knowleoge is a subject that woulo cease to exist at the moment
of its gaining scientinc knowleoge. What we are left with, then, is the no-
tion of a subject that plays a constitutive role in the proouction of science
as truth, even if that role is itself nothing more than a transitory stage
towaros the gaining of that knowleoge.
The shift from this position ,where the subject is an ioeological, non-
scientinc category, to the work of the :qos ,where the subject was a oia-
lectical, political subject, to the current position ,where there can be both
political ano scientinc subjects, presupposes a potentially broao set of fac-
tors that coulo have innuenceo the oevelopment of Baoious work. On the
one hano, in :q6 he maintaineo that if there is no subject of science, it
is because science is the proper subject of philosophy. But by the work of
the :qos, science hao taken a backseat to politicsboth as a subject of
philosophy ano as a conoition for subjectivity altogether. In other woros,
there are only political subjects.
The shift to a set theoretical ontology in Bctrg oro Eccrt signaleo two
changes in Baoious thinking. There was nrst the possible coexistence of
both political ano scientinc ,as well as artistic ano amorous, subjects, at
the same time that the voio became an exclusively ontological category.
It is this secono move that nrmly oistinguishes Baoiou from Lacan, such
that, by the time of Bctrg oro Eccrt:
The choice here is between a structural recurrence, which thinks
the subject-ehect of the empty-set, so exposeo in the unineo
network of experience, ano a hypothesis of the rarity of the subject,
which oefers its occurrence to the event, to the intervention, ano
to the generic paths of noelity, referring back ano founoing the
voio on the suturing of being for which mathematics exclusively
commanos knowleoge.
:

The rarity of the subject is what is put in the service of a mathematical
oetermination of the voio as non-subject, at the same time that subjective
action is renoereo possible through both the intervention of an event,
as well as the voio of local situations that becomes oeterminate in ano
through the forcing of truths. The subject, from such a perspective, is oe-
nneo through its action. In the Lacanian register, in contrast, Baoiou pos-
its the voio as the subject-ehect of the empty set, which is nothing other
:. Alain Baoiou, Lcttc ct lcrcmcrt, Faris, Seuil, :q88, p. :.
Sam Gillespie :q
than the purely empty-place of inequality that allows for the movement
from one signiner to the next, ano for which the subject is the unineo con-
oition of possibility. Ostensibly, this severs the subject from any possibility
of transformation or change, given that the voio that is the subject works
exclusively in the interests of a structural system of oetermination. Asioe
from language, there is nothing.
The above oistinction is maoe possible on the basis of a single ques-
tion: what ooes the voio oo oiherently in philosophy than in psychoa-
nalysis? In oeparting from the above oistinction, Baoiou concluoes that
being is oistinct from the Lacanian real insofar as the real is only possible
on the basis of a subject, while for philosophy, the voio t inoepenoently
of a subject. That is, the voio is the primary name for an inhuman ano
asubjective being that preceoes any possible aovent of subjectivity. Such
a position shoulo haroly surprise: it is entirely consistent with the outlineo
trajectory of Bctrg oro Eccrt, ano it is concomitant with any philosophy
that takes ontology as founoational. It woulo be absuro to make ontology
a subjective category given that many non-human, or non-subjective enti-
ties have an ontological valioity.
If so, why ooes Baoiou bother to have a subject in his philosophy at
all? Why oio he move from oeclaring science to be the subject of phi-
losophy to writing a book on the philosophy of the subject? The reason,
I believe, oepenos on the conoitions unoer which something new can
occur. Ior the new to emerge, something neeos to oisrupt the structural.
In oroer to account for the supplementary means with which subjects ano
events appear in Baoiou, it becomes necessary to appeal to categories that
were central to Lacan. To oetermine the manner in which they inform
Baoious own position, perhaps more intimately than he realizes, one will
have to unoo the above oistinction that Baoiou has orawn between Lacan
ano himself.
Consioer the assumption that the Lacanian subject is a pure voio, a
barreo subjectin short, S. Is it really the case that the subject is nothing
other than a voio that receives its oetermination through a linguistic struc-
ture that exceeos it, on the one hano, while being nothing but an empty
system of structural oetermination, on the other? This position falls prey
to an interpretation of the subject as nothing but its symbolic oesignation,
given that the lack of the subject is, strictly speaking, nothing at all. This
woulo be no oiherent from a rather cruoe interpretation of psychoanaly-
sis as a variant of constructivist logicthe subject is insofar as it is con-
structeo in language. Such a perspective funoamentally misinterprets the
raoical nature of Lacans oennition of subjectivity insofar as it reouces the
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :q
question of the subject as the founoation for the constitution of meaning
,insofar as it is from this position of the subject that meaning is constituteo,
to a oennition of the subject as a oeterminate ehect of meaning ,that is,
the subject as it is positeo in language,. Is the emphasis here put upon the
materiality of language which, in some variant of behaviorist psychology,
comes to oetermine an ioentity? Or is it rather the case that the exclu-
sion of being that is essential for language as a closeo system exerts an
innuence upon the meaning that the speaking subject proouces? In other
woros, the lack that sutures the subject to the signifying chain, if it is to be
something more than an inoeterminate nothing that escapes the grip of
language, must play a constitutive role in Lacanian psychoanalysis.
The implications of this oistinction oo not holo exclusively for sorting
out the internal coherence of Lacanian psychoanalysis, they are also what
founo Baoious entire critique of constructivist mathematical logicthat
is, the belief that existence can only be given through the oiscernibility of
language. To counter constructivism is, of course, to maintain that there is
an existence that is not exclusively subsumeo within the tenets of what can
be oemonstrateo within language. The Lacanian real is one such manifes-
tation of an anti-constructivist tenoency, given that it is what remains of
being in the aftermath of the failure of meta-language. The real, as a sub-
jective function, is the result of the following paraoox. On the one hano,
there is no metalanguageeverything is explicitly positeo in language,
on the other hano, language cannot totalize itself as a closeo system for
which it can then oennitively state that there is nothing outsioe it.
:8

Thus, while one can maintain that the subject is purely a voio, that it
receives its only material support through the signiner, this is quite oiher-
ent from arguing that the subject is nothing other than a lack conjoineo to
a signiner. There is an aooitional something that nlls out this gap between
the failure of a meta-language ano the impossibility of oetermining lan-
guage as a closeo system ,for which the nothing outsioe language woulo
be truly nothing,. This something is Lacans famous objet petit ,a,. The
:8. As ]oan Copjec has put it: Whenever the split between being ano appearance is oe-
nieo, you can bet that one particular inscription is being overlookeo: that which marks the
very failure of metalanguage. Language speaks voluminously in positive statements, but
it also copiously speaks of its own lack of self-sumciency, its inability to speak the whole
unvarnisheo truth oirectly ano without recourse to further, exegetical speech. Some eli-
sion or negation of its powers writes itself in language as the lack of meta-language. This
negation is no less an inscription for its not being formulateo in a statement, ano the being
it poses presents no less a claim for our consioeration. ]oan Copjec, Rcoo M, Dcttc: Locor
Agotrt tlc Httottctt, Cambrioge, MIT Fress, :qq, p. q.
Sam Gillespie :q
object ,a, is not subsumeo within language, ano thus ooes not exist as one
signiner among others. At the same time, however, what makes object ,a,
what it is results oirectly from the fact that language fails to subsume the
totality of being: the object ,a, is the emergence, in the symbolic, of that
which remains outsioe its grasp, a positive oetermination of the negative
inoeterminate. Like Baoious event, the object ,a, is the appearance of
something that is anterior to presentation, at the same time, it is subtract-
eo from what is subtracteo. It is neither being-qua-being, nor a consistent
presentation, but rather a category of the subject.
Lacans famous formula for the fantasy is the conjoining of a barreo
subject to its virtual object: S a. To the lack in the subject instituteo by the
signiner corresponos a oetermination of that lack in the form of a fantasm
of presence ,say, in a psychoanalytic context, the oesire of the analyst,.
What lies behino that fantasm is precisely nothing, but it is a nothing that
gains oeterminate form in the various oesires, repetitions, or sublimations
of the psychoanalytic subject that oesires presence beyono language. At
the risk of making a mere analogy, is this not the very same logic inform-
ing Baoious theory of the eventprecisely the neeting appearance of that
which is inoiscernible from the position of experience, ano which is given
oeterminate form through the activity of a subject? The very problematic
status of the event in Baoiou hinges upon a paraoox: on the one hano,
there is an excess of being over presentation, on the other hano, this ex-
cess is purely nothing. How can nothing present itself? Frecisely insofar
as there are events that are given form by those subjects who recognize
them. We can only unoerstano the possible corresponoence between Ba-
oious event ano Lacans object ,a, if we unoerstano that the former is not
a phenomenal event any more than the object ,a, is a phenomenal object.
Insteao, both are what one coulo call supplements to presentation itself
that makes the move from a purely subtractive theory of presentation to
a oirect oetermination of the inoeterminate possible. That is, the event
is what facilitates a movement from a negative ontology ,in which the
question of inconsistency remains a negative oetermination of something
that is subtracteo from presentation, to a positive oetermination of that
subtracteo inconsistency qua proouction of truths. Likewise, in oroer to
move from a purely negative oetermination of oesire ,which always hinges
upon the immanent failure of some impossible object,, the psychoanalytic
subject must shift its activity to the orive, where it gives form ano oetermi-
nation to the empty grouno of its causality in ano through the formation
of an object ,a,. A oistinctly Lacanian question is, how ooes the subject
give form to its own existence?
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :q6
One possibility was put forth in Lacans theory of sublimation. In a
ruoimentary sense, sublimation is the creation of oeterminate things in
ano out of a constitutive lack that is inherent to experience. It emerges
out of the constitutive relation of the subjects relation to its own real.
In the remainoer of this essay, then, I want to examine the potential re-
lations that inhere between Lacans theory of sublimation ano Baoious
theory of truth, while at the same time as looking to Lacans theory of
the orive ,which is closely linkeo to sublimation, for a possible account
for the subjective conoitions that enable such activity. Doing so will allow
me to initially reconsioer the supplementary framework that is necessary
to account for Baoious theory of the event, the subject, ano noelity, at
the same time as putting us in a position to question the ultimate aims of
Baoious entire projectthe knotting of novelty to truth.
Now, in oroer to aoequately assess the possible connections between
Lacans object ,a, ano Baoious event, we have to ask after the ontological
status of each. The reason I say ontological is because the event, in ano
of itself, is not exclusively an ontological category: with the event, we
have the nrst cxtcttot concept to the nelo of mathematical ontology.
:q
The
event supplements presentation ano, by extension, ontology. Ior example,
when consioering the Irench revolution, there are states of ahairs that are
presenteo in the situation ,to name only a few: the bourgeoisie, ]acobins,
the guillotine, the massacres, the storming of the Bastille, which, in ano
of themselves, are a multiplicity of elements that lack a unifying princi-
ple without the name Irench Revolution that creates of these elements
an event from which a political proceoure can be oeriveo. The event
Irench Revolution is not one multiple among others ,insofar as it is not,
in itself, presenteo among the other multiplicities,. It is what unines these
oisparate multiplicities unoer the banner of its occurrence. Or, to put it
another way, the event takes these elements ano aoos something more
that exceeos oirect presentation. But this something more, insofar as it is
not presenteo, cannot be accounteo for as something. Insofar as it escapes
presentation, it is ontologically unoecioable.
Now, in a parallel trajectory, what exactly is Lacans object ,a, if it is
neither an object nor a strictly linguistic oesignation? How can something
be saio to exist if it is not articulateo in language? Consioer one of the
most basic examples of an object ,a,, the breast. It woulo be a mistake to
assume that the object simply is the breast on account of its breast-like
properties. That is, the breast is not tr ttclf an object of satisfaction. An in-
:q. Baoiou, Lcttc ct lcrcmcrt, p. .o.
Sam Gillespie :q
fant coulo presumably be just as satisneo with the warm milk it provioes,
the pleasure it proouces when oigesteo in the booy, ano the satisfaction
that is associateo with the act of suckling. The breast, as the object ,a,,
however, is what is imputeo to give the coupling of booies ano organs the
satisfaction that are proper to them: it represents something more than
just one subsioiary object among others. It is the object that acts as a sup-
port for the satisfaction proper to these objects. The object ,a,, then, is not
the object of satisfaction but that something more that satisfaction aims at.
As Alenka Zupani puts it:
After a neeo is satisneo, ano the subject gets the oemanoeo
object, oesire continues on its own, it is not extinguisheo by the
satisfaction of a neeo. The moment the subject attains the object
she oemanos, the ooct pcttt o appears, as a marker of that which the
subject has not got, or ooc rot loccano this itself constitutes the
ccltc object of oesire.
.o
What Lacans object ,a, represents is a surplus satisfaction that lan-
guage fails to proouce. That is, if a psychoanalytic subject enters language,
she ooes so at a price: there is a necessary acceptance that an unmeoiateo
relation to ones being falls out of the equation. What is left in its place
is the installation of a lack.
.:
This is not to say, however, that this lack is
simply left to persist on its own accoro: something reemerges to the sub-
ject that comes to nll that lack, as it presents itself in the form of an object
that embooies the surplus-value of a being anterior to language. Likewise
for Baoiou, if inconsistent being-qua-being must, by structural necessity,
be subtracteo from consistent presentation unoer the law of the count,
that subtracteo being can nevertheless come to supplement the consist-
ent presentation of a situation in ano through the neeting appearance of
an event. Both Baoious event ano Lacans object ,a, are what resist the
structural necessity of subtraction of exclusion: they subtract themselves
from their initial subtraction as inconsistent being at the same time that
their supplementation of a given nelo provioes a unity for oisparate phe-
nomena.
.o. Alenka Zupani, Etltc of tlc Rcol: Iort, Locor, Lonoon, Verso, .ooo, p. :8.
.:. In Lacans Seminar VII, which leo to his eventual conceptualization of object ,a,, this
constitutive lack, or unnameo being, was calleo oo Dtrg. Do Dtrg is what I will call the
beyono-of-the-signineo. It is as a function of this beyono-of-the-signineo ano of an emo-
tional relationship to it that the subject keeps its oistance ano is constituteo in a kino of
relationship characterizeo by primary ahect, prior to any repression. ]acques Lacan, Tlc
Etltc of P,cloorol,t, .-.o, trans. Dennis Forter, New York, Norton, :qq., p. .
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo :q8
One immeoiate objection presents itself with the above analogy. Ior
the purposes of the present oiscussion, it is questionable whether the ob-
ject ,a, is in any way a catalyst for action. One coulo argue that the cause
of a subjects oesire is a oetermination of the subject as pure passivity
whose oesire exists in a negative relation to its positeo object. In contrast,
Baoious event calls a subject into being in such a way that its resioual
ehects will hinge upon the action ano oecisions taken by the subject that
retroactively give form to it. The event is oetermineo in ano though sub-
jective activity. To make an analogy between Baoiou ano Lacan is prob-
lematic if we lack a means of ascribing an active agency to the Lacanian
subject. What possible forms can the object ,a, assume that oirectly result
from the activity of the Lacanian subject?
We can start with the ruoimentary assumption of Lacans that the
subjects relation to the signiner is a structural relation to emptiness, or
lack. The question that emerges from this is one of the possible relations
the subject can form with that lack. One obvious example of such a rela-
tion woulo be the avoioance, or repression, of that lack that is constitu-
tive of neurosis. Neurotic subjectivity may in fact have some coincioence
with situations in which the voio is forecloseo from presentationin ei-
ther case, normativity or stability oepenos upon a foreclosure of the voio.
But there are other possible relations of the subject to its own lack that
presuppose the oirect activity of the subject in oetermining that relation,
ano thus oetermining the lack. One such possibility was given in Ireuos
account of sublimation that was subsequently mooineo by Lacan. Subli-
mation is conventionally taken to be the oesexualization of libioo in ano
through the proouction of scientinc ano artistic objects ano knowleoge.
In contrast, the orive is usually taken to be the realization of primal, oe-
structive impulses. The former woulo be the cultural purincation of the
latter. Lacans raoical move is to have uniteo the two termsorive ano
sublimationin the very notion of an object ,a,: in each case, it is the
activity of the subject that gives form to the object as satisfaction. This
means that the object is the resioual ehect of subjective action ano not
the object that oetermines a subjects oesire.
..
Thus, the sexual activity
of booies coulo be one possible ,perhaps convenient, way of prooucing
... Alenka Zupani has opposeo the orive to sublimation as such: if the orive is a heao-
less proceoure, sublimation is not. Sublimation is a kino of navigator of the orives, ano
this is why it plays such an important role in society. Sublimation can thus leao to proouc-
tions of oeterminate mooes of that nothing, whereas the orive is simply the expenoiture of
that nothinga orive towaros nothing. See Alenka Zupani, The Splenoor of Creation:
Kant, Lacan, Nietzsche, Umot;o): A }ootrol of tlc Urcorctoo, no. :, :qqq, pp. -., p. o.
Sam Gillespie :qq
mooalities of ahect ,that is, of aiming at a being beyono language,, while
the proouction of objects or knowleoge in science, religion ano art coulo
exemplify other possibilities of giving oeterminate form to the negative
oeterminations of the real. Science woulo entail a quest for the complete
symbolization or oetermination of the realanything that remains un-
symbolizable within it woulo simply imply a limitation in our own knowl-
eoge. Religion attempts to nll out this lack through the imposition of a
raoically transcenoent other, while art, it is argueo, is the realization of
this lack in ano through its representation as something. That is, it renoers
the impossibility of the real possible in ano through the meoium of repre-
sentation ,a result of the paraoox that the real cannot be representeo,. Art,
it woulo appear, has a unique relation to the real insofar as it neither fully
excluoes it from experience ,as in the case of religion, nor fully incorpo-
rates it within knowleoge ,as in science,. Ano this may have implications
for Baoious theory of art as a truth proceoure, given that, for Baoiou,
truth is oetermineo through mathematics.
Baoiou, no less than Lacan, oennes art as an instantiation of the voio:
the artists he oesignates as exemplary prooucers of truth can all be noteo
for their minimalist tenoencies: Beckett, Mallarm, Fessoa, Schoenberg.
Art is || mobilizeo, not because it has worth in ano of itself, or with
an imitative ano cathartic aim, but to raise the voio of Truth up to the
point at which oialectical sequential linking is suspenoeo.
.
This notion of
a purincation of being is, of course, not altogether oissimilar to the com-
monplace notion of sublimation in Ireuo, who saw the sublimation of an
instinct or orive as the purincation of cruoe, ano potentially oestructive,
instincts, into higher aims that coulo be met with social approval.
.
It is a
telling sign of Ireuos conservative, ano unoer-theorizeo, take on the mat-
ter of sublimation that his aesthetics tenoeo, more often than not, to focus
on the classical or conventional: Michelangelo, Leonaroo, Shakespeare.
In :qo, at the time of Ctctltottor oro tt Dtcortcrt, where he put forwaro
his theory of the cultural value of arts, the work of Ficasso, Lissitzky, Du-
champ, ano others, was left unmentioneo. Ireuos theory of sublimation
.. Alain Baoiou, Mortfcto fot Pltloopl,, trans. Norman Maoarasz, Albany, State Univer-
sity of New York Fress, :qqq, p. :..
.. A satisfaction of this kino, such as an artists joy in creating, in giving his phantasies
booy, or a scientists in solving problems or oiscovering truths, has a special quality which
we shall certainly one oay be able to characterize in metapsychological terms. Sigmuno
Ireuo, Civilization ano its Discontents, in Albert Dickson ,eo.,, Ctctltottor, Soctct, oro
Rcltgtor, trans. ]ames Strachey, vol. XII Fenguin Ireuo Library, Lonoon, Fenguin, :qq:,
pp. .-o, p. .6.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .oo
not only ran the risk of subscribing to a conservative sexual morality ,an
accusation commonly leveleo against psychoanalysis regaroless,, it fell
prey, to put it miloly, to a conventional aesthetics that oenieo art its po-
tential for innovation.
Ireuos notion of sublimation, then, was articulateo as a function of
the superego, insofar as it sought a way for the satisfaction of instincts in
means that were subject to cultural approval. Lacans response, although
quite contrary to Ireuos, oio not leao to a rejection of the notion of subli-
mation. Sublimation for Lacan oio result in the purincation of ahect, but
these emotions were precisely those that were instigateo by the cultural
oemanos of the superegofear ano pity. Lacans theory aims to subvert
the very cultural authority that Ireuos theory of sublimation put to work.
To unravel the possible connict between the two great psychoanalysts, we
will have to consioer the initial mockery that Lacan maoe of Ireuos own
views. In :q6, Lacan proposeo the following Ireuoian interpretation of
sublimation ano its correlate in the orive:
In other worosfor the moment, I am not fucking, I am talking
to you. Well! I can have exactly the same satisfaction as if I were
fucking. Thats what it means. Inoeeo, it raises the question of
whether in fact I am not fucking at this moment. Between these
two termsorive ano satisfactionthere is set up an extreme
antinomy that reminos us that the use of the function of the orive
has for me no other purpose than to put in question what is meant
by satisfaction.
.
The eno of the above quote proposes the following contrast: if the
orive is opposeo to satisfaction, it is contraoictory to speak of the satisfac-
tion of a orive. Taken further, it is clear that satisfaction itself is a contra-
oictory notion, insofar as there are inoiviouals who are clearly capable
of prooucing a certain stability in their lives in ano through the manifes-
tation of their symptoms ,say, compulsive hano-washing,this stability,
while forever frustrateo ano oissatisneo, is what satisfaction aims at. To
borrow the famous term of Slavoj iek, the commano to enjoy your
symptom ooes not result in a possible attainment of an aim, but in a pro-
longation of frustrateo oesire that typines neurosis. But it is just as clear
that inoiviouals who manifest neurotic symptoms are nonetheless oiscon-
tenteo oespite their attainment of satisfaction: just as, we coulo assume,
the act of speaking ooes not result in the same sort of jouissance that can
.. ]acques Lacan, Tlc Foot Foroomcrtol Corccpt of P,cloorol,t, trans. Alan Sherioan,
New York, Norton, :q8:, pp. :6-66.
Sam Gillespie .o:
be enjoyeo in sexual intercourse. This is what Lacan means when he op-
poses orive to satisfaction. The question then is what exactly the orive or
sublimation aims at if not satisfaction. How exactly ooes the orive play out
a trajectory of impossibility?
This question brings us to the centrality of the Lacanian real. Irom
most of the cultural literature that has come out in the past nfteen years
on the topic, it shoulo be evioent that the real is the impossible. The
impossibility, that is, of having an ontology from within the parameters
of psychoanalysis. Or, yet again: the impossibility of the real results from
the paraooxical conclusion that there is no meta-language at the same
time that language cannot foreclose the possibility of an existence that
escapes language. Ior the speaking subject, there is no meta-oiscursive
position from which one can state with certainty that there is nothing
outsioe language. The real is thus the minimal ontological framework
that results from the fact that, within language, being is excluoeo at the
same time that no oennitive limits for that exclusion can be oemarcateo.
We have alreaoy establisheo that the subject occupies the limit point from
which language proceeos, but there is also the question of the excess of
being that is not exhausteo by the presentative capacity of language. The
minimal ontological form this being takes is that of the object ,a,, or, in
Baoious case, the event. The question that intimately links Lacans object
,a, to Baoious event properly concerns the activity of the subject: how
ooes the subject give form to being beyono simply leaving it as an empty,
inoeterminate excess?
Ior Baoiou, it is evioent that the inoiscernible is granteo form through
the forcing of truths. Ano it is unquestionably just as true that the conoi-
tions unoer which forcing can occur oepeno upon a generic, ano thus
universalizable, framework put into place. Truth is universal, for all.
.6
The
contrast with Lacan shoulo be obvious: if the orive is itself an attainment
of Lacanian jouissance, shoulo not jouissance be universalizable, hao by
all?
.
Moreover, the orive itself, as an answer of sorts to the problems that
.6. Ano this is not simply a formal mathematical counterpart to Baoious ontology: a suf-
ncient account of universalizability was given in Baoious account of Saint Faul. See Alain
Baoiou, Sotrt Pool: Tlc Fooroottor of Urtcctoltm, trans. Ray Brassier, Stanforo, Stanforo
University Fress, .oo.
.. This is a bit of a lengthy argument in itself. The basic premise behino it is that no mat-
ter how much one enjoys, there will always be others who enjoy more. This woulo appear
to be the oriving impetus behino Lacans writing of Kant avec Saoe, trans. ]ames Swen-
son, Octooct, vol. :, :q8q, pp. -:o, as well as Slavoj ieks recent writings on enjoyment
as a political factor, see Slavoj iek, Fot Tlc, Iroo ôt 1lot Tlc, Do: Ero,mcrt o o Poltttcol
Foctot, .no eo., Lonoon, Verso, .oo..
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .o.
irrational forms of enjoyment may represent to the subject, remains an
ultimately inoivioual notion: there can be no collective solution to the
problem of jouissance precisely because, from the perspective of psychoa-
nalysis, only inoiviouals can be treateo on the couch. There cannot be a
collective jouissance of the community.
.8
As such, psychoanalysis woulo
be an ultimately inoivioual notion that carrieo very little truth. By exten-
sion, its usefulness for speaking about Baoious notion of subjective noelity
woulo appear quite limiteo.
My response to the above objection is twofolo. Iirst, while there is
certainly a connection between what happens at the level of a subject
being grippeo by an event ano the universal truth that may follow from
such an account, the universalizability of a truth cannot in any way serve
as a criterion for what happens at the level of a subject being grippeo
by an event. A subject oeclares its noelity to the event as a pure matter
of faith. This is because, in a position Baoiou may since have retracteo,
the truthfulness of an event cannot be oecioeo at the time of its occur-
rence. Ano from this perspective, it is just as true that subjects grippeo by
events can form reactionaryano hence untruetenoencies in response
to events ,say, collective unities who oppose political revolution, people
who regaroeo Schoenbergs music as noise, etc.,. Nothing at the level of
universalizability can oenne the trajectory of the subject in response to
something that has the power to form collective subjects out of inoiviou-
als. A theory of what creates those subjective formations is what I am
looking for in psychoanalysis.
Secono, Baoiou has, on at least two occasions, maoe concessions to
the Lacanian cure as a potential truth proceoure, insofar as the subject on
the couch can, over the course of analysis, give form to the unconscious
,or inoiscernible, mechanisms that compel it to act.
.q
At an immeoiate lev-
el, the answer is clearly that certain inoiviouals make oecisions to change
their situations ,their inoivioual lives, in oroer to form new relations to
the being ,the ootorcc, they have to bear in everyoay life. The haro work
.8. Ultimately, this is what Lacan meant with his maxim oo not ceoe your oesire! That
is, oo not let an other oictate to you what your oesire shoulo be.
.q. In Tlcot, of tlc Soocct, Baoiou wrote that: We wont pay any attention to those who
argue that a couch is not as serious as a concentration camp. To them we say without
hesitation that this remains to be seen. The axiom of the nouveaux philosophesa camp
is a campis just as false as what the Chicago therapists wanteo to promote through the
excommunication of Lacan: a couch is a couch. The fact is that the psychoanalytic cure
has no other real aim than that of the reaojustment of the subject to its own repetition. See
Alain Baoiou, Tlottc oo oct, Faris, Seuil, :q8..
Sam Gillespie .o
of analysis, then, coulo be regaroeo as a truth proceoure among others
that allows subjects ,inoivioual human subjects, say, to form new, hopeful-
ly more rational, means of existing. The manner in which we move from
psychoanalysis, a specialist nelo that concerns inoiviouals on couches, to
arguing for its signincance for philosophy will require something else: this
is what I am looking for through the theory of sublimation. Sublimation
can allow for the creation of something new in art, in a manner that will
be applicable, if not useful, for Baoious own writings on the topic.
I will thus attempt to go through these two points so as to assess what
they may have to oher Baoious theory of the event, the subject ano n-
oelity. It is ultimately a question of ahect as a principle of the subject,
over ano above the structural relations that make subjectivization pos-
sible. It may seem ooo to appeal to Lacan for these purposes, given that
he has often been accuseo of stripping psychoanalysis of or, notion of
ahect. Irom such a perspective, it ohers a colo ano sterile framework for
speaking about human behavior. Fhilosophically, however, the psycho-
analytic notion of the orive remains tainteo by an irrationality that, more
often than not, assumes morbio or abject vicissituoes ,for example, ieks
comparison of an encounter with the monstrous real with Baoious truth
proceoures,. This psychoanalytic approach, for iek, constitutes an irra-
tionality that unoerlies every philosophical approach to nll out the voio of
the inoiscernible through the forcing of truths: in a Truth-Event, the voio
of the oeath orive, of raoical negativity, a gap that momentarily suspenos
the Oroer of Being, continues to resonate.
o
In many ways, iek is entirely correct. In the nrst place, truth is
inoeeo an empty category: behino any particular or local instantiation
of it, there is nothing other than the voio, just as ontology ano thinking
are nothing apart from their particular presentations or instantiations.
But there is a surreptitious jump that iek makes from the emptiness of
truth as a category to the fact that the truth proceoures become nothing
more than a way of regulating primoroial psychic orives ,whereby love is
nothing other than the ability of human beings to rationalize an unbrioleo
jouissance, politics becomes a means of mooulating the non-universaliz-
ability of enjoyment as a political factor, art is a means of sublimating
the abject horror of the real into beautiful objects, etc,. ieks move is to
grouno oll subjective action in impulses ano interests that are applicable
only to a psychoanalytic subject. In other woros, at the bottom of Baoious
o. Slavoj iek, Tlc Ttclltl Soocct: Tlc Aocrt Ccrttc of Poltttcol Ortolog,, New York, Verso,
:qqq, pp. :6.-.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .o
truth proceoures lie libioinal impulses. What he has oone, then, is oppose
Lacan to Baoiou without acknowleoging that this oistinction is possible
on the basis of what oistinguishes psychoanalysis from philosophy. Ano
seconoly, is it not the very point that sublimation, in supposing the oe-
sexualization of libioo, makes categories such as unbrioleo jouissance
seconoary to the ultimate aims of its activity? The applicability of the
orive for Baoious philosophy will holo only insofar as the orive ceases
to be a purely inoivioual notion ano aomits of a capacity for universaliz-
ability. In other woros, I am in no way arguing for a correlation between
Baoiou ano Lacan on the grouno that subjective action presupposes a
libioinal interest ,in the same way that sublimation presupposes a orive,,
but rather that the elementary relation of a subject to its enjoyment ,that
is, a speaking subject to its unsaio being, is constitutive of the relation
between Baoious subject ano the event. What is requireo, then, is not a
sexualizeo content, but rather a minimal conoition of ahect that oennes
that relation.
AIIECT DEIINED
Lacans major writing on the topic of ahect occurs in his tenth semi-
nar, on Anxiety. Anxiety, he says, is the only thing we can be sure of. I
take this to mean that the other emotions that regulate human experience
are always capable of oeceiving. I have alreaoy mentioneo fear ano pity:
clearly, with respect to contemporary events, there is no ooubt that we live
in a worlo where feareo enemies ano pitieo victims proliferate. Ano their
invocation in politics can often serve contraoictory aims. Ior example,
in relation to contemporary events, the same Muslim population we fear
in the name of potential terrorist attacks is the same we pity in the name
of the humanitarian interventions of just wars.
:
Iear ano pity, in either
case, arouses the neeo for a resolution, just as reaoily as their transgression
can nno form in other, more threatening, extremes. Anxiety is something
oiherent, because it is instituteo on an entirely oiherent basis. What we
fear or pity is conventionally what is other to us: in contrast, what arouses
our anxiety is altogether intimate to us. Its haroly surprising that ethical
inoignation is often arouseo with respect to people at a oistance from
ourselves ,in Bosnia, Falestine, Iraq,, rather than with regaro to people
:. See ]acqueline Roses aomirable eoitorial, We are all afraio, but of what exactly?, Tlc
Goototor, .o March .oo, http://www.guaroian.co.uk/comment/story/o,6o,q::.,oo.
html, accesseo ]uly 6, .oo.
Sam Gillespie .o
we encounter in our everyoay lives ,UK ano American citizens who live
in poverty or are incarcerateo,.
What gives structure to anxiety is not a lack ,a constitutive wouno at
the heart of experience,, but rather, in Lacans terms, a locl of locl. Anxi-
ety is not the signal of a lack, but of something that you must manage to
conceive of at this reooubleo level of being the absence of this support of
lack ,.:..6.,. Subjective lack, which makes the emergence of the speak-
ing subject in language possible, is also that which guarantees that the
object ,a,, qua cause of oesire, will always remain at a oistance from that
subject. It is always excluoeo, ano thus open to various irrational vicis-
situoes. As an object of oesire, the object ,a, remains an impossible object
which the subject relates to by virtue of some kino of constitutive failure.
But in the absence of that lack, the object no longer remains at a oistance,
it emerges full-circle to the subject as the constitutive core of its grounoing
in being. Ano this being that is revealeo to the subject as its own grouno
is precisely that empty place, that nothing that is the subjects own being.
The confrontation of the subject with this being is the proper catalyst for
action. The arousal of anxiety is thus unlike other psychological notions
of ahect that are constitutive of a subjects relation to the stability of their
symbolic oroer. While fear ano pity, among other ahects, coulo be saio to
oetermine the manner in which subjects holo irrational relations to their
jouissance ano its various vicissituoes, it is anxiety, the encounter with
the empty grouno of being, that prompts an inoivioual to go into analysis
with the hope of forming other, preferably more rational, relations to their
jouissance. Anxiety is the cause of subjective change precisely because it
lacks a support in representation.
I will present this in the simplest form to provioe a way into Baoiou.
In normal situations, there may be certain elements that are subtracteo.
As we saw in the case of immigrant workers, some may be representeo
as excluoeo in the contemporary political situation of Irance, ano this
subtractive representation may arouse various feelings of oisgust, pity or
resentment. The arousal of these feelings oepenos upon their status as
subtracteo, as lacking what Irench citizens have ,work permits, legal sta-
tus, recognition by the state, etc,. The movement that woulo facilitate the
shift to an event woulo be to consioer them not as subtracteo elements of
the situation Irance, but rather as human beings that, like Irench citi-
zens, occupy the same place. If an event, or a political sequence, is to be
establisheo in their name, what is requireo is a recognition of the common
being that is shareo with Irench citizens, from which various prescrip-
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .o6
tions against the Irench state can be maoe on behalf of their ontological
valioity.
It is one thing to say that the example of the or-poptct can provioe
one such example of a situations recognition of its own subtracteo being.
It is another thing, however, to say that such a recognition arouses anxi-
ety, or that such anxiety is the sole catalyst for subjective action, or noelity.
Ano, of course, anxiety is not an exclusively Lacanian notion, given that
his work on the topic has been preceoeo by Kierkegaaro, Heioegger ano
Ireuo, among others. If anything coulo be saio to unite these latter three
interpretations, it is the belief that anxiety is a subjects own confrontation
with possibility: the possibility of moral obligation through the acknowl-
eogement of guilt ,Kierkegaaro,, or the possibility of ones own freeoom
to exist in the worlo ,Heioegger,. The inoeterminateness of anxiety, then,
is not anxiety about something in particular, but about being in general.
Ano this revelation of being in general, the fact that it is not something
that can be representeo as excluoeo, ano hence manageo, is constitutive
of a subjects relation to inoeterminate being.
Taking this as our point of oeparture, we must then ask what it is that
anxiety may provoke in psychoanalytic theory ano what its counterpart
may be in Baoious truth proceoure? The answer to the nrst part of the
problem is simple enough: in contrast to emotions like fear ano pity, anxi-
ety is oistinct from oroinary passionate attachments that oenne a subjects
relation to the worlo. In other woros, a person is compelleo to go into
analysis less on the basis of a compulsive neeo or oesire for something
,however much that can serve as a prop for their wish for analysis, as
because of an unoerlying anxiety that makes oroinary life unbearable.
The subject is seizeo by something it ooesnt have a name for, ano this
is what coulo be saio to prompt the series of investigations that ensue in
the course of analysis. So far, this is quite concomitant with how Baoiou
sees a truth proceoure. To speak brutally, I oo not think that analysis is
an interpretation, because it is regulateo not by sense, but by truth. This
is certainly not an uncovering of truth, of which we know that it is vain
to think it coulo be uncovereo, because it is generic.
.
Analysis ooes not
uncover a preexisting truth, but is rather a means through which a subject
gives form ano shape to the inoiscernible being that grounos its anxiety.
This nnal point is the pretext for the conclusion of this oiscussion. If
analysis is ultimately something that inoiviouals, as opposeo to collective
subjects, unoergo, why shoulo it then be seen as universal or generic? Isnt
.. Alain Baoiou, Corotttor, Faris, Seuil, :qq., p. .o8.
Sam Gillespie .o
the whole point of Lacans enterprise that jouissance cannot be univer-
salizeo, hao by all? Lacans famous utilitarian analogy of jouissance as a
white sheet illustrates this logic perfectly: if you cut enough holes in the
sheet for everyone to stick their heao through, you eno up oestroying the
sheet in turn. The universalization of jouissance is its own abnegation.
Ano if we conceive the ultimate goal of analysis to be new, more rational,
relations subjects form with their jouissance, we are left with something
that is funoamentally incompatible with Baoious truth proceoure. The
crux of this problematic takes us to the oiherence between being ano the
real. I mentioneo before that the real is a category of the subject. What is
implieo by this is that the being of a truth that comes to be instituteo in the
situation traverses the inoiviouality of the subject who chose to recognize
it over others who oio not. Baoious subjects are unique subjects to the
extent that they recognize events that others oont, however, if truth is for
all, the particularity of the subject is abnegateo. The move from psychoa-
nalysis to philosophy, ano from the real to being requires that truth must
pass over from being a subjective principle of noelity to become a truth
that exists for all qua forcing. The real, as I see it, names that part of a
truth that the subject operates in the service of, at the same time that the
subjects actions traverse the inoiviouality of the real.
I previously oistinguisheo satisfaction from jouissance on the grounos
that the former attains a certain stability that is rooteo within language,
whereas the latter is an explicit excess of being over language. ]ouissance,
at bottom, is Lacans name for being. Ano the object ,a,, that bit of jouis-
sance that supports subjective activity, is the correlate for Baoious event.
What the object ,a, ano the event both provioe is a minimal framework
through which a subject confronts being. Given that neither the event
nor the object ,a, have proper supports in representation, there is never
a guarantee that oisaster might not ensue from the subjective relations
they establish. Ferhaps their inoeterminacy is what allows them to, quite
often, assume irrational forms, as witnesseo in the example of false truth
proceoures in Baoiou, or in the obscure attachments that subjects form
with obscure forms of enjoyment, in Lacan. The conoitions of possibility
of change ano novelty in both Baoiou or Lacan are just as reaoily the pos-
sible conoitions for evil.
When Baoiou remarks that analysis is not interpretation, he means
that there is a point in the analytic situation that cannot be reouceo to the
oimension of language, which guioes the subject forth in his or her pur-
suit of a truth. In the absence of a metalanguage, jouissance is that excess
of the subject to itself, that part of the subject that is more than simply
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .o8
the sum total of its activity. When coupleo with the object ,a,, then, the
subject is oriven in pursuit of something that is not reoucible to its experi-
ence. Ano conversely, to see the real as a category of the subject is to put
the subject in tanoem with something that exceeos its structural conngu-
ration in a linguistic network: it is that part of the subject that exceeos its
own activity. What oistinguishes Baoious subject from Lacans, then, is
the process through which that subjective excess passes over from being
a purely subjective principle ,qua the real of jouissance, into something
that holos for a collective human situation in its totality ,qua generic be-
ing of a truth,. Iorcing is what makes that shift possible. But it woulo be
oimcult to see how forcing woulo be possible were it not for the activity
of a militant subject who is put in the service of something that exceeos
all positive or representative value in the situation. Lacan, I have argueo,
provioes the framework for Baoious subjectivity.
The nnal question, then, concerns what we are to make of sublima-
tion in Lacan. Is it a notion that is concomitant with art as a truth proce-
oure in Baoiou? The question returns us to Baoious comment that truth
in analysis cannot be uncovereo because it is generic. Is there a generic,
higher faculty of jouissance? Sublimation, I have suggesteo, ohers one
such possibility in ano through the proouction of aesthetic objects that
instantiate the empty grouno of being that is annulleo in ano through
the aovent of language. Ano artistic sublimation may oo this in a manner
that is altogether oiherent from the realizations that occur in religion or
science.
When Baoiou remarkeo that jouissance cannot be reouceo to inter-
pretation, he meant that it was that limit point of the situation which
refuses closure. It becomes quite easy, then, to see that jouissance cannot
be universalizeo: it cannot be given as a totality that can then be cut up
ano oiveo equally among all inhabitants of the situation. Like Russells
paraoox, this is a oirect ehect of the inherent incompletion of being itself.
What neeos to be askeo is whether it is possible for art to instantiate that
incompletion. The artists that Baoiou champions seem to share a tenoen-
cy to strip away oetail to uncover, or localize, the purity of the voio. When
Lacan oescribes sublimation as the elevation of an object into the oignity
of a Thing,
I take him to mean that a Thing remains irreoucible to the

exchange or oistribution of gooos that typify stability in a social situa-
tion. This Thing, this object ,a,, that embooies our jouissance maintains
its generic or universal value insofar as it is not reouceo to the oominant
. Lacan, Tlc Etltc of P,cloorol,t, p. ::..
Sam Gillespie .oq
logic of the situation, whether that be the baseness of fear or pity, or the
customary circulation of gooos in a capitalist society.
What sorts out the oisparity of terms ,jouissance, orive, sublimation,
object ,a,, anxiety, with regaro to the terms of Baoious philosophy? Ior
reaoers less familiar with Lacan, the following shortcut can provioe an
axiomatic framework with which to oigest the preceoing remarks:
:. The subjects oeclaration of an event oennes a ruoimentary means
of relating to being. If the event is object ,a,, the ahect that oennes the
subjects relation to that object ,or event, is anxiety.
.. Being is oistinct from the real insofar as the real is a category of
a speaking subjects relation to its own ,impossible, being. The real pre-
supposes a subject, while only the appearance of an event presupposes a
subject. Events cannot be oeouceo from an asubjective, impersonal ontol-
ogy.
. If the orive can typify a subjects noelity to an event ,insofar as the
psychoanalytic theory of the orive is a subjects instantiation of its ob-
ject ,a,,, sublimation is a means of instantiating the forms of inoiscernible
being that can be met with recognition from other subjects. It provioes
a proouctive form in which a orive can achieve satisfaction irrespective
of its object. Thus, the value we impute to the artistic object oepenos
less upon its usefulness or ability to satisfy human wants or interests, but
rather upon the fact that it gives form to a being that eluoes the speech of
the speaking subject.
.:o
8
Conoitional Notes on a New Rcpooltc
A. ]. Bartlett
Coulo anything show a more shameful lack of
|eoucation| than to have so little justice in oneself
that one must get it from others, who thus become
masters ano juoges over us?
:

The sole remit for thought is to the school of oeci-
sion.
.

whence arises the obstacle to every valio account
of the ehects of eoucation, since what brought about
the results cannot be aomitteo to in oiscussing the
intention.
Alain Baoiou says that what he aomires most about Fascal is his ehort
to invent the mooern forms of an ancient conviction, rather than follow
the way of the worlo ,BE ...,.
That eoucation t gooo is an ancient

:. Flato, Tlc Rcpooltc of Ploto, trans. I.M. Cornforo, Lonoon, Oxforo University Fress,
:q:, p. q, oa. Or, in Desmono Lees translation, It is the sign of a bao eoucation if one
seeks justice at the hanos of others, Lonoon, Fenguin Books, :q, p. :68. See also Apolog,,
.b-.b esp. in Flato, Tlc Lot Do, of Soctotc, trans. 8 intro. Hugh Treoennick, Lonoon,
Fenguin, :q, pp. 6-q.
.. Alain Baoiou, Bctrg oro Eccrt, trans. Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo6, p. :q
,henceforth BE,.
. ]acques Lacan, Kant with Saoe, in Ecttt, trans. Bruce Iink with Heloise Iink ano
Russell Grigg, New York, W.W. Norton 8 Company, .oo6, pp. 66/8. Iirst publisheo in
English in Octooct, trans. ]ames B. Swenson ]r., vol. :, :q8q, pp. -.
. It is obvious that this says as much about Baoiou as Fascal.
A. ]. Bartlett .::
conviction. That the gooo it is neeos to be given mooern form, which is
to say, something other than a state form is the unoerlying wager of this
paper. We take our oirection from Baoious axiomatic ano singular oec-
laration that the only eoucation is an eoucation o, ttotl.
Truths make
holes in knowleogethat encyclopaeoia of the state. This encyclopaeoia
provioes the preoicative oroer of juogements such that a multiple nnos
itself belonging to a set of multiples, that is, to a part ,BE .8,. In other
woros, to paraphrase from Lacan it is the state which know|s| what you
will oo.
6
Ior Baoiou, a truth, constituteo as a generic proceoure ano sub-
ject to its event, necessarily entails a type of inoiherent ano logical revolt
against the totc of the situation. Baoious claim in regaro to an eoucation
by truths suggests therefore something like an operation of immanent ri-
valry, within justice, to an eoucation by the state.
Of course, tooay, at the

level of the ,state, system, the knotting of the state ano eoucation is tighter
than ever. This knot binos a complex historicity of ioeology, economy,
oesire ano oemano. This historicity is itself well worth tracing in light
of Baoious ethic of truths insofar as the state tooay incorporates ano
reconngures many of the raoical, emancipatory ano authentic oemanos
associateo with eoucation since the Irench Revolution. However, we will
not be investigating the particulars of this situation here. Rather, we will
attempt to oiscern what Baoious system provioes for thinking of eouca-
tion in a form which separates the ancient conviction as to its virtue from
its contemporary representation in the state. These notes will, neverthe-
less, set Baoious eoucation by truths against the eoucation of the state in
the hope of oiscerning the possibilities for a mooern form that ooes not
follow the way of the worlo.
We will work through three linkeo variations on the peoagogical
theme. Iirst we will aooress the signincance ano function of the term
. Alain Baoiou, Art ano Fhilosophy, in Horooool of Iroctlcttc, trans. Alberto Toscano,
Stanforo, Stanforo University Fress, .oo, p. : ,henceforth HI,.
6. Ano, to know what your partner will oo is not proof of love. ]acques Lacan. Scmtrot XX:
Or Fcmtrtrc Scxooltt,, Tlc Ltmtt of Locc oro Iroolcogc, .,.-.,, eo. ]acques-Alain Miller,
trans. Bruce Iink New York, W.W. Norton, :qqq, p. :6, ,p. : in the Irench,. If the state
ooes not love, how then ooes it eoucate? One shoulo recall that in articulating the argu-
ment that oeouctive noelity is the equivocal potootgm of all noelity, Baoiou claims that
one such example of this is the proofs of love. See BE, p. ..
. Alain Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Folitics, in Irrttc Tlooglt: Ttotl oro tlc Rctotr to Pltloopl,,
eo. ano trans. Oliver Ieltham ano ]ustin Clemens, Lonoon, Continuum Fress, .oo, pp.
6q-8. Also translateo unoer the same name by Thelma Sowley, Rootcol Pltloopl, q6,
]uly/August :qqq, p. o ano as Truths ano ]ustice, in Mctopoltttc, trans. ]ason Barker,
Lonoon, Verso, .oo6, pp. q6-:o6 ,henceforth M,.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .:.
conoitions. Seconoly we will aooress Baoious essay Art ano Fhilosophy
from Horooool of Iroctlcttc, the only essay in fact where Baoiou aooresses
eoucation in a specinc manner,
8
ano in which Baoiou oiscusses the link
between art ano philosophy in terms of the peoagogical theme: A theme,
he says, that has been brought to collapse. Thiroly we will attempt to ois-
cern what might make up what Baoiou refers to as the fourth mooality
of the link between philosophy ano its conoitions through a somewhat
speculative oiscussion of the oual militant praxis known in Baoious work
as subtraction ano forcing.
AXIOMATIC CONDITIONS
One of the more well known features of Baoious philosophical sys-
tem is that philosophy ooes not proouce truths itself but has begun as a
oiscourse unoer conoitions.
q
The four conoitions are Baoiou says, uni-
form recognisable from afar, whose relation to thought is relatively
invariant. The name of this invariance is clear: it is the name truth.
:o

It is through a tripartite relation with the wholly empty yet invariant
category of truth that these four truthor genericproceoures conoi-
tion philosophy. Fhilosophy as such, will come to be as the thinking of
their compossibility through the categories of being, event ano subject.
Although this certainly causes some oebate we are not concerneo in this
paper with why he opts for these four proceoures alone.
::
Our concern
ultimately is only for the mooality of the relation this term implies be-
8. In the collection Corotttor, Baoiou ooes oevote a short article to the question Qoct-cc
oorc trtttottor pltloopltoc? See Corotttor, Faris, Seuil, :qq., pp. 8-qo. See ch. . of this
volmue. He oiscusses it in passing in an interview with Bruno Bosteels publisheo in Gabri-
el Riera ,eo.,, Alotr Bootoo: Pltloopl, oro tt Corotttor, New York, Suny, .oo. Ano there are
vague references in Logtoc oc moroc, Faris, Seuil, .oo6, i.e. see the table on p. 8.
q. Alain Baoiou, Mortfcto fot Pltloopl,, trans. Norman Maoarasz, New York, Suny Fress,
:qqq, p. . Hereafter, MF.
:o. Baoiou, MF, p. .
::. Ior arguments concerning this issue see Slavoj iek. Tlc Ttclltl Soocct: tlc oocrt ccrttc
of poltttcol ortolog,, U.K, Verso, .ooo, esp. Ch , The politics of truth, or, Alain Baoiou as
a reaoer of St Faul. pp. :.-:o. Here, iek argues for religion as a conoition. As ooes
Simon Critchley in Demanoing Approval: On the ethics of Alain Baoiou, Rootcol Pltloopl,
:oo, March/April .ooo, pp. :6-.. Ray Brassier argues Capital itself might think ano
therefore qualify as a conoition in, Nihil Unbouno: Remarks on the Subtractive Ontology
ano Thinking Capitalism, in Tltrl Agotr eo. Feter Hallwaro Lonoon, Continuum, .oo,
pp. o-8. ]ustin Clemens sees in the letter a conoition of conoitions in Letters as the
Conoition of Conoitions for Alain Baoiou, Commortcottor C Cogrtttor, Vol. 6, Nr. :-.,
.oo, pp. -:o..
A. ]. Bartlett .:
tween the four proceoures, truth ano philosophy. This is because Baoiou
institutes the notion of the connguration of the four conoitionsas a ct
of generic proceouresprecisely as the conoition of the freeoom of phi-
losophy.
:.
Ano so the form of the mooality of the link, what he names in
Horooool of Iroctlcttc as the peoagogical form, as that which, suitably
reconngureo, prevents philosophys suture to, ano saturation by, one of
these proceoures, ano yet maintains each as a conoition, must be a peoa-
gogy of freeoom in some sense.
Irom the ontology of love to the partitioning proofs of Ramsey
caroinals, Maos expression one oivioes into two has an axiomatic status in
Baoious work. Metapolitically speaking, an axiom is that which is thrown
up within the antagonism ano contingency of a situational sequence. It
is that immanent principle which a collective act not so much marches
behino as pushes forwaroltoctt, cgoltt, ftotctrtt as itself.
:
But, as
Baoiou argues, this equality ,the political form of justice, is not objective or
part of the putative enos of a state program, but subjective, an expression
tr octo of the equal capacity for thought. He says, it is not what we want or
plan but what we oeclare unoer nre of the event, here ano now as what is
ano not what shoulo be.
:
An axiom functions as a oeclaration in language
of the immanent singularity of what loppcr in a situation. It authorizes
an operational oecision orawn from its conoitioning event, which it is
the labour of thought to renoer consistent. Oliver Ieltham, oeploying
the term Baoiou himself steals from Deleuze, names this operation
the oisjunctive synthesis saying the synthesis is what allows such an
interruption to enoure.
:
This oivision, at any stage, is not in the form
of a subjective, objective split. It is insteao a wholly operative, subjective
ano situational oivision, singular ano immanent, ano as such, this is what
authorizes Baoious oeployment of Deleuzes terminology.
:6
However, we
must insist here that this borrowing of a name is not the same as borrowing
that which it names. Although it marks for both a conceptual form for
thinking the ,non,relation between being ano thought, for Baoiou it is
:.. Baoiou, MF, p. .
:. On what has become of these tooay unoer conoitions of a contemporary Thermioor
see, Alain Baoiou, Lc Stclc, Faris, Seuil, .oo, pp. :-6. See also, Baoiou, What is a
Thermioorean, in M, pp. :.-:o.
:. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Folitics, p. ..
:. Oliver Ieltham, Ano Being ano Event ano: Fhilosophy ano its Nominations, Pol,-
gtopl, no. :, .oo, p. .
:6. Alain Baoiou, Dclcoc: Tlc Clomot of Bctrg, trans. Louise Burchill, Minneapolis, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Fress, :qqq, p. q.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .:
through the event as ,rare, irruption or, surrection, ano not as univocal
issue that this relation is form|eo|: events mark absolute beginnings
ano singularities of thought incomparable in their constitutive gestures,
whereas for Deleuze, accoroing to Baoiou at least, this non-relation is
still thought in relation to the One, which founos it by raoically sepa-
rating the terms involveo.
:
Ior Baoiou oisjunctive synthesis entails a
non-conceptual, operational oeployment ano as such a proceoure of
inseparation as enouring noelity to this immanent oivision.
This ooes not mean that philosophy ,nor the philosopher, provioes
resolution or totalization of this oivision, between the event oro its
consequences, tr tlc corccpt or anywhere else for that matter. Fhilosophy
oraws the consequences of this constitutive oivision in thought, faithfully
maintaining the real of the oisjunction within the resultant synthesis or
consistency, oemanoeo by the subjective creation of the conceptor, the
thinking of its thought. This noelity to Maos axiom has consequences all
the way through Baoious work.
:8
Fhilosophy itself, on his terms, is the
consequence or rather, the consequences orawn, of the oecisive splitting of
philosophy ano ontology. The latter oeclareo by Baoiou to oc mathematics.
Ano mathematics provioes the mooel of an innnite thought or, a thought
capable of thinking innnities.
:q

When Baoiou claims that philosophy is subject to conoitions we are to
hear this term functioning in two ways: It is the generic name for the four
proceoures as proceoures, that is, conoitions is the nominal form given
to mark these proceoures in their compossible singularity. At the same
time these autonomously operating proceoures conoitionas in form or
shapethat which is or will be the oiscourse of philosophy. They are the
:. Baoiou, Dclcoc, pp. qo-q: ano p. .. respectively.
:8. It is worth noting that in his essay on justice ano politics Baoiou cites Maos oictum
from the sixteen point oecision: Let the masses eoucate themselves in this great revolu-
tionary movement, let them oetermine by themselves the oistinction between what is just
ano what is not. Fhilosophy ano Folitics, p. .q. ,Rootcol Pltloopl, version for this transla-
tion,. See for the full text Mao Tse-Tung, The sixteen point oecision, Foint . Appenoix
to ]ean Daubier, Httot, of tlc Cltrcc Coltotol Rccolottor, trans. Richaro Sever, New York,
Vintage Books, :q, p. oo.
:q. Bruno Besana argues that it is in regaro to a mooel that Baoious thought of the be-
ing oro tlc event can be most strictly oemarcateo from Deleuzes thought of being o or
event. The argument involves two reaoings of Flato ano is beyono this essay. See Bruno
Besana, One or Several Events? The Knot Between Event ano Subject in the Work of
Alain Baoiou ano Gilles Deleuze, trans. ]ustin Clemens, in Pol,gtopl, no. :, pp. .-.66.
See also Ray Brassier, Baoious Materialist Epistemology of Mathematics, Argclolt, vol.
:o, no. ., August, .oo.
A. ]. Bartlett .:
oisciplinary operations by which these four proceoures act upon the ois-
course that will be philosophy. Ano it is thus only within this constituteo
oiscourse that the truths proouceo by the four conoitions are one-ineo
or become compossible, or can be thought together: the ontological ois-
junction synthesizeo through the thinking of their truths in a retroactive
syntax which amrms the being tlctc ,or tlctc otc, of truths. In this sense the
conoitions prescribe, ano absolutely so, the possibilities of a philosophys
form.
.o
In this way the wholly empty category of Truth acquires the tools
necessary for it to become operational. Both conoition ano conoition,
as two instances of the singular ,non,relation between a proceoure ano the
philosophy it convokes, name, but again in two ways, this split between
the nnite corotttor, the works of the proceoures, ano the innnite corotttor,
the ,immanent, ioea, or the thought of these works that philosophy comes
to think togctlct.
.:
Fhilosophy is what will have been conoitioneo by its
conoitions. Baoiou renoers the structure of this ehect, which is evioently
peoagogicalthough not as we might oroinarily unoerstano itas what
a thought oeclares to be a thought, on conoition of which it thinks that
which is a thought.
..

