FM-3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION May 2013

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.
5 1
29 May 2013 2
Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies 3
DRAFTNOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION 4
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION. The material in this manual is under development. It is not approved doctrine and cannot 5
be used for reference or citation. Upon publication, this manual will be approved for public release; distribution will be 6
unlimited. 7
Headquarters, Department of the Army 8
*FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5
Distribution Restriction: The material in this manual is under development. It is not approved doctrine and
cannot be used for reference or citation. Upon publication, this manual will be approved for public release;
distribution will be unlimited.
*When pubIished, this manuaI wiII supersede FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 dated 15 December 2006.
Marine Corps PCN: XXX XXXXXX XX
i

Field Manual
No.3-24
Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
No. 3-33.5
Headquarters
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Department of the Navy
Headquarters
United States Marine Corps
Washington, DC

29 May 2013
Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies
DRAFTNOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Contents
Page
PREFACE.............................................................................................................. iv
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... vi
PART ONE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CONTEXT
Chapter 1 UNDERSTANDING THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT............................................ 1-1
United States Strategy and Policy to Counter an Insurgency ........................... 1-4
Indirect Approach in a Counterinsurgency ......................................................... 1-5
Direct Approach in a Counterinsurgency ............................................................ 1-6
Land Forces and the Range of Military Operations ............................................ 1-7
U.S. Involvement in Counterinsurgency ............................................................. 1-7
Understanding Unified Action ............................................................................. 1-9
Chapter 2 UNDERSTANDING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............................... 2-1
Demographic and Urbanization Trends .............................................................. 2-1
The Operational Variables .................................................................................. 2-2
The Mission Variables and Civil Considerations .............................................. 2-10
Chapter 3 UNDERSTANDING CULTURE .......................................................................... 3-1
Characteristics of Culture ................................................................................... 3-1
Methods for Understanding Culture ................................................................... 3-6
Contents
ii FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) 29 May 2013
PART TWO INSURGENCIES
Chapter 4 INSURGENCY PREREQUISITES AND FUNDAMENTALS .............................. 4-1
Insurgency Prerequisites .................................................................................... 4-1
Insurgency Fundamentals ................................................................................... 4-5
Chapter 5 INSURGENCY THREAT CHARACTERISTICS ................................................. 5-1
Threat Characteristics ......................................................................................... 5-1
Associated Threats ............................................................................................. 5-6
PART THREE COUNTERINSURGENCIES
Chapter 6 COMMAND AND CONTROL AND MISSION COMMAND ................................ 6-1
Command in Counterinsurgency ........................................................................ 6-1
Headquarters Use In Counterinsurgency ........................................................... 6-4
Chapter 7 PLANNING FOR COUNTERING INSURGENCIES ........................................... 7-1
Conceptual Planning ........................................................................................... 7-1
Detailed Planning ................................................................................................ 7-8
Counterinsurgency Paradoxes ............................................................................ 7-9
Chapter 8 INDIRECT METHODS FOR COUNTERING INSURGENCIES.......................... 8-1
Generational Engagement .................................................................................. 8-1
Negotiation and Diplomacy ................................................................................. 8-2
Identify, Separate, Isolate, Influence, and Reintegrate ....................................... 8-3
Security Cooperation........................................................................................... 8-4
Other Indirect Enablers ..................................................................................... 8-19
Chapter 9 DIRECT METHODS FOR COUNTERING INSURGENCIES ............................. 9-1
Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition ..................................................................... 9-1
Attack the Network .............................................................................................. 9-4
Targeted Threat Infrastructure ............................................................................ 9-5
Strike ................................................................................................................... 9-6
Other Direct Enablers.......................................................................................... 9-7
Chapter 10 INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS .......................... 10-1
Intelligence ........................................................................................................ 10-2
Inform and Influence Activities .......................................................................... 10-5
Operational Considerations .............................................................................. 10-9
Chapter 11 ASSESSMENTS ............................................................................................... 11-1
Assessment Frameworks .................................................................................. 11-1
Assessment Methods ........................................................................................ 11-2
Assessment Considerations ............................................................................. 11-2
Developing Measurement Criteria .................................................................... 11-3
Chapter 12 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................ 12-1
Authority to Assist a Foreign Government ........................................................ 12-1
Rules of Engagement........................................................................................ 12-2
Law of War ........................................................................................................ 12-2
Non-International Armed Conflict ...................................................................... 12-7
Detention and Interrogation .............................................................................. 12-9
Enforcing Discipline of U.S. Forces ................................................................ 12-11
Training and Equipping Foreign Forces .......................................................... 12-12
Contents
29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) iii
Claims and Solatia .......................................................................................... 12-14
Establishing the Rule of Law .......................................................................... 12-14
GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... GIossary-1
REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1

Figures
Figure 1-2. Construct for counterinsurgency .......................................................................... 1-7
Figure 1-3. The primary objectives of an insurgency ............................................................. 1-9
Figure 1-4. Country team command relationships ............................................................... 1-14
Figure 4-1. Conflict model .................................................................................................... 4-11
Figure 4-2. Insurgency in different phases ........................................................................... 4-12
Figure 4-3. Organizational elements of an insurgency ......................................................... 4-13
Figure 4-4. Urban (terrorist) strategy .................................................................................... 4-17
Figure 4-5. Foco strategy ..................................................................................................... 4-18
Figure 4-6. Protracted strategy ............................................................................................. 4-19
Figure 4-7. Subversive strategy, part I ................................................................................. 4-21
Figure 4-8. Subversive strategy, part II ................................................................................ 4-22
Figure 7-1. Army design methodology ................................................................................... 7-2
Figure 7-2. Lines of effort ....................................................................................................... 7-6
Figure 8-1. Building host-nation capacity ............................................................................... 8-9
Figure 8-2. Counterinsurgency relationships ........................................................................ 8-11
Figure 8-3. Country planning ................................................................................................ 8-14
Figure 8-4. Phases of building a host-nation security force ................................................. 8-16
Figure 9-1. The capability spectrum of counterinsurgency conflict ........................................ 9-4
Figure 12-1. Provisions binding high contracting parties ..................................................... 12-8
Figure 12-2. Extract of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 .............................................. 12-10

Tables
Table 1-1. Influence of ends, ways, means, and risk in determining military
involvement ......................................................................................................... 1-5
Table 2-1. Interrelated dimensions of the information environment ....................................... 2-8
Table 3-1. Cultural influences ................................................................................................. 3-4
Table 8-1. Developing the host-nation security force ............................................................. 8-4
Table 8-2. Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and
facilities framework. ............................................................................................ 8-6
Table 8-3. Host-nation contributions .................................................................................... 8-19

29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) iv
Preface 1
Field Manual (FM) 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 provides doctrine for Army 2
and Marine units that are countering an insurgency. It provides a doctrinal foundation for counterinsurgency. 3
FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is a guide for units fighting or training for counterinsurgency operations. 4
The principal audience for FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is for battalion, brigade, and regimental commanders and 5
their staffs. 6
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., 7
international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their 8
Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.) 9
FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 implements standardization agreement (STANAG) 2611. 10
FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint, Army, and Marine Corps terms and 11
definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For terms and their definitions shown in the text, the term is 12
italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. 13
FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 applies to the United States Marine Corps, the Active Army, Army National 14
Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. 15
The proponent of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing 16
agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send 17
comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank 18
Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D 19
(FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to 20
usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. 21
22
Preface
29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) v
23

29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) vi
Introduction 24
The introduction will be completed after comment adjudication. 25
26

29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) 1-1
PART ONE 27
Strategic and OperationaI Context 28
Every time the United States (U.S.) conducts or supports counterinsurgency 29
operations, it does so in a unique strategic and operational environment. Part 1 30
provides an overview for commanders and staff to understand the environment and 31
context of an insurgency and the decision to counter that insurgency. Chapter 1 32
provides the strategic context of a counterinsurgency. When the U.S. becomes 33
involved in a counterinsurgency, policy and strategic decisions affect operations. 34
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the operational environment and operational 35
variables. In a counterinsurgency, there are unique considerations that operators and 36
planners should take into account. Of particular importance in a counterinsurgency is 37
culture. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth overview of culture and its relationship with 38
counterinsurgency. 39
Chapter 1 40
Understanding the Strategic Context 41
1-1. Any decision by the President to commit U.S. forces in a counterinsurgency must be understood 42
within the larger sphere of U.S. policy. Soldiers and Marines must first understand the strategic context that 43
the U.S. is acting in to best plan, prepare, execute, and assess a counterinsurgency operation to achieve 44
national objectives. Countering an insurgency should incorporate previous or continuing security 45
cooperation efforts and other activities, U.S. and host-nation objectives, and whole-of-government efforts 46
to address root causes of the conflict. Despite its irregular nature and generally less intense combat level, 47
counterinsurgency may be just as critical to U.S. vital interests as conventional warfare. Strategic planning 48
guidance reflects this importance. 49
1-2. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence 50
over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches and asymmetric capabilities, 51
though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversarys 52
power, influence, and will (JP 1). Because of its irregular nature, U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgency 53
demands a whole-of-government approach. Defeating an insurgency requires a blend of both civilian and 54
military efforts that address both assisting the host-nation government to defeat the insurgents on the 55
battlefield and to enable the host nation to address the root causes of the insurgency. Nevertheless, U.S. 56
civilian and military participants in counterinsurgency can never fully compensate for lack of will, lack of 57
capacity, acceptance of corruption, or counter-productive behavior on the part of the supported 58
government. 59
1-3. Insurgency in the most basic form is a struggle for legitimacy and influence, generally from a 60
position of relative weakness, outside existing state institutions. Insurgencies can exist apart from or before, 61
during, or after a conventional conflict. Throughout history, elements of a population have grown 62
dissatisfied with the status quo. When they are willing to fight to change the conditions to their favor, using 63
both violent and nonviolent means to affect a change in the prevailing authority, they have often initiated 64
an insurgency. An insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge 65
political control of a region (JP 3-24). Counterinsurgency is comprehensive civilian and military efforts 66
Chapter 1
1-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) 29 May 2013
taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes (JP 3-24). Warfare 67
remains a violent clash of interests between organized groups characterized by the use of force. 68
Traditionally, in conventional warfare, there are clear determinants of victory. Achieving victory for the 69
insurgent may depend less on defeating an armed opponent and more on a groups ability to garner support 70
for its political interests (often ideologically based) and to generate enough violence to achieve political 71
consequences. 72
1-4. Ideally, the host nation is the primary actor in defeating an insurgency. Even, in an insurgency that 73
occurs in a country with a nonfunctioning central government or after a major conflict, the host nation must 74
eventually provide a solution that is culturally acceptable to a society. The conclusion of any 75
counterinsurgency effort is primarily dependent on the host nation and the people that reside in that 76
country. Ultimately, every society has to provide relevant solutions its own problems. As such, one of the 77
Army and Marine Corps roles (perhaps their primary role) is to enable the host nation. 78
1-5. Counterinsurgency can occur as part of large-scale combat, but it often occurs absent a major 79
conflict. For example, an external threat may sponsor an insurgency and this could be part of an effort to 80
attain other strategic objectives. As such, the objectives of a counterinsurgency must be contextual to that 81
insurgency. Creating objectives that are relevant to a particular insurgency is essential to defeating that 82
insurgency. Effective counterinsurgency requires clearly defined and obtainable objectives that result in an 83
end state acceptable to the host-nation government and the governments providing forces. 84
1-6. Legitimacy, the acceptance of an authority by a society (see chapter 2), is the central issue in 85
insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Insurgents use all available toolspolitical (including diplomatic), 86
informational (including appeals to religious, ethnic, historical, national, class, political, tribal or 87
ideological beliefs), military, and economicto overthrow or undermine the existing authority. This 88
authority may be an established government or an interim governing body. It may be an existing generally 89
accepted social order. Political power in itself, however, may not be the end state desired by the insurgent. 90
A criminal enterprise might seek to undermine existing political power in order to enable it to continue its 91
criminal activities; or, there could be a desire to seize political power in order to impose an ideological 92
(including religious) system on an unwilling population. In counterinsurgencies, the affected government 93
should use all instruments of its national power to defeat the insurgency and reduce the likelihood of 94
another crisis emerging. 95
1-7. The military role should be coordinated with all instruments of national powerdiplomatic, 96
informational, military, and economic. The Army and Marine Corps are only part of the elements of 97
national power that the U.S. can use to counter an insurgency. At times, they may be a supporting role. For 98
example, Soldiers and Marines may be withdrawn from the counterinsurgency effort altogether while the 99
U.S. uses other elements of national power as the primary enablers of a host nation. In such cases, the 100
Army and Marine Corps may play a supporting role performing security cooperation tasks. 101
1-8. Counterinsurgency is neither a concept nor a strategy. It is simply a descriptor of a range of diverse 102
activities intended to counter an insurgency. The U.S. can use a range of activities to aid a host nation in 103
defeating an insurgency. The various combinations of these activities with different levels of resourcing 104
provide the U.S. with a wide range of strategic options to defeat an insurgency. The strategy to counter an 105
insurgency is determined by the ends the U.S. wishes to achieve, the ways it wishes to achieve those ends, 106
and the resources or means it uses the enable those ways. 107
1-9. The Laos insurgency highlights the unique nature of an insurgency. This insurgency took place in the 108
context of Vietnam. Here, internal groups with various interests and outside interests from North Vietnam 109
and the U.S. created a unique context for the Laos insurgency. Moreover, the corrupt and ineffective host 110
government was not able to wage its own counterinsurgency campaign effectively. To effectively counter 111
the insurgency in Laos, the U.S. needed an operational approach that would work in that environment, if a 112
successful operational approach were possible. Unfortunately, U.S. forces failed to create an effective 113
strategy to counter the insurgency in Laos. Thus, the U.S. government failed to find the needed ways and 114
means to meet the policy goal. 115
Understanding the Strategic Context
The Laos Insurgency 116
Lamented as the forgotten war, the insurgency in Laos was heavily influenced (and 117
often overshadowed) by the conflict in neighboring Vietnam. A victim of geography, 118
half-hearted fighting between the different factions in Laos may well have worked 119
itself out in a lasting compromise if not for pressure from North Vietnamese 120
communists to control areas of Laos for the infiltration of men and materiel into South 121
Vietnam (the Ho Chi Min trail) and U.S. efforts to oppose communist presence and 122
influence. 123
Beginning in earnest in 1959, fighting pitted variously rightist Royal Lao forces 124
supported by Hmong guerillas against the leftist Pathet Lao (indigenous communists) 125
and their North Vietnamese supporters. These participants were at times joined by 126
other players, including U.S. advisors, Filipino troops, U.S. air power, Thai 127
commandos and artillery formations, as well as neutralist Lao forces. During the 128
period of conflict, Laos was underdeveloped in every way: the government, the 129
economy, and the military. The government was corrupt and ineffective, the economy 130
was wholly dependent on outside support, and the military was corrupt and 131
ineffective. 132
As the United States became more invested in Vietnam, it also increased support to 133
Laos; by the end of 1955, the U.S. provided 100% of the Lao military budget. North 134
Vietnamese backers of the Pathet Lao sought to grow that force, supporting a 135
significant recruiting campaign and sending many of the recruits to North Vietnam for 136
schooling and training. This led to greater investment by the U.S. in materiel and 137
training for government forces, and included, beginning in 1957, efforts to arm 138
Hmong guerillas, who would play an important role later in the conflict. 139
Vietnamese interest in Laos was primarily in securing the so called panhandle 140
region, through which the Ho Chi Min trail allowed the North Vietnamese to infiltrate 141
men and materiel into South Vietnam. A secondary consideration was the support of 142
a fellow communist movement (the Pathet Lao). Once fighting began in earnest in 143
1959, the Vietnamese used government chaos to their benefit, increasing attacks on 144
government forces and expanding the territory under their influence or control. 145
During this period, many attacks took the form of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 146
regulars attacking and overwhelming a position, and then letting their Pathet Lao 147
allies occupy the area and claim the victory, thus at least paying lip service to 148
maintaining the neutralization of Laos. 149
These NVA-led attacks and several attempted counterattacks by Royal Laotian 150
Forces against Pathet Lao positions revealed the gross incompetence of the 151
governments regular forces. This lack of capability stemmed from several sources, 152
including a half-hearted martial tradition in general, a preoccupation with profiteering 153
and political games by the senior leadership, lack of earnest efforts by the French 154
responsible for their training until late 1958, and a fundamental lack of motivation. 155
Despite the vigorous efforts of U.S. trainers and millions of dollars in materiel 156
throughout the course of the conflict, Royal Lao Forces would never become a 157
consequential fighting force. In this phase, the only effective forces on the 158
government side were the Hmong tribesmen, trained and provisioned by the CIA, and 159
fighting as guerillas. 160
International pressure (from the United States as well as from China and Russia 161
preferring to avoid unnecessarily provoking the United States) and support (from the 162
United States and other allies) prevented the complete collapse of the government of 163
Laos in 1962 and pushed for neutralization through coalition government. The North 164
Vietnamese were content to allow negotiations to take place, as they had succeeded 165
in securing what they needed: the Ho Chi Min trail. After months of wrangling, 1962 166
finally saw another Geneva agreement, this time for a neutralized Laos with a 167
coalition government representing the three major factions: the rightists, the leftists, 168
and the neutralists. Part of the neutralization agreement included the removal of 169
foreign forces from Laos. While U.S. and allied personnel who had been fighting on 170
Chapter 1
the side of the Royal Lao Government were withdrawn from the country, very few of 171
the substantial number of NVA forces withdrew. Nor, of course, did the CIA cease its 172
work with the Hmong. 173
The new coalition government proved shaky. Turmoil again rocked the Lao 174
government with continued political maneuvering by greedy generals and a string of 175
coups. Military Region commanders ran their zones like private fiefdoms, rarely 176
dispatching their troops outside the Mekong River valley. A series of spectacular 177
failures by the Royal Lao forces all but ensured those forces would never seek to 178
take the initiative and act in other than a strictly defensive capacity again. Between 179
1964 and 1968, the conflict was primarily between the U.S.-supported paramilitaries 180
(backed by U.S. airpower), and the Pathet Lao. The cycle of dry season and wet 181
season, each favoring one side or the other, saw very modest back and forth 182
movement between the two primarily irregular forces, with little change from year to 183
year. That all changed in 1969. The communist dry season offensive of 1968 did not 184
end with the onset of the rainy season, and gains were substantial. In early 1970, the 185
communists seized a provincial capital for the first time, and later that year they 186
seized another. 187
In the now traditional way, Hmong guerillas counterattacked. However, after nearly a 188
decade of war, the CIAs secret army was nearly fought out. Fighting against superior 189
numbers of regular troops, the Hmong became more and more reliant on U.S. 190
airpower and on support from Thai artillery. Bombing in southern Laos expanded 191
such that by 1971, it was more extensive than bombing in South Vietnam and 192
Cambodia combined. 193
The communist dry season offensive that started in December of 1971 brought 194
extraordinary pressure on the government. For the first time, NVA forces used 195
significant armor, as well as large tube artillery. The Hmong were battered and 196
quickly thrown back. After another year of significant communist gains, the Lao 197
government and its international supporters once again sought a ceasefire. 198
By the time of the 1973 ceasefire and neutralization, the government of Laos 199
controlled little more than the capital and the Mekong river valley, and that only by 200
virtue of the Hmong and U.S. airpower. With the withdrawal of U.S. support (both 201
airpower and funding) in 1973, the Hmong were demobilized and the Lao 202
government was left to its fate, which was to fall relatively quickly to the communists. 203
UNITED STATES STRATEGY AND POLICY TO COUNTER AN 204
INSURGENCY 205
1-10. When and how the U.S. government provides assistance to other states to fight an insurgency is a 206
question of policy and strategy. Commanders and staffs should understand that the U.S. can respond with a 207
range of measures, many of which do not directly involve U.S. forces performing an active role in the 208
counterinsurgency. This manual provides the reader with information on how the counterinsurgent may 209
organize tactical tasks in time and space to reach an end state. It cannot and should not be the only 210
reference to conduct counterinsurgency operations for anyone who wishes to fully understand the policy 211
tools available to the U.S. to aid a host nation in fighting a counterinsurgency. (See JP 3-24, NATO 212
Publication 3.4.4, and the U.S. Government Guide to Counterinsurgency for more information on 213
counterinsurgency policy tools.) 214
1-11. Counterinsurgency operations involve other military actions addressed in other manuals. One 215
example is a unit supporting security cooperation activities linked to a nation combating insurgents. (See 216
FM 3-22.) Advisors and trainers need to understand their own doctrine on how brigades and battalions fight 217
a counterinsurgency before they can train or advise host-nation security forces to counter an insurgency. If 218
trainers have no frame of reference for what a host nation is doing in a counterinsurgency, their 219
effectiveness at training is questionable. Whether a unit is directly performing the tasks to defeat an 220
insurgency or indirectly supporting a host nation, this manual provides foundational doctrine for how land 221
forces perform counterinsurgency. 222
1-12. Political leaders and commanders must have a dialogue to decide the optimal strategy to meet the 223
security needs of the U.S. The different operations and activities provide different choices that offer 224
different cost and risk. Commanders inform political leaders about the different cost and risk of various 225
options, and political leaders weigh these costs and risks with the importance to U.S. national interests. 226
Once U.S. policymakers have determined the goals (the ends) of the U.S., the military evaluates operational 227
approaches to conduct counterinsurgency efforts depending on the ends, ways, means, and acceptable risk. 228
The joint force provides a range of capabilities that integrate into the overall strategy. For example, in a 229
functioning state that is facing an insurgency, the joint force may employ a range of security cooperation 230
tools. Moreover, there are tools that fall outside of security cooperation, such as direct action and counter 231
threat financing, that the U.S. can integrated into the mixture of ways that it will use to defeat or contain an 232
insurgency. (See JP 3-22, JP 3-24, JP 3-05, Commanders Handbook on Counter Threat Finance, and 233
Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats Handbook for more information on integrated 234
counterinsurgency tools.) The U.S. government integrates the various elements of national power to create 235
a range of strategic options, of which military involvement is only one part. (See table 1-1, and see chapter 236
8 for more information on indirect approaches and chapter 9 for more information on direct approaches.) 237
Table 1-1. Influence of ends, ways, means, and risk in determining military involvement 238
Strategy and Military Operations
Ends Ways Means Risk
Defeat or
contain an
insurgency.
Support
strategic
goals and
end state
defined by
policy
makers.
Indirect approach
Nation assistance.
Security cooperation.
Generational
Engagement
Negotiation
Diplomacy
Identify, Separate,
Isolate, Influence, and
reintegrate counter
threat finance
Other indirect
enablers
Direct approach
Shape, clear, hold,
build, transition.
Attack the Network
Targeted Threat
Infrastructure
Other Direct Enablers
Unified Action
Military Force

Determined by
a mismatch in
the ends,
ways, and
means.
INDIRECT APPROACH IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY 239
1-13. An indirect approach seeks to support existing governments and security forces through the building 240
of capabilities to counter an insurgency and enabling existing capabilities. This approach indirectly 241
counters an insurgency by working through the host-nation institutions. The U.S. can use nation assistance 242
and security cooperation to aid a host nation in building its institutions and capabilities. Moreover, the U.S. 243
has other capabilities, such as counter threat finance, that can enable a host nations counterinsurgency 244
force. The list of capabilities in this manual is not an exclusive list of capabilities that the U.S. uses to 245
indirectly aid a host nation in defeating an insurgency. 246
NATION ASSISTANCE 247
1-14. Nation assistance is assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nations territory 248
based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP 3-0). This civil or military assistance (other 249
than foreign humanitarian assistance) is rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nations territory 250
Chapter 1
during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the U.S. 251
and that nation. Nation assistance operations support the host nation by promoting sustainable development 252
and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. 253
1-15. Nation assistance involves other government agencies that provide expertise in building civil 254
institutions. This is an essential element in counterinsurgency because the military lacks the expertise to 255
build civil control over the population, perform economic reforms, or aid in other basic functions that a host 256
nation may need to prevent or prevail against an insurgency. Using the whole-of-government approach is 257
essential in conducting nation assistance to prevent insurgencies from arising. 258
SECURITY COOPERATION 259
1-16. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to 260
build defense relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and 261
friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces 262
with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (JP 3-22). These activities help the U.S. and host 263
nation gain credibility and help the host nation build legitimacy. These efforts can help prevent 264
insurgencies or shape the host nations ability to defeat or contain insurgencies. 265
1-17. As directed, the Army and Marine Corps provides forces to support security cooperation missions. 266
This requirement can include assistance in training, equipping, and advising the military forces of foreign 267
nations. Security cooperation includes security assistance, foreign internal defense, and security force 268
assistance (See FM 3-22 and chapter 8 for more information on security cooperation activities) 269
COUNTER THREAT FINANCE 270
1-18. Counter threat finance works to detect, counter, contain, disrupt, deter, or dismantle the transitional 271
financing of state and non-state enemies threatening U.S. national security. Counter threat finance can deny 272
the insurgent access to vital funding streams by identifying the sources and conduits of funding. In 273
counterinsurgency, this can play an important role because of the connection between insurgencies and 274
black markets. It provides one means to prevent an insurgency from obtaining resources. (For more 275
information, see the Joint Staffs Commanders Guide to Counter Threat Finance and DODD 5205.14.) 276
OTHER INDIRECT ENABLERS 277
1-19. The U.S. can also integrate a number of other enablers into a counterinsurgency effort. Some 278
examples include signal intelligence assets, geospatial intelligence assets, airlift capabilities or a number of 279
other capabilities the U.S. possesses that it can use to enable a host nations ongoing counterinsurgency 280
efforts. These assets can enhance an ongoing effort to combat an insurgency and allow a host nation to 281
defeat an insurgency. Effective integration of other enablers requires an understanding of the problem and 282
an understanding of the gaps in host-nation capabilities. 283
DIRECT APPROACH IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY 284
1-20. The direct approach of using land forces in a decisive action role is resource-intensive when done on 285
a large scale, but it is often necessary to fully support a counterinsurgency effort. One example of a 286
possible direct approach is when the success of a host nations counterinsurgency efforts are critical to U.S. 287
interests. The U.S. can use a direct approach after or during a major conflict or when U.S. interests 288
necessitate stability in a failed or failing state. Land forces can also integrate into a host-nations ongoing 289
effort. There are often unintended consequences to a direct approach, and leaders must carefully plan and 290
execute a direct approach to avoid negative consequences. However, this remains a valid option and an 291
important capability that the Army and Marine Corps provide the joint force. 292
1-21. There is a spectrum of direct approach capabilities. For example, a host nation may be capable of 293
providing civil control and security. The U.S. commander can integrate a conventional force into the host 294
nations efforts that provide a force to perform direct action or fires provided by airpower or field artillery. 295
There is a spectrum of a modest and supporting ground force commitment doing a range of offensive, 296
defensive, and stability tasks, to a major ground force commitment that may, for a time, take the role of 297
primary counterinsurgent force while host-nation forces become better able to take on that role themselves. 298
These efforts, when combined with various indirect capabilities, are integrated to create an overall 299
operational approach. 300
LAND FORCES AND THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 301
1-22. Across the range of military operations, U.S. land forces take actions and set priorities to shape the 302
environment to reduce the possibility of insurgencies. For example, during conventional warfare, land 303
forces must take actions to prevent insurgencies from occurring once the opposing conventional force is 304
defeated. These actions could include a range of stability tasks. (See ADRP 3-07) 305
1-23. Security cooperation can prevent an insurgency from occurring. First, it increases credibility of the 306
capacity, readiness, and capability of the host nation. Second, it increases the capacity of the host-nations 307
security forces. Third, it changes the factors that allow an insurgency to begin. (See FM 3-22.) Figure 1-2 308
depicts the prevent-shape-win construct specific to counterinsurgency. 309
Figure 1-2. Construct for counterinsurgency 310
U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 311
1-24. The circumstances of U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgency are important to understanding the 312
context of an insurgency. U.S. forces participate at the direction of the President based on challenges to 313
national security or national security interests. One example is the collapse of a fragile state in a 314
geographically strategic area. Even if U.S. land forces are not in place when the government collapses, the 315
President may deploy land forces to counter an insurgency and restore stability. The use of an indirect 316
approach in a failed state is complex because the commander often has to work with groups outside of the 317
legitimately constituted government. However, large scale direct involvement is often resource intensive, 318
because the state has collapsed. The commander can use a smaller direct approach to support groups 319
outside the legitimately constituted government, but this also adds to the uncertainty and strategic risk. 320
1-25. U.S. forces can participate at the request of a sovereign government that seeks to counter an 321
insurgency in its country with assistance from the U.S. In cases where there is a capable government, the 322
U.S. can offer a wide range of capabilities, including the use of land forces to intervene directly to help a 323
host nation counter an insurgency. 324
1-26. U.S. involvement can also occur in a country where there are ongoing security cooperation 325
operations. If the U.S. is performing security cooperation activities in a country and an insurgency 326
develops, continued security cooperation efforts could result in U.S. involvement in an insurgency. If land 327
forces are preventing an insurgency from occurring, and an insurgency begins, U.S. forces could also 328
transition to direct involvement in an insurgency. This can be a range of direct involvement activities, from 329
Chapter 1
enabling the host nation with fires to providing units to secure directly an area of operation. In either case, a 330
clear policy decision should be made to include the development of a national strategy. 331
1-27. Insurgencies could also be part of large scale combat or fueled by a regional or global adversary. In a 332
protracted large scale operation, an insurgency often develops in controlled areas with populations 333
sympathetic to the enemy. As such, planning for prevention of an insurgency and integrating stability tasks 334
into a prolonged operation is essential. If an insurgency develops, it will require resources to defeat the 335
enemy. In addition, an adversary can fuel an insurgency in a partner nation to undermine U.S. interests. In 336
this case, the insurgency is part of an overall strategy and policy of an adversary. 337
1-28. An insurgency can also occur at the conclusion of a large scale combat operation when an organized 338
movement seeks to challenge the authority of the U.S. and its partners. The organized movement may be 339
remnants of the defeated force or an opportunistic movement that seeks to obtain power using a 340
political-military challenge to the existing authority. In either case, U.S. land forces, along with other 341
unified action partners, must be prepared at all stages of conventional warfare to assess the capability of an 342
insurgency occurring either during the conflict or after hostilities cease. Soldiers and Marines must also 343
recognize that the very presence of U.S. forces in the region can lead to the conditions for an insurgency. 344
U.S. land forces can do much to prevent the insurgency from occurring in the manner in which it conducts 345
the conventional warfare and in the conduct of post conflict operations. Should prevention fail, U.S. forces 346
will be exponentially more successful in countering the insurgency if it shapes the environment during and 347
immediately following conventional warfare for an effective transition to counterinsurgency. 348
1-29. From the U.S. land forces perspective, insurgencies range along a spectrum depending on the scale 349
of effort and resources the Army and Marine Corps must take to counter them. The discussion in 350
paragraphs 1-30 through 1-34 is not absolute, but it allows for a discussion on the range of insurgencies that 351
U.S. land forces may encounter. 352
1-30. In a worst-case scenario, an extremely capable insurgency that has a significant impact on the 353
population exists in a failed state region in which there is little or no host-nation government capability. 354
The U.S. may have to commit significant combat power to offset the momentum of the insurgency. While 355
the U.S. can avoid using land forces in direct combat, often the use of other capabilities will support groups 356
that are not the recognized government. In such cases, the U.S. would be enabling one group to gain control 357
over the state. While the cost may be lower, it is fraught with possible unintended consequences. On the 358
other hand, direct involvement could be extremely costly and provoke a wider conflict. If the U.S. operates 359
in a failed state to defeat an insurgency, it must create a policy and strategy that matches its goals and the 360
resources that it is willing to spend. Moreover, it must be willing to accept a large degree of uncertainty and 361
strategic risk. 362
1-31. The best-case scenario is when the host nation has the capability to defeat an insurgency and the U.S. 363
plays only a role in enabling the insurgencies defeat with weapons, training, or intelligence. A middle case 364
occurs when a functional state has an insurgency in a remote area in which the host-nation government 365
cannot exert complete control. The existing insurgency is not a challenge to the continued authority of the 366
host-nation government, but it may seek to gain control of a specific region or area. This type of scenario 367
can require much fewer resources for U.S. land forces to counter the insurgency than the worst-case 368
scenario. Since the capacity of the host-nation security forces exists to contain the insurgency to a specific 369
region or area, the U.S. can integrate a number of capabilities into the host governments efforts to increase 370
the effectiveness and capabilities of the host nation. While every insurgency is unique, this basic 371
framework offers the U.S. the opportunity to achieve policy goals while spending fewer resources and 372
offering less uncertainty and risk. However, as with any conflict, unintended consequences can change the 373
insurgency and increase the cost and uncertainty of U.S. involvement. 374
1-32. In all cases, specific national policies govern U.S. land forces actions to counter an insurgency. 375
Figure 1-3 on page 1-9 depicts the four primary objectives of insurgencies. These insurgencies are not 376
exclusive and can occur anywhere along the range. 377
Figure 1-3. The primary objectives of an insurgency 378
1-33. Victory will not be as clear as winning in conventional conflicts. U.S. national ends determine 379
winning, regardless of how the U.S. land force deployed to conduct counterinsurgency operations. As it 380
applies to U.S. national objectives, winning in an insurgency often depends on developing host-nation 381
capacity to contain, reduce, and defeat the insurgency without the requirement for U.S. involvement. In a 382
counterinsurgency, the host nation often determines the criteria. Counterinsurgents avoid judging 383
host-nation criteria based on their own cultural and national expectations. Achieving victory may depend 384
less on defeating the armed element of the insurgency and more on the ability to legitimize host-nation 385
institutions to the populace. Short- and mid-term success in counterinsurgency can be developing a 386
host-nation government that has sufficient capability to secure itself and address an insurgency on its own. 387
This success allows the U.S. to continue to support it through a long-term relationship that addresses that 388
nations legitimacy in the long term. Winning includes the concept of developing resiliency systems within 389
the host-nation population and host-nation institutions to sustain the ability to counter the insurgency in the 390
future and prevent the conditions in the area from allowing an insurgency to gain strength. Achieving the 391
conditions for winning will require a mix of application of force, influence operations, cultural awareness, 392
information collection, and building capacity within host-nation institutions either to persuade the people to 393
support the government or dissuade them from supporting the insurgents. 394
1-34. U.S. forces should expect that the host-nation government will have its own interests that may not 395
coincide with U.S. national interests. It may not be willing to undertake the political changes necessary to 396
address the root causes of the insurgency. How U.S. forces deploy may depend upon the degree to which 397
U.S. policy makers consider the affected government to be receptive to assistance, advice, and reform. 398
How Soldiers and Marines deploy will also require a clear determination by national decision makers as to 399
what post-conflict commitments by military and civilian organizations will be required. Outside 400
counterinsurgents, however, can never fully compensate for lack of will, incapacity, or counter-productive 401
behavior on the part of the supported government. No government that is not unambiguously committed to 402
the defeat of an insurgency is likely to do so, regardless of the actions of (or commitment level of) an 403
outside supporter. 404
UNDERSTANDING UNIFIED ACTION 405
1-35. Once the U.S. decides to become involved in a counterinsurgency, all instruments of national power 406
provide the U.S. important capabilities to defeat an insurgency. Unified action is essential for all types of 407
involvement in any counterinsurgency. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or 408
integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to 409
achieve unity of effort (JP 1). This section provides commanders and staffs with an understanding of how 410
civilian agencies and military departments and forces synchronize and integrate their operations to achieve 411
Chapter 1
unity of effort. This section explains both a whole-of-government and a comprehensive approach to defeat 412
insurgencies and achieve U.S. and host-nation objectives. It also explains the roles of intergovernmental, 413
nongovernmental, multinational forces, private sector organizations in counterinsurgency, and host-nation 414
government and host-nation forces. 415
A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT EFFORT 416
1-36. Accomplishing U.S. policy objectives in any conflict requires government expertise and resources 417
outside of the DOD. Policy objectives, especially during a conflict, require a whole-of-government effort. 418
A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the 419
U.S. government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A whole-of-government effort is vital to 420
achieving the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforce progress made by one of the 421
instruments of national power while enabling success among the others. It relies on coordination among the 422
agencies of the U.S. government, including DOD, to ensure that the full range of available capabilities are 423
leveraged, synchronized, and applied to a given policy objective. Government agencies usually agree upon 424
relationships and authorities in a memorandum of agreement or understanding. Military commanders 425
exercise only the authority outlined in the agreements and are often directed by another agency. The terms 426
in those documents may form the basis for establishing some form of relationship between commanders 427
and agency chiefs. When unity of command is not possible, commanders should strive to achieve unity of 428
effort. Often, the interpersonal relationship that commanders establish with their interagency partners 429
proves essential. 430
1-37. A whole-of-government effort incorporates all of the capabilities of the U.S. government to achieve 431
U.S. national objectives. In many counterinsurgencies, for example, political objectives will include 432
assisting the host nation with managing the nonmilitary aspects of the insurgency. Therefore, these political 433
objectives should include eliminating the root causes of the insurgency. However, counterinsurgency 434
commanders and planners must understand that, in the end, societies must address their own root causes of 435
insurgency. Imposing major reforms may result in unintended consequences. Enabling a host nation to 436
address its root causes is more likely to succeed. In dealing with the sorts of complex socio-cultural 437
problems that counterinsurgents frequently face, host-nation good enough is normally better than what the 438
U.S. would consider perfect. 439
1-38. A primary challenge for integrating civilian and military efforts into a whole-of-government effort is 440
the differing capacities and cultures in civilian agencies compared to those of military forces. A successful 441
whole-of-government effort requires that all actors 442
Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process. 443
Share an understanding of the situation and problem to be resolved. 444
Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal. 445
Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities. 446
Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goal. 447
1-39. The importance of the commanders personal involvement in building inter-organizational trust, 448
understanding, mutual respect, and friendships cannot be overstated. If the commander does not set the 449
appropriate tone and establish the necessary climate, the best whole-of-government plan will fail. 450
1-40. A clear understanding of the desired end state and national objectives should infuse all efforts, 451
regardless of the agencies or individuals charged with their execution. Given the primacy of political 452
considerations, military forces often support civilian efforts. However, the nature of counterinsurgency 453
operations means that lead responsibility shifts among military, civilian, and host-nation authorities. In 454
other words, as the U.S. shifts its policy and strategy, different agencies take on different roles during the 455
operation. Different or changing relationships with the host nation may also drive shifts in lead 456
responsibility between different authorities. Regardless, military leaders should prepare to assume local 457
leadership for counterinsurgency efforts if civilian leadership is unavailable or cannot access the area. 458
1-41. U.S. land forces conducting counterinsurgency operations must recognize the legal authority of the 459
country team and the chief of mission. Commanders must ensure that they gain an understanding of the 460
purposes, goals, and restrictions under which their interagency partners are operating. Absent such an 461
understanding, the military and nonmilitary efforts may frustrate and interfere with one another because the 462
military and civilian organizations are functioning under separate statutory obligations that lead to 463
conflicting guidance and direction. 464
COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT 465
1-42. In addition to the whole-of-government effort, counterinsurgent forces may also use a comprehensive 466
effort to plan and execute operations when intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, 467
multinational partners, and private sector entities are involved to achieve unity of effort toward a shared 468
goal. This effort incorporates all capabilities of U.S and host-nation governments, intergovernmental and 469
regional organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to address the root causes of the 470
insurgency, in conjunction with military operations aimed at the insurgents themselves. This is difficult 471
because many organizations will be operating in the same area, some conducting combat operations, while 472
others use non-lethal methods such as education programs and humanitarian assistance. Each organization 473
will have different perspective or interests. In addition to the host-nation government and U.S. military 474
forces, likely participants in counterinsurgency operations include 475
A country team. 476
Other governments agencies. 477
Multinational forces. 478
Multinational corporations and contractors. 479
Intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations (UN). 480
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the International Committee of the Red Cross 481
and Medecins Sans Frontieres. 482
Private sector corporations. 483
Other organizations that wield diplomatic, informational, and economic power. 484
1-43. These various organizations may work with, in parallel to, separately from, or counter to U.S. 485
government and civilian agencies supporting counterinsurgency efforts. Those organizations, whose goals 486
align at least partially with U.S. government goals, frequently have capabilities that, if properly 487
synchronized and coordinated, can be critical to achieving success in counterinsurgency operations. 488
Aligning U.S. military, NGO, and intergovernmental organization capabilities requires collaboration and 489
cooperation focused toward a common goal. This can be more difficult than working with other U.S. 490
government agencies. Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for 491
military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort among the diverse array of actors involved in a 492
counterinsurgency. Often, the legal, cultural, and operational requirements will prevent direct collaboration 493
between U.S. land forces and non-U.S. civilian organizations. U.S. forces will encounter NGOs not aligned 494
with any insurgent faction and providing humanitarian assistance. These organizations can be neutral or 495
hostile to U.S. policy goals. Commanders should handle such groups carefully and professionally. 496
Commanders must work to understand the objectives and priorities of each organization. Unity of effort 497
between U.S. forces and host-nation forces is particularly critical. Understanding these organizations is 498
essential to understanding the operational environment and shaping the effect of even organizations that are 499
hostile or neutral to U.S. policy goals. (See JP 3-08 for more information on NGOs.) 500
UNITY OF COMMAND 501
1-44. Unity of command is the operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the 502
requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose (JP 3-0). Where 503
possible, counterinsurgency leaders achieve unity of command by establishing and maintaining the formal 504
command or support relationships. While designated officers will exercise unity of command of military 505
forces, such relationships will not usually include nonmilitary U.S. government organizations engaged in a 506
counterinsurgency mission. (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on unity of command.) 507
1-45. Unity of command of military forces is operationally desirable and important for the military to 508
establish. However, unity of command is almost impossible to achieve among all of the various actors in a 509
counterinsurgency. Differing political objectives, national caveats, the legal limitations on the use of force, 510
and sensitivities about subordinating national forces to those of other states or intergovernmental 511
organizations often preclude strong command relationships. While agreements that establish a 512
Chapter 1
multinational force provide a legal foundation for determining the scope and limitations on authorities, 513
responsibilities, command, support, or other relationships, the reality might be less clear. Unity of 514
command is one of the most sensitive and difficult-to-resolve issues in a counterinsurgency. 515
UNITY OF EFFORT 516
1-46. When unity of command with part or all of the force, including nonmilitary elements, is not possible, 517
commanders work to achieve unity of effort. Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward 518
common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or 519
organizationthe product of successful unified action (JP 1). In a counterinsurgency campaign, an 520
example of unity of effort could be a military commander and a civilian leader ensuring that governance 521
and economic lines of effort are fully coordinated with military operations. Unity of effort among 522
nationally, culturally, and organizationally distinct partners is difficult to maintain given different mission 523
focus and layers of command. To achieve unity of effort will require participants to overcome cultural 524
barriers and set aside parochial agendas. It also will require that each organization understand the 525
capabilities and limitations of the others. 526
1-47. Commanders achieve unity of effort through the following activities: 527
Coordination. 528
Liaison. 529
Division of labor. 530
Coordination 531
1-48. The complex diplomatic, informational, military, and economic context of insurgency and 532
counterinsurgency precludes military leaders from exercising unity of commandand they should not try 533
to do so. Interagency partners, NGOs, and private organizations have many interests and agendas that 534
military forces cannot control. In addition, the degree of independence of local institutions affects their 535
legitimacy to the population. However, military leaders should make every effort to ensure that 536
counterinsurgency actions are as well integrated as possible, taking into consideration the distinct mission, 537
need for independence, and security requirements of other organizations. Coordination between the various 538
actors in a counterinsurgency is essential. 539
1-49. U.S. government agencies should participate in coordination meetings to ensure integration with 540
military and host-nation plans. At the joint headquarters level, the commander establishes joint interagency 541
coordination groups. A joint interagency coordination group provides timely, usable information and 542
advice from an interagency perspective to the commander. Joint interagency coordination groups share and 543
integrate information and assist with synchronization, training, and exercises. Joint interagency 544
coordination groups may include representatives from other federal departments and agencies, state and 545
local authorities, and liaison officers from other commands and DOD components. The interagency 546
representatives and liaison officers are the subject matter experts for their respective agencies and 547
commands. They provide the critical bridge between the commander and interagency organizations. (See 548
JP 3-08 for more information on joint and interagency coordination.) 549
1-50. Coordination between NGOs may be difficult or impossible. Direct interaction among various 550
organizations may be impractical or undesirable. The differing goals and fundamental independence of 551
NGOs and local organizations usually prevent formal relationships governed by command authority. In the 552
absence of such relationships, military leaders seek to persuade and influence other participants to 553
contribute to achieving counterinsurgency objectives. Informal or less authoritative relationships include 554
coordination and liaison. Basic awareness and general information sharing may be all that is possible. 555
Nevertheless, NGOs and other organizations may resist or refuse cooperation because of the appearance of 556
cooperating with military forces. 557
1-51. Commanders are responsible for coordinating the activities of military forces and nonmilitary 558
organizations in their areas of operations. To carry out this responsibility, military and civilian leaders 559
establish a coordinating structure, such as an area coordination center (see JP 3-22) or civil-military 560
operations center at each subordinate political level of the host-nation government. Area coordination 561
centers and civil-military operations centers provide a forum for sharing information, conducting 562
coordination and liaison, and ensuring an effective and efficient division of labor. Active commander 563
involvement is imperative to affect coordination, establish liaison (formal and informal), and share 564
information. Influencing and persuading groups outside a commanders authority requires skill and 565
subtlety. In some cases, informal meetings with a civilian group at a civil-military operations center will 566
grow to an informal liaison that eventually leads to close cooperation. 567
1-52. Leaders must ensure the various organizations supporting counterinsurgency operations in each area 568
know which commander is responsible for the respective areas of operation. Multiple organizations 569
operating within a land force commanders area of operationssuch as U.S. government, coalition, 570
host-nation, interagency organizations, and special operations forcesincrease the risk of fratricide, insider 571
threats, and civilian casualties and create tactical and operational seams that insurgents can exploit. 572
1-53. Entities best qualified to accomplish nonmilitary tasks may not always be available. In such cases, 573
military forces perform those tasks until civilian-led capabilities become available. Sometimes forces have 574
the skills required; other times they learn them during execution. By default, U.S. and multinational 575
military forces often possess the only readily available capability to meet many of the local populaces 576
fundamental needs. As such, it is important for commanders to assess the capabilities of their forces and 577
other organizations on the battlefield. 578
UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS 579
1-54. In counterinsurgency operations, unified action partners work together. These partners consist of 580
personnel from U.S. government organizations, special operations forces, NGOs, and other organizations. 581
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 582
1-55. The U.S. Department of State is responsible for implementing U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy 583
efforts and plays a key role in integrating the capabilities of the U.S. The Department of State leads and 584
oversees U.S. government support to counterinsurgency efforts. Several functional bureaus and offices 585
have substantive roles in the development and execution of counterinsurgency strategy. These offices 586
include the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the 587
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 588
Labor; the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and 589
the Legal Advisors Office. The Department of State is responsible for diplomatic programs to assist the 590
host nation with countering the insurgency. In many of U.S. military operationssuch as detention 591
operations; demilitarization, demobilization, and reintegration; and governance capacity buildingthe 592
Department of State is the U.S. supported element and the military is the supporting element. 593
1-56. One important capability that the State Department maintains is the civilian response corps. The 594
civilian response corps maintain active members who are full time responders whose specific job is to train 595
for, prepare, and staff overseas conflict prevention and stabilization operations. Active members of the 596
civilian response corps can deploy with a 48-hour notice. The civilian response corps also maintains 597
standby members. They are current full-time employees the U.S. government or retirees of the U.S. Foreign 598
Service. Members in the standby component must be available to deploy within 30 days, for up to 90 days 599
with the possibility to extend. The civilian response corps work focuses on six skill groups. They are 600
planning, operations, and management, security and rule of law, diplomacy and governance, essential 601
services, and force protection. 602
COUNTRY TEAM 603
1-57. The country team is the senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the 604
chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented 605
United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission 606
(JP 3-07.4). In a foreign country, the chief of mission is the highest U.S. civil authority. The chief of 607
mission leads the country team and is responsible for integrating U.S. efforts in support of the host nation. 608
See figure 1-4 for an illustration of country team command relationships. As permanently established 609
interagency organizations, country teams represent a priceless counterinsurgency resource. They often 610
provide deep reservoirs of local knowledge and interaction with the host-nation government and 611
Chapter 1
population. (See JP 3-07.4 for more information on the country team.) Some of the government agencies 612
normally represented on a country team include: 613
The United States Agency for International Development. 614
The Department of Justice. 615
The Department of Treasurys Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. 616
The Department of Homeland Security. 617
The Department of Agriculture. 618
Figure 1-4. Country team command reIationships 619
MULTINATIONAL FORCES 620
1-58. Soldiers and Marines normally function as part of a multinational force, for example supporting the 621
UN or as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Each multinational participant provides 622
capabilities and strengths that U.S forces may not have. Many other countries military forces bring cultural 623
backgrounds, historical experiences, and other capabilities that can be particularly valuable to 624
counterinsurgency efforts. 625
1-59. However, nations join coalitions for various reasons. Although the missions of multinational partners 626
may appear similar to those of the U.S., rules of engagement, host-nation policies, and sensitivities may 627
differ among partners. U.S. military leaders require a strong cultural and political awareness of other 628
multinational military partners. (See JP 3-16 and the ABCA Coalitions Operations Handbook for more 629
information on multinational partners.) 630
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 631
1-60. A nongovernmental organization is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to 632
alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, 633
environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of 634
democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). There are several thousand NGOs of many different 635
types. Organizational charters and their members motivations govern their actions. Some NGOs receive at 636
least part of their funding from national governments or intergovernmental organizations. Some may 637
become implementing partners according to grants or contracts. For example, the United States Agency for 638
Internal Development contracts some NGOs to perform certain functions. In these cases, the funding 639
organization often gains oversight and authority over how to use the funds. 640
1-61. To ensure their own security and gain access to vulnerable populations in theaters of conflict, most 641
NGOs currently maintain neutrality, impartiality, and independence from all sides in a counterinsurgency. 642
These positions provide protection against claims of favoritism by the parties to armed conflict and enhance 643
the credibility and security of these organizations. 644
1-62. Depending on the degree to which NGOs follow these principles, NGOs may carry out their work 645
with a very different frame of reference from that of the government. Rather than perceiving their 646
organization as supporting the overall U.S. or coalition stabilization effort, they may view the situation 647
from the perspective of the victims of conflict, regardless of their affiliation with belligerent parties. They 648
will give preference to individuals and communities based on humanitarian need, rather than meeting 649
operational objectives. 650
1-63. While NGOs sometimes choose to coordinate their activities with the U.S. government for security, 651
policy, or funding, often they are reluctant for fear of being associated with the governments political 652
goals in conflict. This creates a natural but often unavoidable tension in the relationship. Commanders ease 653
this through a mutual understanding of respective mandates and a clear delineation of tasks. For example, 654
some organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, refuse to take armed escorts in 655
conflict zones, relying instead on their wide recognition as neutral, independent, and impartial humanitarian 656
actors. 657
1-64. Many NGOs are already operating in conflict areas long before external military forces arrive. These 658
NGOs may remain after forces depart. Depending on their mandate, they can support critical host-nation 659
government functions, or can contribute to the stabilization effort. To the greatest extent possible, 660
commanders should attempt to complement rather than override their capabilities. It is vitally important to 661
build a complementary, trust-based relationship based on mutual understanding, and a clear delineation of 662
objectives and tasks. 663
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 664
1-65. An intergovernmental organization is an organization created by a formal agreement between two or 665
more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared 666
by member states (JP 3-08). Regional organizations like the Organization of American States and European 667
Union or global organizations such as the UN may be involved in some counterinsurgency operations. The 668
UN in particular has many subordinate and affiliated agencies active worldwide. 669
1-66. In the private sector, multinational corporations and other businesses often operate in a conflict 670
environment. At a minimum, commanders should know which companies are present in their area of 671
operations and where those companies are conducting business. Understanding the overall profit motivation 672
of these business will help commanders understand their actions in the operating environment 673
1-67. When the U.S. government pays contractors, the principle of unity of command should apply. 674
Commanders should influence contractors performance through U.S. government contract supervisors. 675
Commanders should identify contractors operating in their area of operations and determine the nature of 676
Chapter 1
their contract, accountability mechanisms, and appropriate coordination relationships. (See FM 4-92 for 677
more information on contractors.) 678
HOST-NATION GOVERNMENT AND FORCES 679
1-68. The essential unified action partner is the host nation and its own forces. The purpose of 680
counterinsurgency operations, from the viewpoint of the U.S., is to support or enable the host nation to 681
defeat an insurgency. In the worst case situation, this may require the U.S. becoming the primary 682
counterinsurgent or working with groups inside a state to build a legitimate government. However, even in 683
the worse case, the goal is still for the host nation and its forces to defeat an insurgency. 684
PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY 685
1-69. Whatever type of strategy and operational approach that a counterinsurgent takes, several 686
counterinsurgency principles are normally relevant. Whether the U.S. is enabling a host nation with certain 687
capabilities or directly using its land forces, the principles listed in paragraphs 1-70 through 1-93 are 688
normally relevant to most counterinsurgency operations. However, the principles are not meant to be 689
exclusive rules for every conflict. They are provide for the practitioner and planner a firm foundation for 690
how they think about planning and executing counterinsurgency. 691
LEGITIMACY IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE 692
1-70. The primary objective of any counterinsurgency operation is properly to foster development of 693
effective governance by a legitimate government that can provide security and acts in the best interests of 694
the people. Legitimacy can be seen as the willing acceptance of a government by the population (see 695
chapter 2). Counterinsurgency forces may achieve this objective by the balanced application of both 696
military and nonmilitary means. All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. 697
Governments that are legitimate normally rule with the consent of the governed; those described as 698
illegitimate tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. Citizens of the latter tend to obey the state for 699
fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. This 700
requires the use of resources, such as internal intelligence. A government that derives its powers from the 701
governed tends to be accepted by its citizens as legitimate. It still uses coercionfor example, against 702
criminalsbut most of its citizens voluntarily accept its governance. Legitimacy is a perceived condition 703
by the population that can only be achieved by host-nation government actions that lead to an acceptance of 704
its primacy by the people. 705
UNITY OF EFFORT IS ESSENTIAL 706
1-71. Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a counterinsurgency operation. Otherwise, 707
well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to 708
exploit. Ideally, a single counterinsurgency leader has authority over all agencies involved in 709
counterinsurgency operations. Usually, however, military commanders work to achieve unity of effort 710
through liaison with leaders of a wide variety of nonmilitary agencies. Both military and nonmilitary 711
leaders must be key players in higher level planning. Unity of effort is a requirement between all 712
participants in a counterinsurgency, especially in relationships in which unity of command is impossible. 713
Counterinsurgents must achieve unity of effort between host-nation government entities, host-nation 714
security forces, foreign diplomatic entities, foreign security forces, development agencies, and 715
non-governmental organizations. 716
Political Factors Are Primary 717
1-72. The political and military aspects of insurgencies are inseparable. Military actions executed without 718
properly assessing their political effects at best result in reduced effectiveness and at worst are 719
counterproductive. Any military action should support a political end state, otherwise it lacks any rational 720
purpose. Resolving most insurgencies requires a political solution; it is thus imperative that 721
counterinsurgency actions do not hinder achieving that political solution. (See chapter 2 for more 722
information on political factors.) 723
1-73. At the beginning of a counterinsurgency operation, military actions may appear dominant as security 724
forces conduct operations to secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents; however, political 725
objectives must guide the militarys approach. This means that political and diplomatic leaders must 726
actively participate throughout the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. 727
Secure the Population 728
1-74. The cornerstone of many counterinsurgent efforts is establishing security for the civilian populace. 729
Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads. 730
Counterinsurgents, in coordination with the host-nation security forces, must determine how best to provide 731
that security. Security includes separating the insurgents from their cause and support and protecting the 732
people from insurgent intimidation and violence. Although killing and capturing insurgents will be 733
necessary, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to kill them all, especially if their cause is based 734
on commitment to an ideology or religion. Killing insurgents can also be counterproductive, in that it risks 735
generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of 736
revenge. Whenever possible, security forces should be provided by the host nation. 737
1-75. Some sources of support can be reduced by addressing the core grievances that fuel the insurgency 738
and combating the insurgencys narrative. If the host nation can mitigate the core grievances of the 739
insurgency, the insurgent will no longer be seen as the solution to the underlying problems. Physical 740
support can be cut off by population control or border security. International or local legal action might be 741
required to limit financial support. 742
1-76. Where possible, a permanent presence of security forces, whether military or paramilitary, should be 743
established at the lowest possible level within an area of operations. The violence level must be reduced 744
enough for counterinsurgents to maintain order prior to any transition to full host-nation responsibility; 745
otherwise, host-nation forces will be unable to secure the populace and may lose the legitimacy gained by 746
the transition. Counterinsurgent forces must also understand how the military and police are viewed by the 747
populace and not assume they are always seen as protectors. The goal of change to any host-nation security 748
forces is an accountable, self sustaining, capable and credible force able to meet the security challenges 749
faced by the host nation and looked upon as legitimate by the population. 750
Counterinsurgent Forces Must Understand the Environment 751
1-77. Successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations depends on thoroughly understanding the 752
society and culture within which they are being conducted. In most counterinsurgency operations in which 753
foreign forces participate, insurgents hold a distinct advantage in their level of local knowledge. They speak 754
the language, move easily within the society, and are more likely to understand the populations interests. 755
Thus, for foreign forces participating in counterinsurgency operations, they require a greater emphasis on 756
certain skills, such as language and cultural understanding, than they do for conventional operations. 757
Understanding the operational environment allows the counterinsurgent to identify the conditions which 758
impact the pre-requisites for the insurgency and the root cause that is driving the population to accept the 759
insurgency. Only through understanding the operational environment can the counterinsurgent plan and 760
execute successful operations to counter the conditions that allow the insurgency to exist in the first place. 761
Nevertheless, U.S. forces must never assume they will be welcomed by the local people. They may even be 762
viewed as occupiers. (See chapter 2 for a discussion on developing an understanding of the operational 763
environment.) 764
Intelligence Drives Operations 765
1-78. Effective counterinsurgency operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, 766
gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force. Without good 767
intelligence, it is often better to not act rather than to act. Gaining situational understanding before action is 768
often essential in avoiding long term damage to mission objectives. In environments where commanders do 769
not have situational understanding, the first action they is to use forces to gain that understanding while not 770
creating unintended and lasting harm to the mission. (See chapter 10 for more information on intelligence.) 771
Chapter 1
1-79. Because of the dispersed nature of counterinsurgency operations, the actions of counterinsurgency 772
forces is a key generator of intelligence. A cycle develops where operations produce intelligence that drives 773
subsequent operations. Reporting by tactical units and civilian agencies is often of greater importance than 774
reporting by specialized intelligence assets. These factors, along with the need to generate a favorable 775
tempo (rate of military operations) drive the requirement to produce and disseminate intelligence at the 776
lowest practical level. Commanders are responsible for driving the intelligence process. 777
1-80. Intelligence does not pertain only to insurgent combatants and insurgent leaders. To truly counter an 778
insurgency, intelligence includes gathering, analyzing and disseminating relevant information pertaining to 779
the population. If legitimacy is the primary principle of counterinsurgency operations, then identifying what 780
is preventing legitimacy is as important, if not more so, than intelligence pertaining to enemy actions. 781
Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support 782
1-81. It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent. 783
Clearly, killing or capturing insurgents will be necessary, especially if the insurgency is based upon violent 784
extremism. However, killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be 785
counterproductive in some cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new 786
recruits, and producing cycles of revenge. Dynamic insurgencies can replace losses quickly. 787
Counterinsurgency forces must cut off the sources of that recuperative power. 788
1-82. Some sources of support can be reduced by addressing the root causes that fuel the insurgency and 789
combating the insurgencys narrative. If the host nation can mitigate the root causes of the insurgency, the 790
insurgent will no longer be seen as the solution to the underlying problems. Physical support can be cut off 791
by population control or border security. International or local legal action might be required to limit 792
financial support. Counterinsurgent efforts are more successful when insurgents can be isolated from 793
outside support. (See chapter 7 for developing lines of effort to isolate the insurgents and address root 794
causes.) 795
Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential 796
1-83. The cornerstone of most counterinsurgency effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. 797
Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads. 798
Counterinsurgents, in coordination with the host-nation security forces, must determine how best to provide 799
that security. Security includes shielding, separating, and protecting the people from insurgent intimidation 800
and violence. Where possible, a permanent presence of security forces, either military or paramilitary, 801
should be established at the lowest possible level within an area of operations. 802
1-84. To establish legitimacy, the affected government must strive to transition security activities from 803
military authorities to host-nation law enforcement authorities as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are 804
seen as criminals, they lose public support. 805
1-85. Using a legal system established in line with local culture and practices to deal with insurgents and 806
criminals enhances the affected governments legitimacy. To succeed in countering an insurgency, the 807
host-nation government must develop its legal and conflict resolution systems, including police forces, 808
judicial systems, and penal facilities. It is important to remember that the violence level must be reduced 809
enough for counterinsurgency forces to maintain order prior to any transition to full host-nation 810
responsibility; otherwise, counterinsurgency forces will be unable to secure the populace and may lose the 811
legitimacy gained by the transition. Counterinsurgent forces must also understand how the military and 812
police are viewed by the populace and not assume they are always seen as protectors. 813
Counterinsurgent Forces Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment 814
1-86. Insurgencies can be protracted by nature. Though most insurgencies are quickly defeated by 815
government forces (see chapter 4), U.S. involvement normally comes in insurgencies that are not quickly 816
defeated. Insurgents can become extremely difficult to identify, track, and interdict once their manpower 817
and activity drop below a critical mass. Insurgencies may persist for many years after the main threat has 818
been broken. Thus, counterinsurgency operations may demand considerable expenditures of time and 819
resources. The populace must have confidence in the staying power of both the affected government and 820
any counterinsurgency forces supporting it. The populace may prefer the affected government to the 821
insurgents; however, people do not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the 822
government has the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. Stabilizing the security situation and 823
transforming a failed, failing, or ineffectual government is an extremely difficult task that may take an 824
extended period to complete. 825
Manage Information and Expectations 826
1-87. Information and expectations are related; skillful counterinsurgency forces manage both. To limit 827
discontent and build support, the affected government and any counterinsurgency forces assisting it create 828
and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and the 829
international community. Inform and influence activities (including military information support operations 830
and the related activities of public affairs and civil-military operations) are key tools to accomplish this. 831
Commanders always tell the truth; they refuse to give projections; and they never promise more than can be 832
provided. Achieving steady progress toward a set of reasonable expectations can increase the populaces 833
tolerance for the inevitable inconveniences entailed by ongoing counterinsurgency operations. Where a 834
large foreign force is present to help establish a regime, such progress can extend the period before foreign 835
forces are perceived by the population as an army of occupation. 836
1-88. Counterinsurgency forces ensure that their deeds match their words and both are consistent with the 837
broader narrative. They also understand that any action has an information reaction. Counterinsurgency 838
forces carefully consider that impact on the many audiences involved in the conflict and on the sidelines. 839
They work actively to shape responses that further their ends. In particular, messages to different audiences 840
must be consistent. In the global information environment, people in the area of operations can access the 841
internet and satellite television to determine the messages counterinsurgency forces are sending to the 842
international community. Any perceived inconsistency reduces credibility and undermines 843
counterinsurgency efforts. 844
Use the Appropriate Level of Force 845
1-89. Any use of force generates a series of reactions. There will be times when an overwhelming effort is 846
necessary to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the populace. However, counterinsurgency 847
forces should calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any 848
operation. Normally, counterinsurgency forces can use escalation of force procedures to minimize 849
unnecessary loss of life or suffering. These procedures are especially appropriate during any operation in 850
which the counterinsurgent security force interacts with the local populace. All interactions between 851
security forces and the population directly impact legitimacy, and if the counterinsurgent security forces 852
show restraint in the eyes of the population, the entire counterinsurgency effort is further legitimized. The 853
general rule for the use of force for the counterinsurgents is do not create more enemies than you eliminate 854
with your action. Escalation of force does not limit the right of self-defense, including the use of deadly 855
force when such force is necessary to defend against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. However, 856
counterinsurgency forces must be properly trained in such procedures and, more importantly, in methods of 857
shaping situations so that tactical leaders have to make fewer split-second, life-or-death decisions. 858
1-90. Who wields force is also important. If the police have a reasonable reputation for competence and 859
impartiality, it is better for them to execute urban raids than military forces because the populace is more 860
likely to view that application of force as legitimate. This is true even if the police are not as well armed or 861
as capable as military forces. Local circumstances, however, affect this decision. For example, if the police 862
are seen as part of an ethnic or sectarian group oppressing the general population, their use may be 863
counterproductive. (See chapter 8 regarding the development of host-nation security forces and chapter 11 864
regarding assessing counterinsurgency operations for further discussions on use of force.) 865
Learn and Adapt 866
1-91. An effective counterinsurgency force is a learning organization. Insurgents connected with other 867
organizations constantly exchange information about their enemys vulnerabilitieseven with insurgents 868
in distant theaters. However, skillful counterinsurgency forces can adapt at least as fast as insurgents. Every 869
unit needs to be able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. Commanders must 870
Chapter 1
develop an effective system to circulate best practices throughout their command. Commanders might also 871
need to seek new laws or policies that authorize or resource necessary changes. Insurgents shift their 872
locations looking for weak links, so widespread competence is required throughout the counterinsurgency 873
force. 874
Empower the Lowest Levels 875
1-92. Local commanders have the best grasp of their situations, but they require access to or control of the 876
resources needed to produce timely intelligence, conduct effective tactical operations, and manage 877
intelligence operations and civil-military operations. Leaders encourage the initiative of subordinates and 878
facilitate the learning that must occur at every level. Effective counterinsurgency operations are 879
decentralized, and higher commanders owe it to their subordinates to push as many capabilities as possible 880
down to their level. However, this must be balanced with ensuring that tactical leaders have the situational 881
understanding of the wider operational and strategic consequences of their actions. While tactical missions 882
are essential, it is the responsibility of commanders to ensure that tactical missions support the overall 883
objectives to defeat the insurgency. 884
Support the Host Nation 885
1-93. In the situation of U.S. and multinational forces committed to assisting a host-nation government 886
with its counterinsurgency strategy, the long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself. In 887
the end, the host nation has to win on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders 888
and institutions. External assistance can help, but host-nation authorities must accept responsibilities to 889
achieve real victory. Depending upon the condition of the host-nation government (failed, failing, or 890
viable), a robust whole-of-government approach may be critical to enabling that government to accept 891
those responsibilities. In a failed or failing state, there may be no functioning government or national 892
economy. The counterinsurgent, therefore, will be forced to create institutions necessary to provide 893
governance and support economic development. While it may be easier for U.S. military units to conduct 894
operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and then assist them. 895
Host-nation governments have the final responsibility to solve their own problems. Eventually all foreign 896
armies are seen as interlopers or occupiers. The sooner the main effort can transition to host-nation 897
institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the better. 898
899

