What Is A Thing by Martin Heidegger

W H A T IS A T H IN G ?
by M artin Heidegger
translated by W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch w ith an an alysis by Eugene T. Gendlin
( iA T K W A Y E D IT IO N S ,
i .t d
s o i l II BENI). INDIANA
Copyright 1967 by Gateway Editions. Ltd., 620 West Washington Street, South Bend, Indiana 46625. Manufactured in the United States of America. 9-77. Library oj Congress Catalog Card Number: 67-31050 International Standard Hook Number: 0-89526-979-1 (old I.S.B.N.: 0-8092-6137-5) First published in German as Die Frage nach dem Ding bv Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tbingen.
Contents
Translators Note Preface

A. V ar io u s W
the ays
v vii
o r Q u e st io n in g A
bout
T h in g
1. Philosophical andscicntific questioning 2. Ambiguous talk about thething 3. The difference in kind between the question of thingness and scientific and technical methods 4. The everyday and scientific experiences of the thing 5. Particularity and being-this-one 6. The thing as just this one 7. Subjective-objective; the question of truth 8. The thing as the bearer of properties 9. The essential construction of the truth, the thing, and the proposition 10. The historicity of the definition of the thing 11. Truthproposition (assertion)thing 12. Historicity and decision 13. Summary
B. K
a n t s
1 4 7 11 14 24 26 32 35 39 44 49 52
M anner
op
A sk in g A
bout t h e
h in g
I. The Historical Basis on Which Kants C ritique o f Pure Reason Rests 1. The reception of Kants work in his lifetime 2. The title of Kants major work 3. The categories as modes of assertion 4. -yos ratioreason 5. The modern mathematical science of nature and the origin of a critique of pure reason
iii
55 57 61 62 64 65
iv
WHAT
IS A T H I N G ?
6. The history of the question about the thing: summary 7. Rational metaphysics(Wold, Baumgarten) II. The Question About the Thing in Kants Main Work 1. What does "critique mean in Kant 2. The relation of the "critique of pure reason to the "system of all principles of the pure understanding 3. Interpretation of the second main section of the transcendental analytic 4. The highest principle of all analytic judgments 5. Kants essential definition of the judgment 6. On the highest principle of all synthetic judgments 7. Systematic representation of all the synthetic principles of pure understanding A n alysis Indices
108 112 119 119 121 124 132 153 181 184 245 297
T ran slato r s N o n -
Translating Heidegger alw ays presents difficulties. We have attem pted to be as accurate as possible, w hile hold ing the invention o f cum bersom e term s to a minimum. Dasein has been retained wherever possible. This key word, translated literally as "Being-there, is Heideggers unique term for m ans own w ay o f Being over against other entities in the world. In a few instances, however, it seemed best to translate it as "existen ce, according to the accepted mode. In these cases the German word is retained in parentheses. We take this opportunity to acknowledge the valuable assistan ce o f W altraut J. Stein in translating som e knotty sentences, M arsha Lynn B allew, who helped w ith proof ing and the indices, and Elizabeth Barton, who worked indefatigably in typing the m anuscript. W. B. Barton, Jr. Vera Deutsch ( E m eritu s ) Memphis S tate University
Preface
I his work presents the text of a lecture w hich w as held in the w inter sem ester, 1935-36, at the U niversity o f Frei burg. The lecture w a s entitled B asic Questions o f Meta p hysics. Martin Heidegger Freiburg April, 1962
WHAT IS A THING?
A . V a r io u s W a y s o f Q u e s t i o n i n g A b o u t t h e
T h in g 1
I. Philosophical and Scientific Questioning From the range o f the b asic questions o f m etaphysics w e shall here ask this one question: What is a thing? The question is quite old. What rem ains ever new about it is merely th a t i t m u s t b e a skcd again and a g a m T ^ We could im m ediately begin a lengthy discussion about the question "W h at is a thing? before w e have really posed it. In one respect this would even be justified, since philosophy alw ays sta rts from an unfavorable posi tion. This is not so w ith the sciences ( W issen sch aften ), lor there is alw ays a direct transition and entrance to them starting out from everyday representations, beliefs, and thinking. If one takes the everyday representation as the sole standard of all things, then philosophy is alw ays
1 The following footnote appears on the first page o f the author ized German text from which this translation is made: "A tran* n o t ol this lecture w as reproduced without the knowledge o! the author and w as put on the market outside Germany without mentioning the source." Trans.
WHAT
IS A T H I N G ?
som ething j eranscd (verr ck test. This shifting ( Ver rckung) o f tHe attitude o f thought can be accom plished only after a jo lt (R u ck ). Scientific lectures, on the other hand, can im m ediately begin w ith the presentation of their su bject. The plane o f questioning thus chosen w ill not be abandoned again when the questions become more difficult and complex. Philosophy, on the other hand, executes a continuous shifting o f standpoint and level. Therefore, one docs not know for a tim e which w ay to turn in it. However, in order that this unavoidable and often beneficial entangle ment does not go to excess, there is a need for a prelim inary reflection about w h at should be asked. Otherwise there is the danger o f ones speaking long-windedly about philosophy w ithout considering its meaning. We shall use the first hour, and only it, to reflect on our intention ( Vor haben ). When the question "W h at is a thing? arises, a doubt im m ediately announces itself. One may say that it m akes sense to use and cn ioy things in our reach, to elim inate objectionable things, to provide for necessary ones, but that one can really do nothing"with the qu estion "W h at is a c h in g /" This is true. One can start to do nothing w itlT it. It would be a great m isunderstanding of the ques tion itse lf if w e tried to prove that one can start to do so mething w ith it. No one can start to do anything w ith it. This assertion about our question is so true that w e m ust cverTunderstand it as a determ ination o~ f~ 1ts essence. The quest inn 5 B E a t is a thing? is one w ith w hich nothing can bi ' ~/Iorc than this need not be said about it. question is already very old (a s old, in fact, as the beginning o f W estern philosophy in Greece in the seventh century b .c .), it is therefore advisable that this question also be outlined from its historical point o f view. Regarding this question, a little story is handed down which Plato has preserved in the Theaetetus (174 a.f.):
Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

"ih n r tp
k il l
3
c is

tls
> ( '
\tn o v r a f
y i/ie X y * &
a im
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tv to ciSevai, '
riots' . '"The story is that Thales, w hile occupied in studying the heavens above and looking up, fell into a w ell. A good-looking and w h im sical maid from Thrace laughed at him and told him that w hile he might passionately want to know all things in the universe, the things in front o f his very nose and feet were unseen by h im ." Plato added to this story the remark: Si ini o i t o l * ev , "T h is je st also fits all those who becom e involved in philosophy. Therefore, the question "W h at is a thing? m ust alw ays be rated as one which cau ses housem aids to laugh. And genuine housem aids m ust have som ething to laugh about. Through the attem pt to determine the question o f the thing w e have unintentionally arrived at a suggestion about the ch aracteristic o f philosophy w hich poses that question. Philosophy, then, is that thinking w ith which one can start nothing and about w hich housem aids neces sarily laugh. Such a definition o f philosophy is not a mere jo ke but is som ething to think over. We shall do well to remember occasionally that by our strolling we can fall into a w ell whereby w e m ay not reach ground for quite some time. There rem ains the question as to w hy w e talk about the fundamental questions of m etaphysics. The term "m e ta p h ysics here should indicate only that the ques tions dealt w ith stand at the core and center o f philos ophy. However, by "m e ta p h ysics w e do not mean a spe cial field or branch w ithin philosophy in contrast to logic and ethics. There are no fields in philosophy b ecause Philosophy itself is not a field. Something like a d ivision o f labor'i~s~senseless in philosophy; sch o lastic learning is to a .certain extent indispensable to it but is never its e therefore want to keep the term m etaphysics
W H A T IS A T H I N G ?
