Brock 1 Weston Harold Brock Professor Alicia Bolton English 101 English Composition I November 21, 2013 The

e Problem with Prison Security One of the most important aspects of a prison is its security systems. A security system can consist of things such as guards, searches, cameras, monitors, motion detectors, metal detectors, cells, chains, and fences. A prisons security systems purpose is to make sure that inmates stay in, contraband stays out, prisoners behave the way that they should, and that everyone, inside and outside the prison, is safe. If even one aspect of these systems fails, or is insufficient, it can have catastrophic consequences, such as inmates escaping, someone getting hurt, or worse. One such case of an inmate escaping from prison due to sub-par security is the case of Diane Downs, in Steven Caseys Never Cry Wolf, who took advantage of a flawed motion detector that went off for the smallest of things, and the guards whose nonchalant attitudes towards the constant false alarms allowed her the time it required to scale the two chain link fences separating her from the outside world. One morning in the middle of July, in the recreation yard of a medium-security womens prison in Oregon, an inmate named Diane Downs was staring at the two chain link fences keeping her inside the yard of the prison, contemplating her escape. The key to her escape was a motion detection system that was so sensitive that even the slightest movement set it off. Lately, the system was set off so often that the guards eventually disregarded the alarm as anything

Brock 2 important, so they took their time to respond to it when Downs set it off. Downs had counted on this, and managed to climb over the last fence before any guards showed up to respond to the alarm, escaping her incarceration for shooting her three children. This is an interesting albeit bittersweet story, and a prime example of technological and human error. It should concern many people, such as prison staff, people who live near prisons, the loved ones of victims, and witnesses to the crime. This tragic oversight, caused by the careless attitudes of the guards and the so-perfect-it-is-flawed security system, has proven that prison security in some areas need to revise their faulty alarms and disinterested security guards. An article by Stan Czerniak, the assistant secretary for operations for the Florida Department of Corrections, and James Upchurch, the security administrator for the Office of Operations for the Florida Department of Corrections, describes how security systems going off too frequently, and the subsequent complacency of the guards, is the biggest enemy of an institutional security program and, by its nature, the most difficult to combat (Czerniak and Upchurch). The article tells how what happened in Never Cry Wolf is exactly the kind of thing to avoid. When dealing with life and death issues, it is unwise to wait for security systems to break down before deciding to fix them. With this approach, by the time the inmate population discovers a flaw in the security system, it usually is too late. For example, an escape or other serious incident demands an immediate response or reaction. This reactive approach to prison security is like waiting for the horse (or inmate) to escape before we close the "barn door." (Czerniak and Upchurch)

Brock 3 It mentions how corrections officials tend to assume that security systems are working just fine, and so they feel secure, without the need to check and see if the systems truly are working how they should. Regular security checks and the like become mundane, and the resulting complacency makes the guards feel unprepared for when they are actually needed. The authors suggest making varying systems and equipment checks once or twice a month, per shift, for better results. Sometimes, the fault lies not only with the technology and guard detail, but the people running the prison as well. One website details: A recent report by the Arizona Republic reveals that many of the security lapses that led to the escape of 3 murderers from the MTC facility in Kingman last year have not been resolved. In fact, 14 prisons, a mixture of private and state-run ones, suffer from the security flaws that allowed these prisoners to escape and elude the law for weeks, while killing a vacationing elderly couple in the process. (WhyIHateCCA) The website mentions faulty alarm systems, large holes beneath the fences, and broken lights and cameras. Proper security protocols were also apparently ignored at almost all of the facilities that were studied. Many of the issues brought up in the website were attributed not only to the staff, but the companies that ran the prisons as well. Aside from faulty security, inmates can also be very crafty, clever, and cunning in order to find ways to bypass security. One inmate at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, convicted murderer James Wily, discovered a way to escape by watching the behavior of the animals outside the prison. The way Id learned how to do is Id watch the animals. I watched the rabbits go in and out through the razor wire, and as long as they ignored the razor wire, it didnt