Chapter 2 900
Understanding an OperationaI Environment 901
2-1. Regional and strategic conditions affect U.S. involvement in opposing an insurgency. How and why 902
the U.S. becomes involved in an insurgency is important. However, some important strategic trends can 903
also affect the context of an insurgency. The global trends of demographic changes, globalization, the 904
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, religious extremism, and failed states are leading to an era of 905
persistent conflict. Persistent conflict is the protracted conflict among state, non-state, and individual actors 906
who are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. These trends not 907
only affect the likelihood of conflict, they also affect the capabilities and action of friendly, threat, neutral, 908
and nonaligned actors. 909
2-2. Understanding the conditions that may affect the stability of a nation or region assists commanders as 910
they focus on a specific operational environment to determine the root causes that led to an insurgency. 911
Whether operating at the operational or tactical level, commanders must understand and anticipate the 912
effects of their operations and how they fit into the broader mission. The U.S. may enter situations with 913
long-standing conflicts and established ways of life that have implications beyond the boundaries of a 914
specific area of operations. They must identify individuals within that area that may exert external 915
influence on other governments that have their own agendas in the region. Commanders also must 916
recognize that in the modern interconnected world, actions at any level may have far broader impact than 917
intended. This, coupled with certain global trends, may provoke more insurgencies in the future. 918
DEMOGRAPHIC AND URBANIZATION TRENDS 919
2-3. The world will become more populated and urbanized. Global population will increase by 920
approximately 1.2 billion people by 2025 with more than a billion new urban dwellers in that time. Most 921
population growth will occur in the developing world. Population growth, urbanization, and competition 922
for limited resources in the Middle East, Africa, and South Central Asia will contribute to increased 923
resource scarcity and may present governance challenges. The uncertain impact of climate change 924
combined with increased population centers in or near coastal environments may challenge the ability of 925
failing and fragile states to respond to natural disasters. These conditions enhance the possibility of 926
insurgencies in highly populated developing countries whose governments lack the capacity to provide 927
effective governance, to include providing security and the rule of law. These trends could lead to failed 928
states and problems that will affect regional and global security because of globalization. 929
2-4. Urbanization is the growth of urban areas due to both a population surge and migration. In 1950, 930
29 percent of the worlds population lived in urban areas; by 2050, it is estimated that 60 percent of the 931
worlds population will live in urban areas. This rapid growth of urban areas, and accompanying crowded 932
conditions with the potential for high unemployment, creates a greater potential that future insurgencies 933
may arise in urban areas. 934
GLOBALIZATION 935
2-5. Globalization is a combination of the technological, economic, social, cultural, and political forces 936
that are bringing nation-states and the people of the world closer together. Globalization affects an 937
insurgency by providing a freer flow of arms, information, and money to an insurgency and allows an 938
insurgency to have a wider strategic effect than in the past. It is easy for ethnic groups or ideological groups 939
to link together internationally because of globalization. That provides a greater likelihood that insurgents 940
will have access to outside resources, or that they will try to affect objectives outside of their local area. 941
Through technology, globalization also allows an insurgent to gain access to cyber tools that could be used 942
to attack any country. 943
Chapter 2
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS 944
2-6. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and precision and technologically advanced 945
weapons will increase the potential for catastrophic attacks. The threat of the use of weapons of mass 946
destruction by terrorist organizations actively seeking them is as real as it is deadly. However, weapons of 947
mass destruction present significant possibilities beyond terrorist actors. If the insurgent group acquires 948
them, they can allow the insurgent group to pressure the host nation, attack a target that would have 949
countrywide affects, or to attack a target that could have regional or global strategic affects. These weapons 950
can provide an insurgent group with capabilities unmatched in the history of irregular warfare. The 951
likelihood of an insurgent group obtaining these weapons has never been higher because of both 952
globalization and failed states. As ethnic and ideological groups enhance bonds that go beyond state 953
boundaries, and insurgent groups create vast safe haven areas within failed states, the proliferation of 954
weapons of mass destruction creates new possibilities for any insurgency. Not only will insurgents strive to 955
obtain weapons of mass destruction, but the continued availability of more precise, cheaper, and more 956
lethal conventional weapons will make insurgent actions more deadly. 957
FAILING OR FAILED STATES 958
2-7. Governments of nation-states face increasingly greater challenges in providing effective support to 959
their growing populations. The problems of both demographic changes and the pressures of globalization, 960
corruption, lack of government services, and decaying infrastructure can lead to a failed state. A failed state 961
can provide insurgent groups safe havens to build their organizations, but may also hinder their ability to 962
promulgate their message and actions due to lack of infrastructure. (See FM 3-07 for a detailed discussion 963
on a failed state framework.) 964
THE OPERATIONAL VARIABLES 965
2-8. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that 966
affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Commanders 967
and staff analyze and describe an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational 968
variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time 969
(PMESII-PT). The operational variables are fundamental to developing a comprehensive understanding of 970
an operational environment. 971
2-9. In the Iraq's Anbar Province, the eight interrelated operational variables created a unique operational 972
environment. The Al Qaim tribes had different interests, both political and economic, than both the 973
Americans and Al Qaeda. Religion, economic interests, culture, and other variables helped to shape the 974
actions of everyone in the operational environment. The Marine Corps had to act in this environment and 975
attempt to shape it. This was a process that required situational understanding and an appreciation for the 976
uniqueness of the environment. 977
The Anbar Province Operational Environment 978
The Anbar Provinces Al Qaim district became increasingly important to Abu Musab 979
al-Zarqawis Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) after November 2004 when it lost its sanctuary to 980
the American forces offensive in the second battle of Fallujah. The Al Qaim district is 981
located on Iraqis border with Syria. Although the district represents only 10% of the 982
Anbar population, the area holds strategic importance due to its location along the 983
Iraqi/Syrian border as well as the Euphrates River. Al Qaim is and always has been 984
a lucrative smuggling route for black market goods and served as AQIs lifeline to 985
infiltrate Baghdad with foreign fighters, money, and other resources that fueled the 986
insurgency. With the loss of Fallujah, Al Qaim became AQIs newfound sanctuary. 987
AQI arrived with offers of partnering with Al Qaims tribes to defeat and 988
expel the Americans. They promised the indigenous population money and other 989
resources for their support. As Muslims and Arabs, AQI members exhorted it was 990
their obligation, their Jihad, to fight the crusaders. After all, the Americans, ignorant of 991
tribal customs, religion, and traditions had disrespected and dishonored the people of 992
Understanding an Operational Environment
Al Qaim and a patriotic resistance had already formed in the district. The tribes of Al 993
Qaim saw the Al Qaeda movement as the answer to their problem with the 994
Americans. The tribes, together with AQI, felt that the time was ripe to rid the area of 995
the infidel occupiers. 996
Al Qaim tribes varied in available resources and were incapable of defeating the 997
American occupiers on their own. For example, the Albu-Mahal tribe, the strongest 998
tribe in the area, organized and resourced the Hamza Battalion specifically to fight 999
the Americans. However, it, along with the other tribal militias, lacked the weaponry, 1000
ammunition, and other equipment to win such a fight on their own. AQIs offer was 1001
tempting and most of the tribes accepted. 1002
As time went on it became apparent that AQIs offer was deceptive; this partnership 1003
was not what it seemed. AQI provided weaponry and funding, but in return they 1004
demanded to lead the Jihad with the intent of first destroying and then transforming 1005
the social fabric of the tribes and Al Qaim. AQI started by taking over the smuggling 1006
routes, skimming large profits and killing those that resisted. They then imposed a 1007
radical form of Sharia on the community with fanatical punishments for transgressors. 1008
Religion was used to justify AQIs actions, which included marriages to the local 1009
women, not allowing cigarettes, the ban of music and films and the common 1010
intimidation tactic of beheading those that resisted. 1011
3rd Battalion 6th Marines (3/6) executed Operation IRON FIST the first week of 1012
October, attacking from east to west through the town of Sadah and eastern Karabila, 1013
ultimately stopping at the Emerald Wadi in the center of the Al Qaim region. They 1014
built four Combat Out Post (COP) : Chosin, Iwo Jima, Belleau Wood, and Khe Sahn 1015
and left Marines and Iraqis in place providing combined, permanent, persistent, 1016
presence. 1017
The next clearing operation was conducted the first week in November by 3/6 and 2/1 1018
commanded by Regimental Combat Team 2. This operation cleared the Husaybah, 1019
Karabilah, Sadah and Ubaydi areas of all insurgents. Immediately upon clearing the 1020
areas, 3/6 began constructing COPs in all of the cities. 1021
By late November 3/6 had constructed 14 COPs in the areas from Husaybah to 1022
Ubaydi. Each COP consisted of a U. S. Marine platoon and an Iraqi Army platoon or 1023
company. Those positions completed and reflected combined, permanent, persistent 1024
presence, where the Marines and Iraqi Army lived together and amongst the people. 1025
The next step was to engage the people. Mission analysis led to assigning company 1026
areas based on the tribal distribution. The ideal was to link a company with a tribe. 1027
This was not an exact science because the tribes were intermingled, but they did 1028
locate companies to areas where a majority of tribe resided. The next step was a 1029
concerted drive to recruit tribesmen into the police force. The Marines solicited help 1030
from the Sheikhs to nominate men from their tribes, and started developing police 1031
stations near the COPs. This would allow the Marines and Iraq Army forces to 1032
partner with the local police forces in those areas and further engender trust and 1033
confidence from the local people. 1034
In January 2006 General Casey, the commander of all forces in Iraq, visited the Al 1035
Qaim area and was toughly pleased with the general progress in the region, but he 1036
was very concerned with the smuggling of foreign fighters, money and weapons 1037
coming across the Syrian border. His orders were to confiscate everything being 1038
brought across the border in order to stop the flow of illegal goods. During some 1039
discussion it was explained to the General that this smuggling industry was the life 1040
line of this region and always had been. These people had been good honest 1041
smugglers for millennia and we should not intervene and disrupt the tribes 1042
livelihood. This ordered disruption of cross border trading would jeopardize our fragile 1043
relationship that we worked so hard to develop over the past months. In fact, we had 1044
learned from the Sheikhs that this disruption of trade was one of the major mistakes 1045
and grievances the locals had against AQI. It was also explained to the General that 1046
we had worked a deal with the local tribes that we would stop and inspect all vehicles 1047
Chapter 2
coming into the country to ensure no foreign fighters, money or weapons were being 1048
smuggled. The tribes readily agreed and said they would help with the inspection. 1049
These inspections were largely conducted by the new local police and the Iraqi Army 1050
with Marines in over-watch. The tribes had picked our side in the struggle against 1051
AQI and wanted to stop foreign fighters, money and weapons from entering Iraq as 1052
much as we did. The scenario described above was the beginning of what is known 1053
today as The Awakening. 1054
2-10. It is important to have an understanding of the operational environment before beginning a 1055
counterinsurgency operation. This understanding is necessary to begin planning the initial development of 1056
measures of effectiveness and performance. The commander must understand what happened in the 1057
operational environment and determine the nature, scope, and severity of its problems. The situation is 1058
usually more complicated than it seems when the military force first becomes involved. Understanding the 1059
operational environment is a collaborative effort of the unified action partnersU.S. government military 1060
and civilian, international civilian and military, as well as host-nation civilian and military. To the 1061
maximum extent possible, the military force and unified action partners strive to have a common situational 1062
understanding from the beginning. If the partnering agencies do not have the same picture, they can quickly 1063
find themselves working at odds with each other. Rarely will there be enough time to fully understand the 1064
operational environment. Understanding the operational environment is a continued and iterative process 1065
that will continue throughout the operation. 1066
2-11. An area of operations is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and 1067
maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). 1068
For land operations, an area of operations includes subordinate areas of operations as well. A commanders 1069
area of operation may be relatively static, but people and information continuously flow through the area of 1070
operations. An area of operations can cross physical structures, such as roads and rivers, and span diverse 1071
population groups. Fabricated borders that divide natural groupings can create problems in understanding 1072
an area of operations. For example, cross-border ties allow insurgents safe haven outside of a tactical units 1073
area of operations. Moreover, international boundaries often divide population groups. The span of the 1074
insurgency may be far larger than the defined area of operations and areas outside the area of operations 1075
may be relevant to a commander. For example, areas outside a commanders area of operations may 1076
provide a safe haven for an insurgency or an adjacent state may support an insurgency. In an insurgency, an 1077
area of interest may be large. 1078
2-12. The area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas 1079
adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy 1080
forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0). It is the area in which events 1081
could have significant impact on areas of operations. The area of interest can be large relative to the area of 1082
operations. When defining an area of interest, commanders should consider the operational variables. 1083
2-13. Commanders analyze operational variables to understand the operational environment in which they 1084
are conducting operations. An operational environment is not static; it continues to evolve. Introducing 1085
units into the environment causes shifts and changes. As a result, commanders, their respective staffs, and 1086
all Soldiers and Marines must continuously reassess the operational environment for changing conditions. 1087
Moreover, in addition to understanding U.S. interests and desired end states in an environment, a 1088
commander must understand the environment from three additional perspectives; those of the host nation, 1089
the enemy, and the population. 1090
POLITICAL 1091
2-14. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of 1092
governanceformally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers. (See 1093
ADRP 5-0 for more information on the political variable.) Legitimacy is essential to understanding the 1094
political variable in an insurgency. Legitimacy is the popular acceptance of authority. Legitimacy can 1095
change as the society involves and groups or individuals change their conceptualization of who they are 1096
and what authority they accept. Sometimes, large changes, such as the American War of Independence or 1097
the creation of the German state, create a change in group identity and accepted authority. Sometimes 1098
group identity changes by slow evolution, such as the case with the European Union. However, at the core, 1099
whom a group accepts as providing legitimate authority to govern their actions is that groups legitimate 1100
authority. Legitimacy provides willing acceptance of authority and thus does not require resources to 1101
enforce an authority. Whom the population sees as a legitimate authority is at the core of a 1102
counterinsurgency. 1103
2-15. The counterinsurgent seeks to understand not just the formal political system, such as political parties 1104
and elected officials, but also the informal systems of political influence, such as ethnic groups and other 1105
centers of power. There is a connection between the political variable and the social variable. A tribal 1106
grouping or a Hindu caste may directly affect whom that group sees as a legitimate authority in an area. 1107
Moreover, these social groupings can affect the formal power structure. For example, in an electoral 1108
system, groups will often vote in unison, giving them added political power in the formal system. 1109
2-16. Often, informal groups such as tribes or local councils are the essential actors in the distribution of 1110
political power, especially at the local level. Political power is the ability to influence behavior. The biggest 1111
influence of behavior is often local groupings that can create a norming effect on a population. Most groups 1112
hold power only because the population accepts that power distribution. Political power is the by-product 1113
of a society that has developed by countless human choices over time, rather than an objective and 1114
non-changing set of rules. 1115
2-17. However, the opposite can also be true and the formal political system can change group identity and 1116
influence the actions of any social group. States can create identity in a population though education and 1117
information. For example, an education program that instills nationalist views on an individual from an 1118
early age can be a powerful tool in shaping a persons identity and in turn whom that person sees as a 1119
legitimate authority. Group and individual identity is not static nor is whom the population views as 1120
legitimate static. While groups have internal means to view identity, variables outside the group, including 1121
the host nation, also affect them. 1122
2-18. The commitment and motivation of the host nation to defeat the insurgency is an important 1123
motivation. Governments with more than one of the following traits have tended to lose historically, even 1124
when supported by competent and committed external forces: 1125
Government sponsorship or protection of unpopular economic and social arrangements or 1126
cultural institutions. 1127
Government involved corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule. 1128
Government operates as a kleptocracy. 1129
Government elites had perverse incentives to continue conflict. 1130
Government economically dependent on external actor. 1131
MILITARY 1132
2-19. The military variable explores the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, 1133
friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment (see ADRP 5-0). For many countries, an army is 1134
the military force primarily responsible for maintaining external security. However, this is not a universal 1135
rule, and many militaries become involved in internal security and even governance. In some cases, there is 1136
a degree of military control over the government, which then blends the political and military variables. 1137
This can range from a military dictatorship to a praetorian guard type military that intervenes in the 1138
governance of society periodically. Even in cases where a host nation appears to have complete objective 1139
control over the military, the military can be an important bureaucratic and political actor. The interaction 1140
between the military and the political structure is important to understanding this variables relationship 1141
with the political distribution of power in a society. 1142
2-20. A host of institutions including police, paramilitary, intelligence, and other organizations can 1143
maintain internal security and thus need to be considered within the military variable. In many autocratic 1144
societies, intelligence agencies provide an essential means of control over a society. Many societies 1145
maintain civil control and civil security by an accepted rule of law and a police force that enforces the rule 1146
of law. In a counterinsurgency, the host nation may use the military or a paramilitary to defeat an 1147
insurgency. 1148
Chapter 2
2-21. The military variable includes all forces involved in both internal and external security. 1149
Counterinsurgents must fully understand how the host nation maintains internal and external security. 1150
Moreover, they must understand both neutral and enemy military forces. Neutral military forces are 1151
commonplace in a counterinsurgency, as some states or multinational corporations will employ or contract 1152
for limited forces to protect personnel, resources, or infrastructure for their own interests. Moreover, the 1153
there can be a peacekeeping force that is maintaining a position of neutrality in the conflict. Also, there can 1154
be informal groupings of military power. For example, local gangs, armed militias, and private security can 1155
be a factor in local areas. 1156
2-22. Commanders and staffs should analyze friendly, neutral, and enemy forces with both qualitative and 1157
quantitative data. Some aspects to consider include 1158
Position of forces in national and local government structure. 1159
General organization, training, and doctrine. 1160
Economic basis (to include appropriations system). 1161
Conscription or recruitment systems. 1162
Police role in the nations internal security. 1163
Rapport with population. 1164
The impact of other international forces already there or there in the recent past. 1165
These considerations are particularly important with regard to the insurgents. Knowing from what groups 1166
and sources, both within the country of conflict and outside of it, are providing what kinds of support (for 1167
example, financial, personnel, materiel, and provisions) and by what processes or routes is critical. 1168
Insurgencies that continue to meet their tangible support needs are difficult to defeat. 1169
2-23. There is variance in an enemy force in a counterinsurgency. Some could be based on cellular 1170
organizations while others could be more hierarchical. Moreover, there will be a wide variance in enemy 1171
capabilities. Some insurgencies have capabilities to conduct large scale and well coordinated attacks that 1172
may rival the capability of the host nation military. Others have less capability and may rely on small unit 1173
tactics. (See chapter 5 for a further discussion on enemy military forces.) 1174
ECONOMIC 1175
2-24. The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to gaining access to, 1176
producing, distributing, and consuming resources. These behaviors determine incentives and disincentives 1177
that encourage or discourage economic behaviors. The sum of these individual and group decisions may 1178
determine the production, distribution, and consumption of economic resources. Typically, an economy is 1179
conceptualized as currency, stocks, major commodities, banking, and trade controlled and monitored by the 1180
government. However, informal economies, trade, or economic exchange outside state controlled or 1181
money-based transactions may be of equal or greater importance in understanding an operational 1182
environment. While the world economy continues to grow more interdependent, local economies remain 1183
relatively distinct. These differences significantly influence political choices, including individuals 1184
decisions to support or subvert the existing order. When commanders and staffs analyze a local economy, 1185
they should look at both governmental policies and the type of local economy. 1186
2-25. Types of economies vary widely. When looking at economic activities, it is important to understand 1187
the relative importance of the various sectors of an economy. Looking at the percentage of the economy in 1188
the public sector versus the private sector provides some understanding of the structure of the economy. 1189
Moreover, the private and public sector can potentially be divided into different sectors based on type of 1190
activities. Agriculture, raw materials, services, and other types of production play an important role in 1191
defining the economy of a local area. It is important to analyze governmental policies. Corruption, the rule 1192
of law, and macroeconomic policy play a role in the structure of a local economy. 1193
2-26. Another important factor in analyzing economic activity is the informal economy. In weak states, 1194
understanding the informal economy is key to providing a full understanding of an operational 1195
environment. The informal economy is those economic interactions and exchanges that are not recognized, 1196
regulated, controlled, or taxed by a state government. In this case, informal does not always equal 1197
illegitimate. For example, a black market is a form of informal economy based on criminal activities such 1198
as racketeering, money laundering, prostitution, drug trafficking, and smuggling. In every country, there is 1199
a balance between formal and informal economies. In successful states, the informal economy may be 1200
relatively small. However, in failing states the informal economy may form the majority of all economic 1201
activities. The local population may depend on informal markets for their most basic needs. It is difficult 1202
but important to develop an understanding of these informal economies (both legitimate and illegitimate.) 1203
Because they are outside host-nation government oversight, insurgents can exploit even legitimate formal 1204
economies as a source of funding. The black market, on the other hand, will most likely be a direct enabler 1205
of an insurgency in terms of both funding and logistics. 1206
2-27. The counterinsurgent must give attention to other informal economies. Most people work, buy, and 1207
sell in this economyoperating outside legal frameworks but not engaging in illicit or criminal activity 1208
(except for taxation issues). Sensitivity to the rules of an informal economy is one piece of cultural 1209
sensitivity to the population and the host nation in general. Examples of the rules of an informal economy 1210
include the following: 1211
People earn income in kind rather than in cash. 1212
People often use land for decades (or more) through traditional usage rights granted by village 1213
heads and chiefs with no legal title. 1214
People may work without pay (in arrangements ranging from slavery to traditional divisions of 1215
household and farm labor). 1216
2-28. Economic variables also tie into other elements of a society. For example, ownership or control of 1217
land and debt indicate something about the power structure within a society. Many developing societies 1218
have highly concentrated ownership of land, which can serve as a driver for social conflict and discontent. 1219
Whoever owns land or controls the land has the power to use it for economic profit. Maintaining this 1220
ownership or control during an insurgency indicates a degree of power in a society. The same is true of 1221
debt. The ability to collect a debt owed indicates a degree of power in a society. Land and debt are 1222
examples of how economic factors link into other social factors. 1223
2-29. A lack of economic opportunity can be the reason an insurgency continues to exist. As part of 1224
developing an understanding of an operational environment, counterinsurgents assess the current economic 1225
variables described in paragraphs 2-24 through 2-28, the economic opportunities available to different 1226
segments of the population, and the effect insurgent and counterinsurgent operations are having on the 1227
populations ability to meet their most basic economic needs. Economic survival, especially in an area 1228
where an insurgency is occurring, is almost as important and as immediate a challenge for households as 1229
physical security. For this reason, leaders at all levels of the counterinsurgency operation (including 1230
platoons and companies) need to assess the impacts of military operations on the following simple elements 1231
of the economic welfare of households and communities: 1232
Income (including the capacity to earn streams of income in future). 1233
Assets and property (used to earn income). 1234
Work (including traditional patterns of unpaid work). 1235
2-30. Commanders strive to understand the economic impact of the units presence in the area. For better 1236
or worse, the presence of an Army or Marine Corps unit affects normal economic incentives and 1237
disincentives for individual behavior. Introducing foreign wealth can have unintended negative 1238
consequences. For this reason, careful thought and planning is needed for a project intended to have local 1239
economic impact. Commanders anticipate the economic impact of their arrival and their continued presence 1240
in the area of operations. Additionally, commanders and staffs carefully weigh the costs and benefits 1241
associated with all economic activity. Some factors to consider are: 1242
Prospects of long-term sustainability. 1243
Possibility of local price inflation. 1244
Disrupting natural incentives (such as farmers leaving fields to work on trash pickup projects). 1245
SOCIAL 1246
2-31. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational 1247
environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society. Understanding the society is 1248
Chapter 2
foundational to understanding the social variable. A society is defined as a population whose members are 1249
subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share a 1250
sense of identity. However, no society is completely homogeneous. A society usually has a dominant 1251
culture, but it can have a vast number of secondary cultures. Different societies may share similar cultures, 1252
such as Canada and the U.S. do. Societies are not static, but change over time. (For more information on 1253
this variable, see chapter 3 of this publication and ADRP 5-0.) 1254
INFORMATION 1255
2-32. The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, 1256
organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information 1257
environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, 1258
or act on information (JP 3-13). Understanding the communications system is important because it 1259
influences international, national, regional, and local audiences. Insurgents often use information to gain 1260
credibility and legitimacy with the population, while simultaneously undermining their opponents. 1261
Understanding how people communicate and who influences them on a daily basis is essential. This is 1262
important at all levels. For example, identifying local gathering places is important for spreading 1263
information, rumors, and gossip. 1264
2-33. The information environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions: cognitive, informational, 1265
and physical (see table 2-1). The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decision maker or 1266
specific audience and is the dimension where people think, perceive, visualize, and decide. The 1267
informational dimension is the place where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, 1268
displayed, and protected with key components of the content and flow of information. The physical 1269
dimension is composed of systems, human beings (including decision makers, leaders, and military forces), 1270
and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to conduct operations across air, 1271
land, maritime, space and cyberspace domains. 1272
Table 2-1. Interrelated dimensions of the information environment 1273
Dimension Description
Cognitive
Dimension
Exists in the minds of human beings.
Consists of individual and collective consciousness.
Where information is used to develop perceptions and make decisions.
Significant characteristics include values, beliefs, perceptions, awareness,
and decision making.
Informational
Dimension
Created by the interaction of the physical and cognitive dimensions.
Where information is collected, processed, and disseminated.
Significant characteristics are information content and flow.
Physical
Dimension
The tangible, real world.
Where the information environment overlaps with the physical world.
Consists of targetable individuals, organizations, information systems, and
the physical networks that connect them.
Significant characteristics include terrain, weather, civilian information
infrastructure, media, populace, and third party organizations.
2-34. The technological advances in communications offer some unique considerations for insurgencies. 1274
For one, international communication is easier than it used to be. This allows insurgencies to communicate 1275
with organizations outside of their physical control. Connecting to diasporas or sympathetic groups could 1276
be vital to an insurgency. With the ability to communicate comes the ability to move resources and funding. 1277
Moreover, communications can be vital in importing weapons or other supplies to an insurgency. Global 1278
communications can be essential in increasing the military capabilities of an insurgency. 1279
2-35. At the operational and tactical level, communications allow for effective coordination of attacks. 1280
Organizations can communicate by cell phones, by the internet, or a number of other instant and quick 1281
means. This allows for coordinated large-scale attacks even by dispersed organizations. 1282
INFRASTRUCTURE 1283
2-36. The infrastructure variable is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for 1284
the functioning of a community or society. Societies have different infrastructure needs. For example, the 1285
expectation for hours of available electricity vary widely. Counterinsurgents should try to access 1286
infrastructure needs to meet the expectation of the user not their own expectations. 1287
2-37. Infrastructure is also interrelated with other variables. For example, the development of a highway 1288
system will affect the ability of people to move and interact with others. Creating a society in which 1289
humans can easily move based on economic needs or simple desire greatly increases the variety of groups a 1290
person will meet. These interactions and new relationships can change how the person views the world and 1291
the persons values. A communication system, such as a cellular network, can have the same effect. These 1292
systems allow for communication outside of ones areas and allow the transmission of new ideas and 1293
concepts. 1294
2-38. Another important interaction to consider is the relationship with infrastructure and the economic 1295
variable. An effective infrastructure can allow for the easy movement of people, goods, and ideas. 1296
Moreover, many businesses require infrastructure. While it is true that a local population may not expect 24 1297
hours of electricity a day, a manufacturing plant may require it. Moreover, infrastructure such as schools 1298
can increase the human capital in an area and drive economic growth. 1299
2-39. Infrastructure also has an effect on the military variable. Host nation forces can use a good 1300
transportation system, but so can an insurgency. A road system provides a means of transportation for 1301
everyone, not simply the population and government. Moreover, infrastructure may be important for the 1302
population and the governments role in maintaining civil control and security. An attack on the 1303
infrastructure may undermine the governments legitimacy in an area. However, the opposite is also true. 1304
An attack on infrastructure may also undermine the insurgency, if the population places blame on the 1305
insurgency and turns towards to government. 1306
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 1307
2-40. The physical environment includes the geography and manmade structures, as well as the climate 1308
and weather in the area of operation. The physical environment can affect the tactics and operations of an 1309
insurgency. Extreme conditions, such as in nations in higher elevations, can make insurgent movements 1310
difficult in the winter. The movement and the tactics of any military force will be affected by the physical 1311
environment of the area of operations. The physical environment will influence insurgency sanctuaries, the 1312
ability of an insurgency to hide resources, and the ability of an insurgency to mass forces. Understanding 1313
the physical environment is essential to understanding an insurgency. (See chapter 4 for further discussion 1314
on how the physical environment relates to an insurgency.) 1315
2-41. The physical environment also relates to the other variables. A country with a high attitude and that 1316
is landlocked will have a difficult time building the infrastructure needed for large-scale international trade. 1317
Moreover, if the physical environment precludes the ability produce with ease an excess of food, it is 1318
difficult to divert much labor to other enterprises. This can hamper the development of a highly specialized 1319
economy. A green revolution will often predate a major increase in industrial production. 1320
TIME 1321
2-42. Time describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an operational 1322
environment, as well as how various actors in the operational environment perceive the timing and 1323
duration. Time also has an interrelated relationship with other variables. For example, a multinational 1324
coalition may see their efforts in an insurgency as limited by national objectives or by the public pressure. 1325
In other words, other parties can always leave an insurgency. On the other hand, for the host nation, the 1326
insurgent, and the population in the struggle are less constrained by time. An insurgency may use the time 1327
variable to its advantage, while the time variable usually works against an external counterinsurgent. 1328
2-43. Time can also play a role in the social variable. Ongoing conflicts tax societies. Populations can 1329
become less interested in the nuisance of a conflict and more interested in simple peace. As time passes, a 1330
Chapter 2
population may be more interested in who is likely to win an insurgency, than the motivation of either side 1331
of the conflict. 1332
THE MISSION VARIABLES AND CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS 1333
2-44. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders filter information categorized by the operational variables 1334
into relevant information with respect to the mission. They use the mission variables, in combination with 1335
the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the situation and to visualize, describe, and direct 1336
operations. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, 1337
time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) (see ADRP 5-0.) Within the mission variables, civil 1338
considerations are of unique importance for counterinsurgency. Civil considerations are the influence of 1339
manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and 1340
organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. Civil considerations 1341
comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, 1342
organizations, people, and events. (See FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A for information on the use of ASCOPE.) 1343
2-45. The commanders refinement of information for their mission and their particular area of operation is 1344
essential. ASCOPE can play an important role in the identification of structures or events, for example, that 1345
will have an effect in a units area of operations. As such, ASCOPE is an important tool for the unit in 1346
determining important civil considerations in an insurgency. Units within an insurgency should use 1347
ASCOPE to identify and continually refine their understanding of the area of operations over time. 1348
2-46. It is essential to perform ASCOPE in the perspective of the population, the insurgent, and the 1349
counterinsurgent. This is of unique importance for counterinsurgency. A detailed explanation of a 1350
technique to perform ASCOPE in can be found in ATP 3-24.1. 1351
1352

Chapter 3 1353
Understanding CuIture 1354
3-1. Each society is composed of both a social structure and culture. A social structure refers to the 1355
relations among groups of persons within a system of groups. Social structure is persistent over time. It is 1356
regular and continuous despite disturbances. While social structure does change, it changes over a long 1357
period and its change is characterized by evolution, not dramatic change. In a military organization, for 1358
example, the structure comprises the arrangement into groups like brigades, regiments, and battalions. In a 1359
society, the social structure includes groups, institutions, organizations, and networks. Social structure 1360
involves the following: 1361
Arrangement of the parts that constitute society. 1362
Organization of social positions. 1363
Distribution of people within those positions. 1364
3-2. Staffs should identify and analyze the culture of the society as a whole and of each major group 1365
within the society. Social structure comprises the relationships among groups, institutions, and individuals 1366
within a society. In contrast, cultureideas, norms, rituals, codes of behaviorprovides meaning to 1367
individuals within the society. For example, families are a core institutional building block of social 1368
structure everywhere. However, marital monogamy, expectations of a certain number of children, and 1369
willingness to live with in-laws are highly variable in different societies. They are matters of culture. 1370
Social structure resembles a skeleton with culture being the muscle on the bones. The two are mutually 1371
dependent and reinforcing. A change in one results in a change in the other. 1372
CHARACTERISTICS OF CULTURE 1373
3-3. Culture is web of meaning shared by members of a particular society or group within a society. (See 1374
FM 3-05.301/MCRP 3-40.6A for more information.) Culture is 1375
A system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that members of a society 1376
use to cope with their world and with one another. 1377
Learned through a process called enculturation. 1378
Shared by members of a society; there is no culture of one. 1379
Patterned, meaning that people in a society live and think in ways forming definite, repeating 1380
patterns. 1381
Changeable, through social interactions between people and groups. 1382
Variable, meaning that Soldiers and Marines should make no assumptions regarding what a 1383
society considers right and wrong or good and bad. 1384
Internalized, in the sense that it is habitual, taken for granted, and perceived as natural by people 1385
within the society. 1386
3-4. Culture can be described as an operational code that is valid for an entire group of people. Culture 1387
conditions the individuals range of action and ideas, to include what to do and not do, how to do or not do 1388
it, and whom to do it with or not to do it with. Culture includes under what circumstances the rules shift and 1389
change. Culture influences how people make judgments about what is right and wrong, assess what is 1390
important and unimportant, categorize things, and deal with things that do not fit into categories. Cultural 1391
rules are flexible in practice. For example, the kinship system of a certain Amazonian Indian tribe requires 1392
that individuals marry a cousin. However, the definition of cousin is often changed to make people eligible 1393
for marriage. 1394
3-5. Each individual belongs to multiple groups, through birth, assimilation, or achievement. Each group 1395
to which individuals belong influences their beliefs, values, attitudes, and perceptions. Individuals 1396
Chapter 3
consciously or unconsciously rank their identities into primary and secondary identities. Primary identities 1397
are frequently national, racial, and religious. In contrast, secondary identities may include such things as 1398
hunter, blogger, or coffee drinker. Frequently, individuals identities are in conflict; counterinsurgents can 1399
use these conflicts to influence key leaders decisions. 1400
3-6. Structure and culture relies on relationships to create a group norming affect on an individual, called 1401
enculturation. Relationships, whether based on a number of groups based on family, economic (such as 1402
class), tribal, ethnic, racial, religious, or other ties, affect how an individual views the world. Both social 1403
structure and culture help shape identity each persons identity and in turn helps shape legitimacy. 1404
3-7. The norming effect of groups also provides social norms for individuals. The standard of conduct for 1405
social roles is known as a social norm. A social norm is what people are expected to do or should do, rather 1406
than what people actually do. Norms may be either moral (theft, homicide prohibitions) or customary 1407
(prayer before a meal, removing shoes before entering a house). Violation of a role prescribed by a given 1408
status, such as failing to feed ones children, results in social disapproval. When a persons behavior does 1409
not conform to social norms, the society may sanction a person. Understanding the roles, statuses, and 1410
social norms of groups within an area of operations can clarify expected behavior and provide guidelines 1411
on how to act. Some norms that may impact military operations include the following: 1412
The requirement for revenge if honor is lost. 1413
Appropriate treatment of women and children. 1414
Common courtesies, such as gift giving. 1415
Local business practices, such as bribes and haggling. 1416
3-8. An individual can be a member of more than one group, and groups within an area, even groups with 1417
some of the same members, can be in conflict. Friction points between different groups, based on religious, 1418
racial, gender, or some other form of cultural identity, in a society are important to understand. 1419
Commanders and staffs can understand conflict and cultural change by understanding internal friction 1420
points within a society. Different values are often friction points. 1421
3-9. The size of a nation, its diverse sub-cultures, different educational levels, and geographic 1422
backgrounds contribute to a great range of cultural variances among individuals and groups. Members of 1423
the population view cultural influences differently depending on their geographic location or identifying 1424
group. Analyzed and understood together, cultural influence provide a snapshot of a culture. Developing 1425
relevant questions about cultural influences enables commanders and staffs to achieve greater situational 1426
awareness and understanding. 1427
3-10. A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is preferable to 1428
an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state of existence. Values include beliefs concerning such 1429
topics as toleration, stability, prosperity, social change, and self-determination. Each group to which a 1430
person belongs inculcates that person with its values and their ranking of importance. Individuals do not 1431
absorb all the values of the groups to which they belong. They accept some and reject others. Most 1432
individuals belong to more than one social group. The values of each group are often in conflict: religious 1433
values may conflict with generational values or gender values with organizational practices. 1434
3-11. Religion can play a role in changing the value of a culture, and it can create friction points within a 1435
culture. When groups are under stress, a message of change based on a new understanding of the world can 1436
change a culture as the concepts gain cultural acceptance. These new concepts often create friction with 1437
groups in a society that resists the change. This can lead to conflict, uncertainty, and complexity in the 1438
operational environment. When societies encounter new ideas, religions being one of them, the end state of 1439
that interaction is often unpredictable. For example, Hong Xiuquan led the Taiping rebellion in China. He 1440
had contact with an American Southern Baptist missionary and then had visions in which he was the 1441
younger brother of Jesus Christ and sent to reform China from Confucianism. In 1850, he started a revolt 1442
that lead to the death of over 20 million Chinese in one of the deadliest conflicts in history. 1443
3-12. Cultural forms are the concrete expression of the belief systems shared by members of a particular 1444
culture. Cultural forms include rituals, symbols, ceremonies, myths, and narratives. Cultural forms are the 1445
medium for communicating ideologies, values, and norms that influence thought and behavior. Each 1446
culture constructs or invents its own cultural forms through which cultural meanings are transmitted and 1447
Understanding Culture
reproduced. One can decode a cultures belief systems by observing and analyzing its cultural forms. 1448
Insurgent groups frequently use local cultural forms to mobilize the population. 1449
3-13. One of the most important cultural forms to understand is the narrative. A cultural narrative is a story 1450
recounted in the form of a causally linked set of events that explains an event in a groups history and 1451
expresses the values, character, or self-identity of the group. People express and absorb ideologies though 1452
narratives. For example, at the Boston Tea Party in 1773, Samuel Adams and the Sons of Liberty dumped 1453
five tons of tea into the Boston Harbor to protest what they considered unfair British taxation. This 1454
narrative explains in part why the Revolutionary War began. However, it tells Americans something about 1455
themselves each time they hear the story that fairness, independence, and justice are worth fighting for. As 1456
this example indicates, narratives may not conform to historical facts or they may drastically simplify facts 1457
to express clearly basic cultural values. For example, the British taxed Americans in 1773 less than their 1458
British counterparts and most British attempts to raise revenues from the colonies were designed to help 1459
reduce the crushing national debt incurred in their defense. By listening to narratives, one can identify a 1460
societys core values. Commanders should pay particular attention to cultural narratives of the host-nation 1461
population pertaining to outlaws, revolutionary heroes, and historical resistance figures. Insurgents may use 1462
these narratives to mobilize the population. 1463
3-14. Other cultural forms include ritual and symbols. Rituals can be either sacred or secular. Vast amounts 1464
of information are found in symbols, and a knowledgeable observer can decode the information. Symbols 1465
can be objects, activities, words, relationships, events, or gestures. Institutions and organizations often use 1466
cultural symbols to amass political power or generate resistance against external groups. Commanders 1467
should pay careful attention to the meaning of common symbols and how various groups use them. 1468
INTERESTS VERSUS BELIEFS 1469
3-15. Beliefs are concepts and ideas accepted and perceived as true. Beliefs can be core, intermediate, or 1470
peripheral. Core beliefs are those views that are part of a persons deep identity. They are not easily 1471
changed. Examples include belief in the existence of God, the value of democratic government, the 1472
importance of individual and collective honor, and the role of the family. Core beliefs are unstated, taken 1473
for granted, resistant to change, and not consciously considered. Attempts to change the core beliefs of a 1474
culture may result in significant unintended second- and third- order consequences. 1475
3-16. Intermediate beliefs are predicated are assumptions and expectations about the world and a persons 1476
identity. They have a direct relationship with ones core beliefs. These perform a set of rules that a person 1477
follows. Intermediate beliefs can change overtime and that change is sometimes influenced by leadership 1478
within a society or group. 1479
3-17. From intermediate beliefs flow peripheral beliefs. These beliefs are open to debate, consciously 1480
considered, and easiest to change. Peripheral beliefs within a society that are often debated. However, the 1481
intermediate beliefs or core beliefs are rarely challenged in that debate. For example, a society may debate 1482
the punishment for a murder and that debate can range from the death penalty to prison time with the hope 1483
of rehabilitation and return to society. However, the core belief, that society has an obligation to seek 1484
justice and protect its members from murders, is not often challenged in that debate. 1485
3-18. The totality of the identities, beliefs, values, attitudes, and perceptions that an individual holdsand 1486
the ranking of their importanceis that persons belief system. Religions, ideologies, and all types of 1487
isms fall into this category. As a belief system, a religion may include such things as a concept of God, a 1488
view of the afterlife, ideas about the sacred and the profane, funeral practices, rules of conduct, and modes 1489
of worship. 1490
3-19. A belief system acts as a filter for new information. It is the lens through which people perceive the 1491
world. What members of a particular group believe to be rational, normal, or true may appear to outsiders 1492
to be strange, irrational, or illogical. Understanding the belief systems of various groups in an area of 1493
operations allows counterinsurgents to more effectively influence the population. 1494
3-20. Commanders analyze the belief systems of the population, insurgents, and other groups in the area of 1495
operations carefully. A societys belief system is fundamental to how an insurgency uses a core grievance 1496
to mobilize a population. Moreover, an insurgent groups belief system influences their actions and their 1497
Chapter 3
relationship with society. Differences between the insurgents and populations belief systems provide 1498
opportunities for counterinsurgents to separate the insurgents from the population. 1499
3-21. The interests of a group flow from their belief system. Interests refer to what a group or society 1500
wishes to attain or protect. The perception of these interests changes with time and events. For example, 1501
after the September 11
th
attacks, the U.S. wished to attain a greater degree of security and saw terrorist 1502
groups as greater threats. This event changed how the U.S. saw its interest in security. 1503
3-22. Interests can include physical security, basic necessities, economic well-being, political participation, 1504
and social identity. During times of instability, when the government cannot function, the groups and 1505
organizations that people belong to meet some or all of their interests. Understanding a groups interests 1506
allows commanders to identify opportunities to meet or frustrate those interests. A groups interests may be 1507
used as a core grievance by an insurgent, if that group thinks that the insurgent group is more likely to meet 1508
their grievance versus the host government. 1509
3-23. Beliefs and interests affect attitudes which are affinities for and aversions to groups, persons, and 1510
objects. Attitudes affect perception, which is the process by which an individual selects, evaluates, and 1511
organizes information from the external environment. Commanders should consider groups attitudes 1512
regarding the following: 1513
Other groups. 1514
Outsiders. 1515
Host-nation government. 1516
The U.S. 1517
The U.S. military. 1518
Globalization. 1519
CULTURAL AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING 1520
3-24. To understand culture, a basic understanding of various cultural influences is often important. 1521
Cultural influences are categories of information used study culture. Cultural influences include, but are not 1522
limited to, those items listed in table 3-1. 1523
Table 3-1. Cultural influences 1524
Cultural influences
History Philosophy Science and technology
Political science Literature Geography
Sociology Psychology Law, crime, and punishment
Cultural anthropology Education Art, music, and entertainment
Language Religion Military arts and science
Economics Communication Food and drink
3-25. History is the study of the past. Understanding what occurred in the past and what the population 1525
views as significant, controversial, inspirational, and regretful provides insight on the populations culture. 1526
What actually occurred in an event or a period is less important than how those events are perceived by the 1527
population. When a historian or a individual studies history, that individual studies the remaining evidence 1528
of past events. It is up to an individual to make sense of that evidence. The evidence of any historical event 1529
is filtered through the historians own set of bias and that influences how that person perceives an historical 1530
event. 1531
3-26. Political science is primarily concerned with interaction between different international states and the 1532
politics of a certain state or type of state. Political science uses the scientific method to provide insights into 1533
these different relationships. It is based on the development of a theory, creating a hypothesis based on that 1534
theory, and then testing that hypothesis using either quantitative, qualitative, or a combination of both 1535
methods. 1536
3-27. Sociology is the scientific study of human society. It uses many of the same methods as political 1537
science. The primary difference between political science and sociology is that sociology is not as tied to 1538
political structure. Sociology studies the effect of various systems, such as the family, community, and 1539
laws, on an individual or group. 1540
3-28. Cultural anthropology studies cultural variation among humans. The methods of anthropology 1541
include participant observations, interviews, and surveys. The adaptation of culture to a particular 1542
environment and the evolution of that culture is essential in the study of cultural anthropology. 1543
3-29. Language is verbal communication. Language proficiency is essential in a counterinsurgency. This 1544
can range from simply learning and using some common phrases of greeting to a full understanding of a 1545
language. In many cultures, the use of language helps to demonstrate respect and commitment to work with 1546
members of the host nation. The use of basic greetings, in the local language, can be the fastest and 1547
effective ways of gaining rapport and setting a good impression. 1548
3-30. Economics studies the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. An 1549
awareness of the how the local economy works can help U.S. forces support local merchants, laborers, and 1550
managers within their own system. It also provides an understanding of the connection between the local 1551
economy and the national economy. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of economics and chapter 10 for a 1552
discussion of integrated monetary shaping operations.) 1553
3-31. Philosophy uses reason and logic to study fundamental problems. Many cultures have a wide range 1554
of philosophies. Many cultures believe in fatalism and have different criteria to describe a code of honor 1555
that can all provide insights to their value and interests. Other cultures may have more of an individualist 1556
philosophy. 1557
3-32. Literature consists of written works. In many cultures, there are important pieces of literature that are 1558
known and read widely. Literature helps to shape a culture. Authors often try to capture part or all of a 1559
culture in a written work or use allegories to describe part or the whole of a nations identity. 1560
3-33. Psychology is the study of the mind and behavior. An individuals mental state is effected by that 1561
individuals environment. Using psychology can help Soldiers and Marines understand the state of mind of 1562
the local populace. 1563
3-34. Education is the transfer of knowledge to a person. Understanding the education levels and literacy 1564
rates of the host nation can assist in all aspects of working with host-nation forces, provide an appropriate 1565
medium for delivering information operations products to the population, and determine who the people 1566
consider responsible for providing curriculum and education services. 1567
3-35. Religion is the belief and worship of a supernatural power. Understanding what the religions are of 1568
an area and understanding their basic structure is fundamental to understanding a culture. This will help 1569
staffs and commanders understand the operational environment, including the roles of religious leaders, 1570
significant religious structures, and religious sites. Understanding a cultures religion can provide insights 1571
on local family functions, local taboos, and the local moral code. 1572
3-36. Communications is the transmission of information from person to person. Commanders and staffs 1573
determine the best way for the locals to pass and receive information. This can help counterinsurgents 1574
understand how the enemy may conduct their propaganda and the best means for counterinsurgency 1575
elements to conduct information operations. 1576
3-37. Science and technology refers to the level of technological sophistication. Understanding the 1577
compatibility of the local community with the nations infrastructure and U.S. capabilities (for example, 1578
cell phones and the internet) is important to determine what projects and initiatives are sustainable. 1579
3-38. Geography is the study of the terrain, including the human terrain, of the earth. Geography provides 1580
knowledge of the terrain and its surrounding in the area of operations. This could include knowing where 1581
one community begins and another ends, where different migrants or displaced personnel congregate, and 1582
the natural and manmade landmarks that are significant to the population. 1583
3-39. The legal structure of a society deals with laws, crimes, and punishments. A basic understanding of 1584
local and accepted rules, laws, and justice within the communities and society is important. The legal 1585
Chapter 3
structure determines who in and outside the government plays roles in maintaining order. The legal 1586
structure governs the significant rules within a community, including etiquette, driving, and dispute 1587
resolution. 1588
3-40. Art, music, and entertainment are important elements of culture. Understanding the significance of 1589
host-nation crafts, music, dance, clothing, and symbols provides an awareness of key events and their 1590
significance. Commanders and staffs determine what holidays are important. They then determine events 1591
that can adversely affect operations or the timing of operations that can adversely affect the populace. 1592
3-41. Military arts and science deals with the use of military force and its relationship with a society. 1593
Understanding how the military is viewed by the host nations population is critical to assessing the 1594
militarys effectiveness and credibility. For example, commanders and staffs need to determine if 1595
host-nation military forces believe in their cause, or if they are in the military primarily for employment. 1596
Another example is determining where the loyalty of the military is. Determining whether the militarys 1597
loyalty is to a certain section of society, to the elected government, or to themselves is essential to 1598
determining the militarys relationship to society. 1599
3-42. Food and drink are often important to a culture. What and how a person eats is essential to the 1600
day-to-day life of the average individual. Determining what traditional meals and beverages are or 1601
determining the importance of sharing a meal is important for the counterinsurgency. Culture in religion, 1602
holidays, celebrations, and daily life are commonly tied to food and drink. 1603
METHODS FOR UNDERSTANDING CULTURE 1604
3-43. There are two important methods for trying to understand the cultural element of a 1605
counterinsurgency. One involves the organization of a staff in order to concentrate on cultural 1606
understanding. The other provides an outside capability to allow commanders and staff to understand the 1607
culture. These outside capabilities are 1608
Cultural analysis cell and cultural advisor. 1609
Human terrain teams. 1610
CULTURAL ANALYSIS CELL AND CULTURAL ADVISOR 1611
3-44. There are cultural implications for planning. Planning teams must develop an understanding of 1612
civilian aspects of the area of operations and the will of the population. There are many techniques to 1613
achieve this capability and each unit may approach this differently based on resources and available 1614
qualified personnel. Two techniques of note are the cultural analysis cell and cultural advisor. 1615
3-45. A cultural analysis cell is an ad hoc working group consisting of individuals with a diversity of 1616
education and experience capable of identifying and considering the perspective of the population, the 1617
host-nation government and other stakeholders within an operational environment (MCWP 5-1). Ideally, a 1618
cultural analysis cell is composed of individuals with cultural expertise across all warfighting functions. If a 1619
whole-of-government approach is used, experts from other government agencies such as the Department of 1620
State should be included in the cell. The cultural analysis cell cooperates closely with the other members of 1621
the planning staff, so that cultural factors are considered throughout the range of military operations. The 1622
cultural analysis cell is also expected to interface and coordinate with joint and interagency groups, 1623
drawing upon the Department of State, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign resources, such as 1624
provincial reconstruction teams. 1625
3-46. The commander forms the cultural analysis cell during receipt of mission and problem framing 1626
planning steps to add to the commanders and the operational planning teams cultural understanding of an 1627
operational environment. In order to support the operational planning team, the cultural analysis cell 1628
understands the operational planning teams mission and tasks and is able to translate cultural information 1629
in a manner that is relevant to the mission. 1630
3-47. The cultural advisor is a concept developed and employed in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 1631
Afghanistan. Cultural advisors are the principal subject matter experts on culture and planning related to 1632
their designated geographical region of expertise, serving as the culture and language advisor to the 1633
commander. The cultural advisor is a special staff officer for the commander and a member of the planning 1634
staff. This person not only serves on the planning staff, but also deploys and serves as an ongoing advisor 1635
to senior leaders while in they are in theater, if needed. The advantage of having a cultural advisor on staff 1636
is that this advisor can often help explain to the commander what the advisor sees on the ground in the area 1637
of operations. As a result, the commander can adjust operations in response to a rapidly changing 1638
environment. 1639
3-48. Overall, there are many options to task-organize staffs to incorporate culture into planning. While a 1640
cultural analysis cell creates expertise in one part of the staff, those concerns are also important for other 1641
staff sections. It is important for commanders to create staffs that are well integrated across the warfighting 1642
functions. One danger of creating a cultural cell within the staff is that it will relegate cultural concerns to 1643
one staff element and inhibit cultural concerns being integrated into the planning process. It is a 1644
commanders responsibility to ensure that the staff integrates all operational and planning concerns, 1645
including cultural concerns. 1646
3-49. Regardless of the particular planning configuration, commanders and planners seek out and use 1647
whatever cultural resources are available to the unit. Incorporating culture into planning occurs during the 1648
beginning of mission planning in order for commanders and staffs to understand an area of operations prior 1649
to developing any course of action. Success is recognized not by stand-alone briefs that describe the culture 1650
of an operational environment, but when all of the operational planning teams planning products reflect 1651
and have been informed by the cultural analysis that has been performed by these subject matter experts. 1652
HUMAN TERRAIN TEAM 1653
3-50. Human terrain teams provide tactical-level support to brigade and regimental commanders. They 1654
conduct field research of the local population to determine the human terrain in order to help the 1655
commander assess how actions will be perceived by the local populace. The human terrain team typically 1656
consists of a team leader, one or two social scientists, and one research manager. When manning demands 1657
permit, human terrain teams are deployed with at least one woman each to facilitate access to females 1658
within the local population. 1659
3-51. Human terrain teams represent a capability that traditionally falls outside of military expertise. 1660
These teams are an additional tool for the commander to gain situational understanding and are an 1661
important tool in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace. (See FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A for 1662
more information on human terrain teams.) 1663
1664