free from all (hat h isto rically adheres to it. For us it signi fies only that procedure during w hich one runs the danger o f falling into a w ell. Now, after this general preparation, we can more closely delineate the question "W h at is a thing? 2. Am biguous Talk About the Thing First, what arc we thinking about when we say " a thing ? We mean a piece o f wood, a rock, a knife, a w atch, a ball, a javelin, perhaps a screw or a piece of wire. But also a huge building, or a depot, or a giant spruce are re ferred to as huge things." In the sum m ertim e w e speak o f m any things in the meadow: grasses, herbs, the butter flies and the bugs. The thing there on the w a ll the paint ing w e also call it a thing, and the sculptor has m any different finished and unfinished things in his w o rk shop. By contrast, w e hesitate to call the number five a thing, because one cannot reach for the number one cannot hear it or see it. In the sam e w ay a sentence The weather is bad is not a thing any more than is a single word "h o u se . We distinguish precisely the thing house and the word which names th is thing. Also, an attitude or d is position which w e m aintain or lose on som e occasion is not considered as a thing. If, however, a betrayal is in the air w e say, "There are uncanny things going on. Here we do not refer to pieces of wood, utensils, or sim ilar item s. When, in making a decision, it depends "above all things on this or that con sideration, the other things which have been om itted are not rocks or sim ilar item s but other considerations and decisions. Also, when we say "th in g s arent right, "th in g is used in a much broader sense than at the start o f our inventory. Now it has the sense which our German word had from the very beginning, namely a court trial or an
Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing
affair.2 Sim ilarly, w e "cle a r things up som ewhere, or as the proverb states, "G ood things take tim e. Also that which is not wood or stone, but every task and enterprise needs time. And someone for whom things are going w e ll is a man whose affairs, w ishes, and w o rks are in good order. It now becom es clear that w e understand the term "th in g in both a narrower and a broader sense. The narrower or lim ited meaning o f "th in g is that which can be touched, reached, or seen, i.e., what is present-at-hand ( das Vorhandene). In the wider meaning o f the term, the "th in g is every affair or transaction, som ething that is in this or that condition, the things that happen in the world occurrences, events. Finally, there is still another use of this word in the widest p ossible sense; this use w a s intro duced w ithin the philosophy o f the eighteenth century and w as long in preparation. W ith respect to this, Kant speaks of the "th in g -in -itself" ( Ding an sich ) in order to distin guish it from the "thing-for-us ( Ding fr un s), that is, as a "phenom enon. A thing-in-itself is that which is not ap proachable through experience as are the rocks, plants, and anim als. Every thing-for-us is as a thing and also a thing-in-itself, which m eans that it is recognized ab so lutely w ithin the absolute knowledge o f God. But not every thing-in-itself is also a thing-for-us: God, for in stance, is a thing-in-itself, as Kant uses the word, accord ing to the meaning o f Christian theology. Whenever Kant calls God a thing, he does not mean a giant gaslike form a tion that a cts som ewhere in hidden depths. According to strict usage, "th in g here means only "som eth in g (e tw a s), that which is not nothing. We can think some- Das Ditig: From Germanic legal language, originally desig nating the tribunal, or assem bly of free men. The thing'""0' w as a cause one negotiated or reconciled in the assem bly of judges. Heidegger in a later work refers to this in setting forth the notion of thing as what assem bles a world. See the lecture on Das Ding in Martin Heidegger, Vortrge unci Aufstze (VA) (Pfullingen: Verlag Neske, 1954), pp. 172-74. Trans.
thing by the term and concept o f God, but w e cannot experience God as w e do this piece o f chalk, about which we can m ake and prove such statem ents as: If w e drop this piece o f chalk it w ill fall with a certain velocity. God is a thing insofar as He is som ething at all, an X. Sim ilarly, number is a thing, faith and faithfulness are things. In like manner the signs > < are "som eth in g," and sim ilarly "a n d and "e ith e r/o r . If w e again ask our question What is a thing? we realize that this question is not in good order, because what should be put into question, that is, the "th in g , is ambiguous in its meaning. W hat is to be put into question must be sufficiently defined to becom e questionable in the right way. "W here is the dog? "The dog cannot be searched for if I do not know whether it is our own dog or the neighbors. "W h at is a thing? Thing in w hat sense in the lim ited, the wider, or the w id est? We have to distin guish three different meanings even if the means of dis tinction is still uncertain: 1. A thing in the sense o f being present-at-hand: a rock, a piece of wood, a pair o f pliers, a w'atch, an apple, and a piece o f bread. All inanim ate and all anim ate things such as a rose, shrub, beech tree, spruce, lizard, and w asp. . . . 2. Thing in the sense in which it means w hatever is named but which includes also plans, decisions, reflec tions, loyalties, actions, historical th in g s.. . . 3. All these and anything else that is a som ething ( ein E tw a s) and not nothing. W ithin w hat boundaries we determine the m eanings of the term "th in g alw ays remains arbitrary. With respect to this the scope and direction o f our questions w ill change. It is closer to our linguistic usage of today to under stand the term "th in g in the first (n arrow er) significa tion. Then each o f these things (rock, rose, apple, w atch ) is also som ething (e tw a s), but not every som ething (the number five, fortune, bravery) is a thing.
In asking What is a thing? w e shall adhere to the first meaning; not only because w e want to stay close to the usage o f language but also because the question con cerning the thing, even where it is understood in its wider and w idest meanings, m ostly aim s at this narrower field and begins from it. As w e ask What is a thing? w e now mean the things around us. We take in view w hat is m ost immediate, m ost capable o f being grasped by the hand. By observing such, w e reveal that w e have learned som e thing from the laughter of the housemaid. She thinks we should first look around thoroughly in this round-aboutus ( Um-uns-herum ). . 3. The Difference in Kind Between the Question o f Thingness ('Dinghcit ) and Scientific and Technical Methods As soon as w e begin to define these things, however, we run into an em barrassm ent. All thcsc-th in gs have really been settled long ago, and, if not, there are nroven scien tific procedures and m ethods o f production in w hich they can be scttle37 What a stone is can hest and most quickly be told by m ineralogy and ch em istry; what a rose or a b jislijs . botany teaches rclTablv: what a Irog or a falcon is, /.oology; as to what a shoe is, or a horseshoe, o r a w atch, the. shoemaker, the hfa^k.smiiliîixl the w atchm aker re s pectively, give the best technical inform a tio n. It turns out that we are alw ays too slow w ith our ques tion, and we are im m ediately referred to quarters which already have a far better answ er ready or, at least, experi ences and m ethods to give such answ ers quickly. This only confirm s w hat we have already adm itted, namely, that w e cannot start to do anything w ith the question What is a thing? But since we intend ( Vorhaben) to < -Iat ify this question, especially w ith regard to im m ediate 1 lings, it w ill be necessary to m ake clear what else we w ant to know in contradistinction to the sciences.