The singular importance for philosophy of these conoitionsthe
work of the proceouresis that in their various operations they are capa-
ble of creating a sequence ,of works,, a consistent multiple, subject to an
event ,of its situation,, such that it will be possible to say, something new,
some truth, has come to be. It is important to remember however, that
that which Baoiou calls a truth is not incarnate, substantial or aoequate
by corresponoence. In the nnal section we will elaborate on this further
but it is important in light of what a conoition is for Baoiou to remark that
in relation to these truths philosophy proceeos in its history unoer these
conoitions, as the oesubstantialization of Truth, which is also the self-
liberation of its act.
.
Thus it is incorrect to say, for example, a revolution
t True or a poem t an event or to connate the two. These may mark or
inscribe a nnite point in a process of truth but the process itself can never
be totalizeo. A process ooes not belong to being as being but is precisely a
.o. On the importance of this point see ]ustin Clemens, Hao We But Worlos Enough, ano
Time, this Absolute, Fhilosopher in this volume .
.:. Alain Baoiou, Dennition of Fhilosophy, in MF, p. ::.
... Alain Baoiou, The Folitical as a Froceoure of Truth, trans. Barbara F. Iaulks, locortor
trl ., Iall .oo:, p. 8: ano in M, as Folitics as a Truth Froceoure, pp. ::-:..
.. Baoiou, Dnnition oe la philosophie in Corotttor, p. 8.. I cite the original because I
have mooineo the English translation from Dennition of Fhilosophy, p. :.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .:6
subtraction from being that forces the logic of its appearing. Its trajectory
cannot be circumscribeo by any preoicative or nnite expression because it
is founoeo in the voio, ano as such is without representation ano therefore
without knowleoge in the state. If this trajectory coulo be oiscerneo or, in
other woros, preoicateo by a curricular process, it woulo merely belong
to the existing regime of knowleoge. Its process woulo belong to the oroer
of what was reaoily verinable.
Thus these four proceoures, art, mathematics, politics ano love, are
conoitions for philosophy precisely because of their extraoroinary ability
to formalize by the processes unique to their functioning the truth,s, of
the situation in which they operate, truths that are singular to their nelo,
irreoucible to any other ano immanent to the situation in which these
proceoures appear. That is, the truths proouceo are singular to the work
ano thought of the proceoure itself. There is no external surveillance in
this regaro ano at the same time, nor ooes any single proceoure organ-
ize the whole of truth within itself. No proceoure can say that it alone
constitutes all that Truth is on pain of oisaster.
.
Thus, these proceoures
provioe the conoitions for philosophy by their singular ano immanent
proouction of truths. In the oictionary oennition wholly appropriate here,
these conoitions are an inoispensable requirement. At the same time,
in the mooality of their operation, these proceoures are a qualincation,
a limit ano a restriction. They are a oiscipline. Here, conoition takes
on its more oirectly peoagogical sense of forming, shaping ,oooc,, even
prescribing. What they prescribe is precisely the form ano shape of the
trajectory of the enquiries maoe in the proouction of the generic, ano by
which the thought proouceo within this proceoure is seizeo unoer the
name of philosophy. We can get a sense of how this works if we think of it
in the manner in which a coach is saio to conoition an athlete. In ehect
without the conoition-trg the athlete woulo not, as the athletic subject,
have begun.
It is worth looking at an example here of how a conoition works. To
oo this I will move quickly across Baoious oescription of the importance
of the mathematical conoitioning of philosophy initiateo by the Flatonic
oecision to enquire into the consequences of the mathematical rupture.
As one move in what amounts to a series of moves against the Heioegge-
rian innuence on contemporary thought, Baoiou claims that philosophy
begins with Flato. This beginning is oue to the Flatonic attention to math-
.. Alain Baoiou, Etltc: Ar co, or tlc orocttorotrg of cctl, trans. Feter Hallwaro, Lonoon,
Verso, .ooo, p. :.
A. ]. Bartlett .:
ematics as a form of thought which, as atemporal ano ioeal constitutes a
break with ooxa.
.
This break is both once ano for all, in the sense that
mathematics t a break with ooxa, ano oiscontinuous in the sense that it
will continue to be that thought which will have to break with ooxa again
ano again.
.6
Certainly, time ano again in Flatos work Socrates establishes
as his starting point that there in fact is such a break with ooxa. That is,
that ooxa, establisheo circulating knowleoge, alreaoy incluoes within its
oelimitations of knowleoge a site at the eoge of the voio which it repre-
sents as nothing. Ior Flato/Socrates it is this nothing, this knowleoge of
rotltrg which can be thought unoer the conoition of mathematics. Such
a thought will be a break with knowleoge. As such, voio to knowleoge,
it founos a thought whose intelligibility owes nothing to the regime of
alreaoy existing knowleoge. This intelligibility exists as that which will
have been establisheo. Ehectively, it is establisheo that mathematics is
a form of thought, one that thinks that which is intelligible against the
perceptually immeoiate.
.
This break, with what is for Baoiou ehectively
opinionmathematically speaking there are no opinionsoemanos a
further break or intervention. This is because this nrst break is obscure
insofar as its consequences for thought are concerneo. What ooes it mean
that mathematics proceeos as it ooes? In one sense this is perfectly ame-
nable to ooxa, knowleoge or the state, insofar as mathematics proceeos
to follow a trajectory whose oiscoveries remain within mathematics. Such
oiscoveries remain, so Baoiou says, obscure ano forceo in the sense that
mathematics is not free to break with opinion, or not, but working from
hypothesis ano making use of axioms it cannot legitimate it is thus forceo
unoer constraint of its own oeouctive chains || themselves oepenoent
upon a nxeo point, axiomatically or prescriptively stipulateo, to rupture
with opinion. Thus it is this oual constraint of being forceo ano obscure
that at once makes mathematics an essential thought oue to its singular
ability to ahect the entirely necessary break with opinion, to instate ois-
continuity into thought, oro makes necessary a secono break. Ano this
precisely because the signincance of this break must itself be thought.
What consequences ooes the existence of a form of thought which breaks
with ooxa, with the knowleoge that repeats as the way of knowing, that
establishes oiscontinuity within thought, have for the freeoom of thought?
.. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Mathematics, in Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, eo. ano trans. Ray Brass-
ier ano Alberto Toscano, Lonoon, Continuum Books, .oo, p. ..
.6. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Mathematics, p. .q.
.. Baoiou, Flatonism ano Mathematical Ontology, Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, p. o. Whether
mathematics thinks is a thorny issue ,for some, still.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .:8
Fhilosophy must begin here. It is the oiscourse of the secono break. As
such the oialectic ,in Flato, is the proceoure by which this oeouctively
present oiscontinuity is placeo within thought. Its obscurity is ,or must be,
renoereo consistent outsioe itself. But this is not to be unoerstooo in the
form of a subsumption, rather, in Baoious woros mathematics amounts
to an in between ,mctoxo) of thinking as such: that it intimates a gap which
lies even beyono the break with opinion.
.8
What Baoiou is moving towaro
here is the claim that mathematics is ontology. What he wants to establish
ano precisely what links the notion of conoitions ano the notion of the
peoagogical theme is that mathematics is that which presents nothing.
This nothing is the gap between knowleoge as opinion or ooxa ano being.
Being, being precisely what knowleoge, in its sophistic state sense, claims
to be knowleoge of. What Baoiou insists on ano what he nnos so essential
in the thought of Flato for example, is that Flato himself, in a sense forceo
by his noelity to mathematics, elaborates a oiscourse nameo philosophy
which establishe|s| the illumination of the continuous at the moment of
oiscontinuity. Ano he ooes so precisely at that point where mathematics
has to oher only its blino, stubborn inability to propose anything other
than the intelligible ano the break.
.q
Fhilosophy as a particular conoi-
tioneo operation comes to elaborate within a space of freeoom this truth
which is the oemonstrateo break with opinion. Fhilosophy thinks the con-
sequences of a thought that is other than opinion ,or in Baoious terms,
knowleoge, on conoition of the conoitioneo break with that knowleoge.
We have no room here to oo so but as is well known each of Baoious four
conoitions can be similarly explicateo as to their particular ano irreouc-
ible role in conoitioning philosophy, which is to say, of establishing the
ehect of an encounter as a transformation.
So conoition, or to conoition, one coulo almost say belongs to the
register of the fototc ortcttot in that to argue that the conoitions as we have
oescribeo them also conoition philosophy is, in a way, to subject philoso-
phy to an exam as to its performance regaroing what it ooes with these
truths proouceo by the four proceoures.
o
This might suggest, to take up
the terminology of a thesis oevelopeo by Bruno Bosteels, that we are oeal-
ing with a oialectical materialism, of a sort ,perhaps, inoeeo, a materialist
oialectic,, in which neither the nnite ,subject, nor the innnite ,of the pro-
ceoure it supports, provioe the substance of which the other is merely
.8. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Mathematics, p. :.
.q. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Mathematics, p. ..
o. Baoiou, A Fhilosophical Task: To Be Contemporaries of Fessoa, in HI, p. .
A. ]. Bartlett .:q
the ioea.
:
Such a suggestion, on the one hano, woulo then invert what
Baoiou calls the oioactic schema, whereby it is philosophy that author-
izes the truths of art ano, on the other, it woulo authorize a step beyono
what he calls the romantic schema whereby philosophy orags along in the
wake of art ,or logic, as a fawning servant come journalist in thrall to arts
immanent ability to reveal absolute truth.
.
We now turn to the artistic
conoition.
ART, FHILOSOFHY AND THE FEDAGOGICAL THEME
Ior Baoiou ultimately, it is unoer the conoition that tlctc otc ttotl that
philosophy functions ,HI :,. The peoagogical theme he suggests is that
which enables the encounter between these truths that are proouceo with-
in the process of these conoitions, ano the thought which thinks them. It
is in the essay Art ano Fhilosophy that Baoiou makes several explicit
claims regaroing eoucation. As stateo above, to my knowleoge, this is the
only text in which Baoiou aooresses eoucation qua eoucation. Inoeeo the
term is ,symptomatically?, absent from his work. So for anyone looking
for some sort of master methooology or hoping to oraw some instances
from these claims that might be aoapteo to the contemporary scene of
a state eoucation, the following will ,hopefully, be singularly unhelpful.
What the several claims in this essay signify is an inherent peoagogical
operation, operating within Baoious project for philosophy which teaches
the immanent power of what is ,ano is, not, as against the ruthless repeti-
tion of what must be. Such is the project of all philosophy, Baoiou con-
tenos, which is nothing less than oiscerning the possible mooalities of a
single statement: The Same is at once thinking ano being.
Obviously
the interconnection between peoagogy ano philosophy is embeooeo in
:. Bruno Bosteels, Alain Baoious Theory of the Subject: The Recommencement of
Dialectical Materialism, Fart :. Plt :., .oo:, pp. .oo-..q ano Fart ., Plt :, .oo., pp. :-
.o8.
.. Baoiou, HI, p. . In regaro to mathematics Baoiou names the three schemata which
organize the link between philosophy ano mathematics, the ortologtcol, the epttcmologtcol,
ano the cttttcol. There is some scope for mapping the nrst three schemata from the realm
of art ano philosophy onto the latter from mathematics ano philosophy but such an at-
tempt must proceeo with caution. Ano in any case Romanticism is for Baoiou the central
concern, as for him it is our subjection to Romanticism post-Hegel that constitutes the
time of our time. See, Fhilosophy ano Mathematics: Innnity ano the eno of Romanti-
cism, Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, p. ...
. Baoiou, Dclcoc, p. q. The statement is of course from Farmenioes. See translators
note ,p. :, note :, for an explanation of this translation.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo ..o
the traoition of the oiscipline itself. However, in the same way that Ba-
oiou oetermines one aspect of the relation between art ano philosophy
to have been characterizeo, the relation between eoucation ano the state
has itself been one oetermineo by a form of philo-sophistical surveillance.
Despite the plaintive cries lamenting the states attack on the acaoemy, the
university persists in being that institution which sets ano oetermines the
stanoaro ano form of the curriculum for the nnal years of high-school,
as for itself.
It also, at the behest of ano as an immanent function of the

state, persists in being that nexus of knowleoge ano training which reigns
oown upon both the seconoary ano the primary schools, upon itself, ano
upon the social realm in general its methoos, its economic, social, cultural
ano psychological insights ,such as they are, ano its graouates. All this ano
so much more, operate as the eoucation system. Ano tooay of course, as
Althusser ano Lenin before him ,ano many others in various less raoical
ways, have pointeo out, this is inextricably linkeo to the capitalist form of
the state.
Concerneo as we are with an eoucation which serves as a mo-

. Consioer that the highest oegree available in any oiscipline is still calleo Doctor of
Fhilosophy ,FhD,. It is thus that we here connate the university, as an institution of the
state ano philosophy as the ,master, oiscourse of this institution. Apologies to Lacan,ians,
ano, of course, to Flato,nists,.
. The revolution that the bourgeois class has brought into the conception of law, ano
hence into the function of the state, consists especially in the will to conform ,hence ethicity
of the law ano of the state,. The previous ruling classes were essentially conservative in the
sense that they oio not teno to construct an organic passage from the other classes into
their own, i.e. to enlarge their class sphere technically ano ioeologically: their conception
was that of a closeo state. The bourgeois class poses itself as an organism in continuous
movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it to its own cultural ano
economic level. The entire function of the state has been transformeo: the state has become
an eoucator. Antonio Gramsci, Sclccttor ftom tlc Pttor ôtcoool, trans. Quentin Hoare
ano Geohrey Nowell-Smith, New York, International Fublishers, :q:, p. .6o. One shoulo
note here that in the U.K. ,as elsewhere, prior to the installation of the state-school many
worker groups maintaineo a oistance from this gooo on oher by the state. Frophetically, or
rather because they were very well aware of their relation to the state, they were concerneo
that it was merely a vehicle for further co-option. Of course it is neither ololl, one nor
the other. Frecisely this is Baoious reason for a move away from a traoitional oialectics.
This because it is in the sphere of representation that the voio is seen to be incluoeo in the
situation. This voio, what immanently escapes signincant representation, is the founoation
for the new. One must be careful here though to not slip into liberalism which happily
grants that in ano through eoucation for all in its state sense, new relations emerge in
the social. Liberalism forecloses the voio precisely unoer operations of reform. Reform or
reaction, if you like, is a veil of the voio. It incorporates any ano all interruptions within
itself as its virtue. In liberalism the inoivioual unoer eoucation may change his place in the
social relation, the social relations themselves are maintaineo by just this move. See Mao
Tse-Tung, Comoot Ltoctoltm, Feking, Ioreign Languages Fress, :q.
A. ]. Bartlett ..:
oality of a proceoure of truth, a mooality subject to the encounter of being
ano thought, then we are engageo with Baoiou in thinking the thought
tlot t, against such surveillance, ano is nothing other than the oesire to
nnish with the exorbitant excess of the state.
6

In the essay Art ano Fhilosophy which serves to introouce a series of
variations on the theme Iroctlcttc,
Baoiou oistinguishes three primary

schemata which he maintains have governeo the thinking of the mooality
of the link between art ano philosophy. He links these schemata to what
he calls the three massive tenoencies of thought in the .o
th
century. In
the .o
th
century these tenoencies have become saturateo by particular
schemata which are in themselves out of time oue to the fact that they
themselves are not the proouct of these .o
th
century tenoencies. As such,
in regaro to the thinking of art Marxism ,oialectical materialism, is oi-
oactic, hermeneutics ,after Heioegger, is romantic, ano psychoanalysis
,in relation to Art, vis-a-vis Aristotle, is classical ,HI ,. Each massive
tenoency of thought is thus saturateo by being oeployeo in the form of
a particular schema that either utilizeo or ioentineo with them.
8
Baoiou
contenos that the thinking of the relation between art ano philosophy has
thus become saturateo by the preoominance of one of these three tenoen-
cies or, by a tmoltorcool, corctcottcc oro cclccttc combination thereof ,HI
emphasis aooeo,.
q
Baoiou argues that these tenoencies saturateo by their
schemata are thus incapable of ohering anything new in regaros to think-
ing ,the thinking of, art.
Along with the proouction of a oisentanglement between art ano
philosophy, something he restates in oiherent ways in regaro to philoso-
phy ano all its conoitions
o
, this saturation has also proouceo the pure
ano simple collapse of what hao circulateo between them, the peoagogi-
cal theme ,HI ,. The oimculty assumeo in this essay, Art ano Fhiloso-
6. Baoiou, BE, p. .8.. See also Feter Hallwaro, Generic Sovereignty, Argclolt, Vol ,
:qq8, p. q..
. Which he oescribes thus, By inaesthetics I unoerstano a relation of philosophy to art
that, maintaining that art is itself a prooucer of truths, makes no claim to turn art into
an object for philosophy. Against aesthetic speculation, inaesthetics oescribes the strictly
intraphilosophical ehects proouceo by the inoepenoent existence of some works of art.
Baoiou, HI.
8. See, on these .o
th
Century tenoencies, or passion,s, for the real, Baoious Lc Stclc.
q. Though it is consioereo to be the century |.o
th
| of enoings, breaks ano catastrophes,
when it comes to the link that concerns us here, I see it insteao as a century that was si-
multaneously conservative ano eclectic, HI, p. .
o. See for example Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Mathematics: Innnity ano the Eno of Ro-
manticism, in Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, esp. pp. .:-...
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo ...
phyas in many othersis to account for the ois-relation that this link
,a link he oetermines to re-founo,,
:
signines between two entirely ois-
tinct, yet intimately ,non,relateo operations of thought. In other woros,
what is the methoo, in reality the non-methoo proouceo within the sin-
gular, situational praxis of these four conoitions?
.
Baoiou proposes a
new schema, a fourth mooality of |this| link, thus proposing a formal
trajectory, between art ano philosophy ,HI 8,. Ano one which at the same
time subverts the sophistic subterfuge that an artistic apprenticeship is
the way to an eoucation ,HI :,.
While it is not the place of this essay to provioe a critique of the verac-
ity of Baoious oiagnoses of those schemata ano their attenoant satura-
tion of the massive tenoencies ,schemata, by the way, that can oennitely
be founo to be operating conservatively ano eclectically ,HI ,
within
the theory, policy ano practice of the contemporary eoucation system,,
:. See Baoiou, HI, where this link has collapseo ano must therefore also be re-founoeo
in the fourth mooality, see also MF, where this re-founoing is more accurately a return |of
philosophy| {to} itself. See, The Return of Fhilosophy to Itclf , pp. ::-:8.
.. It is interesting on this point to compare with Baoiou what ]acques Ranciere oescribes
as the non-methoo of intellectual emancipation stumbleo upon by ]oseph ]acotot,
whereby one may teach what one ooesnt know. This methoo, as with Baoiou, begins
with an axiomatic statement. Ranciere oeclares an equality of intelligence. Thus: Lets
amrm then that universal teaching otll rot tolc, it will not be establisheo in society. But tt
otll rot pcttl because it is the natural methoo of the human mino, that of all people who
look for their path themselves. What the oisciples can oo is to announce to all inoiviouals,
to all mothers ano fathers, the way to teach what one ooesnt know on the principle of
the equality of intelligence. See ]acques Ranciere, Tlc Igrotort Scloolmotct: Ftcc lcor tr
trtcllcctool cmorctpottor, trans. Kristin Ross, Stanforo: Stanforo University Fress :qq:, p. :o.
cf. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Folitics, p. :. What ooes equality mean? Equality means that
the political actor is representeo unoer the sole sign of his specincally human capacity
|t|his specincally human capacity is precisely thought, ano thought is nothing other than
that by which the path of a truth seizes ano traverses the human animal.
. This at once conservative ano eclectic tenoency is ruthlessly at work in the theoretico-
policy work of the contemporary state systemat least here in Australia ano especially
noticeable within the New Basics regime of Eoucation QLD. It is also very to the fore
in eoucational theory. This summary paragraph is all too exemplary: Each chilo, as a
unique human being, can be enlargeo ano enliveneo in the inclusive, enactive environ-
ment of the transactional curriculum. In such classrooms the liveo experience of stuoents
ano teacher co-exist, learning ano knowleoge co-emerge, the multiplicity of curricula
converge, nature ano nurture co-originate as proouct ano process, ano, the cognitive ano
non-cognitive learning of each as Other are brought forth through peoagogical love into
a new worlo of knowleoge, acceptance ano unoerstanoing. Truly, in such classroom set-
tings the light gets in, ano heart in becomes heart of teaching. Blaine E. Hatt, ,Assist-
ant Frofessor, Iaculty of Eoucation, Heart In is Heart Of Teaching, in ,funnily enough,
Ecclccttco, December, .ooo, http://www.ecclectica.ca/issues/.oo.//hatt.asp
A. ]. Bartlett ..
nevertheless it is necessary to follow closely the trajectory of Baoious oi-
agnoses because it is against the saturation of these schemata that he in-
troouces his ,un-explicateo, ano quite extraoroinary notion that the only
eoucation is an eoucation by truths ,HI :,. What we will oo is explore
the peoagogy of conoitions in Baoious essay in oroer to unoerstano how
that which Baoiou proposes as a fourth mooality of the peoagogical link
between art ano philosophy ,HI ::,, or of the re-entanglement of math-
ematics ano philosophy,
or the subjective role of justice that philosophy

will come to seize from politics
or the exact conoition of the immanent

two that constitutes philosophy as a thought of love,
6
might oher a return
of the peoagogical theme to itself, as an instance of overcoming its col-
lapse ,HI ,.
Against the thesis that art is the being-there of truth, Baoiou contenos
that the oioactic schema treats art as mimesis. This, Baoiou insists, ac-
counts for arts singularity as a process ,HI q,. Art functions as the charm
of a truth. Its power, oeriveo from its immeoiacy, consists in charming us
away from the necessary oialectical labour of reasoneo argument that
leaos to principle ,HI .,. Art is imitation, in regaro to a certain ehect of a
truth extrinsic to art as a process. Art is true only insofar as it is a verinable
re-presentation of the Truth. This capitalizeo, substantializeo Truth prop-
erly belongs to the regime of philosophy or at least to its police function.
Ano as such truth is not a proceoure immanent to art. In this sense there
is no art other than what philosophy authorizes. As Baoiou puts it, |t|his
position upholos a oioactics of the senses whose aim cannot be aban-
ooneo to immanence. The norm of art must be eoucation, the norm of
eoucation is philosophy ,HI ,. Here philosophy operates much as master
to a pupil, verifying the truth of a work or, its the same thing, its gooo, by
the ehect it has in its oisplay ,HI ,. In this schema, philosophy graouates
a work as art, subject to it ehectively achieving a response in the spectator
,the marker?, that the master, in accoroance with the masters knowleoge
of the Truth, can verify as correct. The process of the work itself achieves
only, ano at best, the status of ,the act of, re-presentation. Dioacticism as
a peoagogy places all power in the hanos of the master ano the masters
knowleoge. As Baoiou argues in oiscussing the power of Brechts oioactic
art, the philosopher is in charge of the latent supposition of a oialectical
. Baoiou, Mathematics ano Fhilosophy, p. .
. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Folitics, p. :.
6. Alain Baoiou, The Scene of the Two, trans. Barbara F. Iulks, Locortor Irl, no. .:,
.oo, p. .
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo ..
truth ,HI 6,. It becomes essentially a question of sovereignty, a sover-
eignty retaineo by knowleoge as truth over the mimesis achieveo by mere
practice, or, in another register, the intellectual over the manual. As we
see in Tlc Rcpooltc ,at the point where it over-reaches itselfperhapsin
its oesire to have oone with sophistry, a strict protocol of surveillance is
maintaineo between these two forms. An alienation is activateo as all that
proceeos in the city as the work of the oay to oay is only a semblance ,or
a semblance of a semblance, of the state. The truth of the state remains
extrinsic to the functioning state. The obvious gap openeo by the pro-
tocol of surveillance between the quotioian, working city-state ano the
sovereign truth of the state amrms the oioactic oemano of the extrinsic
objectivity of the true ,HI 6,.
Romanticism, essentially in total opposition to the eoucative surveil-
lance of this schema, unoerstanos truth to be that of which art alone is
capable. In Baoious woros regaroing this schema, Fhilosophy might very
well be the withorawn ano impenetrable Iatherart is the suhering Son
who saves ano reoeems ,HI 6, The relation between art ano truth here is
inoeeo one of immanence. The romantic schema proposes an eoucation
by its com-plex of pure subjective example. It is an example of a practice
which in itself is one of truth absolutely, because it teaches of the power of
innnity helo within the tormenteo cohesion of a form ,HI q,. Thus, only
what the artist unveils of the innnite through the nnituoe of the work is
True. Fhilosophy ,as hermeneutics, bears this as the funoamental grouno
of its relation to art. Baoiou says, it is tlc omc ttotl tlot cttcolotc octoccr
tlcm ,emphasis in original,. The philosopher thinker is helo in thrall to
the artist poet for it is the poet alone who preserve|s|, not Being itself
but the octtor of Being ,MF o,. Feoagogically speaking, romanti-
cism, unoer this analysis, has something in common with pastoralism as
its concerns are with the shepheroing of that authenticity which ,it sup-
poses, inhabits the inoivioual qua subject ano which through the process
invokeo as its process alone, this Truth of the inoivioual ,literally, of tlc
trotctoool, might come to be revealeo as the very speaking of Being. In this
way the thinker ,or teacher, is merely the reversal of the artist/poet/,true,
subject, as they both approach the same truth. The truth reveals itself as
]anus-like. ]anus as shephero of salvation from, pocc Heioegger, the anni-
hilation that Being, in the terminal technical ngure of its oestiny, has as its
being to otll ano pastorally, from the evil wrought by a certain ignorance
,of Goo ano all his shaoows,

ano towaros a resacralisation ,MF .,.
. See Louis Althusser, Ioeology ano the State, In Lcrtr oro Pltloopl, oro Otlct Eo,,
A. ]. Bartlett ..
Contrary to Maos oictum the two is here revealeo as an ehect of the one
which is not at all a mere obverse of one oivioes into two.
8
It is at this
point that romanticism, oespite itself, might be implicateo in terms of the
state. Ioeologicallyano therefore eoucationallyspeaking, to locate the
very agency that provioes the ballast of the subject within each inoivioual
uniquely, serves at the same time to structure the alienation of one subject
from another as an inherent law of Being, or nature. Thus the extrinsic,
self-authorizeo truth of the state as the site of freeoom is exhibiteo pre-
cisely through the authentic expression of alienation as ehect. That is, the
expression of this romantic alienation as the mark of the truth of being is
not at all, at least unoer contemporary oemocratic state ioeology, that of
a raoical separation but is precisely the kino of subjectivity authorizeo by
that very state ano ,re,proouceo in its institutions.
q

The thiro schema, classicism, removes the question of truth from
art altogether. Baoiou proposes that Aristotle employeo this schema to
oefuse, albeit in an unsatisfactory manner, the quarrel between art ano
philosophy, As Baoiou puts it, fusing Lacan ano Aristotle, the classical
trans. Ben Brewster, New York, Monthly Review Fress, .ooo, where he says eoucation
as the oominant Ioeological State Apparatus is as natural inoispensable-useful ano even
benencial to our contemporaries as the church was for our ancestors a few centuries
ago, p. :o6.
8. Alain Baoiou, One Divioes into Two, trans. Alberto Toscano http://culturemachine.
tees.ac.uk/frmf:.htm. In this essay, oiscussing revolutionary China in the :q6os, Baoiou
articulates the connict of these two positions. The latter is consioereo leftist because its
partisans holo that, from the perspective of the revolution, there is no view of the one as
synthesis in sight. So it is a maxim of oivision ano struggle, of, if you like, continuing to
oraw the consequences of a central antagonism. The former, in this essay two fuses into
one is consioereo rightist, reactionary, a plea for a return to the olo orc unoer cover of
syntheses. It is a connict that occurs in a oiherent form, to give it a nominal mark, between
Lenin ano Kautsky. In both cases the reactionary form is the mark of a retreat, a throw-
ing up of ones hanos, a oeclaring of only a Goo can save us now. This essay is translateo
from Lc Stclc, Ch 6.
q. Baoiou, BE, pp. :6-. Iirst publisheo in English as Hegel, trans. Marcus Coelen
8 Sam Gillespie Umot;o), no. :, :qq6, p. o. Baoiou oennes bao innnity as the repeti-
tion of the alternative between one ano another unoer the law of ought to be. See also
Alain Baoiou, A speculative oisquisition, tr Mctopoltttc, p. 8. Iirst publisheo in English
as Highly Speculative Reasoning on the Concept of Democracy, trans. ]orge ]auregui
in locortor trl, No. :6, .oo:, at www.lacan.com, p. :. Actually the woro oemocracy is
inferreo from what I term authoritarian opinion. It is somehow prohibiteo not to be a
oemocrat. Accoroingly, it furthers that the human kino longs for oemocracy, ano all sub-
jectivity suspecteo of not being oemocratic is oeemeo pathological. We suggest that with
certain grammatical changes in place the term eoucation can take the place of oemoc-
racy in these sentences ano be unoerstooo in much the same way.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo ..6
schema ocl,tcttctc art ,HI 6,. It oeclares art innocent of either hysteri-
cally submitting its always alreaoy there-ness to the masters surveillance
or of incarnating, in the simultaneity of the oeclaration ano its act, the
Truthself-ioentity as profouno alienation. Insteao unoer Aristotles clas-
sical prescription, which a certain applieo p,cloorol,t ,HI , carries
into the contemporary situation, art is suboroinateo not to knowleoge, but
to its performance of an ethical function of therapy. It provioes a space of
catharsis whereby art is that which makes it so that the object of oesire
which is beyono symbolisation, can subtractively emerge at the very peak
of an act of symbolisation ,HI ,. It provokes an amrmative, captivating
ano ultimately therapeutic ehectiveness upon the passions. This ehect is
renoereo upon the passions through a process of liking, or cctttmtlttooc,
in which the work of art within the regime of semblance provioes that
likeness which calls to mino olot t ttoc ano arranges an ioentincation
which is always ex-centreo ano yet at the same time ooes not commano
the oetermination of the work itself ,HI ,. Or, in more psychoanalytic
language, accoroing to Baoiou it links up to a transference because it ex-
hibits, in a singular ano contorteo connguration, the blockage of the sym-
bolic by the Real, the extimacy of the ooct pcttt o ,the cause of oesire, to
the Other ,the treasure of the symbolic, ,HI ,. The passions are relieveo,
oesire is pacineo, merely having imagineo this ex-centreo truth ,or, ooct
pcttt o, through the work of art.
o
Such a work, of itself, ooes not aim at this
o. It is interesting to note here what Lacan himself saio about oesire in the context of
state eoucators. In Seminar VII he says that oesirethat oesire one shoulo never give up
onhas been oomesticateo by eoucators ano the acaoemies, he says, betray it. If we
recall Baoious claim that a thought is nothing other than the oesire to have oone with
the exorbitant excesses of the state, we come across a suggestive link between thought ano
oesire. Iurther, Lacan says, ano Alain Baoiou takes this up, what I call giving grouno
relative to ones oesire is always accompanieo in the oestiny of the subject by some be-
trayal. Lacan goes on to say that either the subject betrays himself in some way or that
someone with whom he is involveo betrays that to which they were jointly committeo ano
this commitment is to some gooo. This betrayal senos the subject back to the service of
gooos but he is forever out of joint there. So my contention is overall that eoucation func-
tions tooay as a betrayal. What ooes it betray? It betrays the gooo. That it betrays some
gooo rather than any inoivioual in particular is both what allows this process of betrayal to
be tolerateo as Lacan says, ,ano one shoulo hear this woro especially in its contemporary
context, ano also illustrates the essential oisinterest of the state in inoiviouals as such. This
gooo, as Lacan sees it, is that which serves to pay the price for access to oesire ano oesire
is, he says, a oesire for both what we are ano what we are not. Betrayal thereby is an act,
rather a process that forecloses the possibility which inheres in the oesire for the what we
are not. Surely that oesire or rather that we are oesiring, is precisely that aspect of being
which sustains that sioe of the subjective oisjunction that we, at any given time are not,
that which in fact we will have been. This oesire then is like a wager on the future, or on
A. ]. Bartlett ..
Truth but renoers its likeness constrain|able| within the imaginary, an ef-
fect recognizable by the catharsis achieveo by the spectator. Art, as Ba-
oiou says in relation to the classical schema, captures oesire ano shapes
|oooc| its transference by proposing a semblance of its object ,HI ,.
Such a state of ahairs signals for Baoiou, for whom truth ano thought are
intimately ioentineo, that art, innocent of truth is therefore not a form of
thought. It is, he says, little more than a public service ,HI ,. Unoer the
rule of patronage in the absolutist state so unoer the rule of arts councils
then in contemporary capitalist bureaucracy ,or oemocracy,, the therapy
or, ethical catharsis that art will renoer must nrst be approveo before any
funoing is forthcoming. To Baoiou, the state, in relation to the thinking of
art, is essentially classical ,HI ,.
:

As I have suggesteo an ehect issues in the contemporary state of these
three schema unoer the saturation of these tenoencies.
.
So, to reiterate
ano reouce: The oioactic schema operates a peoagogy of surveillance, the
romantic, a peoagogy of authentic ioentity as alienation, ano the classical,
a peoagogy of public service or state ethics. Thus, we can say, subtracting
from Baoious otherwise occupieo assessment, that surveillance, ioentity,
ano ethics make up, the peoagogical forms inherent to the saturateo
.oth century. Accoroing to Baoiou, what these schemata have in com-
mon is the negative fact that all three propose a mooality of this relation
that we must rio ourselves of ,HI ,. Ior Baoiou, this commonality is
the very being of an encounter, a future other than that which it has always alreaoy been.
State eoucation works its magic on the what we always alreaoy are the animal with
interests inscribeo in the signifying chain, interests expresseo materially by our activities
within the service of gooos. How ooes a state eoucation function in this way? Frecisely
because it prescribes, through its errant power to oeploy its knowleoge, what we will oo
ano what we otll oo subject to its oemano is enter some-how, some-waywith a school
certincate or with a FhDinto the service of gooos. Ano the more we enter into it as La-
can says, the more it oemanos. Thus what this oemano must prevent is the least surge
of oesire. See ]acques Lacan, Scmtrot VII Tlc Etltc of P,cloorol,c, ]acques-Alain Miller
,eo.,, trans. Dennis Forter, Lonoon, W.W. Norton, :qq, pp. ::-.. One shoulo also
juxtapose here Marxs analysis of the ]uly oays in his .8
tl
Btomottc of Loot Boropottc, where
he says something remarkably similar in form regaroing the betrayal of the proletariat by
the bourgeois-oemocratic party.
:. |E|except for the socialist states which were rather oioactic, HI, p.
.. I have shown elsewhere how actual policy prescription from the state in regaro to the
everyoay functioning of eoucation can be seen to operate unoer the injunction of similar
schemata, whereby it operates a series of surveillance, alienation ano an ethics thoroughly
conoucive to the perpetuation of the state form. All of these are shown to be without
truth in Baoious sense. See my The Feoagogical Theme: Alain Baoiou ano an Eventless
Eoucation, ortt-THESIS, vol :6, .oo6, pp. :.q-:.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo ..8
constituteo by the fact that none of these schemata operate a peoagogical
form that is both singular ano immanent. It is because of this that they
have ohereo nothing new. Concerneo as we are with this link, with the
peoagogical theme, we must insist on two points: One, that ehectively
the reouction of these three schema through their negative commonality
allows us to claim that what has ehecteo this collapse as its own, is a state
peoagogy. Secono, that in regaro to this state peoagogy it becomes pos-
sible to say that this collapse is a functional collapse.
The peoagogical
theme unoer the saturation of the state schema functions as a collapse that
at the same time maintains an impasse. The operational function here is
nothing other than the perpetuation of the state or, the knowleoge of the
statewhich in Baoious woros is the pront of statincation, calculable
interest ano placement.
Ano the impasse, as the ehect of this operation,

functions to precluoe a subject from ehecting the extent of its enquiries
which is to say, a truth from coming to be.
Unoer the conoition of singularity ,irreoucible taking place of truth,
ano immanence ,whereby the conoition is rigorously co-extensive with the
truth that it generates,, the peoagogical theme is granteo a specinc task
within the innnite proceoure of a truth. It must be that which arrange|s|
the forms of knowleoge in such a way that some truth may come to pierce
a hole in them ,HI q,.
Lest the philosophical actthe thoughtful com-

position of these oisparate truthsbe nothing but an acaoemic quibble,
. It is instructive to compare this tripartite schema with Baoious own in What is a Ther-
mioorean, where he analyses that which is constitutive of a sequence of Thermioor. Such
a sequence is objective in its conception of the country, conservative in its conception of
law ano obsesseo with security. Thus a triple alliance -objectivism, status quo ano security.
Unoer Thermioorano Baoiou is certainly explicit that Thermioor is nowa oisarticu-
lation is active. What it ooes is renoer a political sequence unintelligible. It proouces the
unthinkable. This is what we claim a state eoucation involves. See, Baoiou, M, p. :.q.
. Baoiou, M, p. :6. Ior example, a pervasive slogan of eoucation in Australiaone
that enlists a wioe ano stupefying consensusis that it functions to make one job-reaoy
or employ-able. One shoulo above all lroo or rather, oc, what the bosses want. Thus the
gooo of eoucation equates nicely with the pront of these three. Baoiou conceptusalizes
this nicely: Tooay, it seems that mooernisation, as our masters like to call it, amounts to
being a gooo little oao, a gooo little mum, a gooo little son, to becoming an emcient em-
ployee, enriching oneself as much as possible, ano playing at the responsible citizen. This
is the new motto: Money, Iamily, Elections. See Baoiou, Lc Stclc, p. :oo. Many thanks to
Alberto Toscano for the use of his forthcoming translation. I cite the page number of the
Irench eoition.
. Baoiou borrows this from Lacan who is nothing less for Baoiou than the eoucator for
every philosophy to come. See, Baoiou, Truth: Iorcing ano the Unnamable, in Tlcotcttcol
1ttttrg, p. ::q.
A. ]. Bartlett ..q
there must be truths. |To| make truths manifest |is| to oistinguish
truths from opinion. To oecioe therefore that there is something besioes
opinion or, as Baoiou provocatively puts it, something besioes our oe-
mocracies ,HI :,. On Baoious terms, eoucation is that which makes
the necessary arrangements for the manifestation of truths which are not
opinions ano which signify therefore the possibility for some other, new
,political etc., connguration. In fact using Baoious analysis it is not going
to far to claim that as our oemocracies are manifestations of the organizeo
rule of opinion then the state system of eoucation for which our oemoc-
racies are responsible is without truth, without thought, ano thus cannot
operate other than as either oppressive or perverteo or inoeeo as both
,HI q,.
6

What is signincant concerning an eoucation which arranges the forms
of knowleoge in a way that can make truths appear therein is that this
eoucation can have no preoication tr those forms of knowleoge. The
process t immanent to the situation ano it ooes proceeo to work through
the knowleoge of the situation but that knowleoge qua knowleoge of the
state ,encyclopaeoia, can have no oeterminative role over what is in es-
sence a process of ocltt, to olot loppcr ano not to olot t. Ano this, as we
know, because knowleoge is a result, ano as such, it never crcoortct any-
thing. Knowleoge is not that which is subject to the encounter but such
an encounter is the very presupposition whose conoitions of possibility it
works to foreclose ,BE q,.
This is why eoucation, in Baoious sense,

is a ,permanent?, revolutionary process, an auto ,but not inoivioualistic,
eoucation whose only preoicate is the axiomatic form. An axiom being,
as we have saio, the immanently proouceo principle of the event, the
formalizing, within a linguistic aooress capable of transmission, of that
which has ehectively oisappeareo. As such the subject, this nnite support
of the truth of this aooress, is in fact he/she/we/it which eoucates ano
is eoucateo in the faithful process of this arrangement. Subject then to
the inherent oeclaration of the political event, the equal capacity of all
6. What is perverteo, we coulo say, is noelity, what is oppresseo is the ,possibility of a,
subject. Althussers contention in regaro to state eoucation being the leaoing ISA in our
epoch shoulo be recalleo here.
. cf. Ranciere. Tlc Igrotort Scloolmotct, pp. 6-. Ranciere says this, before being the act
of a peoagogue explication is the myth of peoagogy, the parable of a worlo oivioeo into
knowing minos ano ignorant ones, ripe minos ano immature ones, the capable ano the
incapable, the intelligent ano the stupio. ]acotot calls the methoo of the master enforceo
stultincation. The trick of the peoagogue in this sense is two. On the one hano the peoa-
gogue oecrees when learning is to begin, on the other he presents all that is to be learneo
as veileo ano the peoagogue of course is the only one who can lift this veil.
for thought, the arrangements carrieo out by this subject of the forms of
knowleogeor the enquiry of enquiries within the situationwill con-
stitute a generically eoucative set, as each enquiry whose trajectory is
regulateo by chance, whose ethic amounts to the courage to continue,
reveals elements of the initial set that connrm the justice ,i.e. belonging, of
the evental oeclaration. The generic is not an act of representation but a
regathering of presenteo termssingularitiessubject to their belonging
,BE q6,. Ano belonging is a relation whose intercourse with inclusion, or
representation by the state, is not mutually reciprocal. The latter, being
what the state in its excess must assume. Given then, that the peoagogi-
cal theme is ehectively caught in the non-space between what presents
of truth subject to an event, ano the state of that situation which is the
proceoure of annulment of the extensive consequences of these truths,
this theme then must perform something of a oual operation of subtrac-
tion ano forcing which in turn is the very constitution of itself. As such it
becomes legitimate to say that eoucation amounts to nothing more ano
nothing less than ctooltltrg tlc ccct of or crcoortct o o ttorfotmottor. Ano
this is saio of course unoer illegitimate conoitions.
8
SFECULATIVE REMARKS ON THE COMFLEX FROCEDURE:
SUBTRACTION AND IORCING
Transformation, in the work of Baoiou, goes unoer the name of ge-
neric truth proceoure.
q
As we know, the generic truth proceoures or, the
conoitions in relation to philosophy, proouce these truths in the singular
labour they perform. To put it bluntly they renoer an existence, an ex-
istence precisely, wresteo from all founoeo inclusion, from that is, the
knowleoge that represents it as nothing. Ano nothing, as Baoiou claims,
can be granteo existence without unoergoing the trial of its subtrac-
8. In passing, this authorizes us to turn the Socratic problem of the teaching of virtue
,ano oespite the vicissituoes of interpretation in regaro to this term ano the utilitarian
oisavowals, this t the ongoing question of eoucation especially at a time when the state
represents virtue, from a question into an axiom. Rather than consioer virtue from the
pctpccttcc of knowleoge ano then consioer the mooe of its transmission as such, we can
insteao now begin with the oeclaration virtue teaches. Here we have the form of a truth
whose veracity is wholly suspenoeo in the proceoure it authorizes. Irom this point the
oeouctive process of subjecting this oeclaration to the real of the situation oennes an
eoucation. As Lacan put it, to be on the sioe of virtue is not to change unoer an ehect of
law. Kant with Saoe, Ecttt.
q. Oliver Ieltham, Ano Being ano Event ano: Fhilosophy ano its Nominations, in
Pol,gtopl, no. :, p. ..
A. ]. Bartlett .:
tion.
6o
To put it somewhat schematically the peoagogical theme in this
process articulates the amrmative core of a taking away. The state form of
eoucation so long concerneo with that which supports its aooitionwhat
the Brazilian Eoucator Faulo Iriere once oescribeo not inappropriate-
ly, as a oorltrg eoucationfunctions in thrall to a logic of quantitative
repetition. As we have mentioneo, it cannot conceive of itself as split or
oivioeo in any amrmative way ano so its aooing is always that which
serves to repeat what it is unoer the law, as Baoiou says, of what must be.
Thus to proher truth as revolt against the state it is logically necessary to
locate that which is negateo by the state. Ano further in oroer to avoio
transcenoence or the appeal to any form of theology it is ooubly neces-
sary to amrm that voio-site, amrmeo through a process of taking away,
as wholly within the situation oroereo by the state. One, in fact, oivioes
into two. Eschewing the explicative equations, we know, via the axioms
of founoation ano separation that any situation representeo as a one is at
some point constituteo by a oivision, a point where the consistency, or the
well oroereo-ness, or constructability of the set or situation cannot holo. It
is from this point that subtraction proceeos to renoer an existence, which
is nothing more than the operations necessary to make being appear.
Subtraction essentially names four operations which Baoiou says
are irreoucible to one another. They are: the unoecioable, which
philosophically is linkeo to the event, the inoiscernible, linkeo to the
subject, the generic to truth, ano the unnameable to an ethics of truths.
6:

Essentially, subtraction works by voioing all preoication. As an operation
of thought it asserts the primacy of being over language. However, Baoiou
cautions, it is not a process of extraction, of orawing out of but it is one
which oraws unoer.
6.
Ior Baoiou, there is no position from which to
operate upon a situation other than from within that very situation. As
is the case in all Baoious analyses however, there can be no clearing of
the grouno ocfotc something takes place.
6
So this removal of preoication
is a part of the very process initiateo by the act of irruption or surrection
within the situation. What marks the oiherence between an event as an
interruption within the situation ano say a strike for wages ano conoitions,
6o. Baoiou, On Subtraction, p. :o.
6:. Baoiou, On Subtraction, p. :::. The latter term has oisappeareo in recent times. We
will maintain it here as it nevertheless has an ethical truth to it which continues in Baoious
work unoer new names, perhaps.
6.. Baoiou, On Subtraction, p. :::.
6. Destruction was my Beatrice, Baoiou says, quoting Mallarm, comparing his Tlottc
oo oct to Lttc ct lcrcmcrt. Lc Stclc, p. 8.
is precisely that in the latter the state is immeoiately able to incluoe such an
interruption within its oroer of operations. It may instigate negotiations,
oeclaim the strikers in the press or seno in its police but in any case such
a strike nts within the logic ano knowleoge of the state.
6
The logic of
subtraction pertains to the event in an intrinsic form. The event so to
speak unooes or will have unoone, through its sheer novelty, the oroer
of this knowleoge of inclusion ano thus, subtracting from the state of the
situation its formal process of evaluation, it opens a space which marks the
immanent separation of the truth of the state from its knowleoge.
6
However, as we know, it is of the very empirical character of the
event to oisappear. Ano as Baoiou says, this is why it will always be
necessary to say the event has taken place.
66
This statement in ehect
constitutes a oecision for the unoecioable. Ehectively it is a oecision which
intervenes in the inoices between the event ano its naming as an event.
The oecision oecioes for the event, itself subject to pure contingency. It is
constitutively an act of noelity which is ontologically prior to any formal
announcement. It is a pure yes saying, to use a Nietzschean formula, but
within the connnes of a wager. The oecision says nothing more than that
which happeneo, happeneo. The oecision founos a oeclaration, to the
ehect that what has oisappeareo has being ano it is to this oeclaration that
the subject is faithful. The subject, being that which crosses any temporal
conoitions by oeclaring a noelity to a sequence that will have been true
ano at the same time pursues the consequences of this evental occurring
within the situation as the nnite being that it ,also, is. The pursuit of the
consequences has no preoicative oroer, no establisheo law by which the
subject guioes itself in its enquiries. As Baoiou puts it, such a subject is a
hazaroous trajectory without a concept one who can nno no verinable
comfort in the representations of the object of his enquiry or from the
principle of objectivity more generally.
6
What then is the logic of this
subjects progress given that it is faceo at every turn with the necessity
6. Inoeeo most strikes tooay in the rich west seem to a priori nt themselves to the
oemanos of the state. At a recent teachers rally in Melbourne the police were accoroeo
an ovation for their ehorts at securing the march. In their clamour to professionalize,
many teacher organisations have aoopteo the term peoagogy to oescribe their praxis.
There is a naive accuracy to this as all too often we see these peoagogues acting towaro
the state in the manner of slavish petitioners oesirous only of being well thought of by their
master. Althusser reminos us to account for the militant exceptions: They are a kino of
hero. These exceptions are active tooay in Latin America in particular.
6. Baoiou, On Subtraction, p. :::.
66. Baoiou, On Subtraction, p. :::.
6. Baoiou, On Subtraction, p. :::, also BE, p. q.
A. ]. Bartlett .
to choose ano yet oue to its noelity to a oisappearing ano oevoio of a
law of operation, it has no way to oistinguish between terms? Given this
situation, whatever terms present to the subject for choosing, present as
properly inoiscernible. We must nrst backtrack somewhat for it appears
we have two subjects, one which oecioes for the unoecioable ano one
which is co-oroinateo by the inoiscernible.
68
We must recall that we are
tracking the trajectory of a truth as it makes its way across a situation. We
coulo say the four ngures of subtraction mark the stations of its progress.
In regaro to a temporal schema it is not the case that one station follows
the other in a graouateo stage of becoming. There is no particular time
frame or objective oetermination which either verines the time of a truth
nor oetermines the instances of the subject within a chronological form.
The schema of the truth proceoure is operationally structural ano it is true
to say that a truth after circuiting the trajectory of the structure unoer the
logic of subtraction, will only be seen or be known to have been true
once it has ehectively returneo as the knowleoge of the subject. This
subject, Baoiou says, in relation to its proceoure is ruleo in its ehects,
but entirely aleatory in its trajectory ,BE q,. Thus to oecioe for the
unoecioable is to immeoiately be situateo between the event ano the voio,
two inoiscernible terms. Ano in terms of Baoious schema, this place is at
the eoge of the voio.
6q
The subject then is structurally situateo between
or is founoeo as the split ofthe oisappearance which it has oecioeo for
ano the voio, or nothing, from which the oroer of its trajectory must be
orawn. It is not that the subject so situateo has to choose between nothing
ano nothing. Rather, it is that the subject faithful to this constitution as
the fragment of a oisappearance ano the oroer of the voio proceeos to
make enquires from the perspective of a truth that otll locc occr ttoc ano
not from that of the knowleoge of the state. Thus, as the logic of truth is
such that it aooresses itself to all inoiherent to oiherencescircumcizeo
or uncircumcizeo, Greek or ]ewthe subject proceeos as that which
ooes the work of inoiscernibility, ehectively subtracting the mark of
oiherence.
o
The subject proceeos with what Baoiou calls connoence, a
knowing belief ,BE q,. Belief being, Baoiou says, the what is to come
unoer the romc of truth ,BE q,, such that, peoagogically speaking, the
68. Baoiou, On Subtraction, p. ::.
6q. We coulo posit that it is precisely at this point that mathematical inscription ano poetic
inscription meet. See, Alain Baoiou, Lacan ano the pre-Socratics, in Slavoj iek ,eo.,,
Locor: Tlc Stlcrt Pottrct, Lonoon, Verso, .oo6, p. ::.
o. Alain Baoiou, St Pool: Tlc fooroottor of ortcctoltm, trans. Ray Brassier, Stanforo Uni-
versity Fress, Stanforo, .oo, p. .6.
knowleoge the subject has recourse to, is essentially this connoence. This
connoence equates with the belief that what is oiscernible is subject to
an oroer of thought whose trajectory, is inoiscernible. The subject has
connoence that the truth to come will have been true for the very situation
within which the subject proceeos to conouct its enquiries ,BE q,. Such
connoence, we can say, owes its mooal power to that proceoure Baoiou
names forcing, o foroomcrtol loo of tlc oocct ,BE o:,.
The complex ontological exposition of forcing ,the term taken from
Faul Cohen, is beyono the scope of this essay. Insteao, in oroer to situate
the subject as that which performs this act ano as that which constitutes
itself in this act, we will sketch its topology in a speculative interlacing of
Baoious concept with the notion of the peoagogical theme. Lets preface
what we are here faceo with: an unoerstanoing or rather a oeclaiming
of eoucation as contingent, risky, without preoicate, opposeo to knowl-
eoge, subject to noelity, to courage, to a certain ruthlessness in regaro
to continuing. Eoucation in essence is founoeo on the chance encounter
between a site ano its inconsistency, that sets forth subtractively to main-
tain this irruptive oemano from pure multiplicity by a forcing of its truth
through the terms alreaoy known to the situation. With such ehect that a
transformation literally tolc plocc. To go to school, sit up straight, atteno,
repeat with a certain facility ano graouate well behaveo, which incluoes
of course suitable acts of rebellion, certainly appears the simpler form.
To eoucate is certainly to transform. To have been eoucateo is no
ooubt to have been transformeo. Thus eoucation amounts to either be-
ing or, to have been transformeo. The questions, of course, are: by what,
from what, to what? Is it by the state whose goal is perpetuation ano
whose methoo thereby is preoicateo on meiosistic repetition or, in Althus-
sers more structural terms reproouction ,of the relations of proouction,?
Or is it by truths ano thus to be transformeo without preoicate, eoucateo
without curriculum, subject to the what will have been by grace of the
event? A proceoure which is at once immanent ano thus without sur-
veillance ano singular in that it universally presents singularities without
representation ,BE o:,. But what is this thing that is being or has been
transformeo? Certainly contemporary oemocratic eoucational logic, as
we have seen above, performs a process of subjectivisation whose goal
is the creation of a certain inoivioual,s, nt for the state. This state mooe
of transformation apprehenos the collective as a generically amorphous
mass, both empty of what it is that makes them nt for the state ano pos-
sesseo of nothing but this. This mass is then that which, via the processes
of the state, will be operateo on in such a way that it will renoer to the
A. ]. Bartlett .
state inoiviouals capable of performing pursuant to the norms, laws ano
proceoures of the state. The subjectivizing process of the state as trans-
formation from equality of ignorance to equitable reoistribution as het-
erogenous entities conforming to its count renoers a re-presentation of
ioeologically self-ioentifying inoiviouals. It achieves a sort of one to one
corresponoence in which each, libioinally investeo in the other, consioers
an objective interest to be theirs in common.
:
That is, the state guar-
antees the suitably eoucateo subject access to his/her interests. As suit-
ably eoucateo, the interests of this subject will correspono, more or less,
to the interest of the state.
.
Ano of course in its excess the state terrines
this subject through its retaining the imminent threat of withorawal. Its
excessive count fot one, that operation by which a state is the state of the
situation, collecting one-multiples into one-parts constitutively threatens
un-representation. Its subjects are thus those whose very representation
as a subject is subject to their oesire for representation. Such a oesire is
the very constitution of their subjectivity. Such is why theories of recogni-
tion are so attractive in social theory tooay. Ano such is why notions like
aoaptability, nexibility ano availability for learning across the life-span
proves so intensive in eoucational oiscourse. These are of course pure
suboroinate responses to the state as excess provioeo by the state itself
for the subject: A balm for permanently open sores ano they remino us
of nothing lessano this is entirely appropriate in this contextof La-
cans oescription, from a philosophical perspective, of the truth of human
:. In this new ano risky future the ^co Botc will oeliver a stuoent who is nexible,
aoaptable, capable of a form of self-analysis that copes with this nexibility ano possesses
an eoucabilityfor retraining across the life-span through a range of meoia. The
stuoent will be capable of oesigning him/herself a social future, be proncient in the care
oro motrtcrorcc of tlc clf ano practice an active citizenshipottltr our oemocracy. It
shoulo come as no surprise that the theoretical parameters of the three year longituoinal
research of which the New Basics is both a result ano an experiment were cooroinateo
by a constructivist ano reconceptualist paraoigm. See, ^co Botc Rccotcl Popct. No. ..
Synthesis ano Research. p. 6 http://eoucation.qlo.gov.au/corporate/newbasics/ ano
^co Botc Tcclrtcol Popct, pp. 8-6 Lacans remark in relation to Saoes treatise on the
eoucation of young girls shoulo be recalleo here: The victim is boreo to oeath by the
preaching ano the teacher is full of himself , Lacan, Kant with Saoe, Ecttt, p. 66/8.
.. A subject capable of making their way within a globalizeo information environment
Such a subject |will help| gain access to the benents ,sic, of the knowleoge economy of
the future|a|no will improve our |QLDs| economic performance. Non-performance
of this role, this oocument says, has oire consequences for the inoivioual. See, Eoucation
QLD .o:o, New Basics Research Frogram, .oo, pp. -:o. Available through http://
eoucation.qlo.gov.au/corporate/newbasics/. The use of the term role is somewhat
fascinating, but we leave it to sit here.
rights as the freeoom to oesire in vain.
Opposeo to this is the subjectiv-

izing process of the generic truth proceoure whose initiation in the event
as oisruption of the stateof precisely its excessconvokes a collective
as oocct ,in the case of a political situation,. Its aooress, so to speak, is
carrieo by the practice of its thought, by that of which we are equally
capable. Ior Baoiou, no subject at all preceoes this subject. Subject to the
axiomatic oeclaration of an equal capacity for thought any one ,multiple,
might be/coulo be/can be transformeo from public alienation into the
collective subject alienateo ftom the public. This is a subject at once of ano
to truth. Of this we can say that a subject is that which at each stage will
have been eoucateo. So there are two reaoings of what it is to be trans-
formeo. On the one hano, the thing is transformeo into an inoivioual
issuing as ano within the states permanent reoroering of its parts. Rep-
resentation here makes voio the possibility of generic extension. That is
to say, the site of the generic is representeo as nothing. Ano on the other,
from the egalitarian multiple is subtracteo, subject to the oisappearance
that is the empirical mark of an event, the generic set whose trajectory
as innnite collection proceeos by subtracting itself at every step from the
logic of the situation in which it labours.
What then makes this anything but some form of anarchic wanoer-
ing? What makes this eoucation by truths oistinct from no eoucation at
all or mere reaction? The state is after all ,ano this is a symptom we must
be very attentive to, I suggest, such is the basis for this exploration, oe-
termineoly focusseo on an eoucation for all. Fublicly, this is seen as its
chief creoit or virtue ,just think of the oialectic of election time rhetoric
ano publicity where eoucation is oemanoeo by the state ano equally by
its petitioners, ano again we must be attentive to this as a symptom. What
serves to oiherentiate here are two things: One, as we have seen, is the
event itself. It establishes the possibility for the new in being. A subject
is convokeo who, unoer the oiscipline of a noelity to that which is oisap-
peareo, itself becomes a rising of that which was not. Seconoly, in regaro
to the subject we must ask the question, what ooes this subject holo to?
The subject is that which is caught in a proceoure between what has gone
ano what is to come. We know that truths interrupt knowleoge, that they
are in fact an a-voioance of ,the oeterminants of, knowleoge ano so on.
But what of the subject split by the two? How can it avoio knowleoge?
The question in relation to forcing is two-folo. On the one hano there is
some knowleoge, while on the other, by noelity, this subject is faithful to
. Lacan, Kant with Saoe, Ecttt, p. 66:, 8.
A. ]. Bartlett .
that knowleoge which is sustaineo in its veracity o lroolcogc by the future
anterior ano as such, it is knowleoge that is itself the ccct of a rearrange-
ment. It is in this space that eoucation by truths is enacteo. Between the
event ano its forcing, or rather, o tt fotctrg, a subject is eoucateo. To quote
Baoiou:
What one must be able to require of oneself, at the right time, is
rather that capacity for aoventure to which ontology testines, in the
heart of its transparent rationality, by its recourse to the proceoure
of the absuro, a oetour in which the extension of their solioity may
be restituteo to the equivalences: He shatters his own happiness,
his excess of happiness, ano to the Element which magnineo it, he
renos, but purer, what he possesseo ,BE .,.
Baoious claim that the only eoucation is an eoucation by truths oemanos
in fact that this equation result. Thus we can say that, as the nnite carrier
of an innnite proceoure, a truth, it is only a subject who is coocotco.
It has been argueo elsewhere that forcing constitutes the real praxis of
the subject ano I can only concur with this.
By extension, I am suggest-
ing that it is entirely within a praxis of this type that an eoucation takes
place, whereas in the state situation nothing takes place but the place
which is to say the positive proouction of impasse. So rather than force a
subject to be eoucateo, in this ioea, forcing, as that complex of the subject,
is what eoucates. As part of the complex of forcing we can say that it is
by non-knowleoge that the subject proceeos. As we have seen, the subject
follows no curriculum, no pre-establisheo methoo in its enquiries. That
it makes inquiries at all is, as Baoiou says, subject to chance: On the one
hano, the chance of an event occurring ano, on the other, the oecision
for its occurring qua event. But with no methoo, how ooes the subject
proceeo?
Ior any obscure occurrence to be an event it must proouce its name
in the subject. The name given by the subject, as an act of its very sub-
jectivity, unoer conoition of the event, belongs in the nrst instance to the
subject-language. It is the singleton of the occurrence in Baoious terms.
This name is the minimal conoition of the subject qua enquiries, or for
us, of the subject qua eoucation. How then to remake the name, a name
alreaoy incluoeo by state knowleoge, into a name belonging to the occur-
rence? That is, how ooes the name make evental that which is obscure?
In this nrst instance the subject supports the transitory status of the name
. Oliver Ieltham, A Fttc Botr: Of Ortolog,, Ptoxt, oro Forcttorol 1otl, unpublisheo FhD
oiss., Deakin University, .ooo.
which is at once attacheo to an obscurity ano an encyclopaeoia. In a
sense this is a nrst instance of tearing holes in knowleoge. The name is
subtracteo from the encyclopaeoia of the state for which language is the
meoium of commensurability between itself ano the situation it repre-
sents ,BE .88,. The voio, by which the name as supernumery is founoeo
as exposeo, is mobilizeo in the subjective proceoure of forcing. Frecisely
through this immanent gapbetween the presentation of inconsistency
markeo by the event ano its consistent presentation markeo by the ,voio,
name of this eventa truth proceoure authorizes itself. Iorcing hereby
names the proceoure of tearing the name from encyclopaeoic inclu-
sion ano remaking it as belonging to the event.
Similarly to the oual

nominalism of conoition, forcing also names the arouous process of this
becoming-true, of which noelity is the ethic of a militant operation ano
subtraction the mooe of oeployment. By its series of enquiries the sub-
ject establishes, in the nrst instance, the connection or non-connection
of this name to the multiples of that situation through which it works ,BE
o,. This is the proceoure which establishes ,or ooes not, the grounos
for the universality inherent to the oisappeareo event by organizing via
connections the belonging to the generic set. Thus these enquiries fol-
low a militant trajectory of connectionmultiples subtracteo from the
laws of presentationano a subsequent oecioeo oeployment rather than
a scholarly process which by ,institutional, instinct ano not by thought,
seeks to meoiate ano not commit.
6
Structurally speaking, we coulo say
that the scholar marks the place of announcement.
Eoucation for all, that common refrain of the representative state,
thus takes on a very oiherent ano critically particular meaning in this
process than that which is meant by this state. To put it schematically,
we might say that the latter is concerneo with what to oo with its subject
within the connnes of a state, ano the former with the extension for all
of that which a subject is capable.
At every step, forcing articulates the

. Thus, Baoiou calls the statement of the subject-language in regaro to names bricols.
See Alain Baoiou, Lcttc ct lcrcmcrt, Faris, Eoitions ou Seuil, :q88, p. :. Barker trans-
lates this as makeshift ,p. :o,, ano Ieltham as cobbleo-together, BE, p. o. The point is
that this name is brought about by a forceo relation between the language of the situation
ano the subject-language. The latter itself is a part of the former but is co-cooroinateo
by a oiherent logic. See ]ason Barker, Alotr Bootoo: A Cttttcol Irttooocttor, Lonoon, Fluto
Fress, .oo..
6. Hallwaro, Bootoo, p. :.6.
. In relation to Baoious newer work in which the faithful subject opens a space within
which the reactive subject ano the obscure subject can also come to exist, we can ar-
gue that what eoucation tooay eoucates for is a reactive subject. This is a subject who
A. ]. Bartlett .q
crucial aspect of this minimal oiherence by its imposition of its positive
connections. The name of the event thus holos as that single term by
which the innnite of the truth of the event may become verioical over
ano above its oeclaration.
8
But as was mentioneo above, this is not, as
some have intimateo, simply the coming of a truth back to knowleoge.
Or rather, it is ano it is not.
q
The whole point of Baoious enterprise is
of course that the situation as it is is transformeo in truth. Thus the state-
ment for every situation there is a truth is, as we can see, the complex of
a oisjunction ano its synthesis or, the junction of a oisjunction ,BE .q,.
This is because this statement contains two temporal schemas. Iirst, the
schema markeo by the claim for any situation there otll oc a truth ano
by the statement, for any situation there will locc occr a truth ano thus
the knowleoge that returns is precisely not the knowleoge that was. Ano
further this knowleoge ooes not by necessity merely reprise the structural
form of the previous knowleoge for that situation. As Anorew Gibson has
maoe a point of, what are forceo are generic extensions to the situation
ano not the constructions of new situations entirely.
8o
As Cohen showeo
is constituteo by an eoucation which tells that an event is unnecessary, that attempts at
establishing justice are not worth it, that truths are relative ,or belong to fact alone,, ano
that opinion ano consensus oecioe the political ano so on. What is of interest is that the
obscure subject ano the reactive subject seem to have an investment in each other.
8. One shoulo recall here Baoious text on Nietzsche where he singles out Nietzsches
connation of the oeclaration ano the event as the form of an archi-politics. See, Who is
Nietzsche? Plt: 1ototcl }ootrol of Pltloopl,, no. ::: Nietzsche: Revenge ano Fraise, .oo:.
q. In relation to what we are calling the peoagogical themethat truths mobilize a oesire
for the eno of the statewhat we mark here is that Socrates crime is all that it is maoe
out to be. Socrates ooes not bring knowleoge but rather he submits all to the singular
proceoure of subtracting truth from knowleoge. Flato oescribes this in the Sopltt as that
of follow|ing| our statements step by step ano, in criticizing the assertion that a oiherent
thing is the same or the same thing is oiherent in a certain sense, to take account of the
precise sense ano the precise respect in which they are saio to be one or the other. Having
hereby amrmeo the proceoure amrmeo in the Socratic practice he then goes onto impute
to the sophist a methoo like but ultimately unlike, oue to its proximity to the sensual ano
the immeoiate. He says, merely to show that in some unspecineo way the same is oiherent
or the oiherent is the same, the great small, the like unlike, ano to take pleasure in perpetu-
ally paraoing such contraoictions in argumentthat is not genuine criticism, but may be
recognizeo as the callow ohspring of a too recent contact with reality.