PART TWO 1665
Insurgencies 1666
Part two provides doctrine to help understand an insurgency. Chapter 4 provides the 1667
prerequisites of a successful insurgency and an insurgencies fundamentals. Chapter 1668
5 then provides a description of an insurgencys threat characteristics. While part one 1669
provides the context of an insurgency, part two provides a discussion of an 1670
insurgency within that context. 1671
Chapter 4 1672
Insurgency Prerequisites and FundamentaIs 1673
4-1. The three prerequisites of an insurgency, opportunity, motive, and means provide a framework for 1674
both planners and executers to plan for and prevent an insurgency. Planners and executers should use the 1675
prerequisites for planning and execution of operations in environments where insurgencies are likely, such 1676
as a post conflict environment. (See JP 3-24 for a further discussion of insurgency prerequisites.) 1677
4-2. The vast majority of insurgencies are not successful. Generally they start and then they are quickly 1678
defeated by government forces. However, several factors separate an insurgency that has the possibility of 1679
being successful from insurgencies that are quickly defeated. An developing adaptive and capable 1680
insurgency is a significant risk to any counterinsurgency operation. 1681
INSURGENCY PREREQUISITES 1682
4-3. In previous doctrine, the prerequisites of a insurgency were represented as a vulnerable population, 1683
leadership for direction, and lack of government control. The concept was that a population is vulnerable if 1684
the people have real or perceived grievances that insurgents can exploit. Moreover, there must be an 1685
insurgent leadership element that can direct the frustrations of a vulnerable population. The insurgency 1686
must act on real or perceived lack of governmental control, which can allow insurgents to operate with little 1687
or no interference from security forces or other agencies. This means that the government is not providing 1688
for the people. This may refer inadequate services or an overly harsh and repressive government. When all 1689
three exist in an area, an insurgency can operate with increased freedom of movement, gain the support of 1690
the people, and become entrenched over time. 1691
4-4. Insurgencies are also be viewed in the context of intrastate conflict. Intrastate conflict directly relates 1692
to insurgencies. With the exception of a coup dtat, which may or may not be an insurgency, other types of 1693
interstate conflicts are insurgencies that differ only in the amount of popular support or the amount of 1694
governmental capacity. The types of intrastate conflicts include rebellions (also referred to as 1695
insurrections), revolutions, civil wars, and coup dtats. This section gives the counterinsurgent a 1696
foundation for understanding an insurgency in its different forms. 1697
4-5. A rebellion (also known as an insurrection) may be fomented by a group that challenges state 1698
control, is usually manifested by acts of violence, and the state is unable or unwilling to address the groups 1699
concerns. Another insurgency may use a rebellion if it can gain enough popular support to engage in large 1700
scale unrest or open conflict with the governing authority. Rebellions are forms of insurgency in which an 1701
organized group is leading the population, the causes of instability exist, and the movement enjoys some 1702
Chapter 4
passive support among the population. Under most bodies of international laws it is a crime to incite, assist, 1703
or engage in violent actions against a constituted government. The Geneva Convention states that Every 1704
government had a right to put down rebellion within its borders and to punish the insurgents in accordance 1705
with its penal laws. (See the final record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 vol. II section 1706
B, page 121 for more information on insurrections.) 1707
4-6. A revolution is a popular insurgency with designs at overthrowing a government and totally 1708
replacing its form from one type to another. Revolutions generally evolve from a rebellion but differ in the 1709
fact that popular support comes in the form of a mobilized population, which differs from simply passive or 1710
active support. A mobilized population are a part of a revolution and are generally looking for fundamental 1711
lasting change in a societys political, economic, or social order. Significant in this distinction is a 1712
requirement of the host-nation military, government, and civil authorities to prepare, plan, and conduct 1713
counterrevolution, and not simply counterinsurgency. The main difference is the need to reintegrate the 1714
mobilized population and not only reintegrate members of the insurgency. Although coup dtats can 1715
resemble a revolution in the fact that they can overthrow a government, this is generally done rapidly and 1716
secretly versus a protracted struggle of the masses during a revolution. 1717
4-7. Civil wars are condition-based conflicts beginning with an insurgency. Once the insurgency achieves 1718
certain characteristics of organization and resembles an alternate government, the conflict reaches the state 1719
of civil war. If the insurgency loses the ability to meet these criteria, the status or state of civil war is no 1720
longer present. The insurgent movement may attempt to gain outside recognition by calling the conflict a 1721
civil war as it tends to afford international recognition as a competing group and not an illegal movement. 1722
According to the Geneva Convention the criteria of a civil war is that the insurgents must have an 1723
organization purporting to have the characteristics of a State; that the insurgent civil authority must exercise 1724
de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory; that the armed forces must act under the 1725
direction of the organized civil authority and be prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war; that the 1726
insurgent civil authority must agree to be bound by the provisions of the Convention. (See the final record 1727
of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 vol. II section B, page 121 for more information on civil 1728
wars.) 1729
4-8. Recognized anti-government elements in a civil war may be classified as belligerents and not 1730
insurgencies. A belligerent, though generally a sovereign state, can be a non-sovereign state if it is 1731
recognized by the international community (of two or more states or organizations like the United Nations), 1732
organized, and providing services to the population within their controlled areas. In the case where 1733
anti-government forces meet the criteria of a state during a civil war, they achieve sufficient international 1734
recognition they may achieve belligerent status rather than that of an insurgency. Although status may 1735
change, counterinsurgency operations, by government forces, generally remain the same at the theater 1736
through lower tactical levels. The difference between a group being classified as an insurgency or a 1737
belligerent can affect the overall status of U.S. involvement as a belligerent has international recognition. 1738
4-9. A coup dtat seeks to overthrow the governing authority by a quick decisive action. A coup dtat 1739
may or may not be an insurgency. If the conditions of instability are present and the movement has popular 1740
support, then a coup may be the action of an insurgency. Without the conditions of instability sufficient to 1741
cause a popular resistance movement, a small group or single person can kill or remove a leader and 1742
assume control without an insurgent movement. Many coups are called revolutions due to the change in 1743
government. The main point is a coup, if successful, may be unknown as a revolution, but is still not 1744
protracted or organized like other insurgencies that use mass popular support in its strategy. 1745
4-10. An intrastate conflict is as war or conflict between a constituted government and its people or 1746
representative factions from the people. It is a war within a state versus a war between two or more nation 1747
states. Intrastate conflicts present different challenges than interstate wars, since they involve the 1748
population and, therefore, human rights violations and sectarian violence are more likely. Secondly, 1749
intrastate conflicts can spread to adjacent countries that have governments or aspects of the population that 1750
share beliefs or goals with one side or the other. When looking at global conflicts since the post soviet era, 1751
the overwhelming preponderance of conflicts have been intrastate conflicts. 1752
4-11. The nature of an intrastate conflict is a grievance between segments of a states population with its 1753
constituted government. There can be a single root cause or a variety of causes perceived as so severe that 1754
they impact the populations social contract with its government. There are many likely contributors to 1755
Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals
intrastate conflicts, including perceived weak, illegitimate, corrupt, or overly oppressive governments, 1756
ethnic or racial tensions, religions conflicts, economic stresses, or a need for land reform. Often an 1757
intrastate conflict causes the formation and growth of insurgencies and other intrastate conflicts. 1758
Understanding the nature of intrastate conflicts is important because they are often poorly defined. A 1759
misdiagnosis, by a commander, of an intrastate conflict can be disastrous in properly identifying and 1760
addressing the root cause of instability and nature of the threat. 1761
4-12. Also, commanders and staffs should not see an insurgency as simply an intrastate conflict. Insurgent 1762
movements may operate in multiple countries, as their desired end state may be regional, transnational, or 1763
global. As such, understanding an insurgency in the context of an intrastate conflict is important. 1764
OPPORTUNITY 1765
4-13. Opportunity refers to the emergence of significant gaps in the ability of the state or its local allies to 1766
control its territory and population. States must have the capacity to detect the early stages of insurgent 1767
organization and mobilization a challenge that typically requires the cooperation of a significant portion 1768
of the population or the establishment of an extensive program of domestic surveillance and intelligence 1769
activities. The state must also be capable of suppressing the insurgency in a way that deters other potential 1770
rebels while avoiding feeding the insurgent narrative and provoking wider resistance. 1771
4-14. For a land force, opportunity provides a means to evaluate the likelihood of an insurgency. For 1772
example, after victory during a major combat operation, if the former government prevented insurgencies 1773
by a domestic surveillance and intelligence program, the commander and staff need to consider how likely 1774
and for how long can an occupying force prevent an insurgency without gaining the active support of the 1775
population or re-establishing domestic surveillance programs. Moreover, the commander and staff need to 1776
consider that if the enemy has the active support of the population, will population groups within areas that 1777
you control start insurgencies. Understanding the opportunity of an insurgency in an area is essential for 1778
land forces. 1779
4-15. At the tactical and operational level, this provides a means for commanders and staffs to analyze the 1780
local conditions and the likelihood of a successful insurgency developing. Commanders and staffs should 1781
actively make assessments on both the support of the population or the domestic surveillance and 1782
intelligence ability of a local area. If the population is not supportive of the host nation and the host nation 1783
has no means to prevent an insurgency in a hostile population, there is an opportunity for an insurgency in 1784
that area. (For a further discussion on why a gap in state control might happen, see JP 3-24.) 1785
4-16. A population that has grievances does not necessarily cause an insurgency. Grievances are a 1786
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for an insurgency. Poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, 1787
inadequate essential services, political marginalization, and repression are commonplace. These conditions 1788
exist in many places where an insurgency does not. It takes established or emerging leaders to build a 1789
compelling narrative that links grievances to a political agenda and mobilizes the population to support a 1790
violent social movement. The narrative explains who is to blame for the grievances, how the grievance will 1791
be addressed under an insurgents rule, and how the population and insurgency should work together to 1792
accomplish the goal. Ideology often provides a coherent set of ideas that provide a compelling framework 1793
for a narrative. Where opportunity and motive (grievances) intersect, individuals emerge to attempt to 1794
mobilize the population. When grievances mobilize a population, they are a root cause of an insurgency. 1795
(See JP 3-24 for a further discussion on motive.) 1796
ROOT CAUSES OF AN INSURGENCY 1797
4-17. The root causes of an insurgency are real or perceived grievances that insurgents use to mobilize a 1798
population in support of an insurgency. Insurgents use these grievances to fuel an insurgency. Root causes 1799
are not static and can change over the course of an insurgency. As conditions change, insurgent leaders will 1800
create different narratives to mobilize a population. The root causes that led to the insurgency in the first 1801
place may not be the same ones that are sustaining an ongoing insurgency. Commanders and staffs perform 1802
continued assessments and reassessments to determine what an insurgency is using as a root cause. 1803
4-18. Identity, based on cultural, religious, or other cultural grouping, can create a strong root cause. In 1804
cases were groups are persecuted and underrepresented, the insurgents can use a narrative that uses this 1805
Chapter 4
underrepresentation or persecution as root causes against the government. In some cases, groups are 1806
concentrated in certain regions where the government exercises biased controls over those groups. This 1807
might be an effective root cause to use for an insurgency based on a nullification of government control. 1808
4-19. Religion can also be an effective root cause. Religious-based movements create a perception that a 1809
certain type of religion should drive politics and groups should convert to that religion. Insurgents can use 1810
religion as part of an identity based root cause if the government persecutes a certain religious group. 1811
However, insurgents can also use religion to create an ideology that everyone should be a part of, and 1812
governed by, a certain religion. In this case, a religious-based root cause group could seek to overthrow its 1813
government and replace it with a religious based government. 1814
4-20. Insurgents can use a foreign military forces presence in another state as a root cause. The presence 1815
can come after a major combat operation that replaces a government. As such, any major combat operation 1816
includes planning for stability tasks to prevent an insurgency. However, this could also be a root cause if 1817
there are Soldiers or Marines stationed in a host nation. Insurgents can use the perception that outsiders 1818
exploit the host nation or that the host-nation government excessively caters to foreigners as a root cause. 1819
4-21. Pervasive and desperate poverty can often be a root cause of an insurgency. Starving young people 1820
without jobs or hope are ripe for insurgent recruitment. Where there is little expectation of better future, 1821
populations may align with any movement that provides them hope. Poor economic policies can hurt a 1822
population, thus adding more strength to the insurgency. In these conditions, an effective root cause of 1823
insurgencies is often a narrative that uses wealth inequality and connects that wealth inequality to 1824
government policies. 1825
4-22. A related root cause is land disputes concerning ownership, usage, and rights, especially to agrarian, 1826
mining, or other land based livelihoods or identities. Land disputes often manifest themselves as an issue of 1827
income inequality. For example, landowners may have tenant farmers that pay the landowner rent. 1828
Insurgent groups can often use a narrative that promises redistribution of land and land reform to the tenant 1829
farmers as an effective root cause. 1830
4-23. Corruption of the host-nation government can be a root cause. If institutional corruption is systemic, 1831
ongoing, and considered unfair, insurgents can use that as an effective narrative. For example, corruption in 1832
government development programs can cause resentment by the aggrieved group. Corruption can lead to 1833
loss of host-nation legitimacy and can undermine government control of an area. 1834
4-24. Insurgents can use a gap between a populations expectations and the governments capability to 1835
meet those expectations as a root cause. The larger the gap, the greater the populations perceived or real 1836
sense of deprivation. This allows for the development of a narrative in which the insurgents promise to 1837
close the gap. 1838
MEANS 1839
4-25. It takes considerable resources to mount a violent challenge to the incumbent political authorities and 1840
the ways an insurgency goes about securing those means determines a great deal about its behavior. The 1841
leaders of a potential insurgency must assemble and organize personnel, funds, weapons, and systems of 1842
secure communications and logistics. The other prerequisites relate to the means. For example, recruitment 1843
can leverage strong pre-existing social networks, which insurgents could use based on the development of a 1844
root cause. (See JP 3-24 for a detailed discussion on means.) 1845
4-26. Commanders and staffs consider the possible resources of an insurgency or possible insurgency. An 1846
insurgency will often depend on a local population for resourcing and recruitment. In these cases, 1847
insurgents base an insurgency on social networks, defined by villages, clans, tribes, ethnicities, or other 1848
groups. In these cases, the insurgency may have legitimacy. However, the use of these means also restricts 1849
an insurgency. It is constrained by the social norms of the society. Moreover, there is a certain amount of 1850
difficulty expanding the insurgency beyond its core group. 1851
4-27. A local area with an ethic population could connect, through communications, with its diaspora and 1852
attain resources from around the world. In such cases, commanders and staffs need to determine possible 1853
means to undermine this support. For example, the use of counter threat finance may prevent this funding. 1854
On the other hand, resourcing can be local. Insurgencies can have access to black markets or other 1855
resources that they can use to buy weapons. In these cases, stopping these transactions may be an effective 1856
means of blocking insurgent resources. 1857
4-28. If an insurgency has state sponsorship, the insurgency has important advantages and disadvantages. 1858
State sponsorship could offer resources, sanctuary, and training. These are important advantages for any 1859
insurgency because they offer an insurgent group the ability to organize and become tactically and 1860
operationally more effective. On the other hand, state sponsorship can undermine the support of the local 1861
population. An insurgency that depends on outside state support can be perceived as artificial and may not 1862
have deep support from the local population. While recruits may join an insurgency because of increased 1863
resources, recruits that are attracted because of the possibility of wealth may be less effective. However, if 1864
an insurgency uses outside support to build a political base before starting military operations, insurgents 1865
mitigate these risks. For the counterinsurgent, understanding the nature of state support allows the 1866
commander and staff to undermine that support before an insurgency begins. 1867
4-29. A group that already has resourcing could potentially become an insurgency. Groups tied to black 1868
markets, such as those selling drugs, may seek to resist or nullify the governments ability to stop their 1869
activities. While they may exploit the population and create a root cause, the protection of their resources is 1870
the essential reason for the development of their insurgency. The means for an insurgency can play an 1871
interrelated role with the motive and opportunity. 1872
INSURGENCY FUNDAMENTALS 1873
4-30. Few insurgencies fit neatly into any rigid classification. However, insurgencies do have common 1874
characteristics that can provide a basis for building a more accurate picture of an insurgency and allow 1875
commanders to achieve an understanding of the situation. The fundamentals of insurgencies help 1876
commanders and staffs to analyze insurgent strategies, objectives, and tactics. Each fundamental is 1877
important independently, but analyzing the interactions and relationships between the fundamentals as a 1878
whole is the key to understanding an insurgency. Two major areas used to examine an insurgency are 1879
Dynamics of insurgency. 1880
Insurgent strategies. 1881
DYNAMICS OF INSURGENCY 1882
4-31. In an operational environment, there may be multiple insurgent groups. These groups can be 1883
pursuing a wide variety of goals and interests. As such, these groups can be collaborating, fighting each 1884
other, or acting neutral towards each other. When commanders and staffs analyze an insurgency, they 1885
consider each group and provide a different analysis for each group based on the eight dynamics of 1886
insurgency. 1887
4-32. Eight dynamics or some combinations of these dynamics are common to most successful 1888
insurgencies. These dynamics provide a framework for planners to analyze insurgencies. Each of these 1889
dynamics can contribute to the strength of an insurgency, but each can also be a source of weakness or 1890
vulnerability for the insurgents. The eight dynamics are 1891
Leadership. 1892
Ideology. 1893
Objectives. 1894
Environment and geography. 1895
External support. 1896
Internal support. 1897
Phasing and timing. 1898
Organizational and operational patterns. 1899
First DynamicLeadership 1900
4-33. A group committing random violence is not an insurgency. There is a political rational behind the 1901
violence in an insurgency. An insurgency requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, 1902
Chapter 4
coordination, and organizational coherence. Leadership is required to mobilize the population by using a 1903
root cause (see chapter 4). The key tasks of an insurgencys leaders are to undermine the legitimacy of the 1904
host nation and to establish the legitimacy for their movement. Their ability to organize and their 1905
willingness to distribute power across the organization is vital to the long-term success of the movement. 1906
Organizations dependent upon key charismatic personalities to provide cohesion and motivation for the 1907
movement are vulnerable to disruptions if those leaders or co-opted or killed. 1908
4-34. Poor leadership can undermine an insurgency. Insurgent leaders that undermine their own legitimacy 1909
with the population, for example, will significantly hamper the success of their insurgency. An analysis of 1910
insurgent leadership provides information on how effective its leaders are in mobilizing the population and 1911
effectively using resources to undermine the host nation. 1912
Second DynamicIdeology 1913
4-35. The insurgents must have a problem that justifies their actions in relation to the populations 1914
grievances and explains what is wrong with the status quo. Insurgents use a narrative to connect population 1915
grievances with what its actions and demands. This is the root cause of an insurgency. An essential part of 1916
the ability of an insurgency to mobilize a population is an insurgencys ideology. An ideology is the 1917
integrated assertions, theories, and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program. Not all insurgencies are 1918
ideological, but an ideology provides an insurgency with a message of change that is normally coherent and 1919
logical, based upon the insurgencys underlying assumptions. 1920
4-36. Ideology is an important factor in unifying the many divergent interests and goals among the 1921
insurgency members and the general population. As a common set of interrelated beliefs, values, and 1922
norms, ideology is used to influence the behavior of individuals within the group. It is an explanation of 1923
how the world works. Ideology can serve as the rallying call for all members of the population to join the 1924
struggle. There are several question to answer when analyzing insurgent ideology: 1925
What is the problem the insurgency will fix, and how will they fix it? 1926
Are there any ideological divisions within the insurgency or the population? 1927
Is the ideology supported by outside groups? 1928
What propaganda are the insurgents using to propagate their ideology? 1929
Third DynamicObjectives 1930
4-37. Insurgencies can have strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Tactical objectives most directly 1931
translate to actions. For example, a tactical goal of destroying a logistics convoy directly translates into an 1932
attack against a logistics convoy. However, these actions are normally done to achieve an operational 1933
objective. In the example of the attack on the convoy, the operational objective might be to prevent 1934
logistical support of host nation forces. When insurgents achieve various operational goals, they will 1935
achieve the strategic end state of their insurgency. 1936
4-38. A strategic objective is the movements overall political goal or desired end state. An insurgency will 1937
seek to 1938
Force significant political, economic, or religious change. 1939
Overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power. 1940
Generate resistance to outside occupiers or change within a society. 1941
Nullify government control in an area. 1942
Secede a region from government control. 1943
Subvert the population away from the government. 1944
4-39. An insurgencys strategic objectives will influence the type of insurgency that develops and its 1945
ideology will influence an insurgencys end state. For example, an insurgency focused on resistance against 1946
outside occupiers or change in a society may unify many different groups based on that shared end state. 1947
The strategic end state of the insurgency may be as simple as resistance to occupation or a conservative 1948
insurgency that is resisting change in a society. Groups that seek to nullify government control may have an 1949
objective to protect criminal activities and black markets. These groups may be non-ideological, but they 1950
will still need to mobilize the population to nullify governmental control. On the other hand, groups that 1951
wish to force significant change in a society or overthrow an existing social order are likely to be 1952
ideologically driven. There is a connection between an insurgencys strategic goal and an insurgencys 1953
ideology. 1954
Fourth DynamicEnvironment and Geography 1955
4-40. The environment and geography affect insurgent actions. Insurgencies may form their base in urban 1956
environments, rural environments, or a combination of both. Insurgents located in rural areas can enjoy the 1957
relative safety of remote terrain or safe heavens, such as jungles or mountains. These geographical 1958
conditions make it possible for them to form larger units and conduct larger-scale operations. However, 1959
there are some disadvantages to a rural based insurgency. Communications and supply lines are longer and 1960
slower. Insurgents can be isolated from the population, and an insurgency can be destroyed with a decisive 1961
military operation. 1962
4-41. Urban insurgencies tend to operate within ethnic ghettos or enclaves of sympathetic supporters. 1963
However, operating in urban settings requires a high degree of compartmentalization, which makes it 1964
difficult for groups to train and organize for larger-scale operations. Urban insurgencies are often cellular. 1965
However, an urban setting does allow an insurgency to work within large population groups. The 1966
opportunity for mobilization of the population is therefore higher than in a rural insurgency. 1967
4-42. Other factors of the area of operations may affect an insurgency. Tribal, religious, and others factors 1968
have an interrelated relationship with insurgencies. Moreover, the physical environment also effects 1969
insurgent movement and planning. 1970
Fifth DynamicExternal Support 1971
4-43. Historically, insurgencies are less likely to succeed without some form of external support. The 1972
support can be in the form of 1973
Moral support. 1974
Political support. 1975
Resources, such as money, weapons, food, advisors, training, and foreign fighters. 1976
Sanctuary, such as secure training sites, operational bases over a border, or protection from 1977
extradition. 1978
4-44. Governments providing support to an insurgency normally share beneficial interests or a common 1979
ideology with the insurgency. Ethnic enclaves or diasporas in third-party countries can provide significant 1980
support, even if a countrys government is not actively supporting an insurgency. For example, a global 1981
diaspora could provide significant resources for an insurgency, even if no government is providing active 1982
support. 1983
4-45. However, with external support comes a degree of dependency on that support. The support is a 1984
possible means to influence or change the actions of the insurgency. External support provides one means 1985
to affect an insurgency indirectly. 1986
4-46. External support can help to shape an insurgency and the outcome of an insurgency. In the case of 1987
the insurgency in Sri Lanka, external support was essential to the success of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 1988
Eelam. A large diaspora provided the Liberation Tigers of Tamil sanctuary and resources. This allowed 1989
them to gain dominance over other insurgent groups and to wage a long and bloody insurgency against the 1990
government of Sri Lanka. 1991
Chapter 4
External Support for the Tamil Tigers 1992
Even Years of discrimination by the Sinhala majority against the Tamil minority 1993
reached a breaking point in Sri Lanka during the Black July riots of 1983. Soon after, 1994
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged as the most capable Tamil 1995
insurgent group, prepared to wage a campaign of violence and terror against the Sri 1996
Lankan state and non-Tamil civilians. The operational environment was complex, 1997
with insurgents fighting insurgents while also fighting the government, as occurred 1998
with Sunni and Shia groups in Iraq. At various stages of the conflict, the LTTE fought 1999
against the Sri Lankan state but also against other anti-government insurgent groups. 2000
The most prominent of these groups was the Janatha Vimukthi Permuna, (JVP), a 2001
Marxist-Leninist group that blended violence and right-wing politics before laying 2002
down its arms in the mid to late 1990s. 2003
This case illustrates the importance of non-state actors in an operational 2004
environment. While the LTTE was indeed a non-state actor in its own right, the group 2005
relied on its global diaspora for a range of support activities. Following the ethnic 2006
riots of 1983, thousands of Tamil refugees fled overseas to India, Australia, Canada, 2007
and the United Kingdom. This sowed the seeds for the Tamil diaspora and the 2008
transnational nature of the LTTEs insurgency. The global diaspora was a major part 2009
of the organizations fundraising and propaganda network. Furthermore, the 2010
transnational diaspora network provided funding and weaponry to sustain the Tigers 2011
for most of the groups existence. 2012
In addition to enjoying the largesse of a well-organized and entrepreneurial diaspora, 2013
the insurgents relied on co-ethnics in India for sanctuary, which was essential in the 2014
groups early years. Since the Tamils effectively controlled the Jaffna peninsula in 2015
the northeast of the country, the LTTE had a home base from which it could train, 2016
plan, and execute attacks against the military. Furthermore, across the Palk Straits 2017
in Tamil Nadu, India, the LTTE was able to rely on the supportboth active and 2018
passiveof thousands of ethnic Tamils who sympathized with the group. 2019
The LTTE took advantage of the benefits of globalization, developing a truly global 2020
network of contacts abroad, and soon engaged in weapons procurement activities 2021
throughout East and Southeast Asia, in AFPAK, Ukraine, the Balkans, Lebanon, and 2022
other well-known arms markets. At various points throughout the insurgency, the 2023
Tigers collaborated with other terrorists groups as diverse as the Revolutionary 2024
Armed Forces Colombia (FARC), the African National Congress (ANC) in South 2025
Africa, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) in 2026
Afghanistan, the Japanese Red Army (JRA), and the Popular Front for the Liberation 2027
of Palestine (PFLP). In 1996, the insurgents acquired U.S. Stinger-class missiles 2028
from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and used these weapons two years later to 2029
shoot down a Sri Lankan civilian Lionair jet. 2030
Over time, the LTTE distinguished itself as perhaps the most lethal insurgent force in 2031
modern history. By the mid-late 1990s, the group boasted a navy, an air force, and 2032
an elite suicide commando unit used to assassinate several heads of state and 2033
numerous COIN force commanders. As a pioneer of suicide techniques, the Tamil 2034
Tigers devoted significant resources to two operational wings that functioned as 2035
suicide strike teams, the Black Tigers and the Sea Tigers. A no-holds barred 2036
approach to the conflict led the COIN force and the insurgents to routinely and 2037
systematically slaughter each other, while also destroying Sri Lankas infrastructure 2038
and displacing much of its civilian population. 2039
Sixth DynamicInternal Support 2040
4-47. Internal support is any support provided from within the borders of the state in which the insurgency 2041
is active. Any sort of insurgency must have some sort of internal support, even if limited. The level and 2042
type of support varies by insurgency and area. It is important to understand the specific nature of the 2043
support to address and counter the relationship between the population and insurgents. Support may be 2044
either willing or based on coercion. 2045
4-48. A larger populated area or region where insurgents can operate represents many different 2046
communities that provide varying levels of support for different reasons. There are two basic types of 2047
internal support: active and passive. Passive support is critical for successful insurgent operations. It 2048
provides freedom of movement for members of the insurgency to conduct operations, reside, train, plan, 2049
and operate in an area without resistance from the local community. As Mao Tse-tung states, The guerrilla 2050
must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea. Passive supporters do not report insurgents to 2051
local counterinsurgent forces out of sympathy for the cause, antigovernment sentiment, or reluctance to get 2052
involved due to peer pressure, threats of violence, or the benefits that the insurgency provides. 2053
4-49. Active supporters provide open sympathy to the movement, participate in insurgent operations, and 2054
find new recruits. Active supporters are usually central to the insurgencys propaganda efforts. They may 2055
provide material, intelligence, or assistance as requested or demanded by insurgents. Active support, like 2056
passive support, may be volunteered or coerced. 2057
4-50. When trying to determine the type and amount of support the following factors may be important for 2058
analysis: 2059
Increased communications between the insurgents and an outside state. 2060
Reduction in local medical supplies or personnel absent from clinics and hospitals. 2061
Increased black market activities and extortion for resources. 2062
Increased theft or purchase of food and gas. 2063
New presence of bodyguards. 2064
New areas in which the local police are growing reluctant to patrol or conduct operations. 2065
New or increased interaction with local civilian leaders by insurgents 2066
Rumors confirming the presence of insurgents in areas where people gather and communicate. 2067
Increased assassinations of those opposing insurgents or for symbolic value to frighten locals. 2068
A drop in the number of walk-ins and tips due to fear of retribution. 2069
A rise in the reluctance of locals civilians to be seen talking with counterinsurgent forces. 2070
An increase in the absence of local reconstruction crews, police, and military or a decrease in 2071
their willingness to be associated with counterinsurgent forces or to leave their families. 2072
Suspension of local government or community meeting and events. 2073
4-51. There is a relationship between internal and external support. Insurgents must have significant 2074
strength in at least one of these dynamics (internal or external support) or they will not be able to meet their 2075
tangible support needs, making them much less viable. Both of these dynamics must be controlled and 2076
reduced in order for the counterinsurgent to prevail; just eliminating internal support is not enough to defeat 2077
an insurgency with robust external support (and vice versa). 2078
Seventh DynamicPhasing and Timing 2079
4-52. Successful insurgencies often progress through three phases in their efforts. Not all insurgencies 2080
progress through all three phases, and linear progression through all three phases is not a requirement for 2081
success. Insurgent success can occur in any phase. In addition, insurgencies can revert to an earlier phase 2082
and resume development when favorable conditions return. 2083
4-53. Movement from one phase to another phase does not end the operational and tactical activities of 2084
earlier phases; it incorporates them. Therefore, it is difficult to determine when an insurgency moves from 2085
one phase to another. In addition, a single insurgency may be in different phases in different parts of the 2086
country. Advanced insurgencies can rapidly shift, split, combine, or reorganize; they are dynamic and 2087
adaptive. 2088
4-54. The first phase is latent and incipient. During this phase, activities include the emergence of 2089
insurgent leadership, creation of initial organizational infrastructure, training, acquisition of resources, and 2090
political actions, such as organizing protests. An eventual insurgent group may be simply a legitimate 2091
Chapter 4
political group at this stage. Governmental actions and changes in society can transform political groups 2092
into insurgencies. 2093
4-55. The second phase is guerrilla warfare. In this phase, successful insurgents could use small unit tactics 2094
to attack security forces while continuing ongoing political efforts. The goal is to undermine the 2095
governments legitimacy and replace the governments legitimacy with the population seeing them as 2096
legitimate. In this stage, insurgencies may begin performing limited governmental functions for the 2097
population in areas they control. 2098
4-56. The third phase is war of movement. During this phase, an insurgency can be trying to overthrow a 2099
government or trying to force the withdrawal of an occupying power. For success, an insurgency does not 2100
necessarily need to transform into a conventional military, but it must position itself to defeat the 2101
government or occupying power. Moreover, this phase may not needed. In some cases, all an insurgency 2102
must do is create a continual problem that cannot be solved and thus wear down the patience of the 2103
counterinsurgents. This is especially true when the counterinsurgents are an outside power. However, this 2104
phase is characterized by increased military capability, popular support, logistics capacity, and territorial 2105
control. 2106
4-57. Many successful insurgencies go through a process similar to the three phases. This is not a uniform 2107
rule. Some insurgencies, for example, form rapidly and displace a government quickly. Figure 4-1 on page 2108
4-11 provides a model for understanding the possible evolution of insurgencies. A model provides a 2109
simplification of reality in order to understand something. A model of conflict simplifies that type of 2110
conflict so that one can take actions. A model is not a uniform rule. A phase-like evolution of an insurgency 2111
tends to create a strong political and military organization with deep roots in a society. Such organizations 2112
are difficult to undermine. However, historically the most likely outcome of an insurgency is its rapid 2113
defeat. These insurgencies demonstrate little phasing beyond the beginning of violence followed by the 2114
quick defeat of the insurgency. 2115
2116
2117
Figure 4-1. ConfIict modeI 2118
4-58. Figure 4-2 is an attempt to show how an insurgency adapts and changes in response to actions by 2119
host-nation security forces. It depicts an insurgency in different phases in different areas and possible 2120
reactions to counterinsurgency actions. In figure 4-1, insurgents openly control the city marked in area 1, an 2121
indication that that portion of the insurgency is in Phase III (a war of movement). Counterinsurgency forces 2122
started actions in the market to remove the insurgency. During clearing operations, many insurgents were 2123
defeated or left while others, especially auxiliary and underground elements, remained. This occurred 2124
because of the counterinsurgency clearing operations. 2125
4-59. Insurgents in area 1 then reverted to Phase I. The underground elements were specifically tasked, 2126
trained, and equipped to operate within government-occupied areas; this is especially prevalent if the 2127
insurgents are using an advanced strategy. Auxiliary elements, which can operate among the population, 2128
may be present. In the clear-hold-build operational approach, clearing operations are designed to eliminate 2129
the guerrilla elements, not the entire insurgency. Hold and build phases, following the clear phase, are used 2130
to destroy the remaining insurgent infrastructure. (See chapter 9 for more information on the shape-clear- 2131
hold-build-transition.) 2132
4-60. Insurgents in areas 2 and 5 could increase activity to draw friendly resources to those areas. 2133
Chapter 4
4-61. Areas 3, 4, and 7 show reduced activity. Although this may appear to be good news for 2134
counterinsurgents, it may actually indicate the arrival of insurgents, their leaders, foreign advisors, sensitive 2135
information, and equipment. They may move without weapons and use fleeing civilians to mask 2136
movements. The drop in attacks can indicate that insurgents are conducting consolidations and 2137
reorganization, movement, tending to their wounded, occupying safe houses, preparing for a counterattack, 2138
or performing logistic, administrative, and intelligence operations. Counterinsurgents must consider all 2139
three phases of an insurgency to evaluate if insurgents have migrated to new areas, even if there is not an 2140
increase in violence. 2141
Figure 4-2. Insurgency in different phases 2142
4-62. Commanders and staffs use this data and the broader view to observe, collect, analyze, and 2143
disseminate intelligence to units across the region to identify potential insurgent routes, and proactively 2144
address media in anticipation of negative insurgent propaganda. At the same time, commanders and staffs 2145
must promote counterinsurgent actions that provide safety and care to civilians who have left the area. 2146
4-63. An ability to react to the actions of a counterinsurgency is an indication of that insurgencys 2147
capability and the degree of control the leaders has over the organization. Insurgents can migrate to a 2148
variety of locations to consolidate and reorganize. A lack of guerrilla activity does not mean there are no 2149
insurgents. Rather, insurgent leaders and other elements may be temporarily underground, intending to 2150
reappear when conditions are more favorable. 2151
Eighth DynamicOrganizational and Operational Patterns 2152
4-64. Each insurgencys organization is unique. The specific type and level of organization, however, is an 2153
indicator of the insurgents strategy and capabilities. Understanding an insurgencys organizational and 2154
operational patterns helps counterinsurgents predict the enemys tactics, techniques, and procedures, 2155
understand their capabilities, and forecast their potential targets. 2156
4-65. Insurgents can be organized into networks and require certain elements, characteristics, bonds, and 2157
conditions to survive and operate. A network is a series of direct and indirect ties from one entity to a 2158
collection of others. There may be a central point of communication or influence (critical node) that 2159
provides a critical vulnerability for targeting against the network. Insurgent networking extends the range 2160
and variety of both insurgent military and political actions. Networks of communications, people, and 2161
activities exist in all populations and have a measureable impact on the organized governance of a 2162
population and, consequently, military operations. Many insurgent networks are actually complex adaptive 2163
systems, making them difficult to destroy. They tend to heal, adapt, and learn rapidly. They may be a 2164
combination of insurgent, criminal, regular, or irregular forces, and foreign government sanctioned forces. 2165
These networks live within the population that enhances their capabilities to sow disorder, survive, and 2166
protract the struggle, presenting particularly difficult problems for counterinsurgency forces. 2167
Organizational Elements 2168
4-66. The basic organizational elements of an insurgency are the movements leadership, guerrillas, 2169
auxiliary forces, and underground. Each element has its specific leadership, proportion of personnel, and 2170
effectiveness. While there are almost certainly members of the insurgency that perform multiple functions, 2171
grouping an insurgency into these groups provides a model of understanding. However, commanders and 2172
staffs must avoid the trap of mirror imaging an insurgency against U.S. organizational structure. Many 2173
insurgencies have these four basic elements. Each element is broken down into smaller cells, included as a 2174
part of larger wings, and so forth. (See figure 4-3.) 2175
Figure 4-3. OrganizationaI eIements of an insurgency 2176
Leadership 2177
4-67. Insurgencies have a political rational or reason for their existence. As such, every insurgency has 2178
some type of political leadership. That leadership can be the same as military leadership. However, 2179
sometimes this is not the case and there is well-defined political leadership. When an insurgency has 2180
well-defined political leadership, that leadership is called the political cadre. The political cadre can 2181
participate in the political system or could be clandestine and illegal. In either case, it is useful to define the 2182
political cadre of an insurgency when there are insurgent leaders who are mainly involved in the political 2183
struggle and not the armed struggle. 2184
4-68. The political cadre are the force behind the ideology of the insurgency. They are actively engaged in 2185
the struggle to accomplish insurgent goals. They may also work within a political party to work within the 2186
political system and provide some legitimacy for the insurgency to the population. The cadre is active in 2187
Chapter 4
spreading the ideology of the insurgency, if the insurgency has an ideology. Modern noncommunist 2188
insurgencies rarely, if ever, use the term cadre; however, these movements usually include a group that 2189
performs similar functions. Additionally, in a movement based on religious extremism, religious leaders 2190
can play a role similar to cadre. 2191
4-69. The leadership of an insurgency is composed of leaders from the political cadre, guerrillas, and 2192
auxiliaries. They may work closely together or operate in a more decentralized manner, depending on their 2193
need for security or other operational concerns. Insurgent leaders usually exercise leadership through force 2194
of personality, the power of revolutionary ideas, and personal charisma. In some insurgencies, they may 2195
hold their position through religious, clan, or tribal authority. These leaders may include supporting 2196
members, much like command and staff in a regular military. These supporting members may include 2197
advisors, logistics and administration personnel, spokespersons, and those leading operations. Insurgent 2198
leaders can attain positions within the government and work to undermine the government. 2199
Guerilla Units 2200
4-70. The origin of the word guerrilla comes from the Peninsula War of Napoleons invasion of Spain and 2201
Portugal in the early 1800s. Spanish partisans formed small rebel groups to conduct small wars. The 2202
Spanish word for war is guerra, adding illa to the end of guerra means small war and thus guerrilla. These 2203
are the guerrillas, analogous to combat arms in a regular military. Each cell, for example, may consist of 10 2204
to 15 members, divided into two or three smaller sub cells of five to seven individuals, depending on the 2205
insurgents mission variables and strategy. Guerrillas are used for a wide range military purposes, but the 2206
underlying purpose is to achieve a political end. For example, attacks on host-nation forces may undermine 2207
host-nation legitimacy among the population and create safe heavens. 2208
4-71. Guerrilla cells can conduct small-unit tactics and can mass for larger initiatives. Bomb and 2209
demolition squads designed to build and plant explosives or conduct ambushes against convoys are 2210
examples of small unit tactics meant to engage the enemy but to not themselves become decidedly engaged. 2211
However, as an insurgency gains military power, guerilla units increase their ability to conduct large scale 2212
attacks. During the final insurgency stage, war of movement, guerilla movements can perform actions 2213
meant to destroy the host-nation military force. This can be a decisive action for an insurgency. If 2214
successful, a war of movement can overthrow the government or allow the insurgency to reach other 2215
political goals. However, if the insurgency begins a war of movement too soon, the insurgency can deplete 2216
its military power and undermine its political power. 2217
Auxiliary Forces 2218
4-72. Auxiliary forces are the support elements. Logistic functions can be performed by anyone involved 2219
in an insurgency, and there are probably members of the insurgency involved in both logistics and combat. 2220
However, creating this division allows the grouping of an essential function for a counterinsurgency. 2221
4-73. The auxiliary includes cells and external elements. Cells include logistics, intelligence, 2222
counterintelligence, propaganda, population control, and recruiting. These are elements that perform tasks 2223
directly connected to an insurgency. External elements are elements that provide support for an insurgency 2224
but are not directly part of the insurgency. External elements may include drug smugglers or external 2225
support from another state, for example. Examples of the support provided by cells and external elements 2226
include 2227
Logistics. 2228
Training. 2229
Populace and resource control. 2230
Intelligence and counterintelligence. 2231
Recruitment and screening. 2232
Deception operations. 2233
Propaganda. 2234
Transportation. 2235
Medical support. 2236
Promotion or facilitation of security forces desertion. 2237
Inner and outer security zones and early warning. 2238
Manufacture and maintenance of equipment and weapons (for example, improvised explosive 2239
devices). 2240
Money laundering and financing. 2241
4-74. Auxiliary forces also include economic support systems to fund the insurgencys military and 2242
political operations. Economic support systems include 2243
Fund raising and terrorist finance networks. 2244
Pillaging, looting, extorting, and enslaving the population. 2245
Business operations that include both direct control, joint ventures and taxation of enterprises in 2246
these industries: 2247
Illicit trade in commodities and natural resources (such as oil, timber, and diamonds). 2248
Criminal trafficking in narcotics, humans, and arms. 2249
Sanctions busting. 2250
Legal business enterprises (such as oil, shipping, motor transport, and hotels). 2251
Banking and finance operations. 2252
Underground 2253
4-75. Underground cells conduct clandestine combatant and logics operations in areas controlled by 2254
government forces. Combat operations can include sabotage, assassinations, and small arms attacks. 2255
Logistical operations can include maintaining safe houses, controlling hostages, moving weapons, and 2256
providing communications. Underground cells include intelligence cells, logistic cells, and combatant cells. 2257
4-76. The underground includes those elements of the insurgency that conduct covert or clandestine 2258
activities, especially in counterinsurgent occupied areas. Movement leaders may also often exist within the 2259
underground if they are attempting to keep their affiliation or identity a secret. Insurgencies with effective 2260
undergrounds tend to be more compartmentalized, secretive, vetted, trained, and indoctrinated than 2261
insurgencies without them. The underground, for example, can carry out terrorist acts, if desired, with 2262
plausible deniability for the insurgency. The underground may remain in an area after counterinsurgency 2263
clearing operations to gather information, intimidate civilians, attack members of the security forces or 2264
government, emplace improvised explosive devices, or perform sniper operations. The underground can be 2265
a major part of an insurgency. Its effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) provides counterinsurgent analysts with 2266
indicators of the skill, advancement, and strategy of the insurgency. An advanced insurgency with an 2267
effective underground is capable of operations and tactics that differ from those of a basic insurgency, with 2268
a less capable underground. The underground tends to be the most difficult element to recruit and train; 2269
therefore, its size tends to fluctuate with time and capability. 2270
4-77. Underground cells seek to be self-contained; they often have their own leadership, combatants, and 2271
auxiliary forces. The underground, however, can also utilize members of the auxiliary to provide materials, 2272
intelligence, counterintelligence, and early warning as well as to pass messages, propaganda, and 2273
disinformation. This use allows the underground to conduct operations in areas where the regular auxiliary 2274
is present, but the underground does not have a widespread presence. 2275
4-78. Some activities of the underground include 2276
Conducting psychological warfare. 2277
Conducting sabotage, assassination, and subversion. 2278
Conducting intelligence and counterintelligence. 2279
Maintaining safe houses. 2280
Protecting shadow or alternate insurgent political wings. 2281
Eliminating rivals. 2282
Destroying practical or symbolic political, cultural, social, or economic structures and ensuring 2283
the blame is on another group or on the government. 2284
Controlling the population and resources. 2285
Chapter 4
Demoralizing locals and counterinsurgent forces. 2286
Counterfeiting documents, including identification and currency. 2287
Conducting extortion. 2288
Conducting coercion. 2289
Conducting intimidation. 2290
INSURGENT STRATEGIES 2291
4-79. Counterinsurgents have to determine not only their opponents motivation but also the strategy being 2292
used to advance the insurgency. Insurgencies can use more than one strategy, depending on the level or 2293
echelon of the insurgency. Aspects of these strategies and their recognizable characteristics are important. 2294
This information is essential for developing effective programs that attack the root causes of an insurgency. 2295
The dynamics of insurgency are used as a methodology to assess an insurgent strategy. Commanders and 2296
staffs combine their understanding of the insurgents plan to accomplish goals with the insurgents 2297
capabilities to provide the counterinsurgent with the insurgents most probable and dangerous course of 2298
action. 2299
4-80. Understanding the insurgent strategy is vital to understanding the insurgents decisionmaking 2300
process, capabilities, future actions, current tactics, method of command and control, recruiting, 2301
propaganda, and use of the local population. The term strategy refers the insurgents devising or employing 2302
a plan or method to dictate actions toward a specific goal. Counterinsurgents assess the insurgent strategy 2303
and capabilities to develop assumptions about insurgents operational goals. Examining these goals and the 2304
insurgents attempts to achieve them through combat actions, propaganda, and subversion enable 2305
counterinsurgents to get in front of the enemys decisionmaking process. The insurgents strategic goals 2306
may be overt and publicly championed or covert. Insurgent operations may have immediate consequences 2307
or delayed effects aligned with long-term objectives. For example, car bombings among a local population 2308
may seem counterproductive because they incite immediate anger against the bombings and their 2309
perpetrators. However, a sustained campaign of massive violence can have two long-term results, it can 2310
Weaken popular support for the government, who has failed to protect the people. 2311
Make the population susceptible to insurgent intimidation. 2312
Whatever the insurgents intent, approaching the problem from the perspectives of the population and the 2313
insurgents campaign plan can provide counterinsurgents the means to interdict the threat on a number of 2314
levels. 2315
4-81. Four insurgent strategies are the most common strategies that counterinsurgents are likely to face. 2316
Two of these strategies are considered basic and the other two are considered advanced. Basic strategies 2317
refer to the insurgents capabilities as a whole to achieve long-term political objectives in their current state 2318
or area. It may refer to the entire movement or just the movement in a given area. Basic strategies do not 2319
mean insurgents are not efficient in tactics or other skills, but overall they are not capable of longer-term 2320
political goals. In contrast, advanced strategies do have political wings that govern the militant side of the 2321
movement and are focused on longer-term political goals. This distinction is only important in the analysis 2322
of the dynamics to determine the strategy. 2323
4-82. There are variations to every strategy. Insurgents do not necessarily use a single doctrinal model or 2324
theory for their strategy. The eight dynamics of an insurgency aid in identifying an insurgents strategies. 2325
This allows counterinsurgents to identify the insurgents operational objectives in relation to their overall 2326
campaign plan by region, area of operations, or area of interest. The eight dynamics enable 2327
counterinsurgents to combat all of the insurgent elements, not just the combat forces. This is necessary in 2328
order to conduct counterinsurgency operations designed to physically and psychologically separate the 2329
insurgents from the population and deny them the active or passive support of the people. 2330
4-83. Insurgent strategies include, but are not limited to, the following: 2331
Urban (terrorist) strategy. 2332
Military-focused or Foco strategy. 2333
Protracted strategy. 2334
Subversive strategy. 2335
URBAN (TERRORIST) STRATEGY 2336
4-84. The urban (terrorist) strategy is a basic strategy. In this strategy, insurgents attack government targets 2337
to cause government forces to overreact against the population. The insurgents want the governments 2338
repressive measures to enrage the people so that they rise up and overthrow the government. Although this 2339
type of strategy may develop popular support against a government that is particularly brutal or corrupt, it 2340
may only develop limited committed support. (See figure 4-4.) The urban (terrorist) strategy has these 2341
distinguishing characteristics: 2342
Insurgent actions calculated to provoke harsh government or counterinsurgent response. 2343
Propaganda that focuses on government brutality, calling attention to specific harsh government 2344
actions (massacres, torture of political prisoners, disappearances, brutal response to peaceful 2345
demonstrations, and so forth). 2346
Political organization or sustained effort to indoctrinate a political cadre or the masses. 2347
Little effort to subvert the government from within. 2348
Use of tactics to sow disorder, incite sectarian violence, weaken the government, intimidate the 2349
population, kill government and opposition leaders, fix and intimidate police and military forces, 2350
and attempt to create government repression. 2351
Popular sympathy if the government is particularly brutal or corrupt, but limited committed 2352
support. 2353
Figure 4-4. Urban (terrorist) strategy 2354
4-85. The actions of an urban (terrorist) strategy are sometimes predictable because they cause 2355
counterinsurgents to respond harshly. In some cases, this allows the insurgency to gain popular support as 2356
the population blames the government for these harsh tactics. In other cases, the population is willing to 2357
accept a harsh government response because of their dislike of insurgent actions. 2358
Chapter 4
FOCO STRATEGY 2359
4-86. The Foco strategy is another basic strategy. (See figure 4-5.) It is military-focused and named for its 2360
origins from Latin American insurgencies (Spanish enfocarto focus). Insurgents efforts focus on causing 2361
the government to lose legitimacy and inspiring a vulnerable population to join the insurgents against the 2362
government. The most important idea behind a Foco strategy is that it does not require building political 2363
support among the population. Instead, military success and action will gain the support of a population 2364
with core grievances. Foco strategy has these distinguishing characteristics: 2365
Attacks on soft government and civilian targets and on poorly equipped and trained security 2366
forces, demonstrating their inability to protect themselves or the population. 2367
Propaganda focused on showing the governments weakness and illegitimacy. 2368
Little evidence of long-term efforts at building a political base. 2369
Few efforts along a wider spectrum of objectives (for example, political wing, infiltrating 2370
legitimate organizations, and so forth) as seen in more advanced strategies. 2371
Figure 4-5. Foco strategy 2372
4-87. The foco strategy is vulnerable to effective counterguerrilla operations due its dependence on 2373
successful military action and developing a popular uprising. As a basic strategy, counterinsurgents can 2374
sometimes predict foco actions through detailed analysis. 2375
PROTRACTED WAR STRATEGY 2376
4-88. A protracted war strategy is an advanced strategy based on Mao Tse-Tungs theory of protracted 2377
popular war. (See figure 4-6 on page 4-19.) It postulates that insurgents should lengthen the conflict as 2378
much as necessary to assemble the resources and forces necessary for success and to wear down the 2379
counterinsurgent forces and their political leadership. Although most insurgent strategies use some or all of 2380
the phases as discussed in the sixth dynamic (phasing and timing), the protracted war strategy is based upon 2381
three distinct phases: latent and incipient, guerrilla warfare, and war of movement. Each phase builds upon 2382
the previous phase and continues activities from all or some of the previous phases. The protracted strategy 2383
requires both a political wing and a military wing. In all the variations of this strategy, certain 2384
characteristics stand out, including 2385
Continuous, long-term efforts to build popular support, infiltrate legitimate government 2386
organizations, and establish and maintain a clandestine organization. 2387
Highly-indoctrinated leadership, political cadre, and combatant fighters. 2388
Extensive, well-organized auxiliary and underground elements. 2389
Leadership able to exert control over the insurgency. 2390
Ability to shift phases at the direction of its leadership to include return to previous phases, if 2391
necessary. 2392
Campaign of attacks on infrastructure and attacks designed to wear down the government (and 2393
other counterinsurgents). 2394
Continuous operations along multiple lines of effort (although some are emphasized more than 2395
others are in different phases). 2396
Advanced insurgencies (like those in the protracted strategy) are more likely to form 2397
collaborative efforts with other insurgencies including rival movements due to a common enemy 2398
or goals. This may simply be coordinating simultaneous attacks to maximize psychological 2399
effects. 2400
Figure 4-6. Protracted strategy 2401
4-89. The protracted strategy is characterized by a high level of organization, indoctrination, a requirement 2402
to balance multiple objectives, and the need for leaders who can adjust and direct efforts according to 2403
circumstances. 2404
SUBVERSIVE STRATEGY 2405
4-90. The subversive strategy is another advanced strategy. (See figure 4-7 on page 4-21.) A subversive 2406
strategy attempts to subvert the government from within by using its political arm to become a legitimate 2407
political party and enter the government. Subversive activities may occur as part of other strategies, 2408
Chapter 4
particularly the protracted war strategy. (See figure 4-8 on page 4-22.) Certain characteristics and actions 2409
stand out: 2410
Insurgents seeking meetings with government or coalition forces to discuss ceasefires, although 2411
local insurgent movements are in a position of strength. The goal of these meetings is often not 2412
to discuss the details of a ceasefire, but rather to bolster their bid for legitimacy within the 2413
nation, with sympathetic external states, and the international audience. 2414
Prolonged campaign of attacks on infrastructure designed to wear down and reduce the 2415
credibility of the government. 2416
Public statements by the insurgencys political wing denouncing violence and distancing itself 2417
from the insurgency (while still operating under insurgent leadership). 2418
An apparent breach between the insurgencys military and political wings. 2419
Note: A breach between the insurgencys military and political wings could be an indicator of a 2420
subversive strategy, but the counterinsurgent must be aware that there may actually be a real 2421
split between the two wings that counterinsurgent forces can exploit. The key is that 2422
counterinsurgent forces should never assume the one or the other without confirmation. 2423
Commanders and staffs continue to look at all of the dynamics of an insurgency to identify other 2424
indicators of the subversive strategy. 2425
Formation of new alliances, sometimes with rival groups that seem to have little in common, 2426
except to defeat counterinsurgents. 2427
An end or reduction in combatant activity and an increase in political activity, riots, 2428
demonstrations, and propaganda. 2429
Sophisticated propaganda aimed at specific target audiences with appropriate messages. 2430
Emergence of an insurgent political wing (not a legitimate political party) that seeks recognition 2431
and entry into national politics or election to national, regional, department, district, or local 2432
offices. 2433
Figure 4-7. Subversive strategy, part I 2434
Chapter 4
Figure 4-8. Subversive strategy, part II 2435
4-91. Commanders and staff must understand the nature of an insurgency when conducting a 2436
counterinsurgency. This requires understanding both the dynamics of an insurgency and the insurgent 2437
strategies. Understanding the nature of an insurgency will help the commander in analyzing an insurgency 2438
and understanding that insurgency in the context it is occurring in. 2439
MODELS OF INSTABILITY 2440
4-92. The district stability framework assists planners in identifying and mitigating sources of instability. 2441
Because of the uniqueness of the stability environment, the interagency district stability framework was 2442
designed to identify and mitigate sources of instability. This framework works as a planning assessment 2443
tool and nests into the military decisionmaking process. There are three steps to the district stability 2444
framework: analysis, design, and monitoring and assessment. (ADRP 3-07 contains more details on the 2445
district stability framework.) 2446
4-93. The interagency conflict assessment framework is another framework used to understand conflict. 2447
The purpose of the interagency conflict assessment framework is to develop a commonly held 2448
understanding, across relevant U.S. government departments and agencies, of the dynamics driving and 2449
mitigating violent conflict within a country, that informs U.S. policy and planning decisions. It may also 2450
include steps to establish a strategic baseline against which U.S. government engagement can be evaluated. 2451
It is a process and a tool available for use by any U.S. government agency to supplement interagency 2452
planning. (For more information on interagency conflict assessment framework, see the interagency 2453
conflict assessment framework at ) 2454
2455
2456