With our question "W h at is a thing? it obviously is not our purpose to discover what granite, a pebble, lime stone, or sandstone is but rather what the rock is as a thing. We do not care to know how to distinguish at any tim e m osses, ferns, grasses, shrubs, and trees, but what * the plant is as a thing, and sim ilarly in respect to anim als. We do not care to know w hat pliers are in com parison w ith a hammer, what a w atch is in com parison w ith a key; but we w ant to know what these implements and tools are as things. What this means, o f course, m ust be further clarified. But if one once adm its that we can ask the question in this way, then obviously one demand re m ains: nam ely, that we stick to the facts and their exact observations in order to discover what things are. What things are cannot be contrived at a desk or prescribed by generalized talk. It can be determined only in w orkshops and in the research laboratories. And if w e do not confine ourselves to this then w e w ill be exposed to the laughter o f housemaids. We are inquiring about things, and yet w e p ass over ( berspringen ) all the givens and the opportu nities which, according to general opinion, give us ade quate inform ation about all these things. This is how it actually looks. With our question "W hat is a thing? w e not only p ass over the particular rocks and stones, particular plants and their species, anim als and their species, im plem ents and tools, w e also p ass over whole realm s o f the inanimate, the anim ate, and tools, and desire to know only "W h at is a thing? In inquiring this wav, we seek what m akes thcHliTng^ tftffrg and~n( 11 w h at m akes it a stone or wood: what conditions ( be-dingty the thing. .We do not ask concerning a thing of som e species but after the thingness of a thing. jôFthe
:l Be-dingt; verb bedingen: "conditioned; "to condition." As already suggested. Heidegger wants to connect dingen w ith the notion of ".assem bling. Thus he writes: "D as limn aTTigt. Das Dingen versam m elt." The thing things. The (hinging assem bles" (VA, p. 17Z). Here he seems to w ant to call our altention to the original signifigaiiLL t)l httilHiWi. The originanegrcnnoTation
condition of being a thing, which conditions the thing as a thirigTeannot itse lf again be a thing, i.e., som ething conditloned. The thingness must be som ething un-conditioned ( un-bedingtes). V V ith fRe^question "W h at is a thing ? ~\vc are asking for someTtrTTlg unconditioned. We a skltboiTt what is all around us and ca n be grasped bv the haritTand vet we alienate ourselves from those immediate things very much more than did Thales, who could _see onl y a s far as the s ta r s. But we want to pass beyond even these things to the unconditioned, where there are no more things that provide a b a sis and ground. And, nevertheless, w e pose this question only in order to know w hat a rock is, and a lizard taking a sunbath on it, a blade o f grass that grows beside it, and a knife w'hich perhaps w e hold in our hands w hile w e lie in the meadow. We w ant to know ju st that, som ething that the m ineralo gist, b otan ist, zoologist, and m etallurgist perhaps dont w ant to know at all, som ething that they only think they want to know w hile actu ally w anting som ething else: to promote the progress o f science, or to satisfy the joy of discovery, or to show the technical usage of things, or to m ake a livelihood. We, however, desire to know w hat these men not only do not want to know but perhaps w hat they never can know in spite o f their science and technical skill. This sounds presumptuous. It doesnt only sound so, it is. N aturally this is not the presum ptuousness o f a single person any more than our doubt about the desire and ab ility o f the sciences to know passes sentence on the attitude and conviction of particular persons or even against the u tility and the necessity o f science. The demand for knowledge in our question is a pre sumption o f the kind found in every essential decision ( E ntscheidung ). Although we are already fam iliar w ith this decision, that does not mean that w e have already passed through it. It is the decision whether w e want to
of these words must not be overlooked. An "assem b ly " does condi tion something. Traits.
10
W H A T
IS
A T H I N G ?
know those things w ith which one can start to do nothing in the sense o f this figure o f speech. If w e forego this knowledge and dont ask this question, then all remains as it is. We shall p ass our exam inations, perhaps even bet ter, without asking this question. Even if w e ask this question, we shall not overnight become better botanists, zoologists, historian s, ju rists, or physicians. But per haps better or more cau tiously put certainly different teachers, different physicians and judges, although even then w e can start to do nothing w ith this question in our professions. With our question, we want neither to replace the sc i ences nor to reform (verbessern ) them. On the other hand, we want to participati in the. pnpnratTon ol ^deci sio n; the decision: Is science the measure o f know ledge, or is there a knowledge in which the ground and limit o f science and thus its genuine effectiveness are determined? Is this genuine knowledge necessary for a historical people^ or is it dispensable or replaceable by som ething else? However, decisions are not worked out by merely talk ing about them but by creating situ ation s and taking posi tions in which the decision is unavoidable, in which it becom es the most essential decision when one does not make it but rather avoids it. The uniqueness o f such decisions remains that they are prepared for only by questions w ith which one cannot start to do anything insofar as common opinion and the horizon o f housemaids are concerned. Furthermore, this questioning alw ays looks like a pretense to know better than the sciences. The term "b e tte r alw ay s means a difference o f degree in one and the sam e realm. However, w ith our question w e stand outside the sciences, and the knowledge for w hich our question strives is neither bet ter nor w orse but totally different. Different from science but also different from w hat one calls a W eltan schauung.
11
4. The Everyday and Scientific Experiences of the Thing; The Question Concerning Their Truth The question "W h at is a thing? seem s now to be in order. It is at least roughly determined: (1 ) What is put in question, and (2 ) That w hereafter w e ask regarding w h at is put in question. Put in question is the "th in g " in its narrower meaning, w hich refers us to the present-athand ( Vorhanden ). That w hereafter the thing is asked and interrogated, as it were, is thingness, w hat deter m ines a thing as such to be a thing. Yet when w e start to ascertain this thingness o f a thing w e are im m ediately helpless in spite o f our well-ordered question. Where should we grasp the thing? And besides:, w e nowhere find "th e thing," but only particular things,) these and those things. W hat m akes this so? Is it only we, because, first and forem ost, we strik e only the particular and then only afterw ard, as it seem s, extract and pull off (a b str a c t) the general, in this case the thingness, from the particular? Or is the fact that we alw ays meet only par ticular things inherent in the things them selves? And if it is in the things, is it then only their som ehow b asic or accidental caprice to meet us in this w ay, or do they meet us as p articulars because they are w ithin them selves par ticular, as the things w hich they are? In any case, this is where our everyday experience and opinion about things is directed. But before w e continue this line o f our questioning, it is necessary to insert an intervening exam ination o f our everyday experience. There is not at first, nor later on, any valid reason to doubt our everyday experiences. Of course, it is not suffi cient sim ply to claim that that which everyday experi ence show s o f the things is true, any more than it is sufficient to m aintain in a seem ingly more critical and cautious way: after all, as individual humans we are in dividual su b jects and egos, and what \vc represent and
12
W H A T
IS
A T H I N G ?