Flato, Sophist, in
Ploto Tlcot, of Iroolcogc: Tlc Tlcoctcto oro tlc Sopltt, trans. I. M. Cornforo, Mineola,
Dover Fublications, .oo, .qb-o, pp. .q-8. See also Flato, Farmenioes, in Ploto oro
Potmcrtoc: Potmcrtoc 1o, of Ttotl oro Ploto Potmcrtoc, trans. I.M. Cornforo, Lonoon,
Routleoge 8 Kegan Faul, :qq, p. ::.
8o. Anorew Gibson, Repetition ano Event: Baoiou ano Beckett, Commortcottor oro Cogrt-
ttor, vol , no. -, .oo, p. .:.
ontologically ano Baoiou here translates philosophically in relation to be-
ing ano truth, a generic set is situateo precisely in the space normally oc-
cupieo by the state. Ano this space is the immeasurable excess of inclusion
over belonging: An excess for which, in Baoious metaontology, the event
provioes the nrst measure.
8:
The price for the avoioance of transceno-
ence, as for holoing fast to the axiom the one is not, is that of extension.
Extension, however, is in no way reform. The latter, as we know, is almost
constitutive of the contemporary state. It exists only to reform ano this re-
form is of course in oroer to better capture whatever threatens to escape.
Ano nowhere it seems as much as in eoucation ,ano this is consensual, is
this type of reform regaroeo as imperative.
8.
Extension of course is the
extension by evental rupture of that which was representeo as nothing
precisely the truth of the situation. Somewhat paraooxically but logically,
representation exposes the unique singularity immanent to the situation
it represents that of the voio, the very possibility of extension, of same/
other. The subject is again this ngure of, or rather tr, extension. To put it
somewhat enigmatically we can say that extension is what sames in truth
what was other in knowleoge. Thus the mooality of extension is forcing
ano thus the subjective trajectory is that which is forceo on two sioes. The
two relate to Cohen in particular. On the one hano the subject comes to
be unoer the axiom of choice. It oecioes itself into being as it oecioes for
the unoecioable, that an obscure occurrence is an event subtracteo from
all knowleoge, or as Baoiou puts it, lroolcogc lroo rotltrg of tlt ,BE .,
Baoious italics,. On the other sioe the subject is forceo by that which
continues. It continues faithful to the unoecioability which it has oecioeo
for.
8
It has oecioeo that there will have been a something ,rather than
nothing, to oecioe for. Structureo in this way it can holo fast to the name
subtracteo from ,thus inoepenoent of, the state encyclopaeoia but lroor
8:. Hallwaro, Bootoo, p. ::.
8.. Again this shoulo be reao as symptomatic ano not as evioence of the states gooo intent.
It has two forms. On the on hano the state must of course organize the worker/consumer
in such a way as to be reaoily available in the right way for subjection to the oominant
relations of proouction. But it must also oo this unoer the ioeological cloak that it thereby
renects the non-ioeological authentic longingto quote from iekof the population
for precisely what is perceiveo of eoucation, as being that which is more than just such a
job reaoiness. The ioea that eoucation is not just utilitarian training is that ioea, prevalent
in the community at large, which enables the capture of all unoer the eoucation system. A
system oear to the state for reasons alreaoy outlineo.
8. Cohen, of course, proveo the inoepenoence of CH from the axioms of set theory. CH
is thus unoecioable.
A. ]. Bartlett .:
to the subject by its oclorgtrg to the makeshift subject language.
8
The real
force of the subject then is precisely the maintenance of this complex of
forcing.
The subject, as we have seen, has nothing, purely nothing, as its cur-
ricular instruction, no methoo, no syllabus, no state. The trajectory of
the eoucateo subject is a-voioance, of the state ano of knowleoge. It is
separateo from the state by its non-knowleoge ano from the truth that will
have been by an innnite series of aleatory encounters ,BE qq,. What it
has is pure structure or rather pure axioms of operation by which it re-
garos every step of its enquiries. Such is why noelity for Baoiou is orawn
from mathematical proceoures of oeouction ano not from its theological
variant.
8
Ano we propose that this noelity, unoer the complex of forc-
ing, extenos into the situation itself. Shoulo such a truth proceoure be
forceo into the situation, shoulo a truth come to be that which it was,
noelity to that noelity which extenoeo ano sustaineo the proceoure ooes
not eno. Shoulo there be an eno, then oecioeoly we have hao reform but
not revolution, not transformation.
86
Even though Baoiou reminos us that
knowleoge in its constructivist orientation with its mooerateo rule, its po-
liceo immanence to situation ano its transmissibility is unavoioable, he at
the same time reminos us that this is the oroinary regime of the relation
to being unoer circumstances in which it is not time for a new temporal
founoation, ano in which the oiagonals of noelity have somewhat oete-
riorateo for lack of complete belief in the event they prophesise. Then
again, Baoiou claims that even for those who wanoer on the boroers of
evental sites staking their lives on events, it is, after all, appropriate to
be knowleogeable ,BE .q,. But even as it is in the process of enquiries
that a faithful subject approximates a proceoure of knowleoge, such en-
quiries are nevertheless nrst ano foremost a matter of a militant noelity.
Such a noelity oemanos that the voio constitutive of every situation not
be forecloseo or veileo or counteo as no-thing but be rigorously markeo
8. To the state what the subject knows is precisely nothing at all. In Flatonic terms the
subject is that which can claim only that it knows nothing. This claim places the voio
within the situation. Non-knowleoge as voio of knowleoge is that name of the voio which
is the very mark of tlctt knowleoge. The subject sets their enquiries by this mark in oroer
not to fall back into the knowing comforts of the statesuch as they are.
8. A variant still very prominent in the methoos of the state through the pastoral-welfare
complex it runs as an ioeological soul supplement to the material syllabus of the mar-
ket.
86. Ultimately this is why Baoiou talks of exhaustion not enos. A proceoure can become
exhausteo, subjects may be lacking, but the truth for which a subject is a subject has not,
by this, come to an eno. Ano nor are we nnisheo with truths.
as such: Which is to say that this, at a certain point, necessary coincioence
with knowleoge must not itself be coincioent with a taming by the state
,BE .q,. Only in this way is justice oone ano subjects appear in their
belonging as constituteo by this very noelity to their belonging, ano not
as the mere consequence of an inclusive eoucation.
8
That is to say that
ontology, which presents beings in the singularity of belonging, links with
truth as that which is true for all or not at all ano with justice which is the
philosophical name for equality whose very being is the presentation of
a communism of singularities. Ultimately the invariance that pertains to
eoucation, to the name eoucation in the generic phrase eoucation for all,
is that which tooay must be forcefully subtracteo from the state, which is
to say the one multiple that it is must be founo to be inoiscernible ano
unclassinable for the encyclopaeoia of the state ,BE ,. Flatos Rcpooltc
was one attempt at this, being as it was an ioeal non-state articulateo on
the basis of a certain event within the state ,of the situation,.
88
As Baoiou
has saio, we neeo a new Republic for it is quite obvious that tooay the
eoucateo-subjecta being struck by the oesire to think the truth that it
also is, ano thereby proouce a generic presentis precisely that which
cannot be tolerateo. As Baoiou says, such a subject, linkeo as it is to the
innnity of a truth ano its generic inoiscernibility, is without qualincation
,BE o8, ano funoamentally irreoucible to the peoagogy of the worlo as
it goes.
8q
8. As is well known, inclusion is the concept of the age. It ano recognition form the crux
of a weak leftismtaken up by the oemocracies as their rhetoric of choicewhich still
sees a state eoucation, a state program, as the way to ,social, justice. Or, to use the timio
ano oefeateo contemporary form, equality of opportunity.
88. Like Flato, what we object to is the claim that this state eoucation t an eoucation.
Ior if the only eoucation is an eoucation by truths then this cannot be an eoucation at all
unless the state can in some way be equateo with truth. This is precisely what Flato seeks
to founo, this knot of truth ano the state in his thought institution nameo the Rcpooltc.
This oesignation of the Rcpooltc as not a state goes against the very language Flato uses
to oescribe his republic but, so I woulo argue, not against his thought. That Flato oeemeo
it necessary to invent an entirely new form by which to support this truth in its transmis-
sion is what legitimates this notion that the Rcpooltc is not the repetition of the state. Ano
neither is it an ioeal state, it is rather the toco of o ror-totc: precisely a utopia.
8q. Alain Baoiou, Tlottc oo oct, Faris, Seuil, :q8., p. :8.
ott
.
9
An Explosive Genealogy:
Theatre, Fhilosophy ano the Art of Fresentation
Oliver Ieltham
Il ny a la peste,
le cholra,
la variole noire
que parce que la oanse
et par consquent le thatre
nont pas encore commenc a exister
Antonin Artauo, Le Thatre oe la cruaut, :q
:

It is not only in the conceptual reconstruction but in the straightfor-
waro application of Baoious thought that its problems ano tensions come
to light. When things are no longer quite so straightforwaro perhaps we
can start to think. The purpose of this paper is thus to ioentify a generic
truth proceoure in the oomain of art, specincally within theatre. It turns
out that in ooing so one enos up sketching an explosive genealogy whose
ehects cannot be easily containeo.
I. THE HISTORICAL SITUATION
Where to start? The question of origins is tricky in Baoious thought
ano not only because the temporality of a truth proceoure is that of the
future anterior. Ior the sake of the argument lets start where Baoious
theory of praxis appears to start: with the existence of a historical situa-
:. Antonin Artauo, Ococtc Compltc, vol. XIII, Faris, Gallimaro, :q, p. :o-::8.
tion in one of the four conoitions of philosophy.
.
Ior us: the situation of
theatre at the turn of the twentieth century. Given Baoious ontology, we
know that this situation is an innnite multiplicity, ano that any attempt to
circumscribe it linguistically presupposes the excess of its being over any
specincation of its properties. Thus we shoulo not be embarrasseo by our
historical situation traversing national ano European cultural spheres to
incluoe that of Russia which itself incluoes elements of Inoia ,the innu-
ence of Hinoi philosophy ano yoga on Stanislavski,.
II. THE EVENT
It is evioent that what goes unoer the name of theatre tooay is far
more varieo than what went unoer that name in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, thus a certain transformation must have taken place. The problem
is where to situate or event that marks the beginning of that transforma-
tion. I holo that it is the Meyerholo-eventthe oool aovent of Meyerholos
scanoalous ano innovative proouctions oro his writings, which occurreo
at the beginning of the transformation of the situation calleo theatre.
There are four reasons for this:
In Meyerholos work the plasticity of the acting booy is lib-

erateo from the constraints of mimesis via the exploratory
system of exercises calleo biomechanics.
.. It actually starts with the axioms of set-theory ontology, to be specinc the axiom of in-
nnity is funoamental because a rttc truth proceoure woulo be inoistinguishable from the
unfoloing of state knowleoge. Ior the vexeo question of the interoepenoence of Baoious
set theory ontology ano his theory of praxis see Ray Brassier, Fresentation as Anti-Fhe-
nomenon in Alain Baoious Bctrg oro Eccrt, Corttrcrtol Pltloopl, Rcctco, .oo6.
. Why not call Stanislavskis Moscow Art Theatres proouctions, especially the :8q8 pro-
ouction of the Scogoll an event? It ooes seem to be an event insofar as Stanislavski imports
Eastern techniques such as yoga to transform his actor training. Of course, one coulo
argue that these techniques are appropriateo ano employeo in the service of mimetic natu-
ralism which was not a new orientation in Western art. On the other hano, the ehects of
such importation were not necessarily preoictable or containable, once these exercises ano
techniques of corporeal exploration are introouceo, they inevitably break the bounos of
naturalistic acting. I think Stanislavskis funoamental innovation, ano this is obvious in the
work of his oisciples Eugene Vakhtangov ano Michael Chekhov, is the introouction of the
laboratory mooel of rehearsal. The nnal objection, however, to there being a Stanislavski-
event in Baoious sense is that he installs ano reinforces the very fourth wall between the
actors ano spectators which so many twentieth century oirectors attempteo to oismantle.
:.
Oliver Ieltham .q
Meyerholo consciously workeo to liberate theatrical space
from the box-set with its illusional painteo scenery ano pro-
scenium arch.
Meyerholo nameo the fourth wall as an obstacle to be ois-

mantleo insofar as the spectator was to be transformeo into
a co-creator.
The mask is reintroouceo as essential to theatre along with
clowning, mime ano play-acting.
All of these elements were present in Meyerholos work from :qo

onwaros, over a oecaoe before he attempteo to create a proletarian thea-
tre in line with the October revolution.
6
In Meyerholos essays he names
his own proouctions as evental, claiming that his work along with that of
a few other oirectors constituteo the stylizeo theatre that answers the
oemanos of the age. Thus the Meyerholo-eventwhich is fragile, note,
rot ot ortologtcoll, but in its very mooe of appearance, the ephemeral-
ity of performanceis nameo in polemical writings which then circulate
amongst theatre practitioners.
III. THE OFERATOR OI IIDELITY
But for a truth proceoure to ensue from an event not just a name but
an operator of noelity must emerge, ano this is where things get tricky.
In the four constituent elements of the Meyerholo-event ioentineo above
there is a common phrase which coulo be taken as the operator of noelity,
the phrase liberate theatre from the constraints of X. Any innovation in
twentieth century theatre coulo thus be taken as faithful to the Meyer-
holo-event ano as part of the truth proceoure tf it liberates theatre from
a constraint. But then what oo we eno up with? A story of progressive
liberation that looks suspiciously like Clement Greenbergs classic history
. Meyerholo fut sur le point oe raliser un thatre conu sur ce principe: forme ovulaire,
oouble aire oe jeu, amphithatre enveloppant un plateau oailleurs reli a la salle par oes
passerelles le projet manqua oe justesse. In Mikhail Barkhine ano Serge Vakhtangov
Le batiment thatral mooerne vu par Meyerholo, Rccoc oHttottc oo Tlottc, :q6-, p.
o.
. Meyerholo attempts to reintegrate commcoto ocllottc into high theatre. In his seminal
essay The Iairgrouno Booth Meyerholo rehabilitates the following terms as key to his
conception of theatre: mommct,rioiculous ceremonial, religious ritual which is silly or
hypocritical, performance by mummers, mommctactors in a traoitional maskeo mime
or oumbshow, poor actors, play actors, cooottrstrolling player, thiro rate ham.
6. See Meyerholo, Mc,ctlolo or Tlcottc, trans. E. Braun, Lonoon, Metheun, :q6q, p. :q-
6.
..
.
.
of mooernism as a teleological sequence of increasingly raoical breaks. If
all we can oo after Baoious conceptual nreworks is replicate Greenberg
then were wasting our time. In the introouction to Bctrg oro Eccrt Baoiou
exhorts the philosopher to circulate through the referential of the four
conoitions. If one circulates through art nowaoays, even just a little bit,
one soon realizes that Greenbergs account is obsolete. The trick is to
ioentify another operator of noelityin fact, the tcintroouction of masks
ano mummery alreaoy ooes not nt this schema of liberation. Evioently
the operator has to be material, it has to ngure within the situation to be
transformeo. It also has to be transmissible ano it has to be general insofar
as it can be useo to juoge the connection or non-connection of oistant
multiples to the Meyerholo-event. At present I holo the operator of noel-
ity to be the following sentence ano in particular its last three woros
founo in a :qo essay: We inteno the auoience not merely to observe, but
to participate in a cotpototc ctcottcc oct.
The operator of noelity is actually

a concept which ooes a lot of work in Baoious theory of praxis, perhaps
too much work, it alone oetermines the consistency of a truth proceoure.
Before going into this we neeo to oetermine where this truth proceoure
starts: what is the evental-site for the Meyerholo event?
IV. THE EVENTAL SITE
If a site, strictly speaking, is evental only insofar as an event occurs,
then we can retrospectively reao the site oh the event. Given that I oenneo
the event in four ways, its site can thus be ioentineo in four oiherent ways.
Two of these turn out to be promising. On the one hano, the evental site
for Meyerholo is the material space of the auoitorium. The latter is oen-
nitely present in the situation of theatre, ano its expressive capacities were
inexistent accoroing to establisheo canons of theatrical practice. On the
other hano, inasmuch as the Meyerholo-event also consists of his prole-
tarian theatre, the evental site is social oiherentiation or class: again, nec-
essarily an element of the situation of theatre, but one whose implications
for theatrical practice remaineo entirely foreign to pre-WWI theatre.
How can these two oiherent ioentincations of the evental site be rec-
oncileo?
8
The operator of noelity isooes this multiple make for a cot-
. Meyerholo, The Stylizeo Theatre, in Mc,ctlolo or Tlcottc, p. 6o.
8. The ioentincation of evental-sites is one of the most oimcult challenges Baoious phi-
losophy lays oown to those who woulo work on it. Without the evental-site his ontology
is merely a competitor to other formalist ontologies whose most striking applications are
in oatabase ano intranet oesign. The evental-site is how Baoiou anchors the possibility of
Oliver Ieltham .:
pototc ctcottcc oct? Hence, what the Meyerholo-event ooes is transform rot
ot the stage ano its objects, but the crtttc motcttol pocc of the auoitorium
trclootrg the auoience members trto the work. To backtrack, what markeo
Stanislavskis reforms within realist theatre was that he sought to trans-
fer the sovereign singularity of the art workusing the terms of classi-
cal aestheticsfrom the play to the actors performance. Through the
actors attainment of a creative state of mino ouring their naturalistic
performance, they intuitively aoo or mooify tiny oetails such that each
performance will be singular. The obvious trap with this reform is that it
leaos oirectly to the star system: the play A Sttcctcot ômco Dcttc remains
the same but people say the star, Marlon Branoo, shone on a particular
night. What the Meyerholo-event ooesor starts oh, because it is an in-
nnite taskis far more profouno: it seeks to transfer this singularity ftom
the literary work or the actor to tlc pctfotmorcc o o motcttol ololc incluoing
the participant-auoience members. In other woros, the task is to create a
corporate creative act, to integrate, however momentarily, an acting col-
lective booy that cannot be repeateo. The evental site for the Meyerholo
event is thus all the material elements in the auoitorium inasmuch as they
coulo become parthowever brienyof a transinoivioual act.
q
A con-
nrmation of this ioentincation of the evental site is founo in the tale that,
in one proouction, Meyerholo wanteo to exteno a night of stairs across a
picture box stage, have it sweep towaros the footlights, pass them ano con-
tinue oown to the level of the auoience. The prooucers vetoeo this oesign
ano alloweo the stairs to come as far as the footlights ano no further. The
material space of the auoitorium was absent from the state of theatre at
Meyerholos time. The veto is a sign of this lack. In another paper I argue
that one cor ioentify a site without an event actually occurring oue to the
change in being. Moreover, the ioentincation of such sites counters the tenoency of aca-
oemic institutions to encourage eclectic inoivioualism ano specialization: thinking evental
sites gives a tactical orientation to research, it connects it to spaces of potential praxis:
spaces where thought as such is likely to emerge.
q. Iinally, one last way of ioentifying the site of the Meyerholo event is to say that it
was Stanislavskis rehearsal processes. Meyerholo starteo his theatrical career by spenoing
four years acting in the Moscow Art Theatre. Stanislavskis rehearsal techniques involveo
continual experimentation ano a proliferation of exercises that were unpublicizeo ano
restricteo to him ano his oisciples. What was at stake in these rehearsals was the creation
of signifying booies ano non verbal communication between actors ano auoience. Again
the crucial oiherence between Stanislavski ano Meyerholo was that Stanislavski oio not
consioer the potential creativity of the auoience ano the emergence of a collective which
incluoeo it.
signs of lack ano excess that emerge at the level of the state with reference
to the site.
:o
V. ONE OR MORE INTERVENTIONS?
Accoroing to Baoiou, for a truth proceoure to occur not only must
an event occurring at an evental site be nameo ano turneo towaros the
situation via the emergence of an operator of noelity, but enquiries must
be conoucteo into the multiples of the situation, oetermining whether or
not they are connecteo to the event. Both the oirection ano the results of
these enquiries cannot be preoetermineo: otherwise one woulo be oeal-
ing with the practical unfoloing of state knowleoge ano not with a generic
truth proceoure.
What happens to theatre after Meyerholo? A whole number of oif-
ferent enquiries ano explorations take place, some of them more or less
simultaneously. I am going to focus on two names which crystallize inno-
vation in the situation of theatre: Artauo ano Brecht. These two ngures re-
spono to the Meyerholo-eventto its echoesbut in oiherent manners.
M
A B
Diagram 1
How ooes Brecht work in theatre in noelity to the Meyerholo-event?
Brecht knew of Meyerholos worknotably he saw one of Meyerholos
proouctions in Berlin in :q.6 ano cites Meyerholo in his writings- but this
is not the point.
::
Brecht was faithful not to Meyerholos oirecting style or
proouctions, but to the Meyerholo event. His noelity lies in his investiga-
tion of what he calls the social function of theatre, an interesteo investi-
:o. See O. Ieltham, Singularity Happening in Folitics: the Aboriginal Tent Embassy,
Canberra :q., Commortcottor oro Cogrtttor, vol. , no. :, .oo, ..-..
::. Brecht refers to Meyerholo in relation to Stanislavski ano Vakhtangov ano as part of
a complex of Russian oirectors, ano also with reference to choreographic work in Brecht,
Btcclt or Tlcottc, eo. ano trans. ]. Willett, Lonoon, Methuen, :q6, pp. :o, :. Fiscator
refers to Meyerholos Lo Domc oox comclto in April :q conversation with Brecht ,see Btcclt
or Tlcottc, p. 6,.
Oliver Ieltham .
gation in that he seeks to oislooge theatre from what he calls its culinary
function of provioing an evenings pleasure in the form of merchanoise.
:.

This oisplacement is carrieo out by exploring theatres capacity to expose
the existence of social classes. The ioea was to interrupt ano frustrate
the auoiences habit of ioentifying with characters ano empathizing with
their inability to change their fatesuch, for Brecht, was the essential
operation of what he calleo Aristotelian orama, his name for that theatre
which was not connecteo to the Meyerholo-event.
:
Rather, the auoience
was to be encourageo to think about how characters choose to act in so-
cial situations. The horizon or promise of these interruptions ano stimuli
to thought was a possible politicization of the auoience. Brechts explora-
tion leao to a proliferation of new names, as Baoiou remarks of all truth
proceoures: epic theatre, alienation or oistanciation-ehect, theatre of a
scientinc age, theatre for instruction. Insofar as such names were ano are
pickeo up ano reworkeo by other theatre practitioners they form part of
what Baoiou terms a subject ioiom. Insofar as the names can be useo to
regroup multiples encountereo in the situation of theatre, they become
part of the truth proceoures counter-state.
:

But Brecht is faithful to the Meyerholo-event in yet another man-
ner: in line with Meyerholos embrace of masks ano mummery Brecht
incorporates into the language of theatre complicateo stage machinery,
marionettes, ano the projection of titles ano pictures onto screens. Ior
Brecht these oevices, in particular the projections, were not mere aios
but, organic parts of the work of art.
:
The thiro ano perhaps the most
important element of Brechts noelity is his critical interrogation of mass
meoia which were rising in prominence in his time. It is this interrogation
that generates a classic example of forcing for us.
What is forcing exactly? It is a relation between a statement concern-
ing the situation-to-comethe situation supplementeo with its generic
subsetano a particular multiple which, tf it turns out to belong to the
:.. Brecht, The Mooern Theatre is the Epic Theatre ,:qo,, in Btcclt or Tlcottc, p. 6.
:. We are free to oiscuss any innovation that ooes not threaten the stage-apparatus social
functionthat of provioing an evenings entertainment. We are not free to oiscuss those
which threaten to change its function, possibly by fusing it with the eoucational system
or with the organs of mass communication. Brecht, The Mooern Theatre is the Epic
Theatre, p. .
:. New York performance artist Dan Graham useo Brechts alienation-ehect to think his
own work in the :qos. See Rosa Lee Goloberg, Pctfotmorcc Att: Ftom Fotottm to tlc Ptccrt,
reviseo eo., Lonoon, Thames ano Huoson, :q88, p. :6..
:. Brecht, Notes to Die Mutter: the Inoirect Impact of Epic Theatre ,:q,, in Btcclt or
Tlcottc, p. 8.
generic subset, renoers the statement true in the situation to come. In Ba-
oious metaontologynot in Cohens mathswhat oetermines whether a
multiple belongs to the generic multiple is whether or not it is connecteo
to the event. Therefore the concept of forcing provioes a more complicat-
eo account of what happens in an enquiry. In an :q. essay Brecht claims
that one way of changing the social function of theatre woulo be to fuse it
with the organs of mass communication, he consioers the case of raoio. At
this point we alreaoy shoulo note that the generic truth proceoure of new
theatre has proceeoeo oc,oro the bounos of the situation of theatreby
encountering the mass meoia. In this essay Brecht argues that raoio as
it stanos has no social object because it is unioirectional ano the listen-
ers cannot supply content. The public occasions it reports upon are not
genuinely public because listeners cannot communicate themselves, only
receive. The statement the social function of theatre woulo be changeo
by fusing it with the organs of mass communication is thus not forceo by
the element raoio, insofar as the latter ooes not belong to the generic
multiple of new theatre. Why? Because it ooes not leno to the generation
of a corporate collective act. However, Brecht then makes another state-
ment that coolo be forceo: if the raoio apparatus were changeo over from
oistribution to communication ,it, woulo be the nnest communication ap-
paratus in public life, a vast network of pipes. That is to say, it woulo be
as if it knew how to receive as well as to transmit, how to let the listener
speak as well as hear, how to bring him into a relationship as well as iso-
lating him.
:6
What clearer anticipation coulo one want of contemporary
oebates arouno uses of the internet ano grass-roots oemocracy.
However this example of forcing appears quite problematic. Given
the statement, what is the relateo element which if it turneo out to be-
long to the generic multiple woulo force the statement? Woulont it simply
be the existence of an interactive raoio technology ano the institutional
means to put it in place? Surely such a multiple has turneo out to exist:
the internet. Then forcing woulo be no more than an avatar of Aristotles
concept of actualization, an empirical neshing out, an incarnation of an
ioea. Such a conclusion woulo be too hasty: what has to be oecioeo is olot
pott of the internet ano its use is an element of the generic multiple, how is
the internetnot all of it, perhaps very little of itconnecteo to the Mey-
erholo-event?
:
But we are way aheao of ourselves here, on the outer limit
:6. Brecht, The Raoio as an Apparatus of Communication, in Btcclt or Tlcottc, p. ..
:. What actually oecioes whether a multiple belongs to the generic subset? Obviously in
the case of the new theatre it is not a particular proouction style being valioateo by its
Oliver Ieltham .
of an explosion that we have just began to map. Inoeeo, to oecioe such
a question by applying the operator of noelity we woulo neeo to ioentify
many more forceo statements on the part of other practitioners which
nesh out ano qualify the sense of a corporate creative act. As Baoiou says,
an activist or an artist works accoroing to truth as a process rather than
the categories of knowleoge, but they cannot ahoro not to know their situ-
ation ano thus, here, the preceoing enquiries.
Lets turn to Antonin Artauo. Although Artauos primary references
are to Appia, Craig ano Copeau, he explicitly cites Meyerholo ano other
Russian oirectors with aomiration for their combatwhich he also sees
as his ownagainst psychological or literary theatre: he sees in their
work a theatre of action ano of the masses.
:8
He saw Meyerholos proouc-
tions in Berlin in :q. ano scholars wager that he was aware of the lat-
ters Farisian tour in :qo. Artauos thought responos in three ways to the
event of new theatre. Iirst he continues the enquiry into the plasticity of
theatrical space towaros a oissolution of the actors-auoience oistinction.
At the age of twenty he alreaoy planneo a spontaneous theatre which
woulo perform in the mioole of factories.
:q
In Tlc Tlcottc oro tt Dooolc he
speaks of using granges or hangars for theatres ano oeveloping a turning
spectacle with the spectators in the mioole.
.o
Not only that but he also
follows Meyerholos reintroouction of masks ano mummery by seeking to
oevelop a unique concrete language of theatre that woulo incluoe eve-
rything which can be materially manifesteo ano expresseo on stage such
as music, oance, plasticity, mime, gesticulation, intonations, architecture,
lighting, ocor, later aooing masks ano mannequins.
.:
Artauo unoerstooo
the construction of this plural yet unique language as both a purinca-
tion ano an enrichment of theatrical practice. It was to be achieveo by
recourse to non-Occioental theatrical traoitionsfor example, the Bal-
inese, ano oirecteo against the hegemony of the text or of articulateo
language in European theatre.
success in commercial terms or even in terms of publicity. The Daoaists ano the Iutur-
ists were criticizeo by art critics for seeking notoriety for the sake of notoriety. Evioently
notoriety is available without art. I holo that the only viable criterion for belonging to a
generic multiple is whether or not the multiple in question repeats ano transforms in an
unpreoictable unsettling manner certain oecisions ano innovations maoe by other artists
in other contexts.
:8. In a :q: text in Artauo, Ococtc Compltc, vol. III, Faris, Gallimaro, :q6:, p. .:6.
:q. Alain Virmaux, Artortr Attooo ct lc tlottc, Faris, Seghers, :qo, p. .q.
.o. Artauo, Le Thatre oe la Cruaut ,Fremier Manifeste,, Ococtc Compltc IV, Faris,
Gallimaro, :q6, p. ::.
.:. Artauo, Le Thatre oe la Cruaut, pp. 8, , :::.
Iinally, ano most importantly, unoerneath the names of the theatre
of cruelty or Balinese theatre or metaphysical theatre, Artauo thinks
theatre as an immeoiate act of communication which oirectly ahects the
spectators sensibilities, a transnguration of their state of nerves akin to a
oisaster in its intensity. Hence his long exploration of the metaphor of the
plague, itself orawn from St. Augustine who oeploreo theatre as a form
of mental infection.
..
It so turns out that it is none other than Meyerholo
who lamenteo in :qo that theatre was losing its power of trfccttoo ttor-
fotmottor.
.
However, at a certain point in his thought Artauo oistances his con-
ception of theatrea magical metaphysical eventfrom the Russian
conception:
I consioer as vain all those attempts maoe in Russia to place the
theatre at the service of immeoiate political or social enos. This
is the case however new the staging proceoures employeo. These
proceoures, insofar as they wish to suboroinate themselves to the
strictest givens of oialectical materialism, turn their back on the
metaphysics that they scorn, ano remain scenic staging following
the most vulgar sense of the woro.
.
The oistance that Artauo thus places between himself ano Meyerholo is
commutative insofar as it is the same oistance which is normally unoer-
stooo to exist between Artauo ano Brechts political theatre.
.
Nevertheless, Artauos thinking of theatre oio remain faithful to the
Meyerholo-event: witness this extract from his last letter on theatre, writ-
ten in :q8, two weeks before his oeath. He renects on what he saw as the
complete failure of his censoreo raoio programme To have oone with the
juogement of Goo:
I will never touch Raoio again
ano from now on I will consecrate myself exclusively to the
theatre
... Artauo, Le Thatre oe la Cruaut, p. ..
.. Meyerholo, The Stylizeo Theatre in Mc,ctlolo or Tlcottc, p. 6o.
.. Virmaux, Artortr Attooo, p. :8.
.. Schma banal et simpliste: Artauo reprsenterait un thatre oe participation, oe
frnsie, oirralisme, Brecht, un thatre oe oistanciation, le oioacticisme, oinsertion oans
lhistoire. Bref, oeux ples, oeux univers inconciliables. En fait, les position ne sont pas si
tranches et les passarelles ne manquent pas oun univers a lautre, mme si la tentative
ou Living Theatre, jouant lArttgorc oe Brecht, parait ocioment insumsante a combler
la foss. Quon relise plutt le livret oIl r, o plo oc tmomcrt ,II, q,: oans lanimation oes
foules, oans la monte oe la rvolte contre les possoants, on trouve oes procos et oes ac-
cents qui semblent repris oes granoes oeuvres oe Brecht. Virmaux, Artortr Attooo, p. :q.
Oliver Ieltham .
such as I conceive it
a theatre of blooo
a theatre that, in every performance will have causeo to gain
corporeally
something as much the one who performs
as the one who comes to see performing
besioes
one ooesnt perform
one acts
theatre is in reality the genesis of creation
.6
Here Artauos noelity to the ioea of theatre as a corporate creative act
is evioent.
Artauo ano Brecht thus name oiverging exploratory transforma-
tions of the situation of theatre, both of which are faithful to the Meyer-
holo-event. It is alreaoy clear that Baoious theory of praxis ooes not leao
to a uni-linear account of mooernism: we alreaoy have two oiverging lines
with inoepenoent chronologies.
.
Moreover, not only oo these particular
lines continue ano fork in the work of other theatre practitioners, but
these are not the only lines that emerge from the Meyerholo event.
M
A B
Diagram 2
Explotor: tlc ttotl ptoccootc ptoccco moltt-ottccttoroll, trto otctcrt oomotr
cto fotctrg
What is at stake here is the mapping of a generic truth proceoure.
No ooubt this is an oxymoronic if not moronic activity: the generic ooes
.6. Virmaux, Artortr Attooo, p. .q.
.. In any case, to criticize a theory of change for being linear ano reouctionist in contrast
to the virtues of the non-linear is to betray an impoverisheo unoerstanoing of the nature
of line, especially in the nelo of art ,the line outlines strata ano opens up universes,.
not let itself be oiagrammeo, only written mathematically. Ior the sake
of communication, lets say this is a rough sketch, not a map. To sketch
a generic proceoure one can either ioentify a sequence of enquiries via
a proper name or inoicate forcings to which proper names may be at-
tacheo. At least six general statements can be ioentineo which force the
new theatre.
:. Tlc pocc of pctfotmorcc, trclootrg tlc oootcrcc, t totoll, mootlc oro
plottc. This forcing may be traceo from Meyerholo to the
:q:8 outooor reconstruction of the October revolution with
8ooo actors, to Brechts stage machinery, to Grotowskis com-
plete integration of stage ano auoitorium ano it evioently in-
cluoes street theatre ano happenings but not all of them ano
perhaps very few.
.. Acttor oltcl molc op o tlcotttcol ootl mo, oc ror-trtcrttorol oro
oocct to clorcc. See the function of improvization in Artauos
early thought, the work of ]ohn Cage ano Allan Kaprows
happenings.
.8
However, not all collective events involving
chance ano presentation belong to the new theatre, chance is
stageo in commercializeo sport.
. Ir tlc ogc of mocltrc, tlcotttcol moccmcrtolctlct of poppct ot
lomormot oc mcclortco to tlc potrt of olotttrg tlc otgortc-mc-
clortc otttrcttor. In :qo8 Eowaro Goroon Craig calls for aboli-
tion of the performer ano his or her replacement by an uber-
marionette. The Iuturist Frampolini repeats this call in :q:
but actually builos ano uses marionettes.
.q
Marinelli writes
of the metallic mechanic Dance of the Aviatrix. Meyerholo
oevelopeo a biomechanical theory of actor training. Erwin
Fiscator, Brechts early partner, useo marionettes in Berlin,
Artauo calls for them in his :q. Theatre of Cruelty text.
Again, the use of marionettes ooes not per se guarantee that
a work belongs to the new theatre.
. Actot oo rot locc to ptccrt ocll-tooroco clotoctct ot tolc, oot forc-
ttor. In :q Brecht says, the people were just cyphers serv-
ing a cause.
o
In the late :qos, ]erzy Grotowski abanoons
.8. I owe the reference to Allan Kaprows work to Barbara Iormis who is a specialist in the
area of nuxus, happenings, contemporary oance ano the ]uoson Dance Group.
.q. Goloberg, Pctfotmorcc Att, p. ...
o. Brecht, Btcclt or Tlcottc, p. 66.
Oliver Ieltham .q
characters ano coherent roles. Nevertheless, rot oll collective
presentations in which people oo not present inoiviouality
belong to the new theatre ,Nuremberg rallies,.
. A tlcotttcol oro motcol lorgoogc trcotpototc tlc rotc of tlc moo-
ctr ootlo. See the Iuturist Russolos :q: manifesto Tlc Att of
ôtc, Daoas use of bruitist poetry in the Cabaret Voltaire
in :q:6,
:
Artauos call for the use of cries ano intonations
in his Balinese Theatre ano Staging ano Metaphysics in
:q., ano ]ohn Cages :q manifesto entitleo The Iuture of
Music. The new theatre thus incluoes the enquiries of con-
temporary music.
6. Tlc mo mcoto cor oc opptopttotco oro otccttco to cttttcol cro. See
Brecht on raoio as mentioneo above but also on nlm in :q:.
.

Brecht met Eisenstein in :q.q. Thus the exploration-transfor-
mations of the new theatre coulo then incluoe certain en-
quiries of nlm, ano more recently, as I suggesteo earlier, parts
of mass meoia movements such as open-source ano creative-
commons on the internetbut not all of them, perhaps even
very few.
Note that none of these statements pct c ioentines a subset of the ge-
neric multiple the new theatre: the oecioing factor is whether particular
multiples relateo to these statementsperformances, works, schools
turn out to be connecteo to the Meyerholo event or not. Hence not all
ano perhaps very few uses of chance ano noise will turn out to belong to
the new theatre.
With this caveat, each of these statements can be saio to serve as a
synecooche for a trajectory of enquiry which can be traceo to the Mey-
erholo event. The problem, howeverano this is only a problem for the
strict application of Baoious philosophy of changeis that these enquir-
ies take the new theatre truth proceoure into other oomains than the
original situation. Many of the artists I attacheo to these statements ap-
pear to belong to other situations, if not other truth proceoures such as
Ferformance art, visual art, or oance. Inoeeo, once one ioentines these
forcings it is evioent that the exploration-transformation of the new thea-
tre passes as much through Iuturism ano Daoaism as it ooes through Bre-
:. Goloberg, Pctfotmorcc Att, p. 6.
.. See also as a line of enquiry the function of masks in Meyerholo, The Iairgrouno
Booth, :q:., Cabaret Voltaire, :q:6, ano Eowaro Goroon Craigs innuential magazine on
theatre calleo Tlc Mol.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .6o
chts theatre. The genealogyano genealogies are usually selectivethus
explooes from original situation of theatre out into oiherent realms.
Diagram 3
M
A
B
Marinelli Cage
art
music
mass media
19
th
C
theatre
education
Philosophy ?
We coulo blame such multiplicity on our choice of artform, unlike
Baoious favourite examples of artistic truth proceoures, music, poetry
ano painting, theatre is alreaoy a l,otto art, combining painting, sculp-
ture, literature, ano music. But this is not enough. We coulo oivioe the
new-theatre up into political theatre, avant-garoe theatre ano art-thea-
tre, but this woulo be mere acaoemic convenience. If the new-theatre
invaoes spheres of art, performance art ano even cinema, then the obvi-
ous question is raiseo of whether the Meyerholo-event is its unique source
of noelity. What is usually calleo performance art is usually traceo back
to Mottrcllt, not Meyerholo, if not back to commeoia oellarte ano Ro-
man circuses. Via forcings the explosion thus rushes outwaros ano then
chronologically backwaros to secure new sources of noelity. Ior example,
Dario Iowhose work is oennitely part of the new theatreexplicitly
rejects avant-garoe theatre in oroer to return to the popular theatre of
scanoalous Meoieval mystery plays.
Accoroing to Baoious philosophy of change o generic truth proceoure
proceeos within o historical situation. It separates out, in noelity to or
event, tt generic submultiple ano then aoos it to the former situation. The
schema in oiagram is a twist on Baoious set-up. Not only oo we have
multiple historical situationsart, music, cinema, etc.but we may even
have multiple events.

. The irreoucible multiplicity of the arts is precisely ]ean-Luc Nancys question in Lc
Moc, Faris, Gallimaro, .oo:. What we have is Meyerholo-event not as absolute source
Oliver Ieltham .6:
It is here that Baoious theory of generic truth proceoures can be sup-
plementeo. What is requireo is a more complicateo account of forcing
ano of the oevelopment of a counter state. I holo that within the oomains
of art ano politics one can think a counter-state as a collective assem-
blage of enunciation which reinforces ano unfolos the truth proceoure by
a number of typical operations. It is these operations which allow for the
multiplication of the proceoures situations ano for its possible corcctgcrcc
with otlct truth proceoures, in the realm of oance or music for exam-
ple. One of these typical operations is tlc tcromtrg of tlc ololc. It occurs
frequently in the new theatre truth proceoure: Meyerholo attempteo
to name the new theatre as stylizeo theatre, Brecht as epic theatre or
theatre for a scientinc age ano these names can be useo to multiply the
oomains of the truth proceoure. Brecht speaks of cinema as an ioeal ve-
hicle for epic theatre. In other woros, if a historical situationtheatreis
slowly transformeo by a truth proceoure, then evioently its name ano its
bounoaries have to change. The philosophical question of what oistin-
guishes one artformsuch as theatrefrom another artformsuch as
sculpture or performance or oance is in fact an tmmcototc ptocttcol octtor
insofar as the reworking of these bounoaries is precisely what the truth
proceoure ooes in its renaming of the whole.
In my work on the ]acobin assemblage of enunciation in the Irench
Revolution I ioentify three typical operations: catachrestic metonymy ,the
renaming of a whole by a part,, centrifugal translation ,]acobin spokes-
men travelling to outlying villages ano translating the law passeo by the
Assemble nationale into local oialects for the resolution of oisputes, ano
centripetal incarnation ,Robespierres attempt to let the people speak
through him,. I mention this to inoicate the kinos of operationwhich
are not just rhetorical but also technical ano physicalwhich coulo be
active in the new theatre truth proceoure. To rouno oh this preliminary
investigation lets mark some unexpecteo ehects of this explosive geneal-
ogy on both theatre ano Baoious philosophy.
VI. THE EMERGENCE OI A GENERIC ART OI
FRESENTATION
As for theatre, the multi-oirectionality of the truth proceoure means
whatever the setbacks of, say, political theatre, the new theatre continues
but as an early knot/conjuncture/transistor which concentrateo ano then explooeo out
lines of energy. We also have a series of event-knots in Iuturism, Daoa ano post-Schoen-
bergian music that leao to converging truth proceoures.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .6.
its exploration-transformations in other oirections. Its inclusion of cer-
tain enquiries in the realm of mass communication enables it to expano
beyono the trap calleo the oeath of theatre. Its inclusion of work which
abanoons aesthetic autonomy ano seeks to integrate itself into oroinary
practice means that it ooesnt so much surpass the eno of art trap as en-
velop ano enfolo it. Ultimately what is at stake in these multiple enquiries
is not so much a new tlcottc but the unfoloing of a gcrcttc ott of ptccrtottor:
gcrcttc insofar as it links up all of these artstime-baseo, visual, sonorous,
tactile or ooorouswhich appear to be oistinct to theatre, trotcctrtolc in-
sofar as rot oll of the work in these nelos ,perhaps cct, ltttlc of it, belongs
to it.

But then how ooes this generic art of presentation carve out what
belongs to it? Earlier I suggesteo that the operator of noelitythat which
oecioes whether a multiple is connecteo to the Meyerholo-event of not
was the ioea of a corporate creative act. Yet isnt this, at least in the
realms of art ano politics, another name for any generic truth proceoure:
a corporate creative act? Ferhaps Baoious philosophy itself has been
conoitioneo by the new theatre truth proceoure.
Before exploring this possibility, lets step back in history for a moment.
Long before Baoious work, philosophy hao alreaoy been conoitioneo by
theatre as a truth proceoure. If we look at the intraphilosophical ehects
of Greek trageoy in Flatos work we see that in fact it is precisely there
that philosophy comes closest to thinking the generic ocort lo lctttc, before
Cohen, ano before Meyerholo. In Book :o of Tlc Rcpooltc Flato thinks
the being of the mimetic actor-poet as that presentation which both ap-
pears to occupy ccct, ;ptofctorol) plocc, ano which, insofar as it ooes not
maintain a proper relation to knowleoge ano the Ioea, ooc rot occop, or,
plocc olotoccct. The other moment in which Greek philosophy comes cloc
to thinking the generic is in its examination of matter ano change. Not to
mention the cloto in Flatos Ttmoco, if we turn to Aristotles Mctopl,tc, we
can see that he is leo to think being, ooto ,substance,, not only as oenn-
able form ano as composite substanceform plus matterbut also as
l,polctmcror, the material substrate tlot oroctltc clorgc in his consioeration
of proouction ,which is none other than the economic constituent of the
. These exclusions mark the oiherence between the ioea of a generic art of presentation
ano the German romantic program of turning life into a work of art, which I holo to be a
illusory temptation ano trap necessarily generateo by the ambition of a truth proceoure:
Marinetti mistakenly imagineo at one point: Thanks to us the time will come when life
will no longer be a simple matter of breao ano labour, nor a life of ioleness either, but a
ootl of ott.
Oliver Ieltham .6
polt,.
The substrate has no properties in itself since it is the bearer of any

property whatsoever ano this is why it is not a oennable this ,tooc tt,.
6

The result of this conoitioning is that the Greek oispensation of the
rapport between philosophy ano theatre triangulates them by means of
a thiro term, the polt. This is so not just for philosophy but also from
the perspective of theatrethink of Aristophanes in Tlc Clooo or Tlc
Ftoginsofar as both seek to monopolize the relation to the polt which
they name rot as mimesis but as eoucation. However, eoucation, in both
cases, is thought unoer the rubric of presentation.
Diagram 4
theatre
polis
philosophy
rivalry
education
(presentation)
education
(presentation)
If we return to the twentieth century it is obvious that certain enquir-
ies of the new theatre are not inoiherent to this Greek oispensation: in
fact, Brechts work transforms it. Alreaoy for Flato, thus from this view-
point of philosophy the ,pseuoo, function of theatre is the presentation of
society to itself via simulacra. The Brechtian twist is to argue that in ooing
so the only way can theatre avoio presenting simulacra is by not present-
ing society as a stable unity. That is, unoer Brechts oirectives theatrical
presentation necessarily involves an ioentincation of the social booy but
at the same time an exposure of its oisjunctions cccr tf only at the place of
the gap between the subject of enunciation of the social ioentity ano the
enunciateo of that social ioentity. Brecht thus thinks theatrical practice o
the true installation of the renexive moment within society.
. Ior Aristotle, nothing can come from nothing. Moreover, a form is generateo through
the process of proouctionsuch as a tablewhich is oiherent to the original formsep-
arate pieces of woootherefore there must be something which persists throughout the
change of form but which is separate to form: this something is the material substrate.
6. See Baoiou, Logtoc oc moroc, p. on being suhering neither generation nor cor-
ruption ano on the inconsistent multiple as substrate.
This Brechtian oispensation immeoiately reveals the trttopltloopltcol
ccct of the new theatre truth proceoure: the explosion has reacheo phi-
losophy ano it has oennitely conoitioneo the very mooel of change that we
have been using to sketch it. These ehects can be seen in three places:
Iirst, for Baoiou, the slow outlining of a generic subset in-
volves traversing all of the properties of the historical situa-
tionthe situation is thus tocrttco in its totality.
Secono, the truth proceoure is saio to oecioe upon ano
measure the immeasurable gap between the situation ano its
statethus the practice of renexivity exposes ano brioges the
principle oisjunction of the situation.
Thiro the structure of the event itself involves renexivity inas-
much as it is a multiple whose name belongs to itselfthus a
renexive moment is at the origin of change.
The investigation of a new theatre truth proceoure via the strict ap-
plication of Baoious philosophy of change thus bears strange fruit: the
very lcot we can say, now, is that Baoious mooel of change is eminently
theatrical, but in a completely reworkeo sense of theatrical. If Baoious
concept of the event as appearing-oisappearing is a result of his philoso-
phy being conoitioneo by Mallarmes poem Ur coop oc o then the con-
struction of a generic booy can be unoerstooo as the intraphilosophical
ehect not only of Cohens mathematical inventions, but also of the art-of-
presentation truth proceoure.
But the consequences go further still: tf it is the very nature of truth
proceoures to cross ano reoraw bounoaries, tlcr Baoious pltloopltcol con-
cept of a generic truth proceoure coulo be unoerstooo as a pott of the
art-of-presentation truth proceoure. Of course, Baoiou, oealing with the
spectre of fusion between philosophy ano its conoitions, calls for a strict
oistinction between philosophy ano truth-proceoures. I am no longer sure
that this is the best way of thinking the real of an explosive genealogy.
Insofar as Aristophanes, the Greek playwright, feels it necessary to com-
oot the rival oiscipline of philosophy in the eoucation of the citys youth,
philosophy itself coulo alreaoy be unoerstooo as an emergent collccttcc o-
cmologc of crorctottor which trtctfctc ottl if not corotttor if not tolc pott tr
theatre. Thenano here the explosive genealogy carries right back out
of the twentieth century ano into the nfth ano fourth century B.C. the
Greek philosophy machine itself coulo be thought to be part of the ge-
neric art of presentation, not all of it, perhaps very little of it, but oennitely
some of it.
:.
..
.
.6
10
Ontology ano Appearing:
Documentary Realism as a
Mathematical Thought
Linosey Hair
Irom its very inception, cinema has grappleo with the question of
presentation, or being-there, versus representation. The Lumiere broth-
ers early shorts or actuality nlms appeareo, in the eyes of the nrst nave
nlmgoers, to present life as it is, Dziga Vertovs experimentation with the
Kino-eye ano montage claimeo to construct a more penetrating winoow
on reality via the harnessing of technology, neo-realisms framing of the
Real broaoeneo the conception of the nelo of presentation, ano the ,post,-
mooern nlmmakers renexive techniques challengeo the very possibility
of oocumenting reality. Thus, it woulo seem that oocumentary plays in
the fringes of the ontico-ontological oivision, in the interstices between
being as pure presentation, ano being as appearing, the area that Baoious
latest work in category theory seeks to explore.
If oocumentary can be saio to proouce a worlo, it is because the nlm-
maker unoertakes an artistic proceoure following a oecision on existence.
Each oiherent orientation raises the question of being as the oirector
unoertakes a commitment to present a reality or truth that the actual
situation obscures. Analogous to the case of founoational mathematical
orientations, being as such is establisheo following a particular axiomatic
oecision that shapes the presenteo universe in the light of certain artistic
convictions, or thought protocols. Baoiou oennes an artistic worlo as a
relation between the chaotic oisposition of sensibility ano form.
:
Thus,
the innnity of the material situation is given an oroer, or form, as a result
of the artistic conviction, or vision, which can be unoerstooo as an onto-
logical oecision that orients the proouction of a truth that structures the
particular being-there of the worlo proouceo by the oocumentary.
To be ehective, art must take as its starting point that which Empire
ooes not recognizeits voioano builo a truth process from its imma-
nent oistribution within its context such that its in-existence is renoereo
visible, a oe-structuring process that sheos particularity, returning to the
elemental level prior to the overlay of representation. This paraoigm
places Empire in the position of knowleoge, ano ngures the artistic truth
proceoure as raoically oisjunct. The purity of art stems from its ascetic
separation, however: its purporteo aim, to renoer visible to everyone
that which, for Empire ,ano so by extension for everyone, though from
a oiherent point of view, ooesnt exist,
.
oistinguishes between the state of
the situation, ano peoples inevitable captivation by the symbolic oroer.
This is at the heart of Baoious injunction against the unthinking material
re-proouction of existent ,countable, elements of the state: ,w,hat there
alreaoy is, the situation of knowleoge as such, only gives us repetition. Ior
a truth to amrm its newness, there must be a opplcmcrt.
The criterion of
novelty oemanos that cocl work must initiate a new mooe of enquiry. If
an artistic creation is not surprising, incalculable, unanticipatible, it mere-
ly reiterates knowleoge, rather than exposing a truth. Repetition is the
mechanism by which the state regenerates, whereas art is chargeo with
the proouction of a generic singularity.
Documentary is engageo in the struggle to overcome mere repetition
of the pro-nlmic or material worlo in front of the camera. Its manoate is
to proouce a work of art that brings to appearance those elements of a
situation that were previously forecloseo by current mooes of representa-
tions as legislateo by the State of the Situation. Thus, while we woulo
seem to be oealing with re-presentation ,in so far as oocumentary gains its
special status via its manipulation of inoexical traces,, since its inception
as a genre it has oenneo itself in terms of what it oooa supplement, the
space for a new appearance. ]ohn Grierson, in his canonical Fttt Pttr-
:. Alain Baoiou, The Subject of Art, Tlc S,mptom, no. 6, Spring .oo, http://www.lacan.
com/symptom6_articles/baoiou.html
.. Alain Baoiou, Iifteen Theses on Contemporary Art, Locortor Irl, no. ., .oo, pp.
:oo-:q, p. ..
. Alain Baoiou, The Ethic of Truths: Construction ano Fotency, trans. Selma Sowley,
Plt: 1ototcl }ootrol of Pltloopl,, no. :., .oo:, pp. .-, p. .o.
Linosey Hair .6
ctplc of Docomcrtot,, oeliberately excluoeo the actuality nlm as one of
the lower forms because it was constructeo largely of natural materials,
arguing that the only worlo in which oocumentary can hope to achieve
the oroinary virtues of an art |is when| we pass from the plain ,or fancy,
oescriptions of natural material, to arrangements, rearrangements, ano
creative shapings of it.
Irom this has grown a wioe oiversity of creative

output ano critical oiscussion, each hotly contesting the relation between
reality, truth, objectivity ano textuality. I am not presently concerneo in
establishing the valioity of one particular stance in this complex oebate,
rather I woulo like to relate this whole oiscourse to Baoious elaboration
of the oiherent mathematical orientations that I see as similarly contest-
ing the nature of ontology, ano the appropriate means of approaching the
formalization or construction of its objects. Mathematicians ano oocu-
mentarists alike start from a founoational oecision that orients the nature
of the universe they set out to explore ano oetermines the appearance
of objects ,mathematical or human, within the context of the oelineateo
worlo. ]ust as Baoiou argues for a trglc nelo of mathematics, wherein the
oiherent orientations ,Flatonic, constructivist, generic etc., bring various
aspects of this innnite nelo into being as a result of the institution of pro-
tocols of thought, we can see how the oocumentary also forms particular
instances of being-there which are similarly shapeo by an orientation that
oerives from an artistic oecision regaroing olot I.
Traoitional ontological approaches to the question of being as being,
either take what Desanti ioentines as a maximalist approach, associateo
with empirical or logical reaoings whereby being is aoequate to its ex-
tensional concept, ot, like Baoiou, unoertake a minimalist reaoing ano
set out to think being in its being, without external reference to an exten-
sion
the question of the Tlctc t ,il y a,, or pure presentation. If being

is to be treateo within its own, proper framework, the logical, or analytic
approach that seeks to oelineate an conceptual extension is excluoeo be-
cause it sets up an analogical relation that meoiates between instances of
being ano pure being, while the contemporary linguistic turn in philoso-
phy attempts to reoress this problem by maintaining the impossibility of
re-presenting being or presence, ano insteao seeks the trace of being in
. ]ohn Grierson, Fttt Pttrctplc of Docomcrtot, quoteo in Fhilip Rosen, Clorgc Mommtco:
Ctrcmo, Httottctt,, Tlcot,, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Fress, .oo:, p. ..
. I am grateful to ]ean-Toussaint Desantis elaboration of this point in ]ean-Toussaint
Desanti, Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology of Alain Baoiou, in Feter Hallwaro
,eo.,, Tltrl Agotr: Alotr Bootoo oro tlc Fototc of Pltloopl,, Lonoon, Continuum Books, .oo,
pp. q-66.
poetry which retains a unique opening to presence without subjecting it
to the violence of linguistic oeterminacy. The oesire to think being in-
trinsically leaos Baoiou to reformulate the question within mathematical
,or set-theoretical, terms, which means that to approach the thinking of
being, we must also unoerstano mathematics as a thought. Baoiou turns
to ,ZI,
6
set theory because it makes no existential claims, nor aoos any
extension, or preoicate to its bare inscription of being.
Re-reaoing Leibnizs maxim What is not o being is not a octrg Ba-
oiou suggests that rather than this necessitating a Onenness of Being, ano
hence entailing preoication, the singularization of a specinc entity or mul-
tiple is always the result of an operation performeo upon pure ,inconsist-
ent, multiplicity, ano it is the operation of the count that structures it as
one, or as o thing.
In sum: the multiple is the regime of presentation, the one, in
respect to presentation, is an operational result, being is what
presents ,itself,. On this basis, being is neither one ,because only
presentation itself is pertinent to the count-as-one,, nor multiple
because the multiple is olcl, the regime of presentation.
At the level of pure presentation all elements are simply registereo

on the level of belonging to the multiple/set, or are counteo, such that
what is appears as presenteo consistency. If Being as pure inconsistent
multiplicity is subtractive ,there is no Whole, no One, ano existence, or
octrg-tlctc is the result of an onto-logical oroering that falls within a oiher-
ent level, there is no way of substantiating ontological claims. It follows
that any statements about Being must be founoeo upon pure oecision,
given its funoamental inaccessibility to presence as inconsistent ,uncount-
able, multiplicity. Baoious interest in category theory lies in its ability to
map the consequences of any oecision regaroing the nature of being ano
the conoitions that structure its particular mathematical universe, allow-
ing the logic of oiherent orientations to be oirectly compareo within a
framework that is intrinsic to the ontological structures they oescribe. In
particular, the absence of a meta-language is a strength of category theory
6. Zermelo-Iraenkel set theory ohers a nrst-oroer system built up from the primitive
notion of belonging ,,, ano which constructs its axiomatic framework from the voio, or
empty set {}. It makes no existential claims about the nature of sets, or their elements,
in ehect the system provioes a means of oescribing the generation ano organization of
multiples, or sets, from nothing. It ooes not legislate over existential quantiners ,being
specincally formulateo to by-pass Russells paraoox,.
. Alain Baoiou, Bctrg oro Eccrt, trans. Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. .
,henceforth BE,.
Linosey Hair .6q
that makes it compatible with the minimalist approach to Being that Ba-
oiou aooptsall logical relations are intrinsically generateo specinc to the
various mathematical worlos, mapping their potential existence, in terms
of the oiherent logics that structure the being there or appearing of ele-
ments, within each worlo.
Thus, although there are oiherent orientations, there is but a single
mathematics whose oomain is the inconsistent multiplicity, the very stuh
of Being, that is able to be brought to presentation in various oiherent
ways, oepenoing upon whether one upholos the constructivist conviction
that all mathematical entities must be capable of being generateo from a
consistent, oemonstrable axiomatic framework, whether the mathemati-
cian accepts unlimitable caroinality that is regulateo by a separate axi-
omatic framework, or whether s/he allows generic sets, ano therefore a
subtractive notion of Being. Baoiou turns to the signincant impasses that
have formeo mathematical thought, such as the paraooxes of set theory
or generic sets, to support his insight that these blino spots function as the
Real of mathematical thought, ano the oecisions arise from these areas of
unoecioability oemonstrate the manner in which thought proouces orien-
tations that shape the various conceptions of existence: each oecision on
Being unoerwrites the founoations of the mathematical universe whose
existence it oeclares.
In each case, it is a connict in the thinking of Being, but on the level of
cxttcrcc, which Baoiou glosses as that which thought oeclares ano whose
consistency is guaranteeo by Being
8
, is graspeo oiherently in each case.
Since thought alone supports the founoational oecision regaroing an un-
oecioable impasse, existence itself is the meeting point between oecision
ano encounter, act ano oiscovery, in other woros, existence is proouceo
by its particular thought: each oecision axiomatically founos being via its
initial inscription thereby oetermining the logic of its construction. The
peculiar nature of such a oecision entails both the positing of what is, ano
the paraooxical oiscovery of the structure of that existence, on the basis
of this initial intuition/conviction. Since this inaugural oecision can have
no grounoingbeing qua being is raoically inaccessibleit is open to
be thought in a range of orientations, but the conviction that is uphelo in
each orientation leaos to the formulation of a potential being via its nc-
tive activation: Existence is precisely Being itself in as much as thought
8. Alain Baoiou, Bttcrg Or Exttcrcc: A Slott Ttcottc or Ttorttot, Ortolog,, trans. Norman
Maoarasz, Albany, State University of New York Fress, .oo6, pp. -8, p. ,henceforth
TO,.
oecioes it. Ano oecision orients thought essentially ,TO ,
.
The Farme-
nioian insight Thinking ano Being are One is oemonstrateo through
the retroactive consistency that each orientation enoows upon the math-
ematical universe oeclareo to exist as a result of its particular thought. As
Baoiou notes: a position has to be taken. Ior we stano actually as an
act ,oo ptco oc lct,, if I oare say, upon the very norm of the oecision the
act accomplishes. // At any rate, what is referreo to in this obligation to
oecioe is Being ,TO .,.
Baoious latest work explores the process whereby mathematical oeci-
sion on how the inconsistent stuh of Being can be brought to presentation,
oroereo, or numbereo ptooocc a framework of possible entities, or that
forms being accoroing to certain conceptual convictions. If, as Baoiou
suggests, the oivergent mathematical oecision to attribute existence can
be metaphorically mappeo with the three oiherent political orientations
that oominate contemporary society ,TO -6,, it woulo seem plausible
to exteno this analogy to the nelo of art which, broaoly speaking, is simi-
larly orienteo relative to the three mooes of thinking Being: constructivist,
transcenoent ano generic.
The constructivist/intuitionist approach limits mathematical thinking
of Being to a logical grammar ,BE .8, with origins that are traceable
back to the Aristotelian rebuttal of Flatonic ioeality. Aristotles proposal
that mathematics is ultimately a branch of aesthetics rests on his con-
viction that mathematical thought consists of a nctive activation of ob-
jects that have only potential existence in the realm of the sensible ano
thus oeals with questions of oroer ano symmetry, governeo by a norm of
the beautiful. This power to inseparate the inseparable ,TO , Baoiou
equates with language, ano the various inscriptions of Being that oomi-
nate the thinking of mathematics tooay. Ior example, the aesthetic princi-
ple unoerpins the conviction that mathematics tells us nothing of real-be-
ing, but it forges a nction of intelligible consistency from the stanopoint of
the latter, whose rules are explicit ,TO 8,. Thus, mathematics is reouceo
to a consistent set of rules ano structures rather than being the science of
Being qua Being: thought subsumes the relation to being ottltr tlc otmcr-
tor of lroolcogc ,BE .q,. The constructivist limits the set universe within
which operations can be carrieo out to the class mooel of Constructible
Sets. This is characterizeo as a thin set universe, in that it is generateo
from a spine of oroinals from which all the counting operations which are
concretely constructible are appenoeo. Such a mooel proouces a universe
that is as tall as any potential universe, in that it contains the oroinals
up to innnity, but it ooes not fully utilize the power set axiom, which
Linosey Hair .:
woulo theoretically generate all potential subsets of a given oroinal, ano
so exhaust the combinatorial abilities inherent within the system. In the
thin set universe, these oenumerable subsets are not incluoeo, only those
which can be oirectly counteo are aooeo on to the spine of oroinals. Such
an omission is acceptable in that the continuum hypothesis is unprovable
within ZI which remains consistent with ano without its aooition.
However, this opens the question as to the nature of the resulting set
universe L ,known as the class of constructible sets, relative to the innn-
ity of sub-sets capable of generation unoer the power set axiom, giving
rise to the complete universe of sets V, oesignateo as the real worlo.
One woulo intuitively assume that the latter is much larger than the thin
set universe ,L,, however, the Axiom of Constructability states V ~ L, ano
has been shown to be consistent. Irom V ~ L the existence of a minimal
mooel can be consistently assumeo, however, this in ehect conoitions the
bounoaries of the set universe relative to the language in which it is acces-
sible. At this juncture, mathematics is encountering the Wittgensteinian
oictum whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
q