Chapter 5 2457
Insurgency Threat Characteristics 2458
THREAT CHARACTERISTICS 2459
5-1. Threat characteristics involve the composition, disposition, activities, and tactics of an insurgency. 2460
The composition of an insurgency is covered under the eighth dynamicorganizational and operational 2461
patterns. Tactics for an insurgency include both political activities and military tactics. It is also important 2462
to consider how these threat characteristics create strengths and weaknesses for an insurgency. 2463
DISPOSITION 2464
5-2. The disposition is the geographic location of insurgent elements and the way they are deployed, 2465
employed, or located. Additionally, disposition includes the recent, current, and projected movements or 2466
locations of these elements: 2467
Training camps. 2468
Base camps. 2469
Logistic camps. 2470
Headquarters. 2471
Safe houses. 2472
Front organizations or businesses to include farms, factories, universities, markets, and trading 2473
posts. 2474
Cultural sites insurgents use as protection from counterinsurgent forces and for the psychological 2475
impact of counterinsurgents entering or firing on such a site (shrines, religious structures, 2476
cemeteries, ruins, schools, and other protected sites). 2477
5-3. The dispositions of an insurgency are partially determined by the operational environment and 2478
variables. For example, if an insurgency has connections to a black market, some of its dispositions will 2479
normally be to protect that market. Terrain will also affect the dispositions of the enemy. Commanders and 2480
staffs must understand the operational environment to understand the enemys dispositions. 2481
INSURGENT ACTIVITIES AND TACTICS 2482
5-4. Insurgents that rely solely on violence to achieve their political goals are probably ineffective. 2483
Instead, effective insurgents conduct a wide range of activities to achieve their goals. Many of these 2484
activities are not enemy or terrain oriented. Many insurgent actions are political. Moreover, many insurgent 2485
military actions are terrorism. Terrorism is the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear 2486
and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other 2487
ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political (JP 3-07.2). In addition 2488
to terrorism, insurgents use a wide range of means to achieve their end state. There is also a range of 2489
activities supporting both military and political actions. 2490
Political Activities 2491
5-5. Insurgents may use political activities to achieve their goals and enhance their causes legitimacy. 2492
An insurgencys actions can come from inside the governments political system or actions to communicate 2493
a message to the population. Political actions that happen within the government normally happen in a 2494
democracy or a semi-democracy. In these systems, an insurgency and related political parties can have 2495
some political power through elections. This gives groups the ability to launch official investigations and a 2496
platform to question government actions. This was a technique used by the Irish Republican Army and Sinn 2497
Fein. 2498
Chapter 5
5-6. Insurgent political actions within the government are limited to a democracy, unless those actions are 2499
secretive. An authoritarian regime can have members that are either sympathetic to or actual members of an 2500
insurgency. However, those individuals must remain clandestine, if they are to remain inside the 2501
government. In these cases, insurgencies can use these individuals for intelligence and to influence some 2502
governmental decisions. 2503
5-7. The use of political activities to influence a society is much more common. Demonstrations, 2504
propaganda, strikes, and civil disobedience can be effective means to undermine the legitimacy of the 2505
government and to disrupt the host nation. These actions show the level of support for the insurgency and 2506
transmit the insurgents message to the rest of society. 2507
5-8. In areas of the country where the insurgency is in control, the insurgency can perform governmental 2508
functions. These functions replace the functions of the host-nation government. When an insurgency 2509
provides effective governance of a region or community, it builds its legitimacy in that area. 2510
5-9. Moreover, at the national level an insurgency can promote a shadow government. A shadow 2511
government offers a known alternative that is tangible to the population. This can be effective as a 2512
propaganda technique, and a shadow government can be useful in creating a successful transition for an 2513
insurgency. As propaganda, a shadow government allows an insurgency to identify and inform a population 2514
of a known alternative to the current government. In practice, it allows a governmental structure to form in 2515
insurgent controlled areas quickly. If an insurgency is successful, this allows for a transition to a coherent 2516
national government. 2517
5-10. Propaganda is one of the most important political tools an insurgency has. Propaganda provides the 2518
means for the insurgency to communicate a message, often political, to the population. It allows the 2519
insurgency to create a narrative of why the governments actions are not legitimate, and how the 2520
insurgency can eliminate the root causes of the conflict. Common insurgent propaganda efforts include the 2521
following: 2522
Encouraging the host-nation populace or specific neutral parties to avoid supporting host-nation 2523
or other friendly governments forces. 2524
Increasing insurgent will to resist by fanning hatreds, biases, and predispositions. 2525
Inciting riots or organizing rallies, which may include honoring martyred insurgents. 2526
Causing or exacerbating a dislocated civilian crisis. 2527
Creating or fostering public distrust of the host-nation security forces. 2528
Undermining the support of specific host-nation local leaders or businessmen. 2529
Creating or intensifying general ethnic or religious unrest or friction. 2530
Supporting or revitalizing dissident or opposition organizations. 2531
Linking local groups with similar groups in neighboring countries or regions. 2532
Discrediting or ridiculing specific host-nation or counterinsurgent officials. 2533
Characterizing government leaders as puppets and tools of foreign counterinsurgency forces. 2534
Spreading hostile coverage of counterinsurgency personnel, especially counterinsurgent 2535
mistakes. 2536
Justify insurgent violence 2537
Generate sympathy from the local to the international. 2538
Military Tactics 2539
5-11. Insurgents use violence to achieve a wide range of effects. For example, in the early phases of an 2540
insurgency, insurgents plan attacks to achieve the greatest political and informational impact while not 2541
becoming decisively engaged. During the war of movement phase of an insurgency, insurgents may try to 2542
destroy a host-nations security forces. Commanders need to understand the wide variety of insurgent 2543
tactics. Insurgents make use of terrorist acts and conventional military tactics. 2544
Insurgency Threat Characteristics
Terrorist Acts 2545
5-12. Terrorist acts are meant to undermine the legitimacy of the government by demonstrating both the 2546
inability of the government to protect the population and the strength of the insurgency. Insurgents 2547
generally select targets based on their strategic importance and propaganda value. A terrorist attack will 2548
generally have some amount of deception and use techniques outside of the accepted norms. 2549
5-13. The possibility of an insurgent group gaining access to weapons of mass destruction changes the 2550
strategic effect of terrorist actions. If an insurgency gained nuclear capability, which is an increased 2551
possibility in an interconnected world, the threat of using a nuclear weapon would provide leverage for any 2552
type of political negotiations. The actual use of a nuclear weapon would have regional and global effects. 2553
Biological and chemical weapons also have a strategic effect, but to a lesser degree. The insurgents use of 2554
weapons of mass destruction as a terrorist weapon would transform the nature of the conflict. 2555
5-14. There are several types of terrorist attacks that may be effective and that insurgents have used. A 2556
faked terrorist attack can also undermine a host nation. All of these attacks serve to undermine the 2557
governments legitimacy by undermining the security of the population. Vehicle borne improvised 2558
explosive devices can be effective in terrorist attacks. Vehicle borne improvised explosive devices can be 2559
used against markets, checkpoints, voting stations, cultural sites, ports and ships, combat outposts, traffic 2560
control points, or other targets. Assassinations can also be an effective tactic. An assassination can be 2561
directed towards killing a government or community leader. Intimidation and blackmail can both raise 2562
revenue and create fear. 2563
5-15. Insurgents may perform terrorist attacks on key infrastructure and government or public facilities to 2564
disable systems, deny their use by the government, demonstrate government inability to secure critical 2565
sites, kill or capture personnel, or acquire resources (such as robbing a bank or stealing a fuel truck). 2566
Examples of key infrastructure are power plants and substations, dams and bridges, petroleum refineries, 2567
public health facilities, reconstruction projects, telecommunications and mass media facilities. Insurgents, 2568
especially those who use more advanced strategies, may patiently infiltrate personnel who work at these 2569
facilities in order to gather information about these systems and conduct precision sabotage as dictated by 2570
the insurgents objectives. 2571
5-16. Pseudo operations are operations normally carried out to blame someone else for the units deeds. In 2572
pseudo operations, the element assumes the guise of another group. They can mask themselves as 2573
government elements, security forces, or any group outside of their own. This involves developing or 2574
obtaining false identifications, uniforms, official vehicles, and credentials to complete the deception. The 2575
goal is to conduct operations in someone elses name to cause blame to that group. 2576
5-17. Insurgents can also use cyber attacks. Cyber capabilities can give an insurgency the ability to affect 2577
systems within the host nation and outside of the host nation. For example, a cyber attack could undermine 2578
the financial system within a state. This may be an effective way to undermine the legitimacy of a host 2579
nation. However, a cyber attack could also affect any state or region. Cyber capabilities provide an 2580
insurgent the ability to attack a country that supports the host nation, for example. If an insurgency attains 2581
cyber capabilities, the nature of the conflict changes. 2582
Conventional Tactics 2583
5-18. Insurgents use a wide range of tactics to engage the counterinsurgent. During a war of movement, 2584
insurgents may try to destroy host-nation government forces. However, this may expose the insurgent if an 2585
attempt to destroy a host nations security force is taken too early. Often insurgents will use small unit 2586
tactics. 2587
5-19. The counterinsurgents knowledge of the insurgents conventional capabilities is used to evaluate 2588
insurgent courses of action. Commanders use this knowledge to determine appropriate protection measures 2589
and tactics to counter insurgent actions. A knowledge of how insurgents conduct attacks helps to determine 2590
the effectiveness of efforts to counter enemy military capabilities. Commanders and staffs evaluate the 2591
following to determine insurgent capabilities for violent action: 2592
Forms of violent actions used. 2593
Available weapons and their capabilities. 2594
Chapter 5
Training. 2595
Known methods of operating. 2596
Frequency of attacks. 2597
Timing of attacks. 2598
Targets of attacks. 2599
Tactics and techniques. 2600
Known linkages between violent, political, and information actions. 2601
Uses of violence to increase popular support and undermine counterinsurgents. 2602
Means of command during attacks (to include methods of communication). 2603
5-20. Insurgents use a wide range of conventional tactics. Insurgents often employ ambushes for 2604
harassment and disruption. Sniper operations may also be effective. Insurgents may use indirect fire, such 2605
as mortar and rocket attacks, to harass counterinsurgents or cause them to commit forces that can then be 2606
attacked by other means. Weapons and munitions are frequently modified to best suit insurgent needs for a 2607
specific target or mission. Examples include using direct fire rockets or missiles in an indirect manner to 2608
avoid detection. 2609
5-21. Improvised explosive devices are effective tools that can be integrated into many different types of 2610
attacks. Improvised explosive devices can be inexpensive to produce and, because of the various detonation 2611
techniques available, may avoid risks to the perpetrator. Also, suicide bombing cannot be overlooked as an 2612
employment method, and it can be very effective. Other advantages of improvised explosive devices 2613
include their ability to gain publicity and their ability to control casualties through timed detonation and 2614
careful placement of the device. It is also easily for insurgents to deny responsibility, should the action 2615
produce undesirable results. Improvised explosive devices that can be command detonated or tripped by a 2616
device like a pressure plate are also used as ambush weapons to disrupt and destroy vehicles and convoys. 2617
In addition to improvised explosive devices, insurgents often use mines and booby-traps against vehicles, 2618
helicopters, dismounted troops on patrol, in homes, while searching enemy equipment and personnel, and 2619
first responders. 2620
Support Activities 2621
5-22. Although noticeable, violence may be only a small part of overall insurgent activity. Insurgent 2622
support activates include training, logistics, and communications. These support activities sustain 2623
insurgencies and allow for both military and political actions. They are enabled by an insurgencys ability 2624
to generate popular support. Insurgent support networks may be large, even when violence levels are low. 2625
These networks can include support from other nations or from population groups outside the country. 2626
5-23. The effectiveness of insurgent operations depends heavily on logistics. The support cells and active 2627
supporters within the population accumulate, move, store, and disseminate supplies for the other cells. 2628
Specialty underground cells tend to have their own covert logistics elements to ensure secrecy and security. 2629
Insurgents obtain logistics from active supporters, smugglers, black markets, extortion, theft, and external 2630
actors. Insurgents can purchase items such as food, water, medicine, bomb making materials, propaganda 2631
products, transportation, and places to store supplies. Sometimes an insurgents location and disposition is 2632
dictated by existing logistics or supplies. Commanders and staffs can find insurgents through analysis of 2633
their logistics and supply lines. Insurgent logistics activities can include outposts and bases near rivers, 2634
farms, smuggling routes, markets, hospitals, drug fields and labs, and borders. 2635
5-24. In some parts of the world, a lack of access to weapons may forestall insurgencies. However, there is 2636
widespread availability of weapons in many areas, with especially large surpluses in the most violent 2637
regions of the world. Explosive hazards, such as mines and improvised explosive devices, are likely to be 2638
common weapons in insurgencies. Insurgents can obtain weapons through legal or illegal purchases or from 2639
foreign sources. A common tactic is to capture them from government forces. Counterinsurgency forces 2640
should seek to cut off the flow of arms into the area of operations and eliminate their sources. 2641
5-25. Income is essential not only for insurgents to purchase weapons but to pay recruits and bribe 2642
officials. Money and supplies can be obtained through many sources. Foreign support is one possible 2643
source of income. Local supporters or international front organizations may provide financial support. 2644
Sometimes legitimate businesses are established to furnish funding. In areas controlled by insurgents, 2645
confiscation or taxation may be utilized. Another common source of funding is criminal activity. 2646
5-26. Funding greatly influences an insurgencys character and vulnerabilities. The insurgents approach 2647
determines the movements requirements. Protracted popular war strategies that emphasize mobilization of 2648
the masses require considerable resources to build and maintain a counter-state. In comparison, the 2649
military-focused approachwhich emphasizes armed actionneeds only the resources to sustain a 2650
military campaign. Counter threat finance is an important means to interdict an insurgencys funding. (See 2651
the Commanders Handbook for Counter Threat Finance for more information.) 2652
Training and Indoctrination 2653
5-27. The quality and quantity of training depends on how advanced the insurgency is and what its specific 2654
strategy is. Indoctrination is a part of training which is critical to maintain allegiance and to focus cells to 2655
conduct continuous operations without frequent communications and direction from insurgent leadership. 2656
The level of indoctrination can help analysts identify the strategy and sophistication of the insurgency and 2657
includes more than just the overall objective of the insurgency. Subordinate leaders within an insurgency 2658
are indoctrinated because they must execute the senior leaderships intent and vision as well as guide 2659
operations until redirected. The better the indoctrination of the intent and vision, the more decentralized, 2660
self-sufficient, and focused the insurgent cells are. 2661
5-28. Higher education also plays a role in insurgent training. Many insurgent leaders are well educated 2662
and understand how to use things such as the Internet and mass media to communicate their messages. 2663
Guerillas, however, might not be as well educated. 2664
5-29. Training also includes individual and collective training depending on the role of the insurgent and 2665
the specific skills of the insurgent (such as sniper, information operations, human intelligence, raid or 2666
ambush, communications, logistics and caches, or bomb maker). More advanced training may include how 2667
insurgents conduct themselves if captured, including resistance to interrogation and operations within 2668
detention facilities (recruiting, clandestine communications, and maintaining control of other insurgents). 2669
5-30. Other states may play an essential role in training an insurgency. Training can occur at sites in the 2670
supporting country or covertly within the host nation. Many states maintain the ability to conduct 2671
unconventional warfare. (See FM 3-05 for more information on unconventional warfare.) 2672
Communications 2673
5-31. Communications in an insurgency cannot depend on open and traditional means. Ensuring an 2674
effective network of communications is an essential support activity of an insurgency. Insurgents can 2675
compensate for the lack of regular and reliable communications in numerous ways, including masking their 2676
communications in radio, television, or Internet messages. They may also pass information in cameras, 2677
high frequency, short-wave, and amateur (ham radio) sets, cellular phones, the mail, computers, or memory 2678
storage devices transported by couriers. They may also avoid detection by use of couriers and face-to-face 2679
meetings. 2680
INSURGENT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 2681
5-32. Insurgents usually have several strengths. Insurgents usually have a significant knowledge of an area 2682
of operations. Usually insurgents are operating in their own country and own ethnic group, making it 2683
extremely difficult for friendly forces to identify insurgents in the community or to identify people 2684
connected with the insurgency. Insurgents have intimate knowledge of the area of operations including 2685
things like the characteristics of the local people and their culture, daily schedules, accents, and local slangs 2686
that enable them to blend in with the local population, enhancing their ability to operate with secrecy. 2687
Insurgents will probably wear similar clothing, have like postures, mannerisms and hand gestures, body 2688
movements, walking speed, greetings, body motions, and maintain eye contact (or lack of) as the 2689
population of the area of operations. They will also probably observe local social norms of food, drink, and 2690
sleeping schedules. 2691
Chapter 5
5-33. The insurgent is not usually responsible for maintaining normal governmental obligations to the local 2692
population. While an insurgent may conduct some governmental functions and set up a shadow 2693
government, an insurgency does not normally have the same expectations from the population to provide 2694
governmental services. This normally means that insurgencies spend few resources on governmental 2695
functions, which frees more resources to conduct the insurgency. 2696
5-34. Most insurgencies have limited personnel and resources. Long periods without resupply and loss of 2697
key personnel can affect the insurgencys ability to sustain the conflict. Counterinsurgents can apply 2698
pressure on the insurgency by conducting raids on cell members; recovering enemy caches; interdicting 2699
supply routes; searching or seizing resources from cars, homes, and personnel entering the area of 2700
operations; isolating the insurgents from access to markets, smugglers, and black-market goods; and by 2701
conducting offensive operations that diminish guerrilla numbers. Insurgencies usually fail when their 2702
ability to replenish, either through counterinsurgent action, mismanagement on their own part, or 2703
withdrawal of the support of an external actor, is undermined. 2704
5-35. Insurgent movements are vulnerable to friendly force information operations that shows their danger, 2705
futility, privation, and numerical inferiority compared to government forces. In some cases, the fear of 2706
being treated as a criminal if captured, and the fear of violence to the insurgent and the insurgents family, 2707
can cause desertions and defections. In some societies, good treatment, pardons, protection, food, shelter, 2708
and participation in the government may be stronger incentives than the fear of criminal punishment to 2709
induce desertions. Other insurgent stress factors include sustained combat and a hostile environment that 2710
weakens insurgent resolve. 2711
5-36. The decentralized nature of the insurgent cells that provide operations security can also be a 2712
weakness as it is resource intensive, slows responsiveness, and causes information to move slowly. The 2713
difficulty of the insurgent to receive encouragement from superiors and members of the political wing, a 2714
lack of direction in the face of counterinsurgent pressures, and an inability to openly call for reinforcements 2715
and logistics due to their operations security plan can make insurgents feel isolated, alone, confused, and 2716
unsupported. Analysts need to identify these points and recommend operations to demoralize and promote 2717
defections among insurgents. 2718
ASSOCIATED THREATS 2719
5-37. Other threats can play an interconnected role in an insurgency. Two groups are particularly 2720
important, criminal organizations and nongovernmental militias. These groups can be supportive, neutral, 2721
or opposed to an insurgency. 2722
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS 2723
5-38. Insurgents commonly use criminal organizations to accomplish objectives. Common activities 2724
designed to gain revenue or materials include theft, drug or human trafficking, smuggling of illicit 2725
materials, prostitution, extortion, kidnapping, blackmail, counterfeiting, taxing of civilians, bank robbery, 2726
and bribery. Criminal organizations appear as street gangs, mafias, cartels, or other structured groups. 2727
Criminal organizations can also assist insurgent groups in achieving objectives other than financial or 2728
accumulating resources. Other objectives may include intimidating government employees or candidates, 2729
conducting assassinations, kidnapping key personnel, initiating sectarian violence, strikes, demonstrations, 2730
riots, and smuggling high-value leaders, advisors, or weapons. Criminal organizations can also conduct 2731
operations deemed unpopular with the civilian population at a distance from the insurgent movement to 2732
create deniability. 2733
5-39. Many insurgencies degenerate into criminality. This occurs as the primary movements disintegrate 2734
and the remaining elements become isolated. Insurgent disintegration is desirable; it replaces a dangerous, 2735
ideologically inspired body of disaffiliated individuals with a less dangerous but more diverse body, 2736
normally of uneven character. The first is a security threat; the second is a law-and-order concern. This 2737
should not be interpreted as denigrating the armed capacity of a law-and-order threat. Successful 2738
counterinsurgents are prepared to address this disintegration. They recognize that the ideal approach 2739
eliminates both the insurgency and any criminal threats the insurgencys elimination produces. 2740
5-40. However, criminal groups can develop into insurgencies. In the case of localities that depend on 2741
black markets for their general welfare, the local population may depend on criminal activities. This creates 2742
an closely interlocked relationship between the criminal element (running the black market) and the 2743
insurgents (linked to the black market). In some cases, this relationship feeds into the causes of an 2744
insurgency, namely the local population supports the insurgents because they want to stop interference with 2745
their economic livelihood. An insurgency based on a black market generally has ties to other black markets 2746
and resources through globalization. At its core, a black market requires trade and contact with others. This 2747
can create a well-funded, trained, and equipped commercial insurgency. 2748
5-41. An insurgency can begin with a political aim and then develop into a commercial insurgency because 2749
of connections to that market. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia started as a communist 2750
insurgent group in 1964. However, through its involvement in the drug trade, it has become the richest 2751
self-sustaining insurgent group in history. In the parts of Columbia that it controls, it is closely linked to the 2752
population because the population depends on the drug trade for its economic well-being. 2753
NONGOVERNMENT MILITIAS 2754
5-42. As the host-nation government weakens and violence increases, people look for ways to protect 2755
themselves. If the government cannot provide protection, people may organize into armed militias to 2756
protect themselves. Moreover, some societal structures, such as tribes, may have a militia structure. 2757
Examples of militias include the following: 2758
Loyalist militias formed in Northern Ireland. 2759
Right-wing paramilitary organizations formed in Colombia to counter the Revolutionary Armed 2760
Forces of Colombia. 2761
Militias of various ethnic and political groups formed in Iraq during Operation IRAQI 2762
FREEDOM. 2763
5-43. If militias are outside the host-nation governments control, they can often be obstacles to ending an 2764
insurgency. Militias may become more powerful than the host-nation government, particularly at the local 2765
level. They may also fuel the insurgency and a precipitate a downward spiral into a full-scale civil war. 2766
However, they can also play a constructive role and provide local security. While this can undermine the 2767
host-nations government, it can also be a building block to help build legitimacy at the local level. 2768
OPPORTUNISTS 2769
5-44. An opportunist is one who takes advantage of any opportunity to achieve an end, often with no 2770
regard for principles or consequences. In the context of irregular warfare, opportunists often take advantage 2771
of the conditions of instability in the pursuit of their own goals, such as smuggling contraband, while 2772
security forces are distracted from protecting the border due to combating an insurgency. Commanders and 2773
staffs identify opportunists, assess their impact on the mission and force protection, consider them in 2774
planning, and mitigate their impact as needed. This section will review the types of opportunists and their 2775
activities, and it will discuss planning considerations to address the impact of opportunists. 2776
5-45. There are several types of opportunists who, by nature, impede the regular and effective functions of 2777
government and may act contrary to the wellbeing of the people. Opportunists may be existing local people 2778
or external actors, including civilians, members of the government, or security forces. Opportunists can be 2779
in direct support of the insurgency or outside actors. They can be state sponsored, sponsored by a non-state 2780
actor, or unsponsored, all while taking advantage of unstable conditions. Opportunists understand and 2781
exploit the conditions of instability inherent in irregular war where lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency 2782
are the norm. The extreme conditions of an insurgency may allow activities that are normally countered 2783
with effective law enforcement and governance to proceed with impunity. These conditions allow 2784
opportunists to pursue their political and economic interests. 2785
5-46. Opportunists may tend to exploit vulnerable populations by conducting kidnapping for ransom, 2786
revenge killings, murder for hire, hijacking, extortion, black marketing, smuggling, and trafficking of 2787
drugs, humans, and weapons. Opportunists use the conditions of instability to perform activities that are 2788
often illegal to further their interests. They can also work within the political system to further their 2789
Chapter 5
interests. Insurgencies often occur in a chaotic political environment. As such, opportunists can take 2790
advantage of the chaos to gain political power 2791
5-47. Foreign opportunists, such as mercenaries, international criminal groups, and terrorists, may be 2792
sponsored by an external state or non-state actor or act independently. These groups may also work in the 2793
environment of an insurgency. They can act in a similar manner as internal opportunists, but they pursue 2794
the interests of an external actor. 2795
5-48. Opportunists can work for an insurgency, against an insurgency, or both. How they work and who 2796
they work for is determined by an opportunists own interests. Opportunists can work both sides to 2797
maximize influence and profits while avoiding retribution. An opportunist can provide safe passage for 2798
insurgents, while also providing intelligence to counterinsurgents. An opportunist is not bound by the 2799
objectives of either the counterinsurgent or insurgent. 2800
5-49. Reintegration initiatives, although favorable to resolve many insurgencies, can be exploited by 2801
opportunists due to the inclusive and reconciliatory nature of these programs. Opportunists can infiltrate 2802
local civilian security forces to avoid retribution, influence less secure communities, and provide 2803
opportunities for vigilantism. Reintegration can also offer incentives for opportunists looking for 2804
employment, benefits, or even amnesty from a seditious criminal, social activist, or political past. 2805
5-50. Opportunists can be malign by design or by circumstance. Malign by design refers to the opportunists 2806
whose purpose is criminal and counterproductive to effective government and a populaces wellbeing by 2807
charter. By circumstance refers to opportunists whose purpose is not criminal by design but shifts to wholly 2808
or partial illicit activities to further their interests based on obstacles to their original path. Groups like 2809
corporations, nongovernmental organizations, or security contractors may be advocates for a functioning 2810
government, but due to conditions which present opportunities for them, these groups or individuals may 2811
act counterproductively to counterinsurgent efforts. These are very difficult to identify due to their 2812
favorable position and the potentially clandestine activities employed to sustain their position. 2813
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPPORTUNISTS 2814
5-51. In the planning process, it is important to analyze the activities of opportunists, even though their 2815
presence may not be apparent. The same conditions that may allow an insurgency to form and enjoy 2816
freedom of movement also allow opportunists to act. Opportunists will probably take advantage of the 2817
vulnerability of the population and exploit the lack of governmental control in pursuit of their goals 2818
5-52. The presence, actions, and impact of opportunists can affect the success of the mission to defeat the 2819
insurgency and address the root causes of the conflict. This is especially true as the opportunists may rely 2820
on the presence of the insurgency and unstable conditions to achieve their ends. Opportunists and their 2821
activities need to be included in understanding the area of operations and addressed during mission 2822
planning and in attack the network operations. In the intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace 2823
process, opportunists may be addressed within civil considerations, or within the threat, where appropriate. 2824
The mission analysis must address identifying opportunists, understanding their impacts, and addressing or 2825
mitigating their impacts. 2826
5-53. The commanders intent may need to include dealing with opportunists depending on the level of 2827
interference or political nature of opportunists. Opportunists can impact the mission or force protection. 2828
This is especially true if the opportunists are from a state sponsor or a border region where an internal 2829
conflict can spread to another country. Overall, it is important to understand how opportunists can aid an 2830
insurgency, either directly or indirectly, and how they can undermine the efforts of a host-nation 2831
government or a coalition effort, to address the causes of instability. 2832

PART THREE 2833
Counterinsurgencies 2834
Part three provides doctrine for how to counter an insurgency. How one counters an 2835
insurgency is dependent on the strategic and operational context (Part I) and the 2836
insurgency (Part II). Chapter 6 discusses command and control and mission 2837
command. Chapter 7 discusses planning. This includes conceptual and detailed 2838
planning. Chapter 8 discusses indirect methods and chapter 9 discusses direct 2839
methods for countering an insurgency. Chapter 10 discusses intelligence and 2840
operational considerations. These include inform and influence activities and 2841
integrated monetary shaping operations. Chapter 11 discusses assessments, which 2842
provides information on effectively using measures of performance and measures of 2843
effectiveness in counterinsurgency. Finally, part three discusses legal considerations 2844
in chapter 12. 2845
Chapter 6 2846
Command and ControI and Mission Command 2847
6-1. The operations process is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and 2848
the command and control or mission command process sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. 2849
Sometimes this recognition takes the form of a conscious command decisionas in deciding on a concept 2850
of operations. Sometimes it takes the form of a preconditioned reactionas in immediate-action drills, 2851
practiced in advance so that units can execute them reflexively in a moment of crisis. Sometimes it takes 2852
the form of a rules-based procedureas in the guiding of an aircraft on final approach. Some types of 2853
command and control or mission command must occur so quickly and precisely that they can be 2854
accomplished only by computers such as the command and control of a guided missile in flight. Other 2855
forms may require such a degree of judgment and intuition that they can be performed only by skilled, 2856
experienced people-as in devising tactics, operations, and strategies.(See MCDP 6 and Marine Corps 2857
Operating Concepts Third Edition for more information.) 2858
COMMAND IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 2859
6-2. Command in counterinsurgency often involves a large geographic area and control over multiple 2860
units performing different types of operations. In Western Iraq, Brigadier General W. Blake Crowe 2861
commanded a large area that began along the Syrian border and extended to the Jordanian border. He 2862
executed command over multiple units, performing multiple tasks in different areas. The following vignette 2863
provides a his insights into command during the Iraqi War in 2006. 2864
Chapter 6
Command in Counterinsurgency 2865
Our area of operations began along the Syrian border and extended down to the 2866
Jordanian border. We were also responsible for the Marine Expeditionary Force 2867
(MEF) security area, which extended to Saudi Arabia. This was a large area, and it 2868
was not possible to be everywhere. This situation forced us to work with the locals 2869
and to work and play well with other units operating in the region, such as the Special 2870
Operations Forces (SOF). But there in 2006,we were the surrogate government. We 2871
did not have mayors at the time. The provincial governor was in Ramadi, and he 2872
stayed there. Twice we were able to get him out to western al-Anbar in the year I was 2873
there, and it took a regimental size operation to get him out to cities such as 2874
Baghdadi, Haditha, and al-Qaim. We spent nearly thirty days worth of planning to 2875
get him out there because for us he was more important than the president of the 2876
United States. I think Marines here would understand that. 2877
Our first mayor came in six months into my deployment in al-Qaim. Lieutenant 2878
Colonel Dale Alford, commander of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, was involved in 2879
setting the conditions for that success. We didnt have a mayor in Haditha because 2880
we had to arrest him. He was an insurgent. We didnt have a mayor in Hit because 2881
the previous ones had been killed. So until December 2006, we were the surrogate 2882
local government. We learned very quickly that if we allowed the Iraqis to fail to build 2883
and provision their security forces, then we would have failed as well. So, we had to 2884
step in and fill that surrogate role. 2885
There is a debate concerning these operations and whether or not they are 2886
counterinsurgencies, hybrid operations, or distributed operations. We did them all. In 2887
al-Qaim, we conducted what I would call a pure counterinsurgency (COIN) operation 2888
because the conditions had been set by the previous regiment. We were still having 2889
major manned gun, tank rounds, and combined arms in downtown Hit with more than 2890
one hundred surging on twelve- to fifteen-man positions. Phasing, synchronizing, 2891
supporting, and enabling formed what I thought was my primary role there. 2892
Every battalion commander wants to be the main effort. Every regimental or brigade 2893
commander wants to be the main effort. We werent the main effort in Iraq. And every 2894
battalion could not be the main effort, and thats the hard thing for people to 2895
reconcile. How come Im not getting all these assets? 2896
When I was in Afghanistan, I received everything. We were one Marine battalion 2897
attached to the Army and we were given everything. In Iraq, I had five battalions in 2898
my command and one reduced Force Reconnaissance company commanded by six 2899
lieutenant colonels. At least one unit is not going to get what they want in a timely 2900
fashion. The battalions, companies, and platoons had autonomy, but autonomy 2901
doesnt mean that they operated independently. Thats where synchronizing comes 2902
in. It means going out and working very close to the battalions and blurring the 2903
borders between zones of responsibility and forcing commanders to get together and 2904
have a cup of coffee. Just as we needed to have tea with the local nationals, we also 2905
needed to do that among ourselves. We did that very well with the SOF. I put liaisons 2906
with the national-level SOF. I put liaisons with the white SOF. We established an ad- 2907
hoc tactical fusion center at the regimental level. 2908
[W]e raised close to 4,000 police officers. I waited a year and was told the police 2909
stations are coming. They never did. So we created expeditionary forward operating 2910
bases, because that way I could use Marine Corps money. I could put police in them, 2911
although they could not be designated official Iraqi Police stations. If it was 2912
designated as such, you would get reported because it would not be official. So, 2913
there are things that you have to do. Its not selective disobedience of orders, but 2914
rather a creative way of getting the mission accomplished. 2915
We had two force protection measures: the American standard and what was 2916
acceptable to the Iraqis. Casualties were unacceptable to me as a commander. The 2917
first time you go to a scene where youve lost a soldier, it does not matter what 2918
Command and Control and Mission Command
uniform hes wearing. He is one of ours. He was bought in to serve with us, and I 2919
dont care what nationality he is. We needed to build it to one standard: checkpoints, 2920
force protection, food, weapons, ammunition, all the way down. They fight with us 2921
and were going to treat them to our standard. Thats just nonnegotiable. 2922
Excerpt from Chapter 5, Regimental Command in Counterinsurgency, 2923
Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, p. 51-54. Marine 2924
Corps University Press, Quantico, Virginia. 2925
Note: For Army users, JP 1 defines command as the authority that a commander in the armed 2926
forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes 2927
the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the 2928
employment of, organizing directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the 2929
accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, 2930
and discipline of assigned personnel. ADP 6-0 defines control as the regulation of forces and 2931
warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commanders intent. 2932
6-3. Sometimes mission command occurs concurrently with the action being undertakenin the form of 2933
real-time guidance or direction in response to a changing situation. Sometimes it occurs beforehand and 2934
even after. Planning, whether rapidly time-sensitive or deliberate, which determines aims and objectives, 2935
develops concepts of operations, allocates resources, and provides for necessary coordination, is an 2936
important element of mission command. Furthermore, planning increases knowledge and elevates 2937
situational awareness. Effective training and education, which make it more likely that subordinates will 2938
take the proper actions in combat, establish mission command before the operation. The immediate-action 2939
drill, practiced beforehand, provides mission command. A commander's intent, expressed clearly before the 2940
operation begins, is an essential part of mission command. Likewise, analysis after the operation, which 2941
ascertains the results and lessons of the action and so informs future actions, contributes to mission 2942
command. 2943
Note: For Marine Corps users, mission command is a type of command and control that 2944
promotes innovation and enables the strong relationships of trust and mutual understanding 2945
necessary for decentralized decision making required to seize the initiative, degrade enemy 2946
cohesion, and strengthen friendly cohesive relationships that are critical elements to any 2947
counterinsurgency. Based on leader character, mission command offers no checklist for success, 2948
but instead challenges the services to cultivate a bias for taking appropriate action and accentuate 2949
the senior leadership virtues of trust, moral courage, and restraint. The mission command 2950
philosophy asserts that people are the basis of all military organizations, and military operations 2951
occur as human interactions. Commanders use the philosophy of mission command to exploit 2952
and enhance uniquely human skills. Commanders implement mission command though the 2953
leadership providing direction and guidance as part of command and understanding that his 2954
subordinates contribute to control. For the Army, the philosophy of mission command is the 2955
exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined 2956
initiative within the commanders intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of 2957
unified land operations (ADP 6-0). 2958
6-4. Mission command is the preferred method for counterinsurgency operations because Marines and 2959
Soldiers interact with a society at the lowest levels. Because interactions with a society occur at the 2960
individual level, freedom of action within the commanders intent is the most effective means to support a 2961
host nation in building legitimacy. Effective counterinsurgency operations require tactical leaders to have 2962
freedom of action but to stay within the commanders intent. Tactical leaders can have strategic effects in a 2963
counterinsurgency. As such, tactical leaders must act with a conceptual understanding of operational 2964
environment and how their actions fit into that operational environment. 2965
6-5. A counterinsurgency involves simultaneous activities at every echelon. For example, platoons within 2966
a company could be doing a different tasks, and companies within a battalion could be doing different 2967
tasks, all in support of a battalions method of counterinsurgency. Every task involves potential decisions 2968
Chapter 6
that can have an immediate impact on success or failure. Moreover, these tasks are interrelated. This 2969
means that junior leaders will make decisions at the point of effort, relying on mission type orders. This 2970
applies to any operational approach taken to defeat an insurgency. For example, if the commander 2971
integrates a direct action force into a host nations counterinsurgency effort, that force will have to 2972
understand the operational environment and the commanders intent. Any mission can have unintended 2973
consequences, and this includes missions with clear objectives. For example, a direct action mission taken 2974
with faulty intelligence could result in the deaths of civilians. All commanders have to be empowered to 2975
make decisions that positively impact mission accomplishment. Whatever operational approach the 2976
commander takes and however the host nation is supported, mission command is essential. 2977
6-6. When squads, platoons and companies are distributed over wide areas, they must frequently make 2978
decisions and their understanding of the environment is generally better than that of their higher 2979
headquarters. In an effective counterinsurgency, there is a need for decentralization that puts a premium on 2980
the higher headquarters establishing a clear commander's intent and providing subordinates with vision and 2981
guidance particular to the insurgency and host nation. In a counterinsurgency, commanders must effectively 2982
execute the art of command, which is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through timely 2983
decision-making and leadership. These decisions often have to be made in a time constrained environment. 2984
As such, decentralized decision making is essential, and it provides control over the operations and 2985
activities inherent in a counterinsurgency. 2986
HEADQUARTERS USE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 2987
6-7. While mission command allows for multiple actions to simultaneously occur at every echelon, every 2988
echelon has an important role in ensuring that the various actions meet the desired end state. Control, which 2989
is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the 2990
commanders intent (ADP 6-0), requires a shared understanding of the operational environment and 2991
operational approach in a counterinsurgency. A lack of effective control over these activities can create 2992
gaps that insurgents can exploit. For example, if brigades or different divisions set different prices for 2993
weapons buyback programs or have different policies on wages, this sometimes creates situations that 2994
hamper the overall policy. A lack of understanding of the economic variables within a country can produce 2995
policies that undermine a weapons buyback program or distort the labor market. On the other hand, there 2996
might be cases in which one wants to allow a local commander more flexibility in setting such policies. The 2997
balance between local control and coordination of overall policy is one of the primary challenges facing the 2998
commanders and staffs of brigades, battalions, and regiments. 2999
6-8. The commander bases the level of flexibility and coordination of activities and policies on the 3000
operational environment and the commanders intent. Conditions vary within a country or region and the 3001
cities and towns within it. For example, while different policies on wages could produce a disjointed 3002
overall policy, it is also possible that different wages are justified by the economic environment in different 3003
areas in the country. One city could have low unemployment, while another city could have high 3004
unemployment. The different conditions in the labor market is something commanders should take into 3005
account when designing a policy on economic development and hiring local workers. 3006
6-9. The various activities that different units perform must also work within the operational approach of 3007
the joint commander. The joint commander is responsible for designing the overall operational approach of 3008
the counterinsurgency campaign. The joint commander has to ensure that that various activities being 3009
performed will meet the stated policy goal of the U.S. Subordinate commanders must ensure that their 3010
operational approaches and activities fit within the overall operational approach. Tactical actions must 3011
produce a strategic result, and every echelon of command shares a responsibility for ensuring that this 3012
occurs. Commanders understand the end state and the ramifications of their actions in meeting that end 3013
state. In a counterinsurgency, operations are interrelated, and they must support the overall commanders 3014
intent. 3015
6-10. Moreover, understanding the problem and having key leaders engage the population may be more 3016
important than having a large number of troops. Understanding and analysis drive planning. Understanding 3017
what one should do is more important than doing tasks that may be counterproductive. Also, constant 3018
engagement of key leaders with the population is essential to enhancing understanding of the population 3019
Command and Control and Mission Command
and understanding of the counterinsurgency. Having a robust headquarters or multiple headquarters may be 3020
more important than having a large number of Soldiers or Marines. 3021
6-11. A larger number of headquarters may also provide a further ability to work with the interagency and 3022
host-nation organizations. The interagency organizations can integrate their capabilities more effectively if 3023
there is a robust headquarters element to work with. The analysis and intelligence capabilities of a division 3024
or corps headquarters may be essential in integrating interagency organizations capabilities. These division 3025
and corps capabilities provide brigades the needed span of control to operate and integrate interagency 3026
organizations capabilities. Using multiple headquarters provides a robust capability for working with the 3027
host-nation organization, both military and civilian. Many programs meant to build capacity within the host 3028
nation are national level programs. A robust headquarters element will help to ensure that these programs 3029
are integrated and resourced to maximize the benefit to the counterinsurgency effort. This is needed to 3030
ensure that these programs are effective at the local level. 3031
6-12. A headquarters can also serve as a coordination center. A coordination center can provide a means to 3032
unify multiple governmental, military, police, and civilian partners to share information, provide support to 3033
priority projects, gather information, conduct meetings with local leaders, promote a whole of government 3034
and unified effort approach, and lend added credibility to the government. Coordination centers provide 3035
needed flexibility to control and coordinate host nation and coalition actions. Coordination centers can also 3036
act as joint tactical operations centers and integrate various joint capabilities, such as air support. 3037
6-13. Finally, every echelon has to ensure that adjacent units or units working in another units area of 3038
operations have relationships that allow for the overall completion of the end state. The operational 3039
environment does not normally dramatically change at a unit boundary. It is essential in a 3040
counterinsurgency to understand the actual economic, political, and social boundaries of an operating 3041
environment and not base policies on unit boundaries. Moreover, the relationships between units that are 3042
adjacent is essential. While the conditions in their operational environment may be different, commanders 3043
should understand their adjacent units problem frame and operational approach. Moreover, they should 3044
understand how their actions may affect the operational environment of other units. It is essential for 3045
commanders at every echelon to ensure adjacent units have relationships that allow for the completion of 3046
the overall mission. 3047
6-14. The same is true of forces operating in another units area of operations, such as special operating 3048
forces. While missions to capture an insurgent leader are may be essential to the overall mission, 3049
commanders must also work with other units to mitigate any negative consequences of those actions. It is 3050
the responsibility of commanders and staffs at all levels to ensure that the units under their command have 3051
productive relationships with other units. Establishing command and support relationships helps create 3052
channels that streamline information dissemination by ensuring the right information passes promptly to the 3053
right people. The three common channels for information dissemination are known as command, staff, and 3054
technical channels. (See ADRP 6-0.) 3055
6-15. The effective link between planning and assessing the effects of operations is in a counterinsurgency 3056
is the foundation for establishing effective mission command. (See chapter 11 for more information on 3057
assessments.) Success in a counterinsurgency is largely dependent on making lasting changes to the 3058
operating environment. This requires that commanders and staff continue to evolve in their situational 3059
understanding. Linking planning and assessing ones actions is essential. 3060
3061