mean arc only su bjective pictures which we carry around in us; w e never reach the things them selves. This view, in turn, w ill not be overcome, in case it is not true, hv talk ing about " w e " instead o f "1 and bv taking into account the com m unity rather than the individual. There alw ays remains the possib ility that we only exchange su b jective pictures ol things with one another, which m a v j i ot thereby become any truer because we have exchanged them com m unally We now set aside these different interpretations of our relation to the things as w ell as the truth o f this relation. But, on the other hand, we do not w an t to forget that it is not at all sufficient to appeal only to the truth and cer tainty o f everyday experience. Precisely if everyday ex perience carries in itse lf a truth, and a superior truth at that, this truth m ust be founded, i.e., its foundation m ust be laid, adm itted, and accepted. This w ill becom e even more necessary when it turns out That the evei v d a y jhings show still another face. That they have long done, a nd they do it for us today to an extent and in a w ay that w e have hardly com prehended, let alone m astered^ Take the common example: The sun's diam eter is at m ost half a meter to one m eter w ide when it sets behind the m ountains in the form o f a glowing disk. All that the sun is for the shepherd coming home w ith his Hock does not now need to be described, but it is the real sun, the sam e one the shepherd aw aits the next morning. But the real sun has already set a few m inutes before. W hat we sec is only a sem blance ( S ch ein ) caused by certain proc esses o f rays. But even this sem blance is only a sem blance, for "in reality," w e say, the sun never sets at all. It does not wander over the earth and around it but the reverse. The earth turns around the sun, and this sun, further more, is not the ultim ate center o f the universe. The sun belongs to larger system s w hich w e know today as the M ilky W ay and the spiral nebula, which are o f an order o f magnitude compared to w hich our solar system must
13
be characterized as diminutive. And the sun, w hich daily rises and sets and dispenses light, is ever growing colder; our earth, in order to m aintain the sam e degree of warm th, would have to com e alw ays closer to the sun. However, it is moving aw ay from the sun. This m eans it rushes toward a catastrophe, albeit in time sp an s in com parison w ith which the few thousand years of human history on earth amount to not even one second. Now which o f these is the true sun? Which thing is the true one, the sun of the shepherd or the sun o f the astro p hysicist? Or is the question wrongly put, and if so, w h y? How should this be decided? For that, obviously, it is necessary to know w hat a thing is, w hat it means to-be-athing, and how the truth o f a thing is determined. On these questions neither the shepherd nor the astrop hysi cist inform s us. Neither can or needs to pose these ques tions in order to be im m ediately who they are. Another example: The English ph ysicist a nd astronomer Eddington once said o i his table that every thing of this kind the tab le, the cHaTFTTtL.'liaa a dntfBTeTTable nuinber one is the table known Since his ch ild h o o d fta b lc number twoTs the "scie n tific t a b i c / This scientific table, th a t is , the table which science delines in its thingness, con sists, according to the atom ic physics o f today, not of wood but m ostly of em pty space; in this em ptiness elec trical charges are distributed here and there, which are rushing back and forth at great velocity. Which one now is the true table, number one or number tw o ? Or are both true? In the sense o f w hat truth? What truth m ediates be tween the tw o? There must be still a third one according to which number one and number two are true in their w ay and represent a variation of this truth. We cannot save ourselves by the favored road o f saying: w hatever is assei ted about the scientific table number tw o, the spiral nebula, and the dying sun are but view p oints and theories o physics. To that the retort is: on this physics are ounded all our giant power station s, our airplanes, radio
14
W H A T IS T H I N G ?
and television, the whole o f technology which has altered the earth and man w ith it more than he suspects. These are realities, not view points w hich som e investigators distant from life defend. Does one want science even "clo se r to life ? I think that it is already so close that it suffocates us. Rather, w e need the right distance from life in order to attain a perspective in which w e m easure w hat is going on w ith us human beings. No one knows this today. For this reason w e must ask everyone and ask again and again, in order to know it, or at least in order to know w hy and in w hat respects w e do not know it. Have man and the nations only stum bled into the universe to be sim ilarly slung out of it again, or is it -otherw ise? We^must ask. For a long time there is-first som ething m uch m ore prelim inary: w e m ust first again learn how to ask. That can only happen by asking ques tions o f course, not just any questions. W e chose ihe question What is a thing? It now turns out: the~tliings ^ t.-inrl in rliff.-n-ni truths. What is the thing such that it is like th is? From w hat point o f view should w e decide the being-a-thing o f things? We take our standpoint in every day experience w ith the reservation that its truth, too, w ill eventually require a foundation ( eine Begrndung ).'' 5. Particu larity and Being-This-One (Jediesheit^. Space and Time as Determ inations o f Things In evejxd.ay experience w e alw ays meet particular things. W ith this suggestion w e resume the pursuit of our question after the above digression.
Begrndung: "A foundation, "establishm ent, "argum ent, "reasons for, "explanation, "proof." The English "ground" is equivalent to Grund; but the German includes the idea of a foun dation of a building. Heidegger seems to emphasize this aspect of its meaning. Therefore, in the related words this sense w ill be adhered to where possible. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Jam es S. Churchill, trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 3, n. 1. Trans.
15
The things arc particular. That means first: the ston e ,^ the lizard, the blade of grass, and the knife are each-foritself (je fr sich ). Moreover, the stone is a com pletely definite one, exactly this one; the lizard is not a lizard in general, but just this one, and so it is w ith the blade of grass and the knife. There is no thing in general, only par ticular things; and the particulars, moreover, are ju st these (je diese). Each thing is one such this one (ein je A d ie se s ) and no other. Unexpectedly, w e meet w ith som ething w hich belongs to the thing as a thing. This is a determ ination that is disregarded by the sciences w hich, w ith their thrust to ward facts, apparently com e clo sest to things. For a botanist, when he exam ines the labiate llowcr, w ill never be concerned about the single flower as a single one: it alw ays rem ains an exemplar only. That is also true o f the anim als, for example, the countless frogs and sala manders which are killed in a laboratory. The "th is one"^ (je d ieses) which distinguishes every thing, is passed over by science. Should w e now consider the things in this w ay? W ith the coun tlessness o f things w e would never come to an end, and w e would continually establish nothing but irrelevancies. H owever, w e are not directing ourselves exclusively at the particulars, alw ays these things (je diese D inge) one after another, but are after every things general ch aracteristic o f being "th is one :> the bcing-this-one (Jed iesh eit), if such a word form ation is acceptable. fitq v /a S r v f t t s p-frtjlaff r W a / But is the sentence "E v ery thing is a this one (ein je d ieses) and not another one at all applicable? There are tilings which do not differ at all from one another, things uhich are exactly alike, as tw o buckets or tw o pine needles which we cannot distinguish from each other in any respect. I he fact, one could say, that w e cannot d is tinguish between the two exactly alike things does not piove that, in the end, they are not different. However, L"-n assum ing that tw o single things are sim ply alike,
16
. I
each is still this thing because each of these tw o pine needles is in another place (O r/); and if they are to oc cupy the sam e place, they can do so only at a different tim e point. Place and time point m ake even absolutely alike things be these very ones (je diesen), i.e., different ones. Insofar as each thing has its placc, its time, and its time duration, there are never tw o sam e things. The par ticularity ( Je w eilig k e it ) o f the places and their m anifold ness are grounded in space, and the p articularity o f the tim e points is grounded in time. That b asic ch aracteristic o f the thing, i.e., that essential determ ination of the thing ness o f the thing to be this one (je d ieses), is grounded in the essence o f space and time. Our question "W h at is a thing? includes, therefore, the questions "W h at is sp ace? and "W h at is tim e? It is cu s tom ary for us to speak of them both together. But how and why arc space and tim e conjoined? Are they con joined at all, as though externally thrust onto one another and into one another, or are they prim ordially at one? Do they stem from a common root, from som e third, or b et ter, som e first which is neither space nor time because more prim ordially it is both? These and other related questions w ill occupy us, i.e., w e w ill not set our minds at rest that there is space and time and that w e place them next to each other space and time by use of the patient little word "a n d , as in "d og and ca t. In order to keep hold o f these questions by m eans of a title, w e call them the question o f the time-span (Z eitrau m ). We understand by time-span a certain length o f time, and say: w ithin the time-span of a hundred years. By this expression w e really mean only som ething temporal. In con trast to this very com m on usage, which is very instructive for further thought, w e w ill give the com posite "Z eitra u m a meaning that is designed to indicate the inner unity of space and time. Thereby, the real question applies to the and. That w e name tim e first, that w e say Zeitraum and not Raumzeit, should indicate that tim e plays a special
17
role in this question. But that should not mean at all that space can be deduced from time or that it is som ething secondary to it. The question "W h at is a thing? includes in itse lf the question: "W h at is Zeitraum (tim e-sp an )?", the puzzling unity of space and time w ithin w hich, as it seem s, the basic character of things, to be only this one, is deter mined. We w ill not escape the question about the essence of space and time, because im m ediately so m any doubts arise regarding the distinguishing mark w e gave of the thingness o f the thing. We said: Place and time point make even absolutely identical things just these (je diesen), i.e., different ones. But are space and time at all determ inations of the thing itse lf? The things, as w e say, are indeed w ithin space and time. Space and time arc a frame, an ordering realm , w ith the help o f which we establish and indicate the place and time point o f the particular things. It might be, therefore, that each thing, if it is determined w ith respect to place and time, is now ju st this (je d ieses), not m istakable for any other. How ever, these are only determ inations w hich are externally brought to and at a thing through the space-tim e relation. As yet, nothing is said about the thing itse lf or what makes it to be this one. We easily see that behind these difficulties hides the principal question: Are space and time only a fram e for the things, a system o f co-ordinates which we lay out in order to reach sufficiently exact state ments about things, or are space and time som ething else? Is the relation to them ol the thing not this external one? (Compare D escartes.)'