Baoiou links this approach to Being with the neo-classical norms in
art, that privilege continuity: The neo-classicist fulnls the precious func-
tion of the guaroianship of sense on a global scale. He testines that there
mot be sense ,BE .q.,. In terms of oocumentary, if we think the conoi-
tion of existence being oetermineo by constructibility, or conoitioneo by
language, textuality, we can incluoe those oirectors that privilegeo the
structuring of the nlm as the means of prooucing a consistent construction
of existence. We can relate this to Fuoovkin ano Kuleshovs conception of
montage as an unfoloing sequence built out of separate nlmic elements
that were placeo together, piece by piece, to oepict a specinc narrative
sequence.
:o
This approach can be seen as a forerunner of what Bazin
ioentineo as the transparent technique of classical Hollywooo cinema in
the os. Iilm theorist Fhilip Rosen has remarkeo the joint emergence of
the classical nction nlm along sioe the new oocumentary genre, suggest-
ing that many of the conventions of sequencing ano narratorial regulation
of the latter resulteo from this newly establisheo viewing practice. This is
q. Luowig Wittgenstein, Ttoctoto Logtco-Pltloopltco, trans. C.K. Ogoen, Lonoon,
Routleoge ano Kegan Faul, :q...
:o. Dziga Vertovs Kino-pravoa uses montage in an entirely oiherent manner: the use of
split screen, superimpositions ano rapio montage to proouce a truth that only the superior
technological resources of nlm coulo capture, oistances him from the more conventional
constructivist stance. A full oiscussion of Vertovs contribution the oevelopment of the
oocumentary genre is beyono the scope of this present article.
most closely realizeo in Robert Ilahertys ôrool of tlc ôttl ,wioely ac-
cepteo as founoing the genre, which was structureo along classical narra-
tive lines. The oaily existence of the Inuits captureo on nlm was a reality
proouceo especially for ano by the nlm. Most scenes were stageo, ano the
oramatic structure collaboratively preoetermineo between Ilaherty ano
Nanook. Broaoly speaking, the thought that unoerwrites the treatment
of appearing within this orientation aims to oeal with that which can be
shownto close oh aporia, making the oiegetic worlo seamless. At this
point, constructivism can be equateo with textualitythere is no Real
to which the nlm/mathematical proposition refers, only the manipulation
of signincation within a conventionally governeo framework that allows
the proouction of meaning. As Baoiou comments: the constructible uni-
verse is || the ontological symbol of knowleoge. The ambition which
animates this genre of thought is to maintain the multiple within the grasp
of what can be written ano verineo. Being is only aomitteo to being within
the transparency of signs which bino together its oerivation on the basis of
what we have alreaoy been able to inscribe ,BE oq,. That construction
is commensurate with knowleoge is a oangerous proposal, as evioenceo
in the colonialist overtones of early anthropological oocumentary. Ior
instance, Iatimah Tobing Rony has critiqueo Ilahertys ôrool for its ro-
mantic preservationism, viewing its appropriation of the Inuit lifestyle as
a fetishization of Otherness ,ethnographic taxioermy, ano the oeliber-
ate proouction of a nostalgic nction.
::
The contemporary rejection of the
traoitional omniscience of the oocumentarist/ethnographer nevertheless
retains a self-conscious constructivist approach. As Cool ano Lutkenhaus
suggest, Although these enthnographies take a number of oiherent forms,
they share a self-conscious ehort to portray the socially corttoctco nature
of ethnographic knowleoge
:.
,my italics,. This overtly ethical stance nev-
ertheless foregrounos the textuality implicit in its ioeological orientation,
renecting what Baoiou has termeo the ethic of knowleoge: act ano speak
such that everything be clearly oecioable ,BE :,.
Ior Baoiou, art enters into an antagonistic relation to the oominant
cultural regime which he terms Empire, ano he frames the goal of art
as the proouction of abstract, non-imperial works that achieve the ge-
neric universality common to each of the truth processes. In this context,
::. Iatimah Tobing Rony, Tlc Tltto E,c: Rocc: Ctrcmo oro tlc Etlrogtopltc Spcctoclc, Durham,
Duke University Fress, :qq6, p. :o..
:.. Nancy Lutkehaus ano ]enny Cool, Faraoigms Lost ano Iouno, in ]ane Gaines ano
Michael Renov ,eos.,, Collccttrg Vttolc Ectocrcc, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota
Fress, :qqq, p. ::8.
Linosey Hair .
knowleoge is equateo oirectly with the generalizeo meta-structure, ano
Baoiou writes: Since it is sure of its ability to control the entire oomain of
the visible ano the auoible via the laws governing commercial circulation
ano oemocratic communication, Empire no longer censures anything.
:

This means that the orawback of any constructivist stance is its limitation
to the realm of knowleoge, which is governeo by the State of the Situa-
tion/Empire. While any post-mooern oocumentary that interrogates the
repression ano appropriation at play in any construction of social/racial/
genoer within its own framework as an artistic artefact, as well as the
wioer social context with which it engages is foregrounoing the play of
signincation ano its incommensurability with knowleoge, its paraooxical
reliance upon the properties of language to oo so is nevertheless, from
Baoious perspective, a limitation. It precluoes the possibility of an event,
ano oenies the possibility of a ,subtractive, truth, in favour of an enolessly
oisseminating relativity.
The attraction of such an approach is nevertheless appealing, ano,
within oiscussions of oocumentary practice, the insight that the work is a
text rather than a slice of reality has been extremely innuential. Baoiou
accounts for this linguistic turn by noting that the totalizing force of Em-
pire is not manifestly repressive: rather than imposing an openly oogmatic
program against which an artist might strive to retrieve the light of truth,
the contemporary situation is unremittingly permissive, urging its subjects
to consume, to communicate ano to enjoy
:
, in ehect fusing with the
super-egoic injunction to enjoy! such that one is bouno by the outy to
inoulge. The granting of absolute licence binos the subject more tightly
within the transparent operations of its regime. The meta-Statist strangle-
holo currently saturates the situation to the extent that it is always alreaoy
in excess of any new artistic conngurations that might be formeothe
structure is capable of anticipating all potential oevelopments within the
elements it regulates.
Against a regime that performs a perversely Ioucauloian oiscipline of
surveillance, that exercises absolute control over the oomain of the visible
ano the auoible such that nothing is censureo simply because nothing can
be proouceo that is outsioe the parameters of its control, Baoiou turns to
the force of the subtractive as the only space that is outsioe governance.
To this eno, his theses on contemporary art focus on the process of the
generic, ano the technique of purincation. Art becomes possible at the
:. Baoiou, Iifteen Theses on Contemporary Art.
point which the inoivioual resists the imperative to enjoy ,ano hence par-
ticipate,, ano practices a rigorous asceticism both in the personal realm,
becoming the pitiless censors of ourselves, ano in the refusal to ,re-,pro-
ouce in the service of the state. Inoeeo, |i|t is better to oo nothing than to
contribute to the invention of formal ways of renoering visible that which
Empire alreaoy recognizes as existent.
:
In a constructivist orientation, all
sets are always alreaoy constructible, hence there is no space for the new
to emerge: nothing to challenge the prevailing regime. A self-conscious or
post-mooern incorporation of this maxim ooes not oestabilize this state of
ahairs as it is simply a renexive re-connguration of that which is alreaoy
counteo, or controlleo. Whatever can be ,ac,counteo for is by oennition
always alreaoy within the governance of Empire, ano is inoeeo sanctioneo
as yet another means of proliferating its meta-structural control.
Baoiou ioentines a secono mathematical orientation, which he terms
prooigal or transcenoent. The nnituoe of the constructivist orientation
is superseoeo in set theoretical terms by the introouction of inaccessible
caroinals, which he claims serve to introouce a theological transceno-
ence that breaks oown the maxim of constructability via the positing of
oroinals that cannot be reacheo from within the limits of the constructible
universe. In this orientation V L. Rather than work from the nnite set
universe towaros its potential limit, the transcenoent orientation works
from the unquantinable caroinals towaros the constructible universe.
This orientation revives Cantors original theological insight, maintaining
the unoecioability of such caroinals from within ZI. Baoiou oiscusses this
in terms of oiherent species of multiple beingthe successor oroinal,
that has a local status ano is ioentinable within V, whereas the limit oroi-
nal ex-sists from the sequence whose limit it is ,BE :,, ano has a global
status. The existence of large caroinals rests on a oecision of thought,
which proouces a oivergent mathematical orientation that conceives of
the mathematical universe as far exceeoing the part that has currently
been formalizeo by its theorists. Although the positing of an inoiscerni-
ble breaks the tyranny of the language/knowleoge oyao, Baoiou remarks
its negative connotations, such that it inoicates the inability of exact nomi-
nation, whereas the generic positively oesignates the truth of a situation
that is incommensurable with knowleoge.
We can compare this thinking of being with the neo-realist move-
ment, which proposes a similarly transcenoent Wholeness of reality that
the totalizing gaze of the camera brings to appearance. The unninching
Linosey Hair .
recoroing of the oetail of the everyoay brings to presentation a oeeper
unoerstanoing of the local, prooucing a oescription of reality conceiveo
as a whole by a consciousness oisposeo to see things as a whole,
:6
a con-
sciousness that Anore Bazin, has oescribeo as properly ontological. The
crucial oiherence is that meaning is constructeo o potcttott, from the cu-
mulative ehect of the fragments of reality it juxtaposes, rather than aiming
to construct a particular argument from the fragments by their oeliberate
arrangement. While such nlms are nevertheless crafteo artefacts, ano as
such prey to the same oictates of textuality, Bazin suggesteo that neoreal-
ism presenteo oocumentary reality plo something else, this something
else being the plastic beauty of the images, the social sense, or the poetry,
the comeoy ano so on.
:
Baoiou links this valorization of transcenoence
with Heioeggers notion of the Open, ano inoeeo Bazins appeal to the
intangible evocation of the Real via poetry certainly speaks to this oesire
to locate a trace of being as such.
Neorealisms belief in the truth inherent in uncontrolleo events coun-
tereo the earlier use of oocumentary to proouce a subjective, personal
truth whereby ranoom, unpreoictable happenings were retroactively re-
frameo within a larger structure of governance, by eoiting ano voice over
narrative. Knowleoge/language is exceeoeo by the intervention of the
Real, here inoicateo by the poetic trace that lenos a teleological tran-
scenoence to the artistic worlo of the nlm. Baoiou oismisses the Heioeg-
gerian appeal to poetry as the conouit to access the withorawal of Being,
equating it with the chimera of the inconsistent multiple that becomes ret-
roactively thinkable as a result of the operation that brought the consistent
multiple to presentation. There is no inehable Whole of being.
This same appeal to totality can be seen in the Irench ctrmo cco,
where the oocumentarists immersion in a particular way of life ano
the subsequent recoroing of testimonies claimeo to proouce an excess
of truth. Likewise, Direct Cinema, ano Ctrmo Vttt were innuenceo by
neorealisms orive to present a more complete reality, introoucing such
oiverse techniques such as the hiooen camera, the provocative onscreen
interview, or a narroweo focus on the crisis structure, in a bio to capture
the full event as it unfoloeo. This belief in the cameras ability to capture
the real nature of the worlo soon came to be wioely challengeo by theo-
:6. Anore Bazin, In Defence of Rossellini: A letter to Guioo Aristarco, eoitor-in-chief
of Cinema Nuovo, 1lot t Ctrcmo., trans. Hugh Gray, Berkeley, University of California
Fress, :q:, p. q.
:. Bazin, In Defence of Rossellini, p. :oo.
rists ano nlm makers alike. As oocumentarist ]ames Lipscome notes: we
cannot assume as c-v seems to, that there is a universal or absolute truth
about objects ano eventsano thus we must face up to the fact that, to
paraphrase Euclio on mathematics, there is no royal roao to the real nitty-
gritty.
:8
Which brings us to Baoious thiro mathematical orientation, that
of the generic.
The construction of a generic extension entails a positive mapping of
an inoiscernible part of a situationan excrescencevia an innnite truth
proceoure that verines, element by element, those aspects which can be
saio to have a positive connection to the event ano those which oo not.
The crux of this proceoure is that the elements of this inoiscernible part
are all nameo within the prevailing knowleoge of the situation, but the
generic set that results forms a oiagonal to the current representational
norms, incluoing at least one element that ooes not share an ioentinable
property with the rest of the innnite set to which it belongs, making the
generic set inoiscernible from within the situation insofar as it evaoes
nomination. This inoiscernibility is precisely that which characterizes the
set as generic since its property is solely the fact of its octrg in the situation,
ano ooes not refer to its classincation within language, as per the other
constructible sets. It is this that allows the construction of the being-mul-
tiple of a truth, insofar as the enquiry focuses on being, ano its suture to
the voio, rather than on verioical oeterminations: what we are looking
for is an ontological oiherentiation between the true ano the verioical,
that is between truth ano knowleoge ,BE ,.
The generic art-ioea is not incluoeo in the ptccrtco work, simply be-
cause the parameters of space ano time within which it is proouceo con-
strain the material artefact to nnituoe. Baoious emphatic insistence that:
|| the work of art is in fact the only nnite thing that existsthat art cre-
ates nnituoe
:q
oerives its justincation from the Greek aesthetic principle
of completion, in which perfection ano completion are co-oeterminate.
Thus the single work of art cannot be coextensive with a truth proceoure
as this woulo repeat the romantic error of seeing art as the privilegeo site
of the incarnation of the innnite within the nnite. Baoious inaesthetic
schema ngures the relation between art ano truth as being both singular
ano immanent:
:8. ]ames. Lipscome, Corresponoence ano Controversy: Cinma Vrit, Ftlm Qoottctl,,
vol. :8, :q6, pp. 6.-.
:q. Alain Baoiou, Horooool of Iroctlcttc, trans. Alberto Toscano, Stanforo, Stanforo
University Fress, .oo, p. :: ,henforth HI,.
Linosey Hair .
Art ttclf is a truth proceoure. Or again: The philosophical
ioentincation of art falls unoer the category of truth. Art is a thought
in which artworks are the Real ,ano not the ehect,. ,HI q,
An artistic truth is immanent to the work of art ano is constructeo
from the unlocatable point of the voio: we are oealing with a subtrac-
tion that bears witness to the reouctive exigency of the structuring regime
of the count-for-one. The nrst axiom of Baoious Iifteen theses on con-
temporary art states: Art || is the proouction of an innnite subjective
series, through the nnite means of a material subtraction.
.o
Farsing this
in terms of its mathematical context, we can unoerstano each point, or
element, as the site of an enquiry as to whether it can be saio to be a mem-
ber of the generic sub-set, given that there is no unifying preoicate that
oetermines membership ,since the generic set/truth is innnite it remains
untotalizable,. As such, the mooality of any particular truth lies in the
future anteriorolot otll locc occr ttoc a wager that founos the unoer-
taking of the process ano so brings the possibility of that truth into being
as the innnite result of a risky supplementation.
.:
The truth of any single presenteo multiple is that which from insioe
the presenteo, as pott of this presenteo, makes the inconsistencywhich
buttresses in the last instance the constancy of the presentationcome
into the light of oay ,MF :o6,. Thus, the truth of a work of art is an imma-
nent, but anonymous aspect of its material presentation, retrospectively
reaoable as the operation that fotmco its nnite consistency: a constitutive
aspect that is not strictly commensurate within its spatio-temporal con-
text, but is a rem,a,inoer of the creative process itself.
The generic orientation, then, explore|s| how, from a given situation,
one can construct another situation by means of the aooition of an inois-
cernible multiple of the initial situation. This approach can be metaphori-
cally linkeo to the oocumentary style of Alain Resnais, whose lanomark
oocumentary, ^tglt oro Fog, unoertakes the bringing-to-appearance of
those aspects of the holocaust that continue to be invisible ,or inoiscern-
ible, from the perspective of the state, creating a form that is aoequate
to the investigation of that which is most properly formless. What I am
ioentifying as a generic truth proceoure is the painstaking manner in
which the elements of the situation are counteo, both accoroing to the
prevailing regime of knowleoge ano, simultaneously, as being incluoeo
.o. Baoiou, Iifteen Theses on Contemporary Art.
.:. Alain Baoiou, Mortfcto fot Pltloopl,, trans. Norman Maoarasz, Albany, State University
of New York Fress, :qqq, pp. :o6- ,henceforth MF,.
within a separate ,what Baoiou woulo call excrescent, part of that same
situation that is inoiscernible from within the governing norms of repre-
sentation. Thus, Resnais oocumentary can be saio to construct a generic
set that cuts a oiagonal across the verioical truth of the situation, initiating
an on going interrogation of the forecloseo aspects of an immanent truth.
Much as the generic set cannot be totalizeo ano therefore is resistant to
being simply aooeo to the constructible set universe ,since such nomina-
tion woulo oestroy its being o generic,, Resnais work ooes not set out
to present the Truth of the holocaust. However, by his serial interroga-
tion of the material traces, he seeks to extract immanent fragments from
which he constructs his truth proceoure. This leaos us to suggest that
Resnais orientation, or manner of thinking of being avoios the pitfalls of
constructivism: since the localizeo truth of the holocaust is precisely the
unthought of the situation, it cannot simply be brought to representation,
since it ex-ists as its Real. In other woros, it exceeos V~L. It is equally ap-
parent that Resnais work ooes not seek to evoke a transcenoent Truth of
the holocausta temptation to which many contemporary ethical theo-
rists fall prey,
..
rather, he oeparts from a formalization which allows him
to interrogate the excess of the Real over the governance of representa-
tion. It is this subtractive approach that makes Resnais work analogous
to Baoious mathematical orientation. We shall return to Resnais nlm
shortly, as I unoertake an exploration of the capacity of category theory to
oher a more nuanceo reaoing of localizeo being-there within the oiegetic
worlo,s, of the oocumentary.
While set theory remains the proper means of inscribing being as be-
ing, it ooes not oher any insight into loo particular beings interact within
a particular context, thus Baoious latest work turns to category theory to
provioe a means of mapping the structure of any localizeo section of be-
ingor a way of thinking the appearing of a worlo. In particular, topos
theory ahoros the means of explicating the plotoltt, of worlos, since it
mooels the structural oetermination of all potential situations, or topoi,
rather than provioing a global regulatory framework that accounts for a
single, totalizeo Being. In terms of mathematics/ontology, this means it
can map the set universe that holos for the oiherent thought orientations
or oecisions taken by the working mathematician, provioing a consist-
... Baoiou oistances himself from the contemporary ethical stance in philosophical
thinking that valorizes the victim, ano seeks to make suhering sacreo. Resnais oocumentary
avoios this stance, framing a political challenge to think the truth of the holocaust in oroer
to prevent its recurrence.
Linosey Hair .q
ent map of the relations that structure the universe following certain axi-
omatic presuppositions.
Traoitionally, we have approacheo the question of worlo from the
point of view of a being ano their oegree of consciousness of, or rela-
tion to it. Category theory by-passes this binary subject/object relation,
placing the emphasis on the relation itself as the active component that
ehectively gives the being its capacity for appearing, legislating its mooe
of octrg tlctcthe oonation of place. A worlo is a topos oelineateo by a
nnite series of ioentincations ano operations. The anchor for all relations
stems from the Voio, as the only multiple-being that has no elements as
is thus immeoiately oetermineo.
.
All other multiples are maoe up of ele-
ments, which means that the multiple itself is oetermineo accoroing to its
elements.
.

|| one calls worlo ,for those operations, a multiple-being such
that, if a being belongs to it, every being whose being is assureo
on the basis of the nrstin accoroance with the aforementioneo
operationsbelongs to it equally.
Thus, a worlo is a multiple-being closeo for certain oerivations of
being.
.
Worlo in this sense, is properly speaking, the situation, or localizeo
context within which the operation that allows a being to appear-there is
performeo. This formal conoition of appearing or becoming locally situ-
ateo is extrinsic to the proper Being of an essent, but which allows an as-
pect of its Being to appear a certain way, as conoitioneo by its contingent
network of ,multiple, relations.
.6
Something can only be saio to appear in
.. Alain Baoiou, The Transcenoental, Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, trans. Ray Brassier ano
Alberto Toscano, Lonoon, Continuum Books, .oo, pp. :8q-..o, p. :q:.
.. Since all of these operations are contingent on the voio as the only immeoiately
oetermineo being, it is theoretically possible to proouce an ontological rank, relative
to the multiples oistance from its origin, or the number of operations performeo in its
composition. However, since there is no whole of Being, there can be no single scale upon
which multiple being can be oroereothere are multiples whose construction ooes not
intersect with other multiples outsioe the single shareo founoational set of the voio. This
cancels the possibility of any global uniformity, or categorization of beings: ioentincations
ano relations are always local. It is this property that Baoiou exploits in his oennition of
worlo.
.. Baoiou, The Transcenoental, p. :q..
.6. It is important to note that the operation is oepenoent upon the place: without an
ontologically presenteo multiple, there is nothing which can be locateo via the onto-logical
operation. As we have seen, a worlo is constituteo by a sequence of operations that map
relations from an alreaoy existent being to a secono being that is thinkable with respect to
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .8o
a worlo if it participates in a relation with another being within the same
localizeo context. Thus an object x can be expresseo on an ontological
level as a pure multiple, using a set theoretical framework, but this makes
no existential claims. As Baoiou notes |w|hen x is saio mathematically
the possible ano real become inoiscernible.
.
If we want to claim that x ex-
ists, it has to be situateo ,x belongs to S,. Thus, existence is not an attribute
of x alone, but is a function of its relation to S, hence what Baoiou terms
appearance is what is thinkable about x in so far as it belongs to S.
It is important to note that the being-ness of an existent is always
thinkable relative to the situation within which it is embeooeo. Since be-
ing itself is not-all, then |b|eing is only exposeo to thought as a local
site of its untotalizable unfoloing ,TO :-68, :6:, Inoeeo, oetermination
itself can only be unoerstooo in a relative sense, since the essent must be
situateo in oroer to show its beingness. The morphisms of a situation
form the objects that make up its map, thus any instance of being there
ooes not oerive its attributes from the ontological manifolo, but relative to
the onto-logic of its context. Hence Baoious focus on appearing, which
he argues is an intrinsic oetermination of Being:
Appearing is the site, the there ,lo, of the multiple-existent insofar
as it is thought in its being. Appearing in no way oepenos on space
or time, or more generally on a transcenoental nelo. It ooes not
oepeno on a Subject whose constitution woulo be presupposeo.
The manifolo-being ooes not appear fot a Subject. Insteao, it is
more in line with the essence of the existent to appear. ,TO :6.,
This leaos to the paraooxical overturning of the Flatonic binary of ap-
pearance ano ioeality, since the immeoiate or given worlo is a worlo that
is intimately structureo, a web of relations ano intensities, that stabilize
the inconsistency of multiple-being within a oeterminate, situateo logic.
In contrast, the worlo of ioealitiesas inscribeo by set theoryis a space
the nrst. The operation itself ooes not exist, but is inferreo relative to the new point that
is nameable as a result of its action. Thus: |w|e call situation of being, for a singular
being, the worlo in which it inscribes a local proceoure of access to its being on the basis
of other beings. The onto-logical operation actualizes possible formations within the
oiherent multiples of presentation ano allows them to appear within a localizeo context.
The being of these elements insists prior to their actualization, the operation one-ines
them, by linking them in a network of relations that establish oegrees of oiherence ano
ioentity within the presenteo situation. These values are not absolute, i.e. they are not
ontological, thus the same element can be appear concurrently ,ano therefore oiherently,
in a variety of worlos.
.. Alain Baoiou, Notes Towaro Thinking Appearance, Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, trans. Ray
Brassier ano Alberto Toscano, Lonoon, Continuum Books, .oo, p. :8:.
Linosey Hair .8:
of oisjunction ano absolute oiherentiation, a sense-oepriveo rationality
that lays oown the composition of manifolos in an axiomatic austerity.
The practical applications of categorical analysis remain to be establisheo.
In terms of nlm stuoies it ahoros the possibility of mapping the appearing
of elements within a given oiegetic worlo, ano in particular, the in-ap-
pearing of those elements that woulo ,potentially, be incluoeo within the
construction of a generic extension.
Alain Resnais oocumentary, ^tglt oro Fog, can be approacheo as a
meoitation on appearing, exploreo through the oisjunctive worlos of the
]ews in the concentration camps, the Germanic Volk, ano the present
oay worlo of the viewer. While the potency of Blanchots writings on the
oisaster remain unparalleleo in provioing a nuanceo insight into the oes-
titution of subjectivity ano the peculiar timelessness of the event, Baoious
framework aoos an invaluable commentary on the logic of the situation
the lack of meoiating phenomenological consciousness
.8
in the categorical
framework paraooxically enables one to think the relational complexity of
the oiherent worlos, without innicting the violence of oetermining the be-
ing of any of those who suhereo this inapprehensible experience. Baoious
onto-logic oescribes the being-there, or the oegrees of intensity of appear-
ance of any single being within a given situationit ooes not make juoge-
ment regaroing their actual Being, since each essent has the potential to
appear in a variety of ways, ano in multiple situations. It remains impor-
tant to unoerline that the holocaust itself ooes not ngure as an event for
Baoiou, primarily because it is a proouct of the Nazis poltttcol agenoa. The
ioeology of the Thiro Reich is ioentineo as a simulacrum of an event, ano
as such serves as a paraoigm of evil.
The opening shots of ^tglt oro Fog introouce the antagonistic multi-
ples, or envelopes
.q
of a worlo, that will structure the nlm. The present
.8. Baoiou stresses that his own oemonstrations of the applicability of categorical logic
are largely allegorical, retaining a vulgar phenomenological slant, whereas in fact |t|his
entire arrangement can oo without my gaze, without my consciousness, without my
shifting attention ,Alain Baoiou, Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, eo. ano trans. Ray Brassier ano
Alberto Toscano, Lonoon, Continuum Books, .oo, p. .o8.,. My own analysis follows
Baoious mapping of the terrain. To take full aovantage of category theorys oeparture
from the privileging of consciousness it remains necessary to theorize the construction of
worlos within the oiegetic framework, ano concurrently map their relation to the worlo,s,
of the spectator. In the case of ^tglt oro Fog, the nlm aooresses an auoience on the tenth
anniversary of WWII, which has to be factoreo in alongsioe the viewing present of each
particular screening. I am particularly interesteo in how category theory might leao us to
re-think specularity ano appearance outsioe traoitional matrixes of spectatorship.
.q. The highest value of the synthesis of the total network of relations that form the
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .8.
oay site of what will be revealeo as the former concentration camp, shot
in colour ano accompanieo by the light-hearteo nute music ,scoreo espe-
cially for the nlm by Hans Eisler, is introouceo as a tranquil lanoscape.
The camera then pans oown to incluoe the stark outline of an electric
fence that cuts across the harmony of the lanoscape, oivioing the screen
with a gesture which seems to signal a rupture, or a oisjunctive conjunc-
tion between this element ano the rest, since they are situateo within a
single worlo ,they each appear within the nlm frame, yet the common
element of their respective intensities of appearance is nilit approaches
the minimum value of appearance within a part of being. While the nlm
woulo seem to be setting up an emblematically oisjunctive relation be-
tween what it ioentines as the closeo worlo of the camp, ano the tran-
quil lanoscape surrounoing it, topos theory allows us to approach this
oiherently: oespite the ehective ,ano oeliberate, lack of appearance of the
camp from the situation of the free worlo, it nevertheless is oemonstrably
present as an element of that worlo, but one that in-appears. It is precisely
this paraoox of ehacement ano inclusion that we will be exploring.
The operation that regulates the appearing of beings ooes not guar-
antee that every element of a multiple be granteo a place accoroing to
the governing transcenoental.
o
As we have seen, since there is no Whole
of Being, the very fact of localization means that the placement of beings
is similarly not-all. Thus, we neeo to account for this zero oegree of
consistency of a section of being-there is termeo its envelope: The regional stability of
a worlo comes oown to this: if you take a ranoom fragment of a given worlo, the beings
that are there in this fragment possessboth with respect to themselves ano relative to
one anotheroiherential oegrees of appearance which are inoexeo to the transcenoental
oroer within this worlo. || Corcocrtl,, oc coll crcclopc of o pott of tlc ootlo, tlot octrg
oloc otctcrttol coloc of oppcotorcc t tlc ,rtlcttc coloc opptopttotc to tlot pott. ,Baoiou, The
Transcenoental, p. .o8.,. In other woros, the envelope is the value of the composite
intensities of appearances within a given segment of a worlo, ano as such it provioes a
global stability to this section that unoerpins all appearances, even those with zero-value,
as this lack of appearance is still a ration that maintains its relation to the envelope itself,
ano hence is incluoeo as a non-appearance.
o. The transcenoental provioes a basic oroering of a situation, stemming from a series of
measures that oetermine the relations between the elements that comprise the situation.
It is important to note that the transcenoental is itself a multiple that oroers ano self-
regulates: the situation itself t rot otoctco. The transcenoental oetermines the conoitions
unoer which its elements operate within the specinc, localizeo appearance. In moving
from the potential real to the actual, we are tracing a reconnguration of ioentity from
a formal, singular mooe, to a contingent, relational mooe. The same set, ano the same
elements coulo appear as or in a wioe context of situations, ano as such their governing
transcenoental woulo vary accoroing to the oiherent constitution of worlos.
Linosey Hair .8
appearance, one which falls within the operating logic that structures a
given situation without actually oesignating a place of being-there. Ba-
oiou speaks of a logical mark, or inoex of non-appearance, an inscription
of absence. Moreover, this being that lacks a situation of appearing is
funoamental as the lower limit against which all other appearances in
the transcenoental envelope are to be measureo, provioing a stable scale
against which the variations, or oegree of beings oraw their meaning. It
is important to bear in mino that situational oiherence between elements
is simply a question of the intensity with which they appear tr tclottor to
all the other elements within that worlo: there is no absolute measure of
appearance, or appearance in itself . This being given, an element with
zero oegree appearance within a worlo is one with the least oegree of
relation with all other elements, thus, from the perspective of that par-
ticular worlo, it is not there: it is an element in the multiple being on the
ontological level, but from the onto-logical perspective of the situation
itself, it is not present.
:

While the wire fence ooes not seem to appear within the envelope of
the rural worlo, their juxtaposition entails a re-connguring of the topos.
The wioening of the context allows a re-calibration of the network of rela-
tions, ano what Baoiou calls the global unity of the section of the worlo
is reconstituteo to allow for its conjunction with the totality of its elements.
This oegree of relation, then, is calculateo in terms of the value of the con-
junction between the wire fence ano the synthesis of the value of its rela-
tions to all of the apparents within the envelope of the tranquil lanoscape,
consioereo case by case. In our current example, the train tracks that
appeareo with a LM oegree of intensity within the initial rural conngu-
ration, when taken in conjunction with the wire fence immeoiately take
:. To bring out this crucial oistinction, Baoiou ohers an example of natural numbers,
which we have alreaoy establisheo consist of transitive oroinals ano contain their own
logic of successionthus their ontological status is given. However, when we turn to an
instance of their use within an empirical situation, such as the numbering of the pages of
a book, whilst their intrinsic being remains unaltereo, it becomes possible to make claims
about their varying oegrees of appearance. Any page number participates in the situation
of the book, ano is governeo by a transcenoental logic that relates each number to the rest
in terms of their sequencing. Within this, it is evioent that some numbers appear more
intensely than othersfor example the chapter numbers that are singleo out in the inoex
ano form a separate sub-set of extra-signincant numbers, a oiherence that gives them a
higher value of appearance since these are the ones to which all the other numbers in that
respective chapter are relateo. Similarly, numbers that oo not correspono to a given page
,say, , can be saio to have zero-appearance within this situationwhilst ontologically
they share the same being as other oroinals, or natural numbers, within this nnite situation
of appearing their relation is minimal ,Baoiou, The Transcenoental, p. .:,.
on a maximal oegree of appearance, since they change from being part
of a sleepy rural railroao, to being implicateo in the oeportation of the
]ewsthe path that anticipates the link between the two oiherent worlos
of the camps ano the free worlo. This gesture is to be repeateo throughout
the nlm, as the routine of the present which initially seems removeo from
the inarticulable horrors of the camps, is re-connecteo to this unquantin-
able multiple, oemonstrating over ano again the logical tclottor that binos
the two as a single worlo. The oocumentary foregrounos the formal oim-
culty of being present-to that which remains subtracteo from nomination,
or representation, while paraooxically unoerlining the insistence of that
which in-appears within the current situation.
Certainly, the oocumentary foregrounos the intercalary relation be-
tween the tranquil lanoscape ano the camp site: grass has overgrown the
tell-tale tracks, ano the literal sites of the atrocities seem softeneo by the
summer sunshine, the crumbling builoings ironically becoming almost
picturesque such that, the narrator informs us, the crematorium has be-
come the subject of postcaros ano snapshots. The builoings that houseo
the subjugateo now appear blano, neutral, baloly refusing any appear-
ance of extraoroinariness that one feels events ought to have inscribeo
upon their surface. This aura of specious normality is taken up by the
narration that oetails the proouction, planning ano construction of the
camps, unoertaken as pragmatically as if they were any hostel or sta-
oium, with estimates, bios, bribes. The black ano white oocumentary
footage that accompanies this section again fails to bring-to-appearance
any of the horror that the re-visiting of these images now invokes. It is only
in the incongruous listing of the various architectural styles chosen for the
camps, presenteo almost as though it were a lesson in real estate alpine
style, garage style, ]apanese style, no style, that we begin to unoerstano
that the failure to form a consistent envelope proper-to the appearing of
the camps is not simply oue to a current oisjunction of worlos. Rather,
it signals an operating logic which oeliberately sought to ehace that ap-
pearance, builoing facaoes, semblances that present a transcenoental that
mimics that of its rural context, an act that testines to the imagination of
the oesigners, who inoeeo hao the ability to envisage gates to be passeo
through only once, ano the callous foresight to oesign them as part of the
tranquil lanoscape, such that the atrocity remaineo screeneo, having a
nil value of appearance within the larger worlo of the German people. To
put this oiherently, the very fact that the various styles of the camps are
all incluoeo within the larger matrix of representation that constitutes the
German state of the situation, enableo the prevention of the appearing
Linosey Hair .8
of the camps as such: at the time, they ex-sisteo as an unoetermineo ge-
neric set without a unifying preoicate to make them ioentinable.
The oocumentarys meoitation on the oestitution of subjectivity maps
the oescent from singularity to the oe-humanizeo oissemination of parts,
oevoio of particularity: the oeliberate attempt to erase the being-there, or
appearing of a whole section of humanity. To trace this, we must nrst re-
view the ioentity laws, which consist of three categorical prescriptions for
stabilizing a universe. Ior every object o there is an ioentical arrow to;o)
associateo with it, i.e. a map in which the oomain ano cooomain are the
same set A, oro for each o in A, f ;o) = o is calleo an ioentity map, written
I
A
.
.
Baoiou remarks that the ioentity arrow is a neutral element in the
operation of an arrow composition. The ioentity map is also known as an
enoomap, as its compositional map is internal, leaoing Baoiou to equate
it with the null action of the Ones minimal power ,TO :-., :6,, or
the inertia of renexive relations that function as a stopping point.
The tautological composition of the ioentity map is contrasteo with
the expression of the same cxtttrtcoll,, or isomorphically. Unlike in set
theory ,on the ontological level, in which we oetermine two sets ,or mul-
tiples, to be ioentical if they have the same elements, otherwise they are
absolutely oistinct, category theory aomits oegrees of relation. Two ob-
jects are saio to be categorically inoiscernible if there is a reversible ,or
isomorphic, arrow connecting them. This means that logically the same
set of relations holo for each object. However, there remains the pos-
sibility of cancelling an inversion, which in itself ioentines each object as
literally oistinct, although within the map they are ioenticala formal,
relational juogement.
This oennition is aooeo to the laws of composition ano association

to generate the oennition of a group within category theory: A group is a
.. I. W. Lawvere ano S. H. Schanuel, Corccptool Motlcmottc: A Fttt Irttooocttor to Cotcgottc,
Cambrioge, Cambrioge University Fress, :qq, p. :.
. :, Two arrows following one another make up a composition, or to put this oiherently,
if we have an arrow f that links a to its cooomain b, ano a secono arrow g that has b
as its oomain, ano c as its cooomain, then we can state that object a is linkeo to c ,by g o
fexpresseo as g following f ,. The two maps representeo by the arrow ano its respective
oomain ano cooomain proouce a composite map written:
f g
A B C.
., the associative law, which shows that
f o ,g o h, ~ ,f o g, o h
,ano thereby allows us to leave out the parentheses ano just write l o g o f, or h following
g following f ,. cf. Lawvere ano Schanuel, Corccptool Motlcmottc: A Fttt Irttooocttor to
category that has a single object in which every arrow is an isomorphism
,TO :8,
.
Thus, a group comprises an object that is ioentineo purely by
the anonymity of a letter ano the set of morphisms that are associateo
with it, or the set of the oiherent ways in which object-letter G is ioentical
to itself ,TO :q,. Where set-theory looks at the oroering of elements to
oetermine ioentity between sets, in category theory the elements are ar-
rows, the operations mapping a composition, not the objects upon which
it operatesinoeeo the object is the point of inertia, or neutral element
that ohers zero information, other than tautological self-evioence. We are
clearly ohereo a oiherent perspective on ioentityrather than the rep-
etition of the same, we have a plurality of active ways of prooucing the
same, the conngurations via which it isomorphically manifests itself o
the same. Baoiou theorizes this via reference to the Flatonic oialectical
relation between the Same ano the Other: whereas the ioentity enoomap
conforms to a mimetic relation, the activity of the isomorphisms perform
a specular relation as the reversibility of each arrow that claims two lit-
erally oistinct elements as logically the same performs a ooubling, a pair
of symmetrical ioentincations that, when taken simultaneously, collapse
back into the inertia of the enoomap.
In rethinking ioentity in this categorical manner, we see how the be-
ing-there of an essent is oetermineo not by the composition of its nxeo
properties ,i.e. the oroering of its elements, which comprise its ontological
being, but through to its active self-proouction which gives its ioentity
via the combination of relations it entails. Diherence is not absolute, since
the ioentity arrows are caught up within a network of Same/Other rela-
tions, but a question of oegreeano here we are close to Deleuzes notion
of intensities. These areas of convergence between same/other are not
simply points of mimetic similarity between oistinct essents ,shareo ele-
ments, such as the null set that is common to all constructeo sets, but ac-
tive relations that ptooocc the ioentities of the two oomains that are joineo
by the isomorphic arrows. Since these relations are not oeriveo from nxeo
attributes but comprise active links that proouce connections of sameness
ano oiherence, we can see how a situation is nuio, ano yet rigorously
structureo.
Relating this back to the operational logic of the camps as portrayeo
in Resnais oocumentary, we can note the oeliberate attempt to erase the
oiherential of appearances, as each inmate is strippeo of any external
marker that might oistinguish them. This oescent from ontological singu-
Cotcgottc, p. :.
Linosey Hair .8
larity, to the erasure of onto-logic appearing, is portrayeo in the nlm as a
passage from family groups, lingering close-ups of inoivioual faces prior
to their boaroing the trains, to the sealing oh of carriages as preluoe to
the ultimate concealment of appearance in the camp. Within the connnes
of the camp we no longer see images of whole people, the fragmenta-
tion of ioentity is signalleo by the oe-subjectivizeo close-ups of the oiher-
ent booy parts that are regulateo, oisciplineo, upon arrival nakeo, tat-
tooeo, numbereo, ano shaveooperations that oo not seem to happen to
someorc. All inmates appear with a similar, minimum oegree of intensity,
or lack of appearance, since oiherentiation itself is systematically ehaceo.
The ehacement of ioentity can be thought of as severing, or restrict-
ing, the multiple relations via which an inoivioual constitutes the ioentity.
In being reouceo to just one more name, or number, meticulously re-
coroeo in a register, ioentity ceases to be interrelational, ano is restricteo
to the minimal tautological relation that Baoiou equates with the inertia
of the One, the pure inscription that opens the place for an essent to
appear, without allowing any oialectic between self/other to mooulate
the relational intensity with which an ontological singularity manifests the
oiversity ano variety of its situateo appearing. This inertia in ehect is the
minimum oegree of self-relation that proouces a limiteo ioentity, or nxes
the being-there within a localizeo worlo as merely countable.
This minimal inscription of presence/absence is emphasizeo in the
nlm by the many ways in which the prisoners are systematically eraseo
from the registers. The closeo universe of the camp enters into relation
with a simulacrum of the Germanic worlo beyono its gates, having a hos-
pital, but one in which all illness is reouceo to a single ailment, the same
ointment for every oisease, or treatment is in fact oeath by syringe.
Suhering is homogenizeo in the eno each inmate resembles the next,
a booy of inoeterminate age that oies with its eyes openeven oeath,
that which gives beings their singularity, is reouceo to a process in which
there remains no I to oie, only the enoless oying of someone, again, the
oegree of visibility of all apparents is negateo such that even oeath fails
to register as a singularizing event. Counter to this hospital in which all
patients receive the same oegree of inattention, we have the surgical block
where the patients receive an inoroinate oegree of surveillance, becoming
guinea pigs for pointless, grotesque operations, testing grounos for orugs,
or simply a focus for iole experimentation. The well equippeo surgeries
here are not to heal the booy, but proouce oeviant variations, new mooes
of appearing that violate the laws of nature ano the humanity of the vic-
tim.
Once ioentity is reouceo to the minimum inscription of place,
number, one woulo imagine that no further oestitution were possible.
However, the imperative of the Iinal Solution provokeo Nazi ingenuity
to take the mania for oismantlement even further: the total ehacement
of the appearing of the ]ewish prisoners is unoertaken via the methooi-
cal oissemination into parts. That all elements that combineo to proouce
the singularity of an inoivioual were methooically strippeo away we have
alreaoy establisheo, however, the perverse extent of this process that oe-
manoeo the cataloguing ano storing of all these oismembereo attributes
speaks to a oesire to mutilate the ioentity of the prisoner beyono any
possible recognition or recuperation. Iootage from the Nazi warehouses
oepicts vast piles of connscateo propertythe corollary of the proper-
ties of each inoivioual that were sheo. Files of clothes, ousty ano moth
eaten, mountains of ooo shoes, spectacles, carelessly pileo up, inoiherent
to scratches, combs, shaving equipment, the intimate oebris of particular
lives, separateo out into their oisparate elements ano formeo into a new,
amorphous multiple, constructeo of a single element that is reiterateo to
the nth oegree, a magnituoe of such scale that their original value, or use
becomes lost, their specinc features blurreo in the sheer incomprehensi-
ble volume of which they are an inoiscernible element who is to re-use
these mouloy shaving brushes, or pick out a particular crackeo pair of
reaoing glasses? Surely the point is not the thrifty cataloguing ano re-
cycling of resources, but the oismantlement of a section of humanity to
its minimum parts, an operation Baoiou terms immanent oissemination
whereby the elements that comprise an element are further broken oown
into their sub-elements, an extrapolation of relation, to its limit pointto
the point at which the original being loses all particularity, being oenuoeo
of property, ano the sub-elements themselves are re-conngureo to form
innnitely large multiplicities that exteno beyono any imaginable capacity
to think their inoivioual use. Each item is placeo in a context where there
is no possibility of it retaining its intrinsic personal value, as operateo in
relation to its original context. Thus, even the smallest elements are re-
ouceo in their appearing to an absolute minimum.
In category theory, the logical operation of negation oerives from the
relation of oepenoence. As we saw with the zero-value of a being that
ooes not appear within a worlo, this lack of relation is not unoerstooo as
a simple negation, but is linkeo to the envelope or the synthesizing tran-
scenoental, such that it has a value in the worloit inappearsrather
than functioning as a hole, or break in the fabric of its continuity. This
insight is generalizeo to proouce a logic of negation. Rather than restrict-
Linosey Hair .8q
ing our operation to a single element that accoros to the minimum oegree
of appearance, we can oeouce whole sections, or envelopes that belong to
a worlo, but are unrelateo to other envelopes. Thus, if we construct the
envelope that centres arouno the initial being-there of an apparent we
are also able to construct a set, or envelope of those beings, or elements,
with which it has zero ,or minimum, relation, ano within this set we can
again extract the measure that synthesizes this collective being-there for
this separate part of the worlo. This provioes a measure of the reverse of
our former situation.
We shall call reverse of the oegree of appearance of a being-there
in a worlo, the envelope of that region of the worlo comprising all
the beings-there whose conjunction with the nrst has a value of
zero ,the minimum,.
Baoiou stresses that it is of particular signincance that the logical opera-

tion of negation occurs as a tcolt of the transcenoental parameters ,mini-
mality, conjunction ano the envelope, ano is not a meta-structural conoi-
tion imposeo from without.
This mania of ehacement ano control reaches its zenith in the Nazi
hoaroing of the hair of the shaveo camp women. Here we have the mate-
rial link between property as possession ano property as attribute. Not
only are the women maoe anonymous, sexless via the humiliating act
of being shorn, but the markers of their inoiviouality ano freeoom is re-
taineo ano amasseo, forming an shapeless billowing mass of curls ano
tangles, impossible to take in as the camera pans across the expanse of the
warehouse showing acres of hair, a quantity so expansive that there is no
other contextualizing feature within the frame to help the viewer to com-
preheno what they are seeing. Here surely is the height of reounoancy, a
oismantling that exceeos sense.
But no, the oocumentary transitions to its nnal phase, where it traces
the logic of in-appearing from the attempt to oeny visibility, oiherence, to
its actual transformationits appearing-as-other. The shapeless hair be-
comes neat bales of cloth, stackeo reaoy for the practical German Haus-
frau, the recalcitrant skeletons that withstooo the nres of the crematorium
are re-cycleo as fertilizer, booies yielo up fat to proouce soap, ano even
skin is re-useo as paper: one of the nuttering scraps that testify to this has,
ironically, a beautiful female face orawn upon ita grotesque inscrip-
tion of lack at the very site of the inexistent whose absence it attests. In
focusing on this literal inappearance of the ]ews within the German situ-
. Baoiou, The Transcenoental, p. .:.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .qo
ation, Resnais seeks to oiscuss the wioer problem of thinking the Real of
the holocaust. While the very use of oocument, of historical footage, to
construct his argument might suggest that, on the contrary, the reality is
all to evioent, the closing sequence of the nlm unoerlines its continuing
resistance to being thought. The universal oenial of responsibility extenos
beyono the oepicteo post-war trials, ironically implicating the work of art
itself, as its release for oistribution ,so Resnais tells us
, was contingent
upon the erasure of a Irench soloiers cap, shown supervising the oepor-
tation of the ]ews. In answer to the closing question Who is responsible?
even ten years later, the answer continueo to be no one. In submitting
to the change oro remarking it, Resnais remains faithful to his artistic
conviction which oemanos that he inscribe the impossibility of the bring-
ing-to-appearance of the inexistent within the current state of the situa-
tionontological impossibility proper, but in parallel with the onto-logic
,as here, the crassly political, level.
So long as we consioer appearing within a traoitional ,vulgar, phe-
nomenological framework, we can leverage only inoirectly, through al-
legory, category theorys ability to map the logic of appearing within the
oiegetic frame. The real strength of category theory is its inoepenoence
from phenomenology, from the centering consciousness of the subject,
from the parameters of space ano time. This makes category theory a
particularly attractive tool for mapping the site of subtractive truth,s, in
the nelo of art, for oiscussing works of art purely in terms of their in-ap-
pearing, ano in terms of their relation with truth, ano the character of
that truth. In closing, we may consioer some woros of Chris Marker, an-
other thinker of the generic, that truth is not the oestination, but perhaps
it is the path
6
ano where oocumentary truth is at stake, it is perhaps
even more explicitly the proceoure, rather than the constructeo artefact.
. Interview at the time of the nlms release, now incluoeo with the oistribution of the
nlm on vioeo.
6. Chris Marker, quoteo in Mark Shivas, New Approach, Moctc 8, no. :, April :q6.
.q:
11
Can Cinema Be Thought?:
Alain Baoiou ano the Artistic Conoition
Alex Ling
I. THE ART OI THE MATERIALIST DIALECTIC
In his recent Logtoc oc moroc: lcttc ct lcrcmcrt, ., Alain Baoiou
names the tension integral to his philosophynamely the one which runs
between being ano event, knowleoge ano trutha materialist oialectic.
It is on the basis of this peculiar oialectic that he opposes his own phil-
osophical project to the contemporary oemocratic materialism which
more ano more oennes our epoch ,prescribeo as it is by the master signin-
ers relativism, oemocracy, terror ano the like,. In contrast to the appar-
ent sophistry of this oemocratic materialismwhose principal assertion is
that there are only booies ano languages
:
Baoious materialist oialectic
proclaims there are only booies ano languages, cxccpt tlot tlctc otc ttotl
,LM :.,. Or again: there are only worlos in which beings appear ,of which
the pure multiple ngures being qua being, cxccpt tlot tlctc otc ttotl oltcl
cor comc to opplcmcrt tlcc ootlo ,oro oltcl otc ortcctoltoolc,. Such is Baoi-
ous philosophical axiom, within which we nno the three principal strata
comprising his thought, namely, the ontological ,the thinking of the pure
multiple, of being qua being,, the logical ,the thinking of appearance,
of being-in-a-worlo, ano the subject-ive ,the thinking of truths, of tlooglt
itself,. Yet these three terms alone are meaningless without an ,albeit sub-
tracteo, fourth, which is of course the abolisheo nash that is the event
,LM :6,. Alreaoy we can oiscern here a clear conoitional oivioe between
:. Alain Baoiou, Logtoc oc moroc: lcttc ct lcrcmcrt, ., Faris, Seuil, .oo6, p. q ,henceforth
LM,.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .q.
the nrst three terms ,ontology, logic, thought, ano the fourth ,event,, in-
sofar as whilst the former are themselves thought mathematically by vir-
tue of three oistinct scientinc eventsrespectively the Cantor-event ,set
theory,, the Grothenoieck-event ,category theory,, ano the Cohen-event
,genericity or forcing,mathematics can say nothing of the event itself.
On this point Baoiou is unequivocal, for
if real ontology is set up as mathematics by evaoing the norm of
the One, unless this norm is reestablisheo globally there also ought
to be a point wherein the ontological, hence mathematical nelo,
is oe-totalizeo or remains at a oeao eno. I have nameo this point
the cccrt.
.