Brock 4 cut em. And Id watch the coyote. The coyote moved in a manner kind of with its head down, and no one noticed the coyote there. It was just kinda meek, so I was like, move like that. (Wily, 34:28-34:47) Wily also describes how another coyote walked along the fence and found a ditch. He emulated the behavior of the animals, and managed to escape for 4 days before a fellow inmate reported him. He was returned to prison and promised not to attempt escape for the next 4 years, and mentioned that, if he tried again, it would be easy for him to escape once more. Since the escape, the facility is now patrolled by armored cars 24 hours a day. Though I argue that the whole security system ought to be revised for the prison from which Downs escaped, and others like it, other people, such as prison staff and the makers of the security system, may argue that the only fault lay within the attitudes of the guards. They might say that, with such a sensitive security system, it was certain to catch anyone that may attempt to escape. Aside from that, it was a medium security prison. It did not need more security than it had. The only fault may lie within the guards themselves, as no one was overseeing the inmates in the yard, and their nonchalant attitude towards the alarm was a grave mistake. On the one hand, I agree with them that the attitudes of the guards could use a great deal of improvement. But on the other hand, I still insist that the whole system needs to be revised. While it is merely a medium security prison, it does not sound unreasonable or extreme to at least have a camera monitoring the yard or space between the fences. That way, false alarms can be instantly identified and ignored, and real escape attempts can be swiftly responded to. The sensitivity of the motion sensors could be toned down, as well. If weeds swaying in the wind are enough to set off the alarm, perhaps it is a little too sensitive. In Richard Wortleys work, Situational Prison Control: Crime Prevention in Correctional Institutions, Wortley writes:

Brock 5 Unsurprisingly, escapes overwhelmingly take place from low-security institutions and by low-security-rated prisoners. Lyons (1997) found that in New York State, 92 per cent of escapes took place from minimum- or medium-security facilities. Herrick (1989), reporting 1988 data for all US prison systems, found that only 6 per cent of escapes were from maximum- or medium-security prisons. Gorta and Sillavan (1991: 208) found that only 2 per cent escapes in and Australian sample took place from maximum security. Of the remaining cases, 83 per cent occurred from minimum security, including 12 per cent who were non-returns from some form of leave programme. The Centre for Research, Evaluation and Social Assessment (1996: 27) found that of 117 escapes from the New Zealand prison system only two took place from maximum security. (179) As was written in the above quote, most escapes are from prisons with low levels of security, such as the one that Downs escaped from. This should be reason enough to increase security in low-level prison, and there are many ways to do so without being unreasonable. Wortley goes on to provide examples of how to increase security. According to McManus and Conner (1994: 142), effective perimeter security should possess three features. First, it should appear so daunting that most prisoners will not even consider the possibility that it can be breached. Second, it should in fact be difficult and time-consuming to penetrate. Third, it should allow staff to monitor activity within the precincts of the perimeter. There are numerous articles in the corrections literature dealing with methods and techniques for meeting these conditions and improving prison perimeter security (American Society for Industrial Security, 1979; Buchanan et al., 1988; Camp and Camp, 1987; Czerniak and Upchurch, 1996; McManus and Conner, 1994; Travis et al., 1989). These articles describe both hardware options such as multi-

Brock 6 barrier configurations, new fencing materials and designs, advances in barbed wire, and new technological aids such as fence-mounted sensors, underground seismic systems, micro-wave and infrared detection devices and CCTV coverage and procedural considerations such as ID checks, search practices and key control. (181) While some of these may seem expensive, not all would be necessary for a low-security prison. Multiple barriers, new fencing materials and designs, more efficient barbed wire, and a security camera would be both cheap and incredibly effective. Perhaps there could be 3 barriers instead of two, a plastic barrier could be put on the sides of the fences, the barbed wire could be taller, and the barrier between the prison and outside barriers could be electrified so that no one would be in danger of being shocked unless they tried to break into or out of the prison. While security is there to prevent people from getting outside, it is also there to keep contraband from getting inside. Prisoners are finding more ways to smuggle in contraband, for which security has to keep creating measures to prevent. Contraband not only includes drugs and weapons, but even cell phones, too. In the chapter, Cell Phones Are a Growing Threat to Prison Security (pg. 150-155), by Robert K. Gordon, in the book Prisons, Charles Sansum explains that, in a prison setting, we want to monitor the communication of inmates. Its hard to do that when they have cell phones. Different measures are being used to combat this, such as dogs, shakedowns, and metal detectors. Judging from these different issues, it seems that prison security could be greatly improved upon. Whether it be careless guards, faulty technology, or even crafty inmates, breaches in security happen all the time. The extra measures explained above could prove to be invaluable ways to help with these issues. If more measures were taken, and guards took their

Brock 7 jobs more seriously, it should not even have to be said that prison security would improve drastically, so less inmates would escape, and less contraband would get in.