. Descartes identifies space or internal place with the body |1 .1 Ci.,<,ccuP*es it: For, in truth, the same extension in length, Th'i a,K* depth, which constitutes space, constitutes body. ih ^ lsllncl,on wo rnake is only a conceptual one; extension being i o Wn. lmwn j actor. individualized in the case of body, but given ]01 !i l,m t' ' n *!lc ease ol space. For this reason Descartes s lie notion of the vacuum. ( The Principles of Philosophy,
11
18
According to the everyday manner w e are used to, w e look at w hat is around us. We can notice: this chalk is white; this wood is hard; the door is closed. But such statem ents do not carry us to the goal. We w an t to look at the things w ith respect to their thingness, therefore for what presum ably characterizes a ll things and each thing. When w e look at them w ith respect to this w e find that things are singular: one door, one piece o f chalk, one blackboard, etc. Being singular is obviously a general, uni versally applicable ch aracteristic (Z u g ) o f things. If w e look more closely, w e even discover that these single things are ju st these (je d iese): this door, this chalk, this now and here, not those o f classroom six and not the ones from last semester. Thus, we already have an answ er to our question "W h at is a thing? A thing is alw ays a this one (je d ieses). We now seek to understand more precisely wherein this essential ch aracteristic of the thing co n sists. The above named ch aracteristic o f the things, that they are alw ays these (je d iese), stands in conjunction w ith space and time. Through its particular space and tim e point, each thing is un m istakably this one and not another. However, some doubts arise as to whether w ith such a reference to space and time w e are saying anything about the thing itself. Such statem en ts about the place and time point after all concern only the fram e w ithin w hich things stand
Part II, Principles X-XVI, E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, trans.. The Philosophical Works of Descartes [N. Y.: Dover Publications, 1955], 2 vols., 1, 259-62.) In Meditation III and in his reply to P. Gassendis objections, Descartes asserts the doctrine of continual creation, based on his belief that the moments of time are discrete. Thus he asserts: ". . . that the single moments of this time can be separated from their neighbours, i.e., that a thing which endures through individ ual moments may cease to exist. ( I b i d II, 219; 1, 163, 164.) Descartes, therefore, identifies both space and time with the existent thing. Both are considered as external in their relation to the thing only because of the w ay we conceptually give them generic unity. Trans.
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and how, that is to say where and when, they happen to stand w ithin it. One could point out that each thing as far as w e know things has its space-tim e-position ( Raum -Zeit-Stelle), and that this relation o f the thing to space and tim e is not som ething arbitrary. Do things necessarily stand within this space-tim e-relation ( Raum Zeit-Bezug), and w hat is the b asis for this necessity? Does this b a sis lie in the things them selves? If this were the case, then the aforementioned ch aracteristic would have to assert som ething about things them selves, about the being-a-thing ( D ingsein ). First, however, we have the im pression that space and time are som ething outside o f things. Or does this im pression deceive us? Let us look more closely: this piece o f chalk, the room better, the space o f the classroom lies around this thing, if w e m ust speak o f a lying around. We say that this piece of chalk takes up a certain space. This space is delim ited by the surface o f the piece of chalk. Su rface? Plane? The piece o f chalk itse lf is ex tended. The space is not only around it, but directly in it, even within it; but this space is occupied, filled up. The chalk itself co n sists inwardly o f space. After all, w e say the chalk takes up this space, encloses this space by its surface, in itself, as its interior. Therefore, for the chalk, this space is not a mere exterior frame. But w hat does interior mean here? What does the interior o f the chalk look like? Let us sec. We break it into tw o pieces. Are we now at the interior? Exactly as before w e are again out side. Nothing has changed. The pieces o f chalk are sm aller, but bigger or sm aller does not m atter now. The surfaces where it is broken are less sm ooth than the rest the surface, but that does not m atter. The moment we 'anted to open the chalk by breaking it, to grasp the in terior, it had enclosed itself again. And we could continue 1 iis action until the piece ol chalk had becom e a little pile powder. Under a m agnifying glass and a m icroscope " e could still break up these tiny grains. Where this lim it
c f.ouA
20
IS
A T H I N G ?
o f such a "m e ch a n ica l" division lies cannot be clearly de termined. In any case, such breaking up never yields any thing but w hat w a s already here, from which it started. Whether this piece o f chalk is four centim eters or .004 m illim eters only m akes a difference in how much but not in what (essen ce). Following this m echanical division w e could carry out a chem ical-m olecular analysis. We could even go behind that, to the atom ic structure of the m olecules. But a c cording to the starting point of our question, w e w ant to remain in the realm o f the things im m ediately around us. But even if w e go the w a y of chem istry and physics, we never reach beyond the sphere o f m echanics, that is, be yond such a spatial sphere wherein m atter m oves from place to place or rests in one place. On the b a sis of the results o f our present atom ic p hysics since N iels Bohr exhibited his model o f the atom (1913) the relations between m atter and space are no longer so sim ple, although fundam entally still the same. What keeps a place oc cupied, takes up space, m ust itself be extended. Dm- qn cstion has been what the interior of a physical body looks lik e; m ore exactly, the space there. The result is: this interior is alw ays again an exterior lor the sm aller andl s m aller particles. fj Meanwhile, our piece o f chalk has become a little pile^ o f powder. Even if w e assum e that nothing o f the m atter has escaped, that the full amount is still here, it is no longer our chalk, i.e., w e can no longer w rite w ith it on the blackboard. We could accept that. But w e cannot ac cept that w e could not find the space w e looked for in the interior o f the chalk, the space w hich belongs to the chalk itself. But, perhaps w e did not reach for it fast enough. Let us break the piece o f chalk again! The surface where it is broken and the pieces o f surface are now the exterior. But this piece of surface which w as ju st previously "in terior is exactly that piece o f surface delim iting the grains of chalk, and it w a s alw ays the exterior o f these
21
pieces o f chalk. Where does the interior begin and the ex terior end? Does the chalk con sist of space? Or is the space alw ays a container, som ething o f an enclosure, of which the chalk co n sists, o f that w hich the chalk itself is? The chalk only fills space; a place is alw ays placed into the thing. This placing in o f space tells us exactly that the space rem ains outside. W hatever occupies space alw ays form s the border between an outside and an inside. But the interior is really only an exterior lying farther back. (S trictly speaking, there is no outside or inside w ithin space itse lf.) But where in the world would there be an outside and inside, if not in space? Perhaps, however, space is only the p o ssib ility o f outside and inside but it self neither an interior nor an exterior. The statem ent "S p ace is the p ossib ility of inside and ou tside might be true. What w e call "p o ssib ility ( M glich keit ) is still rather indefinite. P o ssib ility can mean many things. We are not of the opinion that w e have decided w ith such a statem ent the question o f the relation between the thing and space. Perhaps the question has not yet been suffi ciently posed. Up to now w e have not considered that space w hich especially concerns such things as this chalk, as well as w riting tools and im plem ents in general, which we call the storeroom (equipm ent room: Zeugraum ). We were concerned to reflect on whether space and time are "exterio r to things or not. Yet it becam e evident that the space w hich appears m ost likely to be w ithin things is som ething exterior when viewed from the physi cal thing and its particles. Still more exterior to things is timeXThe chalk here also has its tim es: the time point ( Zeitp u n kte ) now in which flu chalk is here, and this next now when it is there. With ho question concerning space there still appeared some prospects of finding it w ithin the thing itself. But even iliis is not the case with time. Time runs over things as a n o o k passes over rocks. Perhaps not even in this way, because, in the movement of the w aters, the rocks are
22
WIIAT
IS A T H I N G ?