Simply, mathematics can think the event only to the extent that it can
think its own real qua impasse. Or again, mathematics thinks the event
insofar as it axiomatizes its own aporetic structure ,as we see for example
in Gooels theory of incompletion or in the axiom of founoation,. Con-
trarily, the event, of which science must remain silent, ano on which the
concept of truth relies absolutely, is thought solely unoer conoition of art.
Given then the evental importance of art ,coupleo with the fact that
Baoiou is an accomplisheo novelist ano playwright in his own right, it is
surprising to observe the relative scarcity of critical renection on Baoious
conception of art ,when compareo to, say, the abunoance of works consio-
ering Baoious unoerstanoing of politics,.
Inoeeo it follows thatinsofar

as it is art ano art alone that thinks the eventthe real nexus of Baoious
oialectic lies with the artistic conoition, or, to be more precise, with the
subtractive poetry of Stphane Mallarm.
Thus Baoiou notes immeoi-

ately after introoucing his oialectic that in its principal assertion ,there
are only booies ano languages, except that there are truths, one will
recognize here the style of my master Mallarm: nothing will have taken
.. Alain Baoiou, Bttcrg or Exttcrcc: A Slott Ttcottc or Ttorttot, Ortolog,, trans. Norman
Maoerasz, New York, SUNY, .oo6, p. 6o ,henceforth TO,.
. This is further compounoeo if we consioer Baoious own ehorts to tie the question of art
to that of political emancipation. Ior example, in his Iifteen Theses on Contemporary
Art Baoiou states that the question of art tooay is a question of political emancipation,
there is something political in art itself. There is not only a question of arts political orien-
tation, like it was the case yesteroay, tooay it is a question in itself. Because art is a real
possibility to create something new against the abstract universality that is globalisation,
Locortor Irc, vol. ., .oo, p. :o.
. Baoiou says as much on numerous occasions. To pick but a single example: Mallarm
is a thinker of the event-orama, in the oouble sense of its appearance-oisappearance
ano of its interpretation which gives it the status of an acquisition for ever, Alain Baoiou,
Bctrg oro Eccrt, trans. Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. :q: ,henceforth BE,.
Alex Ling .q
place but the place, except, on high, perhaps, a constellation ,LM :.,.

So the sequence of scientinc events ,Cantor-Grothenoieck-Cohen, princi-
pally conoitioning Baoious philosophy is supplementeo by the Mallarm-
event, exceptional in its singular, non-mathematical ano axial status. Of
course this separationof poetry ano mathematicsis far from innocent,
being on the contrary illustrative of a funoamental antagonism lying at the
,voioeo, interval of art ano science.
6
Accoroingly within Baoious artistic
system or his inaestheticsinaesthetics being namely his approach to art
which restricts its consioerations to the strictly intraphilosophical ehects
proouceo by the existence of some works of art ,LM :.,
the imperial
poem takes prioe of place. Inoeeo, it is the expressly lttctol artsthose
arts of the letter: of poetry as much as theatre ano the novelwhich com-
mano Baoious closest attention, to the extent that, as ]acques Ranciere
has remarkeo, ultimately only two arts are requireo in Baoious system of
the arts: the poem as amrmation, as inscription of a oisappearance, ano
theatre as the site wherein this amrmation turns into mobilization.
8
In
point of fact, beyono these expressly literal arts art becomes for Baoiou
both oecioeoly less artistic ano less amenable to inaesthetic consioeration.
Hence in Baoious eyes oance for example falls shortunoeserveoly, one
hastens to aooof artistic status, serving insteao as its metaphor ,or rath-
er as the metaphor of real thought,. Fainting, on the other hanothough
clearly itself an art ,in Logtoc oc moroc, for example, painting exemplines
artistic truth,by virtue of its oecioeoly non-literal form, proves itself ,as
we shall see, somewhat oimcult to justify artistically ,to say nothing of
sculpture or architecture, let alone the myriao other illiterate arts,.
. cf. Stphane Mallarm, Collcctco Pocm, trans. Henry Weinnelo, Berkeley, University of
California Fress, :qq, pp. :.-:.
6. Inoeeo, Baoiou notes that in their subjective ,true, oimension science proves to be the
opposite of art, which explains the spectacular isomorphism of their evental traces, LM,
p. 8.
. Alain Baoiou, Horooool of Iroctlcttc, trans. Alberto Toscano, Stanforo, California,
Stanforo UF, .oo, p. xiv ,henceforth HI,.
8. ]acques Ranciere, Aesthetics, Inaesthetics, Anti-Aesthetics, in Feter Hallwaro ,eo.,
Tltrl Agotr: Alotr Bootoo oro tlc Fototc of Pltloopl,, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. .. I
am of course aware that in oescribing theatre as a literal art I am essentially ignoring its
funoamentally performative nature. It shoulo be noteo however that whilst Baoiou clearly
recognizes performativity to be vital to theatres artistry, his writings on the subject ,or at
least those which have been translateo into English, teno to focus on the texts themselves
,outsioe of the singularity of their performances,.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .q
II. CINEMA DECONDITIONED
In consioering Baoious inaesthetics this paper will however take as its
focal point the case of cinema, insofar as Baoious typically polemical writ-
ings on the subject appear symptomaticano arguably serve as the most
extreme exampleof the oecreaseo amenability to inaesthetic oiscourse
presenteo by the illiterate arts. Inoeeo, Baoious writings on the subject
of cinema are oistinguisheo foremost by their oeep ambivalence: in his
eyes nlm rests somewhat precariously on the boroer of art ano non-art
,although ones immeoiate impression is that it leans somewhat towaro the
latter,. Simply, cinema is for Baoiou an art both parasitic ano inconsist-
ent oenneo nrst ano foremost by its own impurity ,HI 8,. This impurity
hinges as much on cinemas inherent bastarory ,nlm being the proouct
of an unsanctioneo union between theatre, photography, music, litera-
ture, painting, vauoeville, ano so on, ano compromiseo nature ,cinema
being a collaborative meoium governeo for the most part by capitalistic
concerns,, as on its artistically porus nature, that is, its peculiar status as
a place of intrinsic inoiscernibility between art ano non-art.
q
Inoeeo ac-
coroing to Baoiou
no nlm strictly speaking is controlleo by artistic thinking from
beginning to eno. It always bears absolutely impure elements
within it, orawn from ambient imagery, from the oetritus of other
arts, ano from conventions with a limiteo shelf life.
:o
Insofar as cinema ngures as something of a grey area between art ano
non-art Baoiou contenos that artistic activity can be oiscerneo in cinema
only as a process of purincation of its own immanent non-artistic char-
acter.
::
Yet at the same time he consents to the fact that such a process
can never be completeo ,as such cinematic purity might be at best ap-
proacheo only asymptotically,. Baoious overall position regaroing the ar-
tistic status of cinema woulo then appear to be the following: the impurity
proper to cinema forecloses from the start any possibility of its attaining
true ,pure, artistic status.
Ano yet Baoiou clearly recognizes cinema to have been an art, his
frequent citing of the thinking cinema of Grimth, Welles, Murnau ano
Eisenstein ,as much as Gooaro, Kiarostami, Visconti, Oliveira ano the
q. Alain Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Cinema, in Irrttc Tlooglt: Ttotl oro tlc Rctotr to Plt-
loopl,, eo. ano trans. Oliver Ieltham ano ]ustin Clemens, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo,
p. :::.
:o. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Cinema, p. :::.
::. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Cinema, p. :::.
Alex Ling .q
like, amply attesting this fact. Inoeeo, cinemas artistic status woulo seem
to have been connrmeo far in aovance of Baoious own inaesthetic incur-
sions, insofar as it has serveo to conoition philosophy, most notably that
of Gilles Deleuze. As Baoiou explains,
nlm buhs have always founo it oimcult to make use of |Deleuzes|
two hefty volumes on the cinema, for, however supple the inoivioual
nlm oescriptions may be in their own right, this malleability seems
nevertheless to function in philosophys favour, rather than to
fashion, in any way whatsoever, a simple critical juogement that
nlm enthusiasts coulo oraw on to enhance the authority of their
opinions.
:.
Deleuzes apprehension of nlms intraphilosophical ehects woulo thus seem
at nrst glance an absolutely inaesthetic operation ,this being accoroingly
incongruous to any aphilosophical thinking of cinemanamely any other
consioeration of cinema whatsoeverwhich simply fall into the thought-
less ano self-interesteo realm of opiniatry,. Ano yet Baoiou proceeos to
isolate Deleuzes conceptual unoerstanoing of cinema as an exampleor
rather, as tlc exampleof Deleuzes monotonous proouction of concepts
insofar as his cinema books propose in the eno a creative repetition of
concepts ano not an apprehension of the cinematic art as such:
let us unoerstano that, unoer the constraint of the case of cinema,
it is once again, ano always, ,Deleuzes, philosophy that begins
anew ano that causes cinema to be there olctc tt corrot, of ttclf, oc.
,D :6,
Which is to say that those concepts founo in cinema are in fact not so
much founo as re-founo.
:
Thus the Deleuzian screenmeoiateo as it is
through the thought of Baoiouis strippeo of its genitive powers, reveal-
ing a space through which Deleuze oeploys concepts which, whilst cer-
tainly immanent to cinema, are funoamentally anterior in nature.
:

:.. Alain Baoiou, Dclcoc: Tlc Clomot of Bctrg, trans. Louise Burchill, Minneapolis, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Fress, .ooo, pp. :-:6 ,henceforth D,.
:. One can juoge for oneself whether this conception jars with Deleuzes explicit asser-
tionciteo by Baoiouthat a theory of cinema is not a theory about cinema, but about
the concepts that cinema gives rise to, Gilles Deleuze, Ctrcmo .: Tlc Ttmc-Imogc, trans.
Hugh Tomlinsom ano Robert Galeta, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, pp. .68-.6q.
:. In his One, Multiple, Multiplicities Baoiou is much more oirect: I cannot register
any kino of caesura between Dtctcrcc oro Rcpcttttor ano the more oetaileo philosophical
texts to be founo in the two volumes on cinema, in Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, eo. ano trans. Ray
Brassier ano Alberto Toscano, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. o.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .q6
By thus attesting to the ,conceptually as much as manifestly, re-pre-
sentative nature of cinema Baoiou implicitly oetermines nlm to not in
fact conoition Deleuzes philosophy: the concept is not borne of cinema,
rather, it enoures as a passage through the works themselves. Hence as
Baoiou, as Baoiou explains, in Deleuzes philosophy
concepts, which are never concepts-of , are only attacheo to the
initial concrete case in their movement ano not in what they give
to be thought. This is why, in the volumes on the cinema, what one
learns concerns the Deleuzian theory of movement ano time, ano
the cinema graoually becomes neutralizeo ano forgotten. ,D :6,
Can we not oiscern a certain structural ,as much as conceptual, homology
between this assertion ano Baoious own inaesthetic conception of cinema
as the passage of the ioea, perhaps even of its phantom? ,HI , As with
the ioea, the concept merely passes through the concrete case, meaning
that, insofar as it evinces not the sensible creation of the Ioea ,LM ., but
rather serves only to signify its ephemerality, cinema once again falls short
of its artistic aspirations. In fact, we might ,provisionally, say that cinema
remains for the most part in Baoious writings a funoamentally Deleuz-
ian eoince, the peculiar twist or torsion here being that this Deleuze is
a oistinctly Baoiouian Deleuze ,ano inoeeo Baoious writings on cinema
clearly constitute an implicit oialogue with Deleuze, as can be seen for
example in Baoious thesis regaroing the false movements of cinema,.
:

III. IDEAL IMMOBILE MOVEMENT
As we have seen, Baoious materialist oialectic hinges on the question
of the event which is thought solely by art ,ano which nnos its immeoiate
cooroinates in the poetic thought of Mallarm,. Iurther, his inaesthetic
conception of art accoroingly allows room principally for the literal arts,
making it oimcult to properly grasp those arts which fall outsioe of this cat-
egory. Having seen then how Baoiou grants cinema an artistic pot ,which
paraooxically take the form of present, that is, as specinc artistic con-
ngurations, whilst ultimately unoercutting its conoitional status we might
wonoer whetherinsofar as it fails to proouce any intraphilosophical ef-
fectscinema can truly occupy a place in Baoious inaesthetic system.
Inoeeo, can concrete cinematic art be ioentineo at all? The opening lines
:. cf. HI, pp. 8-88. To take a simple example Deleuze asserts that as a consequence of
the supersession of the movement-image by the time-image time ceases to be oeriveo
from the movement, it appears in itself ano itself gives rise to folc moccmcrt, Ctrcmo ., pp.
xi-xii.
Alex Ling .q
of Baoious essay on Fhilosophy ano Cinemain which he asserts there
is no objective situation of cinema
:6
woulo seem to suggest not. Here
Baoiou appears to oeny from the nrst the very possibility of there being
any truth to ,contemporary, cinema for the simple reason that in Baoious
philosophy truth, by virtue of its generic nature, must ahect the entirety of
the situation: if there is no coherent situation there can be no truth of the
situation. Nonetheless Baoiou acknowleoges that select cinematic situa-
tions ,plural, might be oeriveo on the basis of previous ioentinable artistic
conngurations ,or subjects,, which he ooes not shy from cataloguing: the
nlms of Oliveira, of Kiarostami, of Straub, of the early Wenoers, of a
certain Follet, of some Gooaros, etc.
:
Yet even though we can ioentify
multiple cinematic situations in which truth is thinkablewhere the new
new ,the contemporary subjects of cinema, can come into a oialectic
with the olo new ,as oelineateo by the Oliveiras, the Kiarostamis ano
the like,
:8
cinemas ineraoicable impurity woulo seem nonetheless to en-
sure its position as properly antithetical to truth. Baoious stance is after
all that a nlmic work is both contemporary ano universalizable ,that is to
say, capable of truth, inasmuch as it purines its own intrinsic non-artistry
,plus all the visible ano auoible materials of everything which binos them
to the oomination of representation, ioentincation ano realism, as much
as spectacle ano its various operators,,
:q
which is of course, as he reao-
ily aomits, an ultimately impossible task. Clearly then a novel cinematic
thoughtan artistic cinema ,or rather one recognizeo as such by Ba-
oiou,shoulo appear as a sequence of subtractive or oissociative gestures
built uponano recognizable as entering into a oialectic withthose
prescriptive works of Straub, of Gooaro, of Follet ano so forth. That is,
cinematic thought woulo appear, like any other artistic proceoure, as a
booy of works which constitute themselves as nnite points of an innnite,
albeit anterior, truth ,for unlike truth one cannot force an event,.
.o
:6. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Cinema, p. :oq.
:. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Cinema, p. ::o.
:8. The new ooes not enter into a oialectic with the olo, but rather with the olo new, or
the new of the preceoing sequence, Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Cinema, p. ::o
:q. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Cinema, p. ::.
.o. Baoiou thus implicitly argues that an artistic cinema woulo constitute a funoamen-
tally anti-statist cinema ,statist cinema being all cinema in the service of representation,
ioentincation, spectacle ano the like,. We might then infer that, insofar as statist cinema
is clearly the oominant nlmic guise ,qualitatively as much as quantitatively,, any artistic
cinema woulo necessarily present itself paraooxically as an anti-cinema. On this point Ba-
oiou woulo be in clear agreement with another of his favoureo artistic exemplars Kazimir
Malevich ano his contention that cinema must realize that art can exist without the
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo .q8
However cinemas impurity presents a further oimculty, one which
concerns any speaking of nlm qua nlm, insofar as when the nlm really
ooes organize the visitation of an Ioea it is always in a subtractive ,or
oefective, relation to one or several among the other arts ,HI 86,. Which
is to say when an ioea visits us cinematically, it is necessarily brought
forth by way of an intranlmic complication of the other arts ,for exam-
ple an ostensibly cinematic ioea might be inoebteo to a certain musical
evocation, an actors peculiar theatricality, ano so forth,. On this point
Baoiou conceoes nothing to romantic notions of an essence peculiar to
cinema: for Baoiou there is nothing artistically singular in nlm per se,
cinema is nothing but takes ano eoiting. There is nothing else ,HI 86,.
Which is why cinema is for Baoiou nothing other than a sequence of
,false, moccmcrt, meaning that any truth specinc to the cinema must relate
this movement or passage of the image to the ioea itself ,or more specin-
cally, to the timeless tmmootltt, of the ioea thus brought forth,. Inoeeo, Ba-
oiou goes so far as to state that such ioeal immobile movement constitutes
the imperative proper to cinema:
by means of the possibility that is proper to itof amalgamating the
other arts, through takes ano montage, without presenting them
cinema can, ano must, organise the passage of the immobile. But
cinema must also organise the immobility of a passage. ,HI 8,
Which is to say that if cinema is in any way to facilitate the passage of an
ioea it must concurrently ensure that the ioea thus brought forth ooes
not itself pass. Thus in other woros the unenviable task Baoiou oemanos
of any properly artistic cinema woulo appear to be nothing short of the
presentation of immobility tr movement. However this formulation itself
raises a number of questions ,to which Baoiou ohers little by way of an-
swer,. Ior example, how exactly might this peculiar immobility be real-
izeo? Baoious own example taken from ]acques Tatis Plo,ttmc ,:q6,of
the oialectic establisheo between the movement of a crowo ano the va-
cuity of what coulo be termeo its atomic composition ,HI 8, as spatially
accounting for the passage of the immobileachieves little by way of
clarincation: how precisely ooes Tatis sequence ehect the immobility of
a passage ,to say nothing of the precise status of the oialectic establisheo
image, without everyoay life, ano without the ioeas visage, Kazimir Malevich, Ano Vis-
ages Are Victorious on the Screen, in Oksana Bulgakowa ,eo., Iotmtt Molcctcl: Tlc 1lttc
Rcctorglc, 1ttttrg or Ftlm, trans. Oksana Bulgakowa, San Irancisco, Fotemkin Fress, .oo.,
p. . One ooes teno to wonoer however exactly how Baoiou can resolve such a thinking
of artistic cinema with his realization that pure cinema ooes not exist, except in the
oeao-eno vision of avant-garoe formalism. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Cinema, p:::.
Alex Ling .qq
therein,? Iurthermore, what exactly is the ioea that Tati is mobilizing
,ano if the ioea is that of the immobile itself how ooes Tatis sequence oif-
ferentiate itself from other seemingly equally re-presentational cases, such
as are founo in the contemporary cinemas of Terrence Malick or Davio
Lynch,? In aooition, if as Baoiou states cinema is itself nothing but takes
ano eoiting we might wonoer what the ultimate result of a purging of its
non-artistic content might be? Lastly we might question whether the very
concept of immobile movement is itself consistent with the remainoer of
Baoious thoughts on cinema, which is to say, can Baoious conception of
cinema as both a potential passage ,of the ioea, ano an inexorable passing
,of the image, be reconcileo with the ioea of immobility itself?
IV. ILLITERATE CINEMA AND THE REMAINDER OI ART
In consioering these questions let us nrst restate the oimculties en-
countereo in Baoious writings on cinema are to a large extent sympto-
matic of its imagistic nature, insofar as it is plainly more conoucive for phi-
losophy ,which is, after all, a funoamentally literal meoium, to consioer
those arts which themselves nno concrete support in the letter. The fact
of the matter is that, outsioe of formal exegesis ano the subjective neeting-
ness of ahect, the image ooes not leno itself well to the letter. This is of
course not to say that that artistic inscription itself is oirectly at issueon
the contrary it is inscription ,of the inexistent of a worlo, which serves as
the overrioing imperative of art qua generic proceourebut rather to
highlight the problem of transmissibility, which might be formulateo as
follows: how might the non-literal be transmitteo by way of the letter?
.:

Take for example Baoious recent woros on Clauoe Monets ^,mplo:
the goal of Monet is to oirectly inscribe on the artincial surface of
the painting the light ano colours as the process of oivision of light.
But light ano its oivision ooes not exist at the surface of water
So Monet has to force the painting to express the inexistent, the
inexistent which is not things in light, but light as a thing ano
nnally when we see the painting we unoerstano that its not really
light as a thing, its the impossibility of something like that. But this
failure is the victory of painting. This failure is the glory of painting
as such.
..
.:. On this point we cannot help but think both of the Lacanian concept of the pass ano
of the ultimate aim of the analytic cure, which is to renoer a knowleoge that is wholly
transmissible, without remainoer, Alain Baoiou, The Iormulas of lEtootott, Locortor Irc,
vol. ., .oo6, p. 8:.
... Baoiou, Arts Imperative: Speaking the Unspeakable Locor.com, vol. .6, .oo6, http://
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo oo
We can clearly observe here the oimcultyfaceo by artist ano philoso-
pher alikeof articulating the image through the letter in Monets ex-
pressing light as a thing ,inoeeo, it is the necessary failure of such an
inscriptionpictorially as much as literallythat oesignates for Baoiou
its true artistry,. This oimculty is one Baoiou ooes not shy from acknowl-
eoging. On the contrary, Baoiou is refreshingly forthcoming about the
problem the visual arts present philosophy, aomitting
of all the arts, its the one that intimioates me the most. Its intellectual
charge is the greatest So turning to visual art philosophically has
always been rather oimcult for me. Its not a feeling of ignorance
at all, but a feeling that the mooe in which intellectuality proceeos
irreoucibly into complex ano powerful sensory forms . . . really,
painting intimioates me Whats more, Ive never been very
satisneo by the attempts of my preoecessors to place themselves
unoer the conoition of painting. Nor have I ever founo a regime of
prose aoequate to talk about painting.
.
Returning then to the case of cinema it is clear that we encounter in
fact not one but two complicateo passages: of the ioea through the image
,the artistic or aesthetic passage,, ano of the image through the letter ,the
philosophic or inaesthetic passage,. This in mino we might concluoe the
apparent hegemony of the letter in Baoious inaesthetics to be ultimately
one of convenience, resulting as it ooes from the simple fact that the non-
literal consistently fails to renoer a whollyor even partiallytransmis-
sible knowleoge. Yet, however problematic it may be to express literally,
as we have seen painting is for Baoiou clearly an art whereas cinema re-
mains artistically unclear ,a fact which appears all the more strange given
that Deleuzes two cinema books speno a great oeal of time aooressing
this very problem,.
.

There is of course another basis for the hegemony of the letter in Ba-
oious inaesthetics. Simply, given the funoamental role playeo by subtrac-
tion ano the voio in his philosophyano given that it is art ano art alone
that thinks the event ,which itself issues forth from the voio,we might
www.lacan.com/issue.6.htm.
.. Alain Baoiou 8 Lauren Seoofsky, Being by Numbers, Attfotom, Oct, :qq, http://
www.highbeam.com/library/oocIree.asp?DOCID~:G:::6:q.
.. In Deleuzes woros cinema is not a universal or primitive language system It con-
sists of movements ano thought-processes ,pre-linguistic images,, ano of points of view on
these movements ano processes ,pre-signifying signs,, Deleuze, Ctrcmo ., p. .:. Hence,
for Deleuze, if a semiotics baseo on linguistics worries me, its because it ooes away
with both the image ano the notion of the sign, Deleuze, ^cgottottor: .,.-.o, trans.
Martin ]oughin, New York, Columbia University Fress, :qq, p. -8.
Alex Ling o:
concluoe that the more artistic a work is then the more intimate its rela-
tion to the letter qua matheme ,this being again an asymptotic approach:
art, be it literal or otherwise, can of course never be properly reouceo
to the mark of the voio,. Which is to say that Baoious inaesthetic con-
ceptions are themselves profounoly ahecteo byano inoeeo are sympto-
matic ofhis mathematical leanings: if art thinks the event ,at the precise
point at which mathematics itself falters, it ooes so only by virtue of its
relationor rather, non-relationto the matheme. Thus for Baoiou the
artistic work woulo seem to be ultimately inseparable from its mathemati-
zation. Ano yet, as we saw above, Baoiou contenos that in their subjective
oimension science proves to be the opposite of art ,LM 8,. Inoeeo, the
fact that mathematics ano poetry in particular aomit a straineo relation
is, accoroing to Baoiou, of maximal importance for philosophy in general.
Baoiou stating let us struggle for this nash of connict, we philosophers,
always torn between the mathematical norm of literal transparency ano
the poetic norm of singularity ano presence.
.
Which is to say that art has
a more ambivalent relationship to the question of transmissibilitywhose
ioeal form is of course the mathemethan nrst assumeo. Inoeeo, we
might go so far as to rewrite the imperative of artnamely, the ,oecio-
eoly political, neeo to to inscribe the inexistentas the necessity to, via
the process of subtraction, opptoocl the purity of the matheme.
.6
We say
approach rather than encounter because as we have seen the mark of
real artistic success accoroing to Baoiou paraooxically coincioes with the
very failure of inscribing the inexistent or voioeo content of a particular
worlo ,a failure that woulo itself fail were the work in question were to pu-
rify itself to the level of the matheme,.
.
Clearly then in its ,non,relation to
the matheme art proves itself a funoamentally subtractiveas opposeo to
purincatory or purely oestructiveprogramme, insofar as its aim is the
staging of a minimal, albeit absolute, oiherence, the oiherence between
the place ano what takes place in the place, the oiherence between place
.. Alain Baoiou, Language, Thought, Foetry, in Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, eo. ano trans. Ray
Brassier 8 Alberto Toscano, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. .:.
.6. We might of course further contrast the apparent literality of art to Baoious assertion
that what, amongst the processes of truth, singularizes art, is that the subject of truth is
orawn from the sensible |whilst| the subject of truth in science is orawn from the power
of the letter, Alain Baoiou, Cttcortorcc, .: Itol, foularo, Allemagne/Irance, Faris, Lo
Scheer, .oo, p. q8.
.. Whereas true art inscribes what is voioeo ,ano is thus, while universal, necessarily situ-
ateo,, the matheme marks the ab-sense of the voio itself ,ano is thus both universal ano
unsituateo,.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo o.
ano taking-place.
.8
Which is to say, the point of the artistic enoeavour is
nothing less than to yielo a tcol tcmotroct which woulo ultimately mark the
minimal oiherence between |the| voio ano an element which functions
as its stano in.
.q
Ano inoeeo on this point we can perhaps unoerstano why
in Baoious writings poetry holos prioe of place while cinema remains
inaesthetically questionable: of all the ,literate as much as illiterate, arts
cinema woulo surely appear the least capable of such a task.
However, returning to the problematic of those in/aesthetic passages
specinc to cinemaof the ioea through the image, of the image through
the lettermight we not just as easily argue the contrary, amrming cine-
ma to be insteao, by virtue of its very form, eminently capable of realising
this passage towaro the ioeal of the matheme? Inoeeo cinema, which is
after all as Baoiou states nothing but takes ano eoiting, is a funoamental-
ly subtractive meoium, being one whose ,imaginary, presence is in truth
,real, absence, ano whose essence is accoroingly voio.
o
Iilm theoreticians
have in fact spent a great oeal of time establishing this precise point ,to
take but one example, what ooes Metzs famous imaginary signiner mark
if not the voio itself?,.
:
This is of course not to suggest that cinema nnos
any ,real or otherwise, relation to the matheme but rather simply to say
that cinema exhibits an intrinsic fotmol amnity with the concept of the
mathem,e,atical concept. Such a corresponoence remains, however, un-
acknowleogeo in Baoious writings for the simple fact that he unoerstanos
cinema to be an art of the perpetual past, in the sense that it institutes the
past of the pass ,HI 8,. Or again, nlms formal relation to the matheme
breaks oown for Baoiou insofar as he unoerstanos cinema, in its move-
ment, takes ano eoitingano in oecioeo opposition to his attestations
regaroing cinemas immobilization of the ioea ,ano vice versa, to be an
art of lo: cinema is for Baoiou an art not of subtraction but of pottcottor,
ano hence of oestruction ,or again, an art not of the voio nor the voioeo,
but rather of cototrg,. Simply, if cinema is ultimately a mechanistic proc-
ess of lossas opposeo to a subtractive passage issuing a remainoerit
.8. Baoiou, Lc Stclc, Faris, Seuil, .oo, p. 86.
.q. Slavoj iek, Irom Furincation to Subtraction: Baoiou ano the Real, in Feter Hall-
waro ,eo.,, Tltrl Agotr: Alotr Bootoo oro tlc Fototc of Pltloopl,, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo,
p. :6.
o. This is a fact Baoiou clearly recognizes, as each of the three false movements Baoiou
ioentines ,the global, the local, ano the impure, which together allow for the passage of the
ioea operate by way of subtraction ,the image is subtracteo from itself, etc.,.
:. cf. Christian Metz, P,cloorol,t oro Ctrcmo: Tlc Imogtrot, Stgrtct, trans. Celia Britton,
Annwyl Williams, Ben Brewster ano Alfreo Guzzetti, Lonoon, Macmillan Fres, :q8.
Alex Ling o
can in no way hope to facilitate so much as the passage of the ioea, let
alone inscribe the inexistent, for the simple reason that everything which
appears in its nelo only ooes so only in oroer to immeoiately oisappear:
cinema is for Baoiou ultimately an art of ois-appearance. Ano such a
ois-appearing cinema can of course yielo no remainoer, for what nnally
remains t voio ,hence Baoious oiherentiation between subtraction ano
purincation,. Thus Baoious contention regaroing the immobility of the
ioea ,that if cinema is to facilitate the passage of an ioea it must concur-
rently ensure that the ioea thus brought forth ooes not itself pass, woulo
seem ultimately inconsistent with his overall conception of the nlmic art:
in Baoious cinema, everything passes.
The entirety of Baoious consioerations on nlm are then governeo in
the nnal analysis not by his attestations to its inherent impurity ,a neces-
sary factor,, nor by its incoherent situateoness ,a contingent factor,, but
rather by his presupposition that cinema is visitation ,HI 8, ,the imme-
oiate upshot of which is thatin the case of cinemathe ioea can have
nothing other than an equally transitory existence,. Inoeeo, the peculiar
unoerstanoing of cinema mobilizeo through the use of the term visita-
tion ,as much as passage, past, pass ano the like, woulo seem to consti-
tute not only Baoious real point of oeparture from Deleuzes writings on
cinemawhose concept of the crystal alone stanos in oirect opposition to
such an insistently linear chronology ,to say nothing of ouration or experi-
ence,
.
but also from all hope of establishing any thought proper to cin-
ema. Accoroingly, if any cinematic truths are to be registereo whatsoever
Baoious unoerstanoing of cinema as an art of ois-appearancewhich
is itself a contention arguably grounoeo less in philosophy than in sub-
jectivitymust be rejecteo as being in all senses of the woro funoamen-
tally anachronistic.
Iilm is neither a mechanism of ois-appearance nor a

process of becoming. Cinema is not a passive art, it ooes not simply po.
Nor however is it an accumulative process of coming-into-being.
Rather,
.. Of course, the concept of the crystal itself ooes not bear on Baoious philosophy insofar
as he has himself no recourse to the virtual.
. We might even go so far as to suggest his position remains ultimately untenable unless
he were to conceoe that oll artpainting as much as poetry, literature as much as thea-
treare themselves ,to varying oegrees, nnally nothing but visitation, insofar as all sub-
jects of art invariably pass ,the novel is nnisheo, the play concluoes, the poem is put oown,.
Inoeeo, is this not the precise characteristic separating the subject of art from the truth it
enters into: whereas the subject is nnite, local ano passing, truth is innnite ano spatially
unlocalizable ,hence of truth ano the subject only the former is properly immanent,.
. Of course we might oiscern here a certain ,albeit limiteo, homology with Deleuzes
argument that the chain of connections in cinema cannot be reouceo to the simple
real cinema is in both form ano content a subtractive proceoure insofar
as, like all art, its aim is to yielo a remainoer ,which woulo of course
present the minimal oiherence between the voio ano its stano-in,. Or
again, real cinema must be, contra Baoiou, nothing other than an artistic
process whose aim is to inscribe the voioeo or inexistent elements of a
worlo, to realize the oiherence between place ano taking-place. Ferhaps
then it is in this precise sense that we shoulo reinterpret Baoious two prin-
cipal oemanos of cinema, that is, that it purify ,or rather subtract, itself
of all non-artistic content ,as much as its incioental artistic content, or its
internal complication with the other arts, ano that it concurrently organ-
ize the immobility of a passage: to risk a Ireuoian analogy, with respect to
its manifest content the impossibility of cinemas becoming wholly artistic
woulo ultimately constitute the formal mark of its remainoer ,that is, its
artistic kernel, or the element which keeps cinema from oegenerating
into the pure abstraction of takes ano eoiting,, while in terms of its latent
content the remainoer woulo be nnally nothing other than the very im-
mobility of the passage itself ,inoeeo, how else coulo the immobility of the
ioea be conceiveo outsioe such an ioeal remainoer?,.
Doubtless numerous complications arise with such a conception of
cinema.
Ano yet, ultimately, whether such a conception is or is not in

fact legitimate is in many ways incioental. Rather, given the funoamen-
tal importance placeo on the artistic conoition in Baoious philosophy
,insofar as it constitutesin its thinking of the eventthe nexal point of
his materialist oialectic,, the purpose of this paper has been less to estab-
lish the conoitions of cinematic thought per se than to critically examine
Baoious inaesthetic programme by way of cinema. Thus we have seen
how, whilst he in no way reouces the entirety of art to that of the letter,
Baoious cogent inaesthetic writings are nonetheless essentially prescribeo
by the relative literalityano hence mathematicalityof the arts ,there
are of course obvious exceptions to this rule, although these examples
invariably relate to specincally formal ruptures such as those founo in the
association of images. There is always something left over, Gilles Deleuze, The Brain is
the Screen, in Davio Lapoujaoe ,eo.,, Too Rcgtmc of Moorc: Tcxt oro Irtctctco .,-.,
trans. Ames Hooges 8 Mike Taormina, New York, MIT Fress, .oo6, p. .8.
. The most immeoiate problem being knotteo to the question of time, insofar as in
Baoious philosophy timeif not coextensive with structure, if not the crtolc fotm of tlc
Loois intervention itself, thought as the gap between two events ,which is to say Baoiou
conceives of time solely in evental terms,. BE, p. .:o. Here the problem woulo resioe in
the oiscerning of what precisely woulo constitute cinematic time ,be it evental, purincatory
or otherwise,.
Alex Ling o
cases of Malevitch or Schoenberg,. This concurrently means that Baoi-
ous philosophy, in being conoitioneo nrst ano foremost by those literal
arts, regrettably neglects by ano large those manifolo illiterate arts which
might otherwise serve to augment his thought. Iurthermore, we have
seen how Baoious conception of cinema falters at the point of irrecon-
cilability between the relentless movement of the image ano the ioea of
immobility itself. Which is to say that whilst Baoiou may think cinema his
consioerations oo not themselves allow nnally for cinema to be thought.
Iurthermore it is at the same time clear that Baoiou has as yet not en-
gageo properly with Deleuzes writings on the cinema, choosing insteao
to short-circuit the nlmic question through recourse to the monotony of
Deleuzes conceptual proouction ,ano to a lesseralbeit otherwise wel-
comeextent through an outright rejection of the virtual,. Ultimately
however it woulo seem that if Baoiou is to maintain a certain coherency
to his inaesthetic programme he neeos either oispense with the ioea of a
thinking cinema altogether ,meaning nlm woulo be intrinsically inca-
pable of presenting so much as the passage of the ioea, let alone inscribe
the inexistent, or otherwise reconsioer his position on the inexorability of
cinematic movement ,meaning nlm cannot be a solely purincatoryor
contrarily associativeeoince,. In the event of the former, his inaesthetic
programme woulo certainly become more hermetic ,if more literally
curbeo,. In the event of the latter however Baoiou might begin to allow
for new illiterate thoughts to conoition his at present oecioeoly literal phi-
losophy.
poltttc
oq
12
Towaros an Anthropology of Innnituoe:
Baoiou ano the Folitical Subject
Nina Fower
INTRODUCTION
Against the evacuation of any positive use of the term in Althussers
work ano its reouction to mere ioeological ehect, it is clear that Baoiou
wants to retain a post-Sartrean conception of the subject, ano that this
has been the case from his earlier, more heavily political, works ,Tlottc
oo oct from :q8.,, to his later exercises in meta-ontology ano a theory of
truth ,Bctrg oro Eccrt, :q88 ano Logtoc oc moroc, .oo6,.
However, we can immeoiately complicate this claim by further stating
that the later Baoiou ooes take on boaro one aspect of the Althusserian
claim that there are no extant subjects qua autonomous agents olorgtoc
the seemingly opposeo Sartrean ioea that subjectivation is possible ano,
inoeeo, oesirable. Baoious relationship to the claims ano vicissituoes of
the so-calleo humanism-antihumanism oebate play out over the question
of how ano why he retains ano oennes, not just a question of who or what
the collective political subject might be, but also what the signincance
of the subject might be for philosophy tr toto. His work is an attempt to
merge ano go beyono the two terms of the oebate, in which structuralism
opposes humanism, by entering into a topological oiscourse that never-
theless permits the continueo possible existence of the subject ,inoeeo, we
coulo say that Baoious preservation of the subject is the most consistent
element of his work,. Whilst Baoiou seeks to align himself with the anti-
humanism of Ioucault, Lacan ano Althusser, against both a return to
Kant in human rights oiscourse ano the bao Darwinism of a contempo-
rary conception of man as nnite animal, there are hints, both explicit ano
implicit, of his belonging to a longer trajectory of political humanism.
Inoeeo, we will see this in particular in Baoious mathematico-political
oeployment of terms such as generic, ano its political correlate generic
humanity. It will not be argueo that Baoious mathematical turn is neces-
sarily over-oetermineo by his politics, as some have suggesteo, but rather
that the mathematics ano politics co-implicate each other in ways that
entail that when Baoiou uses terms like revolution the resonances are
intenoeo to be hearo at both levels, scientinc ano historico-political.
The major claim maoe here is that Baoious use of the term human-
ism is, however, evioence of a political struggle whose vicissituoes have
leant the philosophical implications of the woro a oiherent sense at oiher-
ent points between the original oebate of the :q6os ano the contempo-
rary era: the story here with regaro to Baoious work is how the impossi-
bility of using the term in the era of Stalin ,a Soviet humanism through
which we can glimpse the well-heeleo oachas ano the black Merceoes.
:
,
has been transformeo into the possibility of equating the quasi-Ieuer-
bachian term generic humanity with the politics of an egalitarian com-
munism ,Equality means that the political actor is representeo unoer the
sole sign of the uniquely human capacity
.
,.
Also at stake in this article is an attempt to confront some of the early
English-language reception of Baoious philosophy of the subject as a con-
temporary continuation of the Cartesian project. This is a reaoing prima-
rily promulgateo by iek in his Tlc Ttclltl Soocct, where he is explicit in
his attempt to reassert the Cartesian subject, ano enlists Baoiou in this
enoeavour by aligning him on his sioe in the war against those who woulo
oppose the loott of so-calleo Cartesian subjectivity.
This article, on the

other hano, will take seriously Baoious claim in Meoitation Thirty-Seven
of Bctrg oro Eccrt where he writes: The there is of the subject is the
coming-to-being of the event, via the ioeal occurrence of a truth, in its
nnite mooalities. By consequence, what must always be graspeo is that
there is no subject, that there are no longer some subjects. What Lacan
still oweo to Descartes, a oebt whose account must be closeo, was the ioea
that there were always some subjects.
What iek oownplays in Baoiou

:. Alain Baoiou, Tlottc oo Soct , Faris, Seuil, :q8., p. .o: ,henceforth TS,. All translations
are my own with the kino help of Alberto Toscano.
.. Alain Baoiou, Mctopoltttc, trans. ]ason Barker, Lonoon, Verso, .oo, p. q ,henceforth
M,.
. Slavoj iek, Tlc Ttclltl Soocct, Lonoon, Verso, :qqq, p. :..
. Alain Baoiou, Bctrg oro Eccrt, trans. Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, NY, Continuum, .oo,
p. ,henceforth BE,.
Nina Fower ::
is the fact that it is precisely not a question of the psychoanalytic subject
,as it surely must remain the case for iek in his project to rehabilitate
Lacan,, which is why the latter must preserve the ioea that Baoiou re-
mains in some sense Cartesian, or post-Cartesian in a nevertheless strictly
inoebteo manner, ano thus partly Lacanian in the way that iek oesires:
The subject is strictly correlative with the ontological gap between the
universal ano the particular.
Whilst iek ooes recognize a split between

Baoiou ano Lacan on the question of the ioentincation of the subject with
the voio ,imperative for psychoanalysis, but an illegitimate ontologiza-
tion for Baoiou,, he nevertheless aligns Baoiou with a philosophy of sub-
jective oecisionism, on the mooel of a psychoanalytic act: Ior Baoiou
the subject is cosubstantial with a contingent act of Decision.
6
The
problem with this connation is that, whilst it represents a common criti-
cism of Baoiou, it makes Baoious position a kino of voluntarism ,see the
section on Baoiou ano Schmitt below,, which has inoeeo been one of the
charges levelleo against Baoiou in his initial English language-reception.
Contra iek, I seek here to unpack Baoious own oennition of a subject,
in particular, his notion of a political subject, which pays attention to ano
oefenos its collective, proceoural ano organizeo nature.
But what, to begin with, of Baoious oor philosophical concessions
to Cartesianism? In his monograph on Deleuze, Baoiou himself analyses
the reasons why the latter cannot upholo any kino of Cartesianism, even
though Descartes ooes not appear to have any ostensible recourse to the
transcenoence of principles, a position to which Deleuze woulo otherwise
appear committeo. Baoiou presents a series of reasons why Deleuze can-
not be aligneo with a philosophy of the subject: that the principle of the
univocity of being precluoes the primacy of the subject, which can only
reverberate within the connnes of equivocity, booy-soul, being-nothing-
ness, extension-thought ,ano here Deleuze is close to Heioeggers opposi-
tion to the metaphysics of the subject,, that the subject is preoicateo on a
certain renexive negativity that is again precluoeo by a prioritization of
the univocity of Being, which cannot abioe negativity, that philosophies
of the subject place the operator subject within a scientinc paraoigm
,the relationship between the cogito ano Galileanism,, that a certain re-
actionary tenoency towaros the capitalist-parliamentary mooel of politics
generally brings with it a commitment to a moral ano humanitarian sub-
. iek, Tlc Ttclltl Soocct, p. :8.
6. iek, Tlc Ttclltl Soocct, p. :q.
ject.
In place of these four criticisms of the subject, Baoiou argues that

Deleuze replaces their starting-points with a oiherent mooel: that of the
folo, the auto-ahection of the outsioe where thinking coincioes with Be-
ing: It is remarkable that one can name this ioentity subject without
having conceoeo anything to the Cartesian nliation. Ior to be a subject
is to think the outsioe as time, on the conoition of the folo ,D qo,. The
problem for Baoiou with this escape-route from subjectivity is its ioenti-
ncation of thought with the One of being, the aestheticization of foloing,
ano its consequent political ano philosophical inaoequacy: for Deleuze in
the eno what always matters is foloing, unfoloing, refoloing,
8
the mere
performance of the expression of univocal Being. Whilst Baoiou will of
course retain the language of subject ano subjectivation, it is imperative
that this subject not be unoerstooo as an inoiviouateo thinking or ooubt-
ing entity, i.e. as classically Cartesian. Ior Baoiou, it is clear that some
subjects are not conscious ,the subject of a truth in art is an artwork, for
example,, some are collective ,the political subject, ano some are oyaoic
,the truth of the amorous couple is their separate two-ness, not the roman-
tic fusion itself,.
As a preluoe to a more oetaileo exploration of Baoious theories of
the subject, however, it is important to set out a certain non-philosophi-
cal threaoin essence, a positive, active, usually Marxist subjectas it
is this notion, which in part takes its cue from one particular element of
Descartes ,namely the activity of the thinking thing, that unoerpins Baoi-
ous own conceptions ano the political history of his thought. This takes us
from a certain line of thought stretching from Rousseau to Dunayevskaya,
before we turn to Baoious own Tlottc oo oct ano Bctrg oro Eccrt.
Ultimately it will be argueo that Baoious theory of the subject, whilst
beginning from a primarily political problematic ano broaoening out into
a conception that will also incluoe such processes as art works ,in the
oomain of art,, mathematical innovations ,in the oomain of science, ano
couples ,in the oomain of love,, nevertheless oemonstrates certain concep-
tual continuities at the level both of its formalizeo character ano proce-
oure. As Vainqueur puts it, for Baoiou: The subject is neither conceiveo
as the existential place of a set of representations, nor apprehenoeo as the
transcenoental system of the constitution of objects of possible experience,
similarly, truth can no longer be envisageo as the aoequation of subject
. All these points are taken from Baoious Dclcoc: Tlc Clomot of Bctrg, trans. Louise Burch-
ill, Minneapolis, Lonoon, University of Minnesota Fress, .ooo, pp. 8o-8: ,henceforth D,.
8. Gilles Deleuze, Tlc Folo, trans. Tom Conley, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo:, p. :.
Nina Fower :
ano object.
q
It is this evacuateo subject that persists in Baoious thought as
the primary basis of all the truth proceoures, incluoing politics.
THE ACTIVE FOLITICAL SUB]ECT
Pttmo foctc, we know that the category political subject has, at oiher-
ent historical points, operateo in completely antonymic ways: from the
passive subservience of a subject ,oocctom, that which is kept oownlit-
erally that which is thrown unoerneath,, to the active subject, ano its
seizure of politics itself. This active subject, we can say, is largely a col-
lectivizing of an ioea of the Cartesian self-subject in the realm of poli-
tics, rather than a reversal of the substantive passive qualities of an oloer
Aristotelian notion. However, it also bears a relation to the history of the
term ooccto, namely the being submitteo to an authority ,sovereign, mo-
narchical,. When Dunayevskaya writes in :q: that |n|o woro is more
important than Subject Whether we mean the workers or a single
revolutionary, whether we mean womens liberation, Blacks, Inoians, or-
ganization, it is clear that Subject is the one responsible for both theory
ano practice,
:o
there is no ooubt that subject is here unoerstooo as the
propulsive, active, revolutionary force manifesteo by ootl inoiviouals ano
collectives in the fusion of theory ano practice. It retains absolutely none
of its traoitional passive senses. How oio the term political subject be-
come meoiateo by these two senses of the subject ,the Cartesian active
subject ano the political ooccto,?
It is clear that this is not merely a theoretical question, but one that
engages the historical invention of certain meoiating terms, such as peo-
ple ,pcoplc, ano citizen ,ctto,cr/rc,, ano certain events ,the Irench Revolu-
tion, the Faris Commune,. Balibar argues, for instance, that it was only by
way of the citizen that universality coulo come to the subject.
::
Linguisti-
cally, there is evioence in the term of a move from aojective to noun, from
inoiviouals who are subjecteo to the power of another, to the representa-
tion or active force of a people or a community as a set of subjects. We
q. Bernaro Vainqueur, De quoi sujet est-il le nom pour Alain Baoiou?, Pcrct lc Molttplc,
Faris, LHarmattan, .oo., pp. :-8, p. :.
:o. Raya Dunayevskaya, Marxist-Humanisms concept of Subject, letter to young mem-
bers of News ano Letters Committees, Tlc Ro,o Doro,cclo,o Collccttor, Sopplcmcrt, :q:, pp.
:::o-::. Available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/ounayevskaya/works/:q:/sub-
ject.htm.
::. Etienne Balibar, Citizen Subject, 1lo Comc Aftct tlc Soocct., Eouaroo Caoava, Feter
Connor, ]ean-Luc Nancy ,eos.,, Lonoon, Routleoge, :qq:, p. .
can contrast this political fusion of the Cartesian subject ano the ooccto
with the recent Hegelian ano psychoanalytic attempt to trace another
history of the subject as a preluoe for a oiscussion of raoical politics, such
as we nno in iek: the stanoaro notion of the graoual becoming-subject
of the substance ,of the active subject leaving its imprint on the sub-
stance, mouloing it, meoiating it, expressing in it his subjective content, is
ooubly misleaoing |it| is always the remainoer of substance which
eluoes grasp of subjective meoiation.
:.
iek thus turns the question of
the subject into something like a haunting remainoer to be psychoanalyti-
cally traverseo, rather than aooressing the activity of a collective political
subject in all its potential historical force.
It is in Rousseaus :6. text, Tlc Soctol Corttoct, above all, that we ex-
plicitly witness the metamorphosis of subject in the olo sense ,obeoience,
into a new kino of subject, the subject of law which is, nevertheless, also
the nnal arbiter of legal pronouncements ano is thus active ano passive to
the same oegree, although not yet the wholly active revolutionary subject
of Dunayevskayas theory ano practice:
:
The public person thus formeo by the union of all other persons
was once calleo the ctt,, ano is now known as the tcpooltc or the ooo,
poltttc. It its passive role it is calleo the totc, when it plays an active
role it is the occtctgr, ano when it is compareo to others of its own
kino, it is a pooct. Those who are associateo in it take collectively
the name of o pcoplc, ano call themselves inoivioually ctttcr, in
that they share in the sovereign power, ano oocct, in that they put
themselves unoer the laws of the state.
:
This collective of associating beings who are tmoltorcool, people, citizens
ano subjects, operates at the level of the law, ano is neither subject to it in
the more classical sense, nor ooes it impose laws from above ,for it woulo
be merely imposing them upon itself,: There must be an exact corre-
sponoence between the absolute activity of the citizen ,legislation, ano his
absolute passivity ,obeoience to the law,. But it is essential that this activity
ano this passivity be cxoctl, correlative.
:
The inhabitant of such a republic
splits himself or herself between general ano particular interests, ano thus
:.. Slavoj iek, Tott,trg ottl tlc ^cgottcc: Iort, Hcgcl oro tlc Cttttoc of Iocolog,, Durham,
Duke University Fress, :qq, p. .:.
:. Historically, the nrst recoroeo use of the term citizen to mean bearer of rights was in
::. See Ttot oc lo Lorgoc Ftorotc. Available at http://atilf.atilf.fr/tlf.htm.
:. ]ean-]acques Rousseau, Tlc Soctol Corttoct, trans. Maurice Cranston, Lonoon, Fenguin,
:q68, pp. 6:-6..
:. Balibar, Citizen Subject, p. q.
Nina Fower :
inaugurates a new subject, as Balibar oemonstrates, the citizen-subject
,|t|he citizen properly speaking is rcttlct the inoivioual rot the collective,
just as he is rcttlct an exclusively public being rot a private citizen,.
:6
In
this historical turn, there is a certain move towaros informality with re-
garo to the state. The term citizen, from a :.
th
century term meaning
inhabitant of a city, carries with it an actual attempt to reinvent certain
public forms of aooressafter the Irench Revolution, a bill was issueo
to replace Monsieur ano Maoame with citizen ,qua non-oeferential,
urbanizeo, generic term,.
:
We coulo perhaps call this the Republicaniza-
tion of thought, which nnos its rapio historical culmination in the Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man ano of the Citizen ,.6
th
August :8q,: Article
6: Legislation expresses the overall will.
But what is this overall ,so-calleo sovereign, will? In Rousseau, we are
presenteo with a concept of the subject mio-way between the passivity of
the sovereign-subject ano the activity of the revolutionary subject: this
subject is meoiateo not only via the citizen, but also by a new conception
of sovereignty. When Rousseau asks what then is correctly to be calleo an
act of sovereignty? It is not a covenant between a superior ano an inferior,
but a covenant of the booy with each of its members,
:8
there is another
circularity, not just of subject ano law, but also of subject ano sovereign.
But how is this circularity oetermineo?
It is via the conception of the general will that the laws oecioeo upon
by subjects will operate equally for all: since each man gives himself to
all, he gives himself to no one, ano since there is no associate over whom
he ooes not gain the same rights as others gain over him, each man recov-
ers the equivalent of everything he loses, ano in the bargain he acquires
more power to preserve what he has.
:q
How ooes the suppresseo subject
of sovereignty come to be collective? By associating in such a way as that
to assume ones being subjecteo to the law is simultaneously ones giv-
ing oneself to no one oro the recovery of ones rights in the equal ano
simultaneous agreement of all. The social pact or contract expresses this
generic, empty will, which functions by subtracting the sum of inoivioual
oiherences ,the pluses ano minuses of interest, in the name of a common
:6. Balibar, Citizen Subject, p. :.
:. The question of the term citizen is also tieo up with the question of tutoiement ,the
informal use of you in Irench,: Times that one woulo |use the informal form of you|
ano one woulo say: citizen ,as in Victor Hugos Lc Mttoolc from :86.,.
:8. Rousseau, Tlc Soctol Corttoct, p. .
:q. Rousseau, Tlc Soctol Corttoct, p. 6:.
claim. But why ooes Rousseau maintain the classical link between subject
ano sovereign at all? Merely because of the traoitional connotations of the
concept? If the subject ano sovereignty coincioe in the legislating power of
the subject as general will, why not oispense with the formal framework of
a hierarchical political, theological ano monarchical system by replacing
the term subject with a completely new term?
It is perversely enlightening in this regaro to turn to one of Rousseaus
most reactionary critics for a summary of this problem, ]oseph oe Maistre
who, in his Stoo, or Socctctgrt, ,:8.:,, oefenos classical sovereignty in the
following way:
It is saio that the people are sovereign, but over whom?over
themselves, apparently. The people are thus subject. There is
surely something equivocal if not erroneous here, for the people
who commoro are not the people which ooc, If a oemocracy in
its theoretical purity were to exist, there woulo be no sovereignty
within this state: for it is impossible to unoerstano by this woro
anything other than a repressive power that acts on the oocct ano
that is external to him. It follows that this woro oocct, which is a
relative term, is alien to republics, because there is no sovereign,
properly speaking, in a republic ano because there cannot be a
oocct without a occtctgr, just as there cannot be a or without a
fotlct.
.o
De Maistre points out a certain linguistic ano structural irony in Rous-
seaus ioea that the sovereign, which is simply a collective being, cannot
be representeo by anyone but itself .
.:
Whilst De Maistres own conception
of sovereignty is without ooubt anti-philosophical, theological, elitist ano
nationalist ,a clutch of sentiments hanoily summarizeo in the following
quote: whoever says that man is born for liberty is speaking nonsense,,
this oepiction of the circularity of subject ano sovereignty in Rousseaus
republicanization of thought is important: It means that the political sub-
ject, as egalitarian ano as generic, is perilously close, etymologically ano
in practice, to tipping back into forms of oespotism. Rousseau himself
recognizes this possibility very clearly: if the oanger is such that the ap-
paratus of law is itself an obstacle to safety, then a supreme heao must be
nominateo with power to silence all the laws ano temporarily suspeno
.o. ]oseph oe Maistre,Tlc 1otl of }ocpl oc Motttc, trans. ano with an introouction by
]ack Lively, Lonoon, Allen ano Unwin, :q6, p. :.o.
.:. Maistre,Tlc 1otl, p. 6q.
Nina Fower :
the sovereign authority.
..
We are thus left with an ooo formula that at
any moment potentially replaces the olo sovereign ,i.e. the will of the
people expresseo through law ano subject to those laws, with a new su-
preme heao. The moment the subject ano law slip out of alignment with
each other is the moment a novel, perhaps even more oespotic, form of
authority coulo nll the breach. This scenario is renecteo in this retort
to Rousseau, again from De Maistre: Feople complain of the oespot-
ism of princes, they ought to complain of the oespotism of mor.
.
Whilst
De Maistre promulgates a form of naturalizeo politics, which emphasizes
traoition ano oivine purpose: all sovereignty oerives from Goo, what-
ever form it takes, it is not the work of man,
.
De Maistres criticisms of
Rousseau nevertheless point to the funoamental oimculty of reversing the
meaning of the term subject from a politically submissive entity ,either
collective or singular, to an active self-regulating collective noun, namely
the people, the citizens ,we coulo call this the question of a subject-
preoicate reversal within the term subject itself,. This oimculty remains in
so far as the political subject is meoiateo by the concept of the sovereign,
since the sovereign structures the entire space ano placing of that which
is containeo in the political framework, namely the subjects therein. It is
the oestruction of what he will call this space of placements that Baoiou
is concerneo to explicate in Tlottc oo oct.
The same theo-political hierarchization that remaineo in Descartes
in his conception of man engenoers oimculties for a more explicitly politi-
cal project with egalitarian aims. When Balibar, in an explicit attempt to
justify some of the egalitarian elements apparent in Rousseau ,ano com-
pare his own project of cgoltoctt, where the coextensivity of equality ano
freeoom immeoiately concerns the universality of inoiviouals,, argues the
following: |a|fter the subject comes the citizen ano whose constitution
ano recognition put an eno ,in principle, to the subjection of the subject,
there is a sense in which he overlooks the inherent limitations of a such a
positive conception of the political subject ano its inscription within con-
stitutions. While it is clear, as he suggests, that one cannot think a mooern
concept of the political subject without taking into account its mcototco
... Rousseau, Tlc Soctol Corttoct, p. ::.
.. Maistre, Stuoy on Sovereignty, in Tlc 1otl, p. ::8
.. Maistre, Stuoy on Sovereignty, in Tlc 1otl, p. ::. Compare Rousseaus incioentally
pre-emptive response: all power comes from Goo but so ooes every oisease, ano no
one forbios us to summon a physician. Tlc Soctol Corttoct, p. .
role through the terms citizen ano people,
.
there remains an inherent
oanger that the retention of the term subject will leave it open to recu-
peration by whatever force oesires to suboroinate it. By transforming the
oiscourse on the political subject from that of representation in a certain
political space to a reformulation of the very question of placement in
politics, Baoiou attempts to overcome the circular logic that woulo always
leave a subject ,however active, prey to recapture by the logic of the
,sovereign, state.
BADIOU, BALIBAR AND ROUSSEAU
It is revealing, with regaro to the analysis of the terms subject, citizen
ano politics, to brieny compare Balibar ano Baoious reaoings of Rous-
seau, composeo arouno the same time ,ano inoeeo publisheo in the same
year, :q88,, but rather oiherent in emphasis ano conclusion.
.6
Whilst ac-
knowleoging, at the outset, with Balibar, that for Rousseau the woros
oocct ano occtctgr are ioentical correlatives, Baoiou will subsume this oy-
aoic relationship ,what we coulo call the republican oemocratization of
power, unoer what he names, ano will call in his own work, the generic
becoming of politics. Why? Because what he wants to unveil in Rousseau
is an instance of a conception of politics that manifests certain key features
present in Baoious own theory: a oemano for generic equality, an event
in politics ,in this instance, the social contract,, ano, above all, the ioea
that politics is a ctcottor, local ano fragile, of collective humanity. This is,
in the eno, the form of political subjectivity that Baoiou wishes to extract
from Rousseau, rather than remaining within the historical-conceptual
locus of questions concerning the citizen pct c, as Balibar ooes. Insteao
of focussing on the more classically bourgeois elements of Rousseaus pro-
posals ,the oefence of property, security ano the rights of the state qua
state,, Baoiou sees in the general will an almost pure form of noelity to
egalitarian aims ,|t|he general will is the operator of noelity which oirects
a generic proceoure,. The citizen, in this account, becomes translateo
as a militant of a political cause, faithful ,albeit precariously, to the rare
emergence of an event in politics, the social contract ,or rather to its
.. Very much more coulo be saio of this latter term people, of course: in its very origins
it is ambiguous, it coulo potentially refer to ethnicity, inhabitants of a nation, a territory,
etc.
.6. See Balibars Citizen Subject, Bctrg oro Eccrt was originally publisheo :q88.
Nina Fower :q
generic oemanos,.
.
Later, Baoiou will speak of the militant ioentinca-
tion of politics: which, for me, is the orl, ioentincation which can ally
politics ano thought ,M :,.
However, there are two problems here, asioe from the question of
whether Baoious reaoing of Rousseau is something of a theoretical impo-
sition. One is the instability of the political event itself, whereby there is an
inherent ano inevitable vice which relentlessly tenos to oestroy the booy
politic from the moment of its birth ,BE ,. In essence, this represents
the acknowleogement that the egalitarian impulse behino the social con-
tract will inevitably be corrupteo. Baoious point here is again extremely
close ,ano will remain so in his own work, to Sartres argument in the
Cttttoc of Dtolccttcol Rcoor, namely that there is a kino of constitutive fail-
ure, an inevitable ossincation or falling-oh of the oemanos behino every
revolutionary impulse ano any collective project.
The secono major oimculty here is the oistance between what Baoiou
wants to valorize in Rousseau ,the generic nature of the will, the event
of the social contract, the precarious creation of a collective humanity,
ano the way Rousseau sees this in which the generic or general will mani-
festeo, namely through voting, the counting of each representation: this
act of association creates an artincial ano corporate booy composeo of as
many members as there are voters in the assembly ano for the will to be
general, it ooes not have to be unanimous, but all the votes must be count-
eo.
.8
Baoiou aomits that Rousseau submits the general will to the law of
number ano thus turns a generic, egalitarian political programme into a
majoritarian one. ,In Irance, the major historical oennition of whether
one was technically an active or passive citizen was oetermineo by wheth-
er the person voteo or not., If the critical question for both Baoiou ano
Rousseau is ultimately how can the generic character of politics subsist
when unanimity fails? ,BE q,, with the emphasis on the genericity of
politics, then Rousseau clearly nnos the answer in a form of electoral sys-
tems ano majority agreement. Baoiou, on the other hano, will turn to the
concept of noelity ,ano, etymologically at least, introouces a new version
of the theological faithful subject,. Ultimately Baoiou criticizes Rous-
seau for elioing politics with legitimation ,ano the electoral, ano not with
truth. It is politics as a truth proceoure, ano the separation of truth from
knowleoge that grounos Baoious own presentation of politics. Clearly, if
the general will is infallible, oue to being subtracteo from any particular
.. The Baoiou quotes are from Meoitation . of BE, pp. -.
.8. Rousseau, Soctol Corttoct, p. 6:, o.
knowleoge, ano oue to it relating solely to the generic existence of people
then ballot boxes ano the counting of representations woulo seem to be o
pttott supernuous, or at least something that woulont touch the correct-
ness of the will.
.q
Carl Schmitt has a quite oiherent criticism of Rousseau,
which nevertheless chastises him for something very similar to Baoiou,
albeit from the otlct toc of sovereignty, as it were: this critique ,famously,
circles arouno the neeo to maintain a purer concept of oecision. Schmitt
argues the following:
The general will of Rousseau became ioentical with the will of the
sovereign, but simultaneously the concept of the general will also
containeo a quantitative oetermination with regaro to its subject,
which means that the people become sovereign. The oecisionistic
ano personalistic element in the concept of sovereignty was thus
lost.
o

Ior Schmitt, as we saw in the previous section for De Maistre too, it is the
becoming-anonymous of the arbitrary ano ioiosyncratic element of the
sovereign that is at fault in Rousseau, because it oeprives the Sovereign of
his funoamental characteristic, namely, to intervene in the name of an ex-
ception ,Sovereign is he who oecioes on the exception,.
:
Similarly, again
following De Maistre, Schmitt points out the peculiarity of retaining the
,originally, theologically-structureo term subject in a political context if
the concept of sovereignty is, accoroing to Rousseau, to be oissolveo into
its antonym ,The politicization of theological concepts |in Rousseau| is
so striking that it has not escapeo any true expert on his writings
.
,. Ior
Schmitt, it is a question of the systematic structure of these secularizeo
theological concepts which renoers their new oemocratic use suspect.
.q. A clear inoication of Baoious opinion of voting can be founo in Mctopoltttc: If our
knowleoge of planetary motion relieo solely on suhrage as its protocol of legitimation, we
woulo still inhabit a geometrical universe ,M :,.
o. Carl Schmitt, Poltttcol Tlcolog,: Foot Cloptct or tlc Corccpt of Socctctgrt,, trans. George
Schwab, Cambrioge, The MIT Fress, :q8, p. 8.
:. Schmitt, Poltttcol Tlcolog,, p. .
.. Schmitt, Poltttcol Tlcolog,, p. 6. See also p. 6 All signincant concepts of the mooern
theory of the state are secularizeo theological concepts not only because of their historical
oevelopmentbut also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is
necessary for a sociological consioeration of these concepts. Ano also Atger: The prince
oevelops all the inherent characteristics of the state by a sort of continual creation. The
prince is the Cartesian goo transposeo to the political worlo. ,Eot ot llttottc oo corttot
octol, :qo6,.
Nina Fower .:
With reference to the ioea of oecision, whilst Baoiou will separate his
notion from the ioea of the personal, arbitrary oecision ano nx it insteao
to a kino of collective experience of the egalitarian ano generic oemano
of politics itself, it is clear that Rousseaus ultimate subsumption of the
faithful ano oecisional character of the general will to representation via
the electoral system olo strips it of a certain purity for Baoiou: As a pro-
ceoure faithful to the event-contract, politics cannot tolerate oelegation
or representation ,BE ,. It is also intriguing to note a certain similarity
in the tone of both Schmitt ano Baoious oisgust with what Schmitt calls
technical-organization ano what Baoiou names capital-parliamentari-
anism ,ano its corollary, opinionism,: The core of the political ioea, the
exacting moral oecision is evaoeo in both the economic or technical-
organization ano the political oissolves into the everlasting oiscussion
of cultural ano philosophical-historical commonplaces
,Schmitt,, The
essence of politics is not the plurality of opinions ano his oescription of
the State the normative threefolo arrangement of economic manage-
ment, national assessment ano oemocracy ,Baoiou, ,M 8,. Obviously
there is no sense in which Baoiou ano Schmitt share the same political
aimsBaoious concept of politics consistently opposes any statist, arbi-
trary or personalist arguments, ano the occttorol nature of Baoious faith-
ful subject is preoicateo on a certain unoecioability, not sheer arbitrary
will. Bosteels, for one, points to some of the problems with unoerstanoing
Baoious faithful subject simply as a oecisionist conception, emphasizing
insteao the centrality of process ano not merely the act of oecision: The
impure ano equivocal nature of all truth processes is inseparable from
any topological unoerstanoing of the subject.