Chapter 7 3062
PIanning for Countering Insurgencies 3063
7-1. The planning process provides a means to understand the operational environment and understand 3064
the commanders intent within that operational environment. (See ADRP 5-0). The activities of the 3065
operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) in a counterinsurgency are usually performed 3066
simultaneously. Multiple units perform multiple tasks at the same time within an ever changing operating 3067
environment. Developing situational understanding is a continuous process and counterinsurgencies 3068
involve evolving commanders visualizations. As such, the continued conceptualization of the operational 3069
environment and problem is essential for effective mission command in a counterinsurgency. Effective 3070
mission command in a counterinsurgency requires conceptual planning that is continually refined and 3071
questioned through assessments. 3072
CONCEPTUAL PLANNING 3073
7-2. The complexity of insurgencies presents problems that have incomplete, contradictory, and changing 3074
requirements. The solutions to these challenging problems are often difficult to recognize because of 3075
interdependencies of the relationships of the operational environment. While attempting to solve these 3076
problems, the solution to one of its aspects may reveal or create another, even more complex, problem. 3077
Operational design employs various elements to develop and refine the commanders operational approach 3078
(JP 5-0). Operational design involves conceptual planning. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to 3079
the art of operations and is the focus of the commander with staff support. The commanders activities of 3080
understanding and visualization are key aspects of conceptual planning (ADRP 5-0). 3081
7-3. Design provides a method to perform conceptual planning. (Refer to JP 5-0 for more information.) 3082
The purpose of design is to achieve a greater understanding, a proposed solution based on that 3083
understanding, and a means to learn and adapt. For the Army, the Army design methodology is a method 3084
for performing design. Army design methodology is an approach for applying critical and creative thinking 3085
to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for 3086
more information on the Army design methodology.) The Army design methodology is one way to develop 3087
an operational approach. First, design helps to frame the understanding of the operational environment by 3088
understanding what the current environment is and what the environment should look like. Understanding 3089
the operational environment is an essential foundation of counterinsurgency. (See chapter 2.) Commanders 3090
use the Army design methodology to create a shared understanding of the operational environment among 3091
commanders, staffs, and partners through a collaborative process. Commanders then use Army design 3092
methodology to create an understanding of what the environment should look like through the same 3093
collaborative process, which is known as the environmental frame. From there, commanders can actually 3094
begin to frame the problem and determine how to move the environment from the current state to the 3095
desired end state. This allows for the conceptualization of an operational approach, which is the general 3096
actions commanders can use to solve the problem. From an operational approach, the commander develops 3097
detailed planning. (See figure 7-1.) 3098
Chapter 7
Figure 7-1. Army design methodoIogy 3099
7-4. The Army design methodology must be iterative and reframing is essential. Reframing involves 3100
revisiting earlier hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current operational approach. 3101
Reframing can lead to a new problem statement and operational approach, resulting in an entirely new plan. 3102
(See ADRP 5-0). By their nature, counterinsurgency efforts require repeated assessments from different 3103
perspectives to see the various factors and relationships required for adequate understanding. Assessment 3104
and learning enable incremental improvements to the operational approach. The aim is to rationalize the 3105
problemto construct a logical explanation of observed events and subsequently construct the guiding 3106
logic that unravels the problem. The essence of this is the mechanism necessary to achieve success. This 3107
mechanism may not be a military activityor it may involve military actions in support of nonmilitary 3108
activities. Once commanders understand the problem and what needs to be accomplished to succeed, they 3109
identify the means to assess effectiveness and the related information requirements that support assessment. 3110
This feedback becomes the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent reframing. 3111
7-5. In an ideal world, a commander engaged in counterinsurgency operations would enjoy clear and 3112
well-defined goals for the campaign from the beginning. However, the reality is that many goals emerge 3113
only as the mission develops. For this reason, counterinsurgents usually have a combination of defined and 3114
emerging goals to achieve. Likewise, the complex problems encountered during counterinsurgency 3115
operations can be so difficult to understand that a clear operational approach cannot initially be developed. 3116
Often, the best choice is to create iterative solutions to better understand the problem. Using Army design 3117
methodology allows the initiation of learning from intelligent interaction with the environment. 3118
7-6. Initially, situational understanding might be relatively low and the environmental and operational 3119
frame requires, by necessity, a number of assumptions, especially with respect to the populace and the 3120
forces ability to positively influence their perception of events. Before deployment, improved situational 3121
understanding is aided by cultural and historical knowledge. The problem frame can be viewed as an 3122
experiment that tests the operational logic, with the expectation of a less-than-perfect solution. As the 3123
experiment unfolds, interaction with the populace and insurgents reveals the validity of various 3124
assumptions, revealing the strengths and weaknesses of the design. Other key considerations include the 3125
following: 3126
Planning for Countering Insurgencies
Systems thinking. 3127
Continuous assessment. 3128
Structured learning. 3129
7-7. System thinking involves developing an understanding of the relationships within the insurgency and 3130
the environment. It concerns the relationships of actions within the various lines of effort. This element is 3131
based on the perspective of the systems sciences that seeks to understand the interconnectedness, 3132
complexity, and wholeness of the elements of systems in relation to one another. 3133
7-8. Continuous assessment is essential as an operation unfolds because of the inherent complexity of 3134
counterinsurgency operations. No design or model completely matches reality. The object of continuous 3135
assessment is to identify where and how the design is working or failing and to consider adjustments to the 3136
design and operation. (See chapter 11 for more information on assessments.) 3137
7-9. The objective of structured learning is to develop a reasonable initial design and then learn, adapt, 3138
and iteratively and continuously improve the initial plan as more about the dynamics of the 3139
counterinsurgency problem become evident. The problem and environmental frame can be thought of as a 3140
model. In counterinsurgency, this model must always be tested to determine how well it matches reality. 3141
Ensuring that one understands the problem is core to ensuring that tactical actions have an effect on the 3142
environment. 3143
Center of Gravity 3144
7-10. An important element of conceptual planning is center of gravity analysis. The center of gravity is 3145
important in understanding both the environment and the enemy. A center of gravity is a source of power 3146
that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). The center of gravity 3147
construct is useful as an analytical tool to help counterinsurgency forces analyze the insurgencys sources 3148
of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Centers of gravity may change over time, they may 3149
be different at the operational and strategic level, and they could be different from location to location. (See 3150
JP 2-01.3) 3151
7-11. In an insurgency, the population is not necessarily the center of gravity for the enemy. A center of 3152
gravity could be external support from another country, it could be a group of core leadership or believers, 3153
or it could be a host of other factors or vital functions. Any center of gravity analysis in a 3154
counterinsurgency must begin with understanding that any counterinsurgency is unique, and a center of 3155
gravity analysis must not begin with a preconceived center of gravity. 3156
7-12. Moreover, it is important to understand ones own and the host nations center of gravity. In many 3157
cases, political support is the strategic center of gravity for the U.S. Tactical actions, such as war crimes, 3158
can undermine political support for the counterinsurgency. Host nations may also have a wide range of 3159
centers of gravity. Operational and tactical leaders must plan and execute operations that do not undermine 3160
the host nations center of gravity. 3161
Lines of Effort 3162
7-13. One important planning tool to move conceptual planning to detailed planning are lines of effort. 3163
Understanding drives the commanders visualization of an end state in the context of the objectives set by 3164
the commander. An end state are those conditions that, when achieved, accomplish the mission. (ADP 5-0) 3165
Generating understanding of operational environments and understanding the comprehensive threat allows 3166
the commander to determine the set of conditions his force must create to counter the insurgency. The 3167
complex nature of counterinsurgency requires tactical commanders at every echelon to visualize end state 3168
conditions. In a counterinsurgency, the most desirable end state is the conceptualization that the host nation 3169
is legitimate by the population. Different strategic contexts may dictate different end states. For this reason, 3170
establishing lines of effort is an effective way to structure counterinsurgency plans and operations. 3171
7-14. A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical 3172
reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions (ADRP 3-0). A line of 3173
effort is a tool for long-term planning when positional references to an enemy or adversary are not the 3174
Chapter 7
determining factor in friendly action. Because counterinsurgency operations involve many nonmilitary 3175
factors, lines of effort may form a way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state. Lines of 3176
effort help commanders visualize how to integrate military capabilities into the efforts of the rest of the 3177
unified action community. 3178
7-15. Lines of effort are an important tool to link conceptual planning to detailed planning. Lines of effort 3179
are an essential means that commanders can use to arrange tactical events in time and space. Benefits of 3180
using the line of effort framework include 3181
Aiding the commander in visualizing, describing, and directing operations toward a definitive 3182
end state. 3183
Unifying the efforts of joint, interagency, multinational, host-nation government, and host-nation 3184
security forces toward a common purpose. 3185
Allowing commanders and staffs to synchronize activities along all lines of effort to gain unity 3186
of effort. 3187
Ensuring all efforts converge on a well-defined, commonly understood end state. 3188
Combining the effects of long-term operations with short-, mid-, and long-term goals. 3189
Helping commanders identify missions, assign tasks, allocate resources, and assess operations. 3190
Enhancing mutual support between echelons and adjacent organizations. 3191
7-16. Lines of effort are different then lines of operation. A line of operation is a line that defines the 3192
interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or 3193
decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s) (JP 5-0). Because counterinsurgencies are 3194
oriented towards an intended outcome or purpose more so than an enemy force, counterinsurgency 3195
operations generally use lines of effort. However, this does not mean that lines of operation are not useful 3196
as a planning tool in a counterinsurgency. For example, if the counterinsurgency is conducting an attack 3197
into an insurgency safe heaven, lines of operation are useful. 3198
7-17. Lines of effort depict how the actions of a counterinsurgent, over time, achieve the end state 3199
visualized by the commander. In a counterinsurgency, lines of effort must be nested to the actions and 3200
activities of the host nation as well. From the tactical level to the strategic level, the goal of the 3201
counterinsurgent may be to support the host nation, depending on the operational design of the 3202
counterinsurgency. While that may require some tactical actions that do not involve host-nation forces, the 3203
overall effort must be to support the host nations efforts at all levels. The counterinsurgent forces support 3204
and nest their efforts within the efforts of the host nations strategic and operational approaches. 3205
7-18. Each line of effort must be consistently questioned and evaluated. Lines of effort are important 3206
because they help in the conceptualization and visualization of various tasks. However, if the tasks are 3207
linked together and the end state is not important to the mission or the tasks will not attain the end state, 3208
lines of effort can trap the commander into a preconceived notion that accomplishment of various tasks will 3209
result in a successful completion. Lines of effort are a useful means to help plan activities, not a measure of 3210
mission success. All leaders must guard against the assumption that their actions are relevant because they 3211
support a line of effort. The underlying assumptions of any line of effort must be constantly questioned and 3212
evaluated. 3213
7-19. The effects of actions in one line of effort are not contained to only that line of effort. For example, 3214
the commander could have a line of effort to support the rule of law and a line of effort to support 3215
economic development. However, a working legal system has a direct effect on the economic system. A 3216
system, in which contract law is enforced, for example, will have a much wider range of economic activity. 3217
Lines of effort are used for planning and conceptualization. Both commanders and staffs must guard 3218
against their own planning tools creating preconceived notions about the operational environment. 3219
7-20. Below is one example of lines of effort in a counterinsurgency. However, while this is an example 3220
that may apply well to a counterinsurgency after a large-scale combat operations, it may not apply well to 3221
other counterinsurgency operations. For example, the U.S. could be providing only enablers for a 3222
counterinsurgency effort. In other words, U.S. forces might be combining capabilities such as 3223
counter-threat finance, signal intelligence, and a direct action force to enable the host nation by stopping 3224
the insurgency from attaining the means to fight, providing intelligence on an insurgencys 3225
communications, and providing a means to capture or kill insurgent leadership. The host nation may have 3226
the capability to handle basic functions such as governance. When designing lines of effort for a 3227
counterinsurgency, the context one is operating in does matter. If one reduces lines of effort to a standard 3228
solution, the tool becomes supreme, instead of the function the tool performs. In a counterinsurgency, 3229
tactical actions must be connected to operational and strategic purpose. Lines of effort are a means to help 3230
the commander perform operational art. Use of the tool of lines of effort without performing the function 3231
will produce tactical actions not connected to a strategic purpose. Tactical actions not connected to an 3232
operational and strategic end state are ineffective and may not lead to the desired end state. 3233
Chapter 7
Figure 7-2. Lines of effort 3234
Transitions 3235
7-21. Transitions are fundamental to the planning and execution of any line of effort. Transitions are an 3236
internal part of any operation and their integration into each line of effort is essential. There are three types 3237
of transitions in counterinsurgency operations: 3238
Transitions between phases. 3239
Transitions between units in an area of operations. 3240
Transitions of responsibilities to host nation or other agencies. 3241
7-22. A transition between units or phases or a transition to another agency or the host nation represents an 3242
important milestone. A counterinsurgency seeks to change certain variables in the operational environment 3243
to influence the populations perception of legitimacy and to defeat the insurgency. As such, transitions are 3244
different from conventional warfare, in which transitions are likely to be based upon a units movements 3245
and enemy actions or conditions. 3246
7-23. Because transitions are based on the conditions of the operational environment, they must be a part 3247
of both the planning process and based on assessments of the operational environment. Transitions in 3248
counterinsurgency are essential because they show progress towards the desired end state. However, the 3249
commander must link transitions to an assessment process that allows the commander to attain situational 3250
understanding. A transition to another phase or a transition to the host nation delinked from the assessment 3251
process can undermine the achievement of the end state. For example, a transition to a host-nation agency 3252
before that host-nation agency is ready to assume responsibility will ultimately have the effect of 3253
undermining the legitimacy of the host nation as the host nation fails to meet the basic expectations of the 3254
population. 3255
7-24. Transitions and assessments are planned and executed from the beginning of any counterinsurgency. 3256
Commanders build legitimacy by ensuring that the host nation takes responsibility for basic functions when 3257
it can. Therefore, building towards and executing that transition to the host nation is fundamental to the 3258
commanders planning and operations. Transitions to other units or other agencies maintain a coherent and 3259
logical progression towards an ultimate transition to the host nation. The commander avoids allowing any 3260
U.S. element to transition to another U.S. or coalition element in a way that sets back the mission. This is 3261
also true for transitions between phases. A transition to another phase before the operational environment 3262
allows that transition can have disastrous consequences. 3263
7-25. Effective counterinsurgency is about effectively linking offense, defense, and stability tasks to a 3264
purpose and achieving that purpose. This is what makes lines of effort an effective planning tool for a 3265
counterinsurgency. However, linking both assessments and transitions into each line of effort is just as 3266
essential. The end state of every line of effort will be the host nation taking over primary reasonability for 3267
that effort. Transitioning to that point requires a well planned effort that evaluates progress and executes all 3268
transitions in a way that does not undermine the objective of the line of effort. (See chapter 11 for a further 3269
discussion on assessments.) 3270
Transition Considerations 3271
7-26. A transition is a sequence of actions required to shift responsibility from one organization to another, 3272
not a specific point in time. Transitions require adequate time to allow for all transitional tasks to be 3273
completed. Thinking of a transition as a general series of actions rather than a point in time more accurately 3274
reflects what must occur. 3275
7-27. Whether the transition is between military units or from a military unit to a civilian agency, all 3276
involved organizations must clearly understand the tasks and responsibilities being transferred and the time 3277
expected for completion. Commanders and staffs enable coordination between units, agencies, and 3278
organizations to reduce the friction normally associated with a transition. Commanders identify a 3279
collaborative transition planning team early in the process. 3280
7-28. Commanders and staffs identify the criteria and conditions that must be met with regard to lines of 3281
effort prior to executing a transition. For example, transitioning a strongpoint to host-nation control may 3282
require the host nation to allocate specialized personnel to replace the specialized personnel previously 3283
provided by other forces. Additionally, host-nation manning may need to be increased to offset the 3284
Chapter 7
departure of transitioning forces. Commanders identify criteria for all parties involved or gaps will develop 3285
in execution. One criteria is the minimum sustainable effort of the host nation prior to transition. Getting 3286
the balance for host-nation sustained effectiveness and long-term maintenance right may reflect a less than 3287
optimal solution from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, but any additional effort may actually 3288
jeopardize the legitimacy of the host nation in the long term. 3289
7-29. The counterinsurgency force understands that transitions occur at varying times and locations based 3290
on the situation in a given area. A transition may be linear at the local level, but transitions may occur at 3291
multiple levels in the aggregate. For example, one battalion or brigade may have three village clusters in a 3292
build phase, one that has transitioned, and two that are in a clear phase without any geographical context. 3293
One host-nation security unit may be more advanced in training and equipping than another. As a result, 3294
counterinsurgent forces may have to tailor their approach on a daily basis depending on the area, village, or 3295
unit where they are operating. Success in counterinsurgency operations requires small-unit leaders agile 3296
enough to transition among many types of missions and able to adapt to change. 3297
7-30. Maintaining unity of effort is particularly important during transitions, especially between 3298
organizations of different capabilities and capacities. Relationships tend to break down during transitions. 3299
A poorly executed transition affects the success of the mission and places the new unit at risk. Ego and 3300
unhealthy competition are often the greatest impediments to achieving an effective transition, increasing 3301
unnecessary risks to Soldiers, Marines, and the mission. Commanders must set the tone for their forces to 3302
accomplish effective physical and contextual transitions. 3303
7-31. A successful transition is achieved when it is executed properly and in synchronization with all the 3304
relevant organizations, entities, and agencies. Planning for transitions is more than the identification of the 3305
events that govern phases and branches for planning. It requires a holistic framing to develop the full 3306
appreciation of the tasks, time, and resources required to execute effectively and efficiently in a 3307
counterinsurgency environment. Well-planned transitions require proactive analysis and continuous 3308
assessment during execution. Assessment of qualitative and quantitative criteria, supported by expert 3309
opinion, should inform the decision to transition. 3310
DETAILED PLANNING 3311
7-32. The military decisionmaking process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation 3312
and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). Commanders 3313
use the military decisionmaking process to conduct the detailed planning that is required in an insurgency. 3314
Detailed planning translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Conceptual 3315
planning provides the basis for all detailed planning, but conceptual planning must respond to detailed 3316
constraints (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on the military decisionmaking process). 3317
7-33. The conceptual planning efforts in an insurgency are often not under a real time constraint, in that 3318
they are a continued and ongoing process. However, often in detailed planning there are time constraints. 3319
Counterinsurgents often receive time sensitive intelligence or mission requirements that require 3320
commanders and staffs to consider time as a key planning factor. In such cases, commanders allocate 3321
subordinate commands adequate time to conduct planning before an operation. Both parallel planning and 3322
the one-third, two-third rule are essential in detailed planning. (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on 3323
planning.) 3324
7-34. Mission command requires disciplined action that is informed by the commanders intent. In a 3325
counterinsurgency environment, small unit leaders must also understand the overall design of the operation 3326
and the operational environment. It is essential to understand the commanders intent, but it is also essential 3327
to have a shared understanding of the operational environment and the overall design of the operation. 3328
Subordinate commanders tailor and prioritize their actions within the lines of effort based on the distinct 3329
and evolving circumstances within their respective areas of operation. Small unit leaders work on obscure 3330
problems with host-nation, international, and unified action partners. In such an environment, the 3331
commanders overarching design and a shared understanding of the operational environment inform 3332
detailed planning. Subordinate leaders must understand the overall operational design and environment to 3333
make their actions relevant to the end state. 3334
COUNTERINSURGENCY PARADOXES 3335
7-35. A commander planning a counterinsurgency requires a specific mindset before that commander can 3336
plan or execute operations, and that mindset is the foundation for understanding how to counter an 3337
insurgency. Throughout conceptual and detailed planning, the counterinsurgency paradoxes described in 3338
paragraphs 6-51 through 6-58 provide a set of contradictions that aid the commander and staff in 3339
developing a counterinsurgency mindset. These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it. 3340
The applicability of the thoughts behind the paradoxes depends on a sense of the local situation and, in 3341
particular, the state of the insurgency. For example, the statement that sometimes, the more force used, the 3342
less effective it is, does not apply when the enemy is coming over the barricades; however, that thought is 3343
applicable when increased security is achieved in an area. In short, these paradoxes should not be reduced 3344
to a checklist; rather, they should be used with considerable thought. 3345
SOMETIMES, THE MORE YOU PROTECT YOUR FORCE, THE LESS SECURE YOU MAY BE 3346
7-36. Ultimate success in counterinsurgency operations is gained by protecting the populace, not the 3347
counterinsurgency force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, 3348
appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. To be successful, commanders 3349
employ aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations, and they share risks and 3350
maintain contact with the populace. Commanders weigh the effectiveness of establishing patrol bases and 3351
operational support bases against the security of using larger unit bases. Establishing patrol bases ensures 3352
access to the intelligence needed to drive operations. Sharing risks with the populace reinforces the 3353
connections with them that help establish real legitimacy. 3354
SOMETIMES, THE MORE FORCE IS USED, THE LESS EFFECTIVE IT IS 3355
7-37. Any use of force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force the 3356
commander applies, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also 3357
increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In contrast, 3358
using force precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law that needs to be established. The key to 3359
successful counterinsurgency operations is knowing when more force is neededand when it might be 3360
counterproductive. This judgment involves constant assessment of the security situation and a sense of 3361
timing regarding insurgents actions. 3362
THE MORE SUCCESSFUL THE COUNTERINSURGENCY IS, THE LESS FORCE CAN BE USED 3363
AND THE MORE RISK MUST BE ACCEPTED 3364
7-38. This paradox is really a corollary to the paradox described in paragraph 6-52. As the level of 3365
insurgent violence drops, the requirements of international law and the expectations of the populace lead to 3366
a reduction in direct military actions by counterinsurgents. More reliance is placed on police work, rules of 3367
engagement may be tightened, and troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Soldiers and Marines 3368
may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people. 3369
SOMETIMES DOING NOTHING IS THE BEST REACTION 3370
7-39. Often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of enticing 3371
counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploitfor example, 3372
opening fire on a crowd or executing a clearing operation that creates more enemies than it removes from 3373
the streets. If an assessment of the effects of a course of action determines that more negative than positive 3374
effects may result, an alternative should be consideredpotentially including not acting. 3375
SOME OF THE BEST WEAPONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENTS DO NOT SHOOT 3376
7-40. Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and 3377
legitimacy for the host-nation government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents (although 3378
killing clearly will often be necessary). Arguably, the decisive battle is for the peoples minds; hence 3379
Chapter 7
synchronizing influence operations with lines of efforts along the other lines of effort is critical. Every 3380
action, including uses of force, must be supported by adequate information. While security is essential to 3381
setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, 3382
and restored hope. Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more 3383
important effects than bombs and bullets. This is a time when money is ammunition. Depending on the 3384
state of the insurgency, therefore, Soldiers and Marines should prepare to accomplish many nonmilitary 3385
missions to support counterinsurgency efforts. Everyone has a role in nation building, not just Department 3386
of State and civil affairs personnel. 3387
THE HOST NATION DOING SOMETHING TOLERABLY IS NORMALLY BETTER THAN US 3388
DOING IT WELL 3389
7-41. It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where 3390
the U.S. is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable host-nation leaders and 3391
institutions that can carry on without significant U.S. support. The longer that process takes, the more U.S. 3392
public support will wane and the more the local populace will question the legitimacy of their own forces 3393
and government. General Creighton Abrams, the U.S. commander in Vietnam in 1971, recognized this fact 3394
when he said, Theres very clear evidence,in some things, that we helped too much. And we retarded 3395
the Vietnamese by doing it.We cant run this thing.Theyve got to run it. The nearer we get to that the 3396
better off they are and the better off we are. T.E. Lawrence made a similar observation while leading the 3397
Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1917: Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better 3398
the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it 3399
for them. However, a key word in Lawrences advice is tolerably. If the host nation cannot perform 3400
tolerably, the counterinsurgents supporting it may have to act. Experience, knowledge of the area of 3401
operation, and cultural sensitivity are essential in deciding when such action is necessary. 3402
IF A TACTIC WORKS THIS WEEK, IT MIGHT NOT WORK NEXT WEEK; IF IT WORKS IN 3403
THIS PROVINCE, IT MIGHT NOT WORK IN THE NEXT 3404
7-42. Competent insurgents are adaptive. They are often part of a widespread network that communicates 3405
constantly and instantly. Insurgents quickly adjust to successful counterinsurgency practices and rapidly 3406
disseminate information throughout the insurgency. Indeed, the more effective a counterinsurgency tactic 3407
is, the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need to counter it. Effective 3408
leaders at all levels avoid complacency and are at least as adaptive as their enemies. There is no single 3409
prescribed set of counterinsurgency procedures. Constantly developing new practices is essential. 3410
MANY IMPORTANT DECISIONS ARE NOT MADE BY GENERALS 3411
7-43. Successful counterinsurgency operations require competence and judgment by Soldiers and Marines 3412
at all levels. Indeed, young leaders often make decisions at the tactical level that have strategic 3413
consequences. Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and clear 3414
guidance; then they trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Preparation for tactical-level leaders 3415
requires more than just mastering Service doctrine; they must also be trained and educated to adapt to their 3416
local situations, understand the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and 3417
sound judgment in accordance with their senior commanders intent. 3418
3419

Chapter 8 3420
Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies 3421
8-1. The U.S. possesses many different indirect methods to counter an insurgency. Some of these 3422
capabilities may also contain elements that directly involve U.S. forces. For example, security cooperation 3423
also may include combat operations in support of foreign internal defense. (See JP 3-22 for more 3424
information on foreign internal defense.) If U.S. forces become directly involved in offensive operations, 3425
the overall operational approach has a direct element to it. The overall operational approach may involve 3426
the integration of both indirect and direct capabilities. This chapter discusses methods and capabilities that 3427
have a greater indirect element than direct element. 3428
8-2. Generational engagement is an indirect method that seeks to persuade the population to take part in 3429
the legal methods of political discourse and dissent. Negotiation and diplomacy are ways to resolve an 3430
insurgency by negotiating the root causes of the insurgency and the issues and challenges with the 3431
government and people. Security cooperation is a capability that can be used to build a host nations armed 3432
forces or other security forces. The U.S. also has other enablers, such as counter threat finance, that can be 3433
used to enable a host nations security force. These various indirect approaches and capabilities can be used 3434
in conjunction with one another and integrated into an overall approach. 3435
GENERATIONAL ENGAGEMENT 3436
8-3. Generational engagement is a method that can be conducted in conjunction with other approaches 3437
that seeks to get the host nation to educate and empower the population to participate in legal methods of 3438
political discourse and dissent. This can be done in both high threat situations and situations where the 3439
insurgency is at its infancy and combat is less intense. It is best that the host nation undertake this method 3440
as soon as possible to affect the next generation. Generational engagement is a population centric approach 3441
to combating insurgency. Generational engagement focuses on building new constituents in the host-nation 3442
population to counter insurgent actions. Generational engagement is a method of political mobilization of 3443
the people. The purpose of the method is to get population groups to side with the host nation. 3444
8-4. Generational engagement works with factions from the relevant population to get them to see the 3445
benefit of participating in peaceful means to address their core grievances. Getting youths to understand the 3446
legal means they have to address root causes of conflict is a critical tool for reducing violence. If 3447
commanders and staffs believe that insurgencies may occur over extended periods, then some efforts must 3448
be made to engage this next generation of leaders who can establish a lasting peace. Engagement also has 3449
to be made with the intellectual elites of the country. They may still be residing in the country of conflict or 3450
in another country that has significant influence over the insurgent cause. An example of getting youths 3451
involved can be seen in U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. 3452
8-5. In 2008 in Afghanistan, the U.S. government and U.S. forces influenced the government of 3453
Afghanistan to support the creation of the Afghanistan Youth and Social Organization. This is a nonprofit 3454
social and cultural organization dedicated to helping young Afghans understand and advance real 3455
democracy. The Afghanistan Youth and Social Organization has a grassroots network in all 34 provinces of 3456
Afghanistan. Its members consist of young men and women who are interested in rebuilding the 3457
democratic, economic, and social fabric of their country. 3458
8-6. The members of the Afghanistan Youth and Social Organization have been able to unite 30,000 3459
independent youths throughout the country to have a unified voice and establish an active grassroots 3460
network of young activists. They conducted voter outreach to 50,000 individuals in the 2009 presidential 3461
and provincial council elections and assisted 17 of its members getting successfully elected as provincial 3462
counselors. They were effectively represented in youth affairs throughout the country, especially in the 3463
traditionally volatile areas of the South and East of Afghanistan where Afghanistan Youth and Social 3464
Organization members head the department of youth affairs in a number of provinces. They successfully 3465
Chapter 8
implemented projects funded by international donors on anticorruption, education for vulnerable 3466
populations, voter education, and field assessments. The Marine Commander of the 7th Marine Regiment, 3467
after returning from Afghanistan in 2011, indicated in his after action report, that U.S. forces need to work 3468
extremely hard to empower the elders of the society but work harder to win the information operations with 3469
the younger males and get them involved in the political process. 3470
8-7. Another example of youth engagement can be found in the insurgency in Vietnam. In Vietnam, the 3471
U.S. military and Department of State, along with the government of South Vietnam, established several 3472
youth groups that were very successful. For example, the 4-T Youth Club was modeled after the American 3473
4-H organization. In the end, over 2000 4-T clubs have served as a model of success for organizing youths 3474
at the grassroots level. The Republican Youth Movement, National Revolutionary Movements, and 3475
personnel labor revolutionary parties were all models of successful youth engagement strategies, taking 3476
away prospective fighters for the Vietcong. Youth programs were seen as generators of self-esteem for the 3477
participants and tended to work out pent-up student energy by deploying them to the provinces. In this 3478
connection, youth programs proved beneficial. The conclusive report on youth programs in Vietnam was 3479
declassified in 1988. It concluded with this statement: Youth groups rank second only to the in-country 3480
intellectuals as potential transmitters for the stimulus required for social change. 3481
NEGOTIATION AND DIPLOMACY 3482
8-8. Negotiation and diplomacy are ways to resolve or defeat an insurgency. The counterinsurgent must 3483
influence the host-nation government and its subordinate elements (for example, the office of land reform) 3484
to remove the root causes that have led to acts of subversion and violence in order to seize, nullify, or 3485
challenge political control of a region. 3486
8-9. The goal of negotiation and diplomacy is to address the insurgent root cause and therefore reduce the 3487
causes for armed conflict. If a host nation can be influenced by U.S. government or military personnel to 3488
peacefully address root causes then the expected outcome is a reduction in violence and bringing the 3489
insurgents into the political process to have their issues resolved peacefully. If the host-nation government 3490
can do this successfully the insurgency may not totally go away, but it may only use force of arms in a 3491
limited context that would manifest as limited insurrections compared to a full blown armed insurgency. 3492
8-10. An example of how third party intervention with negotiation and diplomacy can have an effect on an 3493
insurgency is shown by the intrastate conflict in the Chiapas region of Mexico, between the Zapatista 3494
Liberation Army Mestizo land owners and the government of Mexico. The Zapatista Liberation Army has 3495
three root causes for its insurgent movement. The first is over indigenous control of land taken away by 3496
article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. The second is the application of social justice by legal recognition 3497
of indigenous rights. The third is the lack of social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and paved 3498
roads in the Chiapas region. 3499
8-11. The Mexican government has made efforts to address the root causes for insurgency. In reaction to 3500
U.S. demands, the government released several people from prison who has been characterized by human 3501
rights groups as political prisoners. The Mexican government also designated a special prosecutor to 3502
investigate and prosecute abuses reported back as far as 1970 by the National Human Rights Commission. 3503
This shows that a third party such as the U.S. can influence a nation to address the root causes of its 3504
insurgency through negotiation and diplomacy. 3505
8-12. Another example of how a third party can influence a country to address insurgents grievances is 3506
found in a 1997 document from the committee on the elimination of racial discrimination. The committee 3507
on the elimination of racial discrimination lauded the Mexican government for its efforts in creating and 3508
implementing sustainable welfare programs within the state of Chiapas, with spending surpassing 12 3509
million pesos, which was at that time the largest beneficiary of the federal budget. The Mexican 3510
government addressed the core grievance of the absence of social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, 3511
and paved roads in the Chiapas region by ensuring that a preponderance of the funds targeted for Chiapas 3512
went to the creation of a regional center for social action, building medical centers, investing in educational 3513
and material supplies for the care and feeding of 48% of the school population, and reconstructing roads 3514
and public works. While the Zapatista Liberation Army still exists today, it rarely resorts to violence in the 3515
path of seeking resolution of its issues. 3516
Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies
8-13. In a peacetime environment where U.S. forces are not committed to help a host nation combat its 3517
insurgency, U.S. military personnel can help influence a nation faced with an insurgency in the conduct of 3518
security cooperation activities and bi-lateral military exercises. If one of the insurgents root causes is 3519
against the host-nation military for human rights abuses or using heavy handed tactics with the local 3520
population, U.S. military personnel can work with the military wing of the government to find alternative 3521
ways of dealing with the population. 3522
8-14. In an armed conflict environment where U.S. forces have been sent in to assist a host nation to fight 3523
its insurgency, U.S. military personnel can not only work the host-nation armed forces to reduce causes for 3524
conflict, but also interact with U.S. and host-nation government personnel to take steps to peacefully 3525
address core grievances and root causes of conflict. 3526
IDENTIFY, SEPARATE, ISOLATE, INFLUENCE, AND 3527
REINTEGRATE 3528
8-15. Identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate is a method that combines several activities that 3529
affect relevant population groups. This can be done in both high threat situations and situations where the 3530
insurgency is at its infancy and combat is less intense. 3531
8-16. Identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate is a proactive method of addressing root causes 3532
before a full blown armed insurgency can develop. Its purpose is to identify and separate the insurgents 3533
from the population. This is a primary requirement for forces conducting counterinsurgency. By identifying 3534
who is an insurgent and who is not, and then applying resources to separate insurgents from the population, 3535
commanders and planners can more effectively focus their efforts on making the insurgency feel isolated. 3536
Insurgents may then believe that their causes for conflict are not supported by the population. Once the 3537
insurgent leaders and members feel isolated from the population, peaceful efforts can be made to influence 3538
insurgents to surrender, return, and be reintegrated into peaceful members of society. 3539
8-17. The importance of influencing members of an insurgency to surrender cannot be overstated. And the 3540
importance of how that former insurgent is reintegrated into a peaceful society is also critical because the 3541
way a war is won will decide how long the peace will last. The Malayan insurgency is a good case study to 3542
illustrate how to influence and reintegrate former insurgents. 3543
8-18. The Malayan insurgency was a contest between the Malayan governments armed forces and the 3544
Malayan National Liberation Army that lasted from 1948 to 1960. The Malayan Emergency was the 3545
colonial government's term for the conflict. The Malayan National Liberation Army called it the 3546
Anti-British National Liberation War, although Australian and British armed forces had fully withdrawn 3547
from Malaysia years earlier. The rubber plantations and tin mining industries had pushed for the use of the 3548
term "emergency" since their losses would not have been covered by Lloyds of London insurers if it had 3549
been termed a "war. Despite the communists defeat in 1960, communist leader Chin Peng renewed the 3550
insurgency in 1967. The insurgency lasted until 1989, and it became known as the Communist Insurgency 3551
War. 3552
8-19. One of the root causes of this insurgency was the restoration of civil government following the end 3553
of World War II. During WW II, many of the Malayan tin mines and plantations had been destroyed to 3554
prevent the Japanese using them, so the Malayan economy was slow to recover after the war. The Japanese 3555
occupation had also sown the seeds of future unrest. The Japanese had pursued a policy of divide and 3556
conquer by favoring the Malays while persecuting the Chinese who were already anti-Japanese due to the 3557
Japanese actions in China. This resulted in some violence in the period between the Japanese leaving and 3558
the British returning. Another cause for unrest was the British plan for a new constitution for Malaya, 3559
known as the Malayan Union. This new constitution was written with little regard and no consultation with 3560
the local population. This new constitution would remove the power of the Sultans and effectively change 3561
Malaya from a being a British protectorate to a British colony. This raised concerns among the Malay 3562
population that they would be swamped by the millions of ethnic Chinese and Indians living in Malaya. 3563
8-20. The Malayan governments civil police were heavily involved in creating safe conditions for 3564
insurgents to surrender on their own accord. The government established the surrendered enemy personnel 3565
program. The government offered generous surrender terms and also increased the rewards for helping kill 3566
Chapter 8
or capture other insurgents. This created a moral dilemma in the mind of the insurgent. Insurgents had to 3567
decide whether to keep fighting, knowing their increased chances of death, or to surrender and live as 3568
peaceful members of society. Insurgents were well aware that those who surrendered on their own terms 3569
were not prosecuted after their surrender. The Malayan government also distributed leaflets and taped radio 3570
broadcasts telling insurgents they would be well treated if they surrendered, and that the life out of the 3571
jungle where the insurgency was being fought was a good one. 3572
8-21. It is a vital lesson. Counterinsurgents should offer a surrendered insurgent generous terms, and 3573
counterinsurgents should follow those terms. These terms helped the Malayan government defeat its 3574
insurgency. 3575
8-22. U.S. military commanders and planners should consider this case study. By separating the insurgent 3576
from the population, commanders and staffs make the insurgent feel vulnerable and also take from the 3577
insurgency the means for recruitment and logistical support. Planners and commanders should work toward 3578
creating liberal and generous surrender terms. It is also vital to protect the surrendered insurgent from 3579
reprisals from his former insurgent colleagues. 3580
SECURITY COOPERATION 3581
8-23. The use of security cooperation tools to build governmental capability, including building a host 3582
nations forces, may be essential. In the eyes of the people, the credibility of the host-nation government is 3583
key in counterinsurgency efforts to address the threat and conditions of instability. Because the host 3584
nations military, police, and paramilitary forces are often the most visible element of the host-nation 3585
governments power and authority, building the capacity of counterinsurgents includes the 3586
professionalization and development of the host-nation security forces competence, capability, 3587
commitment, and confidence (see table 8-1). 3588
Table 8-1. Developing the host-nation security force 3589
Developmental
area
Developmental indicators
Competence The host-nation security forces must possess and demonstrate individual
and collective skills in their respective warfighting or law enforcement
tasks. They must also support institutional functions.
Capability Host-nation security force organizations must be appropriately sized to
accomplish their respective missions. The host-nation security force must
be adequately manned and equipped at a level that is sustainable, given
the host nations own resources. The host-nation security forces
supporting institutions, such as their national level force generation and
logistic agencies, must be organized and directed in a manner that adds
value to the lower-level, host-nation security forces mission requirements.
Commitment The host-nation security force must be committed to the peaceful transition
of political power. It must also be committed to the security and survival of
the state, the rule of law, the preservation of human rights, civil liberties for
the population, and to fighting hard (when necessary) to defeat the active
insurgency.
Confidence The host-nation population must believe that the host-nation security
forces actions are always in the best interests of the people. The
host-nation government must believe that the host-nation security force
supports the governments legal authority. Also, the international
community must see the host nations security force as a force for good
that respects human rights and the international law of war.
8-24. To enable a host-nation security force to conduct counterinsurgency operations, U.S. or coalition 3590
forces conduct various security cooperation capabilities. Commanders often view host-nation security force 3591
development as an essential task and one of their primary lines of effort. The resulting increase in the host 3592
nations ability to secure its own population yields significant benefits because host-nation troops will 3593
normally prove more effective in conducting operations among the local population. Transitioning 3594
responsibility for operations to the host-nation security force reduces the visible presence of U.S. or 3595
coalition troops, further enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government. 3596
8-25. Security cooperation can be an effective means to shape and aid a host nations counterinsurgency 3597
efforts. In the case of El Salvador, the U.S. had limits on its level of direct involvement. The U.S. mainly 3598
aided the El Salvador government with security assistance. By following an effective strategy that linked 3599
this aid to governmental and military reform, the U.S. was able to shape the ongoing counterinsurgency and 3600
aid the government of El Salvador in defeating the insurgency. 3601
Security Cooperation in El Salvador 3602
In 1979, a group of disparate insurgent groups formed a coalition (the FMLN) that 3603
would become a significant threat to the Salvadoran government. They were 3604
opposed by the Salvadoran armed forces, at that time a barracks-bound, defensively 3605
minded organization with severe deficiencies in command and control, tactical 3606
intelligence, tactical mobility, and logistics. The Salvadoran army did poorly in 3607
combat, and its only significant successes early in the conflict were in intimidating 3608
and massacring the civilian population. 3609
The mid-1980s saw a massive U.S. aid effort, and considerable civilian and military 3610
reform. During the decade, the U.S. government spent more than $200,000 in aid 3611
per guerrilla. Congressionally constrained to a limit of no more than 55 military 3612
advisers and no combat troops, U.S. aid consisted of arms, military trainers, and 3613
reform and civic action programs. Several of these programs made slow progress 3614
because many in the Salvadoran military resented their imposition by an outside 3615
power. Though resentful of the imposition, many in the Salvadoran military 3616
recognized the incentive structure, where much U.S. aid was contingent on improving 3617
El Salvadors human rights record. Salvadoran Defense Minister Vides Casanova 3618
said, We know that improving our image is worth millions of dollars of aid for the 3619
country. Even if many Salvadoran counterinsurgents were principally motivated by 3620
the flow of foreign aid, they did learn, they did increase in competence, and they did 3621
improve their human rights behavior. The idea of focusing on all aspects of the 3622
struggle, political, social, economic, as well as military, had taken root and continued 3623
to the end of the war. 3624
8-26. One issue with developing security forces in counterinsurgency is the issue of the quality versus the 3625
quantity of host-nation counterinsurgency forces. In the case of counterinsurgency, quality tends to be more 3626
important than quantity. While it is true that quantity has a quality all its own, to the extent that too small 3627
a force will not be able to accomplish its mission, and quantity and quality must be balanced to some 3628
degree, quantity is not a substitute for quality. 3629
8-27. U.S. or coalition efforts to develop the capability and capacity of the host-nation security force must 3630
focus on operational and developmental needs of host-nation counterparts. Developing a sound plan to 3631
develop the host nations capability to address the root causes of the insurgency requires a deliberate, 3632
comprehensive assessment of the host-nation security force. The set of metrics that the U.S. or coalition 3633
forces selects to assess the host-nation security force must be appropriate for the type of security force 3634
being assessed. For example, assessment of the host-nation army may require a completely different set of 3635
criteria from those used to assess the host-nation police. Likewise, the host-nation border or customs police, 3636
local (city or county) police, and provincial, state, or national police must all be assessed according to their 3637
specific mission requirements, while taking into consideration the federal or local laws, political 3638
considerations, or tribal affiliations. 3639
HOST-NATION FORCE ASSESSMENT 3640
8-28. Assessment of host-nation army or land forces typically comes more naturally to U.S. or coalition 3641
forces than assessing host-nation police forces. It is easier for a Soldier or Marine assess another Army or 3642
Marine Corps unit than it is for a Soldier or Marine to accurately assess a police precinct, fire department, 3643
Chapter 8
or sanitation department. One framework most U.S. land component personnel are familiar with is the 3644
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities framework. When assessing a 3645
unit using this framework, commanders and staffs ask the questions listed in table 8-2. 3646
Table 8-2. Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities 3647
framework. 3648
Assessment Areas Assessment Questions
Doctrine Does the army have set doctrine that provides a foundation for training
and education? If it does, how is that doctrine developed and changed?
What are the intellectual roots of the doctrine? Doctrine can play a
foundational role in how an organization fights because it can create the
foundation for what is trained and how the force is educated.
Organization How is your counterparts units organized? Do they have an institutional
organization? Is the current organization meant to defeat a
counterinsurgency, or is it organized to defeat another army?
Training What is your counterparts level of training in individual and collective
tasks? Do they have an mission-essential task list? Does the host-nation
staff your unit with personnel who have been through some kind of entry-
level training, or are personnel inducted directly into the operating forces,
where they receive on-the-job training? Does the host-nation security
force employ any kind of training and readiness cycle, or is everyone on,
all of the time?
Material Does the unit have a specific table of equipment established by higher
headquarters? Of the major end-items on the table of equipment, how
many do they have on-hand, and what percent are fully mission capable;
what percent are operable, but degraded? Other than major end items,
how is the unit stocked in the other classes of supply? What are their
major deficiencies, and how does this affect readiness?
Leadership How well qualified are the units leaders (mentally, physically, and
morally)? Are they loyal to the host-nation government, do they uphold the
rule of law, and can they be trusted to conduct partnered operations with
U.S. or coalition forces? How willing are they to take advice from U.S. or
coalition personnel? Are they vulnerable to influence by the insurgency?
Does the host-nation security force have a quality noncommissioned
officer corps?
Personnel Based upon the units table of organization, how close is the unit to its
formal staffing goals? What is the armys ability to recruit members of
society and replace members of the unit? How many personnel are
actually present for duty on a given day? What are the top ten personnel
issues, such as pay, discipline, drug abuse, infiltration by insurgents, and
so on? Does an insider threat exist within the ranks of the host-nation
security force? If so, is this the product of ineffective vetting of host-nation
security force personnel and infiltration by insurgents, or are there cultural
issues that could drive host-nation security force personnel to act out
violently against their U.S. or coalition counterparts due to real or
perceived injustices?
Facilities Does the host-nation security force organization have adequate facilities,
such as barracks, office spaces, supply warehouses, armories, and
maintenance facilities? Are adequate physical security and force
protection measures in place? Does the host-nation security force have
access to training areas and ranges? Are the ranges certified for specific
weapons systems based upon range safety considerations such as
surface danger zones?
8-29. When using the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities 3649
framework, commanders and staffs should consider policy as well. Are there weak or strong linkages 3650
between national-level goals and objectives, and the host-nation security force units? How are 3651
national-level policies promulgated, and are these policies adhered to, or scorned? 3652
8-30. Although the assessment metrics for host-nation police or other paramilitary forces may be different, 3653
the process and framework should be similar. Although not prescriptive, metrics for assessment of 3654
host-nation police forces might include issues such as investigations, case review, patrolling, logistics, 3655
administration, detention operations, training, evidence handling, biometrics, and community relations. In 3656
addition to assessing specific tasks, metrics should include military or police specific core competencies. 3657
8-31. One process for establishing an assessment framework for host-nation police, constabulary, 3658
maritime, or aviation organizations begins with the creation of working group staffed by security 3659
cooperation, law enforcement, or other subject matter experts. A working group brainstorms and then 3660
refines a list of lines of efforts and operational tasks for the host-nation security force, if such a list does not 3661
already exist. It is critically important to bear in mind all of the supporting functions that enable or facilitate 3662
the host-nation security forces execution of its operational tasks. The working group then develops a 3663
framework similar to the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities 3664
framework, but tailored to the specific requirements and circumstances for the police, constabulary, or 3665
other type security force, and selects observable, measurable, and relevant metrics by which the host-nation 3666
security force organization will be assessed. 3667
8-32. U.S. or coalition forces working to develop the capability and capacity of host-nation security forces 3668
during the course of counterinsurgency operations must understand the difference between the assessment 3669
of host-nation security forces, and the fulfillment of higher headquarters reporting requirements. 3670
Assessment requires a steady, persistent cycle of observation across a broad framework, and then using 3671
those observations to inform plans for subsequent security cooperation activities, to include the preparation 3672
of official reports to higher headquarters. Historical examples of these kinds of reports include the 3673
operational readiness assessment submitted by advisor teams during operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and the 3674
commanders unit assessment tool prepared by advisors or partner units during operation ENDURING 3675
FREEDOM in Afghanistan. Reports like the operational readiness assessment and the commanders unit 3676
assessment tool were designed primarily to inform key decisionmakers of the achievement or 3677
nonachievement of milestones necessary for the transition of responsibility for security to the host-nation 3678
security force, and do not necessarily constitute a valid or complete assessment framework by themselves. 3679
Preparation of required reports to higher headquarters rarely constitutes a complete assessment of the 3680
host-nation security force. 3681
8-33. A relationship with host-nation forces can provide important training for U.S. forces. Learning from 3682
how the host nation fights could benefit U.S. and coalition efforts in countering an insurgency. Upon a 3683
decision to become involved in an insurgency, U.S. forces learn how the host nation fights. If possible, the 3684
U.S. send officers and noncommissioned officers to professional military schools of the host nation. If the 3685
host nation does not have a developed institutional military, the U.S. finds means to teach leaders how the 3686
host nation operates. To the extent possible, host-nation forces are be built following host-nation doctrine 3687
or otherwise following the host nations traditional organization and approach. 3688
8-34. Security cooperation is a multi-echelon endeavor that builds the capability and capacity of the 3689
host-nation security force at the executive direction, generating force, and operating force levels. During 3690
counterinsurgency operations, U.S. or coalition forces may take a bottom-up approach to building the host 3691
nations capacity to defeat the insurgency and defend its sovereignty by first developing host-nation 3692
security forces at the small-unit level. This approach buys time and space for the host nation to develop 3693
capacity at higher echelons. In time, the host-nation security force establishes the capacity to generate its 3694
own forces through recruiting, vetting, and induction of enlistees as well as officer candidates; initial entry 3695
training for all personnel, to include basic warrior or police skills and advanced technical, tactical, and 3696
leadership training; and processes for promotion, noncommissioned officer training, and senior leader 3697
training. The host-nation security force must also develop processes for acquisition and life-cycle 3698
management of major end items, as well as processes for procurement of all classes of supply, and 3699
contracting of other services or capabilities. Further, at the executive direction levels, the host-nation 3700
security force must establish policies and a system of orders and directives that supports the host nations 3701
Chapter 8
statutory framework, and drives standardization of policies and procedures through a top-down flow of 3702
information and a robust command inspection program. In sum, U.S. or coalition personnel charged with 3703
conducting security cooperation activities in a counterinsurgency environment must look beyond the 3704
immediate tactical conditions on the ground and collaborate with multiple agencies to develop the 3705
supporting infrastructure required for the host-nation security force to sustain and re-generate itself over the 3706
long term. 3707
8-35. Counterinsurgency usually requires an adaptable campaign plan that includes specific objectives for 3708
all lines of effort, to include host-nation security force development. Comprehensive assessments of 3709
host-nation security force units conducted at regular intervals (possibly aligned with reporting 3710
requirements) provide critical information that can shape and inform U.S. or coalition units goals and 3711
objectives for host-nation security force development. One proven technique is to prepare a draft long 3712
range plan prior to deployment, and complete the plan once the initial assessment is complete. Following 3713
every subsequent assessment, the U.S. or coalition leadership develops new goals and objectives based 3714
upon the developmental needs of the host-nation security force, and then issues a fragmentary order with 3715
specific tasks for the advisor teams or partner units that support the new goals. 3716
8-36. Development of a host-nation security force cannot be detached from other operations. Development 3717
of host-nation security forces includes many subtasks that require synchronization across all warfighting 3718
functions and other lines of effort. Protecting the population requires that counterinsurgents also be aware 3719
of other enemies within the operational environment, to include foreign fighters, narco-traffickers, and 3720
common criminals. Host-nation security force developmental goals must include harmonized coordination 3721
among the various branches of the host-nation security force, particularly between the land forces and the 3722
police. All components of the host-nation security force must understand their own constitutional mandates 3723
and limitations. For example, the host-nation army must know if or when it has the authority to detain 3724
individuals suspected of a crime. Host-nation police forces must understand and support the rule of law, 3725
and ensure that their actions harmonize with the nations criminal courts, as well as with the prison system. 3726
Finally, when U.S. and coalition forces advise host-nation security force personnel, they must conduct the 3727
proper troop-to-task analysis to ensure that land forces orient their operations according to host-nation army 3728
doctrine, while police forces should be employed in a way that meets the expectations of the host-nation 3729
government and the people they protect. 3730
8-37. When working with host-nation security forces, U.S. and coalition forces have three primary 3731
functions: advise, assess, and assist. It is important to note that monitoring of host-nation security forces 3732
serves multiple functions, to include intelligence and operational security. U.S. or coalition forces must 3733
always be aware of the host-nation security forces leaderships loyalty to the host nation and be sensitive to 3734
any perceived intentions on the part of the host-nation security force that may run counter to legitimization 3735
of the host-nation government. 3736
8-38. Unified action partners advise the host-nation security forces to affect changes in the way they 3737
operate. If the host-nation security forces are a model of military efficiency across all functions, no 3738
advising would be necessary. However, the only way the host-nation security force will undergo enduring 3739
growth and improvement is if it comes from within. Therefore, advisors must shape host-nation security 3740
force actions so that they make their own processes and systems work as intended. Prior to and during 3741
deployment, advisors must apply a motivated approach to learning and understanding the host-nation 3742
security forces organizational design. To build effective working relationships, advisors need to possess a 3743
keen understanding of the host nations culture, social mores, and taboos. Language capabilityfocused on 3744
rapport-building words and phrases as opposed to just operational jargonfurther enhances the advisors 3745
credibility and status. The ability to negotiate and communicate diplomatically is essential to effective 3746
advising. If possible, commanders and staffs send representatives to attend institutional schools of the host 3747
nation. 3748
8-39. Once the U.S. or coalition forces gain an understanding of their counterparts culture and 3749
organizational design and have completed an initial assessment of the host-nation security force units 3750
capabilities and capacity, advising activities can commence. (See figure 8-1.) Advisors consider culture and 3751
the baseline assessment when choosing an approach to advising the host-nation security force. There are 3752
three approaches to developing a host-nation security force: teach, coach, or advise. 3753
Teaching involves a number of activities designed to impart knowledge or skills to host-nation 3754
security force counterparts, but the advisor or partner unit drives the process. 3755
Coaching also involves the transfer of knowledge, skills, and abilities, but the host-nation 3756
security force unit or individual assumes responsibility for applying what they have learned 3757
when executing counterinsurgency tasks. 3758
Advising simply involves providing advice to commanders and staffs on their actions. There is 3759
no longer a need to actively transfer knowledge. Advising is passive and allows the host nation 3760
to be the primary actor. 3761
Figure 8-1. BuiIding host-nation capacity 3762
8-40. Regardless of the approach taken to developing the capabilities of the host-nation security force, a 3763
key corollary of security cooperation in counterinsurgency is to legitimize the host-nation security force in 3764
the eyes of the population. This is best accomplished by setting the conditions for the host-nation security 3765
force to conduct security and law enforcement operations independently and professionally. 3766
8-41. Assisting the host-nation security force in counterinsurgency means to provide or augment the 3767
host-nation security forces with U.S. or coalition capabilities or resources that they cannot generate on their 3768
own. Forms of assistance may include enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets 3769
and capabilities in support of the host-nation security forces intelligence collection efforts. U.S. or 3770
coalition forces may provide assistance in the form of certain battlefield effects such as close air support, 3771
electronic warfare, secure long-range communications, or inform and influence activities. Assistance to the 3772
host-nation security forces often complements their nascent logistics capabilities, such as transportation or 3773
mobility, medical capabilities, or corrective maintenance support. Assistance may also come in the form of 3774
materiel support across one or more classes of supply. For example, the U.S. may provide host-nation 3775
security forces major end items such as vehicles or weapons systems through foreign military sales or 3776
excess defense articles programs, medical supplies through humanitarian assistance programs, or 3777
construction materials through authorities such as the commanders emergency response program. 3778
Historically, host-nation security force personnel have shown few reservations about asking U.S. forces for 3779
materiel or other forms of assistance. When pressed for assistance of any kind, U.S. or coalition personnel 3780
should ask themselves three basic questions: 3781
Do my counterparts really need this materiel or capability to accomplish their mission? 3782
Is there any way the host-nation security force could procure or acquire this resource or 3783
capability using their own systems, processes, or methods? 3784
Can the host-nation security force sustain this system or capability over the long term? 3785
Chapter 8
8-42. Commanders and staffs should consider the following example. Suppose that host-nation security 3786
force counterparts suspect that insurgent forces have established camps on the far side of a ridgeline where 3787
they assemble and conduct final preparations prior to conducting attacks into major towns in the area. 3788
These counterparts ask if the U.S. commander can arrange for coalition unmanned aircraft systems to 3789
maintain persistent surveillance over these suspected campsites to provide early warning of pending 3790
attacks. By posing the three fundamental questions in paragraph 8-41, it may be possible to determine other 3791
courses of action whereby the host-nation security force can produce and sustain the same effects. For 3792
example, the commander might offer the host-nation security force instruction how to build an intelligence 3793
collection plan and techniques for determining named areas of interest. Next, the advisors could coach their 3794
counterparts on determining what capabilities they have at hand to observe those named areas of interest. 3795
Can they establish permanent outposts or temporary observation posts that overlook these named areas of 3796
interest? Can they establish or improve relations with local police forces or tribal networks to establish 3797
hotlines linking the local population and the host-nation security force? The point is that although 3798
host-nation security force personnel often imagine U.S. or coalition technological or logistic capabilities as 3799
more powerful than they truly are, they also fail to consider or neglect their own capabilities that can 3800
ultimately achieve the same effect. 3801
8-43. It is also important to remember that decisions made at the strategic level may make little tactical or 3802
operational sense to local commanders and staffs. The is especially true with foreign military sales. For 3803
example, the U.S. may sell a major weapon system to a host nation that has inadequate means to maintain 3804
and support that weapon system. However, the sale may accomplish an essential political goal in the 3805
relationship between the host nation and the U.S. Moreover, it may ensure a continued relationship between 3806
the host nation and the U.S. If a host nation is dependent on the U.S. for maintaining a major weapon 3807
system, this gives the U.S. influence over a host nations decisionmaking process. 3808
RELATIONSHIPS 3809
8-44. Counterinsurgency operations require well-defined and understood relationships between U.S. and 3810
coalition forces and the host-nation security force. Insurgent forces will quickly identify and exploit gaps in 3811
the counterinsurgents leadership and cohesion. Clearly defined relationships that evolve as the host-nation 3812
security forces operational capabilities grow are essential for effective mission command and facilitate a 3813
smooth transition to a host-nation security force lead for security. Broadly stated, there are five possible 3814
relationships worth considering for each specific counterinsurgency operation. These relationships are 3815
parallel commands, lead nation, partnered, integrated, and advisors. (See figure 8-2 on page 8-11). Each of 3816
these relationships requires U.S. or coalition forces to modify or adapt their organizations for combat to 3817
complement combined U.S. or coalition and host-nation security force counterinsurgency goals. 3818
Figure 8-2. Counterinsurgency reIationships 3819
Parallel Commands 3820
8-45. A parallel command is when U.S. or coalition forces maintain their own command structure with no 3821
integration or partnership with a host nation. Under a parallel command structure, no single force 3822
commander is designated. This arrangement is suitable when the host-nation security force has well 3823
established, mature operational and institutional capabilities, and U.S. or coalition forces deploy to provide 3824
additional capabilities. The relationship may be based on U.S. forces being given a specific task. For 3825
example, U.S. forces may only conduct raids or only gather intelligence for the national command 3826
authority. It can also be based on the U.S. forces being given their own area of operations within a host 3827
nation. This can be done for various reasons, including that the area is sensitive to host nation forces and an 3828
external counterinsurgent may provide a temporary stabilization of the area. This arrangement supports unit 3829
cohesion. 3830
Lead Nation 3831
8-46. A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one 3832
nation. This relationship works with one nations forces in the lead, and the supporting nation provides a 3833
unit or units that are attached, under operational control, or tactical control of the lead nation. This 3834
arrangement provides flexibility in that the U.S. or coalition force may initially serve as the lead nation, and 3835
as the operational capacity of the host-nation security force grows, the host nation can eventually assume 3836
the role of lead nation. In also provides a possible means for the U.S. to aid a host nation in an ongoing 3837
insurgency. For example, the U.S. could provide a brigade to a host nation in an ongoing insurgency. Like 3838
parallel command, this arrangement supports unit cohesion. 3839
Chapter 8
Partnered 3840
8-47. This arrangement differs from parallel command in that U.S. or coalition forces and the host-nation 3841
security forces are paired down to the small-unit level. Issues commanders and staffs consider include how 3842
to manage unity of command, logistics challenges, and language and cultural barriers. Partnering has the 3843
advantage of maintaining a degree of unit cohesion (individual units are still homogenous), and the specific 3844
capabilities of each nations force can be leveraged down to the small-unit levels. 3845
Integrated 3846
8-48. Integrate means to assemble forces from both the U.S. or coalition and the host-nation security force, 3847
and meld them into a single, inseparable unit. Integration, also referred to as augmenting, poses many 3848
challenges, but it has been used successfully in the past. For example, the Korean augmentation to the U.S. 3849
Army was a very successful program that integrated individual South Korean soldiers into Army units. This 3850
yielded units with enhanced manpower, as well as cultural and linguistic fluency down to the squad level. 3851
The drawback is that integration requires significant time to institutionalize and does little to enable the 3852
host-nation security force as a whole to assume lead responsibility for operations. Integration requires a 3853
single shared language for all personnel, so either the U.S. or coalition forces will have to learn the host 3854
nations language or host-nation security force personnel will have to learn English. Furthermore, 3855
integration of U.S. and host-nation security forces into a single coherent force requires significant 3856
combined training in individual and collective tasks, which will result in a period at the beginning of the 3857
deployment when the integrated force is not fully combat capable. This could result in extended 3858
deployment periods to compensate for this operational integration and training period. Finally, integration 3859
does little to build the capability and capacity of the host nations ministerial-level leadership or the 3860
security forces supporting institutions. 3861
Advisors 3862
8-49. When host-nation security force units achieve a certain degree of organizational maturity at a specific 3863
echelon, the U.S. or coalition forces may assign individuals or teams of advisors to perform any number of 3864
advisory tasks. One advantage of this approach is that is imposes the smallest possible U.S. or coalition 3865
force requirement. It also puts the host-nation security force in the most visible role of providing security in 3866
the eyes of the local population. Finally, since the basing and force requirements are relatively small for the 3867
U.S. or coalition forces, it is the most flexible and adaptable. Advisor teams can be quickly re-assigned to 3868
different host-nation security force units based upon capability gaps across the host-nation security force. 3869
(See FM 3-22 for more information on advisors.) 3870
SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING 3871
8-50. Security cooperation activities occur across the range of military operations. Two important activities 3872
relevant to counterinsurgency are foreign internal defense and security force assistance. Security force 3873
assistance consists of the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. 3874
Government to support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their 3875
supporting institutions (JP 3-22). Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies 3876
of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated 3877
organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other 3878
threats to its security (JP 3-22). Moreover, security assistance, which are activities in which the U.S. 3879
provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan or credit, could 3880
be important in equipping and resourcing a counterinsurgency force. (For a further discussion on foreign 3881
internal defense, security force assistance, and security assistance, see FM 3-22). Both foreign internal 3882
defense and security force assistance represent important defense activities to build the capacity of a host 3883
nation to defeat an insurgency. 3884
8-51. Both foreign internal defense and security force assistance can be used as part of a long term plan to 3885
develop and deploy a host nation force to defeat an insurgency. While the U.S. may intervene in a country 3886
that only needs enablers to enhance an already effective military force, a host nation may lack an effective 3887
military. If there is a lack of an effective military, aid in the development of a host nation military could 3888
follow five phases: planning and resourcing, generation of host-nation security force, employment of 3889
host-nation security force, transition of responsibility for security to host-nation security force, and 3890
sustainment of host-nation security force. U.S. or coalition forces conduct parallel planning with their 3891
host-nation security force counterparts to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in support of 3892
the overall counterinsurgency campaign, while at the same time working toward milestones that lead to a 3893
successful transition from U.S. or coalition lead to host-nation security force lead for security. 3894
8-52. Security cooperation activities are part of both strategy and policy. In planning security cooperation 3895
activities, DOD starts with the National Security Strategy issued by the White House and expanded upon in 3896
overarching DOD guidance documents. The National Defense Strategy influences the Guidance for 3897
Employment of the Force, which provides the parameters for combatant commands to develop their theater 3898
and functional campaign plans, which include direction for the development of country plans. DOD plans 3899
take place in the context of the actions of other partner nations and with other nations. These activities take 3900
place throughout all phases of a joint operation. Figure 8-3 provides a graphic representation of this 3901
relationship. (See FM 3-22 for a detailed explanation on security cooperation activities and planning.) 3902
8-53. The focus on U.S. security cooperation efforts is to support the host nations internal defense and 3903
development. Internal defense and development is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote 3904
its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its 3905
security (JP 3-22). Internal defense and development focuses on building viable institutions that respond to 3906
the needs of society. Security cooperation must work with and support a nations own internal defense and 3907
development programs. Within the context of counterinsurgency, it is essential that commanders and staffs 3908
understand and support a host nations internal defense and development strategy. In the long run, the host 3909
nation, and not the U.S., will either defeat of be defeated by the insurgency. Supporting a host nations 3910
internal defense and development plan is how the U.S. enables a host nation to defeat an insurgency. (See 3911
JP 3-22 for more information on internal defense and development.) 3912
Chapter 8
Figure 8-3. Country pIanning 3913
8-54. The joint phasing model provides a flexible model to arrange combat and stability operations, but it 3914
does not provide a universally prescriptive template for all conceivable joint operations. The operation plan 3915
consists of six phases: 3916
Phase 0, shape. 3917
Phase I, deter. 3918
Phase II, seize the initiative. 3919
Phase III, dominate. 3920
Phase IV, stabilize. 3921
Phase V, enable civil authority. 3922
8-55. Shape, or phase 0 operations, are joint and multinational operations inclusive of normal and routine 3923
military activities. During phase 0, both the Army and Marine Corps perform security cooperation activities 3924
to indirectly support a host nation in countering an insurgency. However, security cooperation operations 3925
can continue through all phases of the operation. Many of these activities, such as foreign internal defense 3926
direct support and foreign internal defense combat operations directly use U.S. forces to counter an 3927
insurgency and are important in phase II and III, for example. Foreign internal defense, security force 3928
assistance, and other security cooperation activities are essential throughout the phases of any operation. 3929
(See JP 5-0 for more information on the joint phasing model.) 3930
8-56. If the U.S. commits forces to a counterinsurgency conflict, it will normally deploy a joint task force 3931
or coalition joint task force headquarters to provide planning and command and control. The coalition joint 3932
task forces desired end state is to terminate the operation plan at the conclusion of Phase V, stand-down or 3933
redeploy the coalition joint task force headquarters, and revert to Phase 0 operations. The geographic 3934
combatant command and respective Service component commands, in coordination with the country team, 3935
resume security cooperation activities per the country plan. Counterinsurgency operations typically extend 3936
across all phases (0 through V). Therefore, U.S. or coalition security force assistance and foreign internal 3937
defense activities in support of the host-nation security forces counterinsurgency conflict may occur under 3938
the auspices of the American ambassador to the host nation and the geographic combatant commander, or 3939
under the authority of the coalition joint task force commander. 3940
8-57. Typically, the first phase of building a host nation security force, planning and resourcing, falls to the 3941
responsibility of geographic combatant command-level planners in coordination with the country team. 3942
Coordination of legal authorities and funding for security force assistance and foreign internal defense 3943
activities is an interagency process because it typically involves resources provided under a number of 3944
different sections of the United States Code (USC). For example, DOD-funded security force assistance 3945
activities fall under Title 10, USC, whereas DOD-funded security force assistance activities (implemented 3946
by the DOD) fall under Title 22. Moreover, other security cooperation programs, such as foreign military 3947
sales, may be essential in equipping another military to perform foreign internal defense operations. 3948
8-58. Generating the host-nation security force is the second phase in building a host nation security force. 3949
If the U.S. is deploying conventional forces, this will probably be the initial phase in which regiments or 3950
brigade combat teams will actually have an active role (see figure 8-4). These forces can partner with 3951
host-nation security forces of varying developmental levels in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. 3952
For example, while supporting recent counterinsurgency operations in Colombia and the Philippines, 3953
host-nation security force counterparts had already fielded relatively sophisticated, well-developed 3954
operational units supported by robust supporting institutions and well established executive-level or 3955
ministerial leadership. In other U.S. historical counterinsurgency operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq, 3956
the host-nation security force operational units, their supporting institutions, and the most senior-level 3957
executive leadership functions were undeveloped or completely non-existent. In situations such as these, 3958
U.S. and coalition forces must organize, train, and equip host-nation security force units, while assisting in 3959
the building or rebuilding of their supporting infrastructure. The organize, train, and equip security force 3960
assistance tasks may be assigned to U.S. or coalition regiment- or brigade-sized units while they are 3961
simultaneously battling the insurgents. At the same time, unified action must be taken to establish the 3962
host-nation security forces own sustainable force generation capabilities and capacity. U.S. or coalition 3963
personnel, working with their host-nation security force counterparts, are placed in a difficult predicament 3964
in that they must carefully select key host-nation security force leaders to be pulled away from the 3965
immediate counterinsurgency fight to assume critical command and staff positions within the host-nation 3966
security forces organizations. Counterinsurgents must exercise restraint by not assigning all of the best 3967
host-nation security force leaders to operating force units, while neglecting to invest in their own force 3968
generation capacity. 3969
Chapter 8
Figure 8-4. Phases of buiIding a host-nation security force 3970
8-59. The third phase of building a host nation security force is the employment of the host-nation security 3971
force to protect the population and defeat the insurgents. During this phase, the primary focus shifts from 3972
organizing, training, equipping, and rebuilding the host-nation security forces to employing the host-nation 3973
security forces to perform the security tasks for which they were designed. As one host-nation security 3974
force unit enters the employment phase, other units may have just begun the force generation process. 3975
Meanwhile, there may be more seasoned host-nation security force units that are ready to transition to the 3976
lead for security operations in their assigned area of operations. Additionally, it may be possible to generate 3977
host-nation police forces more quickly than army units, since they can be employed individually or in small 3978
station-level units, they do not need to conduct large-scale collective training exercises, and they typically 3979
have fewer materiel requirements. However, it may take considerably longer for police forces to show their 3980
effectiveness during the employment phase due to the length of time it takes for police forces to gain the 3981
trust of the local population and build productive, enduring relationships with local or tribal leaders. 3982
8-60. The fourth phase of building a host nation security force in a counterinsurgency is the transition of 3983
responsibility for security operations from the U.S. or coalition forces to the host-nation security force. In 3984
some instances, such as Colombia or the Philippines, the host-nation security force may already be mature 3985
and highly capable in most or all operational realms (land, air, maritime). Security force assistance 3986
activities and the resulting transition to a host-nation security force lead may only refer to a specific 3987
functions such as intelligence, or an even more discreet set of tactical tasks such as employment of remote 3988
sensors that supports the host-nations counterinsurgency strategic or operational goals. In these instances, 3989
the U.S. may provide operational capabilities to meet the immediate threat, while conducting security force 3990
assistance in the form of equipment or training to close the capabilities gap. Once the gap is filled, the 3991
host-nation security force assumes responsibility for that function, and the U.S. forces redeploy, with the 3992
country team providing the host-nation access to long-term security assistance programs as appropriate. In 3993
other cases such as Iraq, U.S. or coalition forces may initially have to assume responsibility for all security 3994
tasks in all operational realms, and across all security force functions (land forces, police, border security, 3995
and so on). In the latter case, transition is a lengthy process with no clearly defined beginning or end date. 3996
8-61. Transition will likely be conducted in steps or subphases, and the steps or subphases may be either 3997
geographic, functional, or a combination of both. For example, the transition to host-nation security force 3998
lead for land force security operations may transpire one province at a time until the entire country has 3999
transitioned. A second example might be for transition to occur for land forces across the entire country by 4000
January 20XX, all police forces by June 20XX, and air and maritime forces by December 20XX, and so 4001
forth. A transition to a host-nation security force lead should be conditions or assessments-based, although 4002
the U.S. or coalition may elect to use a set transition date as a forcing function to compel the host-nation 4003
security forces to assume greater responsibility for securing their own country and their own people. 4004
Transitions will rarely be simple. In cases where U.S. or coalition general-purpose brigade combat teams 4005
deploy for extended tours such as 12-month rotations, units may find that they are supporting the 4006
host-nation security force transition to lead for security when they arrive in-country and still supporting the 4007
same transition when they re-deploy one year later. 4008
8-62. The fifth phase of building a host nation security force in counterinsurgency is sustainment. In this 4009
context, the term sustainment does not refer exclusively to logistic sustainment or combat service-support 4010
functions. Rather, sustainment is an ongoing set of security assistance activities (Title 22) and security 4011
cooperation activities (Title 10) designed to enhance the capabilities and capacity of the host nation to 4012
provide for its own security and to participate in regional or global multinational operations. These 4013
programs also seek to develop enduring relationships with key leaders within the host-nation security force 4014
and to facilitate peacetime or contingency access to host-nation facilities such as ports, airfields, and 4015
training venues. As the transition to the host-nation security force lead for security draws to a close, there 4016
may be a number of security force assistance tasks that require an extended period to be completed 4017
properly. Examples include geographic combatant command-level security assistance programs such as 4018
foreign military sales of new equipment such as tanks, artillery, helicopters, or watercraft and subsequent 4019
deployment of mobile training teams to train the host-nation security force on the employment of these new 4020
weapons systems. Enduring geographic combatant command-level security cooperation activities such as 4021
international military education and training or rotational deployment of U.S. forces to conduct combined 4022
exercises with the host-nation security force serve to sustain and extend the development of the capability 4023
and capacity of the host-nation security force to deal with residual insurgent threats and potential future 4024
external threats to the host nations sovereignty. 4025
8-63. In a counterinsurgency, the host-nation security forces executive and ministerial leadership, its force 4026
generation capacity, and its operating forces capabilities must develop and mature quickly, while U.S. or 4027
coalition forces initially provide time in the form of security to allow this process to succeed. U.S. or 4028
coalition forces must gradually reduce and eventually relinquish control of the counterinsurgency to the 4029
host-nation security force. Parallel planning with the host-nation security force provides the blueprint for 4030
what must occur from the U.S. or coalition side and the host-nation security force side of the operation. 4031
Both entities plan for transition to host-nation security force lead, but they approach the transition from a 4032
different perspective. Initially, teaching, coaching, and advising the host-nation security forces in their 4033
planning efforts is part of the overall process, but it ultimately will result in the host-nation security force 4034
having the capability and capacity to defeat the insurgency on its own. 4035
PARALLEL PLANNING 4036
8-64. When enabling a host nation to develop a security force, parallel planning is essential. Parallel 4037
planning is a time-saving technique that enables leaders at all levels from fire team to division to initiate the 4038
operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) prior to the receipt of a complete operation order. 4039
Parallel planning allows units to generate tempo by conducting a multi-tiered planning process. This 4040
reduces haste and provides all echelons more available time to prepare for future actions. Likewise, parallel 4041
planning with host-nation security forces enables greater efficiency and the ability to conduct simultaneous 4042
actions. It also serves as an essential step in the host-nation security force transition to the lead for security 4043
in a counterinsurgency. 4044
8-65. Parallel planning with the host-nation security force assumes adequate planning capabilities on the 4045
part of at least some of the host-nation security force commanders and staffs. When making this 4046
assumption, U.S. or coalition forces assume operational risks relating to the ability of the host-nation 4047
security force staffs to deliver on their planning requirements. Considerations when conducting parallel 4048
planning with the host-nation security force commanders and staffs may include, but are not limited to 4049
varying or competing agendas, lower literacy rates, access to computer technology, and use of graphics or 4050
visuals. U.S. commanders and staffs conducting parallel planning consider these points: 4051
U.S. or coalition forces have their own national security objectives, while host-nation 4052
counterparts may have conflicting objectives from the national to the local level. 4053
Literacy rates in many of the countries that the U.S. or coalition forces may partner with often 4054
fall far below that of the U.S. or other western countries. Lack of formal education, however, 4055
Chapter 8
does not preclude the host nation from being capable of understanding the western style of 4056
military planning. 4057
Access to computer technology in various host nations often does not match that of the U.S. or 4058
western countries. Manual methods of data collection, storage and dissemination may have to be 4059
used. 4060
Programs, whether computer based, or done on a terrain model, are based on western preference 4061
for the presentation of information through visual modalities. Successful counterinsurgency 4062
operations require U.S. or coalition advisors imbue their host-nation security force counterparts 4063
with the capability to process raw data into information that provides knowledge and leads to an 4064
understanding of an operational environment. 4065
8-66. Regardless of the difficulties of parallel planning, U.S. and coalition forces should make every effort 4066
to understand host-nation planning capabilities prior to conducting operations. Despite the many challenges 4067
presented by conducting parallel planning with host-nation security forces, U.S. and coalition forces should 4068
be completely integrated into the planning process as early as possible because they potentially bring to the 4069
counterinsurgency the specific and essential abilities shown in table 8-3 on page 8-19. 4070
Table 8-3. Host-nation contributions 4071
Task Reason for contribution
Understand an operational
environment
The area of operations is the host-nations home and their
culture; they know the language, the different groups, the
political situation, educational levels, economic
considerations, historical bad actors, and unofficial
community leaders.
Provide human intelligence The host-nation security force is better able to gather
information that leads to human intelligence for a host of
reasons, to include speaking the same language,
understanding the important players in the area, and so on.
Put the pieces together The host-nation can often better integrate the different
fragments of intelligence into the context of an operational
environment.
Determine credibility of
intelligence assets (sources,
walk-ins, call-ins)
The host-nation possesses a vastly superior sense of
cultural and situational awareness vital to managing and
assigning credibility to sources.
Validate and check
interpreters
The host-nation can confirm not only the interpreters'
ability, but also the interpreters' loyalty.
Identify and root out
infiltrators
The host-nation can pick out minute differences between
normal and abnormal behavior.
Gain information superiority The host-nation can write messages that resonate with the
local populace.
8-67. Tactical-level planners in the U.S. military employ either the military decisionmaking process or the 4072
Marine Corps planning process to gain an understanding of an operational environment, identify the tactical 4073
problem, develop possible courses of action, and evaluate and select the best course of action to most 4074
effectively address the tactical problem. Commanders and staffs first properly frame the problem. When 4075
given a set of inputs, such as an order from higher headquarters or some other initiating directive, certain 4076
intelligence products, and an initial commanders visualization, the commander and staff complete the steps 4077
to work toward a specified output, such as a finished operation order. In cases where host-nation security 4078
force leaders have been directly involved in combat operations over many years, those leaders who survive 4079
often owe their lives to their own ability to improvise. As a result, many host-nation security force leaders 4080
apply an intuitive, instead of a process-oriented, method of making decisions. They can immediately size 4081
up a tactical situation, almost instantaneously recognize dangers and opportunities, and decide upon a 4082
course of action. While this capability can serve in critical situations, it cannot be taught to others, and it is 4083
of no use in situations unrelated to the leaders own experiential learning. Therefore, U.S. or coalition 4084
advisors may have to work patiently with their host-nation security force counterparts for them to develop a 4085
planning and decision support process as opposed to allowing them to rely solely on the intuitive approach. 4086
8-68. U.S. and coalition planners ensure that they have conducted basic mission analysis prior to parallel 4087
planning with host-nation partners. This allows advisors to develop and assess assumptions, identify 4088
implied and specified tasks, determine what assets and capabilities are available, and formulate a tentative 4089
timeline to coordinate advisory efforts throughout the planning process. 4090
OTHER INDIRECT ENABLERS 4091
8-69. The U.S. can integrate enablers into a host nations counterinsurgency efforts. These enablers can 4092
provide intelligence or prevent the flow of resources to a counterinsurgency. Various intelligence 4093
capabilities, such as signal intelligence and geospatial intelligence, may be essential to a host-nations 4094
counterinsurgency. Also, other enablers, such as airlift capabilities, might be important for 4095
counterinsurgency. Another capability that can be integrated into a counterinsurgency effort is counter 4096
threat finance. Counter threat finance works to detect, counter, contain, disrupt, deter, or dismantle the 4097
Chapter 8
transitional financing of state and non-state enemies threatening the U.S. Counter threat finance can deny 4098
an insurgent access to vital funding streams by identifying the sources and conduits of funding. In 4099
counterinsurgency, this can play an important role because of the connection between insurgencies and 4100
black markets. It provides one means to prevent an insurgency from obtaining resources. (For more 4101
information on counter threat finance, see the Joint Staffs Commanders Guide to Counter Threat Finance 4102
and DODD 5205.14.) 4103
4104