pushed and driven so that they rub and polish each other. The movement of time, however, leaves things untouched. That the tim e now advances from 5:15 to 6:00 does nothing to the chalk. We do say "w ith time or "w ith the p assin g" o f tim e things are changing. It is even said that the ill-famed "to o th of time is nibbling on things. That things are changing in the passing o f time is not to be de nied. But did anyone ever observe how time nibbles at things, that is, generally speaking, how time goes to work on things? But perhaps time is identifiable only w ith som e out standing things. We know such things: clocks. They show' the time. Let us look at this clock. Where is tim e? We see the figures and the hands which move, but not time. We can open a clock and examine it. Where here is tim e? But this clock does not give the time im m ediately. This clock is set according to the German Observatory in Hamburg. If w e were to travel there and ask the people w'here they have the time, we would be ju st as w ise as before our journey. If, therefore, w e cannot even find time on that thing which sh ow s time, then it actually seem s to have nothing to do w ith things them selves. On the other hand, it is after all not m erely empty talk when w e say that w e can tell the time w ith the help o f clocks. If we deny this, where would that lead? Not only the schedule o f everyday life would fall to pieces, but every technical calculation would also becom e im possible; history, every memory, and every decision would be gone. And yet, in what relation do things stand to tim e? With every attem pt to determine this, the im pression is re newed more strongly than before that space and tim e are only perceptual realm s for things, indifferent toward these but useful in assigning every thing to its space-timeposition. Where and how these perceptual realm s really are rem ains open. But this much is certain: only on ac count o f this position do particular things becom e ju st
23
these (je diesen). And there is then, after all, at least the p ossib ility o f m any sam e things. Precisely when w e look at the question from things them selves and not from their fram e o f reference, each thing is not un m istakably a sin gle one (je d ieses); it is that only w ith respect to space and time. Now, it is true that one o f the greatest German thinkers, Leibniz, has denied that there ever could be tw o identical things. Leibniz established, w ith regard to this, a special principle w hich ruled throughout this philos ophy, o f which today w e hardly have an idea. It is the principium id entitatis indiscer nib ilium, the principle of the identity o f indiscernible things. The principle states: Two indistinguishable things, i.e., tw o alike things, cannot be tw o things but m ust be the sam e, i.e., one thing. Why, we ask ? The reason Leibniz gives is ju st as essential for the fundam ental principle as for his entire b a sic philo sophical system . Two alike things cannot be tw o, i.e., each is irreplaceably this one (je d ieses) because tw o alike things cannot exist at all. Why not? The being o f things is their creation by God, as understood in the Christian theological interpretation. If there ever were tw o alike things, then God had tw ice created the sam e, i.e., sim ply repeating som ething eternal. Such a superficially me chanical deed, however, contradicts the com pleteness of the absolute Creator, the perfectio Dei. Therefore, there can never be tw o alike things, by reason o f the essence of being, in the sense o f being created. This principle is based here upon certain more or less explicit principles and basic perceptions o f w hat is in general and the being ol that; moreover, upon certain conceptions of the perfec tion o f creation and production in general. VVe are not now sufficiently prepared to take our stand \\ith respect to the principle expressed by Leibniz and its oundation. It is necessary alw ays to see again to what i-'ngths the question "W h at is a thing? im m ediately eads. It could be that this theological argument of the
24
W H A T IS T H I N G ?
principle is im possible for us, even disregarding the ques tion of the dogm atic truth o f Christianity. However, one thing rem ains certain; in fact, it now first com es to light that the question concerning the character of the being of \ things, to be singular and "th is one, is com pletely and en, 'tir e ly hung up in the question concerning being. Does be ing still mean to us being created by God? If not, what then? Does being no longer mean anything at all to us, so that w e are only staggering around in a confusion? Who can decide how it stands w ith being and Ks determina tion? But w e first ask only about the proxim ate things around us. They show them selves as singular and as ju st these." From our reference to Leibniz, w e concluded that the character of the things, to be ju st these, could be based on the being o f things them selves and not only w ith reference to their position in space and time. 6. The Thing as Just This One ( jc d ieses) But w e shall let alone the question from where the character o f a thing as ju st this one is determined, and pose a still more prelim inary question, which is wrapped in the preceding one. We said that the single things around us are ju st these. When w e say o f som ething which encounters us that it is this, are w e saying anything about the thing itse lf at all? This, namely, the one here, i.e., that which we now point out. In th is lies a pointing, a referring. We in d i-* cate som ething to the others who are w ith us, w ith whom we are together. It is a reference w ithin the range of the here this one here, this here. The th is means, more precisely, here in our im m ediate neighborhood; w hile we alw ays mean som ething more distant by that, but still w ithin the range of the here and there this here, that there. The Latin language has in this connection still sharper distin ction s. Hie means "th is here, iste means
25
"th a t there. Ille means "th a t far aw ay, the Greek ei by w hich the poets intend what is at the periphery w hat we call the ulterior (Jen seitig e). In gram m ar such w ords as "th is and "th a t are called dem onstratives, for these w ords dem onstrate, they point at. . . . The general verbal character o f these reference words com es to expression in the term dem onstrative pronoun (Fr-w rter). The Greeks said , w hich became the standard for W estern gram m ar (, ). In this designation o f such w ords a s "th is and "th a t lies a quite definite explanation and interpretation ) of their essence. The interpretation is indeed significant for W estern gram m ar (w hich, in spite of everything, still governs us today). Yet it is m isleading. The name "p ro noun (F iir-w o rt ), considering a word as a noun (nom en), a name (N am e) and substantive, means that such w ords as " th is take the place of substantives. It is true that they clo this, yet it is only what they do also. We speak o f the chalk but do not alw ays use the name, using instead the expression " th is . However, such a su bstitu ting role is not the original essence of the pronoun; its naming func tion is more prim ordial. We grasp it im m ediately when we remember that the article "th e is derived from the dem onstrative words. It is custom ary to place the article before the substantive. The naming reference o f the arti cle alw ays goes beyond the noun. The naming o f the sub stantive itse lf a lw a y s occurs on the basis o f a pointingout. This is a "d em on stration , exhibiting the encoun tered and the present-at-hand. The function of naming, '\liie h is performed in the dem onstrative, belongs to the most prim ordial w ay of speaking in general. It is not ' merely a substitu tion, i.e., not a second or later order o f expression. lo consider w hat has been said is im portant for the coi i ect evaluation o f the "th is . It is som ehow included in '- 'e iy naming as such. Insofar as things confront us, they >-ome into the character o f " th is . But thereby w e are say-