BADIOUS FOLITICAL SUB]ECTS: IROM THORIE DU SU}ET
TO BEI^G A^D EVE^T
It is important to set out the relation between Baoious conceptions of
force ano oestruction in the earlier work of Tlottc oo oct ,which consists
of seminars presenteo from :q-q with a preface from :q8:, to his later
,Bctrg oro Eccrt ano Mctopoltttc,. Baoiou is politically at his most Leninist
in the earlier text, both terminologically ano rhetorically. The book is
without ooubt, at least in part, an attempt to come to terms with certain
. Schmitt, Poltttcol Tlcolog,, p. 6.
. Bruno Bosteels, Alain Baoious Theory of the Subject: The Recommencement of
Dialectical Materialism? Fart II, Plt, vol. :, .oo., p. .o.
responses to the explosion ano rapio recapture of the events of May 68,
as well as a certain reactionary moment in Irench political life ,the bitter
perioo of betrayal as he later oescribes it, ,M xxxiv,. It is also an attempt
to oemonstrate his oistance ,as well as his oebt, to Althusser in the wake of
the Humanist controversy.
The question of why Baoiou wants to maintain a concept of the sub-
ject in the nrst place is a crucial one. Whilst it is clear that he is heavily
inoebteo both to Lacan ano to Althusser for their structural analyses ano
their anti-humanism, he sees a oanger in the way in which they hanole
the question of the subject. He writes: the essence of an activist material-
ism requires the proouction of a theory of the subject, which it once
hao the task of foreclosing ,TS .o.,. So whilst the materialism of Althus-
ser ano Lacan usefully criticizeo certain classical, humanist conceptions
of subjectivity ano the subject ot orc cttttcol orctotc, there is a sense in which
Baoiou is unwilling to give up on the term in the context in which he now
writes. Inoeeo, he speaks insteao of a kino of subjective oenciency:
More oeeply, I know that what has happeneo to us which is
essential, in force as in humiliation, bears the mark of a lorg-tctm
lack, whence oerives the fact that, however suooen, the irruption
is also light, whilst, as coulo be preoicteo long in aovance, moral
oisarray is no less ineluctable. This lack is essentially subjective.
It relates to the way in which potential forces, at the heart of the
people, have been kept apart from their own concept. ,TS :,
As Callinicos puts it, Baoiou seeks a conceptual black sheepa material-

ism centreo on a theory of the subject.
6
Not only, but a materialism that
allegeoly takes its cue from Hegel, as summarizeo by Baoiou in the ironic
statement: We must conceive imperialist society not only as substance but
also as subject ,TS 6o,.
Baoiou sets out two political temptations, or oeviations, that he ar-
gues followeo the events of :q68: on the one sioe, the left oeviation, a fet-
ishism of the pure political act that woulo have oone with everything that
belongs to the original situation ano, on the other, the right oeviation, the
. In an interview from .oo:, Baoiou makes the following claim, with reference to his
own work in the late :q6os ano os: I founo in Sartres theory of practical freeoom, ano
particularly in the subjectivizeo Marxism that he was trying to proouce, something with
which to engage myself politically, in spite of everything, in the situation, Can Change be
Thought?, .oo: interview with Bruno Bosteels, in Alotr Bootoo: Pltloopl, oro tt Corotttor,
eo. ano with an introouction by Gabriel Riera, New York, SUNY, .oo, p. ...
6. Alex Callinicos, Tlc Rcootcc of Cttttoc, Cambrioge, Folity, .oo6, p. q. This is one of
the chapter heaoings in Baoious TS.
Nina Fower .
cynical oenial that nothing hao in fact taken place, that all was perfectly
normal. Both of these temptations he argues, were inaoequate to explain
the singularity of the events, ano also inaoequate for an unoerstanoing of
political subjectivity more generally. Baoiou, insteao, revisits Hegel ano
introouces a notion of scission in oroer to refute both these oeviations.
In Tlottc oo oct Baoiou argues that there are two oialectical matrices
in Hegels Logtc. The former is covereo by the term alienation, the ioea
of a simple term that oeploys itself in its becoming-other, to return into
itself as a completeo concept ano the latter, a matrix whose operator is
scission, ano whose theme is that the only unity is a oivioeo one ,TS ..,.
It is this secono matrix that Baoiou will use as the basis of an attempt to
founo a oistinction between something ano another thing ,Etoo oro
Aroctc,. The repetition of the same thing poseo twice, which Baoiou will
refer to as A ,A as such, ano Ap ,A at another place, introouces a oiscus-
sion of placement ,where p is place,. Whilst he explicitly oenies that p is
to be unoerstooo spatially or geometrically ,A ooubling can be temporal,
or even nctional, ,TS .-,, it is this split that he oepenos upon for his
positing of a constitutive scission, which he formulates as A~,AAp, ,A is
A, but also its placement as A,. This minimal oiherence, he states, can
also be unoerstooo as the relationship between theory ano practice, the
letter ano the site in which it is markeo. The oialectic is nrst ano foremost
a process, not of negation ano the negation of the negation, but of internal
oivision. Every force must be split into itself ano that part of it is placeo, or
oetermineo by the structure of assigneo places.
Every force thus stanos

in a relation of internal exclusion as to its oetermining place: As the his-
tory of the twentieth century shows in excruciating oetail, what happens
actually is the constant struggle of the working class against its oetermina-
tion by the bourgeois capitalist oroer, an oroer that oivioes the proletariat
from within.
8
Bosteels repeateoly stresses the oialectical threao of Baoi-
ous work as a whole, refusing to unoerstano the title of Bctrg oro Eccrt, for
example, as the presentation of two oisjunct areas, rather, Baoious later
thought remains oialectical, oespite the mathematical turn, in rejecting
such stark opposition between being ano event, in favour of the specinc
site through which an event is anchoreo in the ontological oeaolock of
a situation that only a rare subjective intervention can unlock.
q
It is the
process of internal oivision, as set out in Baoious heavily politicizeo reao-
. See Bruno Bosteels, Alain Baoious Theory of the Subject, p. :6.
8. Bruno Bosteels, Alain Baoious Theory of the Subject, p. :6.
q. Bruno Bosteels, Alain Baoious Theory of the Subject, p. .o6.
ing of Hegels Logtc, that founos his claims about the subject: his analysis
falls somewhere between a structural presentation ano a more classically
Marxist one ,such as Dunayevskaya or Lukacs, that woulo always stress
the importance of retaining a post-Hegelian notion of the subject. In re-
taining a notion of the subject, however, Baoiou nevertheless ooes not
take up a notion of history, as Sartre woulo oo, as a way of ploctrg this
subject. In fact, Baoiou aligns history on the sioe of the objective, struc-
tural, reactionary orive to plocc in the negative sense: it is always in the
interests of the powerful that history is mistaken for politicsthat is, that
the objective is taken for the subjective ,TS 6o,. His position on this, at
least, ooes not raoically alter in the later work: There are only plural in-
stances of politics, irreoucible to one another, ano which oo not comprise
any homogeneous history ,M .,.
In Tlottc oo oct Baoiou goes further in these paraooxical non-spa-
tial, anti-historical claims regaroing place. When he states that the true
contrary of the proletariat is not the bourgeoisie. It is the bourgeois worlo
the project of the proletarian, its internal being, is not to contraoict
the bourgeois Its project is communism ano nothing else. That is to
say, the abolition of all place in which one coulo oeploy something like a
proletariat. The political project of the proletariat is the oisappearance of
the space of placement of classes ,TS .-6,, there is a clear sense in which
the ,non,space of politics is what is at stake, the complete overturning of
the subjective alignment of class positions, of the very opposition prole-
tariat-bourgeoisie. There is a oouble play on the terms subjective ano
objective in Tlottc oo oct: not only must political subjectivity be positeo
as an active force in the face of the seemingly static nature of the existing
oroer, but subjective is also opposeo to the apparently objective basis
of placement, in the sense of an unoerstanoing of class as a social ob-
jectthe total number of people who woulo count as the working class,
for example. Turning to Baoious claim that there is only one subject, so
there is only one force, whose existence always proouces the event ,TS
:6o,, we must ask: why only one? In this early conception of politics, it is a
question, not of a conception of politics as a battle, taking place in history
,as in late Sartre,, but, again, of place. The proletariat is not opposeo to
the bourgeoisie in a battle over who owns the means of proouction ,the
bourgeoisie is thus not a subject in the same way as the proletariat, there
is a funoamental oissymmetry between the two classes,, but, as Baoiou
puts it we must reject a vision of politics as subjective ouel There is one
place, one subject ,TS :8,. Iurthermore, as a counterweight to certain
of the oiscourses surrounoing May 68, in which running battles with the
Nina Fower .
police summeo up the oppositional structure of active politics: |t|here is
not only the law of Capital, or only the cops. To miss this point means not
to see the unity of the oroer of assigneo places, its consistency ,TS 6o,.
Ultimately it is a question of the separation between what Baoiou calls
lcplocc ,splace or splacementthe neologistic combination of space
ano place, ano lotltco ,outplaceanother neologism fusing outsioe
ano place,. The oialectic is the lotltco against the cplocc ,TS :8,. What
ooes this mean? Ior Baoiou, the working class cannot be synonymous
with the proletariatthe former is the object of a well-oenneo social ano
economic placement, with a set of ioentinable roles ano positions.
o
The
proletariat is insteao the active, oestructive, purifying force of the unoo-
ing of all object-placement ,hence its primarily subjectivizeo nature,:the
proletariat exists wherever a political lotltco is createo. It is thus in purging
itself that it exists. It has no existence anterior to its organization of politi-
cal survival ,TS .o-,. The question for Baoiou here is one of oestroy-
ing ,intenoeo quite literally, a certain structural oistribution of place. In
his later works he will openly regret this rather violent presentation: I
was, I aomit, a little misguioeo in Tlottc oo oct concerning the theme of
oestruction. I still maintaineo, back then, the ioea of an essential link be-
tween oestruction ano novelty. Empirically, novelty ,for example, political
novelty, is accompanieo by oestruction. But it must be clear that this ac-
companiment is not linkeo to intrinsic novelty, on the contrary, the latter
is always a supplementation by a truth ,BE o,. It is critical to note that
the introouction of truth as a category in Baoious later works is concep-
tually bouno to the attempt to separate out his political project from the
violence historically perpetrateo in the name of communism ano insteao
links to a oiherent theoretical lineage, that of Flato ano, inoeeo, to an
oloer concept, that of justice: We shall call justice that through which
a philosophy oesignates the possible truth of a politics ,M q,. This self-
placement in the political trajectory of justice ano truth is also renecteo
in his turn from the term Froletariat to more generic conceptions of man,
thought ano humanity, as we shall see.
Asioe from the terms lotltco ano cplocc, in Tlottc oo oct Baoiou more
broaoly opposes the terms force ano place, such that the lotltco ,out-
place, is not to be unoerstooo as another other than a fotcc, rather than a
o. As Hallwaro puts it: In the early work, this oistinction obtains above all in the ,still
oialectical, movement from the working class ,as object, to the proletariat ,as subject,In-
sofar as they are conoitioneo by their well-oenneo social ano economic plocc, the working
classes are the mere object of history, not its subject or motor. Feter Hallwaro, Bootoo: A
Soocct to Ttotl, Minneapolis, Lonoon, University of Minnesota Fress, .oo, p. .
set location: the oouble articulation of force ano place, whereby the one
is the loss of the other this is Marxs great oiscovery ,TS :88,. Baoiou
goes on to say that: We will call ooccttcc those processes relative to the
qualitative concentration of force ,TS q,. There is a point of comparison
to be maoe here with regaros to the earlier ano later work on this ques-
tion of force, or as it is later termeo, forcing: in Bctrg oro Eccrt Baoiou will
oenne forcing ,a funoamental law of the subject, in the following way:
the belonging of |the| term of the situation to come is equivalent to the
belonging of this term to the inoiscernible part which results from the
generic proceoure ,BE o,. What ooes this entail? That the inoiscern-
ible part of a situation, that which cannot be captureo by knowleoge ,ano
Baoiou will always oppose knowleoge to truth in the later works, cannot
be known to a subject, yet the subject of truth forces veracity at the point
of the inoiscernible ,BE ::,, in other woros, it realizes an inoiscernible by
oecioing on a truth even whilst not being certain that it belongs to the sit-
uation in which it is founo: The subject, which is the forcing proouction
of an inoiscernible incluoeo in the situation, cannot ruin the situation.
What it can oo is generate verioical statements that were previously unoe-
cioable ,BE :,. The move from the inoiscernible to the unoecioable is
what characterizes a faithful subject for the Baoiou of Bctrg oro Eccrt, ano
precluoes any illegitimate forcing of the naming of the event, precisely be-
cause it is baseo on the inoiscernible elements within a specinc situation,
not the imposition of a name from a pre-existing sum of knowleoges. In
the terminology of the later work, Baoiou will put this claim with regaro
to knowleoges in the following way: Any subset, even that cementeo by
the most real of interests, is a-political, given that it can be nameo in an
encyclopaeoia. It is a matter of knowleoge, ano not of truth ,BE ,.
Iurthermore, |a| truth is that inoiscernible multiple whose nnite approxi-
mation is supporteo by a subject, such that its ioeality to-come, nameless
correlate of the naming of an event, is that on the basis of which one can
legitimately oesignate as subject the aleatory ngure which, without the
inoiscernible, woulo be no more than an incoherent sequence of encyclo-
paeoic oeterminants ,BE ,. It is on the basis of this inoiscernible, not
the force of a pre-nameo collective, that a political truth rests. In Tlottc
oo oct, Baoiou claims, however, that every subject is political
:
, ano it
is not unfair to ask whether this is still the case to some extent, or at least
whether the structure of subjectivation in Baoiou is primarily conoitioneo
:. cf. Feter Hallwaros claim that In Baoious early work, the mechanism of this subjec-
tivation is exclusively political., A Soocct to Ttotl, p. .
Nina Fower .
by his analysis of the rare political processes he repeateoly returns to ,TS
6,. In Corotttor ,:qq.,, Baoiou ooes in fact criticize his earlier position
in Tlottc oo oct: Tooay, I woulo no longer say every subject is political,
which is still a maxim of suturing. I woulo rather say: Every subject is
inouceo by a generic proceoure, ano thus oepenos on an event. Which
is why the subject is rare.
.
It is not clear, however, whether this amounts
to a retraction of the fotm of subjectivation which was originally unoer-
stooo solely politicallysubjects were alreaoy rare in Tlottc oo oct, for
example.
However, in the earlier work, Baoious thought itself ooes precisely
circulate arouno a certain collection of names ano knowleoges: Marxism,
Baoiou argues, is the oiscourse that supports the proletariat as subject.
This is a principle we must never abanoon. Despite his separation of pro-
letariat from the working class, the fact that Baoiou sets up a name as a
principle can be retroactively criticizeo from the stanopoint of his later
work as overoetermining that which is left unoecioeo ano unseen in the
later formulation of a political event. The political question in the early
work is what is the organic link between the masses in revoltthe oe-
cisive historical actorano the Farty, as constituteo political subject?

It is this notion of an organic link that marks Baoiou out as essentially
vanguaroist in his conception of the political subject at this point, albeit
a vanguaroism that oscillates with regaros to who the subject is: there is
an inherent ambiguity about who is the true subject in this situationthe
party or the proletariat? Or a fusion of the two? As Hallwaro puts it: |t|he
subjective, or historical, topology of partisan antagonism explooes the
static algebra of class Whereas every object stays in its place, every sub-
ject violates its place, inasmuch as its essential virtue is to be oisorienteo.
Subjectivism operates in the element of force whereby place nnos itself
altereo.
Yet it is not an unmeoiateo proletariat that seeks to abolish the

space of placement of classes. On the contrary, It is only through the
party that the ,objectively, working class becomes revolutionary Subject
the masses make history, but as vanishing or ephemeral, the party
makes this very vanishing cortt ano enoure.
As well as a response to
Sartres problems of the neetingness of the group-in-fusion, as outlineo
in Tlc Cttttoc of Dtolccttcol Rcoor, there is a presentiment of Baoious later
.. Alain Baoiou, Corotttor, Faris, Seuil, :qq., p. ., n. :.
. Alain Baoiou, ]ean-Faul Sartre ,pamphlet,, Faris, Fotemkine, :q8o, p. .
. Hallwaro, A Soocct to Ttotl, p. .
. Hallwaro, A Soocct to Ttotl, p. 6
faithful subjects in the role he assigns to the Farty in this earlier work:
the initial univocal act, which is always localizeo, inaugurates a noel-
ity, i.e. an invention of consequences, that will prove to be as innnite as
the situation itself .
6
In this sense, we coulo say that Baoious attempt to
make noelity an on-going process, rather than a simple oeclaration mu-
tates from oonating to the party a vanguaroist role to a retention of this
same form in later non-political ano more generically political concep-
tions of the subject. Baoious criticism in Tlottc oo oct of mass move-
ments without a party is furthermore extremely close to Lenins criticisms
of spontaneity ano his centralizing of the party in 1lot t to oc Dorc.: 1c
must take upon ourselves the task of organizing an all-sioeo political
struggle unoer the leaoership of oot party that all ano sunory oppositional
strata coulo give assistance to this struggle ano this party accoroing
to their capacities.
Inoeeo, Baoiou is aoamant in his oefence of Lenins

amrmation of the subjective aspect of politics, ano in fact argues against
the common claim that Lenin oelegates too much strength to the party:
Ior Lenin, the party is nothing but the manoatory focal point for a
politics. The party is the active purincation of politics, the system of pos-
sibility practiceo through the assessment of the Commune. It is inferreo
from politics ,from the subjective aspect of force, ,TS 6,. Later Baoiou
coulo not be more explicit in his turn away from the logic of the party,
however: the question worth highlighting is one of a politics ottloot pott,,
which in no sense means unorganizeo, but rather one organizeo through
the intellectual oiscipline of political processes, ano not accoroing to a
form correlateo with that of the State. ,M :..,.
This earlier recourse to the party is Baoious response to the problem
shareo by Rousseau ano Sartre, as noteo above, namely, how to preserve
over time the initial moment of the subjective realization of revolution ,for
Sartre it is in some sense hopeless, for Rousseau, politics becomes a ques-
tion of legitimation,. Inoeeo, Baoiou makes it clear in Tlottc oo oct that
his conceptualization of the party is precisely the subject ,however un-
clear its relation to the proletariat whose struggle it carries, that preserves
the initial moment of force: The party is something subjective, taken in
its historical emergence, the network of its actions, the novelty it concen-
trates. The institution is nothing but a husk ,TS q,. Again, Baoiou is
6. Alain Baoiou, Eight Theses on the Universal, Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, eo. ano trans. Ray
Brassier ano Alberto Toscano, Lonoon, NY, Continuum, .oo, p. :o.
. V. I. Lenin, 1lot t to oc Dorc., trans. S.V. ano Fatricia Utechin, Oxforo, Oxforo Uni-
versity Fress, :q6, p. :.8.
Nina Fower .q
very close to Sartre on this point ,although for Sartre there is no question
of the party preserving the initial moment of revolt,the ossincation of
force into institutions is not the framework that preserves the initial mo-
ment of novelty: here we see why Baoiou must maintain the centrality
of the subjectivestructures ano organization are not enough if their
participants are not grippeo by the motive force that catalyseo their initial
movement. Flacing, institutionalizing, is always on the sioe of the objec-
tive: every force is a subjective force, ano inasmuch as it is assigneo to
its place, structureo, splaceo, it is an objective force ,TS q,.
In later Baoiou, this question will mutate into a more historically re-
nexive, again more Sartrean, ano, we shoulo say, less rhetorically Lenin-
ist, one: Why oo the most heroic popular uprisings, the most persistent
wars of liberation, the most inoisputable mobilisations in the name of jus-
tice ano liberty eno in opaque statist constructions wherein none of
the factors that gave meaning ano possibility to their historical genesis is
oecipherable? ,M o, As Hallwaro puts it:
What has happeneo in Baoious subsequent work is that he has
slowly aoopteo, while struggling to maintain his strictly political
principles, a perspective similar to Sartres historical-ephemeral
pessimism. but whereas Sartre was able to move beyono the
ephemeral only by equating an ultimate historical coherence with
a global political cooroinationwhich accounts for the failure
of the secono volume of his Cttttoc to move beyono Stalin as
the apparent eno of historyBaoious oetermination to avoio
this alternative has oriven him ever further towaro the raoical
subtraction of politics from history altogether.
8
The rhetoric of the party leaos Baoiou in the earlier work to preserve a
pure aspect of the proletariat amiost its contraoictory unity as the prac-
tical working class ,in the historical context, to oiherentiate the Marxist-
Leninist ano Maoist movements from the FCI,. If Tlottc oo oct consioers
the party the only ehective organizational structure, later Baoiou will, on
the contrary, turn his back completely on the necessity of the proletariat-
party movement: the balance of the twentieth century is the withering
away of the party-form, which knows only the form of the party-State.
q

We can again note this move as the shift from a conception of party as
subject to the ioea of politics without a party ,the latter in fact being the
maxim behino Baoious work with lOtgortottor poltttoc,.
8. Hallwaro, A Soocct to Ttotl, p. .
q. Lo Dttorcc Poltttoc, no , .oo:.
Baoious later conception of the subject uncouples its relation to the
proletariat in favour of a more generic conception of humanity, what he
calls polyvalent man: the real characteristic of the party is not its nrm-
ness, but rather its porosity to the event what neeos to come about is
nothing but the amrmative multiplicity of capacities, whose emblem is
polyvalent man, who unooes even those secular connections that bring
together intellectual workers on the one hano, ano manual workers on
the other. ,M ,. This raoical lack of political specincation inoicates a
perhaps surprising turn to pre-Marxist consioerations, at least partly on
the basis of real historical failures, ano aligns Baoiou more with a Ieuer-
bachian lineage than a strictly politically Marxist-Leninist one. This is
particularly the case with Baoious transition from the rhetoric of oe-
struction to the axiomatic assertion that people think politics is a
thought ,TS 6,. The rationalist philosophical universality of Baoious
newer conception of politics removes the antagonism of the earlier work
between the proletariat ano the bourgeois worlo, but precisely at the ex-
pense of a Marxist analysis of the structure of capitalism. The later theory
of the subject is ahistorically amxeo to the notion of event, ano less to
the topology of the proletariat/bourgeois relation: If one were to ioentify
a cause of the subject, one woulo have to return, not so much to truth,
which is rather its stuh, nor to the innnity whose nnituoe it is, but rather to
the event ,BE ,. The event of politics will, however, subtract Baoious
subject from a structureo analysis, not only of capitalism, but also from
worloy politics altogether. This later subject ,political ano otherwise, is
ultimately characterizeo more by what it is not than by what it isneither
the existential place of a set of representations, nor the transcenoental
system of the constitution of objects of possible experience. It is a subtrac-
tive entity, a fragment of collective humanity that arguably remains
weooeo, because of Baoious later theoretically pre-Marxist turn, to the
problem of sustaining the original political impulse behino mass move-
ments, ano thus again to the Sartrean problem of the oepressing ossinca-
tion of the group-in-fusion. The subjects exemption from a philosophy
of history perhaps avoios some of the problems of Sartres progressive-re-
gressive methoo, which ultimately sees the totality of history refracteo in
the life of a single inoivioual, but brings with it its own problems, namely,
how we are to unoerstano the tclottor between the structure of the politi-
cal subject/collective ano the state of ahairs more broaoly, not to mention
historical forces ano tenoencies.
It was brieny noteo above that Baoious later theory of the subject
uncouples the term from a strictly political amliation ano broaoens its
Nina Fower :
possible points of reference to other conoitions, namely art, science ano
love, as well as politics. Nevertheless, the structure of the political subject
in the later works ,Bctrg oro Eccrt ano the collection of essays uniquely
oevoteo to his more recent position on politics, Mctopoltttc from :qq8,
has its own specincity that Baoiou is clear to oelineate: every situation is
ontologically innnite. But only politics summons this innnity immeoiately,
as subjective universality ,M :,. If Baoiou has oelinkeo this newer con-
ception of the political subject from questions of antagonism ano terms
such as Froletariat, as it seems clear he has, what is the status of this
subjective universality? In a sense, Baoiou is oeliberately vague, perhaps
in part to atone for the overly polemical thrust of his earlier work. Ior
example when he claims the following: In collective situationsin which
the collective becomes interesteo in itselfpolitics ,if it exists o gcrcttc
poltttc: what was calleo, for a long time, revolutionary politics, ano for
which another woro must be founo tooay, is also a proceoure of noel-
ity its innnite proouctions are inoiscernible ,in particular, they oo not
coincioe with or, pott romcoolc occototrg to tlc Stotc,, being nothing more
than changes of political subjectivity within the situation. ,BE o,. The
aomission that another woro must be founo tooay inoicates the oim-
culty Baoiou has in trying oiherentiate his own project both from that
of Marxist-Leninism ano from that of the lineage of political humanism
,Ieuerbach ano the early Marx, as well as parts of the later Sartre, that
has characterizeo much of twentieth-century political thought. Despite
stressing Baoious relationship to the trajectory of thought that concerns
itself with the generic in politics, we must be a little wary of trying neatly
to nt Baoiou back into a lineage of humanism which he seems to ignore
or repuoiate, or of neglecting the historical ano political circumstances
of the impossibility of an unproblematic usage of the term humanism
in a perioo when its invocation implieo oevastating inhumanity in prac-
tice ,Stalinism,. As further noteo in the introouction, a key component of
Baoious contemporary criticisms of the oiscourses of human rights ano
his attack on the inherent victimization of man in contemporary ethi-
cal oiscourse in the Etltc is the oefence of those Irench thinkers that we
woulo typically characterize as anti-humanistAlthusser, Ioucault ano
Lacan. Ior Baoiou, in what is only seemingly a paraoox, these attempts
to think beyono man ano without man remain among the most po-
litically emancipatory available to us. However, it seems clear that whilst
Baoiou is faithful to Ioucault in some sense, ano to the explicit problem-
atic of Ioucaults Tlc Otoct of Tltrg, i.e. that the historical emergence of
the very posing of man as a problem ano the empirico-transcenoental
overcooings that inevitably follow is oue for surpassing, nevertheless this
argument is not taken up in the same way for Ioucault as for Baoiou.
Pocc Ioucault, it seems that for Baoiou there is a oiherent way of both
asking ano answering the question of what man is that manages to obvi-
ate the temptation of post-Kantian ,transcenoental or naturalist, answers.
So, oespite having gone through the nlter of theoretical anti-humanism,
the question itselfWhat is man?remains in place for him in the po-
litical context. Folitics, however, becomes something of an autonomous
region, tieo to the situation, but oooly oistanceo from larger tenoencies
ano geopolitical processes: Folitics is, for itself, its own proper eno, in the
mooe of what is being proouceo as true statementsthough forever un-
knownby the capacity of a collective will ,BE ,. If philosophys task
vis-a-vis politics ,as with the other truth conoitions, is to gather together
the truths revealeo in situations, we can in fact retroactively use the early
Baoiou to criticize the later. When in Tlottc oo oct he states that |a| sum
of rebellions ooes not make a subject, regaroless of how much you may
want to cooroinate them ,TS 6.,, oo we not see a kino of pre-emptive
self-critique of the later work? If philosophys task is to compossibilize,
to holo together, the truths emergent unoer the four oiherent conoitions
,whilst possessing none of its own,, then what oistinguishes philosophys
capture of these episooes of non-antagonistic, non-historical, generic
manifestations of politics precisely from this sum of rebellions?
In the later writings on metapolitics, we confront the possibility that
that oepenoency on thought to founo the possibility of politics may
cause problems from within the system. Baoiou makes use of two axioms,
in particular, that ultimately seem to occupy a noating role between the
set-theoretical ontology, on the one hano, ano the oiscussion of events
ano truth proceoures, on the other. These are, nrst, the axiom of equal-
ity, namely that: equality is not an objective for action, it is an axiom of
action.
o
Secono, the generic axiom that man thinks or people think,
namely that: philosophy aooresses all humans as thinking beings since it
supposes that all humans think.
:
Whilst these seem at minimal or almost
banal assertions, without them Baoiou coulo not preserve his commit-
ment to what he calls a mooern politics of emancipation. The connection
o. Here Baoiou shares a similar conception with Ranciere, for whom equality is not an
outcome to be oesireo, but an axiomatic supposition.
:. Alain Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Desire, Irrttc Tlooglt, trans. ano eo. Oliver Ieltham
ano ]ustin Clemens, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. o.
Nina Fower
between the genericity, equality ano politics is basically outlineo in the
following claim:
Some political orientations, throughout history, have hao or
will have a connection with a truth. A truth of the collective as
such. They are rare attempts, often brief, but they are the only
ones unoer conoition philosophy can think about. These political
sequences are singularities, they trace no oestiny, they construct no
monumental history. Fhilosophy can, however, oistinguish in them
a common feature. This feature is that these orientations require
of the people they engage only their strict generic humanity. They
give no preference, for the principles of action, to the particularity
of interests. These political orientations inouce a representation
of the collective capacity which refers its agents to the strictest
equality. What ooes equality mean? Equality means that the
political actor is representeo unoer the sole sign of his specincally
human capacity. Interest is not a specincally human capacity. All
living beings have as an imperative for survival the protection of
their interests. The specincally human capacity is precisely thought,
ano thought is nothing other than that by which the path of a truth
seizes ano traverses the human animal.
.

The following question is important here: Is an anti-humanist noelity to
thought pct c possible in Baoiou, such that it can avoio any question of a
specincally human capacity from the outset? Ferhaps in the case of math-
ematics ,i.e. Baoious set theoretical ontology, we can respono in the af-
nrmative. However, when it comes to politics, this seems unlikely. The
relateo question that neeos to be poseo here is the following: Can Baoiou
ever truly sever thought from a baseline, axiomatic notion of the human
as equal ano generic? Baoious entire project is founoeo on a commit-
ment to political subjectivationbut subjectivation ano generic humanity
are not ontological facts, ano nothing guarantees their possibility. Inoeeo,
events are strictly speaking impossible, or extra-ontological, given the
logic of the situation ,which is why Baoiou refers to them as ultra-ones,.
What, then, is the relation between what Baoiou calls generic humanity,
the axiom that man thinks, ano mans capacity for immortality ano innn-
ity as a collective political subject? We coulo perhaps say that at least one
meta-event conoitions the very existence of these two non-mathematical
axiomsnot the existence of philosophy, but rather the existence of polt-
ttc, of events that once containeo political truths ,Baoiou repeateoly re-
fers to the Irench ano Russian Revolutions,. Iurthermore, ottloot the two
.. Alain Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano Folitics, Rootcol Pltloopl,, q6, ]uly/August :qqq, p. .q.
noating axioms of equality ano generic thought, politics woulo not even
be thinkable, ano certainly not the egalitarian forms of politics which Ba-
oiou in his later works tries to oefeno.

If the capacity that is specincally human is that of thought, ano, as
Baoiou argues, thought is nothing other than that by which the path of a
truth seizes ano traverses the human animal,
we may wish to ask what

the status of this traversing is. The answer seems to be that the path of a
truth enables that which is trlomor to be borne by the generic thinking
of man. But this thought in some sense ptc-cxtt the traversing, via the
axiom that man thinks, ano that man has the capacity to think oisin-
teresteoly. Why oisinteresteoly? Ior Baoiou, interest is not a specincally
human capacity, since all living beings protect their interests as imperative
for survival. Thought as traverseo by truththis peculiarly human ca-
pacitymust be capable of being absolutely oisinteresteo. Baoiou writes:
Any truth proceoure oistinguishes a properly immortal oisinterest from
an abject properly animal assemblage of particular interests. Iurther-
more, thought ano oisinterest coincioe in the overcoming of all that is
nnite in man: Thought is the specinc mooe by which a human animal is
traverseo ano overcome by a truth ,E :6,. The relationship of philosophy
to politics that comes to take a central role in Baoious later work takes a
historical ano theoretical step ooclooto by replacing the question of politi-
cal practice with this more general conception of thought: By metapoli-
tics I mean whatever consequences a philosophy is capable of orawing
from real instances of politics as thought ,inscription from M xxxix,.
There is a potential problem here, asioe from the obscureo yet apparently
necessary philosophical anthropology, if politics is reouceo to something
like noology, a mere examination of its rational qualities.
Faraooxically, then, it has to be the case that for the later Baoiou, it is
the generic human capacity for thought that minimally founos a universal
inhumanismano this is the key role of both politics ano mathematics.
But in oroer to link this back to the conoition of politics we shoulo ask
the following question: Does our capacity for mathematics in any sense
relate to the fact that we can be seizeo by specincally political truths?
Whilst this might souno like an impossible question from Baoious point
. Rather than try ano force Baoious mathematical analysis of the generic onto levels of
thinking to which it cannot apply, it shoulo be pointeo out that it is he himself who uses the
language of the generic, outsioe of its specincally technical role, in oroer to founo the very
possibility of politics ,separate from philosophy,, as well as in his oiscussions of generic
humanity toot coott.
. Baoiou, Irrttc Tlooglt, p. :.
Nina Fower
of view, a mixture of two oistinct conoitions, it oirectly interrogates the
role of innnity in Baoious philosophy. If it is mathematics that teaches us
that there is no reason whatsoever to connne thinking within the ambit of
nnituoe, ano yet it is mans capacity to be traverseo by the innnite that is
immeoiately relevant to any thinking of politics, rather than mathematics,
then it seems that we cannot avoio posing what at nrst appears to be an
illegitimate question.

If every politics of emancipation rejects nnituoe, rejects being-to-
waros-oeath on the basis of the tmmcototc subjective universality of the
innnite, then it seems clear that, paraooxically, innnity is just as, if not
more, important for a politics of emancipation than it is for mathematics.
But what is the relation between innnity ano immortality? In the Etltc
we are tolo that every human being is capable of being tlt immortal, that
in each case, subjectivation is immortal, ano makes Man ,E :.,. This is
why there is no ethics in general, ano no politics in general. All humanity
has its root in the ioentincation in thought |cr pcrc| of singular situations.
If innnity is actually only the most general form of multiple-being, then
human capacity for innnity is perhaps the most banal of starting points.
Nevertheless it plays the founoing role for politics more than for any other
conoition, incluoing mathematics itself. In Folitics as Truth Froceoure,
Baoiou writes the following: The innnite comes into play in every truth
proceoure, but only in politics ooes it take the nrst place. This is because
only in politics is the oeliberation about the possible ,ano hence about the
innnity of the situation, constitutive of the process itself politics treats
the innnite as such accoroing to the principle of the same, the egalitarian
principle. We will say that the numericality of the political proceoure has
the innnite as its nrst term, whereas for love this nrst term is the one, for
science the voio, ano for art a nnite number.
6

Let us oigress slightly here, ano look brieny at Ieuerbach, in oroer to
go over the role that the generic plays in his thought, ano to make sense
of its relation to politics in Baoiou. In a section of Tlc Ecrcc of Clttttortt,
entitleo The Essential Nature of Man, Ieuerbach tells us that conscious-
. cf. Baoious On the Truth-Frocess: An open lecture, where he argues that: the moo-
ern politics of emancipation freeo from the oialectic scheme of classes ano parties has as
its aim something like a generic oemocracy, a promotion of the commonplace, of a quality
abstracteo from any preoicateso its possible to speak of a generic politics, ano a warf-
ielo of prose such as Samuel Becketts, which trieo by successive subtraction to oesignate
the nakeo existence of generic humanity ,August .oo., http://www.egs.eou/faculty/ba-
oiou/baoiou-truth-process-.oo..htm,.
6. Baoiou, Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg.
ness in the strictest sense is present only in a being to whom his species,
his essential nature, is an object of thought.
In the strictest sense here

excluoes brutes who can only conceive of themselves as inoiviouals ano
not in a generic sense. There is seemingly nothing unusual in Ieuerbachs
oennition of consciousness, we are familiar with the argument that be-
cause man is by nature in possession of both inner ano outer life, we can
oiherentiate ourselves from other animals that apparently lack this sepa-
ration. However, Ieuerbach oislocates the role nature usually plays in this
equation ,as that relating to the outer life, outsioe of consciousness,, ano
states insteao that: the inner life of man is the life which has relation to
his species, to his general, as oistinguisheo from his inoivioual, nature. So,
to be inoivioual is to be an external, natural being, like the brute who
can exercise no function which has relation to its species without another
inoivioual external to itself . To be conscious in the strictest sense, on
the other hano, is to be universal, by virtue of the very fact that man can
perform the functions of thought ano speech, which strictly imply such
a relation, apart from another inoivioual. Thus mans very essence, his
Gottorgoccr, oepenos on his capacity for universal, abstractive, activity,
even ,especially, in his isolation ,his inner life,.
Faraooxically, Mans capacity for asceticism ,unoerstooo here as the
renection of thought upon thought, or upon the very capacity for thought,
is that which most inoicates his universality. Ieuerbach, in his thinking of
mans inner life as Gottorgoccr, inaugurates a strano of philosophical
anthropology that has nothing to oo with the equation of interiority with
nnituoe, by which thought comes to renect upon its own limits, ano ulti-
mately the possibility of its own absolute impossibility ,as in Heioeggers
explicitly anti-anthropological formulation,. On the contrary, thought oo
thought is always baseo on a oemonstration of the trrtt, of thought, ano
thus simultaneously of mans generic essence. Here are two quotes from
Ieuerbach that oemonstrate this point a little further, the nrst from the
preface to on tlc Ecrcc of Clttttortt,, ano the secono from Towaros a
Critique of Hegels Fhilosophy:
Consciousness, in the strict or proper sense, is ioentical with
consciousness of the innnite, a limiteo consciousness is no
consciousness, consciousness is essentially innnite in its nature. The
consciousness of the innnite is nothing else than the consciousness
of the innnity of the consciousness, or, in the consciousness of the
. Luowig Ieuerbach, Tlc Ecrcc of Clttttortt,, trans. George Eliot, New York, Lonoon,
Harper ano Row, :q, p. :.
Nina Fower
innnite, the conscious subject has for its object the innnity of his
own nature.
8
The human form is the genus of the manifolo animal species,
it no longer exists as man but as genus. The being of man is no
longer particular ano subjective, but a universal being, for man has
the whole universe as the object of his orive for knowleoge.
q
Returning to Baoiou, we must of course point out the quite oistinct
roles that universality ano consciousness play for himsuch that univer-
sality can in no way preceoe an event, ano that consciousness plays no part
in his raoically anti-phenomenological formulations. But what is clear in
Ieuerbach is that maintaining a generic thinking of innnity as a consti-
tutively human capacity is the orl, way to escape the over-oetermination
of man by his nnituoe. Hence Ieuerbachs philosophical anthropology
has nothing to oo with limiting thought, ano in fact, precisely points to
a raoically oe-inoivioualizeo generic ability to think the innnite which
looks to be very close to the claims Baoiou makes in his later conception
of politics.
However, Baoiou oihers from Ieuerbach here in more complex ways.
Iirst, by having a singular, ano not a general, conception of the universal
,which also separates him on this specinc point from Kant ano the tran-
scenoental traoition,. Thus, when it comes to ethics there can be no gen-
eral principle of lomor rights, for the simple reason that what is ortcctoll,
human is always rooteo in particular truths, particular conngurations of
active thought. Similarly, Folitics as thinking has no other objective than
the transformation of unrepeatable situations ,E :6,. To become a subject
,ano not remain a simple human animal,, is to participate in the coming
into being of a universal novelty. The subject here will be singular because
it will always be an event that constitutes the subject as a truth. However,
to return to the axiom of equality, it is important that equality ooes not
refer to anything objective. Equality is subjective, or revealeo through
subjectivity, ano it is this key claim that links both Baoiou ano Ieuerbach,
asioe from the question of the generic.
Folitics, as we have seen, is impossible without the ioea that people,
taken inoistinctly, are capable of the thought that also constitutes the
post-evental political subject. But at what point are people capable of
this thought? It is my claim that, in the case of politics, Baoiou neeos to
8. Luowig Ieuerbach, Tlc Ftct, Btool: Sclcctco 1ttttrg of Loootg Fcoctoocl, eo. ano trans.
Zawar Hann, New York, Anchor Books, :q., p. qq.
q. Ieuerbach, Tlc Ftct, Btool, p. q.
founo, at an absolutely minimal level, a kino of pre-evental philosophi-
cal anthropology of a quasi-Ieuerbachian kino. This is something of a
problematic position, cutting oirectly against arguments maoe elsewhere
by others, incluoing Baoiou himself, ano Feter Hallwaro, who states ex-
plicitly that there is no oistinct place in Baoious work for a philosophical
anthropology of any kino.
6o
Certainly, there is no room in Baoiou for
any philosophical anthropology of nnituoe. The question here is whether
one can have a philosophical anthropology of innnituoe, as Baoiou seems
to require for his oiscussion of politics. That is why asking this question
returneo us to Ieuerbach. The anthropological aspect of the answer to
this question woulo have to be empty, generic, unlimiteo. In other woros,
that claim that we are subtractively innnite means that what we oo as
subjects, without any reference to an object, has innnity as its oimension.
That we are innnite because we think innnitely, or in Ieuerbachian terms,
because we think innnity o ocl.
The reason for this incursion into the ,mostly uncharteo, territory
of an innnite philosophical anthropology is that, without some kino of
oiscussion of a pre-evental generic capacity, or an empty axiomatic re-
garoing the thought of all, it seems that Baoiou woulo be incapable of
claiming that the events which set oh the truth proceoure of politics have
any reason to be more or less egalitarian. It coulo be the case that there
are no subjects until an event ano its nomination, but without the generic
axioms of universal thought unoerlying the very possibility of subjectiva-
tion, there woulo be no positive content to Baoious oefense of emancipa-
tory, egalitarian politics.
6o. Hallwaro, Bootoo: A Soocct to Ttotl, p. .
q
13
The Bourgeois ano the Islamist, or, The Other
Subjects of Folitics
Alberto Toscano
SUB]ECTS OI UNTRUTH
Among the less fortunate by-prooucts of the recent resurgence in
emancipatory theories of political subjectivity is the tenoency to oepict the
subject in an exclusively militant or, at the very least, progressive light.
Bracketing the contraoictions of social class, or the pathologies of ioeol-
ogy, the political subject seems enooweo, by nat, with the steaofast virtues
of universalism. While, confronteo with a proliferation of noxious political
agents ano ioeas, such a stance may possess an attractive if minimalist
rectituoe, reserving the term subject solely for the kino of collective egal-
itarian ngure that coulo oivert our baleful course might mean oepriving
ourselves of a potent instrument to intervene in the present. If we relegate
the reactionary, or at best ambiguous, ngures that loom large on our po-
litical horizon to the rank of structural epiphenomena, neeting phantoms
or minoless tenoencies, we run the risk of prooucing political theories that
oiher little from plain wishful thinking or self-satisneo sectarianism. Even
within the generally optimistic politico-philosophical paraoigm which, by
way of shorthano, we coulo call the theory of the multituoe, some have
begun to foregrouno the oeep omotcolcrcc of contemporary forms of politi-
cal subjectivity.
:
But can there be any concessions to such an ambiguity,
to the presence of untruthful subjects, in Alain Baoious amrmative, ano
avoweoly Fromethean theory of the subject?
:. Faolo Virno, A Gtommot of tlc Moltttooc, New York, Semiotext,e,, .oo.
Baoious oecaoes-long preoccupation with political subjectivity ooes
inoeeo seem markeo by an increasingly trenchant ano internalist treat-
ment of the subject as both rare ano aloof from the vicissituoes of social
meoiation. Whats more, Baoiou makes subject inseparable from the
novelty of an exception ano the arouous trajectory of a truth which is
always in the worlo, but in many ways not of it ,or rather, a truth which,
by forcefully incluoing itself in the worlo makes sure that the worlo will
never be the same,. He ooes this by aovocating a strenuously post-Car-
tesian thinking of the subject in which the latter is only ngureo as an
ccct, an aleatory trajectory or point of arrival, ano not as a pre-existing
source. After Marx ano Ireuo, the subject is not a starting-point, it must
be founo.
.
All signs point to a stance which is wholly refractory to any
analysis of the subjects particularistic attachments, violent ano violating
impulses, repressive oesires, ano so on. Baoious explicit oecision not to
treat the subject by way of a theory of ioeology, anooespite his grouno-
ing allegiance to Lacannot to oelve into its Ireuoian unconscious, also
militate for a purineo, formal theory of the subject that woulo shun the
subjects unsavoury, pathological sioe. Ano yet, as I woulo like to examine
in these pages, within the strictures of an asocial, non-ioeological ano un-
compromisingly universalistic theory of the subject Baoiou has proposeo
a number of ways to think ano formalize the existence of other subjects,
ones which are not the bearers but the enemies or obfuscators of truth.
AMBIVALENCE OI THE BOURGEOISIE
Given Baoious roots in revolutionary theory one cannot but expect
some traces in his work of the numerous contributions to the theory of
anti- or semi-universalist subjectivity within Marxismfrom Marxs own
paean to bourgeois oestruction in Tlc Commortt Mortfcto, to the wrestling
with the rise of fascist politics in the writings of Trotsky ano many others.
It is evioent, for instance, that a reckoning with the ngure of tcocttor has
been a constant in Baoious work. But perhaps one of the more interest-
ing points of entry into Baoious theory of untrue subjects concerns the
status of the bourgeoisie. To begin with, Baoiou intenos to oislocate the
apparently frontal confrontation, the class struggle, between proletariat
ano bourgeoisie. Ior the proletariat as a fotcc ,a crucial concept in Ba-
oious oialectical writings of the :qos, ooes not seem to be pitteo against
the bourgeoisie as another force. In some of the early seminars that make
.. Alain Baoiou, Tlottc oo oct, Faris, Seuil, :q8., p. .q ,henceforth TS,.
Alberto Toscano :
up Baoious Tlottc oo oct, the bourgeoisie is oepicteo as a mere agent of
a system of places, of a Whole which the proletariat seeks to oestroy by
what Baoiou calls a torsion, whereby an incluoeo but suppresseo element
comes to limit, then oestroy, the totality of which it is a part: To say pro-
letariat ano bourgeoisie is to remain with the Hegelian artince: something
ano something else. Ano why? Because the project of the proletariat, its
internal being, is not to contraoict the bourgeoisie, or to cut its legs oh.
Its project is communism, ano nothing else. That is to say the abolition
of any place wherein something like a proletariat coulo be situateo ,TS
. ,. Ano, o fotttott, anything like a bourgeoisie. In this sense, whilst the
confrontation with the bourgeoisie might be the motor of history, the
proletariats target is really the social Whole, i.e. imperialist society.
Moving further in the series of seminars that make up Baoious nrst
major theoretical work, however, we encounter, in the miost of an analy-
sis of the subjective weakness of May 68, a portrait of the bourgeois as
subject ano force. Inoeeo, Baoiou stresses that revolutionaries have al-
ways maoe the mistake of thinking themselves to be the only subject, ano
represent the antagonistic class to themselves as an objective mechanism
of oppression leo by a hanoful of pronteers. On the contrary, one of the
lessons of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, accoroing to Baoiou, is that
the bourgeoisie too engages in politics, ano not simply by means of exploi-
tation or coercion. Asking himself olctc this politics takes place, Baoiou
answers, with rare Gramscian overtones: Exactly as with the proletariat:
in the people, working class incluoeo, ano I woulo even say, since were
oealing with the new bureaucratic State bourgeoisie, working class cpc-
ctoll, incluoeo. The reason for thus foregrounoing the subjective force
of the aoversary is to counter the feeble-minoeo ano objectivist anti-
repressive logorrhoea, for which the only enemy woulo be a Moloch-like
State. Contrary to this anarchistic leftism, Baoiou proposes the following
assertion: Of course, they are a hanoful, the bourgeois imperialists, but
the subjective ehect of their force lies in the oivioeo people. There is not
just the law of Capital, or the cops. To miss this is not to see the unity of
the space of placements |cplocc|, its consistency. The suggestion here is
that the social space wherein the latent force of the proletariat is captureo,
placeo ano instrumentalizeo cannot be envisageo in a purely structural
manner, as an impersonal given, but must insteao be conceiveo in terms
of that counter-revolutionary or reactionary subjectivity which carries its
own project into the pre-subjective mass of the people. Or, as Baoiou
summarizes in a Hegelian pastiche: We must conceive of imperialist soci-
ety not only as substance, but also as subject ,TS 6o,. This, at least, is the
position put forwaro in the seminar oateo : April :q, which appears
to rectify the earlier unoerstanoing of the proletariat as the sole political
ano subjective force.
In the seminar oateo : Iebruary :q, Baoiou approaches the ques-
tion of the proletariat/bourgeoisie relation from a topological angle. If
we follow an economistic traoition, which sunoers Marxs Copttol from
the concrete ,strategic, analysis of concrete ,political, situations, bourgeoi-
sie ano proletariat appear topologically exterior to one anotherthe nrst
oenneo in terms of its ownership of the means of proouction, the secono
in terms of its separation ,alienation, from them. The result of this purely
external topology, is paraooxically to renoer the proletariat functionally
interior or immanent to the bourgeoisie. Reouceo to alienateo labour-
power, the proletariat is nothing but a piece in the apparatus of exploita-
tion, whose ioentity is entirely heteronomous, oictateo by the laws of capi-
tal. Brieny, capital is the place of the proletariat. Baoiou oeouces from
this the possibility of Soviet state-capitalism, since it is perfectly possible,
given this arrangement, to suppress capitalists, all the while maintain-
ing the law of capital. To oepart from the compulsion to repeat ano the
allergy to novelty that characterize the economistic framework, Baoiou
enjoins us to think the interiority of the bourgeoisie to the working class
,TS :,.
Making reference to Marxs analysis of the series of uprisings ,social
hysterias in his Lacanese, of the eighteen-thirties, forties ano nfties, Ba-
oiou sees the emergence of a proletarian ngure not as a functional cog in
the machinery of capital, but as an internal torsion, an exceptional ois-
oroer within the political trajectory of the oemocratic bourgeois move-
ment. The proletarian subject is born out of its bourgeois impurity, its
being inoexeo to a heteronomous capitalist oroer, ano only emerges by
the expulsion, the purging of the internal infection that, to begin with,
constitutes it. The proletariat is thus oepicteo, through these somewhat
unsettling meoical metaphors, as perpetually in the process of healing
from the malaoy of the bourgeoisie. Insisting with the topological vocabu-
lary, Baoiou writes that the politics of the proletariat is in a situation of
internal exclusion with regaro to bourgeois politics, that is, with regaro to
its object. The proletariat is thus both within ano against the bourgeoisie,
constantly purging its intimate bourgeois oetermination. Its topology of
oestruction means that it is enouringly engageo in an ehort to oislocate
ano ultimately oestroy the site of its existence ,without this oestruction,
it might just be a mask or ruse of the bourgeoisie, as Baoiou oeems to
be the case for the USSR,, but it can only oo so, because of its originary
Alberto Toscano
impurity, in an immanent, oialectical combat with the bourgeoisie that
internally excluoes it. This topological vision transforms the stanoing of
the bourgeoisie within Baoious theory of the subject yet again:
Does the bourgeoisie make a subject ,fott oct,? I saio so in this very
place, in April :q. Let us contraoict ourselves, it is just a trick of
pot-cttc. The bourgeois has not maoe a subject for a long while, it
makes a place ,ltco,. There is only one political subject, for a given
historicization. This is a very important remark. To ignore it is to
become confuseo by a vision of politics as a subjective ouel, which
it is not. There is one place ano one subject. The oissymmetry is
structural ,TS :8,.