Chapter 9 4105
Direct Methods for Countering Insurgencies 4106
9-1. The U.S. has a wide range of direct capabilities that it can integrate to create many different 4107
operational approaches to counter an insurgency. This chapter provides a list of methods and capabilities 4108
that are employed by land forces to directly intervene in an insurgency. These methods and capabilities 4109
provide a framework for a land commander to organize tactical tasks in time, space, and purpose to achieve 4110
a desired end state. Developing an operational approach is the essential product of the Army design 4111
methodology. These operational approaches are also integrated with other capabilities, including indirect 4112
capabilities, from the U.S., and this creates an overall operational approach for the U.S. The U.S. must 4113
develop an operational approach that addresses the challenges of a particular insurgency and meets the 4114
ends the U.S. wishes to achieve. 4115
9-2. Commanders and staffs may use the following methods in combination or independently to support a 4116
direct approach to countering insurgencies. In these operational approaches, U.S. forces act independently, 4117
partnered with a host nation, or as part of a coalition operation to actively address root causes of the 4118
insurgency and engage in activities to reduce the insurgent threat. Moreover, the Army and Marine Corps 4119
can also integrate enablers, such as indirect fires, into a host nations counterinsurgency efforts. The 4120
following is a list of direct methods to counter an insurgency: 4121
Shape, clear, hold, build, and transition. 4122
Attack the network. 4123
Targeting threat infrastructure. 4124
Strike operations. 4125
SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION 4126
9-3. Shape-clear-hold-build-transition is an operational approach commanders may select for 4127
counterinsurgency operations. This operational approach is based largely on an understanding of an 4128
operational environment and the problems facing the commander. Once the commander approves the 4129
approach, it provides the basis for beginning, continuing, or completing detailed planning. 4130
9-4. Commanders and staffs need to understand this method if they are training, advising, or integrating 4131
capabilities into a host nation effort. If a host nation is performing operations, whatever the U.S. role in the 4132
counterinsurgency, Soldiers and Marines must have some framework for understanding a host nations 4133
actions. Commanders and staffs cannot evaluate, advise, or train another force unless they have a base of 4134
knowledge on the subject. In many counterinsurgency efforts, a state will try to defeat insurgencies by 4135
performing a general operational approach that is similar to shape-clear-hold-build-transition. 4136
Understanding shape-clear-hold-build-transition is a fundamental framework for understanding what units 4137
are trying to accomplish in a counterinsurgency. This framework applies to all units involved in the 4138
counterinsurgency, including, for example, an infantry battalion directly performing actions, a member of a 4139
Special Forces team advising a host nation, or a member of a combatant command integrating and 4140
evaluating various security cooperation and other capabilities. 4141
9-5. Whether U.S. forces are executing shape-clear-hold-build-transition or another state is executing it, 4142
it can be very effective in defeating an insurgency. For example, in the Philippines, the government was 4143
successful in performing shape-clear-hold-build-transition, even if it was not called shape-clear-hold-build- 4144
transition by the counterinsurgents at the time. Understanding shape-clear-hold-build-transition can be 4145
essential in understanding what a host nation is trying to achieve in its counterinsurgency efforts. 4146
Chapter 9
A Direct Approach: The Huks 4147
The Hukbalahap, or Huks, was one of several guerilla organizations that appeared 4148
in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation of World War II. By the time of the 4149
countrys liberation from the Japanese occupation, the Huks were well-armed with 4150
weapons taken from the Japanese or shipped to them from the United States. 4151
The Philippines gained independence from the United States on July 4, 1946, and 4152
held its first national election in November 1946. The Huks participated in the 4153
elections, and the head of the wartime Huk movement, Luis Taruc, won a seat in the 4154
Philippine Congress. However, the newly elected president, Manuel Roxas, refused 4155
to seat Mr. Taruc or his allies in Congress, leading many Filipino peasants to join the 4156
Huk movement. 4157
By late 1946, there was open fighting between the Huks and the forces of the newly 4158
independent Republic of the Philippines. The insurgency was motivated by vast 4159
economic inequality during the countrys transition to an export-led capitalist 4160
economy, with abject poverty affecting 90 percent of the population. 4161
The Huks primary tactics in the beginning of the conflict included bank, payroll office, 4162
and train robberies, as well as small hit-and-run raids and ambushes that allowed 4163
them to avoid contact with large government formations. During these first few years, 4164
the Huks numbered 5,000 active insurgents, 10,000 lightly armed reserves, and 4165
35,000 other supporters. The Huks also enjoyed incredible levels of internal support, 4166
with an estimated 250,000 peasants actively supporting them during the early years 4167
of the insurgency. 4168
The COIN force was unable to control the insurgency in the early years. Shortly after 4169
the country was granted independence, the Philippine Army had been reduced from 4170
132,000 to 37,000 men. Approximately 24,000 of these forces were in the Military 4171
Police Command, which was tasked with combating the insurgency. However, the 4172
Military Police Command was poorly led and poorly equipped, and pursued tactics 4173
that accomplished little beyond alienating the population between 1946 and 1948. In 4174
1948, President Roxas reorganized the Military Police Command into the Philippine 4175
Constabulary, which remained neither well-trained nor well-equipped. It mainly 4176
practiced encirclement and sweeps, both of which were easily evaded by the Huks, 4177
and systematically committed abuses against civilians raiding villages, stealing 4178
possessions, and treating the populace worse than did the Huks. 4179
The Huks then began making strategic and operational errors, failing to reach out to 4180
other disaffected groups to form a broad front and employing many common 4181
criminals in their ranks, causing peasants to fear the group. Probably most 4182
catastrophic to the groups public image was the assassination of Mrs. Aurora 4183
Quezon, the well-liked and popular wife of the late former President, Manuel Quezon. 4184
As a result of Mrs. Quezons murder, President Quirino appointed then-Congressman 4185
Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense in 1950. 4186
After this, the Huk Rebellion became a good example of successful shape-clear-hold 4187
operations, with Magsaysay immediately instituting a shape-clear-hold approach. 4188
Shaping operations focused on efforts to win popular support for the COIN effort in 4189
preparation for future operations to clear insurgent areas. These operations therefore 4190
included putting a stop to the abuses of civilians by the Constabulary and Army, firing 4191
many high-level military officers, placing the Constabulary under Magsaysays 4192
personal control, suppressing troop brutality towards the population, and increasing 4193
pay for enlisted troops to remove their incentives for looting. They also involved the 4194
establishment of a Civil Affairs Office through which troops became involved in civic 4195
action projects (including digging wells and building bridges) and the Armys provision 4196
of medical assistance to villagers. Additionally, Magsaysay pursued a population 4197
engagement strategy, even going so far as to set up a telegraph system that 4198
provided a direct line to the Defense Ministry for any villager on Luzon to use. 4199
Direct Methods for Countering Insurgencies
9-6. The commitment of resources, to include time, troops, money, development programs, and other 4200
enablers depends entirely on the capacity of the insurgency, the capacity of host nation institutions, the 4201
capacity of the host nation security forces, and the capacity of the host nations population. The capacity 4202
requirement (such as, commitment) for the external counterinsurgent is that capacity which overcomes the 4203
capacity differential between the insurgents and the host nation systems. As the framework is predicated by 4204
the conditions on the ground, shape-clear-hold-build-transition is based on understanding areas of operation 4205
and understanding the comprehensive threat. To transition between the clear, the hold, and the build, the 4206
unit must be able to measure the conditions on the ground and how those conditions are achieving the 4207
commanders end state. This ties the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework to assessments. 4208
9-7. Shape-clear-hold-build-transition can be used as a method for constructing specific tactical 4209
operations, planning short-range operations for a specific area, or developing a mid- to long-range 4210
operational framework for a units plan for countering an insurgency. Shape-clear-hold-build-transition can 4211
be used as a campaign framework, guiding planning from the introduction of foreign forces to conflict 4212
resolution. It can be used as to campaign design to be executed by multiple units on a rotational basis. The 4213
imperatives, structure, considerations, and conditions listed herein apply no matter how the shape-clear- 4214
hold-build-transition method is applied. 4215
9-8. The counterinsurgent cannot get trapped into thinking that the shape-clear-hold-build-transition 4216
approach is a stage by stage process. The phase that a unit performs is determined by the area of operations, 4217
not planning constructs. While shape-clear-hold-build-transition can be a phased operation in each area, the 4218
environment must dictate the progression of a shape-clear-hold-build-transition. The counterinsurgent uses 4219
the framework as the way to synchronize subordinate unit actions, prioritize efforts, allocate resources, and 4220
direct specific effects to achieve end state criteria in an ever-changing environment. The overall objective 4221
of using the shape-clear-hold-build-transition construct is to transition responsibility of countering the 4222
insurgency to host nation institutions. The commander must understand that conditions associated with the 4223
clear, the hold, and the build phases may be present at any time. U.S. ground forces can expect to carry out 4224
offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously throughout the entirety of shape-clear-hold- 4225
build-transition construct. 4226
9-9. There are some imperatives for the shape-clear-hold-build-transition method. These imperatives help 4227
counterinsurgents turn the method from theory into practical application. The imperatives are 4228
The conditions are assessed across several variables and cannot be taken in isolation. 4229
The phase that the environment is in dictates the decisive operation, priorities, and resourcing. 4230
In each phase, the clear, hold, and build, counterinsurgents must simultaneously conduct 4231
offensive, defensive, and stability operations. 4232
Each area requires its own assessment and assessments change over time. 4233
The shape-clear-hold-build-transition process is not always linear, but the methodology is meant 4234
to be progressive. Improving conditions in the environment allows for progression from one 4235
phase to the next. In essence, the operational framework is cyclic, as changes in the capacity of 4236
any element in the environment can change the conditions on the ground and therefore change 4237
the priorities and actions of the counterinsurgent, including the host nation. 4238
The shape-clear-hold-build-transition process is only reactive if the unit on the ground responds 4239
to conditions. The process can be proactive if the counterinsurgents dictate the conditions they 4240
want to establish and provide the resources and emphasis necessary to achieve them. 4241
Although an area is in a certain stage, this does not preclude operations. For example, although 4242
a unit is in the build phase, that does not preclude the unit from performing offensive operations 4243
against underground cells. 4244
9-10. Executing operations in the shape-clear-hold-build-transition construct requires the counterinsurgent 4245
to continually address the root causes of the insurgency. Actions taken in the clear, hold, and build phases 4246
are not executed in isolation. Instead, elements of each phase must be conducted simultaneously. The 4247
shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework does not specify phasing or stages, but it may be appropriate 4248
for the counterinsurgent to create phases or stages of operations to synchronize actions and priorities 4249
effectively. 4250
Chapter 9
9-11. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is driven by the conditions in an area of operations. 4251
To facilitate discussion of these conditions, figure 9-1 graphically depicts the generic spectrum of 4252
counterinsurgency conflict. The graph portrays the relationship of capacity between the insurgent, the host 4253
nation government, the host nation security forces, the host nation population, and the external 4254
counterinsurgent. Capacity represents the ability to change the conditions in the environment towards the 4255
insurgent or the counterinsurgent. This graph depicts the conditions leading to the insurgencya 4256
vulnerable population, a lack of government control, and effective insurgent leadership. As the 4257
counterinsurgent is able to impact these conditions, the capability spectrum changes. The left hand side of 4258
the graph depicts the worst-case scenario in which the insurgent possesses increased capacity comparative 4259
to the host nation. The right hand side of the graph depicts the best-case scenario in which the host nation 4260
capacity is sufficient to counter the insurgent capability without assistance from the external 4261
counterinsurgent. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework describes the process the 4262
counterinsurgent takes to progress from the left of the graph to the right. 4263
Figure 9-1. The capabiIity spectrum of counterinsurgency confIict 4264
9-12. As part of developing understanding, the counterinsurgent must identify the conditions that exist in 4265
particular regions that lead to instability or allow the insurgency to impact the environment. Commanders 4266
must decide where to focus actions and priorities to impact the conditions in a designated area for tactical 4267
or operational reasons. In many instances, commanders specify a preparation phase or shape phase of the 4268
shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework which clarifies the period of time, series of tasks, and effects 4269
to be achieved before the counterinsurgent begins taking deliberate action against the insurgents. Whether 4270
phasing is used or not, preparation of the environment is an absolute requirement to achieve conditions to 4271
progress along the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. 4272
ATTACK THE NETWORK 4273
9-13. Attack the network operations are defined as lethal and nonlethal actions or operations focusing on 4274
friendly, neutral, and threat networks conducted continuously and simultaneously at multiple levels. While 4275
two thirds of attack the network operations deal with the neutral and friendly population, there is a direct 4276
component to attack the network operations. Attack the network operations include activities against enemy 4277
networks. Attack the network operations are tactical, operational, and strategic operations that capitalize on 4278
or create key vulnerabilities to neutralize the threat networks ability to function and enable success of the 4279
operation. Network engagement is constructed around six fundamentals which are 4280
Understand the mission. 4281
Understand the operational environment. 4282
Understand the networks. 4283
Organize for the fight. 4284
Engage the network. 4285
Assess. 4286
While listed sequentially, these actions occur continuously and simultaneously and are designed as an 4287
enhancement to planning processes rather than a linear operational procedure. 4288
9-14. Network engagement provides a construct to identify, define, and engage any network, regardless of 4289
its design. The framework for network engagement can be applied against any type or combination of 4290
adaptive networks. It allows leaders to effectively engage neutral and threat networks with the appropriate 4291
lethal or nonlethal targeting, once a network has been defined through information collection and analysis. 4292
It also provides a means to protect friendly networks. 4293
9-15. Adaptive networked threats present an enduring challenge to all military operations. Neutralizing 4294
them may require an attack the network approach which includes the following activities: 4295
Supporting friendly networks to increase their capability to neutralize any residual networked 4296
threats independently. 4297
Influencing neutral networks and the general population to gain popular support. 4298
Neutralizing the threat networks capabilities to operate within an operational environment. 4299
Employing force protection. 4300
Performing inform and influence activities. 4301
9-16. These activities or actions are mutually supportive and work concurrently, as focusing on any one 4302
activity may not produce the desired outcome. 4303
9-17. Network engagement requires commanders to understand and integrate specific staffing 4304
requirements. Integrating organic capabilities with enablers including, but not limited to, other government 4305
agencies, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and law enforcement 4306
professional, and theater-specific joint task force explosive ordnance disposal elements is crucial to 4307
conducting network engagement operations. 4308
TARGETED THREAT INFRASTRUCTURE 4309
9-18. The targeted threat infrastructure method is a subset of the attack the network method. Targeted 4310
threat infrastructure is a method that seeks to destroy the insurgencies forces physical infrastructure. This 4311
method seeks to destroy the necessary requirements of an insurgency to conduct combat operations. 4312
Targeted threat infrastructure proactively targets the physical and societal mechanisms that support and fuel 4313
the insurgency. It involves an aggressive spirit of the offense. When using this method, commanders and 4314
staffs consider the legal concept of proportionality. The inconvenience caused to civilians or civilian 4315
property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 4316
anticipated by an attack on a military objective. Commanders and staffs using targeted threat infrastructure 4317
must also ensure it is not contributing to the recruitment of insurgent fighters by using too heavy a hand 4318
against elements of society that are not fully or willingly supporting the intrastate conflict. 4319
9-19. For this method to be effective, commanders and staffs must understand where an insurgency is 4320
attaining its strength and attack those areas and facilities. These efforts must further the desired overall end 4321
state and not undermine a host nation governments legitimacy. Commanders and staffs plan for and limit 4322
second and third order effects of attacks. Moreover, attacks are only targeted against the infrastructure the 4323
insurgency relies on. For example, crop eradication aimed at reducing cash flow is unlikely to effect an 4324
insurgency with a large amount of financial resources. It may, however, hurt the legitimacy of the host 4325
nation. 4326
9-20. Illicit crops such as marijuana, coca, or poppy used to fuel and fund the insurgency can be the targets 4327
threatened under the targeted threat infrastructure method. The cash from these crops may help arm, train, 4328
and pay insurgent fighters or pay condolence payments to the families of terrorists who kill themselves in 4329
suicide acts. Attacking such crops may hurt the individual farmer. In some cases, farmers may be coerced 4330
and have no real choice. In others, farmers may support the insurgency. However, the illicit nature of these 4331
Chapter 9
crops make them valid targets. To avoid creating a new insurgent by crop destruction, counterinsurgents 4332
can work with interagency partners and the United States Agency for International Development to 4333
establish crop substitution programs that can help ease hardships farmers may experience. 4334
9-21. Another key target for the targeted threat infrastructure method is any material or physical item used 4335
to fuel the insurgency. For example, a road network that is the primary means of movement for insurgents 4336
needs to be interdicted by checkpoints or destroyed. This may inconvenience the local population, but 4337
under the legal precept of proportionality this can be a valid course of action. Power systems and water 4338
systems deep in insurgent controlled areas are prime targets for targeted threat infrastructure. As the 4339
building blocks of society, power and water are staples that the insurgents needs to survive in their own 4340
region. By impairing these resources, in concert with effective inform and influence operations, the people 4341
can be made to see that their support of the insurgency has brought them difficulties. Aggressive strikes and 4342
raids are central to the targeted threat infrastructure method, to destroy the physical infrastructure that 4343
supports an insurgency. This tactic is not a slash-and-burn technique, but consists of well-planned, 4344
pinpointed attacks on those critical enablers the enemy needs to operate. 4345
9-22. Another key target is the illicit funds used to fuel the insurgency. By establishing counter threat 4346
finance fusion centers, commanders and staffs can work with the power of interagency law enforcement 4347
and international legal partners to find, interdict, and seize huge sums of money that the illicit regime must 4348
launder before it can be used again for legal currency. By using unit counter threat finance specialists in 4349
targeted threat infrastructure operations, funds determined to have been gained through illicit means can be 4350
targeted for seizure at the local level. For example, if a man is a small farm owner and lives in a palatial 4351
home with three cars, he must be investigated, and his funds can be targeted if it is determined that his 4352
wealth is from illicit means and those means are being used to fuel the insurgency. 4353
STRIKE 4354
9-23. A strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability (See JP 3-0). A strike may be 4355
useful to disrupt an insurgency, especially in insurgent controlled areas. Strikes can be made on guerrilla 4356
bases, large enclosed or isolated compounds, and training camps. Normally these operations are meant to 4357
disrupt an insurgency and allow for the success of other operations. Strike operations can be integrated into 4358
a host nations operations to secure a population. The U.S. can contribute a force to perform strikes. 4359
9-24. The purpose of a strike is to destroy insurgent forces and base areas, isolate insurgent forces from 4360
their support, and interdict insurgent infiltration routes and lines of communications. Strikes are primarily 4361
offensive operations. They are characterized by reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and careful 4362
planning, followed by vigorously executed, coordinated attacks or raids by small, highly mobile combat 4363
forces operating in dispersed formations to locate and fix an insurgent force. Upon locating the insurgent 4364
force, strike force commanders attack, pursue, and destroy the insurgent force. If contact is lost, the strike 4365
forces resume aggressive patrolling to reestablish contact and destroy the insurgent force before it can rest, 4366
reorganize, and resume combat operations. 4367
9-25. Strikes can be conducted in support of shape-clear-hold-build-transition operations after guerrilla 4368
forces are initially driven out of an area during the clear phase. Strikes are often employed to assault 4369
outside cleared areas to fix and destroy guerilla forces and prevent counterattacks against governmental and 4370
reconstruction personnel. Counterinsurgents conduct assaults in areas where guerrillas attempt to 4371
consolidate during the hold and build phases. Precision airpower weapons can be used to support other 4372
units conducting strike operations or to conduct strike operations on their own. 4373
9-26. Reconnaissance to locate and test insurgent dispositions and strengths or to develop additional 4374
intelligence can be followed immediately by a hasty attack or raid. Reconnaissance should emphasize 4375
thorough reconnoitering of an area and is characterized by continuous, decentralized, small-unit operations. 4376
Since strike campaigns are conducted in insecure areas, plans must provide for force withdrawal after 4377
mission accomplishment. 4378
9-27. Strike forces are generally task forces composed of military units and may contain intelligence, 4379
police, and paramilitary elements. Civilian elements may be represented. Forces designated to conduct 4380
strikes should be relieved of routine area defense responsibilities well in advance of an operation. Strike 4381
forces can be controlled at the national, regional, or local levels. Strike forces are organized as 4382
self-sufficient task forces capable of operating for extended periods in areas remote from home bases. 4383
9-28. Once insurgent bases have been located, strike forces maneuver to destroy them. The insurgents 4384
ability to hide weapons and to assume noncombatant guises in attempting to avoid capture may require a 4385
thorough reconnaissance and search of the area. Suspects must be managed firmly but treated fairly to 4386
avoid turning innocent suspects into insurgent sympathizers. When small units conducting reconnaissance 4387
locate relatively large insurgent tactical forces, surveillance should be maintained and reaction forces 4388
quickly deployed to destroy them. In areas suspected of harboring insurgent forces or installations, 4389
reconnaissance and surveillance should be conducted and followed with an immediate raid by reaction 4390
forces when sufficient information has been developed on a target. Good communications and mobility are 4391
essential for success in these combat operations. 4392
9-29. Speed and surprise are important in strikes. The sudden and unexpected delivery of combat forces 4393
into an insurgent held or contested area provides significant advantages to the forces conducting strike 4394
operations. If caught by surprise, guerrillas may be unable to react effectively. Speed and surprise can be 4395
achieved by using air assault tactics to insert the first forces into the area of operations. Subsequent forces 4396
can be delivered on later airlifts or by other modes of transportation. Fires can be used to block escape 4397
routes or areas that are not secured by land forces. 4398
9-30. However, strikes do not address the root causes for beginning or sustaining an insurgency, nor do 4399
they necessarily increase the legitimacy of the host nation government. Strikes will, most likely, need to be 4400
integrated with other approaches to counterinsurgency as part of the overall operational design. In some 4401
cases, the U.S. can integrate this ability into an ongoing host nation effort. 4402
OTHER DIRECT ENABLERS 4403
9-31. The Army and Marines can also integrate other direct enablers into a counterinsurgency operation. 4404
For example, indirect fires can be integrated into an ongoing counterinsurgency effort. Moreover, special 4405
forces have the capability to perform direct actions, which are short-duration strikes and other small-scale 4406
offensive actions conducted as special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments 4407
and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage 4408
designated targets. As with indirect enablers, the Army and Marine Corps have a wide range of direct 4409
capabilities that can be integrated into an ongoing counterinsurgency effort. 4410
4411