ing that the " t h is " is not ch aracteristic o f the thing itself. The " t h is " takes the thing only in sofar as it is an object of a dem onstration. Those speaking and thinking, however, who use such dem onstrative w ords, i.e., human beings, are alw ays single su bjects. The "th is , instead o f being a ... character o f the thing itself, is only a su bjective addition on our part. 7. Subjective-O bjective. The Question o f Truth To see how little, indeed, is said b y the statem ent that "th is is only a "su b je c tiv e determ ination o f the thing is recognizable from the fact that w e are ju st as ju stified in calling it "o b je ctiv e , for objectum means som ething thrown against you. The th is" m eans a thing in sofar as it faces us, i.e., it is objective. W hat a " th is is does not de pend upon our caprice and our pleasure. But even if it de pends on us, it also equally depends upon the things. This only is clear, that such determ inations as the "th is, which w e use in the everyday experience o f the things, are not as self-evident as they m ay appear to be. It re m ains absolu tely questionable w hich kind o f truth con cerning the thing is contained in the determ ination o f it as a "th is . T t is questionable which kind o f truth in general w e have of things in our daily exncrience. whether it i s su bjective or objective, whether both together or neither. Up to now w e have only seen that beyond the sphere of daily experiences the things also stand in different truths (the sun o f the shepherd and o f the astrop h ysicist, the ordinary table and the scientific ta b le ). Now it becom es clear that the truth about the sun for the shepherd, the truth about the ordinary table, e.g., the determ ination this sun and "th is tab le this truth about the th is rem ains opaque in its essence. How shall w e ever say som ething about the thing w ithout being sufficiently in
27
structed about the kind o f truth which is proper to it? At the sam e time w e can state the opposite question: How are w e to know som ething about the essential truth o f the thing if w e do not know the thing itse lf to determine w hat kind of truth can and m ust be proper to it? It is now clear: to go straight to the things cannot be carried out, not because w e shall be stopped on the w ay but because those determ inations at which w e arrive and which we attribute to the things them selves space, time, and " th is present them selves as determ inations w hich do not belong to the things them selves. On the other hand, w e cannot invoke the comm on an sw er which says that if determ inations are not "o b je c tive they are "siih fep tive T l ronld he that tl-iey -arp neither, that the distinction betw een su b je c t and o b je ct. and w ith it the su b je ct-object relationship itself, is a highly questionable, though generally favored, sphere of retreat for philosophy. Hardly a gratifying position so it seem s. There is no information about the thingness of the thing without knowledge of the kind of truth in which the thing stands. But there is no inform ation about this truth o f the thing without knowledge o f the thingness o f the thing whose truth is in question. Where are w e to get a foothold? The ground slip s aw ay under us. Perhaps w e are already close to falling into the well. At any rate the housem aids are already laughing. And what if only w e ourselves are these housem aids, i.e., I we have secretly discovered that all this talk of the his, as well as sim ilar discussions, is fantasy and empty! rhe w orst, however (not for our daily livelihood but loi philosophy), would be if w e wanted to escape from t ie d^ve bad position by trying to steal aw ay on some andestine path. We could say: our everyday experiences a i s t " reliable; this chalk is this chalk, and I take it if I
28
need it and leave it aside if I do not. This is as clear as day, certainly, if w e are concerned about daily use. But now it is a question of w hat the thingness o f this thing is and w hether the " t h is is a true ch aracteristic o f the thing itself. Perhaps w e still have not understood the " th is su f ficiently clearly. We renew our question o f whence and how the truth o f a thing as a " ju s t th is (je d ieses) is de termined. Here w e come upon an observation w hich Hegel has already made in his Phenomenology of Mind.1 ' To be sure, the approach (A n satz), level (E ben e), and in tention (A b sich t) of Hegels w ay of thinking are o f a different kind. The suspicion arose that a things ch aracteristic as "ju s t th is is only subjective, since this ch aracteristic de pends on the standpoint o f the experiencing individual and the time point in which, on the part o f the su bject, the experience o f a thing happens to be made. Why is the chalk "ju s t th is and no other? Only because it is ju st right here now. The "h ere and the "n o w m ake it to be " th is ." W ith the dem onstrative ch aracteristic " t h is w e refer to the "h ere, i.e., to a place, to a space, and, equally, to the now, i.e., time. We already know this, at least in general. Let us now pay special attention to the truth about the chalk: "H ere is the ch alk. That is a truth; the here and the now hereby characterize the chalk so that w e em phasize by saying: the chalk, which means "th is . However, this is alm ost too obvious, alm ost offen1 1It is interesting to compare Heideggers analysis of "th is with that of Hegel, whom he apparently has in mind throughout this section. For Hegel, at the level of sensory experience, "pure being breaks into "th ise s": " I on the one hand and "o b je c t on the other. Together they make up "th e This. The This exists in the twofold form of the Now and the Here. But Hegel wants to estab lish that the Now and Here, as well as the This, are Universals. It is not the individual thing that continues to maintain itself but the NJow and Here. (G. F. Y V . Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, J. B. Baillie, trans. [2nd ed.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1949], section A, 1, 151-52.) Trans.
Various W avs o f Questioning About the Thing
29
sively self-evident. But w e want to do som ething more and elaborate still further the self-evident truth about the chalk. We even w ant to w rite down this truth about the chalk to avoid losing this great valuable. For this purpose w e take a scrap o f paper and w e w rite the truth down: "H ere is the ch alk. We lay this written statem ent beside the thing o f w hich it is the truth. After the lecture is finished both doors are opened, the cla ss room is aired, there w ill be a draft, and the scrap o f paper, let us suppose, w ill flutter out into the corridor. A student finds it on his w ay to the cafeteria, reads the sentence "H ere is the ch alk, and ascertains that this is not true at all. Through the draft the truth has become an untruth. Strange~Tttat a LiUth should"depend on n i?ust of w in d . U sually- philosophers tell each other that the truth is something w hich is valid in itself, which is beyond tim e and is eternal, and w oe to him who says that truth is not eternal. That means relativism , which teaches that everything is only relatively true, only partly true, and that nothing is fixed any longer. Such doctrines are called nihilism. N ihilism , nothingness, philosophy o f anxiety, tragedy, unheroic, philosophy of care and woe the cata log of these cheap titles is inexhaustible. Contemporary man shudders at such titles, and, w ith the help o f the shudder thus evoked, the given philosophy is contra dicted. What wonderful tim es when even in philosophy one need no longer think, but where someone somewhere, occasionally, on higher authority, cares to provide shud dering! And now the truth should even depend on a draft! Should it? I ask whether perhaps it is not so. But finally, this sim ply depends upon the fact that we lave w ritten only half o f the truth and entrusted it to an unstable scrap o f paper. Here is the chalk and right l,ou' We w ant to define this "n o w more exactly. So that w iitten truth w ill not be exposed to the draft, w e in tend to put the truth about the "n o w ," and thus about
30
the chalk, on a blackboard. Now when now ? We w rite on the blackboard: "N o w it is afternoon. All right, ju st now, this afternoon. We suppose that after the lecture the classroom w ill be locked up so that no one can creep to the w ritten truth and secretly fa lsify it. Only early the next morning the custodian is permitted to enter and to clean the blackboard. He reads the truth: "N o w it is after noon." And he finds that the statem ent is untrue and that this professor has made a m istake. The truth becam e an untruth overnight. W hat a rem arkable truth! All the more rem arkable since every time w e w ant sure inform ation about the chalk, it itse lf is here and alw ays now here, a thing present here and now. W hat changes is alw avs only fl ^'i.-rmina. tion o f the here and "n o w . and, accordingly, o f the thing. But the chalk remains a lw a v s n Thotyfpi-r in spite o f everything, these determ inations belong to>the v '. lH7r?g_iIseit The " t h is " is a general charnctcrisLte- f the T thing and belongs to its thingness. But the generality o f the th is" demands g en erattystw ays to be determined as particular ( je w eilig e ). The chalk could not be for us w hat it is, that is, " a chalk, i.e., "th is ch alk and no other, were it not alw ays a now and here. Of course, w e shall say that fo r us the chalk is alw ays a " th is ." But w e finally want to know w hat the chalk is fo r itself. For this purpose we have made the truth about the chalk independent o f us and have entrusted it to a scrap o f paper and the b lack board. And observe: while in truth som ething about the chalk itse lf w a s to be truly preserved, th> % into untruth. 't his gives us a hint for approaching the truth about the chalk in another w ay, nam ely, instead o f entrusting this truth to a scrap o f paper or to the blackboard, to keep it w ith us, to guard it much more carefully than w e have so far done, whereby w e drop our peculiar fear be fore su b jectivism or perhaps even endure it. So it could be that the more w e understand the truth about the chalk as