Class struggle, if the term still applies, is thus not between two separate
fotcc, two subjects inoexeo to oiherent places within the apparatus of capi-
tal. It is an ehect of the proletariat ,that surviving booy, born from the
rot, expelling itself from bourgeois politics, ano thus gaining its existence
through that very process of organizeo oestruction. The theory of subjec-
tivation as oestruction thus appears to require the exclusivity of the term
subject, ano the relegation of the bourgeoisie, ano any subjects other
than the proletariat, to a phantasmagorical structural semblance.
This oscillation in the appraisal of the bourgeoisie, ano the oialectical
arguments that motivate it, inoicate the thorny problem poseo to Baoious
project by the existence of other, non-emancipatory subjects: if the bour-
geoisie is not a subject, the theory of the proletariat risks a leftist solution,
a repressive hypothesis which singles out an impersonal State or Capital
as its only enemy, if the bourgeoisie is a subject, antagonism seems to ab-
sorb Baoious theory of torsion-oestruction, ano the historicity of politics
appears ooomeo to ambivalence with the introouction of multiple forms
of universality into the situation. As we will see further on, this antinomy
of the other subject continues to haunt Baoious work.
]USTICE AND TERROR, NIHILISTS AND RENEGADES
Abioing within the rich connnes of the Tlottc oo oct, we witness the
return, in a very oiherent guise, of the problem of the other subject in
Baoious attempt to formulate an ctltc. Insisting with the metaphors of
location ano the topological arsenal that oominates the recasting of oia-
lectics in the Tlottc, Baoiou proposes to rethink the question of ethics
in terms of a topics |toptoc|: There is no major Marxist text that is not
. The untranslatable notion of pot-cttc, a play on potoittc ,to appear, is taken by Baoiou
from Lacans seminars of the :qos.
oriven by the question: Where is the proletariat? That is why politics is
the unity of opposites of a topics ,the current situation, ano an ethics ,our
tasks, ,TS .q,.
But this topics also acquires a more precise meaning,

referring to the ahective ngures that the subject ,vieweo as an unstable
mix of oestructive subjectivation, ano restorative subjective processes,
moves across. This ethics is thus, nrst ano foremost, immanent to the be-
coming of a subjectso how might it allow us to oeepen our investigation
of other, non-emancipatory subjects?
Given the centrality of raoical novelty to Baoious investigation, ano
what he has alreaoy inoicateo regaroing the proletariat, born of a rotting
bourgeoisie on the occasion of a social hysteria, the starting point for an
ethics of subjectivity can only be ototoct. What occt are borne by a sub-
ject that might try, by bringing itself into the worlo, to oraw novelty out
of this oisoroer? To begin with, a methooological proviso is requireo: like
his theory of the subject, Baoious theory of ahect is also post-Cartesian,
which is to say that it treats the subject as a formalization ano an aleatory
trajectory, meaning that ahect ooes not refer to an experience, a capac-
ity, a spiritual or mental oisposition. This ethics of ahects, which princi-
pally concerns the subjects stance vis-a-vis the law of the worlo which
is being oestroyeo, circulates through four concepts: anxiety, superego,
courage ano justice. These are categories of the subject-ehect. What they
allows us to know is a specinc material region, at the basis |pttrctpc| of
every oestruction of what sustains it. How these concepts are articulateo
to one another by the subject will oetermine its oisposition with regaro to
the situation ano its aptituoe for the tasks of innovation.
Arxtct, |orgotc| treats the given oroer as ocoo. It ooes not foresee the
splitting ano re-composition of the symbolic arouno a new law, but the
simple killing of the symbolic by the real. The consequence of this non-
oialectical treatment of oestruction as chaos ano paralysis, abrogation of
sense, is that the law, always unoivioeo, glimmers in the oistance of what
it no longer supports ,TS o,. The excess over the law has no other sym-
bols than those of its oeath, ano remains in a sense hysterical, a question
without an answer.
The intervention of the opctcgo is thus oepicteo as a response to the
morbio paralysis of anxiety: As a ngure of consistency, |superego| puts
excess back in place o, ottttoottrg tt occt oll tlc plocc. The superego is the
structural aspect of excess. Through it the algebrization of the topological
. The philosophical notion of a Topics, concerneo with the topot, the places or locations
of oiscourse, oerives from Aristotles eponymous treatise.
Alberto Toscano
is ehecteo, as if, nlleo with subjectivating anxiety, the place recomposeo
itself upon itself in the terrorizing prescription of placement. The su-
perego is the subjective process of terror ,TS o8,. The mooel here is
provioeo by one of the crucial sources for Baoious treatment of the oark
sioe of subjectivity, Hegels oiagnosis of the Terror. Where anxiety sig-
nalleo the chaos of a worlo without law, the superego oetermines a nxing
of excess ,ano of oeath,, a pitiless control of the situation by the forcible
introouction of a new law, which, as Hegel shows, takes the shape of a
purely negative ano persecutory universality. But, foreshaoowing the use
of the same passages of Hegel in the more recent lessons on the twentieth
century, for Baoiou the superego-Terror is a phenomenon of the subject,
ano not of the State terror is a mooality of politics ano not the me-
chanical proouct of the mooern State ,TS oq,.
What ooes it mean to

think terror as internal to the subject? Ior Baoiou it means that the crimi-
nal ravages of terror ,e.g. the Gulag, cannot be the object of an anti-statist
moral critique, but must be rethought from within a ,Marxist, politics that
comprehenos the superego as an internal, oialectical ano restorative ng-
ure. If terror is subjective it is only by unoerstanoing the ethical trajectory
of subjectsfrom the insioethat it may be parrieo or limiteo. External
critique, which excises or ignores the subjective element, merely prepares
the return or repetition of terror.
The thiro ethical ngure, cootogc, presents an important alternative to
the subjectivity of terror qua antioote to the ravages of anxietywhere
anxiety was a question without an answer, courage is presenteo as an
answer without a question. As an ahect, courage qualines the kino of sub-
ject capable of facing oisoroer ano the anxiety that issues from it, without
oemanoing the immeoiate restoration of the law. What is more, courage
subtenos the capacity to act, to traverse the chaos of anxiety, without the
cooroinates provioeo by the law. When gnaweo by anxietyso goes Ba-
oious recommenoationto act with courage is to oo that very thing you
think impossible, or before which you anxiously recoil. Or, as his motto
has it: Iino your inoecency of the moment ,TS :o,.
Fossibly the most interesting ethical concept proposeo in this topics
is that of ottcc, which is presenteo as basically the opposite of terror in its
relationship to the law. While, inasmuch as its terroristic implementation
. See also Alain Baoiou, Tlc Ccrtot,, trans. ano commentary by Alberto Toscano, Lon-
oon, Folity Fress, .oo, especially Chapter : The passion for the real ano the montage of
semblance, where Hegel features as the principal philosophical reference for a reckoning
with the molten core of the twentieth century.
is self-justifying, the superego absolutizes law, justice relativizes it, working
by the criterion that the more Real ano the less law, the better. But for this
very reason, justice is a oeeply unsettling ahect, generating ever further
anxiety as it casts ooubt on the viability of rules for oealing with oisoroer.
Insisting with a oialectical approach, this is why the institutive character
of justice can never be wholly sunoereo from the restorative proceoure of
the superego, ano why justice calls forth two stances which oeny its au-
tonomy: oogmottm, which oemanos the untrammelleo supremacy of the
superego over courage, ano ccpttctm, in which the non-law of justice ooes
not open up to the institution of new laws, but is merely the stano-in for
the unoecioability of law, which is to say, for anxiety. ]ustice is the ox
|oo| of plocc, the opposite, therefore, of the right place |lo otc plocc| ,TS
:.,.
What are the consequences of this quaoripartite schema for a think-
ing of other subjects? I woulo like to focus on two. The nrst concerns the
ioeologization of subjects, the secono Baoious typology of ethical ois-
courses.
Besioes serving as a psychoanalytic clue to the functioning of Hegelian
terror, the superego is also employeo by Baoiou to account for the imma-
nent proouction of ioeology out of the travails of subjectivation. Iollowing
a general methooological principle, which is that of following the vicis-
situoes of the subject without immeoiately imposing upon it the marks of
structure, Baoiou here proposes to see ioeology as a proouct of something
like an ethical failing within the subject itself. While true subjectivation
involves the real piercing into the symbolic, ano the hazaroous ehort to
recompose a new oroer after the oestruction of the system of places, ioe-
ology is a question of the imaginary. Holoing to the oialectical oemano
that organizes his ethics of the subjectthe ioea that faithful subjectivity
must topologically aohere to its otherBaoiou sees subjectivation ano
ioeology as facets of the same process. He illustrates this with an example
from an event, the German Feasants War of :., which he hao alreaoy
toucheo upon in his earlier collaborative work on ioeology: When Tho-
mas Muntzer sets the German countrysioe aname with an egalitarian
communist aim, he subjectivates courageously, on a backgrouno of oeath,
ano calls for justice. When he names his courage on the basis of the abso-
lute conviction that Christ wants the realization of this project, he imagi-
narily articulates the rebellious bravura on the superego whose allegory
is the kingoom of Goo ,TS :,.
6
The same lesson can be orawn from
6. See also Alain Baoiou ano Iranois Balmes, Dc ltoologtc, Faris, I. Maspro, :q6.
Alberto Toscano
the Cultural Revolution: it is the incapacity of the Reo Guaros to sustain
their egalitarian programme, with courage ano justice, that calls forth the
imaginary ano ioeological guarantee, the ethical stop-gap provioeo by
the superego-cult of Mao. The anxiety proouceo by egalitarian oisoroer is
thus assuageo, not just through the ioolatry of a new, if unoer-oenneo law
,Mao-Tse-Tung-thought,, but, following Hegel, through the persecution
it gives rise to: the superegos manner of saturating places, which can only
be occupieo, without ambiguity, by revolutionaries or enemies. The im-
aginary oimension thus arises as a way of comforting the anxious subject,
unable to sustain the uncertain oiscipline of courage ano the unoecioable
measure of justice.
The terror exerciseo by the superego thus represents a weakness of the
subject. But this ooes not exhaust the content of ethics. If ethics makes
oiscourse of what cannot wait or be oelayeo, if it makes oo with what
there is, then its key problem, as Baoiou explicitly oraws from Lacan, is
that the worlo only ever proposes the temptation to give up, to inexist
in the service of gooos ,TS ., .8, ,. What an ethics of Marxism
woulo therefore neeo to confront are the various ways in which the temp-
tation to give up on the labour of subjectivation, the labour of oestruction,
manifests itself. If subjectivation names the oestructive process whereby
the subject suboroinates place to excess, while subjective process oennes
the contrary, conservative tenoency, then the character of oefeatism or
even reaction involves giving up on subjectivation for the sake of an oloer
subjective process. The source for this remains internal to the subject it-
self, in the failure of connoence |cororcc| ,the funoamental concept of
the ethics of Marxism,. If the ethical subject is ioentineo with the party
pure ano simple, then the ethical nemesis is surely the renegaoe, the trai-
tor to be liquioateo ,thereby returning us to superego-Terror,. But if we
rein back this ferocious form of placement, what light can ethics sheo on
the existence of other subjects?
While Baoiou hao abanooneo the ioea of plural subjects when wres-
tling with the conunorum of the bourgeoisie, the issue seems to return once
he oeclares ethics to be a naming of the subject as historically ehectuateo
in the form of oiscourse. Ior there is not just one, but foot oiscourses of the
subject for Baoiou ano thus, in a complex ano problematic sense, if not
four separate subjects, at least four tenoencies within subjectivation ano
subjective processes. These four oiscourses are the oiscourse of praise,
that of resignation, that of oiscoroance, ano the Fromethean oiscourse.
Their funoamental ahective tonalities are belief, fatalism, nihilism ano
connoence. Now, without oelving into the oetail of how these positions
are oeriveo from the prior oistinction between superego, anxiety, cour-
age ano justice, it is important to note that the ethical subjects inoexeo to
these oiscourses are intrinsically relational. In other woros, they only exist
by oesignating their others ano the oiscourses of these others.
The oiscourse of praise ano the Fromethean oiscourse are the two that
in a sense lie beyono anxiety. But they are oiametrically opposeo in their
relations to the Whole ,or space of placements, cplocc, ano the force of
novelty ,or the out of place, lotltco,. It is a matter of belief ,or connoence in
the space of placements, versus connoence ,or belief in the out-of-place,.
While belief opens up the possibility of salvation, ano the potential eterni-
ty of the subject in a nnally realizeo space of placements ,without lack but
oetermineo by law,, connoence, insteao, works with noelity to the innova-
tive oecision ,courage,, ano a more porous recomposition of the real, less
open to the law ,justice,. The subject of praise can here be recast in terms
of something like the subject of the system itself, the believer ano oefenoer
of its righteousness, a truly corctcottcc subject. But the Fromethean subject
of oestruction ano recomposition, the universalist ,proletarian, subject,
has two other counterparts, mireo in oiherent forms of anxiety. These are
the resigneo fatalist ano the nihilist. The resigneo fatalist is most likely the
one who has succumbeo to the service of gooos, who, though not beyono
the pale, is in a sense a potcc nihilist ano something like an after-subject.
It is the real nihilist insteao who, plungeo into the oiscoroance of an anx-
ious worlo, but without the safety of knowing scepticism, is the subject
whom the Fromethean oiscourse wishes to capture ano persuaoe. Ior the
nihilist is inoeeo imbueo with a certain form of courage ,the passion for
the act, for excess, but is incapable of justice, of the right measurement
of the relationship between the real ano the law. He lacks the connoence
which alone allows the organization ano enourance of both courage ano
justice in a universal ngure.
Thus, oespite his arguments to the contrary when aooressing the pos-
sibility of a bourgeois subject, Baoiou alreaoy recognizes, in the Tlottc oo
oct, the neeo to think oiherent subjective conngurations, not all of which
can be regaroeo as the ethical bearers of novelty ano universality. Though
his more recent work on ethics has been far more wioely oiscusseo than
the earlier foray into an ethical topics, we can ioentify some manifest
continuities, which brioge the theoretical caesura triggereo by the intro-
ouction of the theory of the event ano its metaontological, set-theoretical
armature. In the nrst place, there is the ioea that a subject is ethically
oenneo by the manner in which it relates to other subjects within the
space createo by its connoence, or noelity: Every noelity to an authentic
Alberto Toscano q
event names the aoversaries of its perseverance.
This ogortttc oimension

of subjectivation clearly relates to the relational character of the theory of
ethical oiscourses ,e.g. there is no Fromethean subject without its nihil-
ist,. Seconoly, there is the ioea that one can only rescino ones incorpora-
tion into a subject by octto,ol. This theory of betrayal is in some respects
akin to the oiscourse of resignation in the Tlottc oo oct. The ,ex-,subject
of betrayal in fact ocrtc having been seizeo by a truth, orowning his previ-
ous courage in oeep scepticism ano bowing to the imperative accoroing to
which we must avert the risks imposeo by any truth proceoure. Thiroly,
there is the key tenet that the pathologies of subjectivitymore particu-
larly the emergence of false subjects that traoe in tmolocto of truth ,e.g.
Nazism, ano the tcttot which exerts a full sovereignty of truth over all
placescan only be unoerstooo from out of the possible impasses of a
subject of truth.
The last is a persistent conviction unoerlying Baoious treatment of
what, for lack of better terms, we coulo refer to as non-universal subjects.
In other woros, it is the irruption of a subject of truth which serves as the
aleatory conoition of possibility for the formation of other subjects. In the
case of Nazism, for instance: Such a simulacrum is only possible thanks
to the success of political revolutions that were genuinely evental ,ano thus
universally aooresseo,. This is why it is only from the stanopoint of noelity
to events of universal aooressthe truth-processes whose simulacra they
manipulatethat these other, non- or anti-universal subjects, become
intelligible.
8
Or, in Baoious more classical terms, why Evil can only be
unoerstooo from the stanopoint of the Gooo.
STRUGGLES OVER SUB]ECTIVE SFACE
The foregoing oiscussion suggests that the problem of other sub-
jectsin its ethico-political, rather than epistemological sensehas been
an abioing preoccupation ano a thorny challenge for Baoious thinking
ever since the mio-seventies. In this regaro, the treatment of the theory of
the subject in Bctrg oro Eccrt, wholly concerneo with the subject of truth,
seems to hark back to one of Baoious theoretical tenoencies, alreaoy en-
countereo in the Tlottcthe one which contenos that, for a given situ-
ation ,or space of placements, ano for a given historical sequence, tlctc
t orl, orc oocct. As we observeo with regaro to the concept of the bour-
. Alain Baoiou, Etltc, trans. Feter Hallwaro, Lonoon, Verso, .ooo, p. .
8. Baoiou, Etltc, p. .
geoisie, there is something structural about this oscillation in the work of
Baoiou. Are there one or many subjects? Frior to the recent publication
of the Logtoc oc moroc, which we will oeal with below, Feter Hallwaro
alreaoy inoicateo, in his inoispensable ano lucio summary of Baoious
:qq6-q lectures on the axiomatic theory of the subject, that Baoiou has
founo it necessary to introouce a mooicum of meoiation
q
ano plurality
into his account of the subject. As Hallwaro puts it, Baoiou realizes that
an event can evoke a range of subjective responses. He now sees each
ehect of truth as raising the possibility of a counterehect, no longer con-
sioereo as simply external to the process of subjectivation, but as internal
to subjective space itself .
:o

As I have alreaoy suggesteo however, this realization shoulo not be
seen as a suooen innovation in Baoious thinking, but as the recovery of a
problem intrinsic to his theory of the subject ever since his seminars of the
:qos. Besioes the abioing preoccupation with the lessons of Hegels phe-
nomenology of terror, ano the attempt to nesh out a theory of subjective
betrayal, Baoiou has oemonstrateo an abioing concern with the possible
existence of subjects who veer from, react to or occluoe the struggle for
transformative universality. In this respect, the toptoc presenteo in his eth-
ics of Marxism, with its nihilists, fatalists ano believers, is a clear precursor
of the theory of subjective space sketcheo out in his :qqos lectures ano,
with some amenoments, introouceo in his meta-physics of the subject in
the .oo6 Logtoc oc moroc.
::
In other woros, I think it is useful, especially
in oroer to survey the gamut of subjective possibilities investigateo by Ba-
oious thought, to recognize that it is not just in the past few years that he
has come to consioer the subjective realm precisely as a poccas some-
thing that no one ngure can fully occupy ano oetermine, as something
that every subject must traverse.
:.
Given Hallwaros exhaustive treatment of the earlier ano unpublisheo
sketch of the theory of subjective space, I will focus here solely on the
q. To leno the event an implicative oimension is alreaoy to submit the process of its af-
nrmation to a kino of logical meoiation, as oistinct from the immeoiacy of a pure nomina-
tion. Feter Hallwaro, Bootoo: A Soocct to Ttotl, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Fress,
.oo, p. :.
:o. Hallwaro, Bootoo, pp. :-.
::. Among the oiherences between the two is that what appears as the faithful subject in
the Logtoc oc moroc was split into two ngures, the hysteric ano the master, in the lectures
outlineo by Hallwaro.
:.. Hallwaro, Bootoo, p. :.
Alberto Toscano :
shape that this notion of subjective space takes on in Book I of the Logtoc
oc moroc.
To begin with it is necessary brieny to outline the parameters of Ba-
oious recent nnessing of his formal theory of the subject. Fitteo against
hermeneutic, moral, ano ioeological mooels of subjectivity, it is worth
reiterating that Baoious theory is not interesteo in the cxpcttcrcc of sub-
jectivity, but simply in its fotm. Nor is Baoiou particularly concerneo with
the subject as a source of statements, a subject of enunciation capable of
saying I or we. Rather, the subject is oepicteo as what cxccco the nor-
mal oisposition ano knowleoge of booies ano languagesthe exclusive
focus upon which oennes Baoious current ioeological nemesis, what he
calls oemocratic materialism.
:
While the theory of the subject as a whole
certainly tackles the subject-booies ,political parties, scientinc communi-
ties, artistic conngurations, that support truth proceoures, the formal
theory as such limits itself to the various formalizations of the ehects of
the booy of the subject. The theory propounoeo in Book I of the Logtoc
brackets the booy ,which is why Baoiou oubs it a meta-physics,, provio-
ing the general parameters for thinking how subjects exceeo the situations
whence they arise. The notion of subject therefore imposes the reao-
ability of a unineo orientation upon a molttpltctt, of booies ,LM ,. This
means that it also suspenos a consioeration of the specinc historicity of a
process of subjectivation, the manner in which the booy of a subject is
composeo by incorporating certain elements of the situation ano oisquali-
fying others. The subject is thus vieweo as an active ano ioentinable form
of the proouction of truths. The emphasis, evioently, is on form.
But ooes this entail that the only subjects oeserving of our theoreti-
cal attention are subjects of truth, of the orc truth that may ahect ano
oislocate any given situation? The particular innection of Baoious oenni-
tion tells us otherwise: Saying subject or saying subject with regaro to
truth is reounoant. Ior there is a subject only as the subject of a truth,
at the service of this truth, of its oenial, or of its occultation ,LM 8,.
This with regaro to alreaoy inoicates that there are inoeeo, as Hallwaro
suggests, oiherent subjective positions or comportments, oetermineo by a
subjects stance towaros the irruption of the event ano the truths that may
follow from it. Baoiou himself presents this theory as a self-criticism of
sorts, arguing that his earlier work ,he is thinking of the Tlottc oo oct in
:. Alain Baoiou, Democratic Materialism ano the Materialist Dialectic, trans. Alberto
Toscano, Rootcol Pltloopl,, vol. :o, .oo, pp. .o-.. This is an excerpt from the preface
to Alain Baoiou, Logtoc oc moroc, Faris, Seuil, .oo6 ,henceforth LM,.
particular, stipulateo an all too nrm ano orastic opposition between the
new ano the olo. In this new formal theory he wishes insteao to confront
the existence, amongst others, of what he calls tcocttorot, rocclttc ,LM 6.-
,. To resist the new, to oeny it, one still requires arguments ano subjective
forms. In other woros, the theory of the subject neeos to countenance
the fact that reactionary forms of subjectivation existwhich for Baoiou
unsurprisingly take the shape of the anti-communist anti-totalitarianism
which spurreo the backlash of revisionist historians ,Iranois Iuret, ano
the renegaoe rooccoox pltlooplc ,Anor Glucksmann, to the emancipa-
tory innovations arising in the wake of May 68.
Now, as I suggesteo above, it is not entirely true that the Tlottc oo oct
forecloseo the possibility of reactionary novelties. The brieny-exploreo
possibility of a bourgeois subject ,not just in the Irench new bourgeoisie,
but in the Soviet bureaucratic caste, oennitely oepenoeo on its ability to
generate some kino of novelty, however abject or corrupt. Similarly, the
subjectivity of betrayal ano resignation, or even that of active nihilism, as
exploreo in Baoious early ethics of Marxism, oepeno on the particular
manner whereby they avoio or repress the courageous subjectivity ano
the just praxis of a revolutionary proletariat. They too are new by oint
of how they respono ,or better, tcoct, to the oisturbing irruption of that
subjective ngure. The fact that this formal theory of the subject comes
after Baoious formulation of a theory of evental subjectivity ,nrst sketcheo
in the :q8 book Pcot-or pcrct lo poltttoc., ooes make a oiherence to the
account of other, non- or anti-universal subjects. Ior one, as we alreaoy
intimateo in our oiscussion of the Etltc, the oepenoency of subjectivation
on the event permits Baoiou to propose a philosophical argument as to
why other subjects are raoically oepenoent on a subject of truth. As he
writes: Irom a subjective point of view, it is not because there is reaction
that there is revolution, it is because there is revolution that there is reac-
tion ,LM :,.
:
This Maoist thesis of the primacy of revolt, which Baoiou
hao alreaoy formulateo as early as his :q Tlottc oc lo corttootcttor, is now
philosophically articulateo in terms of the key temporal category of Ba-
oious theory of the subject, that of the ptccrt. In responoing to the ttocc of
a supernumerary, illegal event, ano in constructing the ooo, that can bring
the implications of this event to bear on a given worlo, a faithful subject is
involveo in the proouction of a present. Inoeeo, the only subjective tem-
:. This means, incioentally, that Baoiou reiterates his intolerance for those, generally
leftist positions which base their notion of revolt on the prior reality of oppression, ano
for whom the political subject par excellence is therefore the opptcco.
Alberto Toscano
porality, which is to say the only historicity, envisageo in Baoious system
oerives from such an irruption of generic universality into the status quo.
But if the present, as a kino of rigorous ano continueo sequence of
novelties ,a permanent revolution, belongs to the subject of truth, how
can other subjects partake in it? Baoious contention is that they oo so
in a strictly oerivative ano parasitic ,albeit by no means passive, man-
ner. As he puts it, subjective oestinations proceeo in a certain oroer ,to
wit: proouctionoenialoccultation,, for reasons that formalism makes
altogether clear: the oenial of the present supposes its proouction, ano its
occultation supposes a formula of oenial ,LM :,.
Given the arouous ano ongoing proouction of a truth, tcocttorot, sub-
jects seek to oeny the event that calleo it into being, ano to oisaggregate
the booy which is supposeo to carry the truth of that event. It is for this
reason that reaction, accoroing to Baoiou, involves the proouction of an-
other, extinguisheo present. The thesis of reaction, at base, is that all
of the results of a truth proceoure ,e.g. political equality in the Irench
revolution, coulo be attaineo without the terroristic penchant of the faith-
ful subject, ano without the amrmation of a raoically novel event. As Ba-
oiou recognizes, this constitutes an octtcc oenial of truth, which oemanos
the creation of reactionary statements ano inoeeo of what we coulo call
reactionary anti-booies. Think, for instance, of the elaborate strategies
of cultural organization with which the CIA ano its proxies sought to
incorporate some of the innovations of aesthetic raoicalism in oroer to
oeny their link with communist politics, invariably borrowing many for-
mal traits ano oiscursive oispositions from their nemeses.
:
Or consioer
the emergence, very evioent nowaoays among what some refer to as the
pro-war left, of reactionary subjectivities. The resilience of such subjec-
tivities was convincingly mappeo by Georg Simmel when he set forth his
portrait of the renegaoe. Due to the orastic violence of his conversion,
the renegaoe, accoroing to Simmel, is in a sense a far more steaofast ano
loyal subject than a militant or partisan who, for whatever reason, might
not have aohereo to his camp with the same conscious resolve. As Simmel
writes:
The special loyalty of the renegaoe seems to me to rest on the fact
that the circumstances, unoer which he enters the new relationship,
have a longer ano more enouring ehect than if he hao navely grown
into it, so to speak, without breaking a previous one. It is as if
:. See Irances Stonor Saunoers, 1lo Poto tlc Ptpct. Tlc CIA oro tlc Coltotol Colo 1ot,
Lonoon, Granta, .ooo.
he were repelleo by the olo relationship ano pusheo into the new
one, over ano over again. Renegaoe loyalty is so strong because
it incluoes what loyalty in general can oispense with, namely, the
conscious continuance of the motives of the relationship.
:6
While the reactionaryano the renegaoe as one of its sub-spe-
ciessuspenos or attenuates the present proouceo by an event, oenying
its novelty but absorbing many of its traits, the secono type of unfaithful
subject, what Baoiou calls the oocotc subject, entertains a far more se-
vere relation to the new present that the faithful subject hao given rise to.
Rather than ocr,trg its novelty, the obscure subject is focusseo on actually
rcgottrg the very existence of this new present. The oocotc subject, in oroer
to occult novelty, systematically resorts to the invocation of a transceno-
ent Booy, full ano pure, an ahistorical or anti-evental booy ,City, Goo,
Race, whence it oerives that the trace will be oenieo ,here, the labour
of the reactive subject is useful to the obscure subject, ano, by way of con-
sequence, the real booy, the oivioeo booy, will also be suppresseo ,LM
68,.
:
The obscure anti-booy is thus very oiherent than the reactive one.
While the latter may be repressive, it is also aimeo at persuaoing the faith-
ful that its just not worth it, that they shoulo resign themselves to a lesser
present ano enjoy its oiminisheo but secure rewaros. The transcenoent
booy conjureo up by the obscure subject is insteao a kino of atemporal
fetish, writes Baoiou, unoer whose weight novelty must be thoroughly
crusheo ano silenceo.
Fersisting with a conviction that oominates both the toptoc of the
Tlottc oo oct ano the theory of evil in the Etltc, Baoiou suggests that the
faithful subject, the subject that proouces a new present by orawing the
worloly consequences of an event, must entertain a oiherentiateo relation-
ship to the other ngures who inhabit the new subjective space that his
noelity has openeo up. Compareo to the treatment of the fatalist ano the
nihilist in the Tlottc, in the Logtoc Baoiou strikes a more cautious note.
I will take the liberty of quoting at length the passage where he compares
the two ngures of the reactionary ano the obscurantist, in part because of
the literary nair with which he gives nesh to these formal ngures:
It is crucial to gauge the gap between the reactive formalism ano
the obscure formalism. As violent as it may be, reaction conserves
:6. Georg Simmel, Iaithfulness ano Gratituoe, in Kurt H. Wolh ,eo.,, Tlc Soctolog, of
Gcotg Stmmcl, New York, The Iree Fress, :q6, pp. 8, 86.
:. Baoiou links the theory of obscure fascism to the proouction of imaginary macro-
scopic entities ano passive booies of subjectivation in Tlc Ccrtot,, Chapter q.
Alberto Toscano
the form of the faithful subject as its articulateo unconscious. It
ooes not propose to abolish the present, only to show that the
faithful rupture ,which it calls violence or terrorism, is useless
for engenoering a mooerate, that is to say extinguisheo, present ,a
present that it calls mooern,. Moreover, this instance of the subject
is itself borne by the oebris of booies: frighteneo ano oeserting
slaves, renegaoes of revolutionary groups, avant-garoe artists
recycleo into acaoemicism, lovers asphyxiateo by conjugal routine.
Things are very oiherent for the obscure subject. That is because it
is the present that is oirectly its unconscious, its lethal oisturbance,
while it oisarticulates within appearance the formal oata of noelity.
The monstrous full Booy to which it gives nctional shape is the
atemporal nlling of the abolisheo present. This means that what
bears this booy is oirectly linkeo to the past, even if the becoming
of the obscure subject also immolates this past in the name of
the sacrince of the present: veterans of lost wars, faileo artists,
intellectuals perverteo by rancour, orieo up matrons, illiterate
muscle-bouno youths, shopkeepers ruineo by Capital, oesperate
unemployeo workers, rancio couples, bachelor informants,
acaoemicians envious of the success of poets, atrabilious professors,
xenophobes of all stripes, mobsters greeoy for oecorations, vicious
priests, ano cuckoloeo husbanos. To this hoogepooge of oroinary
existence the obscure subject ohers the chance of a new oestiny,
unoer the incomprehensible, but salvinc, sign of an absolute booy,
which oemanos only that one serve it by entertaining everywhere
ano at all times the hatreo of any living thought, of any transparent
language ano of every uncertain becoming ,LM 6-o,.
While the reactive or reactionary subject incorporates the form of
faithfulness, the obscure subject seems be oenneo by the twofolo move-
ment of laying waste to the immanent proouction of the new ano gen-
erating a transcenoent, monolithic novelty, essentially inoistinguishable
from the most archaic past. Leaving asioe the return of faithfulness in the
fourth subjective ngure, that of tcottccttor,
:8
what changes ooes this theory
of subjective space bring to the earlier theorization of non-universalist
subjects, ano what prospects for formal analysis ooes it harbour?
Most importantly, the theory of subjective space appears oesigneo to
resolve the conunorum about other subjects which, in the earlier work,
:8. Ior some interesting comments on the ngure of resurrection, ano its introouction into
Baoious thought of a complex link between novelty ano tcpcttttor, see Slavoj iek, Ba-
oiou: Notes from an Ongoing Debate, Irtctrottorol }ootrol of tcl Stootc, vol. ., no. :,
.oo, available at: http://ics.leeos.ac.uk/zizek/article.cfm?io~.:8issue~~.
hao been most acute in the ngure of the bourgeoisie. In a sense, the new
formal theory allows Baoiou to amrm the relative autonomy of non- or
anti-universalist subjects, whilst holoing true, in his account of the se-
quence of subjects, to the primacy of revolt, in other woros, to the prima-
cy of the universalist subject. The new theory can thus be seen as a return,
with the aio of a oiherent formalism, of the topical theory provioeo by
the Tlottc oo oct, though now insteao of a oiscontinuous nelo of subjec-
tive ahects we are presenteo with more clearly oistinct subjects ,faithful,
reactive, obscure, resurrecteo,. The relative exteriority of these ngures to
one another is also explaineo by the forsaking of the oestructive-oialecti-
cal schema which, in Tlottc oo oct, hao portrayeo the proletariat as an
immanent purincation of bourgeois space, a subjective torsion whose aim
was to oestroy the space of placements constituteo by imperialist capital-
ism.
THE OBSCURE SUB]ECT OI CURRENT AIIAIRS
What purchase can such a formal theory have on the ioentincation
ano examination of contemporary political subjects? In his philosophical
consioerations on the facts of September ::, .oo:, Baoiou opteo for the no-
tion of nihilism to capture the specular relationship between the innnite
justice of Bushs Goo-bothering capitalist-parliamentarian regime ano
Bin Laoens pyrotechnic theological terror. The current situation woulo
thus be frameo by the oisjunctive synthesis of two nihilisms.
:q
These ni-
hilisms, unlike the youthful oiscoroant nihilism courteo by Baoiou in the
Tlottc oo oct, are clearly not subjectively recoverable. Whats more, it
is rather opaque what relation, if any, they might entertain with faithful
political subjects. So it is once again to the recent Logtoc oc moroc that
we turn for some clarincation.
One of the more striking features of this sequel to Bctrg oro Eccrt for
our aims is that, oespite its formality, the meta-physics of the subject it
oeploys is markeo by some extremely concrete examples. The most strik-
ing of these concerns Baoious treatment of Islamism as the present-oay
incarnation of the obscure subject:
it is in vain that one tries to elucioate genealogically contemporary
political Islamism, in particular its ultra-reactionary variants,
which rival the Westerners for the fruits of the petrol cartel through
:q. Alain Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano the war against terrorism, in Irrttc Tlooglt, eo. ano
trans. ]ustin Clemens ano Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. :.
Alberto Toscano
unpreceoenteo criminal means. This political Islamism is a new
manipulation of religionfrom which it ooes not oerive by any
natural ,or rational, inheritancewith the purpose of occulting
the post-socialist present ano countering, by means of a full
Traoition or Law, the fragmentary attempts through which some
try to reinvent emancipation. Irom this point of view, political
Islamism is absolutely contemporary, both to the faithful subjects
that proouce the present of political experimentation, ano to the
reactive subjects that busy themselves with oenying that ruptures
are necessary in oroer to invent a humanity worthy of the name,
ano who moreover naunt the establisheo oroer as the miraculous
bearer of a continuous emancipation. Folitical Islamism is nothing
but one of the subjectivateo names of tooays obscurantism ,LM
6-8,.
Iollowing the founoational thesis of the primacy of revolt ,or primacy
of the universal, Baoiou is obligeo to argue that if there is inoeeo an Is-
lamist subject, then this subject is oerivative ,by way of occultation, of a
faithful subject. Rather than a regurgitation of the past, Islamism is the
contemporary of a politics of emancipation ,which is why it is useless to
engage in genealogical explanations,. Fossibly the most important, ano
oisputable, aspect of this argument is that the potpoc ,whether conscious
or otherwise, of contemporary Islamism is occulting the post-socialist
present. Osama Bin Laoens jihaoist piety is precisely oepicteo as a kino
of sinister fetishism: the sole function of the Goo of conspiring Islam is to
occult, at the heart of peoples, the present of the rational politics of eman-
cipation, by oislocating the unity of their statements ano their militant
booies ,LM 6q,. In what follows, I will brieny survey some of the oebates
about the nature of Islamisms relation to the politics of emancipation. Ior
the moment, I want to inoicate one of the most problematic aspects of
Baoious account, which inserts it oirectly into some bitter ano vociferous
recent oebates. This has to oo with the equation between Islamism ano
fascism.
In his response to the attacks on the Twin Towers ano the Fentagon,
Baoiou hao in fact alreaoy characterizeo those acts as conjuring up the
fascist concept of action ano thus as formally fascistic.
.o
Moreover, the
Islamist use of religion was juogeo to be akin to that of anti-capitalism by
the populist fascism of the thirties, a mere oemagogic vocabulary cloak-
ing Bin Laoens thirst for oil ano political supremacy. At bottom then, the
.oo: attacks signal the presence, unoer the instrumental facaoe of Islam
.o. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano the war against terrorism, p. :.
of a type of fascistic nihilism typineo by the sacralization of oeath, the
absolute inoiherence to the victims, the transformation of oneself ano oth-
ers into instruments.
.:
In the Logtoc, this veroict is corroborateo by the
inclusion of Islamism unoer the rubric of obscure subjectivity, which is by
oennition fascist. Thus, accoroing to Baoious oennition: The obscure
subject engineers the oestruction of the booy: the appropriate woro is
foctm, in a broaoer sense than was given to this term in the thirties. One
will speak of generic fascism to oescribe the oestruction of the organizeo
booy through which there once transiteo the construction of the present
,of the sequence, ,LM 8:,.
Besioes the all too hurrieo ioentincation of Bin Laoen with Islamism
,when many commentators inoeeo see him as a phenomenon which is
subsequent to, ano incompatible with, political Islam proper,, one can-
not but register the unexpecteo convergence of this formal theory with
one of the theses that have recently permitteo the convergence between
American neo-conservatives ano left renegaoes, to wit, the existence of
something like Islamic fascism or Islamofascism as the archenemy of
tooays oemocrats ano progressivesa notion promoteo by the likes of
Christopher Hitchens, ano very recently publicizeo, in some particularly
incoherent speeches, by Bush himself. Leaving asioe the oubious invoca-
tion of crimes of association, what is interesting about this congruence
lies in its preconoitions. It is inoeeo the short-circuit between a notion of
generic fascism ,or of Ur-fascism,
..
ano the specinc subjective history of
anti-fascist politics that has recently alloweo members of the so-calleo left
to sign up to the propaganoa wing of the war on terror as if they were
joining the International Brigaoes. It is important to note in this respect
that the historical ano sociological oebate on fascism has long been oomi-
nateo by polemics regaroing its specincity ano extension, both historical
ano geographical. So it is rather peculiar to see Baoiou, so aoamant about
thinking the subjective singularity of particular political sequences ,e.g.
.:. Baoiou, Fhilosophy ano the war against terrorism, p. :6o.
... Ior a recent treatment of ,ano intervention in, the scholarly oebate on generic fas-
cism, see Robert Grimn, The Falingenetic Core of Generic Iascist Ioeology, in Ales-
sanoro Campi, eo., Clc co tl foctmo., Rome, Ioeazione, .oo, pp. q-:.., also available
at: http://ah.brookes.ac.uk/history/stah/grimn/coreohascism.pof~. See also his Tlc
ôtotc of Foctm, Lonoon, Routleoge, :qq. On Ur-fascism or eternal fascism, see Um-
berto Eco, Ur-Iascism, Tlc ^co 1otl Rcctco of Bool, vol. ., no. ::, :qq, pp. :.-:. It is
worth noting that while those who aovocate the concept of generic fascism teno to stress
the mooern ano mooernizing character of fascism, Eco regaros the rejection of mooern-
ism as a key feature of fascism. Baoious formal notion of generic fascism seems far more
ample than either Grimn or Ecos proposals.
Alberto Toscano q
Nazism in Tlc Ccrtot,, sign up to a thesis, that of generic fascism, which,
in its formality, seems to forestall an inquiry into that very singularity. By
way of contrast, we can note that one of the more exhaustive recent stuo-
ies of fascism, starting from the methooological imperative to, as it were,
take the fascists at their woro ,to treat their political thought ano practice
as a subjective form, concluoes with a subtle repuoiation of the notion of
Islamic fascism.
.

But, as we have alreaoy intimateo, at the core of Baoious vision of the
obscure subject as generically fascist there lies not a political taxonomy
of the elements necessary for a fascist politics, but a formal evaluation of
how this type of subjectivity relates to the subject which, by oennition,
opens the subjective space: the universalist subject of emancipation, the
faithful subject. Ior Baoious theory of the obscure subject to nno its ex-
emplincation in Islamism it must be possible to argue that, in some sense
or another, the relationship between Islamist obscurantism ano the poli-
tics of emancipation is one where the purpose of the former is absolutely
to negate the latter, through the proouction of a full subjective booy ano
an archaic future. Now, in the case of Bin Laoen, while it may be oisputeo
whether the portrait of a cynical oil-neno can withstano much scrutiny,
it is inoeeo correct that, ioeologically forgeo in the nght against the So-
viet Satan, his relationship to communism bears all the hallmarks of the
obscure subject. Consioer this oeclaration, from Bin Laoens nrst public
.. Ior some useful references about this inevitably heateo, ano clich-riooen oebate, see
the Wikipeoia entry at http://en.wikipeoia.org/wiki/Islamic_fascism~. Accoroing to
Michael Mann, in none of the oisparate, ano often incompatible, instances of political Is-
lam oo we nno the complete fascist package. Rather, the term Islamic fascism is really
just a particular instance of the woro Iascist!a term of abuse for our enemies the
most powerful term of abuse in our worlo tooay. As for Islamism ano Hinou nationalism,
he makes the following juogment: They most resemble fascism in oeploying the means
of moral muroer, but the transcenoence, the state, the nation, ano the new man they
seek are not this-worloly. See his Foctt, Cambrioge, Cambrioge University Fress, .oo,
p. . While the polemical character of the appellation is obvious, ano the point about
the categorical oiherences well taken, I think it can be argueo that most of the aims of
Islamist politics, whether economic, legal or political, are remarkably this-worloly. It is
also worth noting that Baoiou himself, contraoicting his use of it in Logtoc oc moroc, has
even oisputeo the political value of the term Islamism. As he oeclareo in a .oo interview,
woros like terrorism, Islamism ano crimes against humanity are only oestineo to
confuse situations ano to create a kino of international political stupioity. Alain Baoiou,
Las oemocracias estan en guerra contra los pobres ,Democracies are at war against the
poor,, Rcctto ^, ..:o..oo. Available at: http://www.clarin.com/suplementos/cultu-
ra/.oo/:o/./u-8.htm~.
statement, aooresseo to religious jurispruoents ano spurreo by the Sauoi
royals support for the south Yemenis in the :qq civil war:
It is luoicrous to suggest that Communists are Muslims whose
blooo shoulo be spareo. Since when were they Muslims? Wasnt it
you who previously issueo a jurioical oecree calling them apostates
ano making it a outy to nght them in Afghanistan, or is there a
oiherence between Yemeni Communists ano Afghan Communists?
Have ooctrinal concepts ano the meaning of Goos unity become
so confuseo? The regime is still sheltering some of these leaoers
of unbelief in a number of cities in the country, ano yet we have
hearo no oisapproval from you. The Frophet saio, as relateo by
Muslim, Goo curseo him who accommooates an innovator.
.
This ferocious hatreo of innovation, of non-submissive secular equality,
ano of this torrential current of global unbelief ,
.
seems to single out
Bin Laoen ano his cohorts as sterling examples of Baoious ngure of the
obscure subject.
But if we leave asioe the not exactly representative ngure of Bin Lao-
en, with his anarchoio propaganoa of the oeeo ano kitsch fantasies of
the caliphate, the relation between Islamism ano emancipatory politics
appears far more ambiguous. Taking the paraoigmatic case of political
Islam, the post-revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran, we can see that the
theocratic forces oio not engage in a straightforwaro reaction to the mass
revolts against the Shahin which they, alongsioe the various groups of
the raoical left, insteao playeo a mobilizing roleor in a simple occul-
tation. It is certainly true thatas Baoiou himself alreaoy noteo in the
Tlottc oo octthe Islamist superego in the ngure of Khomeini playeo a
.. Osama Bin Laoen, The Betrayal of Falestine ,December .q :qq,, in Bruce Law-
rence, eo., Mcogc to tlc 1otlo: Tlc Stotcmcrt of Oomo Btr Loocr, Lonoon, Verso, .oo,
p. 8. Baoious portrait, accoroing to which Bin Laoens point of oeparture is a series of
extraoroinary complex manoeuvres in relation to the manna of oilnelos in Sauoi Arabia
ano that the character is, after all, a gooo American: someone for whom what matters
is wealth ano power, ano for whom the means are of less concern ,Baoiou, Fhilosophy
ano the war on terrorism, pp. :q-o,, seems to unoerestimate the sinister sincerity of
his conviction, ano inoeeo the fact that, were wealth ano power the objective, Bin Laoen
coulo have attaineo them with far greater ease without unoertaking his peculiar brano of
obscure militancy.
.. Osama Bin Laoen, Unoer Mullah Omar ,April q .oo:,, Mcogc to tlc 1otlo, p. q8. It
is worth noting that an obscure notion of equality, the kino of equality by oivine submis-
sion also favoureo by Qutb, is part of Bin Laoens ooctrinal arsenal. Thus, he writes in his
oeclaration To the Americans ,October 6 .oo.,, that Islam is the religion of unity ano
agreement on the obeoience to Goo, ano total equality between all people, without regaro
to their colour, sex, or language ,Mcogc to tlc 1otlo, p. :66,.
Alberto Toscano 6:
role akin to that of the Mao, ano the archaic ano transcenoent reference
prepareo the brutal occlusion of emancipatory trajectories. But the sup-
pression of the left by theocratic forces workeo, in the ioeological arena,
primarily by oottootrg the lefts prescriptions ano Islamicizing them, leav-
ing the left the abject alternative of either abetting its own suppression or
becoming traitor to the revolution. As Val Moghaoam noteo, in an inci-
sive appraisal of the strategic ano oiscursive failures of the Iranian left:
The shareo language of opposition hao a further negative ehect in
that it obfuscateo very real oiherences between the socio-political
projects of the Left ano the Religious Right ,national-popular
government versus political Islam/theocratic rule,. Moreover,
most of the Left seemeo unaware in the :qos that the religious
forces were weaving a raoicalpopulist Islamic oiscourse that
woulo prove very compellinga oiscourse which appropriateo
some concepts from the Left ,exploitation, imperialism, worlo
capitalism,, maoe use of Thiro Worloist categories ,oepenoency,
the people, ano populist terms ,the toiling masses,, ano imbueo
certain religious concepts with new ano raoical meaning. Ior
instance, motoormeaning the wretcheo or oispossesseonow
connoteo ano privilegeo the urban poor in much the same way that
liberation theology refers to the poor. But in an original oeparture,
the authors of the revolutionary Islamic texts, ano especially
Ayatollah Khomeini, oeclaimeo that the motoor woulo rise
against their oppressors ano, leo by the olomo or religious leaoers,
woulo establish the ommo ,community of believers, founoeo on
toolto ,the profession of oivine unity, ano Islamic justice.
.6

Even if we accept that the purpose of Iranian Islamism lay in the oc-
cultation ,ano inoeeo, the persecution ano often slaughter, of any booy
that carrieo a promise of immanent universalityin what Achcar calls a
permanent revolution in reverse ano a reactionary retrogression
.
it
cannot be argueo that it simply forecloseo the statements ano organs of
emancipatory politics. Rather, in a far more insioious ano powerful move,
it trcotpototco them, transcenoentalizing, for instance, the concept of anti-
imperialism into a religious outy bouno to the oefence of the ommo rather
than the creation of a truly generic humanity. Still remaining with the Ira-
nian case, we can see that Islamism even proouceo a kino of revolution-
.6. Val Moghaoam, Socialism or Anti-Imperialism? The Left ano Revolution in Iran,
^co Lcft Rcctco, vol. :66, :q8, p. :.
.. Gilbert Achcar, Eleven Theses on the Resurgence of Islamic Iunoamentalism ,:q8:,,
in Eotctr Coolotor: Ilom, Afglorttor, Polcttrc oro Ito tr o Motxtt Mtttot, Lonoon, Fluto
Fress, .oo, p. .
ary populism, in the ngure of Ali Shariati, which, though posthumously
manipulateo by the clergy ano its militias for their own rightist enos, is
oimcult to class simply as either reactive or obscure.
In Shariati we nno an uneasy combination of the popular principle
of rebellion, on the one hano, ano an organicist vision of religious soci-
ety, on the other. Via the likes of Ianon ano Sartre, he incorporates an
emancipatory orive into his political theology. Ior instance, he oeclares
that Islam is the nrst school of social thought that recognizes the masses
as the basis, the funoamental ano conscious factor in oetermining his-
tory ano society
.8
, that history is a struggle between the pole of Cain ,of
power, coercion, ano most recently, imperialism, ano the pole of Abel ,a
religiously orienteo primitive communism,, that it is the responsibility
of every inoivioual in every age to oetermine his stance in the constant
struggle between the two wings we have oescribeo, ano not to remain a
spectator.
.q
But the very principles of the emancipatory politics which
provioes the obvious matrix for Shariatis thought ,primitive communism,
the classless society, rebellion, are hypostasizeo into spiritual notions
which, to use the language that the Tlottc oo oct applieo to the religious
politics of the German Feasants War, take equality into the tmogtrot, oo-
main of cosmopolitical unity, in the form of the opposition between unity
,toolto, ano oiscoroance or contraoiction ,lttl,,
o
together with a raoical
reaoing of the notion of ommo which nevertheless sees it, against the sup-
poseo shortcomings of socialism as the oivine oestiny of man in the plan
of creation.
:

A relateo translation of emancipatory themes can be founo in the
earlier ano much more evioently revolutionary-conservative writings of
Sayo Qutb, whose sombre anti-philosophy,
.
organicist vision of society,
ano oennition of equality ano freeoom as common submission before
.8. Shariati, Approaches to the Unoerstanoing of Islam, in Or tlc Soctolog, of Ilom, p.
q.
.q. Shariati, The Fhilosophy of History: Cain ano Abel, in Or tlc Soctolog, of Ilom, p.
:oq.
o. Shariati, The Worlo-View of Tauhio, in Or tlc Soctolog, of Ilom, p. 8..
:. Shariati, The Ioeal Societythe Umma, in Or tlc Soctolog, of Ilom, p. :.o. It is worth
noting that this umma is oistinguisheo by Shariati in terms of its purity of leaoership,
which he explicitly juxtaposes to the fascist purity of the leaoer, obviously sensitive to the
potential confusion.
.. On Qutbs relationship to philosophy ano mooernity, see Roxanne L. Euben, Ercmtc
tr tlc Mtttot: Ilomtc Foroomcrtoltm oro tlc Ltmtt of Mooctr Rottoroltm, Frinceton, Frinceton
University Fress, :qqq, p. 6q.
Alberto Toscano 6
Goo
captureo an authentic oemano for justice ano twisteo it into an

archaic ano transcenoent vision of a society nnally free, not just of impe-
rialism, but of the oiscoroance ano anxiety of mooernity.
Accoroing to the group of theorists ano activist RETORT, this oia-
lectic of appropriation is also present in the most recent incarnations of
revolutionary Islam. This movement is characterizeo, in its oihuse ano
networkeo booy by a remarkable oegree of organizational, theological
ano technological oemocratization, the invention of a new, post-Leninist
,or post-anarchist
,, articulation of vanguaro ano violence, ano what they

appositely refer to as a new, ano malignant, universalism.
While they
too note the gestation of contemporary Islamism in the writings Qutb, ano
some of the proto-fascist ,but also crypto-communist, organizational
mooels at the origins of the Muslim Brotherhooo, they regaro its causes as
originating in the cttt of ccolot rottoroltt occclopmcrtabetteo by a spe-
cinc ,ano poisonous, political-economic conjuncture whose vectors were
oil, primitive accumulation, ano Colo War geopolitics.
6
A similar juog-
ment was put forwaro in the wake of the Iranian Revolution by one of the
more astute Marxist analysts of Mioole East politics, Gilbert Achcar. His
theses on Islamic funoamentalism, which provioe a classical analysis of
the petty-bourgeois roots of the Islamist phenomenon, echo the analysis
of fascismsuch as when he writes that the violence ano rage of the petit
bourgeois in oistress are unparalleleo. Inoeeo, Achcar sees the bourgeoi-
sies relationship to the phenomenon of Islamism ,particularly in Egypt, as
typical of its customary stance towaros far right movements ano fascism
in generalin other woros, to borrow Baoious terminology, reactionar-
ies are always happy to use obscurantists against progressives, especially
if the obscurantists can outbio the Left on the Lefts two favourite issues:
the national question ano the social question, any gains maoe by Islamic
reaction on these two issues mean equivalent losses for the Left. Islamic
funoamentalism in this sense represents an ooxtltot, fot tlc tcocttorot, ooot-
gcottc.
But for Achcar this emergence of a petty bourgeois reaction is

only possible because of the feebleness of the revolutionary proletariat
. RETORT, Iain Boal, T.]. Clark, ]oseph Matthews, Michael Watts, Atctco Pooct:
Copttol oro Spcctoclc tr o ^co Agc of 1ot, Lonoon, Verso, .oo, p. :6. See also Ercmtc tr
tlc Mtttot, pp. 6.-.
. Ior jihaoist, reao anarchist, Tlc Ecoromtt, :8 August .oo, available at: http://www.
economist.com/oisplaystory.cfm?story_io~.q.6o~.
. Boal, et. al., Atctco Pooct, p. :.
6. Boal, et. al., Atctco Pooct, p. :6..
. Achcar, Eleven Theses on the Resurgence of Islamic Iunoamentalism, p. 6.
ano the incapacity or unwillingness of the bourgeoisie to take on the aims
of a national ano oemocratic revolution.
8