Chapter 10 4412
InteIIigence and OperationaI Considerations 4413
10-1. This chapter covers several types of considerations for a counterinsurgency. First it covers 4414
intelligence considerations. This includes considerations for intelligence and for intelligence related 4415
capabilities. Next, the chapter provides some operational considerations. This includes inform and 4416
influence operations, which includes integrated monetary shaping operations. Finally, this chapter covers 4417
considerations for remote area operations, border operations, and basing. 4418
10-2. The insurgency in Peru demonstrates the importance that intelligence capabilities, inform and 4419
influence operations, and integrated monetary shaping operations can have on a counterinsurgency 4420
operation. The Peruvian government was eventually successfully in using economic development and an 4421
information campaign to weaken the Shining Path insurgency. With the gradual development of an 4422
effective military, Peru was able to defeat the Shining Path. 4423
Intelligence and the Shining Path 4424
Peru suffered an unprecedented economic downturn in the 1970s and 1980s. The 4425
Peruvian government, though democratic, was characteristically ineffective and 4426
unable to stem the worsening crisis. This opened the door for an insurgent 4427
organization, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), and its establishment of alternative 4428
governance structures in the economically devastated Peruvian highlands. Sendero 4429
would purge local officials and establish its own authority in the villages, beating back 4430
any contestation of control brought by the Peruvian police. 4431
In the first few years of the insurgency, the government did not take the threat 4432
seriously. Opposition to the insurgents (such as it was) was organized by local 4433
police, and the government made no effort to improve the desperate socioeconomic 4434
conditions in the highlands or to define a clear mission for regional security forces. 4435
With its superior organization and a lack of effective response by the government, 4436
Sendero made significant progress. Its operations and propaganda were coordinated 4437
to create the perception that the group was a winner and met its Maoist strategic 4438
goals, in sharp contrast to the largely ineffective government. 4439
Still plagued by a lack of internal unity both in the government and in the military, the 4440
state moved forward with two competing COIN strategies: one focused on 4441
development and the other focused on ideology and military force. First proposed in 4442
1984, the developmentalist approach finally got its turn (sort of) in 1985. The state 4443
recognized that the highlands were particularly hard hit by the economic crisis and 4444
the heartland of the insurgency, so its goal was to increase development and job 4445
opportunities in these regions. Public investment in Ayacucho (a region in the 4446
southern highlands) quadrupled between 1985 and 1986. Unfortunately, the 4447
insurgents actively resisted this development, or co-opted it, forcing government 4448
teachers to include Sendero materials in their curricula. The government did not 4449
provide the security necessary for development to have any effect. Subsequent to 4450
1986, development funding fell off, and embezzlement became common. So, while 4451
there was an initial push of development and investment, it fell far short of meeting 4452
the needs of the economically disadvantaged population in the highlands. 4453
The election of Alberto Fujimori in June 1990 raised new hopes of resolving the 4454
conflicts within the government and making greater headway against the insurgents. 4455
Fujimori promised a better human rights record and a new commitment to 4456
developmentalism. In addition to renewed government legitimacy, the Fujimori 4457
administration also brought two significant improvements to Perus approach to 4458
Chapter 10
COIN: first, the use of the police and the national intelligence service to track the 4459
movements of Sendero sympathizers and attempt to infiltrate the group and, second, 4460
the arming of rondas, peasant civil-defense militias. These rondas were possible 4461
only because the insurgents treatment of villagers in its areas of operation had 4462
become so harsh that the locals were finally pushed to stand up for themselves. 4463
Improved intelligence and an end to internal divisions within the military allowed 4464
effective engagement of insurgent forces and effective (and rapid) support to 4465
threatened rondas. For the first time in the conflict, the government, police, and 4466
military made effective use of what would now be called strategic communication, 4467
with a greater emphasis on government credibility, consistency between actions and 4468
messages, and significant efforts to woo the population in the highlands away from 4469
the insurgents (of which the rondas were an integral part). 4470
The final blow came in 1992 when good intelligence led to Abimael Guzmn 4471
(Sendros leader)s capture. At the time of capture, the police seized Guzmn's 4472
computer, in which they found a very detailed roster of his armed forces and the 4473
weapons each formation had in each region of the country. His authoritarian 4474
management of Sendero had proven very effective when he was at large, but when 4475
he was captured, not so much. 4476
INTELLIGENCE 4477
10-3. Intelligence can be broken down into seven disciplines, and it is an enabler of any counterinsurgency 4478
effort. Each discipline provides a means for the counterinsurgent to gain a higher level of situational 4479
understanding. These disciplines include counterintelligence, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, 4480
measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, signals intelligence, and technical 4481
intelligence. The intelligence disciplines are integrated to ensure a multi-discipline approach to intelligence 4482
analysis, and ultimately all-source intelligence facilitates situational understanding and supports decision 4483
making. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on intelligence.) 4484
10-4. An essential part of understanding the operational environment is the process of intelligence 4485
preparation of the battlefield/battlespace. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace is a 4486
systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of threat/adversary, 4487
terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. By 4488
applying intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace, commanders gain the information necessary 4489
to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space. (See FM 4490
2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A.) In a counterinsurgency environment, intelligence preparation of the 4491
battlefield/battlespace must take into account operational environment considerations. 4492
ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE 4493
10-5. All-source intelligence are intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate 4494
all sources of information, most frequently including human intelligence, imagery intelligence, 4495
measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-source data in the production of 4496
finished intelligence (JP 2-0). Intelligence organizations fuse data and information into all-source 4497
intelligence products to support counterinsurgency operations. Analysis for counterinsurgency operations is 4498
challenging, due in part to the 4499
Need to understand perceptions and culture. 4500
Need to track hundreds or thousands of personalities. 4501
Local nature of insurgencies. 4502
Tendency of insurgencies to change over time. 4503
10-6. Databases are important for analyzing and synthesizing insurgent activities and personalities. At a 4504
minimum, there should be common searchable combatant command databases of insurgent actions and 4505
personnel, as well as another database of all intelligence reporting. These should be accessible by analysts 4506
both in and out of the theater. 4507
Intelligence and Operational Considerations
10-7. Because all echelons collect and use intelligence, all staffs are heavily involved in analysis. Units are 4508
simultaneously intelligence producers and consumers. Intelligence capabilities are normally greater at 4509
higher echelons of command. Battalion staffs have fewer personnel to collect patrol debriefs, analyze 4510
incoming information from multiple sources, produce finished intelligence products, and disseminate 4511
products to appropriate consumers than brigade staffs, for example. In many cases, brigade intelligence 4512
sections may be inadequate for a counterinsurgency environment. 4513
10-8. Counterinsurgency requirements may require pushing analysts to battalion and brigade staffs to give 4514
those echelons the required analytical support. There are instances when analysts can be beneficial at the 4515
company level. This is the case when a maneuver company must collect large amounts of information on 4516
the local populace and insurgents. An analyst can help collect and process this information and develop a 4517
common operational picture of the area of operations. Pushing analysts to brigade level and below places 4518
analysts closer to collectors, improves the common operational picture, and helps higher echelon staffs 4519
receive answers to their priority intelligence requirements. Commanders may need to be creative in 4520
developing analytical capabilities within their units. Though it is not ideal, commanders can have assigned 4521
non-intelligence personnel to work in the intelligence section. 4522
10-9. A bottom-up flow of intelligence in counterinsurgency is important. Battalions and brigades develop 4523
intelligence for their area of operations. Higher echelons fuse it into intelligence of the insurgency 4524
throughout the combatant command. Higher echelons can also integrate the human intelligence that 4525
battalions and brigades receive with the other intelligence disciplines. Comprehensive insurgency analysis 4526
focuses on the people in the area of operations. It develops information about relationships among them and 4527
the ideas and beliefs driving their actions. Comprehensive insurgency analysis brings together all other 4528
forms of analysis. 4529
Fusion Centers 4530
10-10. Fusion centers are a means to provide effective all-source intelligence. A fusion center is an ad hoc 4531
collaborative effort between several units, organizations, or agencies that provide resources, expertise, 4532
information, and intelligence to a center with the goal of supporting the rapid execution of operations by 4533
contributing members. Fusion centers are primarily designed to focus collection and promote information 4534
sharing across multiple participants within a specific geographic area or mission type. These centers are not 4535
operations centers. Commanders at various echelons create fusion centers to manage the flow of 4536
information and intelligence, focus information collection to satisfy information requirements, and to 4537
process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate the resulting collection. The intelligence portion of a fusion 4538
center typically comprises intelligence representatives from different tactical echelons, interagency 4539
partners, multinational organizations, host-nation organizations, and nongovernmental organizations 4540
operating in the area of operations. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on fusion centers.) 4541
10-11. In a counterinsurgency, creating shared situational understanding is essential. Fusion cells are 4542
important in creating this understanding. The mixture of personnel and expertise allows for the integration 4543
of information and analysis. This is an effective means of understanding the operational environment from 4544
multiple different perspectives. Fusion cells can help in understanding intelligence and informing 4545
operations to avoid unintended consequences. 4546
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 4547
10-12. Human intelligence is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided 4548
by human sources (JP 2-0). Because insurgency and counterinsurgency are struggles for legitimacy, human 4549
intelligence plays a vital role in counterinsurgency. Human intelligence uses human sources as tools, and 4550
human intelligence uses a variety of collection methods, both passive and active, to gather information to 4551
meet intelligence requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines. Interrogation is just one of the 4552
human intelligence tasks. (See FM 2-22.3 for more information on human intelligence.) During 4553
counterinsurgency operations, a great deal of intelligence is based on information gathered from people. 4554
10-13. Operational reporting may have information of intelligence value that originates from the local 4555
populace. People may approach Soldiers and Marines during the course of their day-to-day operations and 4556
offer information. Soldiers and Marines record information and report it to the intelligence section. Doing 4557
Chapter 10
so allows for verification of the information and establishes a means for human intelligence collectors to 4558
contact individuals offering information of value. 4559
10-14. People offering information on insurgents are often in danger. Insurgents continuously try to defeat 4560
collection operations. Commanders ensure that the appropriate personnel are trained in handling human 4561
sources in accordance with Army, Marine Corps, and DOD standards and policies. Human intelligence 4562
collectors are trained in procedures that limit risks to sources and handlers. Counterinsurgents should not 4563
expect people to willingly provide information if insurgents have the ability to violently intimidate sources. 4564
Human intelligence reporting increases if counterinsurgents protect the populace from insurgents and 4565
people begin to believe the insurgency is defeated. 4566
10-15. People often provide inaccurate and conflicting information to counterinsurgents. They may spread 4567
rumors or provide inaccurate information purposefully for their own reasons. For example, people may 4568
give inaccurate information to settle tribal, ethnic, or business disputes. The accuracy of information 4569
obtained by Soldiers and Marines is verified before using it to support operations. This means that 4570
information reported to patrols should be verified with all-source intelligence. Improved accuracy will 4571
come from collecting intelligence from the whole population. Information must be seen as part of a whole 4572
picture and part or segments of information cannot override the whole picture. An important part of gaining 4573
access from the whole population is gaining access to restricted populations. These populations often 4574
include women, but they can include any element which the counterinsurgent cannot access because of 4575
cultural considerations. Restricted access teams may be helpful in ensuring that information is attained 4576
from the whole population, including women. 4577
INFORMATION COLLECTION 4578
10-16. There are several important enabling capabilities affecting intelligence support (See ATTP 2-91.6 4579
for a further discussion.) These capabilities are for information collection in a counterinsurgency 4580
environment. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and 4581
employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in 4582
direct support of current and future operations. (See FM 3-55 for more information on information 4583
collection.) Several capabilities have important considerations for information collection in a 4584
counterinsurgency. They are 4585
Biometrics. 4586
Law Enforcement. 4587
Forensics. 4588
Biometrics 4589
10-17. Understanding biometrics-enabled intelligence requires knowledge of biometrics and its 4590
contribution to Army and Marine Corps missions. The term biometric describes both a characteristic 4591
(biometric) and a process (biometrics): 4592
Biometric is a measurable physical characteristic or personal behavior trait used to recognize the 4593
identity or verify the claimed identity of an individual (JP 2-0). 4594
Biometrics is the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, 4595
physiological, and behavioral characteristics (JP 2-0). 4596
10-18. The Army and Marine Corps employ automated biometric systems to deny threat forces any 4597
freedom of movement within the populace and to positively identify known threats (threat forces, friendly 4598
populace, local nationals, and third-country nationals) throughout their areas of operation to separate 4599
insurgents and foreign fighters from the general population. Biometric systems collect biometric data, such 4600
as iris images, fingerprints, and facial images, and combine them with contextual data to produce an 4601
electronic dossier on an individual. Automated biometric systems support the following tasks: 4602
Positively identity high-value targets. 4603
Screen and badge personnel. 4604
Manage the populace. 4605
Perform force protection (local access). 4606
Conduct detention operations. 4607
10-19. Biometrics are important assets in any counterinsurgency operation. These tools allow the 4608
counterinsurgent to gain both civil security and control. Moreover, biometrics allow the counterinsurgent 4609
to conduct operations and avoid detaining civilians. If used correctly, biometrics allows the 4610
counterinsurgent to effectively execute offensive operations against the insurgency and protect the 4611
population. Moreover, the host nation can be enabled with these capabilities. Biometric abilities can be 4612
essential in building legitimacy among the population. (For more information on biometrics, see 4613
FM 2-22.3, ATTP 2-91.6, and TC 2-33.4.) 4614
Law Enforcement 4615
10-20. Although not an intelligence discipline, police intelligence operations can support the overall 4616
intelligence effort through the analysis, production, and dissemination of information collected from police 4617
activities. Information gathered from military police operations may contribute to a commanders critical 4618
information requirement in addition to focusing policing to maintain order. Criminal acts such as robberies, 4619
kidnappings, terrorism, and extortion may be linked to insurgent psychological or money- gathering 4620
activities. Police information, police intelligence, and criminal intelligence are subtasks of police 4621
intelligence operations. (See ATTP 3-39.20 for additional information on law enforcement.) 4622
Forensics 4623
10-21. Forensics involves methodically gathering and analyzing evidence to establish facts that can be 4624
presented in a legal proceeding. It applies multidisciplinary scientific processes to establish facts.(See 4625
ATTP 2-91.6). Forensics is essential in site exploitation. Site exploitation is a series of activities to 4626
recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the 4627
conduct of operations (JP 3-31). In an insurgency, understanding the operational environment often 4628
depends on understanding activities which civilians or insurgents want to remain secret. The scientific tools 4629
offered by forensics are essential to this understanding. 4630
10-22. For example, documents and pocket litter, as well as information found in computers and cell 4631
phones, can provide critical information that analysts need to evaluate insurgent organizations, capabilities, 4632
and intentions. Forensics that includes site exploitation and forensic documents is of great benefit to 4633
substantiating information if detainees are insurgents. The methods of forensics allow the counterinsurgent 4634
work towards situational understanding. 4635
INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES 4636
10-23. Inform and influence activities are the integration of designated information-related capabilities to 4637
synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform U.S. and global audiences, influence 4638
foreign audiences, and affect threat decisionmaking. All assets and capabilities at a commanders disposal 4639
have the potential to be used to inform and influence selected audiences to varying degrees. 4640
Information-related capabilities are tools and techniques utilizing dimensions within the information 4641
environment that can be used to achieve a commanders end state. Designated information-related 4642
capabilities that support inform and influence activities and its lines of efforts typically include, but are not 4643
limited to, public affairs operations, military information support operations, combat camera operations, 4644
Soldier and leader engagement, civil affairs activities, and the human terrain system. Other capabilities the 4645
commander may allocatesuch as components of cyber electromagnetic activities; special technical 4646
operations; presence, posture and profile; physical attack; and physical securityare capabilities not solely 4647
designed to inform or influence, and they may assist in achieving effects and mission objectives. One of the 4648
most essential inform and influence operations is integrated monetary shaping operations. Success depends 4649
on commanders and staffs effectively employing all available operational assets to best shape the 4650
information environment. (See FM 3-13 for more information on inform and influence activities.) 4651
10-24. In a counterinsurgency, the insurgent often targets the American population with themes and 4652
messages concerning the insurgency. There are legal and professional reasons why the armed forces cannot 4653
Chapter 10
attempt to influence American public opinion. To do so would undermine civil control over the military. 4654
However, the military has a responsibly to inform the American public. Transparency and truthful 4655
information allows policy decisions to be debated in among decisionmakers and the public. Providing that 4656
information in an insurgency is a responsibility of the military, trying to influence the actual debate is 4657
unethical and damages the militarys relationship with the society. On the other hand, the insurgent tries to 4658
influence the host-nation population. Inform operations are essential in trying to counter this effort. 4659
10-25. When integrating inform and influence operations into a counterinsurgency, the counterinsurgents 4660
must understand the cultural environment. The process of integration of influence operations is detailed in 4661
FM 3-13, but that process must be informed by cultural understanding and knowledge. Inform and 4662
influence operations must be integrated into all operations. 4663
10-26. There are several different considerations for influencing a population while an insurgency is 4664
ongoing. The first is the tension between broadcasting a message and engaging the population to achieve a 4665
two way understanding. Normally, the U.S. is involved in a counterinsurgency to aid a host nation. As 4666
such, broadcasting a message that is integrated with the host nations message to tell the population the 4667
reason for involvement may be important. However, there is also a need for engagement of the population 4668
in a counterinsurgency. Commanders and staffs have to establish relationships, seek two-way 4669
understanding, and listen to what others think. Effective counterinsurgency normally requires an effective 4670
broadcast message and engaging the population in a dialogue. Commanders and staffs must find the right 4671
balance between the two approaches. 4672
10-27. Commanders an staffs balance between controlling the message and allowing for complete 4673
freedom of messaging. Having a perfectly controlled message does not allow for real communication with 4674
the population. Leaders must have some ability to actual engage the population and create a shared 4675
understanding. However, if representatives of a command say whatever they feel like saying, the 4676
population is bombarded with contradictions and inconsistencies. Commanders and staffs must find the 4677
right balance to allow real communication, but to also ensure that the command has a coherent message. 4678
10-28. The most important aspect of inform and influence operations is honesty. In the contemporary 4679
information environment, propaganda and deception are unsustainable. Moreover, all information provided 4680
to the population is given to influence the population. There is no such thing as value free information. 4681
This being the case, commanders should be honest about their purpose. They should have a commitment to 4682
the truth, a commitment to credibility, and should seek to virtuously persuade the population. 4683
10-29. The truism that actions speak louder than words is of particular importance in counterinsurgency. 4684
Any inform and influence strategy that includes only traditional communications is likely to fail. To be 4685
successful, inform and influence activities must include a broad set of behaviors, deeds, and undertakings 4686
by members of the command. What units do, will often matter more than what they say. 4687
INTEGRATED MONETARY SHAPING OPERATIONS 4688
10-30. Integrated monetary shaping operations are the use of monetary resources, provided with various 4689
types of aid (for example, economic, financial, humanitarian, or developmental), involving the voluntary 4690
transfer of resources (for example, money, equipment, knowledge, or training other than military) from 4691
U.S. or unified action partners to a host nation, directly or indirectly, for mutual benefit. Simply stated, 4692
integrated monetary shaping operations are the coordinated use of money, goods, or services to support the 4693
commanders objectives. They are a means to an end. Integrated monetary shaping operations are used to 4694
attack sources of instability, build partnerships, and provide for economic stabilization and security. The 4695
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force categorize integrated monetary shaping operations-type activities as 4696
part of information operations executed through civil military operations. The Army and Marine Corps 4697
categorize integrated monetary shaping operations as inform and influence activities. Integrated monetary 4698
shaping operations have two major components: 4699
Supporting operations by funding developmental assistance, infrastructure, and governance 4700
support projects to win the support of an indigenous populace and erode support for the 4701
adversary. 4702
Denying adversaries sanctuary and operational flexibility by hindering their ability to reliably 4703
fund operations. 4704
10-31. Integrated monetary shaping operations can be an effective tool to stabilize the security 4705
environment. However, it can also undermine both the local and national economies. One essential 4706
consideration of counterinsurgencies is to understand that long-term counterinsurgency efforts have an 4707
economic impact on the host nation. Additionally, the implementation of funding and projects can have 4708
negative secondary and tertiary effects. Commanders should recognize decisions over which contractors, 4709
communities, and individuals are chosen to receive funding could create winners and losers in their area. 4710
This effect can exacerbate tensions in the area. Finally, a counterinsurgency can last many years, and this 4711
effort can distort the pricing of goods and services existing within the local and national economy. 4712
Counterinsurgents must understand that they can undermine their own efforts by demanding goods in such 4713
quantities that they fundamentally alters market forces, which results in economic dependence on the 4714
counterinsurgency. This can result in economic problems that can undermine the host nations stability 4715
when the external counterinsurgent departs. 4716
10-32. Integrated monetary shaping operations can be effective, but they should be linked into an overall 4717
development plan. Without that link, the haphazard use of money can be highly destructive to an economy 4718
because it creates an unsustainable economy once the counterinsurgent leaves. The basic point of integrated 4719
monetary shaping operations is primarily to be a catalyst for long-term and natural development and only 4720
secondarily to meet short-term needs or security concerns. The counterinsurgent must understand that 4721
interactions with the local culture do have far-reaching effects. Economic effect is one area where the 4722
counterinsurgent can have both positive and negative effects. 4723
10-33. Integrated monetary shaping operations can also inform a commanders situational understanding. 4724
Property ownership records include census records, deeds, and other means of determining ownership of 4725
land and buildings. They help counterinsurgents to determine who should or should not be living in a 4726
specific area and help them secure the populace. In some cases, it may be necessary for Soldiers and 4727
Marines to go door to door and collect census data themselves. 4728
10-34. Financial records can provide information gathered on sources of insurgent funding. Collection of 4729
financial records often requires help from agencies like the Department of the Treasury and financial 4730
institutions. It may require analyzing criminal activities or traditional means of currency transfer. 4731
10-35. Property ownership and financial records can reveal information about the structure of the society. 4732
Who owns and controls land and who controls debt provide some information on who may be a power 4733
broker in a particular society. Finding these individuals or institutions provides greater situational 4734
understanding for the counterinsurgent. 4735
10-36. Integrated monetary shaping operations can be used to aid stability efforts. Some possible uses of 4736
money include 4737
Repairing damage resulting from coalition operations. 4738
Providing condolence payments to civilians for death or injury resulting from coalition 4739
operations. This type of payment must be in accordance with prevailing standards for payments 4740
of solatia, a victims bereavement fund, or compensatory statutes provided by donor agencies as 4741
well as the United Nations. (The counterinsurgent must be aware of the going rates and, as far as 4742
possible, ensure that the right messaging is provided to the village or other district leadership 4743
where death or injury has occurred resulting from coalition operations.) Further, the 4744
counterinsurgent must guard against payment for injury or accident becoming a means of 4745
extortion or harassment. 4746
Funding civic clean-up projects and other sanitation projects and equipment to provide those 4747
services. 4748
Funding small-scale infrastructure improvements to improve the quality of life of citizens. 4749
Funding agricultural projects to improve farming practices, improve livestock health, or 4750
implement cooperative farming programs. This type of activity should be conducted in 4751
consultation with donor agricultural agencies or the host-nation departments of agriculture to 4752
ensure that land rights and water rights of communities are not infringed and crop management 4753
is according to agriculturally sustainable principles. 4754
Repairing civic and cultural sites and facilities. Preservation of cultural heritage is a sensitive 4755
issue and due respect to the site or culture and its practices must be adhered to. It might even be 4756
Chapter 10
preferable that the counterinsurgent maintain a low profile and let the cultural leaders take a 4757
leading role in this initiative. 4758
Repairing institutions and infrastructure critical to governance and rule of law (such as prisons, 4759
courthouses, and police stations). 4760
Purchasing education supplies or repairing infrastructure critical to providing education to the 4761
local populace. 4762
Paying rewards to citizens who provide information on enemy activities and locations. 4763
Supporting the creation, training, and operation of host-nation security forces. 4764
Funding events and activities designed to build relationships with host-nation officials and 4765
citizens. 4766
Money Usage Principles in Counterinsurgency 4767
10-37. There are seven principles that can help guide the commander and staff in integrated monetary 4768
shaping operations in a counter insurgency. They are 4769
Host-Nation ownership. 4770
Capacity building. 4771
Sustainability. 4772
Selectivity. 4773
Partnership. 4774
Flexibility. 4775
Accountability. 4776
Host-Nation Ownership 4777
10-38. Units must ensure that there is counterinsurgent and host-nation ownership of any project. The 4778
local population and the government officials should view any project as their own and not one that has 4779
been imposed on them by outside agencies. A project that has been conceptualized, funded, and constructed 4780
at the local level legitimizes the local government in the eyes of the populace and further contributes to 4781
stability. However, host-nation officials might lack the capacity to implement and manage the project. 4782
Often it is important to consult development agencies to promote adequate ownership and accountability 4783
for projects. 4784
Capacity Building 4785
10-39. Capacity building involves the transfer of knowledge, techniques, and skills to the local people, 4786
institutions, and government. This transfer enables those people to develop the requisite capabilities to 4787
deliver essential services to the population. Ultimately, the local officials and institutions that gain capacity 4788
are better prepared to lead their regions through political, economic, and security-related issues. 4789
Sustainability 4790
10-40. The principle of sustainability states that commanders should design and select projects and 4791
services that have a lasting effect on the local population. In other words, the impact of the projects under 4792
consideration must endure after forces hand over the facility or service to local authorities and the unit (or 4793
contractors) departure from the site. Sustainability implies that the local government has the necessary 4794
resources to staff and maintain the project. There are examples where commanders have failed to conduct 4795
adequate analysis and built new schools or medical clinics only to discover that too few teachers or doctors 4796
were available to staff these facilities. Similarly, some commanders have purchased large generator systems 4797
to address electricity shortfalls for neighborhoods within their areas of operation. However, without 4798
addressing the fuel, maintenance, and service requirements of these systems, the machines eventually failed 4799
and were unable to serve as a sustainable solution for the local electrical deficit. 4800
Selectivity 4801
10-41. The development community defines the principle of selectivity as the allocation of resources 4802
based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests. These characteristics, while strategic in 4803
nature, are equally important at the tactical level. Commanders seldom receive all of the financial resources 4804
they would like to have when implementing their essential service, economic, and governance lines of 4805
effort. Therefore, it is critical to allocate the available resources into select areas where there is a strong 4806
local commitment to the reconstruction program, where the project can positively impact the most people, 4807
and where the project under consideration can simultaneously best achieve the commanders intent. 4808
10-42. Commanders and staffs carefully research nominations, adopt best practices, and design for local 4809
conditions in their proposed projects. Commanders assess local conditions before investing financial 4810
resources into any potential relief or reconstruction program. Money is not invested in an intelligence 4811
vacuumall available information about local conditions is considered (such as the populations 4812
requirements, animosities, traditions, capabilities, and economics). A detailed assessment of local 4813
conditions will best inform the commander on the projects potential to deliver its desired effects. Each 4814
project should be a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. It is equally critical that the 4815
commander and staff assess potential unintended results from their integrated monetary shaping operations. 4816
Many second- or third-order effects from a project may potentially outweigh the benefits from the original 4817
commanders intent. 4818
Partnership 4819
10-43. The principle of partnership is close collaboration with local governments, communities, donors, 4820
nonprofit organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and universities. Partnership plays a 4821
central role in any relief, reconstruction, or development program, as it supports each of the other principles 4822
of reconstruction and development. In the context of money in integrated monetary shaping operations, 4823
effective partnership ensures the units financial resources are well invested and synchronized with other 4824
programs from outside agencies. 4825
Flexibility 4826
10-44. The principle of flexibility mandates that units adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of 4827
opportunities, and maximize effectiveness as part of their reconstruction and development program. Just as 4828
the conditions for offensive and defensive operations are often changing and uncertain, so are the relief and 4829
reconstruction tasks associated with stability operations. These conditions often require commanders to 4830
change tactics to achieve desired objectives. 4831
Accountability 4832
10-45. Enforcing accountability, building transparency into systems, and emplacing effective checks and 4833
balances to guard against corruption are important components to any relief, reconstruction, or 4834
development program. Accountability in all actions, to include the units integrated monetary shaping 4835
operations, reinforces the legitimacy of the commander and operations, as well as the legitimacy of the 4836
local government, in the eyes of the population. (See ATP 3-07.20/MCRP3-33.1G for more information on 4837
integrated monetary shaping operations.) 4838
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 4839
10-46. There are three types of operations that have important considerations for counterinsurgency. 4840
They are: 4841
Remote area operations. 4842
Border operations. 4843
Basing. 4844
Chapter 10
REMOTE AREA OPERATIONS 4845
10-47. Remote area operations are conducted in rural areas where a decentralized array of forces can be 4846
most effective. Remote area operations are generally conducted in insurgent-controlled or contested areas 4847
to establish pockets of popular support for the host-nation government and deny support to the insurgents. 4848
Remote area operations may be conducted to establish bases in unpopulated areas where insurgent forces 4849
have established staging areas, training areas, rest areas, logistic facilities, or command posts. Units support 4850
remote area operations to interdict insurgent activity, destroy insurgent base areas, and demonstrate that the 4851
host-nation government has not ceded control to the insurgents. They collect and report information on 4852
insurgent intentions in more populated areas. This method is an enemy-centric approach to combating an 4853
insurgency. 4854
10-48. Remote area operations are usually conducted in areas that are either under insurgent control or are 4855
contested. In these areas, ground or water modes of entry are often used, but air assault or parachute 4856
operations can be employed. These operations use offensive tactics such as raids, reconnaissance in force, 4857
cordon and searches, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuit (or combinations of these tactics). Their 4858
purpose is to 4859
Harass the insurgent to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistic resources. 4860
Destroy the insurgent force and its base complexes. 4861
Demonstrate support for the government and for the populace in the local area. 4862
Expand controlled areas. 4863
Isolate insurgents from their support. 4864
10-49. To the extent possible, the task force should include personnel indigenous to the operational area. 4865
The type of task force employed, along with its host-nation counterpart (regular forces or paramilitary) 4866
depends on the objectives, characteristics of the area, attitude of the local population, political 4867
considerations, and the equipment and logistic support available. The size and composition of the 4868
host-nation unit is, in part, determined by the insurgents influence over the population and the 4869
governments ability to recruit and develop an adequate local force. When the unit is recruited from local 4870
inhabitants, local leaders should be used even though their military ability may be limited. By using local 4871
leaders, assisted by advisors, better control and motivation are possible. Training, indoctrinating, and 4872
incorporating the local force into the governmental structure is facilitated by using local leaders. 4873
10-50. Understanding the populations issues from their perspective enables counterinsurgents to address 4874
the prerequisites of the insurgency and obtain local support for remote area operations. Success is more 4875
likely if 4876
A significant segment of the local population supports the program. 4877
The host nation recruits local personnel for its remote area paramilitary or irregular force. 4878
Host-nation forces conduct remote area operations to interdict infiltration routes in areas nearly 4879
devoid of people. In this case, elements and host-nation forces operate in a manner similar to that 4880
of the insurgents, but with access to superior sustainment resources. 4881
10-51. In a rural environment, insurgents rely on friendly elements within the population to provide 4882
supplies and intelligence. Rural insurgents prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and 4883
concealment, such as heavily forested and mountainous areas that hinder the counterinsurgency force in 4884
gaining access to them. Often operating from their own home or village, rural insurgents often move to 4885
camps if security does not permit them to remain at home. Insurgent camps are chosen with a view toward 4886
easy access to the target population, access to a friendly or neutral border, prepared escape routes, and good 4887
observation of counterinsurgency force approach routes. When counterinsurgency operations force the 4888
insurgents from preferred base camps, insurgents tend to establish camps in rugged inhospitable areas not 4889
easily penetrated. Like counterinsurgency in urban areas, remote counterinsurgency operations must focus 4890
on both locating and eliminating insurgents and on severing the supportive element of the population from 4891
providing supplies and intelligence to them. 4892
10-52. Remote operations typically call for use of combat outposts that are linked to the local population. 4893
It is important to consider all three perspectives (the population, insurgents, and counterinsurgents) when 4894
choosing site locations. Establishing a proximity to the local population does not serve to advance the 4895
counterinsurgencys goals without certain factors. These include 4896
Gaining acceptance of the local civilian leadership. 4897
Maintaining a constant presence in the community. 4898
Maintaining constant communications with the local community to provide immediate 4899
emergency assistance. 4900
Maintaining situational awareness and an awareness of any changes in the populations patterns 4901
of life. This includes movement of outsiders (such as visitors, merchants, nomads, or seasonal 4902
labor). 4903
10-53. Remote area operations may include civil affairs, military information support operations, 4904
intelligence, populace and resources control, and advisory assistance operations. Most remote operations 4905
are long term and continuous. They are initially directed at disrupting the insurgents operations and then 4906
destroying the insurgent armed forces. The insurgent infrastructure is destroyed as early as possible. 4907
10-54. Remote area operations generally start with delineating the area of operations, collecting and 4908
assessing data and information pertaining to the area of operations, estimating resource requirements, 4909
training personnel, and preparing operation plans. Following the assessment, counterinsurgents move the 4910
force into the operational area, establish a secure operational base, destroy insurgent tactical forces from the 4911
area, neutralize the insurgent base area, neutralize the insurgent political infrastructure, and establish 4912
government control. Following a primarily offensive posture, counterinsurgents conduct aggressive 4913
defensive operations, primarily by extensive patrolling; introducing and conducting short-term military 4914
civic action programs that may develop into long-term development programs; and training paramilitary 4915
self-defense forces to include tactical operations, populace and resources control, intelligence, civil affairs, 4916
and military information support operations. Development activities initially may include such areas as 4917
health, education, and agriculture. Finally, counterinsurgents continue development activities, transfer 4918
control to appropriate civil agencies, and expand operations to adjacent areas. 4919
10-55. Initially, strong combat and sustainment forces establish secure operational bases. A remote area 4920
operation may be conducted in areas with little or no population to interdict infiltration routes. Maximum 4921
use is made of special equipment to provide continuous coverage of suspected areas and routes. Firepower 4922
and combat forces, with air assault capability, should be prepared to quickly attack identified targets. 4923
Because remote area operations can stress the capability of land forces to make a rapid response, 4924
commanders can mitigate risk by coordinating with joint enablers for close air support, tactical airdrops, 4925
information collection, communications relays, and personnel recovery forces. 4926
BORDER OPERATIONS 4927
10-56. In a counterinsurgency environment, armed forces may be responsible for border security, and they 4928
may have to help other security forces with immigration, customs, and internal security operations. The 4929
specific threat level, however, may require combat-type border operations, particularly in remote areas. The 4930
threat level may require units or advisor teams to advise and assist host-nation forces assigned to prevent or 4931
interdict the infiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries. This method is 4932
a terrain-centric approach to combating an insurgency. The commanders intent is to isolate insurgent 4933
forces from their external support and sanctuaries. Secondary purposes are to locate and interdict insurgent 4934
land infiltration routes, destroy insurgent forces and bases in areas adjacent to the border, and collect and 4935
report information on insurgent capabilities and intentions. Border operations normally require restrictive 4936
populace and resources control measures that are particularly annoying to tribal and ethnic border groups 4937
who do not recognize the international boundary. The host-nation government must make a continuing 4938
effort to physically and psychologically gain and maintain the loyalty of the affected populace. 4939
10-57. Designated border forces may be composed of border police and guards and may include 4940
paramilitary forces and regular armed forces with supporting or direct responsibility for portions of the 4941
national border or key internal routes to access other regions. Border operations are planned, conducted, 4942
and supervised from the national level, to the regional level, and finally through commanders at the local 4943
level. Border task forces are tailored units designed to meet requirements in their assigned areas. They 4944
Chapter 10
should contain sufficient sustainment warfighting function and sustainment elements to support civil 4945
authorities operations for extended periods. 4946
10-58. Tasks that may be performed in controlling the border include the following: 4947
Security of populated areas. 4948
Intelligence and counterintelligence operations. 4949
Operation of authorized points of entry. 4950
Refugee and internally displaced person control. 4951
Enforcement of movement and travel restrictions. 4952
Military information support operations. 4953
Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. 4954
Attacks against insurgent forces. 4955
Destruction of insurgent base areas. 4956
Barrier and denial operations. 4957
10-59. In a phase I insurgency, operations in border areas are normally a function of police, customs, and 4958
other government organizations. Armed and paramilitary forces may assist these organizations, particularly 4959
in remote areas. In phases II and III, denial of external support for the insurgency may require combat 4960
operations in border areas. These operations require close coordination and cooperation between the armed 4961
forces, paramilitary forces, and all government agencies involved. 4962
10-60. Physically sealing the border may not be possible, since it could require the commitment of more 4963
government forces and materiel than overall resources permit. Intelligence must be gathered by all means 4964
available to determine the locations and extent of insurgent activities in border areas. 4965
10-61. Commanders should determine infiltration and exfiltration routes, support sites, frequency and 4966
volume of traffic, type of transportation, number and type of personnel, amount and type of materiel, 4967
terrain and traffic conditions, and the probable location of base areas and sanctuaries. Continuous and 4968
detailed surveillance is required. Since placing forces and barriers at all possible crossings or entry sites 4969
may be impossible, priorities should be established. Natural barriers must be used wherever possible. Using 4970
patrols, sensors, and obstacles in selected areas increase the effectiveness of natural barriers. Herbicides, if 4971
approved for the area of operations, may be used to enhance visibility in vegetated areas. 4972
10-62. A restricted zone is a carefully selected area, varied in width and contiguous to the border. Public 4973
notice is given that all unauthorized individuals or groups encountered in the restricted zone are dealt with 4974
as infiltrators or insurgents. A friendly population buffer zone is an area in which civilians living within the 4975
area of operations are limited to those believed to be loyal to the government. Persons whose loyalty cannot 4976
be established are monitored. This concept offers a good potential for establishing information nets and 4977
using loyal citizens in self-defense border units. It denies insurgents potential civilian contacts and base 4978
areas for border-crossing activities. A continuing military information support operation effort should be 4979
directed toward maintaining the morale and loyalty of the population. 4980
10-63. Aerial reconnaissance, unattended ground sensors, and ground reconnaissance patrols may be 4981
employed to ensure adequate reconnaissance and surveillance of remote areas. Surveillance and control of 4982
extensive coastal areas normally require the use of coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline, coordinated 4983
offshore patrols, aerial surveillance, strategically located observation posts, and an effective system of 4984
licensing and identifying friendly military and civilian watercraft. 4985
10-64. In addition to the three perspectives normally considered in counterinsurgency, border operations 4986
introduce a fourth perspective, the population of the host-nation neighbor country. Counterinsurgent actions 4987
will be viewed and interpreted by local populations in the neighboring country. Counterinsurgents must 4988
consider the impact their actions have on this population. If the neighboring local population sympathizes 4989
with host-nation insurgents or believes that counterinsurgent programs are counterproductive to their 4990
individual goals, then negative perceptions can lead to increased foreign fighter, weapons, and resource 4991
trafficking to support an insurgency. The counterinsurgent lacks the physical means to influence this 4992
population, but the counterinsurgent can mitigate risk by performing effective information operations that 4993
explain counterinsurgent programs and their benefits. 4994
BASING 4995
10-65. Counterinsurgency forces operate within a host country and must therefore have a base from which 4996
to operate. A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0). All bases must be 4997
securable and defendable. Bases vary according to the size of the unit occupying the base and the mission 4998
of the units utilizing the base. All types of bases require clear command relationships. In counterinsurgency 4999
operations, forward operating bases, combat outposts, and patrol bases are three types of bases. 5000
10-66. Normally, at least one forward operating base exists in an area of operations. The size of the area, 5001
its physical characteristics, and the number and size of the units operating within the area often require 5002
additional operating bases. The forward operating bases established by a brigade or battalion are often 5003
semi-permanent and provide deployed units with command, control, and communications facilities; 5004
sustainment; personnel systems support; staging areas; and intelligence activities. They provide units with 5005
relatively secure locations from which to plan and prepare for operations. During counterinsurgency 5006
operations, they aid in limiting insurgent mobility nearby and in providing some security to the local 5007
population. 5008
10-67. There are a few differences between brigade and battalion forward operating bases. Brigade 5009
forward operating bases are larger than battalion forward operating bases and provide a rear location for 5010
nondeployed elements of the deployed battalions such as battalion forward support companies. A battalion 5011
forward operating base is normally staffed with the minimum personnel needed to operate and provide 5012
security. All nonessential personnel, those not crucial to the tactical mission, are positioned in the brigade 5013
operational base. A battalion forward operating base should maintain two methods for sustainment: by road 5014
and either air or water. 5015
10-68. A combat outpost is a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations 5016
(FM 3-90-2). In counterinsurgency operations, combat outposts are often company and platoon sized bases 5017
inside of insurgent influenced territory. They represent the cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations. 5018
Located in strategically important areas, a combat outpost provides security in its immediate area and direct 5019
contact with the local populace not possible from remote bases. Although this strategy carries with it 5020
potential downsides in terms of increased force protection and limiting flexibility, combat outposts provide 5021
a huge increase in overall security in an area. 5022
5023

Chapter 11 5024
Assessments 5025
11-1. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force 5026
capabilities during military operations (JP 3-0). (See ADRP 5-0 and ADRP 6-0 for doctrine on 5027
assessments.) The assessment process monitors the effects of actions on mission accomplishment. 5028
Operational assessments have three enduring purposes. First, they monitor the nature, scope, and severity 5029
of the situation. Second, they track the military forces implementation of the plan in combination with 5030
collaborating agencies. And finally, operational assessments evaluate progress towards achieving goals or 5031
objectives. Assessments must be integrated into the Army design methodology and conceptual planning. 5032
Assessments are crucial for successful adaptation and innovation by commanders within their respective 5033
areas of operation. Assessments are also essential in any type of transition. They are a key ingredient in 5034
adapting and learning. Assessments must be part of initial design. Commanders and staffs must 5035
conceptualize what is actually important and determine how to question those assumptions from the 5036
beginning of understanding a problem. Assessment precedes and is integrated into every operations activity 5037
and entails two broad, enduring tasks: 5038
Continuously monitoring the current situation (including the environment) and the progress of 5039
the operation. 5040
Evaluating the operation against established criteria, expected outcomes, and the desired end 5041
state. 5042
11-2. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, continuously evaluate an operations progress against the 5043
established commanders intent, mission, and concept of the operation. Based on their assessments, 5044
commanders may adjust the operation and associated activities to better achieve the end state and adjust 5045
assessment criteria to address the most credible and relevant activities. 5046
11-3. The critical role of assessment necessitates establishing measures of effectiveness and performance 5047
during planning. Commanders choose these measures carefully so that they align with the campaign design 5048
and the commanders intent and reflect the emphasis on and interrelationship among the lines of effort. 5049
Commanders and staffs revise their assessment and measures of effectiveness and performance as the 5050
operation progresses to most effectively focus limited collection and analytical resources. 5051
11-4. Sound assessment blends qualitative and quantitative analysis with the judgment and intuition of all 5052
leaders. Great care must be applied here, as counterinsurgency operations most often involve complex 5053
societal issues that may not lend themselves to quantifiable measures of effectiveness. Moreover, bad 5054
assumptions and false data can undermine the validity of both assessments and conclusions drawn from 5055
them. Data and metrics can inform a commanders assessment. However, they must not be allowed to 5056
dominate it in uncertain situations. Subjective and intuitive assessment must not be replaced by an 5057
exclusive focus on data or metrics. Commanders must exercise their professional judgment in determining 5058
the proper balance. 5059
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS 5060
11-5. Several assessment frameworks have been developed over the past decade to assist in the 5061
development of the initial assessment. Depending on their specific purpose, they can be used as tools to 5062
develop an interagency initial assessment, assess conflicts, or measure progress. For example, the 5063
Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework is a recognized and very useful initial assessment framework 5064
(See U.S. Government publication Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework). Alternatively, units may 5065
use some form of systems analysis based on the operational variables. 5066
Chapter 11
ASSESSMENT METHODS 5067
11-6. Selecting the appropriate approach to assessment is the most important assessment decision of the 5068
commander. Assessment methodologies may be centralized, decentralized, or both. A centralized 5069
methodology requires units to collect and report information requirements to their higher headquarters for 5070
analysis and situational understanding. This is a common methodology and is often described as pattern 5071
and trend analysis. Pattern and trend analysis uses centralized quantitative analysis to produce a snapshot of 5072
the operations momentum over time. Pattern and trend analysts tend to accept that counterinsurgency data 5073
will be inaccurate and incomplete, but when viewed in aggregate this data will be sufficient to produce 5074
relevant, centralized, and quantifiable analysis. Pattern and trend analysis measures progress, but it is not 5075
truly an assessment. The problem with the centralized approach to assessment is that the decentralized 5076
nature of counterinsurgency prevents the development of any centralized model to understand the important 5077
nuances of local context. Decentralized assessments enable subordinate units to develop and measure 5078
progress locally. The interaction between levels of command is critical to informing the higher commander. 5079
Although preferred by the lower tactical levels, actual measurement of progress is limited by the lack of a 5080
common starting point. This often gives the best picture of the local situation, but it lacks the context of 5081
how it compares to other locales. Senior commanders must weigh the results by comparing apples to 5082
oranges. This makes the development of an aggregate analysis very difficult. 5083
11-7. Military forces in counterinsurgency usually use a combination of these two assessment methods, 5084
choosing common reporting requirements for all subordinates but also requiring a subjective analysis from 5085
each of the subordinate commanders to aid in informing the senior commanders situational understanding. 5086
Units report qualitative statistics to enable pattern analysis, commanders provide quantitative analysis to 5087
fully depict what the statistics mean at the local level. The combined assessment involves a top down 5088
planning, bottom-up refinement approach in which analysis is conducted at the level the data is collected 5089
and reports to higher headquarters include narratives from local commanders. This type of assessment 5090
eschews the establishment of core level metrics at the highest levels and allows commanders to establish 5091
additional metrics in accordance with their situation and their resources. Combined assessment generally 5092
results in more accurate reporting and efficient use of collection and analysis resources. 5093
11-8. In geographically distributed, decentralized counterinsurgency campaigns, only a few activities 5094
produce similar outcomes or are consistently implemented across the theater of operations. What is 5095
important in one area may not be important in another. Similarly, what works in one area may not work in 5096
another area. 5097
ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS 5098
11-9. Assessment begins as soon as the military force receives an alert or warning and does not end until 5099
after the force has ceased operations and left the area. Assessment begins with an initial assessment that 5100
serves as the basis for planning. Planning develops this into an operational assessment that evaluates plan 5101
effectiveness and focus. The assessment is continually reassessed. Often plans are updated because of the 5102
reassessment process. 5103
11-10. The assessment should reflect the achievements of collaborating partners. Military forces cannot 5104
defeat an insurgency alone. It is important that assessors realize that information about the underlying root 5105
causes for social, cultural, political, and economic turbulence will probably be incomplete. Obtaining 5106
reliable information can be costly and time-consuming. Assessors should be extremely wary of methods 5107
that claim to provide this information quickly. An assessment based on faulty information can result in 5108
military force actions that are counterproductive. It is better for assessors to monitor the situation, track 5109
what every organization is doing, and be clear about what they do not know. The next step is to postulate, 5110
hypothesize, and clearly state what assumptions the evaluation process is making. Assessors seek 5111
information to test assumptions and revise estimates as operations continue. 5112
11-11. At its core, a counterinsurgency environment is a political problem. Understanding and solving the 5113
political problem is the essence of counterinsurgency operations. A counterinsurgency environment is 5114
complex, with many lines of effort covering a variety of political, military, economic, social, 5115
infrastructural, and informational activities. As such, developing a comprehensive assessment is a 5116
time-consuming process that is difficult to perform properly and effectively. Counterinsurgents must assess 5117
Assessments
not only their own actions or inactions, but also those of the insurgent and the population. These 5118
assessments must include, among many other factors, the context for any given situation, the perceptions of 5119
those involved, and the possible outcomes of actions or inactions. 5120
11-12. Assessments are the responsibility of the commander. The commanders direct and personal 5121
involvement in the assessment process is critical. Moreover, assessments must contain both subjective and 5122
objective elements. Assessments combine elements of science and art. They are not simply a collection of 5123
numbers or indicators. They must be understood in the context of the overall campaign, not just from a 5124
military perspective. 5125
11-13. Countering an insurgency most often involves an extended campaign. A counterinsurgent must 5126
assess his actions or inactions broadly, to include how they are viewed locally, within the coalition (if one 5127
exists), host nation, and the region. The counterinsurgent also assesses actions against host-nation strategic 5128
goals. Without the backing of each of these levels, the counterinsurgent risks loss of legitimacy and 5129
potential failure. 5130
11-14. Eliminating the root causes of the insurgency is the goal of a counterinsurgency. Assessment must 5131
focus on those activities and actions that are most important in addressing these root causes. The key point 5132
is that the assessment must be focused on gathering the right information needed to understand what to do. 5133
The commander must determine if counterinsurgents are doing things right, if counterinsurgents are doing 5134
the right things, and if change is necessary. 5135
11-15. Balanced assessments include information from all relevant and objective sources, including both 5136
quantitative and qualitative data. This data includes the proper combination of centralized and decentralized 5137
reporting. A balanced assessment includes countering opinions and data that contradict overall findings. A 5138
combination of quantitative and qualitative types of indicators reduces the chance of misconstruing trends. 5139
11-16. No assessment will ever show all the salient aspects of a counterinsurgency campaign. Efforts to 5140
do so waste resources and places unrealistic demands on subordinate units that often result in falsified 5141
reporting. Assessment should rely principally on information gathered through ongoing intelligence and 5142
operational reporting. Demands for additional reporting should be minimized. 5143
11-17. There is no substitute for seeing the battlefield as a means for understanding the situation. 5144
Battlefield circulation is critical to establishing relationships between commanders at all levels. The view of 5145
the commander who walks and lives on a particular piece of ground daily provides a level of insight that no 5146
statistic or report can replace. These first-hand encounters provide commanders a lens with which to review 5147
and compare centralized reports and trend analysis with the intuition and local understanding of 5148
subordinate commands. 5149
11-18. Collecting, assembling, and analyzing information is a time and labor-intensive process. 5150
Commanders balance time and resources for assessment just as they do across the planning, decision, and 5151
execution continuum. To help achieve this balance, commanders and staffs ask the following questions: 5152
What must be understood to begin planning? 5153
What will be assessed and to what detail? 5154
How will a particular task, objective, end state condition, or assumption be assessed? 5155
What measures of effectiveness and measures of performance will be used? 5156
What information requirements (indicators) are needed to support a particular assessment? 5157
Who on the staff has primary responsibility for assessing a particular area? 5158
What is the collection plan? 5159
How can the host nation help? 5160
How can the other agencies of the U.S. government assist? 5161
DEVELOPING MEASUREMENT CRITERIA 5162
11-19. Assessment requires determining why and when progress is being achieved along each line of 5163
effort. Traditionally, commanders use discrete quantitative and qualitative measurements to evaluate 5164
progress. However, the complex nature of counterinsurgency operations makes progress difficult to 5165
measure. Subjective assessment at all levels is essential to understand the diverse and complex nature of 5166
Chapter 11
counterinsurgency problems. It is also needed to measure local success or failure against the overall 5167
operations end state. Additionally, commanders need to know how actions along different lines of effort 5168
complement each other; therefore, planners evaluate not only progress along each line of effort but also 5169
interactions among lines of efforts. 5170
11-20. The most common types of assessment measures are measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and 5171
measures of performance (MOPs). A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in 5172
system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end 5173
state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). MOEs focus on the results or 5174
consequences of actions. MOEs answer the question, Are we achieving results that move 5175
counterinsurgents towards the desired end state, or are additional or alternative actions required? A 5176
measure of performance is a criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task 5177
accomplishment (JP 3-0). MOPs answers the question, Was the task or action performed as the 5178
commander intended? 5179
11-21. MOEs and MOPs for assessing counterinsurgency operations are designed with the same 5180
characteristics. MOEs and MOPs are measurable, discrete, relevant, and responsive: 5181
MOEs and MOPs have quantitative or qualitative standards against which they can be measured. 5182
The most effective measurement is a combination of quantitative and qualitative measures to 5183
guard against an inaccurate view of results. 5184
Each MOE and MOP measures a separate, distinct aspect of the task, purpose, or condition. 5185
MOEs and MOPs are relevant to the measured task, outcome, and condition. Host-nation local, 5186
regional, and national leaders, and nongovernmental organization personnel, may provide 5187
practical ideas, professional ideas, and feedback to craft relevant MOPs and MOEs. 5188
Assessment tools detect environmental and situational changes. 5189
DESIGNING EFFECTIVE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE 5190
11-22. An MOE provides some information about how the operational environment is changing. An 5191
MOE of a number of attacks on the counterinsurgent can indicate a successful counterinsurgency, or it can 5192
indicate insurgent control of an area and an unwillingness of the counterinsurgent to contest that control. In 5193
this example, commanders and staffs need to understand why the attacks are down. What is essential to 5194
any MOE is the development of an effective measure that tells the commander critical information about 5195
how the operational environment is changing. 5196
11-23. Moreover, in developing MOPs, commanders and staffs measure a units performance based on the 5197
conditions of the area of operations. In other words, MOPs should be developed as a means to measure if a 5198
unit is effectively doing the things that the commander and staff view as essential to defeating an 5199
insurgency. MOPs are developed based on the counterinsurgency mission and the area of operations. 5200
11-24. When designing MOEs and MOPs, commanders and staffs consider several points: 5201
Knowledge of how many of anything is usually not as important as how many out of a total and 5202
how important is each. 5203
Knowledge of the state of insurgent training may provide information about the overall 5204
capability of the insurgency. If an insurgency can produce trained units, it may have a higher 5205
military and sustainment capacity. 5206
Training in other states could indicate support from another state. 5207
A high number of un-coerced informant reports could be an important indicator of a breakdown 5208
in insurgent security. 5209
The number of insurgent attacks is not always as important as the scale of an insurgent attack. 5210
Large-scale attacks require a level of operational sophistication that may imply an increased 5211
insurgent capability. 5212
How many insurgents are caught and jailed may be an important MOE. However, the number 5213
convicted and sentenced by government judicial authorities and remaining in jail over time is 5214
also an important MOE for governmental capability and corruption. 5215
Assessments
The number of recruits available for an insurgency can be an important indicator of the 5216
governments and the insurgencys legitimacy. 5217
An MOP based on the number of patrols in a given area over a period may not be as effective as 5218
the persistence of patrols in a given area over the same period of time. 5219
An MOE based on the amount of money seized may not be as important as an MOE based on 5220
denying funding sources. 5221
11-25. When developing MOPs and MOEs, commanders and staffs avoid developing MOPs or MOEs 5222
that highlight what a commander and staff are actively doing to defeat an insurgency. For example, 5223
building a number of schools can be used as an MOP, and the number of students in the school can be used 5224
as an MOE. However, these activities may have no effect on the insurgency at all. Commanders and staffs 5225
connect MOEs and MOPs to the operational environment and insurgency. Accepting the assumption that 5226
what one is doing is actually relevant to defeating an insurgency is an easy means to undermine the 5227
effectiveness of an MOPs and MOEs. Commanders and staffs avoid the trap of thinking that because they 5228
do something and measure it, it is important. 5229
11-26. Commanders and staffs generally avoid measures without any context. For example, the number 5230
of enemy killed, without any context, is normally a dangerous MOP. The number of enemy killed can 5231
indicate that the insurgency is increasing its recruitment and capabilities, thus more insurgents are being 5232
killed in more attacks. Commanders and staffs establish some context in any measure that they use. 5233
11-27. Vietnam highlights the importance of creating an assessment framework that is contextual to the 5234
insurgency and is relevant to actually measuring success. In Vietnam, the U.S. leadership made 5235
assumptions about what were important measures of success without connecting those measurements to 5236
situational understanding. Moreover, U.S. leaders did not actively question their assumptions. Even worse, 5237
their ineffective assessment framework had an influence on operations. 5238
Measuring Effectiveness and Performance in Vietnam 5239
Historical accounts of the conflict in Vietnam vary widely in the points emphasized 5240
and the explanations offered. Disputes are facilitated by the different personal 5241
experiences of many different direct observers who saw or participated in sometimes 5242
very different slices of the conflict at different times, at different operational levels, 5243
and in different parts of the country. What, if anything, could have been done to 5244
change the outcome of the war and who to blame for that outcome remains fairly 5245
hotly contested. What the outcome was, however, is not contested: U.S. forces 5246
withdrew in 1973, and the Saigon government fell to the combined pressure of the 5247
insurgency and North Vietnamese regular forces in April of 1975, unequivocally a 5248
counterinsurgent loss. 5249
The literature on the U.S. militarys Vietnam-era assessment process is highly 5250
negative; even the most strident defenders of the assessment reports produced 5251
during that period expressed some dissatisfaction with the process. Assessments of 5252
the Vietnam War varied in type, purpose, and intended consumer. The entire process 5253
changed and grew between the early 1960s and the early 1970s; there was no single 5254
Vietnam War assessment. There were many assessment processes, and many 5255
were burdened with murky objectives, measures that were poorly connected to those 5256
objectives, and poor data collection. Quantitative data of questionable veracity were 5257
used to make optimistic prognostications, such as the illusion of a trend toward a 5258
light at the end of the tunnel. Distrust of Vietnam-era military briefings became so 5259
endemic that members of the press corps referred to the daily military press briefings 5260
as the five oclock follies. 5261
The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, or MACV, was the theater-level military 5262
command in Saigon, South Vietnam. MACV was the neck of the funnel for nearly all 5263
field reports on operations, intelligence, pacification, and other data categories. 5264
Some of the MACV reports and nearly all of the OSD reports relied heavily on 5265
aggregated quantitative data and pattern and trend analysis. In some cases, data 5266
collection requirements were developed to meet perceived operational or strategic 5267
Chapter 11
needs; in other cases, they were specifically designed to provide data that would 5268
show some kind of progress without context. For example, in 1968, MACV reported 5269
the number of cakes of soap it had issued to Vietnamese villagers in 1967 (572,121), 5270
an irrelevant input metric. More famous (or infamous) is the use of body counts as 5271
a primary progress metric. Not only were body counts a poor proxy for progress 5272
driven by an untenable assumption about adversary attrition, but data collected were 5273
wildly inaccurate because of the adversary emphasis on reclaiming bodies, difficult 5274
terrain, duplicate reporting, and the temptation to exaggerate, among other reasons. 5275
Assessment of the Vietnam War was haphazard before MACV became a theater 5276
combat command in the early 1960s. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, 5277
MACV and OSD (with CIA assistance) created the single largest and most 5278
comprehensive military COIN assessment apparatus in the history of warfare. It 5279
involved the efforts of hundreds of thousands of military personnel, civilians, 5280
Vietnamese nationals, intelligence experts, and analysts over the course of several 5281
years. These contributors produced hundreds of millions of data items (in DoD 5282
parlance), tens of thousands of tactical and operational analytic reports, and 5283
hundreds of comprehensive assessments that addressed nearly every aspect of the 5284
war. Data flowed up from the hundreds of thousands of troops on the ground, 5285
province advisors, military advisors to Republic of Vietnam units, U.S. civilian 5286
officials, and U.S. intelligence officers, as well as Republic of Vietnam military units, 5287
government agencies, and civilian development teams. These data were then fed 5288
into catalogs and computer databases, including the Hamlet Evaluation System 5289
(HES), the Terrorist Incident Reporting System, the Territorial Forces Effectiveness 5290
System, the Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS), the Situation Reports 5291
Army File, and many others. Data could mean anything from a simple number (e.g., 5292
rounds fired in a single artillery attack) to a more complex set of ostensibly correlated 5293
survey data (e.g., hamlet evaluation data). 5294
Assessment in Vietnam was non-trivial: A July 26, 1970, U.S. military intelligence 5295
briefing listed 44 provinces, 257 districts, 2,464 villages, 11,729 hamlets, and 1,500 5296
miles of coastline from the demilitarized zone with North Vietnam to the border with 5297
Cambodia in the Gulf of Siam. The challenges of assessment in Vietnam are the 5298
same challenges faced in any counterinsurgency: How should policymakers 5299
determine progress and decide strategy if all they have to choose from is inaccurate, 5300
decontextualized, and aggregated numbers or thousands of pages of lengthy 5301
narrative? 5302
While it is not possible to state that poor assessment led to the loss of the Vietnam 5303
War, the war was distinguished by internal confusion, poor decisionmaking, and, 5304
ultimately, strategic defeat. It is apparent from analyzing the way in which 5305
assessments were presented and used that they contributed to many of the poor 5306
decisions that led to this defeat. 5307
BROAD INDICATORS OF PROGRESS 5308
11-28. Numerical and statistical indicators have limits when measuring social environments. For example, 5309
in South Vietnam U.S. forces used the body count to evaluate success or failure of combat operations. Yet, 5310
the body count only communicated a small part of the information commanders needed to assess their 5311
operations. It was therefore misleading. Body count can be a partial, effective indicator only when 5312
adversaries and their identities can be verified. (Normally, this identification is determined through a 5313
uniform or possession of an insurgent identification card.) Additionally, an accurate appreciation of what 5314
insurgent casualty numbers might indicate regarding enemy strength or capability requires knowing the 5315
exact number of insurgent armed fighters initially present. In addition, this indicator does not measure 5316
several important factors. For example, it does not measure which side the local populace blames for 5317
collateral damage, whether this fighting and resultant casualties damaged the insurgent infrastructure and 5318
affected the insurgency strategy in that area, and where families of dead insurgents reside and how they 5319
might react. Within the essential services lines of effort, the number of schools built or renovated does not 5320
Assessments
equate to the effective operation of an educational system, nor is it as important as the number of children 5321
in school. 5322
11-29. Planners start with broad measures of social and economic health or weakness when assessing 5323
environmental conditions. Illustrative examples of possible counterinsurgency indicators include: 5324
Acts of violence (numbers of attacks and friendly or host-nation casualties). 5325
Dislocated civilians. The number, population, and demographics of dislocated camps or the lack 5326
thereof are a resultant indicator of overall security and stability. A drop in the number of people 5327
in the camps often indicates a return to normalcy. People and families exiled from or fleeing 5328
their homes and property and people returning to them are measurable and revealing. 5329
Human movement and religious attendance. In societies were the culture is dominated by 5330
religion, activities related to the predominant faith may indicate the ease of movement and 5331
confidence in security, peoples use of free will and volition, and the presence of freedom of 5332
religion. Possible indicators include the following: 5333
Flow of religious pilgrims or lack thereof. 5334
Development and active use of places of worship. 5335
Number of temples and churches closed by a government. 5336
Presence and activity of small- and medium-sized businesses. When danger or insecure 5337
conditions exist, these businesses close. Patrols can report on the number of businesses that are 5338
open and how many customers they have. Tax collections may indicate the overall amount of 5339
sales activity. 5340
Level of agricultural activity: 5341
Is a province, region, or nation self-sustaining, or must life-support type foodstuffs be 5342
imported? 5343
How many acres are in cultivation? Are the fields well maintained and watered? 5344
Are agricultural goods getting to market? Has the annual need increased or decreased? 5345
Presence or absence of associations. The formation and presence of multiple political parties 5346
indicates more involvement of the people in government. Meetings of independent professional 5347
associations demonstrate the viability of the middle class and professions. Trade union activity 5348
indicates worker involvement in the economy and politics. 5349
Government services available. Examples include: 5350
Police stations operational and police officers present throughout the area. 5351
Clinics and hospitals in full operation, and whether new facilities sponsored by the private 5352
sector are open and operational. 5353
Schools and universities open, functioning, with increasing attendance over time. 5354
Freedom of movement of people, goods, and communications. This is a classic measure to 5355
determine if an insurgency has denied areas in the physical, electronic, or print domains. 5356
Tax revenue. If people are paying taxes, this can be an indicator of host-nation government 5357
influence and subsequent civil stability. 5358
Industry exports. 5359
Employment or unemployment rate over time. An increasing employment rate over time is 5360
generally a sign of stability. 5361
Amount of electricity produced. Increasing production of electricity is associated with provision 5362
of essential services. However, increased stability often results in greater demand so care must 5363
be taken in the use of this indicator. 5364
Specific attacks on infrastructure. 5365
ASSESSMENT CELL 5366
11-30. An assessment cell normally shadows the planning effort, looking for areas of the plan that may 5367
require assistance in measuring progress toward planned goals and the purpose of the operation. Assessing 5368
progress is the responsibility of all staff sections and not the sole purview of any one staff section or 5369
command post cell. Each staff section assesses the operation from its specific area of expertise. However, 5370
Chapter 11
these staff sections must coordinate and integrate their individual assessments and associated 5371
recommendations across the warfighting functions to produce comprehensive assessments for the 5372
commander, particularly in counterinsurgency operations. 5373
11-31. The function and purpose of an assessment cell or working group must include not only the 5374
assessment of the plan and progress of operations, but also the effects of those operations on operational 5375
environments. To understand the effect, it is important to assess not only what happened or how, but why a 5376
particular result was achieved. This level of understanding aids in informing future decisions and plans. 5377
11-32. In counterinsurgency operations, especially in widely decentralized operations, assessment cells 5378
with analysts are organized down to and including the battalion level. This capability greatly assists in the 5379
development of bottom-up assessment metrics that provide context and balance for other types of 5380
assessment. 5381
DIRECTED TELESCOPE TECHNIQUE 5382
11-33. The directed telescope technique aids commanders with assessments by providing eyes on the 5383
ground. Military commanders often find value in a separate and objective source of information regarding 5384
actions and events on the ground. Commanders who have favored the directed telescope technique 5385
include Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, King Edward III, Napoleon Bonaparte, the Duke of Wellington, 5386
Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, General George C. Marshall, Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, 5387
General George S. Patton, Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, General Stanley McChrystal, and General 5388
Davis Petraeus. 5389
11-34. When using the directed telescope technique, commanders send trusted subordinates and teams to 5390
the battlefield to swiftly assess and report. This helps the commander get a sense for what is transpiring in 5391
the field. This technique does not take the place of regular after action reviews or reporting, but instead it 5392
helps the commander confirm or deny the visual image he has of how operations are going and the impact 5393
his troops efforts are having. 5394
11-35. The duties of a team assigned to a directed telescope mission, as stated in the 1937 edition of the 5395
United States Army Command and General Staff Schools Command and Staff Principles (Tentative), 5396
include a variety of skills and qualities to be successful. They include 5397
Good judgment. 5398
Unfailing tact. 5399
Initiative. 5400
Sympathy, which implies a desire to help rather than to criticize. 5401
Acute perception, coupled with exactness and accuracy in determining facts. 5402
Ability to express themselves and deliver impartial reports in the clearest and most concise 5403
terms. 5404
Good tactical knowledge. 5405
11-36. Instead of spying or informing the commander on personnel or single events, the focus is to 5406
provide advice to units based on their findings, report trends to the commander, and most importantly 5407
provide recommendations that are feasible, acceptable, and suitable. Sample questions, as detailed in a 5408
1992 directed telescope study by the U.S. Armys Combined Arms Centers Combat Studies Institute, 5409
included 5410
What functions did such personnel perform during combat? 5411
In what ways did such personnel enhance the command and control of units, generate initiative, 5412
create agility and depth, and contribute toward the synchronization of combat power? 5413
What special preparation and training did these personnel receive? 5414
What qualities, attributes, competencies, and capabilities did these personnel possess? 5415
For whom did these personnel work? 5416
How did these personnel go about performing their duties? 5417
How were these personnel selected? 5418
Assessments
Who used these personnel? What are the similarities and differences between the battlefield 5419
effectiveness of units that used such personnel versus units that did not? 5420
What authority did these personnel possess? 5421
11-37. Although the generals mentioned in paragraph 11-33 commanded large forces, the directed 5422
telescope technique can work at various echelons and can be included when battalion and brigade staff and 5423
personnel are supporting subordinate units in information analysis, operations, planning, and training. 5424
5425