In this sense, the emergence of Islamism as a political subject ooes
not necessarily represent an express reaction to emancipatory politics, but
may rather constitute a capitalization on its absence, on the temporary
incapacity of progressives to actually proouce a present. Unlike Baoiou,
whose view of political subjectivation seems to precluoe notions such as
alliance or hegemony, Achcar ooes consioer the possibility, which was
of course the reality in Iran ,his main point of reference in these renec-
tions,, that the proletarian subject might be obligeo to struggle alongsioe
Islamism against a common enemy, imperialism, ano for national, oemo-
cratic, ano social issues. Ano yet, this ooes not by any respects constitute
a real alliance, since the outy of revolutionary socialists is to nght intran-
sigently against the spell |Islamic funoamentalism| casts on the struggling
masses.
q
The least that can be saio then, is that even from this classical
8. This position is corroborateo by one of the most in-oepth, revealing ano sympathetic
treatments of the subjective trajectories ano resources of Islamism, Iranois Burgats Focc
to Focc ottl Poltttcol Ilom, Lonoon, I.B. Tauris, .oo. Burgat, while oiscounting the kino
of socio-economic analysis favoureo by Achcar ano other Marxists, ano refusing its char-
acterization as pttmottl, reactionary, violent or anti-oemocratic, places Islamism nrmly in
the history of emancipation from imperialism ano colonialism: At nrst political, then eco-
nomic, the oistancing of the former colonizer through the rhetoric of oppositional Islam
becomes ioeological, symbolic ano more broaoly cultural, on the terrain where the shock
of colonization has been most traumatic. In aooition to its own language, local culture ano
history enoow the oynamic of inoepenoence with something that has been missing for a
long time: the precious attributes of a sort of ioeological autonomy which perfects it, the
right of those who propagate it to regain universality, without oenouncing the structural
elements of their specincity it is essentially in the olo oynamic of oecolonization that
Islamism has taken root ,p. q,. While Burgats sociological ano anthropological focus
on tocrttt, is oeeply at ooos with Baoious theory of the subject, it is worth remarking the
interest in this interpretation of Islamism as a tool for attaining a kino of universalizing
autonomy. Without seconoing Burgats sympathies, it is important to note that such a
oemano for autochthonous universality is a sign of the failure of classical emancipatory
oiscourses within the Muslim worlo to attain a truly generic status ano not be perceiveo
as alien or imperial implantations. Moreover, Burgats work is almost alone in provioing
oetaileo accounts, using numerous interviews ano autobiographical texts, of the life-paths
of north African Islamistspaths which, it shoulo be noteo, passeo not only through Arab
nationalism, but through Marxism too. Ior an attempt to oelve into the subjectivity of ex-
tremist ano terrorist variants of Islamism, see ]uan Coles intriguing stuoy of the spiritual
oocuments left behino by the perpetrators of the attacks on the WTC ano the Fentagon,
Al-Qaeoas Doomsoay Document ano Fsychological Manipulation ,.oo,, available at:
http://www.juancole.com/essays/qaeoa.htm~. Coles text provioes a useful sketch of
what a situateo phenomenology of the obscure subject might look like.
q. Achcar, Eleven Theses on the Resurgence of Islamic Iunoamentalism, p. q.
Alberto Toscano 6
Marxist position, the problem of other subjectsof how to confront re-
actionaries ano obscurantists whilst prooucing an emancipatory political
presentappears as both urgent ano inescapable.
CONCLUSION
So how ooes Baoious theorization of untrue subjects fare in the face
of Islamism? The few cases ano ngures we have lookeo at point to the
oimculties in formalizing the majority of politics that may be ioentineo
as Islamist in terms of Baoious theory of subjective space. Even if we
accept the thesis of the primacy of the universalthe ioea that other
subjects only arise in the wake of the emergence of a faithful subject ano
of the present it strives to proouceit is the specinc relationship between
the faithful subject ano its two counterparts, reactive ano obscure, that
remains problematic.
Iirst of all, the obscure subjectthe subject that submits its action ano
statements to a transcenoent, full booyooes not necessarily have the oc-
cultation of the faithful subject as its express purpose. One of the oimcult
lessons of the present conjuncture might be that, having vanquisheo the
semblance or placeholoer of communist politics, reactionaries ano ob-
scurantists are facing one another without necessarily passing through a
oirect opposition to faithful subjectivity. Or ratherat least at the spec-
tacular levelwhat we are faceo with is the struggle between slogans, be
it freeoom ano oemocracy, or mythical ano theological corruptions of
anti-imperialism, which, whilst bearing the traces of emancipatory sub-
jectivities, oo not refer to them oirectly.
When its genesis was coeval with that of progressive subject, the ob-
scure subject of Islamism oio inoeeo crush anything that coulo have given
booy to a generic emancipatory subject, but it oio not, contrary to what
Baoiou seems to intimate, erase all traces of the founoing tenets of eman-
cipatory politics. On the contrary, its tactic, largely ehective against a
left oeluoeo by its own populism ano strategic ineptituoe, was to aoopt
ano hypostasize the key principles of emancipation, making out as if their
secular, communist version was merely a oegenerate form of an archaic
ano eternal Islamic politics, with its submissive organicist egalitarianism.
In this sense, the obscure subject is more a thief of the present than simply
its oestroyer.
When insteao, as is mostly the case nowaoays, Islamism is not in oi-
rect contact with ngures of emancipation, it seems to operate with the ep-
igones of capitalist reaction ,Colo Warriors like Rumsfelo ano Wolfowitz,
as its counterparts, ano entertains no univocal relationship to a politics of
emancipation ,asioe from gloating at the oefeat of its Soviet simulacrum,
peooling theological variants of anti-imperialism ano egalitarianism, or
even, in tooays Lebanon ano Egypt, making tactical alliances with social-
ist ano communist groups,. In a sense, this goes to corroborate Baoious
sequence, which moves from the proouction of the present, to its oenial, to
its occultation. But, for reasons very much having to oo with the concrete
strategic history of these movements, the phantasmagorical anti-booies of
Islamism ,e.g. the caliphate, are more to be unoerstooo as the mythical
nlling-in of a political voio proouceo by reaction than as a oirect occul-
tation of a subjectivizeo universal booy. This is not to say that Islamism
cannot be obscurantist, ano inoeeo openly ano virulently anti-communist
,recall Bin Laoens exterminationist statement,, but to note that our sub-
jective space is currently oominateo by struggles between non-universalist
subjects far more than it is by their struggle against intelligible forms of
post-socialist subjectivity.
Having saio that, the presence of a gtgortomoclto, a bloooy ano oisjunc-
tive synthesis, between reactionaries ano obscurantists ooes not as such
occluoe the emergence of true subjects. Which is why, in this grim inter-
regnum, it is not a bao ioea, not only to maintain open the possibility of
universalist courage ano justice, but to builo on Baoious several attempts
to oevelop a muscular theory of the subjects of contemporary untruths
ano half-truths.
6
1!
Fhilosophy ano Revolution:
Baoious Innoelity to the Event
INTRODUCTION
This paper ohers some preliminary thoughts that spring from a nrst
encounter with Baoious philosophy.
:
They are also preliminary in a sec-
ono, more funoamental sense, given that any encounter with genuine
thinkers is always a oeferral that takes the form of a promise for, ano an-
ticipation of, what will become a more raoical ano revealing engagement
in some future reaoing. Inoeeo the practice of revisiting the intellectual
lanoscapes of our fellow thinkers woulo not eventuate but for the recog-
nition of the essentially preliminary ano preparatory nature of previous
visits.
This saio, where oo we encounter a philosopher philosophically ano
why oo we oo so in a certain way rather than some other? This is an
unavoioable question especially when one tries to come to terms with the
thought of philosophers like Baoiou whose work aooresses funoamental
questions. It is unavoioable no less because Baoious work encourages us
to move beyono merely external or arbitrary encounters to what is prop-
erly philosophical. This is why the question we pose is also one of the
haroest to answer.
Heioegger teaches that the encounter with other thinkers becomes
necessary through the question of being ano the thinking associateo with
it, irrespective of whether they belong to the nrst beginning or whether
they are the last metaphysicians. Hegel teaches that such an encounter
:. We woulo like to thank Faul Ashton for introoucing us to the work of Alain Baoiou.
takes place in the gathering of the we whose very ioea is paraoigmati-
cally articulateo by heroes of the pantheon of philosophy. In our encoun-
ter with Baoiou we follow Hegel largely oue to our political history, or
in Baoious terms, oue to our constitution as political subjects through
noelity to the consequences of the event of the Russian Revolution. Ior
Baoiou, of course, to become a political subject is to be constituteo in
relation to an eventa self-founoing or unfounoeo historical entity that
breaks raoically with the situation from which it eruptsas the bearer of
a truth process who is calleo upon to maintain an enouring noelity to the
event ano its commanos. But, we also follow Hegel as a result of a certain
experience not only of the constitution but also of the ultimate retreat
of the revolutionary project ano of the collapse of the collective o ocl.
This experience situates us withinor perhaps, throws us intowhat we
conceptualize as a speculative perspective. We reao Hegels thought as the
result ano philosophical expression of a combination of the revolutionary
explosion of the gathering we ano the no less revolutionary implosion or
retreat of the project of unconoitional solioarity that the Irench Revolu-
tion introouceo.
It is from within the abovementioneo particular form of philosophical
engagement with our political being that we come to explore the concep-
tual spaces that constitute Baoious thinking. Here we nno something at
once familiar ano appealing but also something that we suspect ultimately
fails to oo justice to the raoical oemanos that the political event makes
upon us. Very brieny, our aim in this paper is to give reasons for thinking
that Baoious philosophy ooes not seem prepareo to follow through all
the consequences of the historical retreat of the political event. Irom our
perspective there ooes not seem to be enough room in his philosophy for
the accommooation of the oarkness often encountereo in poetry that
oirectly relates the thinker to the historical retreat of the revolutionary
project. We want to suggest that it is important to come to terms with
the implications of this retreat as no less a revolutionary aspect of the
revolution. If, as Baoiou insists, the event ano ones loving relation to it
unconoitionally oemano an unconoitional noelity then, contrary to the
import of Baoious account of evil, this woulo tell against any show of
eclecticism or any insistence on oistinguishing between what is ano what
is not acceptable from amongst the consequences of an event. Iioelity to
the events retreat also points to a more oirect relation of philosophy to the
event than Baoiou allows. Rather than thinking the conoitions that are
given to it from beyono itself, if philosophical thinking conceptualizes the
evental nature of the event then it must think itself as its own conoition.
Toula Nicolacopoulos ano George Vassilacopoulos 6q
In what follows we will oevelop these points in four sections. Whereas
the nrst section outlines the philosophical orientation that informs our
encounter with Baoious thought, the secono examines the relationship
between philosophy ano the political event in oroer to set the context for
the elaboration of our claim in the thiro section that noelity to the event
calls for attention not only to the oemanos of its emergence but also to
those associateo with the events retreat. In the nnal section we inoicate
how the retreat of the political event might give rise to the philosophical
subject ano to the requirements of a philosophy of the event.
I. READING BADIOU WITH HEGEL
Bearing in mino our comments above concerning Hegel ano the
gathering of the we as the conoition of philosophy, we can begin by not-
ing that Flato is possibly the nrst philosopher as such precisely because, in
oramatizing Socrates oialogical encounter with his frienos, Flato ioenti-
neo the aim of philosophy with the problem of revealing the meaning of
the gathering ano its form with the gathering itself. It is no accioent that
in Tlc Rcpooltc the gathering of Socrates ano his frienos presents justice
as the very meaning of gathering, a gathering whose oepth enables us to
relate our collective being to the worlo as a whole. Of course Flato comes
after Socrates, who is not only the one who ooes not write ,Nietzsche, but
is also the one who gathers in the public spaces of the city. In his unique-
ness Socrates becomes a public thinker by creating the space of thinking
within the city in which, his frienos, the lovers of the philosopher, gather
ano owell.
Still we have to wait until Aristotle for philosophical thought to leave
behino Socrates gathering in the actual space of the city, ano Flatos the-
atrical oramatization of the gathering, in oroer to enter the genuine form
of philosophy, the philosophical we that ioentines the soul of the thinker
in exile from the cityan exile that Flato alreaoy highlighteo in Tlc Rc-
pooltcas its proper ano only place. We shoulo stress that when in his oe-
liberations the philosopher pronounces the we he ooes not just reveal the
inherently oemocratic or egalitarian space of philosophy. Rather, in the
philosophical pronouncement of the we by the singular subject whose
horizon is the alreaoy alienateo practice of the gathering of the collective
from the oemocratic space of the city, the we actually becomes or hap-
pens in its very ioea or principle. Ultimately the philosopher proouces the
ioeal of the collective as a oirect articulation of the principle of the gather-
ing we ano this process achieves a relation of critical unoerstanoing be-
tween the philosopher ano reality. Irom the beginning then, philosophy
explores the conceptual spaces beyono the positivity of the given worlo
ano attempts to make sense of the relation between the ioeal of the revo-
lutionary vision ano the essentially lifeless reality of the polis. One can
nno traces of this tenoency in Heraclitus thought as well. So accoroing to
our story, unoer political conoitions that oeny the we its reality, the ex-
ileo philosopher explores the mystery associateo with what is absolutely
singular, namely the subject who can also pronounce ano announce the
we. In the woros of the poet, Tasos Livaoites: the beautiful mystery of
being alone, the mystery of the two, or the great mystery of the gathering
of us all.
.
How is it that the subject can make such an announcement? In
our view this has to oo with the power to withstano the tension between
the I ano the we that is inoispensable for functioning as a genuine ego
in the sense of being the place of owelling ano gathering of every other
ego. Inoeeo, singularity, contra Levinas, is encountereo as the power of
universal love to accommooate a worlo, the worlo of the gathering we.
Elsewhere we have analyseo this power in terms of the ioea of ,e,merging
selves who unceasingly form as the collective in the processes of their
merging/emerging.
Since the Greeks, western history can be unoerstooo as the yet to be

resolveo tension between a worlo that proouces the revolutionary ioea
of the gathering we ano at the same time constructs itself as the real-
ity that oenies the ioea its actualization. Again Flatos Rcpooltc is the nrst
philosophical work that registers this tension. In this history we can ois-
cern three stages that are characterizeo by three great commanos of the
gathering we. The nrst ano secono stages are respectively associateo with
Greek philosophy ano Christianity ano they respectively invoke the com-
manos know yourself ano love each other. The thiro that was markeo
by the Irench Revolution invokes the commano be as free ano equal in
a manner that is oetermineo by solioarity or what we can reformulate
as be as a worlo. What we want to suggest is that the constitution of
the collective as such shoulo be unoerstooo as the response of mutually
encountering subjects to the commano be as a worlo that the encounter
itself is. Here we have the ioeal of the unconoitional solioarity of people
who owell in each other ano who equally ano freely involve themselves
in the project of creating a worlo. Other forms of encounter, for example
.. Tasos Livaoites, Smoll Bool fot Lotgc Dtcom ;Gtccl), Athens, Kethros, :q8, p. :.
. Toula Nicolacopoulos ano George Vassilacopoulos, Inquiry into Hope, Cttttcol oro
Ctcottcc Tltrltrg: Tlc Aottolotor }ootrol of Pltloopl, tr Sclool, vol. ::, no. ., .oo, pp. :-.
Toula Nicolacopoulos ano George Vassilacopoulos :
love, are equally important but limiteo responses ano formulations of this
commano.
It is important to stress at this point that the essence of the commano
be as a worlo is to be eternal, ano eternally revolutionary, that is inoe-
terminate or lottro ,oark,. In its absolute inoeterminacy or simplicity it
helps to constitute the collective but it says nothing about how to actu-
ally create a worlo. In other woros the collective that is constituteo as a
response to the commano is the formless gathering of the we whose aim
is to create form out of such formlessness. This creation of form is a raoi-
cally open process because its telos is not to overcome formlessness but to
remain informeo by it. In this sense the commano is eternally revolution-
ary because it takes the collective beyono the createo worlo in oroer for
it to recognize its source ano thus always to be creatively recreateo as the
sole responsibility of the participating subjects. Against this backgrouno
we turn to Baoious philosophy ano to the questions that his thought raises
for us.
II. FHILOSOFHY AND ITS FOLITICAL CONDITION
Accoroing to Baoiou,
The specinc role of philosophy is to propose a unineo conceptual
space in which naming takes place of events that serve as the point
of oeparture for truth proceoures. Fhilosophy seeks to gotlct togctlct
oll tlc oootttorol-romc. It oeals within thought with the compossable
nature of the proceoures that conoition it. It ooes not establish
any truth but it sets a locus of truths. It conngurates the generic
proceoures, through a welcoming, a sheltering, built up with
reference to their oisparate simultaneity. Fhilosophy sets out to
think its time by putting the state of proceoures conoitioning it into
a common place. Its operations, whatever they may be, always
aim to think together to conngurate within a unique exercise of
thought the epochal oisposition of the matheme, poem, political
invention ano love ||. In this sense, philosophys sole question is
inoeeo that of the truth. Not that it proouces any, but because it
ohers access to the unity of a moment of truths, a conceptual site in
which the generic proceoures are thought of as compossible.
Baoious philosophy belongs to the great mooern traoition of theorizing

the constitution ano the historical signincance of the collective, a collec-
. Alain Baoiou, Mortfcto fot Pltloopl,, trans. Norman Maoarasz, Albany, State University
of New York Fress, :qqq, p. ,henceforth MF,.
tive that takes shape in response to a raoical break with the status quo. Ior
Baoiou this theorizing is a matter of making possible the saying together
of the truths seizeo from philosophys conoitions. Inoeeo, philosophy is
the locus of thinking within which there are truths is stateo along with
their compossibility ,M ::-:.,. So it is the supply of just this sort of
welcoming space equally to all four conoitions that oistinguishes philo-
sophical thought.
Yet, if we reao Baoious four conoitions of philosophypolitics, love,
art ano scienceas forms of the gathering, politics turns out to be pri-
mary for philosophy. Folitics, accoroing to Baoiou, ooes have a special
oistinction as evioenceo by those rare political orientations in recent his-
tory that have hao or will have a connection with truth, a truth of the
collective as such.
In his Mctopoltttc Baoiou notes that whereas science,

love ano art are aristocratic truth proceoures in that they require only
the two, or no one in the case of the artist, politics is impossible without
the statement that people, taken inoistinctly, are capable of the thought
that constitutes the post-evental political subject.
6
Inoeeo, that the po-
litical event is collective prescribes that all are the virtual militants of the
thought that proceeos on the basis of the event ,M :.,. The political
event is thus the event whose material is collective in an immeoiately
universalizing sense. In acknowleoging that it belongs to all the political
event manifests the intrinsic universality peculiar to this conoition: only
politics is intrinsically requireo to oeclare that the thought that it is is the
thought of all. This oeclaration is its constitutive pre-requisite ,M ::-
:.,. So, in our terms we can say that even though love is no less a form of
gathering it is raoical politics that introouces ano practices the very ioea
of the gathering we as a universal collective. Here we are reminoeo once
again of the woros of the poet, Livaoites citeo above.
Now if we focus on philosophy in so far as it is thinking in relation
to political thought ano if thought is unoerstooo as a capacity which is
specincally human ano oenneo as nothing other than that by which the
path of a truth seizes ano traverses the human animal ,IT :,, what is the
precise relation between politics ano philosophy? Ior Baoiou philosophy
oepenos upon the unfoloing of raoical politics ,just as it ooes on the other
three conoitions, in oroer for it to think. However, raoical political ori-
. Alain Baoiou, Irrttc Tlooglt: Ttotl oro tlc Rctotr to Pltloopl,, eo. ano trans. ]ustin Cle-
mens ano Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p. o ,henceforth IT,.
6. Alain Baoiou, Mctopoltttc, trans. ]ason Barker, Lonoon, Verso, .oo, p. :. ,henceforth
M,.
entations can perform the role of a conoition for philosophys thinking,
not because they trace a oestiny or because they construct a monu-
mental history but because they have a connection with a truth, a truth
of the collective as such ,IT o,. If it is inoeeo correct that the political
unoerstooo in terms of the proceoure that generates a truth of the col-
lective as such is a paraoigmatic expression of thought then there must
be something more primoroial in philosophys association with politics as
compareo with its other three conoitions. Fhilosophys thinking can be
practiceo unconoitionally only if it is oirecteo to thought as such just as it
is politics association with philosophy that can amrm politics thought as
being universal or the thought of the collective as such. Baoiou articulates
the relation between politics ano philosophy via a general axiom that
bears some resemblance with the commano be as a worlo. He insists for
a political orientation to be worthy of submission to philosophy unoer the
ioea justice, its unique general axiom must be: people think, people are
capable of truth ,IT :,. So, the specinc political orientation is suitable to
be elevateo to a conoition of philosophy in that it bears the general axiom.
Through this association political thought can be amrmeo in philoso-
phys thinking ano presumably the criterion for submitting one political
orientation to philosophy rather than some other must be a matter for
philosophy rather than politics since the actual practice of raoical politics
ooes not oepeno upon philosophy. Inoeeo philosophys evaluative role is
its oistinctive service to thought accoroing to Baoiou. In particular:
the oistinctive service that philosophy renoers thought is the
evaluation of time. The issue is whether we can say, ano accoroing
to what principles, that this time, our time, has value.
Now, if we can test the raoicality of a political orientation by submitting

it to philosophys thinking this raises the question: what is the test for the
raoicality of philosophys thinking? Baoious own criterion of aoequacy
for philosophical thought seems mooestly orienteo. Ior him philosophi-
cal concepts weave a general space in which thought acceoes to time, to
its time, so long as the truth proceoures of this time nno shelter for their
compossibility within it ,MF 8,. So, Baoious focus is on maintaining a
certain relation between the truth proceoures. We might say that philoso-
phy ooes well when it ensures that truth proceoures are not placeo so as
to cancel each other out.
. Alain Baoiou, 8 Lauren Seoofsky, Being by Numbers, Attfotom, October :qq, http://
www.highbeam.com/library/oocIree.asp?DOCID~:G:::6:q
Yet, if we say with Baoiou that philosophy activates its thinking when
its conoitions are available it must equally be correct to say that philoso-
phys thinking must nevertheless amrm the authenticity of its conoitions
as a preconoition for its activation. So philosophy must alreaoy incluoe
within itself, quite apart from its conoitions, criteria of aoequacy for what
is to be thought in oroer to prepare the space of the thinking together of
its conoitions. Consequently just as philosophy oepenos upon the reaoi-
ness of its conoitions in oroer to think them, so too these conoitions pre-
suppose philosophys prior reaoiness.
If this is correct then philosophy must have access to its aoequacy
criteria prior to engaging in the act of seizing its truths. This we suggest
is possible when philosophy has oirect access to the political event unme-
oiateo by its four conoitions. The political event has primacy here in so
far as philosophys thinking is primarily the thinking of the collective as
such in which case access to the commano or the general axiom becomes
crucial for the constitution of such thinking. In other woros philosophy
must have a more primoroial relation to the political event, the event that
harbours the great mystery, as a pre-requisite for its activation.
Accoroingly, if philosophy is the general theory of the event, as Ba-
oiou insists, it must also be of the event in the sense that it belongs to the
event. Irom our oiscussion so far we can note that any articulation of
what happens in the practice of philosophical thinking presupposes some
account of how this thinking is activateo ano where it takes place. That
is, the question of philosophys own site ano the process of its own genera-
tion becomes a pressing issue. Here our attention is oirecteo away from
the conoitions of philosophy whose compossibility philosophy must think
to the conoition of philosophy unoerstooo as that tr oltcl philosophy hap-
pens. So, in the nrst instance, the primary challenge is to oetermine not
what philosophy thinks or how it welcomes its multiple conoitions but
where one encounters philosophy or, in Baoious terms, how the subject
of philosophy is constituteo.
Like Baoiou we believe that raoical philosophy, or a properly philo-
sophical project, relates somehow to the raoicality of the event. Irom our
perspective the activation of a philosophical orientation is a matter of ap-
preciating the commano be as a worlo ano the inoeterminate gathering
we that is constituteo as a response to this commano. This means that
the collective as suchthe collective that the political event manifests
must be available to philosophy as its place of activation. So, the woulo-be
philosopher is somehow relateo to a real process of noelity to a singular
political event. This is important because it is only through such relating
that one is exposeo to the experience of the collective as such. One can
participate in poetry by appreciating a poem someone else has written
but one cannot have the funoamental sense of the collective without be-
ing engageo, at some level, with the being of the collective in its oiherent
manifestations.
To be sure, mere involvement in the usual forms of political activism
is not sumcient. The raoical personal transformation that Baoiou rightly
thinks is associateo with revolutionary politics is oirectly connecteo, we
believe, to a certain oynamic interaction between life ano oeath. Ulti-
mately noelity to the political event, in Baoious sense of thinking the situ-
ation accoroing to the event, is grounoeo on ones oeeply helo belief that,
if the neeo arises, one is prepareo to oie for the cause ano ones comraoes.
To put it more oramatically, one is able truly to imagine that one has
alreaoy oieo for the cause even if this might not actually eventuate when
the opportunity arises. This is important for two reasons.
On the one hano, the political event ano noelity to it claim one as a
whole. Consequently nothing, not even life itself, can be taken as a given.
Life, in the raoical sense of committeo presence as such as a preconoition
for engagement with anything specinc, is claimeo through oeath. Thus
the conviction that, given the neeo, one will oie for the cause is the point
of entry, so to speak, into the truth process. Inoeeo, with the poet Liva-
oites we can say ano if we oont oie for each other we are alreaoy oeao.
8

This conviction oecisively characterizes a funoamental aspect of the proc-
ess of noelity to the political event.
On the other hano, oeath is the ultimate site of gathering for the liv-
ing. In the collective ethos of those who respono to any form of the com-
mano be as a worlo sacrince becomes the ultimate realization of the
subject as a place of owelling ano of others gathering. In these circum-
stances even ones absolute absence is signincant as a place of gathering. It
is no accioent that the three commanos we mentioneo above are oirectly
associateo with sacrince ,Socrates, Christ, ano so on,. So, a certain politi-
cal participation functions as a preconoition for becoming philosophical
in so far as the latter relies upon the experience of the collective as such.
In oroer to elaborate our claim that the political subject becomes philo-
sophical as an outcome of remaining faithful to the full implications of the
emergence of the political event, in the next section we turn to an explo-
ration of Baoious claims regaroing the ethic of perseverance that informs
the political subjects noelity to the event.
8. Livaoites, Smoll Bool fot Lotgc Dtcom, p. .
III. THE RETREAT OI THE FOLITICAL EVENT AND THE
EVENT AS RETREAT
There is always only one question in the ethic of truths: how will I,
as some-one, corttroc to exceeo my own being? How will I link the
things I know, in a consistent fashion, via the ehects of being seizeo
by the not-known?
q
The Immortal that I am capable of being || must be ottcctl,
seizeo by noelity. That is to say: broken, in its multiple being, by
the course of an immanent break, ano convokeo |tcot|, nnally,
with or without knowing it, by the evental supplement. To enter
into the composition of a subject of truth can only be something
that loppcr to ,oo ,E :,.
Once composeo, the subject must struggle to maintain her innnite
oimension, the oimension brought into being by a truth proceoure, ano
for Baoiou this struggle is informeo by the maxim keep going ,E .,.
Iioelity to the event, moreover, calls for a oecision to relate henceforth
to the situation from the perspective of its evental || supplement ,E
:,. An evental noelity is a real break ,both thought ano practiceo, in the
specinc oroer in which the event took place, a break that proouces a truth
in the situation:
Essentially, a truth is the material course traceo, within the
situation, by the evental supplementation. It is thus an tmmorcrt
otcol. Immanent because a truth proceeos tr the situation, ||
Break because what enables the truth- processthe event
meant nothing accoroing to the prevailing language ano establisheo
knowleoge of the situation ,E .-,.
In introoucing something new an event always emerges in a specinc situa-
tion ano is oepenoent for this on the eoge of the voio or more specincally
what Baoiou terms an evental site. By this he means:
an entirely abnormal multiple, that is, a multiple such that none
of its elements are presenteo in the situation. The site, itself, is
presenteo, but beneath it nothing from which it is composeo is
presenteo.
:o
q. Alain Baoiou, Etltc: Ar Eo, or tlc Urocttorotrg of Ectl, trans. Feter Hallwaro, Lonoon,
Verso, .oo:, p. . ,henceforth E,.
:o. Alain Baoiou, Bctrg oro Eccrt, trans. Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo, p.
:.
Whilst it is the situations evental sitein Baoious sense of a site that at
once belongs to the situation without also having oiscernable elements in
common with the latterthat ensures its specincity, the unnameable of
the situation, that which falls beyono its knowleoge regime, ensures the
continuation of truth processes.
::
Accoroingly, for Baoiou noelity to the political event calls, not only for
perseverance in following through the consequences of the event, but also
for an acceptance of the unnameable orientation of a truth such that the
subject cannot properly oenne the collective as a matter of engaging in
politics or thinking as the collective. Ior a subject to name the collective
therefore is to practice an evil in Baoious sense of a corruption of the truth
of the given political sequence. By linking the occurrence of political evil
to a specinc subjects orientation through the specinc relation to a truth,
Baoiou provioes a rationale for his ethic of perseverance as expresseo in
the maxim keep going that by-passes the worry that the political evils
of recent history might be evioence of a naw in the very character of the
political event unoerstooo as the ioea of the revolutionary project itself.
Now, if we can imagine the subject of politics, say the revolutionary
party, to fail to remain faithful to the event to which it owes its origin,
through an act of corruption of the truth of which it is the bearer, is it also
conceivable that noelity to the event may call for a faithful response to the
fact of tlc cccrt tcttcot no less than to the overwhelming seizure associateo
with its emergence? If political truths escape the logic that structures the
specinc situation through processes of subtraction from the particularity
of the known, as Baoiou insists, they must nevertheless remain true to the
event from which they originate even when the evental supplement has
receoeo historically ano not for want of willing truth bearers. We suspect
that because Baoious theory of the event ooes not propose an account of
the political events tcttcot in the sense of the collapse of the revolutionary
project but only of its emergence, his oiscussion of the questions of noelity
in the circumstances of tooays worlo ultimately leaos him to lose sight of
that which was at the heart of the revolutionary project, namely bringing
about a new worlo in response to the current circumstances of the worlo.
Insteao, on his analysis the worlo is reouceo to a stage, whatever the cir-
cumstances, for the perpetuation of the revolutionary subjects thinking
,ooing,. We woulo like to leno some force to this critical observation by
::. See Feter Hallwaro, Bootoo: A Soocct to Ttotl, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota
Fress, .oo, pp. .-o.
attempting to outline an account of the possibility of philosophy as a re-
sponse to the retreat of the political event.
Bearing in mino our oiscussion in the nrst section of our paper we
can pose the following question. What if in mooern times, our times, in so
far as it relies on an evental site in a specinc situation every political event
sequence also explicitly or implicitly invokes a tension between the source
of the commano be as a worlo ano that of the prevailing logic of the
situation to which every political truth sequence poses its challenge? Let
us follow through the implications of this suggestion along with Baoiou.
Vieweo from the regime of knowleoge that structures the specinc situation
of liberal-capitalism the political event ano what this event signines for its
revolutionary subjects is nothing tangible, nothing that the cognitive net
of the situation can get a holo of. But coulo the signincance of this noth-
ing lie in the fact that insteao of challenging the situation by way of an
immanent break this nothing constitutes an integral part of the situa-
tion in the sense that the situation relies upon it for its completion? How
might we oiherentiate between a challenge to the situation in Baoious
sense of an immanent break ano the situation taken as posing to itself the
historical challenge to accommooate that which presents to it as noth-
ing? If, as we suggesteo in the nrst section of our paper, we unoerstano
the political event as the gathering we then from the perspective of the
situation we can unoerstano the evental sites abnormality in terms of the
form of gathering that the event is. If the situation is itself a response to a
kino of gathering from whose perspective what the political event signines
is nothing, how can the specinc situation of liberal-capitalism be unoer-
stooo, on the one hano, as a response to a certain ioea of the gathering
ano, on the other, as consisting of sites that make possible the emergence
of the gathering of the political event?
Irom our Hegelian perspective the ioea of the gathering to which the
situation of liberal-capitalism constitutes a response is to be unoerstooo
in terms of Hegels formulation of the abstract principle of the mooern
worlo:
To start from the self, to live in the self, is the other extreme of
formal subjectivity, when it is still empty, or rather has maoe itself
to be empty, such is pure formalism, the abstract principle of the
mooern worlo.
:.

:.. G. W. I. Hegel, Lcctotc or tlc Httot, of Pltloopl,, trans. E. S. Haloane ano Irances H.
Simson, Vol. I Greek Fhilosophy to Flato, vols., Lincoln, University of Nebraska Fress,
:qq, p. :..
Toula Nicolacopoulos ano George Vassilacopoulos q
This pure formalism is expresseo in the exchange relations of persons in
their capacity as property owners. These relations are responses to the
commano be a person, ano respect others as persons.
:
In our terms they
express what we can call the formless gathering of property owners. In the
last few centuries we have witnesseo the unceasing process of expansion
ano intensincation of the gathering of property owners on a global scale.
Accoroingly, the situation of global capitalism amounts to a series of forms
of gatheringslegal, economic, political, artistic ano so onthat are in-
formeo by the formlessness of the global gathering of property owners
perpetually responoing to the commano be as a person. Farticipation in
these processes has become an unconoitionally oemocratic ritual. Irom
this perspective the expansion ano intensincation of exchange relations
has very little to oo with capitalisms orive for pront. Quite the contrary,
the neeo unceasingly to amrm the creation of form from the formless
gathering of property owners feeos capitalism.
Now the revolutionary political event comes to challenge the very
ioea of the gathering of property owners responoing to the commano be
as a person. What is this challenge, precisely? To begin with, at the heart
of the gathering of property owners is the meoiation of what Hegel calls
the thing ano the exchange relation that conforms to it. Because this
purely negative relating captures only the inoiviouality of the self it gives
rise to the negative commano concerning respect for persons. In contrast,
the meoiation of the thing is not relieo upon in the gathering we that
responos to the commano be as a worlo. Here, the self is expanoeo, func-
tioning as the place of owelling of the other selves. This raoical unoer-
stanoing of gathering unoerstooo in terms of the collective as such marks
both a liberation from the conoitioneo form of the gathering of property
owners ano a new project, that of the creation of the worlo of solioarity.
Irom its perspective the gathering of property owners is a particular form
of gathering that misrepresents itself as the gathering as such. It is a false
universal in this sense.
Yet from the perspective of the gathering of property owners, the col-
lective as such means nothing in the sense that the claim to be a uni-
versal commano that meaningfully informs a new worlo appreciation is
incomprehensible. Inoeeo the ioea of the collective as such can only be
unoerstooo as informing a local form of life within the situation. This is
because in so far as the gathering of property owners functions in the
:. G. W. I. Hegel, Tlc Pltloopl, of Rtglt, trans. T. M. Knox, New York, Oxforo, :q8o,
p. .
situation as that which embooies the very ioea of the gathering, the situ-
ation must be able to accommooate incompatible materially local forms
of gathering. In this case the emphasis is placeo on locality ano not on
universality.
To elaborate on this last point let us consioer how evental sites be-
come available in the situation that is informeo by the formless gather-
ing of property owners, the situation of liberal-capitalism. In so far as an
evental site is an element of the situation it conforms to the logic of this
situation. Elsewhere we have analyseo this logic in terms of the operations
of the formal universality of particularity.
:
Accoroing to this logic the
mooern inoivioual ,a group, a person, an institution, a system of knowl-
eoge, is negatively oenneo as not being ioentineo with the universal as
such, ano thus it is oistinct from that which gives the specinc particular its
specincity. Farticularity is the mooe of being of every mooern particular
inoivioual irrespective of the content of its concrete existence. Farticular-
ity is, therefore universal in the sense that it explicitly supplies the mooe
of being of every mooern particular. This points to a separation between
form ano content, since each particular emerges ano becomes part of the
situation through the inoispensable moment of oiherentiation between its
universal mooe of being ,form, ano its particular substance ,content,. This
kino of oiherentiation between the formal universal ano the substantive
particular translates into a oichotomous oivision as oistinct from a mere
oiherentiation. Iirstly, because the substantive particular is oenneo only
in its negative relation to the universal, the two are oppositionally oenneo.
Seconoly, given that the formal being of the oiherentiateo universal is not
oepenoent on any substantive particular, unlike the particular, the for-
mal universal is self-oetermining. Ior both the above reasons the formal
universal takes a privilegeo position relative to the substantive particular.
The principle then of the situation can be appreciateo in terms of the fol-
lowing negative imperative: be a particular in accoroance with the logic
of the formal universality of particularity. Basically this means that in the
given form of gathering what really matters is not what happens within
its connnes but how, those who participate in it are representable in the
situation. They must be representable in terms of the property-owning
relations that this form makes possible, that is, as integral members of the
gathering of formal subjects.
:. See Toula Nicolacopoulos ano George Vassilacopoulos, Hcgcl oro tlc Logtcol Sttoctotc of
Locc: Ar Eo, or Scxooltttc, Fomtl, oro tlc Loo, Aloershot, Ashgate, :qqq, pp. q-..
Toula Nicolacopoulos ano George Vassilacopoulos 8:
Irom the above it follows that through the principle of the formal
universality of particularity the situation combines that which can be ab-
solutely known ano preoicteo, namely sites accoroing to particularity as
the mooe of being of the particular, with that which cannot be known
precisely because it neeo not be known, namely the content of the par-
ticular, or its internal elements. Take love as an example. We can unoer-
stano the loving relation as a total oisruption of each participants being
as a property owner. The form of subjectivity ano recognition to which
the relation of love gives rise ooes not conform to the logic governing
property-owning subjects relations, the logic that relies on the meoiation
of the property item. Love thus oisrupts the commano be as a person by
supplying its own, raoically oiherent imperative: be as the worlo of the
unity that is the loving subject. Yet oespite this raoical oiherence ano the
raoical rupture in the property-owning subjectivity of those who come to-
gether to form a loving subject, even the constitution of the loving subject
ultimately oepenos on the structure of property ownership for its external
recognition. It seems then that the situation oemonstrates its strength the
moment it is shown to oetermine what it cannot oetect by its cognitive
net. By provioing the formal space of particularity the situation situates
the unknowable in the space of its knowing.
We can exteno this analysis to account for the political event ano the
truth proceoures associateo with it. Whereas the event of love is limiteo
in the sense that two sumce for its emergence, the political event exhibits
an in principle unrestricteo universality that oirectly challenges the for-
mal universality of the gathering of property owners. More specincally,
whereas love oisrupts only the subjectivity of those involveo, the political
event oisrupts both the subjectivity of those involveo ano challenges the
formal universality of particularity in so far as it counter-poses the com-
mano be as a worlo to the commano be as a person. Moreover, it is the
situation that provioes the opportunity for this challenge to arise ano to
be containeo, whether peacefully or violently, within the bounoaries of its
own logic. In this sense the political event can be saio to complete the situ-
ation. So, we can explain the abnormality of the evental site by noting
that the event gives rise to something that cannot be known ano hence in-
corporateo into the situation in an evental site whose form is nevertheless
presentable simply because the situation is interesteo only in this form ano
not in what this form accommooates. The fact that the situation cannot
know the event means that the situations horizon of knowing has alreaoy
generateo a space within it for what cannot be known. A priori then the
situation accommooates everything necessary for the event to happen.
Irom the above consioerations something quite oramatic follows re-
garoing the political event. In oroer to take shape that which is in essence
formless ano the source of the forms given to its truth processes, the col-
lective as such, must rely upon a particular site. Here the form is not cre-
ateo out of what is formless since its own formthe form of the formis
alreaoy oetermineo by the situation. So whereas the site as the form of the
event expresses singularity, the form or mooe of being of the site itself, of
any site, expresses universality. In other woros, the principle or law of the
situation ultimately oetermines the site. Because of this historical restric-
tion ano the situateoness of the political event in an evental site, the event
whose own logic it is to question the role of the inoeterminate collective of
property owners can only challenge what is oeterminate in the situation
such as the state, the authoritarian party, the legal institution ano so on.
This sort of challenge ehectively overwhelms the political event ano
its commano. Since challenging what is oeterminate in the situation re-
places challenging the inoeterminate that informs the situation, ultimately
the event is suboroinateo to its truth processes. The truth of a political
sequence, say the Leninist party, performs two roles. Iirstly, as a response
to the commano be as a worlo it expresses the ehort to generate form out
of the formless gathering we. But, seconoly, oue to the fact that the po-
litical event oepenos upon its evental site, the truth process amounts to a
challenge to the specinc situation. Ultimately then truth processes are ac-
tivateo as this challenge ano not as processes of creating forms out of what
is otherwise inoeterminate. Accoroingly, the formless that is unoerstooo
through ano as the challenge of the situation comes to be nameo. As a
result the inoeterminacy of the gathering of property owners that informs
the situation is lost sight of ano its place is taken by specinc formations,
like the state ano so on. Here the truth process comes to articulate the
challenge to the situation rather than to the formlessness of the gathering
we. Even though the ultimate source of challenge is the gathering we
the truth process is forceo to take its place or in Baoious terms to name
the collective as such. In this case what constitutes the collective is not the
response to the commano be as a worlo but the response to the com-
mano linkeo to the particular truth process. Historically, the states or the
partys act of naming the unnameable constituteo an inevitable aspect of
an ehective challenge to the situation. Of course, it amounteo to a chal-
lenge of force precisely because, although it was informeo by the logic
of the formal universality of particularity, it nevertheless positeo itself as
all-oetermining.
Toula Nicolacopoulos ano George Vassilacopoulos 8
The oiherence between the challenge implicit in the ioea of the gath-
ering we that is positeo to the inoeterminate gathering of property own-
ers ano the challenge positeo by truth processes to the situation, can also
be unoerstooo as follows. Truth processes challenge the historical, where-
as the political event challenges history. In so far as we are interesteo in
overcoming the limits of the situation for our political emancipation, as
revolutionary subjects we treat the oeterminations of the situation as his-
torical, that is, as capable of change. However this is a serious limitation
since what we want to change is alreaoy historical as an outcome of being
structureo by the logic of the formal universality of particularity ano in
this case historicality is associateo not with future change but with the
horizontal ano nuio coexistence of particulars. Truth processes are his-
torical in just this sense. Capitalism has replaceo the time of the historical
with the horizon of history ano the inoeterminate gathering of property
owners marks this horizon along with the intensincation of exchange rela-
tions for the reasons we alreaoy mentioneo above. Irom this perspective
change is meaningful if we can move from history to the eternal whose
commano is be as a worlo. But since the situation of history totalizes
itself by excluoing the commano ano the corresponoing inoeterminate
gathering we, the universal ano unconoitional release of this commano
oemanos the collapse, so to speak, of this totality. Frecisely because the
commano is innnitely realisable in the emptiness that such a collapse will
bring, the event that transforms us in the true spirit of the revolution must
be just such a collapse. This saio, for obvious reasons we oo not have ac-
cess to this ioea of collapse ano its implications in our capacity as political
subjects but they are accessible to us through philosophy. We turn in the
nnal section of our paper to the question of the relationship between the
political event as retreat ano the turn to speculative philosophy.
IV. THE EVENTS RETREAT AND SFECULATIVE
FHILOSOFHY
We have argueo that in our times noelity to the political event of the
revolutionary project calls for a response to the fact of the events retreat
ano not only to its emergence. This is a response that forms the basis for
the constitution of philosophical subjectivity. Through the relation of the
political subject as the bearer of a truth of the event, the woulo-be philos-
opher is exposeo to the ioea of the collective as such, a form of the gather-
ing we that the situation of liberal-capitalism oenies in principle. Now, in
our view we can appreciate the turn to speculative philosophy as a matter
of noelity to the events retreat, that is, to the collapse of the revolutionary
project as such, by following through the implications of what we can call
the liberation of the event from oepenoence on some evental site.
To appreciate ano accept the events retreat in all its raoicality is to
insist upon the liberation of the event from the form of particularity that
inevitably regulates the announcement of the gathering we to which the
political event gives rise. If such liberation is conceivablewe might think
of this as a moment of raoical skepticism in relation to all the signinca-
tions that the situation makes possiblethen through its retreat the event
points to the situation as a whole as the worlo that oenies the event. This
is a oenial not merely of the events power to inform the worlo, but of the
very ioea that informs the political event.
Consequently, unlike the truth proceoures that oespite being consti-
tuteo in response to the events emergence are incapable of oirectly ao-
oressing the ioea of gathering that informs the situation, namely the in-
oeterminate gathering of property owners, through its retreat the event
oirects itself to precisely this ioea. How is this possible? We have maoe
the point that the gathering of property owners treats itself as the gather-
ing that embooies the very principle of gathering subjects. Accoroingly, it
functions as the gathering whose commanobe as a personrestricts
the principle of subjectivity to that of formal subjectivity. Irom this it fol-
lows that the retreat of the event can be shown to free the event from
what conoitions it only if its very ioea can become the practice/thought
of a subject as the abyss that stirs the worlo. In citing the woros of Faul
Celan to articulate the meaning of justiceOn inconsistencies Rest: two
nngers are snapping in the abyss, a worlo is stirring in the scratch-sheets,
it all oepenos on youBaoiou emphasizes that it all oepenos on you ,E
8, to the oetriment of the equally signincant observation that for the poet
the worlos stirring is possible only in so far as everythingano, contra
Baoiou ,E .-,, not just the political truth proceoureis alreaoy situ-
ateo in the abyss that justice is.
Ior the emergence of this kino of subject ano thinking there neeo only
be one instance of a revolutionary subject through the being of whom the
all-oetermining power of property-owning subjectivity might ultimately
be oisrupteo to the point of its implosion. In this intense moment we have
the uttering of the we by the single subject. This uttering is the moment
of philosophy that relates oirectly to the event.
Unoerstooo in this way philosophy is activateo in the battlenelo that
the self of the philosopher is, once this self is oetermineo by the power to
think of itself as that which has the power to oisrupt the pure formalism
Toula Nicolacopoulos ano George Vassilacopoulos 8
of subjectivity ano thereby to point to something more funoamental. This
is a oisruption in history itself since, as we noteo in the previous section,
history is constituteo as the inoeterminate gathering of property own-
ers. Through this oisruption the eternal invaoes history in a manner that
renoers it impossible for history to resist. In other woros, the retreating
event oetermines philosophy as its truth process that oirectly intervenes in
history by thinking it. Ultimately only an event without evental site, posits
the very ioea of commanoing to which philosophy responos. History is
the situation of the event that ooes not oepeno on a site. Here, what is to
be thought is not an object but the signincance for the worlo of the very
possibility of philosophy, since history is createo by presupposing this very
possibility. As Hegel notes, history is the emptying out of Spirit, that is, of
the gathering we. What we have here is the in principle implosion of the
worlo that releases the very ioea of the gathering we an ioea fully real-
izeo as philosophy. Fhilosophy is its own conoition ano thus philosophy
thinks itself.
Irom this perspective Baoious approach to philosophy appears, on
the one hano, to refer us to the political event that no longer has the
power to shatter us, ano, on the other, it remains silent on that which ooes
inoeeo have this power tooay, namely the collapse of the revolutionary
project. Consequently, much like some of the philosophers he criticizes,
his thinking remains caught in the in between.

88
Iollysophy
Dominique Hecq
Pocttc fotm t tlc trroccrcc of tlc gtorotoc.
ALAIN BADIOU
Tooay I feel altogether unbuttoneo.
I rejoice in these vast barrens of white
Ano, you will unoerstano, transform them
In the expansive tracts of my genius.
If ,oo octc to tt, to ottct mc
1ttl oototc cocoolc oro cpto cctc,
I loolo oocct.
I think I shall sing,
In a variety of forms, of light,
Of sincerity, ano of love, of course.
Ol, plcoc. I oort gtcc o ltt fot locc.
Foltor fot mc o ocolotc corfccttor.
I fccl tlc rcco of o ootorttol tottc,
Ltgltl, poooctco ottl ocpctottor.
Crookeo gums unoer snow? The light falling
All afternoon? My large ano tragic face
In the glass?
I om ro lorgct ,oorg.
M, ool ortoccl to trrtt, o I cortcmplotc
Tlc oomor I locco tr tlc rolco ptccrcc
Of o loroomc fclloo, comc opor
Ir tlcrcc oro ottl o,.
8q
As in the oark
We are afraio. As we wake. Opening,
Again ano again, our soft ano empty hanos.
I corrot mocc. Fot tlc momcrt I om otopco
Ir gloctol otttc. I cor cc tlc gtoro,
Gtoorolc oo, oroct tlc otpotorotc c,c
Of cocort lcoccr. I cor mcll tlc ropc
Of tlc rccl of ocpott. It t comtrg to fotcr mc
Ir o tcroct cmotocc.
How the banoeo lapwing
Whistles, fatherless, from the plain?
1oo lroo,
Locc ccmco tlc gtoroct plor of tlcm oll.
Pctlop tlc lcott t tmpl, too moll.
It may be. Tough I cant tell for real.
I nno it haro to imagine the stark
Language of a large ano founoering booy.
What I see is an array of banks ano streamers,
Fatches of light, ano hanging oraperies.
I otll cxporo, I tltrl, ot tlc lot, tltoogl tlc oorc.
Scc tlcc lcroct ttcct of toroplcttc gttcf,
Tlc rocttloccrt clooo oro tlc cot ocolottor.
otoltogtopl,
q
Bibliography of Work on ano
by Alain Baoiou in English
Compileo by Faul Ashton
This bibliography presents a complete list of the work on ano by Ba-
oiou currently available ,as of :/:o/.oo6, in English. The bibliography
separates the works by Baoiou ,further broken into the sub-sections: Bool,
Collccttor of Eo,, ano Eo, oro Irtctctco,, from the Commentaries on
Baoious Work.
Other works citeo in this book, ano works by Baoiou that are as yet
not translateo, are listeo at the eno of this bibliography.
WORKS BY ALAIN BADIOU
BOOIS
MP Mortfcto fot Pltloopl,, trans. Norman Maoarasz, Albany, State
University of New York Fress, :qqq.
D Dclcoc: Tlc Clomot of Bctrg, trans. Louise Burchill, Minneapolis,
University of Minnesota Fress, .ooo.
E Etltc: Ar Eo, or tlc Urocttorotrg of Ectl, trans. Feter Hallwaro,
Lonoon, Verso, .oo:.
SP Sotrt Pool: Tlc Fooroottor of Urtcctoltm, trans. Ray Brassier,
Stanforo, Stanforo University Fress, .oo.
BE Bctrg oro Eccrt, trans. Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum,
.oo.
M Mctopoltttc, trans. ]ason Barker, Lonoon, Verso, .oo.
HI Horooool of Iroctlcttc, trans. Alberto Toscano, Stanforo, Stanforo
University Fress, .oo.
TO Bttcrg Or Exttcrcc: A Slott Ttcottc or Ttorttot, Ortolog,, trans.
Norman Maoarasz, Albany, State University of New York Fress,
.oo6.
Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo q
TC Tlc Ccrtot,, trans. Alberto Toscano, Lonoon, Folity, .oo
,forthcoming,.
COLLECTIO^S OF ESSA1S
IT Irrttc Tlooglt: Ttotl oro tlc Rctotr to Pltloopl,, eo. ano trans. ]ustin
Clemens ano Oliver Ieltham, Lonoon, Continuum, .oo.
Incluoing:
Fhilosophy ano Desire, pp. q-.
Fhilosophy ano Truth, pp. 8-68.
Fhilosophy ano Folitics, pp. 6q-8.
Fhilosophy ano Fsychoanalysis, pp. q-qo.
Fhilosophy ano Art, pp. q:-:o8 ,from Corotttor, Faris,
Seuil, :qq., pp. q-:o,.
Fhilosophy ano Cinema, pp. :oq-:. ,from LAtt oo Ctrmo,
no. ., :qqq,.
Fhilosophy ano the Death of Communism, pp. :.6-:o
,from Dor oottc oocot, Faris, Eoitions oe LAube,
:qq8, pp. -.,.
Fhilosophy ano the War Against Terrorism, pp. ::-:6.
The Dennition of Fhilosophy, pp. :6-:68 ,from Corotttor,
Faris, Seuil, :qq., pp. q-8.,.
Ontology ano Folitics: An Interview with Alain Baoiou,
pp. :6q-:q.
OB Or Bcclctt, eo. ano trans. Alberto Toscano ano Nina Fower,
Manchester, Clinamen, .oo.
Incluoing:
The Writing of the Generic, pp. :-6 ,from Corotttor, Faris,
Seuil, :qq., pp. .q-66,.
Tireless Desire, pp. -8 ,from Bcclctt Ltrctccoolc ott,
:qq,.
Being, Existence, Thought: Fose ano Concept, pp. q-::.
,from Horooool of Iroctlct, pp. 8q-:.:,.
What Happens, pp. ::-:8.
TW Tlcotcttcol 1ttttrg, eo. ano trans. Ray Brassier ano Alberto
Toscano, Lonoon, Continuum Books, .oo.
Incluoing:
Mathematics ano Fhilosophy: The Grano Style ano the
Little Style, pp. -.o ,unpublisheo,.
Fhilosophy ano Mathematics: Innnity ano the Eno of
Bibliography q
Romanticism, pp. .:-8 ,from Corotttor, Faris, Seuil,
:qq., pp. :-8,.
The Question of Being Tooay, pp. q-8 ,from Bttcrg or
Exttcrcc, pp. -,.
Flatonism ano Mathematical Ontology, q-8 ,from
Bttcrg or Exttcrcc, pp. 8q-:oo,.
The Being of Number, pp. q-6 ,from Bttcrg or Exttcrcc,
pp. :.-:.,.
One, Multiple, Multiplicities, pp. 6-8o ,from moltttooc, :,
.ooo, pp. :q-.::,.
Spinozas Closeo Ontology, pp. 8:-q ,from Bttcrg or
Exttcrcc, pp. -88,.
The Event as Trans-Being, pp. q-:o. ,reviseo ano
expanoeo version of an essay of the same title from
Bttcrg or Exttcrcc, pp. q-6.,.
On Subtraction, pp. :o-: ,from Corotttor, Faris, Seuil,
:qq., pp. :q-q,.
Truth: Iorcing ano the Unnamable, pp. ::q- ,from
Corotttor, Faris, Seuil, :qq., pp. :q6-.:.,.
Kants Subtractive Ontology, pp. :-. ,from Bttcrg or
Exttcrcc, pp. :-:.,.
Eight Theses on the Universal, pp. :-. ,from ]elica
Sumic ,eo.,, Urtcctol, Strgoltct, Sooct, Faris, Kim,
.ooo, pp. ::-.o,.
Folitics as a Truth Froceoure, pp. :-6o ,from Mctopoltttc,
pp. ::-.,.
Being ano Appearance, pp. :6- ,from Bttcrg or Exttcrcc,
pp. :-:68,.
Notes Towaro Thinking Appearance, pp. :-8
,unpublisheo,.
The Transcenoental, pp. :8q-..o ,from a oraft manuscript
|now publisheo| of Logtoc oc moroc, Faris, Seuil,.
Hegel ano the Whole, pp. ..:-: ,from a oraft manuscript
|now publisheo| of Logtoc oc moroc, Faris, Seuil,.
Language, Thought, Foetry, pp. .-: ,unpublisheo,.
P Polcmtc, trans. Steve Corcoran, Lonoon, Verso, .oo6.
ESSA1S A^D I^TERVIE1S
On a Iinally Objectless Subject, trans. Bruce Iink, Topot, no. , :q88,
pp. q-8. Reproouceo as: Alain Baoiou, On a Iinally Objectless
Subject, 1lo Comc Aftct tlc Soocct., trans. Bruce Iink, Routleoge,
:qq:, pp. .-..
Gilles Deleuze, The Iolo: Leibniz ano the Baroque, in Constantin
Bounoas ano Dorethea Olkowski ,eos.,, Dclcoc oro Tlcottc of
Pltloopl,, trans. Thelma Sowley, New York, Columbia, :qq, pp.
:-6q.
Becketts Generic Writing, trans. Alban Urbanas, }ootrol of Bcclctt Stootc,
vol. , no. :, :qq, pp. :-.:.
Descartes/Lacan, trans. Sigi ]ottkanot ano Daniel Collins, UMBR;o),
no. :, :qq6, pp. :-.
Fsychoanalysis ano Fhilosophy, trans. Raphael Comprone ano Marcus
Coelen, UMBR;o), no. :, :qq6, pp. :q-.6.
Hegel, trans. Marcus Coelen ano Sam Gillespie, UMBR;o), no. :, :qq6,
pp. .-.
What is Love? trans. ]ustin Clemens, UMBR;o), no. :, :qq6, pp. -.
Is There a Theory of the Subject in Georges Canguilhem? trans. Graham
Burchell, Ecorom, oro Soctct,, vol. ., no. ./, :qq8, pp. ..-.
Fhilosophy ano Folitics, trans. Thelma Sowley, Rootcol Pltloopl,, :qqq,
pp. .q-..
On a Contemporary Usage of Irege, trans. ]ustin Clemens ano Sam
Gillespe, UMBR;o), no. :, .ooo, pp. qq-::.
Metaphysics ano the Critique of Metaphysics, trans. Alberto Toscano,
Plt: 1ototcl }ootrol of Pltloopl,, no. :o, .ooo, pp. :-qo.
Of Life as a Name of Being, or, Deleuzes Vitalist Ontology , Plt: 1ototcl
}ootrol of Pltloopl,, no. :o, .ooo.
Art ano Fhilosophy, trans. ]orge ]auregui, Locortor Irl, no. :, .ooo.
Who is Nietzsche? trans. Alberto Toscano, Plt: 1ototcl }ootrol of
Pltloopl,, no. ::, .oo:, pp. :-:o.
The Folitical as a Froceoure of Truth, trans. Barbara F. Iaulks, Locortor
Irl, no. :q, .oo:, pp. :-8:.
Highly Speculative Reasoning on the Concept of Democracy, trans.
]orge ]auregui, Locortor Irl, no. :6, .oo:.
The Ethic of Truths: Construction ano Fotency, trans. Selma Sowley,
Plt: 1ototcl }ootrol of Pltloopl,, no. :., .oo:, pp. .-.
On Evil: An Interview with Alain Baoiou, with Christoph Cox ano Molly
Whalen, Cootrct, no. , .oo:-..
Bibliography q
Fhilosophical Consioerations of Some Recent Iacts, trans. Steven
Corcoran, Tlcot, C Eccrt, vol. 6, no. ., .oo..
Existence ano Death, trans. Nina Fower ano Alberto Toscano, Dtcootc:
}ootrol fot Tlcotcttcol Stootc tr Mcoto oro Coltotc, vol. ., no. :, .oo.,
pp. 6-.
One Divioes into Two, trans. Alberto Toscano, Coltotc Mocltrc, no. ,
.oo..
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Bosteels, trans. Bruno Bosteels ano Alberto Toscano, Argclolt: }ootrol
of Tlcotcttcol Homortttc, vol. 8, no. ., .oo, pp. :::-6.
Seven Variations on the Century, Potollox, vol. q, no. ., .oo, pp. .-8o.
Fhilosophical Consioerations of the Very Singular Custom of Voting: An
Analysis Baseo on Recent Ballots in Irance, trans. Steven Corcoran,
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Logic of the Site, trans. Steve Corcoran ano Bruno Bosteels, Dtocttttc,
vol. , no. , .oo, pp. ::-o.
The Scene of Two, trans. Barbara F. Iaulks, Locortor Irl, no. .:, .oo,
pp. .-.
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., .oo.
Some Replies to a Demanoing Irieno, Tltrl Agotr: Alotr Bootoo oro tlc
Fototc of Pltloopl,, Hollooto, Pctct, Lonoon, Continuum Books, .oo,
pp. ..-.
Iifteen Theses on Contemporary Art, Locortor Irl, no. ., .oo, pp. :o-
:q.
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, no. :, .oo, pp. 8-..
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vol. :o, .oo, pp. .o-.
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6-.
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Toscano, Lorenzo Chiesa, ano Nina Fower, potttor: cot oto coltotc
cttttoc, vol. :, no. , .oo, pp. 6-8.
The Cultural Revolution: The Last Revolution? trans. Bruno Bosteels,
potttor: cot oto coltotc cttttoc, vol. :, no. , .oo, pp. 8:-:.
The Triumphant Restoration, trans. Alberto Toscano, potttor: cot oto
coltotc cttttoc, vol. :, no. , .oo, pp. 6q-6..
Iurther Selections from Tlottc oo oct on the Cultural Revolution, trans.
Lorenzo Chiesa, potttor: cot oto coltotc cttttoc, vol. :, no. , .oo,
pp. 6q-8.
An Essential Fhilosophical Thesis: It Is Right to Rebel against the
Reactionaries, trans. Alberto Toscano, potttor: cot oto coltotc
cttttoc, vol. :, no. , .oo, pp. 66q-.
Manifesto of Amrmationism, trans. Barbara F. Iaulks, Locortor Irl, no.
./., .oo, pp. q.-:oq.
Lacan. Seminar, Book X: Anxiety, trans. Barbara F. Iaulks, Locortor Irl,
no. .6, .oo.
Anxiety, trans. Barbara F. Iaulks, Locortor Irl, no. .6, .oo6, pp. o-:.
The Iormulas of LEtouroit, trans. Scott Savaiano, Locortor Irl, no. .,
.oo6, pp. 8o-q.
Lacan ano the pre-Socratics, in Slavoj iek ,eo.,, Locor: Tlc Stlcrt Pottrct,
Lonoon, Verso, .oo6, pp. -:6.
The Subject of Art, Tlc S,mptom, no. 6, Spring .oo.
What is a Fhilosophical Institution? Or: Aooress, Transmission,
Inscription, trans. A. ]. Bartlett, Como oro Httot,, vol. :, no. :-.,
.oo6, pp. q-:.
COMMENTARIES ON BADIOUS WORK
Alliez, Eric, Baoiou: The Grace of the Universal, Pol,gtopl, vol. :, .oo,
pp. .6-.
Ashton, Faul, A. ]. Bartlett ano ]ustin Clemens, Masters 8 Disciples:
Institution, Fhilosophy, Fraxis, Como oro Httot,, vol. :, no. :-.,
.oo6, pp. :-8.
Azman, M., How to Think Science? How Does Science Think? Ftlooflt
Vctrtl, vol. .6, no. :, .oo.
Balowin, ]on ano Nick Haehner, Iault Lines: Simon Critchley in
Discussion on Alain Baoiou, Pol,gtopl, vol. :, .oo, pp. .q-o.
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Balibar, Etienne, The History of Truth: Alain Baoiou in Irench
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Balibar, Etienne, The History of Truth: Alain Baoiou in Irench
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Fototc of Pltloopl,, Lonoon, Continuum Books, .oo, pp. .:-8.
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Bartlett, A. ]., Conoitional Notes on a New Republic?, Como oro Httot,,
vol. :, no. :-., .oo6, pp. q-6.
Baumbach, Nico, Something Else Is Fossible: Thinking Baoiou on
Fhilosophy ano Art, Pol,gtopl, vol. :, .oo, pp. :-.
Beistegui, Miguel oe, The Ontological Dispute: Baoiou, Heioegger,
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OConnor ano Hannah Arenot, Tlcot, Coltotc C Soctct,, vol. .., no.
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Hallwaro ,eo.,, Tltrl Agotr: Alotr Bootoo oro tlc Fototc of Pltloopl,,
Lonoon, Continuum Books, .oo, pp. q-:o.
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Subject in the Work of Alain Baoiou ano Gilles Deleuze, Pol,gtopl,
vol. :, .oo, pp. .-66.
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Contributors
Faul Ashton teaches in the Liberal Arts at Victoria University ano is completing
his FhD at LaTrobe University.
Alain Baoiou teaches at Ecole Normale Suprieure ano at the College interna-
tional oe philosophie in Faris.
A. ]. Bartlett teaches at Deakin University ano is completing his FhD at the Uni-
versity of Melbourne.
Lorenzo Chiesa teaches in the Department of European Languages ano Culture,
University of Kent at Canterbury.
]ustin Clemens teaches at the University of Melbourne.
Oliver Ieltham teaches at the American University of Faris.
Zachary Iraser teaches at University of Kings College, Halifax, NS.
Sam Gillespie completeo his oissertation in philosophy at the University of War-
wick.
Linosey Hair is a graouate stuoent at the Department of Comparative Literature,
SUNY Buhalo.
Dominique Hecq teaches creative writing at Swinburne University.
Sigi ]ottkanot is a Ilanoers Research Iellow at Ghent University, Belgium.
Alex Ling is a FhD canoioate, School of Art History, Cinema, Classics 8 Archae-
ology, the University of Melbourne.
Brian Anthony Smith is a FhD research stuoent in the philosophy oepartment at
the University of Dunoee.
Alberto Toscano teaches at Golosmiths College, University of Lonoon.
Toula Nicolacopoulos teaches philosophy at LaTrobe University.
Nina Fower teaches philosophy at Roehampton University, Lonoon.
George Vassilacopoulos teaches philosophy at LaTrobe University.
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Agamben, Giorgio :o8
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Beckett, Samuel vii, , :o., :oq, ::.,
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Celan, Faul :oq, ::, 8
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Chiesa, Lorenzo :o, :, :q, :6
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Nicolacopoulos, Toula :o, 6, o,
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Smith, Brian Anthony :o, :, ..o
Socrates :o, :o8, :oq, :6, :q, .:o,
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Vassilacopoulos, George :o, 6, o,
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Zupani, Alenca :q, :q8

Praxis of Alain Badiou

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Disciples must fotcc something, illegitimately, into

Some inoications: :, the oiherence

How can this institution recognize whoever

In Bctrg oro Eccrt, the sought-after structures are oeclareo to

Brouwer, too, envisions the subject as

The formalists sought to sup-

Baoious ioentincation of his position as a Flatonism oeserves some com-

,. This textbook platonism, as Baoiou sees it, simply gets Flatos

In many signincant respects ,which seem to have been as unclear to Ba-

Whereas it is the nature of axioms to be, as far as is possible, separa-

Ior Baoiou, it is the aovocates of a strictly potential con-

a traoition that must be overcome if thought is to unshackle itself

The intuitionist rejection of

Motivateo by the wish to facilitate the penetration of intuitionistic con-

This is precisely the orientation in thought that

ano the set of its subsets ,

,. The question that it poses is, on the

of , accoroing to the following

thus completely oennes a subset

,r, ~ othe number of subsets in

It ooes, however, sumce for a limiteo but serviceable

was to overhaul the entire

The Secono Act oramatically increases the power of intuitionist math-

Let us note that this is a meoium createo by the

. What we wish to oo here is to oenne a spreao

,,r,, ~ o t |,r, ~ {O}| or

Ior Baoiou, the Continuum Hypothesis is a

This ioentity causes being to split into separate

Baoious response to Heioegger is twofolo: to separate philosophy

, elements. Ferhaps the only

is an innnite caroinal number, then ,

Hao we but worlos enough, ano time,

Still, asioe from metaphors of

What is striking about the problems of philosophical sequels ,or, if

Tlc Ptoxt of Alotr Bootoo ::.

One can at least see why

To the extent that the Hegelian Absolute is given

What are the prob-

It shoulo be noticeo that, although Ltocrttcottor argu-

This tension is what ap-

less attention has

Irom a slightly oiherent perspec-

Thus, marking signifying oiherence as

It is only at this level, that of the count of the count, where : -

Most importantly, the proper names relation to the letter as unary

As Aaron Schuster remarks in his elegant commentary

We shoulo pay particular attention to this

If the letter as unary

This means that it is only with the /

Yet, one shoulo note that the unary trait

amrmation ooes not preceoe negation,

Ioentincation proper is then the

since, as we have seen, the real is precisely what in-exists as enunciation

Consequently, repetition is characterizeo by unicity, the

Each circuit of repetition is unique since repetition, the making of

My aim here is not to argue for an ontological principle of unity in

The statement is startling, not least because it foregrounos

I take him to mean that a Thing remains irreoucible to the

That eoucation t gooo is an ancient

Of course, tooay, at the

It also, at the behest of ano as an immanent function of the

Concerneo as we are with an eoucation which serves as a mo-