Chapter 12 5426
LegaI Considerations 5427
AUTHORITY TO ASSIST A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 5428
12-1. All U.S. military operations, including counterinsurgency operations, are governed by U.S. domestic 5429
law, the international law binding on the U.S., to include the law of war, and U.S. policy and regulations. 5430
Counterinsurgency operations are complex and raise challenging legal issues for Soldiers, Marines, and 5431
their commanders. A number of areas of the law are critical for counterinsurgency operations, from the 5432
authority to deploy forces and conduct counterinsurgency operations in the first instance, to the laws 5433
governing the conduct of operations, to the laws that fund counterinsurgency operations. The law of war, to 5434
include the treatment of civilians and detainees, and the application of rules of engagement, in particular, 5435
are critical issues that have a significant impact on the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. 5436
12-2. In addition to the authorities to use military force, through a variety of statutes contained in Title 10, 5437
United States Code (USC) and Title 22, USC, Congress has authorized and directed the Department of 5438
Defense (DOD) and Department of State, respectively, to provide assistance to foreign governments 5439
relevant to counterinsurgency. For instance, U.S. forces may be called upon to provide foreign internal 5440
defense or training to foreign security forces (such as military forces and police). 5441
AUTHORITY FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 5442
12-3. The President or Secretary of Defense may issue a deployment or execution order, which may 5443
authorize U.S. forces to make only limited contributions during operations that involve foreign internal 5444
defense. If the Secretary of State requests and the Secretary of Defense approves, U.S. forces can 5445
participate in foreign internal defense. The request and approval may go through the standing statutory 5446
authorities in Title 22, USC. Among other programs, Title 22 contains the Foreign Assistance Act and the 5447
Arms Export Control Act. Programs under Title 22 authorize security assistance, developmental assistance, 5448
and other forms of aid. The request and approval might also occur under various provisions of Title 10, as 5449
well. Title 10 authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited 5450
forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the American ambassador for the host 5451
nation. In such situations, U.S. military personnel work as administrative and technical personnel. They are 5452
part of the U.S. diplomatic mission, pursuant to a status of forces agreement, or pursuant to an exchange of 5453
notes. This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing 5454
defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations. 5455
GENERAL PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO POLICE 5456
12-4. With certain exceptions, such as those noted above, DOD is usually not the lead governmental 5457
department for assisting foreign governments, even for the provision of security assistance. The U.S. 5458
military typically has no authorized role with regard to the provision of training a foreign governments 5459
police or other civil interior forces. The Foreign Assistance Act specifically prohibits assistance to foreign 5460
police forces except within carefully circumscribed exceptions, and under a Presidential directive, and the 5461
lead role in providing police assistance within those exceptions has been normally delegated to the 5462
Department of States Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. In addition, Public 5463
Law 101-510, div. A, title X, Sec. 1004, Nov. 5, 1990, 104 STAT. 1629, as amended gives U.S. forces 5464
authority to train foreign law enforcement in counternarcotics, and counternarco terrorism. Limited 5465
exceptions have been granted. For instance, National Security Presidential Directive 36, of 11 May 2004, 5466
gave the Commander, U.S. Central Command, the responsibility for U.S. efforts with respect to security 5467
and military operations in Iraq, including the authority to train and equip Iraqi police. U.S. commanders are 5468
not able to train foreign law enforcement unless given specific legal exception. 5469
Chapter 12
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 5470
12-5. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the 5471
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat 5472
engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04). Often these directives are specific to the operation. If 5473
there are no operation-specific rules of engagement, U.S. forces apply the standing rules of engagement. 5474
When working with a multinational force, commanders must thoroughly coordinate the rules of 5475
engagement. 5476
MISSION-SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 5477
12-6. The standing rules of engagement provide a mechanism for combatant commanders to develop 5478
mission-specific rules of engagement by implementing supplemental measures within their discretion, or by 5479
submitting a request for supplemental measures to the Secretary of Defense for approval. These 5480
mission-specific rules of engagement are then passed down the chain of command in the form of an execute 5481
order, fragmentary order, or other formal operational tasking. The combatant commander and subordinate 5482
commanders must follow these mission-specific rules of engagement. Combatant commanders may 5483
augment the rules of engagement as necessary by implementing supplemental measures within their 5484
authority to approve. Both combatant commanders and subordinate commanders are required to notify the 5485
Secretary of Defense of any restrictions placed on the Secretary of Defense-approved mission-specific rules 5486
of engagement. Commanders at all levels are required to evaluate the rules of engagement and request 5487
changes if they determine the rules of engagement are inadequate for the mission. 5488
12-7. Taken as a whole, the rules of engagement regulate the conduct of U.S. forces for the application of 5489
force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of self-defense. For instance, for mission 5490
accomplishment, U.S. forces may be authorized to engage enemy forces declared hostile anywhere and 5491
anytime without the need to observe a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. With respect to 5492
self-defense, unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense 5493
in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. U.S. forces may exercise individual self-defense 5494
in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent; however, unit commanders may limit individual 5495
self-defense by members of their unit. The rules of engagement in counterinsurgency operations are 5496
dynamic. Commanders must regularly review the rules of engagement for their effectiveness in the 5497
complex counterinsurgency environment. Training counterinsurgents in the rules of engagement is 5498
regularly reinforced. 5499
MULTINATIONAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 5500
12-8. U.S. forces assigned to the operational or tactical control of a multinational force will follow the 5501
rules of engagement of the multinational force for mission accomplishment, if authorized by the Secretary 5502
of Defense. U.S. forces retain the right of self-defense. Apparent inconsistencies between the right of 5503
self-defense contained in U.S. rules of engagement and the rules of engagement of the multinational force 5504
will be submitted through the U.S. chain of command for resolution. While final resolution is pending, U.S. 5505
forces will continue to operate under the U.S. rules of engagement. When U.S. forces, under U.S. 5506
operational or tactical control, operate with a multinational force, reasonable efforts are made to develop 5507
common rules of engagement. If common rules of engagement cannot be developed, U.S. forces operate 5508
under U.S. rules of engagement. The multinational forces will be informed prior to U.S. participation in the 5509
operation that U.S. forces intend to operate under U.S. rules of engagement. U.S. forces remain bound by 5510
international agreements to which the U.S. is a party even though other coalition members may not be 5511
bound by them. International agreements, such as status-of-forces agreements, are never interpreted to limit 5512
U.S. forces right of self-defense. 5513
LAW OF WAR 5514
12-9. Counterinsurgency operations may occur in both an international armed conflict (state versus state) 5515
and a non-international armed conflict (state versus armed nonstate actor). Situations can occur, such as 5516
during occupation, where armed forces are engaged in combat with armed nonstate actors, or other persons 5517
who are not part of a states armed force. Any hostilities between state and non-state actors are by 5518
Legal Considerations
definition a non-international armed conflict. There might be a simultaneous international armed conflict 5519
occurring, but this does not affect the state vs. non-state conflict's qualification as non-international armed 5520
conflict. Regardless of the context, U.S. forces obey the law of war. The law of war is that part of 5521
international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often called the law of armed conflict 5522
or international humanitarian law. An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 5523
between states (in an international armed conflict) or protracted armed violence between governmental 5524
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state (in a non-international armed 5525
conflict). The U.S. is bound by the law of war treaties to which it is a party, as well as binding norms of 5526
customary international law. 5527
12-10. The law of war (or law of armed conflict) is the branch of international law limiting the use of 5528
violence in armed conflicts. It spares those who do not or no longer directly participate in hostilities. It also 5529
limits the violence to the amount necessary to achieve the aim of the conflict. The purposes of the law of 5530
war include: 5531
Ensuring good order and discipline. 5532
Fighting in a disciplined manner consistent with U.S. national values. 5533
Maintaining domestic, international, and local support. 5534
Protecting combatants, noncombatants, and civilians from unnecessary suffering. 5535
Safeguarding persons who fall into the hands of an enemy. 5536
Facilitating the restoration of peace. 5537
12-11. The primary sources of the law of war can be found in The Hague Convention of 1907, and its 5538
Annexed Regulations; the four Geneva Conventions of 1949; and their two additional Protocols of 1977. 5539
The law of war is based upon the following fundamental principles: 5540
First, military necessity, that is, that a belligerent is justified in applying those measures not 5541
forbidden by international law, which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of 5542
the enemy as soon as possible. 5543
Second, humanity, according to which requires military forces to avoid inflicting gratuitous 5544
violence on the enemy. 5545
Third, honor, which demands a certain mutual respect between the opposing forces within an 5546
armed conflict, and in their conduct of both offensive and defensive military operations. 5547
MILITARY NECESSITY 5548
12-12. The principle of military necessity is explicitly codified in Article 23, of Hague IV Reg., which 5549
forbids a belligerent to destroy or seize the enemys property, unless such destruction or seizure be 5550
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. While no law of war treaty defines military necessity, it 5551
has been recognized through its codification into treaties to which the U.S. is a state party. Moreover, the 5552
U.S. has defined military necessity in its law of war manuals. For instance, FM 27-10 defines military 5553
necessity as that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are 5554
indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. 5555
12-13. Military necessity does not authorize all military action and destruction. Under no circumstances 5556
may military necessity authorize actions specifically prohibited by the law of war, such as the murder of 5557
prisoners of war, ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees, the taking of hostages, or the execution of a 5558
reprisal against a person or object specifically protected from reprisal. Civilian objects are generally 5559
protected from intentional attack or destruction. However, civilian objects may lose their protections if they 5560
are being used for military purposes or if there is a military necessity for their destruction or seizure. 5561
Civilian objects may, in such circumstances, become military objectives, and if so, the law of war permits 5562
their destruction. In treaties such as Hague IV Reg. and the Geneva Conventions, where an express 5563
prohibition has been stated, neither military necessity nor any other rationale of necessity may override that 5564
prohibition. In short, the principle of military necessity authorizes that use of force that is required to 5565
accomplish the mission. Military necessity, however, does not authorize acts otherwise prohibited by the 5566
law of war. This principle must be applied in conjunction with other law of war principles as well as other, 5567
more specific legal constraints set forth in law of war treaties to which the U.S. is a party. 5568
Chapter 12
HUMANITY 5569
12-14. Humanity addresses those acts governments have determined are neither consistent with the 5570
objectives of the law of war nor necessary for the achievement of the complete or partial submission of the 5571
enemy. As such, the principle of humanity includes, inter alia, the following humanitarian considerations: 5572
Individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities, the civilian population, and civilian 5573
objects are granted immunity from direct attack by military forces. 5574
The provision of certain fundamental safeguards for persons who fall into the hands of the 5575
enemy, particularly prisoners of war, military wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and civilians. 5576
Protections for military medical personnel, units, and transport. 5577
The prohibition of weapons and munitions that may cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous 5578
injury to combatants or that may be so indiscriminate as to pose a risk to civilians in their normal 5579
use. 5580
The principle has been developed further through rules regulating lawful weapon employment to reduce 5581
risk to individual civilians, the civilian population, and civilian objects. The principle of humanity is 5582
sub-divided into discrimination, proportionality, and the prohibition of weapons or munitions calculated to 5583
cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury to combatants. 5584
UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OR SUPERFLUOUS INJURY 5585
12-15. Relevant treaty law is contained in Hague IV Reg. Article 22, which states, the right of belligerents 5586
to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. Article 23(e) then prohibits the employment of arms, 5587
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. The terms unnecessary suffering and 5588
superfluous injury are regarded as synonymous. Although neither of the terms is defined, they are 5589
understood to refer to injury to persons, rather than damage to objects. The prohibition of unnecessary 5590
suffering constitutes acknowledgement that suffering to combatants is lawful and expected, and may 5591
include severe injury or loss of life. As a general proposition, the suffering inflicted by weapons or 5592
munitions would be deemed unnecessary only if: 5593
Its use was calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. 5594
The inevitable result of the normal use causes an injury the nature of which is considered by 5595
governments as manifestly disproportionate in relation to the military advantage anticipated 5596
from employment of the weapons or munitions. 5597
12-16. Weapons or munitions effects must be weighed in light of comparable lawful weapons and 5598
munitions in use on the modern battlefield. A weapon cannot be declared unlawful merely because it may 5599
cause severe suffering or injury. The appropriate determination is whether a weapons or munitions 5600
employment for its normal or expected use would be prohibited under some or all circumstances. The 5601
correct criterion is whether the employment of a weapon for its normal or expected use inevitably would 5602
cause injury or suffering manifestly disproportionate to its military effectiveness. A state is not required to 5603
foresee or anticipate all possible uses or misuses of a weapon or munitions, since almost any weapon or 5604
monition can be misused in ways that might be prohibited. 5605
12-17. Under the law of war, combatants may kill or wound enemy combatants and civilians taking a 5606
direct part in hostilities; such acts are legitimate if accomplished with lawful means and methods. For 5607
example, the prohibition of unnecessary suffering does not limit the bringing of overwhelming firepower 5608
on an opposing military force in order to subdue or destroy it. What the law of war does prohibit is the 5609
design, modification, or employment of a weapon or munitions for the purpose of increasing or causing 5610
suffering beyond that required by military necessity. 5611
DISCRIMINATION 5612
12-18. The principle of discrimination, sometimes referred to as the principle of distinction, is the 5613
international law obligation of parties to a conflict to distinguish between the civilian population (or 5614
individual civilians not taking a direct part in the hostilities) and combatant forces when engaged in 5615
military operations, directing the application of force solely against personnel belonging to the latter. 5616
Similarly, military force may be directed only against military objects or objectives, and not against civilian 5617
objects. A military objective is not limited to military bases, forces, or equipment, but includes other 5618
objects that contribute to an opposing states ability to wage war. Additionally, a civilian object is immune 5619
from intentional attack unless and until it loses its protected status through enemy abuse of that status. The 5620
principle of discrimination also provides civilians immunity from direct attack for so long as they take no 5621
part in hostile acts against enemy military forces. 5622
12-19. The principle of discrimination applies to military forces engaged in offensive or defensive 5623
operations, and to governments in providing protection for their civilian population and civilian objects. 5624
Each government and its military forces, as well as armed nonstate parties to a conflict, are obligated to 5625
separate their military or other fighting forces and military objects from the civilian population and civilian 5626
objects, to take steps to protect the civilian population (or civilians within its control) through affirmative 5627
steps such as evacuation from the vicinity of military operations or air raid precautions, and to minimize or 5628
avoid actions that might otherwise place the civilian population at risk from lawful military operations by 5629
the opposing force. The employment of voluntary or involuntary human shields to protect military 5630
objectives, individual military units, or military personnel is a violation of the law of war principle of 5631
discrimination. 5632
12-20. Physical damage or destruction of property is an inevitable and lawful aspect of combat. Military 5633
equipment (other than military medical equipment and transportation) is subject to lawful attack and 5634
destruction at all times. Civilian objects, including cultural property, are protected from seizure or 5635
intentional attack unless there is military necessity for their seizure or destruction, that is, they become 5636
military objectives. Destruction of civilian objects that is expressly prohibited, or that is not justified by 5637
military necessity, or that is wanton or excessive, is unnecessary destruction for which a commander may 5638
be culpable. 5639
12-21. The civilian population and individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities are protected 5640
from intentional attack. Where civilians are present on the battlefield or in proximity to legitimate military 5641
objectives, or are being used to shield legitimate targets from an attack that otherwise would be lawful, they 5642
are at risk of injury incidental to the lawful conduct of military operations. A law of war violation occurs 5643
when 5644
The civilian population is attacked intentionally. 5645
Civilian casualties incidental to an otherwise lawful attack become excessive in relation to the 5646
concrete and direct military advantage to be gained and are attributed to the wanton conduct of 5647
an attacking force, for which the defending force or individual civilians or groups of civilians 5648
(such as voluntary human shields) bear no responsibility. 5649
A defender or attacker employs civilians as voluntary or involuntary human shields. Each of 5650
these acts constitutes a violation of the principle of discrimination. 5651
12-22. The law of war does not expressly prohibit civilians from taking a direct part in hostilities. If they 5652
do, however, they may be targeted for so long as they take a direct part. Civilians do not enjoy the 5653
combatants privilegethat is, they do not have combatant immunity, and if captured, they may be 5654
prosecuted for their belligerent acts under the domestic law of the captor. Civilians engaging in belligerent 5655
acts not only forfeit their immunity from direct attack; they also make it more difficult for military 5656
personnel to apply the principle of discrimination and, thereby, put all civilians at risk. There is no 5657
definition of direct part in hostilities in treaty law or customary international law. At a minimum, it 5658
encompasses actions that are belligerent per se, that is, by their very nature and purpose can be expected to 5659
cause actual harm to the enemy. In general, the qualification of an act as direct participation in hostilities is 5660
a fact-dependent analysis that must be made after analyzing all relevant available facts, in the 5661
circumstances prevailing at the time. 5662
12-23. Three categories of civilians can be targeted: civilians who are directly participating in hostilities, 5663
while they are directly participating in hostilities; civilians who are continuously participating in hostilities, 5664
and are therefore targetable at all times (as if they were in the third category); and members of organized 5665
armed groups or armed nonstate actors who are parties to the conflict. Generally, a civilian who takes a 5666
direct part in hostilities may be targeted, but only while engaged in such activities, which include deploying 5667
or moving to a position of attack and exfiltrating from an attack to the point from which their movement to 5668
the attack originated. When a civilian commits an isolated belligerent act, the duration of his or her direct 5669
participation in hostilities, and hence the period during which he or she is subject to attack, may be difficult 5670
Chapter 12
to define. When, however, a civilian repeatedly engages in belligerent acts over an extended period, it may 5671
be difficult to determine when or whether his or her direct participation in hostilities has ended. In those 5672
cases, a civilian engaged in a continuous pattern of belligerent acts may be treated as taking a direct part in 5673
hostilities on an ongoing basis, thereby subjecting him or her to attack at any time. The assessment of 5674
whether a person is entitled to protection against direct attack should be based on a reasonable assessment 5675
of the facts available at the time. 5676
12-24. Within an international armed conflict or a non-international armed conflict, the armed forces of a 5677
state may engage in hostilities with armed nonstate actors. This is the classic counterinsurgency 5678
environment. While most international armed conflict involves warfare between the armed forces of two or 5679
more states, situations can occur, such as during occupation, where such armed forces and other armed 5680
security forces of the state (including police forces) are engaged in combat with armed nonstate actors, or 5681
other persons who are not part of a state armed force. Such a group can take a variety of forms, including 5682
an organized resistance movement that belongs to a state party but fails to meet the requirements for 5683
prisoner of war status under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Article 5684
4A (2), or a terrorist organization such as al Qaeda that, without regard to compliance with any of the other 5685
requirements of Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 4A(2) (such as 5686
under responsible command, wears fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carries arms openly, 5687
and conducts operations in compliance with the law of war), operates without any authorization or 5688
affiliation with a state and thereby falls outside of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 5689
Prisoners of War. An individual who is formally or functionally part of an organized armed group that is 5690
engaged in hostilities may be targeted at any time. In essence, membership in armed forces or armed groups 5691
(such as the status of belonging to such a group) and direct participation in hostilities (such as a conduct- 5692
based standard) are separate bases for targeting under the law of war. 5693
12-25. U.S. practice is that the designation of an armed nonstate actor as hostile (such as targetable at all 5694
times) and its members as direct participants in hostilities, should only be made by an official authorized to 5695
do so. Absent such a designation, the determination of whether a civilian may be targeted depends on 5696
whether that civilian is committing specific acts that amount to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile 5697
intent, in accordance with the standing rules of engagement. In addition, individual conflicts may involve 5698
specific rules of engagement that incorporate direct participation in hostilities analysis. 5699
PROPORTIONALITY 5700
12-26. Proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to 5701
attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be 5702
gained. Proportionality is process-oriented rather than result-oriented. Decisionmakers are expected to take 5703
all feasible precautions in planning military operations, but they remain dependent on the (often imperfect 5704
and incomplete) information available at the time to weigh the risk these operations may pose to the 5705
civilian population. In this context, proportionality may be viewed as a fulcrum upon which military forces 5706
and commanders must weigh the legitimate destructive effect of an attack (the law of war principle of 5707
military necessity) against the undesirable incidental effects of an attack (such as the risk of death or injury 5708
to civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities). Proportionality may be applied by decisionmakers at the 5709
national, strategic, operational, or tactical level. 5710
12-27. Proportionality does not prohibit destruction for which there is military necessity, or limit the 5711
degree of engagement of enemy military forces in the absence of civilians or civilian objects. In particular, 5712
it does not prohibit bringing overwhelming firepower to bear on an opposing military force to subdue or 5713
destroy it. Nor does it prohibit injury to civilians that is incidental to lawful military operations. As used in 5714
this context, proportionality constitutes an acknowledgment of the unfortunate inevitabilitybut 5715
lawfulnessof incidental injury to civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities, or of the incidental 5716
damage or destruction of civilian objects, despite precautions, in the execution of legitimate military 5717
operations, particularly when these persons or objects have been inter-mingled with military forces or 5718
objectives. 5719
12-28. Proportionality is weighed by a commander in determining whether, in engaging in offensive or 5720
defensive operations, his or her actions may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 5721
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 5722
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by those actions. The military advantage anticipated is 5723
intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from those actions considered as a whole, and not only from 5724
isolated or particular parts thereof. Generally, military advantage is not restricted to tactical gains, but is 5725
linked to the full context of a war strategy. 5726
HONOR 5727
12-29. Honor has long been a basis of a warriors ethos and of the law of war. Honor demands a certain 5728
mutual respect and trust between opposing forces. It denounces and forbids resort to dishonorable means, 5729
expedients, or conduct that would constitute a breach of trust. An example of this form of honor is the use 5730
of a white flag, which in land warfare represents a flag of truce. Its display is predicated upon good faith. 5731
Its misuse is prohibited and constitutes a war crime. Another example of how honor applies comes from 5732
law of war requirements regarding the treatment of persons hors de combatthat is, military personnel 5733
who are no longer able to fight due to sickness, injury, or wounds, or because they are shipwrecked. The 5734
principle of honor (and other humanitarian considerations) requires that an individual who is hors de 5735
combat be treated and protected in the same manner as one would wish to be treated and protected by the 5736
enemy if the roles were reversed. However, it is not dependent upon reciprocity. 5737
THE SOLDIERS AND MARINES BASIC RULES 5738
12-30. It is DOD policy that members of DOD components comply with the law of war during all armed 5739
conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized (such as international armed conflict or 5740
non-international armed conflict), and in all other military operations. The law of war principles discussed 5741
above can be safely applied by Soldiers and Marines by adherence to the following ten basic rules: 5742
Soldiers and Marines fight only enemy combatants. 5743
Soldiers and Marines do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them over 5744
to their superiors. 5745
Soldiers and Marines do not kill or torture enemy prisoners of war or detainees. 5746
Soldiers and Marines collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe. 5747
Soldiers and Marines do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment. 5748
Soldiers and Marines destroy no more than the mission requires. 5749
Soldiers and Marines treat all civilians humanely. 5750
Soldiers and Marines do not steal. They respect private property and possessions. 5751
Soldiers and Marines do their best to prevent violations of the law of war. 5752
Soldiers and Marines report all violations of the law of war to their superior. 5753
12-31. When working with host-nation or local friendly forces in a counterinsurgency, it is critical to both 5754
teach and enforce these rules among allies and friendly forces. Following the law of war is a critical 5755
component of counterinsurgency operations that directly supports the accomplishment of the strategic 5756
mission to defeat the insurgency and establish local rule by gaining the trust of the local civilian population, 5757
or at a minimum, enabling the local population to cease active support of the insurgency. Violations of the 5758
law of war have a direct and significant negative impact on the ability to conduct successful 5759
counterinsurgency operations. 5760
12-32. The law of war includes rules governing situations in which the military forces of one state occupy 5761
the territory of another. Occupation is not a transfer of sovereignty. It does, however, grant the occupying 5762
power the authority and responsibility to restore and maintain public order and safety. The occupying 5763
power must respect, as much as possible, the laws in force in the host nation. One of the four Geneva 5764
Conventions of 1949the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 5765
Warbecomes a prominent source of law during occupation, as well as the Hague Convention IV 5766
Regulations of 1907 5767
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 5768
12-33. The full body of the law of war only applies during international armed conflict, as a matter of law. 5769
It does not apply during a non-international armed conflict. This does not mean no rules apply during a 5770
Chapter 12
non-international armed conflict. For instance, the law of war principle of distinction still applies requiring 5771
force to be directed at combatants and not innocent civilians, and a proportionality analysis is required 5772
when targeting combatants and military objectives if civilians or civilian objects will be impacted. 5773
Counterinsurgency operations are almost certain to be a feature of non-international armed conflict, the 5774
most common form of armed conflict today. During counterinsurgency operations, Common Article 3 of 5775
the Geneva Conventions applies. Commanders must be aware of Common Article 3, and the basic 5776
protections that must be afforded to insurgents or others captured by U.S. forces, as well as the status of 5777
insurgents under the laws of the host nation. 5778
GENEVA CONVENTION, COMMON ARTICLE 3 5779
12-34. Although insurgencies can occur within the context of an international armed conflict, they are 5780
classically conflicts between states and non-state actors, and therefore legally qualified as non-international 5781
armed conflicts. 5782
12-35. It bears emphasis, however, that one article contained in all four of the Geneva Conventions 5783
Common Article 3is specifically intended to apply to non-international armed conflicts. Common Article 5784
3 affords significantly fewer protections to combatants fighting in a non-international armed conflict than 5785
does the full body of the law of war in an applicable international armed conflict. However, it does set a 5786
simple baseline of humane protection, along with fundamental rules that reflect the principles captured in 5787
the broader law of war. 5788
12-36. Common Article 3 requires that in the case of armed conflict not of an international character (a 5789
non-international armed conflict) occurring in the territory of one of the high contracting parties to the 5790
Geneva Conventions, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions 5791
identified in figure 12-1. 5792
5793
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, to include members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
(2) To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture;
(b) Taking of hostages;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(3) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
(4) An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
(5) The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
(6) The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties
to the conflict.
Figure 12-1. Provisions binding high contracting parties 5794
APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE HOST NATION 5795
12-37. There is no concept of prisoner-of-war status in non-international armed conflict, as reflected in 5796
Common Article 3. Insurgents may be prosecuted by the host nation as criminals for offenses related to 5797
participation in hostilities, such as bearing arms against government forces. Similarly, U.S. forces captured 5798
by insurgents are not prisoners of war, but U.S. forces must be held in accordance with Common Article 3, 5799
which remains binding on non-state armed groups. U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency operations 5800
should remember that the insurgents are, as a legal matter, criminal suspects within the legal system of the 5801
host nation. To support criminal prosecution of insurgents, counterinsurgents must develop and implement 5802
procedures to carefully preserve weapons, witness statements, photographs, and other evidence collected at 5803
the scene. This evidence is used to process the insurgents into the host-nation legal system and thus hold 5804
them accountable for their crimes while still promoting the rule of law. 5805
12-38. It also is important to note that U.S. personnel may be subject to host-nation law as well, 5806
depending on the terms of any existing status of forces agreement between the host nation and the U.S. 5807
Status-of-forces agreements establish the legal status of military personnel in foreign countries and 5808
generally provide the U.S. military some level of protection from host-nation criminal jurisdiction. In the 5809
absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with the host nation, DOD personnel in foreign 5810
countries may be subject to the criminal law of that host nation. 5811
DETENTION AND INTERROGATION 5812
12-39. Chapters 3, 5, and 8 of this publication indicate the need for human intelligence in 5813
counterinsurgency operations. This need can create great pressure to obtain time-sensitive information from 5814
detained individuals. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, FM 2-22.3, and other specific standards guide 5815
U.S. forces working with detainees. 5816
DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT OF 2005 5817
12-40. U.S. law clearly prohibits U.S. forces, to include officials from other government agencies, from 5818
using certain methods to obtain information. Instances of detainee abuse, to include maltreatment involving 5819
interrogation, were documented. In response, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the 5820
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. (See figure 12-2.) 5821
Chapter 12
Figure 12-2. Extract of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 5822
INTERROGATION FIELD MANUAL 5823
12-41. The Detainee Treatment Act established FM 2-22.3 as the legal standard for interrogations. No 5824
interrogation technique other than those prescribed by FM 2-22.3 is authorized for use by U.S. forces. 5825
Commanders ensure that interrogators receive proper training and supervision. Executive Order 13491 5826
extended this requirement to all U.S. government agencies. 5827
STANDARDS FOR DETENTION AND INTERNMENT 5828
12-42. Regardless of the precise legal status of those persons captured, detained, or otherwise held in 5829
custody by U.S. forces, they must receive humane treatment until properly released to host-nation 5830
authorities, who then assume legal responsibility. They must be provided the minimum protections of 5831
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. Specially trained, organized, and equipped military police 5832
units in adequately designed and resourced facilities should accomplish prolonged detention. Such 5833
detention must follow the detailed standards contained in AR 190-8/MCO 3461.1. Military police operating 5834
such facilities shall not be used to assist in or set the conditions for interrogation. 5835
TRANSFER OF DETAINEES TO THE HOST NATION 5836
12-43. There are certain conditions under which U.S. forces may not transfer the custody of detainees to 5837
the host nation or any other foreign government. U.S. forces retain custody if they have substantial grounds 5838
to believe that the detainees would be in danger in the custody of others. Such danger could include being 5839
subjected to torture or inhumane treatment. (See DODD 2310.01E for more information on transferring 5840
detainees and consult the legal advisor or staff judge advocate.) 5841
ENFORCING DISCIPLINE OF U.S. FORCES 5842
12-44. Despite rigorous selection and training, some personnel will commit infractions requiring 5843
discipline. The Uniform Code of Military Justice is the criminal code of military justice applicable to all 5844
military members and, in time of declared war or contingency operations, other persons serving with or 5845
accompanying an armed force in the field. Commanders and general officers are responsible for their 5846
subordinates and their behavior. Commanders must give clear guidance and ensure compliance. All 5847
civilians, including contractors, working in support of operations of the U.S. forces overseas must comply 5848
with the law of war. 5849
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 5850
12-45. Although most well-led and well-trained U.S. military perform their duties honorably and lawfully, 5851
there are some who will commit various crimes, including violations of the law of war. U.S. military 5852
personnel remain subject at all times to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Suspected criminal behavior 5853
must be investigated and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective action. This includes violations of 5854
orders, maltreatment of detainees, assaults, thefts, sexual offenses, destruction of property, and other 5855
crimes, to include homicides, which may be committed during a counterinsurgency. All reportable 5856
incidents committed by or against U.S. personnel, enemy persons, or any other individual must be reported 5857
promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective action. A reportable 5858
incident is a possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the law of war, for which there is credible 5859
information or conduct during military operations other than war that would constitute a violation of the 5860
law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict. 5861
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 5862
12-46. In some cases, military commanders may be deemed responsible for crimes committed by 5863
subordinates or others subject to their control. This situation arises when the criminal acts are committed 5864
pursuant to the commanders order. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, commanders are 5865
responsible if they have actual knowledge through reports received or through other means, that troops or 5866
other persons subject to their control are about to commit or have committed a crime, and they fail to take 5867
the necessary and reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the law or to punish violators. Commanders 5868
must know that under international law, commanders are responsible if they know, or should have known, 5869
their subordinates are about to commit or have committed a violation of the law of war. In a 5870
counterinsurgency environment, where compliance with the law of war is critical to the success of the 5871
mission, commanders may also be held accountable for failing to report and investigate reportable 5872
incidents. Commanders may not ignore credible information that indicates U.S. forces may have 5873
committed, intend to commit, or are in the process of committing violations of the law of war. In addition, 5874
commanders must pay close attention to the command climate within their units. Commanders must foster 5875
a climate through leadership and training that helps Soldiers and Marines understand the critical need to 5876
abide by the law of war, in particular, to distinguish between civilians and insurgents, to refrain from 5877
unnecessarily harming civilians, and to treat detainees in accordance with all applicable laws, policies, and 5878
regulations. 5879
GENERAL ORDERS 5880
12-47. Orders issued by general officers in command during counterinsurgency likely include provisions, 5881
such as a prohibition against drinking alcohol or against entering places of religious worship, important to 5882
maintaining discipline of the force. These types of orders safeguard the image of U.S. forces and promote 5883
the legitimacy of the host-nation government. These types of orders are readily enforceable under the 5884
Uniform Code of Military Justice. 5885
Chapter 12
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTORS 5886
12-48. Modern counterinsurgency operations involve many DOD civilians as well as civilian personnel 5887
employed by government contractors. These civilians may be made subject to general orders. They are 5888
subject to U.S. laws and to the laws of the host nation. These civilians may be prosecuted or receive 5889
adverse administrative action by the U.S. or contract employers. Article 2(a)(10) of the Uniform Code of 5890
Military Justice provides court-martial jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying an armed 5891
force in the field during a time of declared war or a contingency operation. Under this authority, 5892
commanders have Uniform Code of Military Justice authority to disarm, apprehend, and detain DOD 5893
civilians and contractors suspected of having committed a felony offense in violation of the rules for the 5894
use of force, or outside the scope of their authorized mission, and to conduct the basic Uniform Code of 5895
Military Justice pretrial process and trial procedures currently applicable to courts-martial of military 5896
service members. (See Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated 25 September 2007 for more 5897
information.) Before bringing a DOD civilian or contractor to a court-martial, however, the Department of 5898
Justice must have the opportunity to review and determine whether it will pursue the matter pursuant to the 5899
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. This act extends federal criminal jurisdiction over felony offenses 5900
committed by DOD civilians, contractor personnel, and others while employed by or accompany the armed 5901
forces overseas. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act is implemented within the DOD by DODI 5902
5525.11. Third country nationals employed by U.S. forces are covered under Military Extraterritorial 5903
Jurisdiction Act, but host-nation personnel are not. 5904
TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FOREIGN FORCES 5905
12-49. Foreign forces need training and equipment to be effective. U.S. laws require Congress to 5906
authorize such expenditures. U.S. laws require the Department of State to verify that the host nation 5907
receiving the assistance has not engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 5908
recognized human rights. All training and equipping of foreign security forces must be specifically 5909
authorized. Usually, DOD involvement is limited to a precise level of man-hours and materiel requested 5910
from the Department of State under the Foreign Assistance Act or Arms Export Control Act. The President 5911
may authorize deployed U.S. forces to train or advise host-nation security forces as part of the operational 5912
mission. In this case, DOD personnel and operation and maintenance appropriations provide an incidental 5913
benefit to those security forces. All other weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and 5914
services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. 5915
Examples include the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghan Security Forces Fund of fiscal year 2005. 5916
Moreover, the President must give specific authority to DOD for its role in such training and equipping 5917
efforts. 5918
12-50. In counterinsurgency, like all operations, commands require specific authority to expend funds. 5919
That authority is normally found in the DOD Appropriations Act, specifically, operation and maintenance 5920
funds. In recent counterinsurgency operations, Congress appropriated additional funds to commanders for 5921
the specific purpose of dealing with counterinsurgency. Recent examples include the Commanders 5922
Emergency Response Program, Global Train and Equip Program, and the Global Security Contingency 5923
Fund. 5924
DOD FUNDS GENERALLY NOT EXPENDABLE BY COMMANDERS FOR THIS PURPOSE 5925
12-51. Congress specifically appropriates funds for foreign assistance. The United States Agency for 5926
International Development expends such funds under the legal authorities in Title 22. Provisions of Title 22 5927
authorize small amounts of money. These funds are appropriated annually for commanders to provide 5928
humanitarian relief, disaster relief, or civic assistance in conjunction with military operations. These 5929
standing authorities are narrowly defined and generally require significant advance coordination within the 5930
DOD and the Department of State. As such, they are of limited value to ongoing counterinsurgency 5931
operations. 5932
COMMANDERS EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM 5933
12-52. The Commanders Emergency Response Program is a statutory authorization to obligate funds 5934
from the DOD operation and maintenance appropriation for the primary purpose of authorizing U.S. 5935
military commanders to carry out small-scale projects designed to meet urgent humanitarian relief 5936
requirements or urgent reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility that provide an 5937
immediate and direct benefit to the people of Afghanistan. The Commanders Emergency Response 5938
Program authority is found at 1201 of NDAA FY12 (Public Law 112-81, 125 STAT. 1619, Dec. 31, 5939
2011). Notably, the authority to use Commanders Emergency Response Program in Iraq was specifically 5940
repealed, eliminating the use of Commanders Emergency Response Program in Iraq. The Commanders 5941
Emergency Response Program is one of the most important authorities commanders have in Afghanistan. 5942
12-53. Section 1201 of NDAA FY12 includes waiver authority. Section 1201, states that, [f]or purposes 5943
of the exercise of the authority provided by this section or any other provision of law making funding 5944
available for the [Commanders Emergency Response Program] ... the Secretary may waive any provision 5945
of law not contained in this section that would (but for the waiver) prohibit, restrict, limit, or otherwise 5946
constrain the exercise of that authority. As a result, the Secretary of Defense has periodically waived the 5947
Competition in Contracting Act requirements for Commanders Emergency Response Program-funded 5948
projects. Therefore, Commanders Emergency Response Program-funded projects did not need to follow 5949
the competition requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 5950
12-54. Commanders Emergency Response Program appropriated funds may be used to repair property 5951
damage that results from U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations that are not otherwise 5952
compensable under the Foreign Claims Act. These funds can also be used for condolence payments to 5953
individual civilians for the death or physical injury resulting from U.S., coalition, or supporting military 5954
operations that are not compensable under the Foreign Claims Act. Such payments include payments to 5955
surviving spouse or kin of defense or police personnel killed because of U.S., coalition, or supporting 5956
military operations. Commanders Emergency Response Program appropriated funds may not be used to 5957
pay rewards or fund any type of weapon buy-back program. Title 10, U.S.C. 127b, provides the authority 5958
for the Rewards Program. 5959
GLOBAL TRAIN AND EQUIP OR BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY 5960
12-55. Section 1206 of NDAA FY06 (Public Law 109-163, 119 STAT. 3456, Jan. 6, 2006)as amended 5961
most recently by section 1204 of NDAA FY12 (Public Law 112-81, 125 STAT. 1621, Dec. 31, 2011) 5962
provides DOD with the authority to build the capacity of foreign military forces in support of overseas 5963
contingency operations. Section 1206 Train and Equip authority allows DOD to build the capacity of a 5964
foreign country's national military forces in order for that country to 5965
Conduct counterterrorist operations. 5966
Participate in or support military and stability operations in which the U.S forces are a 5967
participant. 5968
The NDAA FY09 expanded this authority to include building the capacity of maritime security forces 5969
conducting counterinsurgency operations. 5970
GLOBAL SECURITY CONTINGENCY FUND 5971
12-56. Section 1207 of NDAA FY12 (Public Law 112-81, 125 stat. 1625, DEC. 31, 2011) established the 5972
global security contingency fund, which provides funds to the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense to 5973
provide assistance to designated countries for the purposes of enhancing the countrys national military 5974
forces, and other national security forces that conduct border and maritime security, internal defense, and 5975
counterterrorism operations. Funds provided also may be used for the justice sector, including law 5976
enforcement and prisons, rule of law programs, and stabilization efforts in a country in those cases in which 5977
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that the conflict or 5978
instability in a country or region challenges the existing capability of civilian providers to deliver such 5979
assistance. Funds come from both DOD operation and maintenance appropriations and state funds. DOD 5980
may transfer up to $200,000,000 of operation and maintenance to the fund. On any given project, the state 5981
must contribute no less than 20% of the total and DOD no more than 80%. 5982
Chapter 12
HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING 5983
12-57. Congress typically limits when it funds training or equipment for foreign security forces. If the 5984
Department of State has credible information that the foreign security force unit identified to receive the 5985
training or equipment has engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized 5986
human rights, Congress prohibits funding. Such prohibitions impose a requirement upon Department of 5987
State and DOD. These departments must vet the proposed recipient units against a database of credible 5988
reports of human rights violations. 5989
CLAIMS AND SOLATIA 5990
12-58. Under certain conditions, the U.S. government makes payments to host-nation civilians. The 5991
Foreign Claims Act permits certain claims to be filed against the U.S. government. In some countries, 5992
solatia payments are made. 5993
FOREIGN CLAIMS ACT 5994
12-59. Under the Foreign Claims Act, claims by host-nation civilians for property losses, injury, or death 5995
caused by service members or the civilian component of the U.S. forces may be paid to promote and 5996
maintain friendly relations with the host nation. Claims that result from noncombat activities or negligent 5997
or wrongful acts or omissions are payable. Claims that are not payable under the Foreign Claims Act 5998
include losses from combat, contractual matters, domestic obligations, and claims which are either not in 5999
the best interest of the U.S. to pay, or which are contrary to public policy. Because payment of claims is 6000
specifically governed by law and because many claims prove, upon investigation, to be not payable, U.S. 6001
forces must be careful not to raise expectations by promising payment. 6002
SOLATIA 6003
12-60. If U.S. forces are conducting counterinsurgency in a country where payments in sympathy or 6004
recognition of loss are common, solatia payments to accident victims may be legally payable. Solatia 6005
payments are not claims payments. They are payments in money or in kind to a victim or to a victims 6006
family as an expression of sympathy or condolence. The payments are customarily made immediately and 6007
generally are nominal. The individual or unit involved in the damage has no legal obligation to pay; 6008
compensation is simply offered as an expression of remorse according to local custom. Solatia payments 6009
should not be made without prior coordination with the combatant command. 6010
ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW 6011
12-61. Establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state in counterinsurgency. Defining that end 6012
state requires extensive coordination between the instruments of U.S. power, the host nation, and 6013
multinational partners. Attaining that end state is usually the province of host-nation authorities, 6014
international and intergovernmental organizations, the Department of State, and other U.S. government 6015
agencies, with support from U.S. forces in some cases. Some key aspects of the rule of law include 6016
A government that derives its powers from the governed and competently manages, coordinates, 6017
and sustains collective security, as well as political, social, and economic development. This 6018
includes national, regional, and local government. 6019
Sustainable security institutions. These include a civilian-controlled military as well as police, 6020
court, and penal institutions, all of which should be perceived by the local populace as fair, just, 6021
and transparent. 6022
Fundamental human rights. The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and the 6023
International Convention for Civil and Political Rights provide a guide for applicable human 6024
rights. The latter provides for derogation from certain rights, however, during an officially 6025
proclaimed state of public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. Respect for the full 6026
panoply of human rights should be the goal of the host nation; derogation and violation of these 6027
rights by host-nation security forces, in particular, often provides an excuse for insurgent 6028
activities. 6029
12-62. In times of extreme unrest and insurgency, host-nation legal structurescourts, prosecutors, 6030
defense assistance, and prisonsmay cease to exist or function. Under these conditions, counterinsurgents 6031
may need to undertake a significant role in the reconstruction of the host-nation judicial system to establish 6032
legal procedures and systems to deal with captured insurgents and common criminals. During judicial 6033
reconstruction, counterinsurgents can expect to be involved in providing sustainment and security support. 6034
They can expect to provide legal support and advice to the host-nation judicial entities. Even when judicial 6035
functions are restored, counterinsurgents may still have to provide logistic and security support to judicial 6036
activities for a prolonged period. This support continues as long as insurgents continue to disrupt activities 6037
that support the legitimate rule of law. 6038
12-63. The rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public 6039
and private, including the State itself, are accountable to the laws that are publicly promulgated, equally 6040
enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms 6041
and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, 6042
equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of 6043
powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and 6044
legal transparency. Justice is an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of 6045
rights and the prevention of punishment of wrongs. Its administration involves both formal judicial and 6046
informal, customary, or traditional mechanisms. Within this paradigm, a range of terms are used to describe 6047
various approaches and activities that strengthen the rule of law such as security sector reform, 6048
administration of justice, protection, and combating impunity. 6049
12-64. Guiding principles for rule of law include 6050
Base assistance on international norms and standards. 6051
Take account of the political context. 6052
Base assistance on the specific country context. 6053
Advance human rights and gender justice. 6054
Ensure national ownership. 6055
Support national reform constituencies. 6056
Ensure a coherent and comprehensive strategic approach. 6057
12-65. In addition, the framework for strengthening the rule of law includes 6058
A constitution or equivalent. 6059
A legal framework and the implementation thereof. 6060
An electoral system. 6061
Institutions of justice, governance, security, and human rights. 6062
Transitional justice processes and mechanisms. 6063
A public and civil society that contributes to strengthening the rule of law and hold public 6064
officials and institutions accountable. 6065
12-66. In counterinsurgency environments, it is likely that justice mechanisms will have either collapsed 6066
or be in serious need of rebuilding. Given the time and resources required to establish a fully functional 6067
judicial system, counterinsurgents may need to support transitional justice mechanismsmechanisms to 6068
provide temporary justice in communities. Such mechanisms may be baseline formal mechanisms or they 6069
may rely on communities and so-called transitional justice mechanisms. It is important that the 6070
counterinsurgent keep in mind that transitional justice and institutional capacity building should be 6071
mutually reinforcing. Overall, the rule of law requires simultaneous capacity building of police, 6072
prosecutors, judiciary, and corrections. 6073
12-67. Tools counterinsurgents can use in the immediate term include the following: 6074
Employ mobile courts, legal defense, and case tracking systems to reduce case processing delays 6075
that lead to prison overcrowding. Mobile courts help address problems of access to justice for 6076
women, minority, and marginalized groups. 6077
When access to courts is obstructed by prohibitive costs, corruption, and socio-cultural biases, 6078
support legal aid, public defenders, and paralegals. 6079
Chapter 12
Investigate whether causes of case delays (lack of court administration systems, training, or 6080
capacity of judges, and training or capacity of prosecutors). 6081
Support prosecution cells with the host-nation armed forces. 6082
6083

29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) Glossary-1
GIossary 6084
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definitions, 6085
and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) 6086
precedes the definition. The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses 6087
after the definition. Terms for which the Army and Marine Corps have agreed on a 6088
common definition are followed by (Army-Marine Corps). 6089
SECTION IACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 6090
ADP Army doctrine publication
ADRP Army doctrine reference publication
AJP allied joint publication
AR Army regulation
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
COIN counterinsurgency
DA Department of the Army
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DOS Department of State
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FM field manual
JP joint publication
MCO Marine Corps order
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time available, civil considerations
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO nongovernmental organization
PMESII political, military, economy, social, informaion, infrastructure
SOF special operations forces
STANAG standardization agreement
U.S. United States
UN United Nations
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USC United States Code
GIossary
Glossary-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) 29 May 2013
SECTION IITERMS 6091
all-source intelligence 6092
Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, 6093
most frequently including human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature 6094
intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-source data in the production of finished intelligence. 6095
(JP 2-0) 6096
area of interest 6097
That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and 6098
extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could 6099
jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 3-0) 6100
assessment 6101
A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities 6102
during military operations. (JP 3-0) 6103
base 6104
A locality from which operations are projected or supported. (JP 4-0) 6105
counterinsurgency 6106
Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core 6107
grievances. (JP 3-24) 6108
country team 6109
The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the 6110
United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United 6111
States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. 6112
(JP 3-07.4) 6113
end state 6114
Those conditions that, when achieved, accomplish the mission. 6115
foreign internal defense 6116
Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by 6117
another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, 6118
lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22) 6119
cultural analysis cell 6120
An ad hoc working group consisting of individuals with a diversity of education and experience 6121
capable of identifying and considering the perspective of the population, the host-nation government 6122
and other stakeholders within an operational environment. (MCWP 5-1) 6123
human intelligence 6124
A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 2-0) 6125
information environment 6126
The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on 6127
information. (JP 3-13) 6128
insurgency 6129
The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force 6130
change of a governing authority. (JP 3-24) 6131
intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace 6132
A systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of 6133
threat/adversary, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a 6134
specific mission. By applying intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace, commanders gain 6135
Glossary
29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) Glossary-3
the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points 6136
in time and space. (FM 2-01.3/ MCRP 2-3A) 6137
intergovernmental organization 6138
An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, 6139
regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. 6140
(JP 3-08) 6141
internal defense and development 6142
The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from 6143
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22) 6144
irregular warfare 6145
A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 6146
population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the 6147
full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversarys power, influence, and will. 6148
(JP 1) 6149
line of effort 6150
A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus 6151
efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. (ADRP 3-0) 6152
measure of effectiveness 6153
A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is 6154
tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. 6155
(JP 3-0) 6156
measure of performance 6157
A criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0) 6158
military decisionmaking process 6159
An iterative planning methodology used to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of 6160
action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0) 6161
military necessity 6162
That principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are 6163
indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. (FM 27-10) 6164
nation assistance 6165
Assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nations territory based on agreements 6166
mutually concluded between nations. (JP 3-0) 6167
nongovernmental organization 6168
A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or 6169
promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and 6170
conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. 6171
(JP 3-08) 6172
operational environment 6173
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of 6174
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0) 6175
rules of engagement 6176
Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations 6177
under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 6178
encountered. (JP 1-04) 6179
security cooperation 6180
All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense 6181
relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and friendly military 6182
GIossary
Glossary-4 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) 29 May 2013
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with 6183
peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22) 6184
security force assistance 6185
The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to 6186
support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting 6187
institutions. (JP 3-22) 6188
terrorism 6189
The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. 6190
Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the 6191
pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 3-07.2) 6192
unified action 6193
The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and 6194
nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1) 6195
unity of command 6196
The operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the requisite authority to 6197
direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose. (JP 3-0) 6198
unity of effort 6199
Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily 6200
part of the same command or organizationthe product of successful unified action. (JP 1) 6201
6202

References 6203
Field manuals and selected joint publications are listed by new number followed by 6204
old number. 6205
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS 6206
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication. 6207
ADRP 1-02. Operational Terms and Military Symbols. 31 August 2012. 6208
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010. 6209
RELATED PUBLICATIONS 6210
These documents contain relevant supplemental information. 6211
JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS 6212
Most joint publications are available online: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.> 6213
DODD 2310.01E. The Department of Defense Detainee Program. 5 September 2006. 6214
DODD 5205.14. DoD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy. 19 August 2010. 6215
DODI 5525.11. Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or Accompanying the Armed 6216
Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members. 6217
3 March 2005. 6218
JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013. 6219
JP 1-04. Legal Support to Military Operations. 17 August 2011. 6220
JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 June 2007. 6221
JP 2-01.3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 16 June 2009. 6222
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011. 6223
JP 3-05. Special Operations. 18 April 2011. 6224
JP 3-07. Stability Operations. 29 December 2011. 6225
JP 3-07.2 Antiterrorism. 4 November 2010. 6226
JP 3-07.3. Peace Operations. 1 August 2012. 6227
JP 3-07.4. Joint Counterdrug Operations. 13 June 2007. 6228
JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011. 6229
JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012. 6230
JP 3-16. Multinational Operations. 7 March 2007. 6231
JP 3-22. Foreign Internal Defense. 12 July 2010. 6232
JP 3-24. Counterinsurgency Operations. 5 October 2009. 6233
JP 3-26. Counterterrorism. 13 November 2009. 6234
JP 3-31. Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. 29 June 2010. 6235
JP 4-0. Joint Logistics. 18 July 2008. 6236
JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning. 11 August 2011. 6237
ARMY PUBLICATIONS 6238
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: <http://www.apd.army.mil/>. 6239
ADP 5-0 (FM 5-0). The Operations Process. 17 May 2012. 6240
References
References-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) 29 May 2013
ADP 6-0 (FM 6-0). Mission Command. 17 May 2012. 6241
ADRP 2-0 (FM 2-0). Intelligence. 31 August 2012. 6242
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012. 6243
ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012. 6244
ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012. 6245
ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012. 6246
ATP 3-07.20/MCRP 3-33.1G. IMSO Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Integrated 6247
Monetary Shaping Operations. 26 April 2013. 6248
ATP 3-24.1. Operational Environment and Causes of Instability. Not yet published. 6249
ATTP 2-91.6. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Site Exploitation. 27 6250
December 2010. 6251
ATTP 3-39.20 (FM 3-19.50). Police Intelligence Operations. 29 July 2010. 6252
FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 15 October 2009. 6253
FM 2-22.3(FM 34-52). Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 September 2006. 6254
FM 3-07. Stability Operations. 6 October 2008. 6255
FM 3-05. Army Special Operations Forces. 1 December 2010. 6256
FM 3-05.301. Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 30 August 6257
2007. 6258
FM 3-13. Inform and Influence Activities. 25 January 2013. 6259
FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013. 6260
FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013. 6261
FM 3-90-2. Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks Volume 2. 22 March 2013. 6262
FM 4-92. Contracting Support Brigade. 12 February 2012. 6263
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956. 6264
MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONS 6265
Most Marine Corps publications are available online: 6266
<http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil>. 6267
Marine Corps Operating Concepts Third Edition. June 2010. 6268
MCDP 6. Command and Control. 4 October 1996. 6269
MCWP 5-1. Marine Corps Planning Process. 24 August 2010. 6270
OTHER GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 6271
Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 6272
Stabilization, United States Department of State. July 2008. <http://www.crs.state.gov/>. 6273
U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Department of State. 6274
13 January 2009. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf>. 6275
UNITED STATES CODE 6276
Find the United States Code (USC) at http://uscode.house.gov/lawrevisioncounsel.shtml. 6277
Title 10, Armed Forces. 6278
Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse. 6279
References
29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) References-3
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION PUBLICATION 6280
AJP 3.4.4. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN). 6281
REFERENCED FORMS 6282
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. 6283

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