31
our truth, the more w e com e closer to w hat the chalk itself is. It has been shown to us more than once that the truth about a thing is connected w ith space and time. Therefore, w e also may suspect that w e shall come closer to the thing itse lf if we penetrate into the essence o f space and time, although it alw ays again appears as though space and time are only a fram e for the thing. Finally, the question shall arise whether the truth con cerning the thing is only som ething that is carried to the thing and pinned on it w ith the help o f a scrap o f paper or whether, on the contrary, the thing itse lf hangs within the truth, ju st as it does in space and time, whether the truth is not such that it neither depends on the thing, nor lies in us, nor stands som ewhere in the sky. All our reflections up to now have presum ably led to no other conclusion than that w e do not yet know either the ins or outs of the thing and that w e only have a great confusion in our heads. Certainly, that w a s the intention of course, not to leave us in this confusion, but to let us know that this happy-go-lucky advance toward the things has its special circum stances in the moment. Therein we w ish to know how it is w ith the thingness o f the thing. If we now remember our position at the beginning, we can determine, on the b a sis o f our intentional and pecu liar questioning back and forth, w hy w e have not come closer to the thing itself. We began w ith the statem ent: hings around us are single, and these single things are ju st these." With this latter ch aracteristic w e reached the realm of reference to the things; seen in reverse: the lealin of how things meet us. Reference and encounter that means generally the realm in which we, the alleged su bjects, also reside. When we attem pt to grasp this realm we alw ays run into space and time. We called it "tim e''Pace, which m akes reference and encounter possible. !> s is the realm which lies around things and m anifests tself in the com pulsive bringing up o f space and time.
32
W HAT
IS A T H I N G ?
8. The Thing as the Bearer of Properties Perhaps w e can never experience anything concerning things and make out anything about them except as we remain in the realm in which they encounter us. Mean while, w e cannot get loose from the question whether or not we approach the things them selves, at least w ithin this realm, whether in it w e aren't alw ays already w ith them. If this is so, then starting from here we shall make out som ething about the things them selves, i.e., w e shall acquire som e conception ( V orstellung ) of how they themselves are constructed. It is decidedly ad visable to dis regard the frame around things and look exclusively at their construction. In any case, this w ay exerts as strong a claim as the previous one. We again ask: "W h at is a thing? How does a thing lo o k ?" Though w e are looking for the thingness o f the thing, w e now cau tiously go to w ork, stopping first at the single things, looking at them, and holding fast to w hat is seen. A rock it is hard, gray, and has a rough surface; it has an irregular form, is heavy, and co n sists o f this and that substance. A plant it has roots, a stem , foliage. The latter is green and grooved. The stem o f the foliage is short, etc. An anim al has eyes and ears and can move from place to place; it has, in addition to the sense organs, equipment for digestion and sexual reproduction or gans w hich it uses, generates, and renews in a certain way. Along w ith the plant, which also has organs, we call this thing an organism . A w atch has gears, a spring, a dial, etc. In this w a y we could continue indefinitely. What we ascertain thereby is correct. The statem en ts w e make are taken from a faithful fitting to w h at things them selves show us. We now ask more definitely: As w hat do the things show them selves to us? We disregard that they are a rock, rose, dog, w atch , and other things and only con sider w hat things are in general: a thing is alw ays some-
33
thing that has such and such properties, alw ays som e thing that is constituted in such and such a way. This som ething is the bearer o f the properties; the something, as it were, underlies the qualities. This som ething is what endures, and w e alw ays return to it again as the sam e when we are in the process o f determining the qualities. This is how things them selves are. What accordingly is a thing? It is a nucleus around which many changing quali ties are grouped, or a bearer upon w hich the qu alities rest; som ething that p ossesses som ething else in itself (an sich ). However we tw ist and turn it, this is how the construction o f things sh ow s itself; and around them are space and time, as their fram e. This is all so intelligible and self-evident that one alm ost shuns lecturing expressly on such com m onplaces. All is so very plain that one does not understand w hy we m ake such a fu ss and still talk about th is and about questionable m etaphysical prin ciples, about steps o f truth and so forth. We said that the inquiry ought to move w ithin the realm o f everyday ex perience. W hat is closer than to take things as they are? We could continue the description o f the things still fur ther and say: If one thing changes its qualities, this can have an effect upon another thing. Things affect each other and resist one another. From such relations be tween things further qu alities then derive which things also again "h a v e ." This description of things and their interdependence corresponds to w hat w e call the "natural conception of the w orld. "N a tu ra lly since here w e remain com pletely "n a tu r a l" and disregard all the profound m eta physics and extravagant and useless theories about knowledge. We remain "n a tu ra l and also leave to things themselves their own "n atu re. I we now allo w philosophy to join in, and we question it becom es clear that philosophy too from ancient t'nies has said nothing else. That the thing is a bearer of many qualities w a s already said by Plato and above all by
34
A ristotle. Later on perhaps it w a s expressed in other w ords and concepts. However, b a sica lly the meaning is alw ays the same, even when the philosophical "p o sitio n s are as different as, for instance, those of A ristotle and Kant. Thus, Kant states in the Critique o f Pure Reason (A 182: N.K.S., p. 212)7 as a principle: All appearances (i.e., all the things for u s) contain the permanent (su b stan ce) a s the object itself, and the changeable as its mere determ ination, that is, as a w ay in which the object ex ists. W hat then is a thing? Answer: A thing is the existing ( vorhanden ) bearer o f m any existing ( vorhanden) yet changeable properties. This answ er is so "n a tu ra l that it also dom inates scien tific thought, not only "th e o retical thought but also all intercourse w ith things, their calculation and evaluation. We can retain the traditional determ ination of the essence o f the thingness o f things in the fam iliar and usual titles:
1. ---- <!
Foundation ( U nterlage) w hat alw ays already (w h at un derlies) stands along w ith , and also com es in along with 2. Su bstan tia accidens 3. The bearer ( Trger) properties ( E igen sch aften ) 4. S u bject predicate
7 References to the Critique of Pure Reason accord with Raymund Schmidt, Philosophische Bibliothek (Hamburg: Verlag Meiner, 1956). In the Preface to the fourteenth edition, written in 1930, Schmidt expresses his special thanks to E. Franck in Mar burg, Norman Kemp Smith in Edinburgh, and M. Heidegger in Freiburg for their valuable suggestions. A refers to the first edi tion and "B to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. "N.K.S. refers to the translation by Norman Kemp Sm ith (Lon don, 1929). References to quotations Heidegger utilizes from the Critique of Pure Reason remain in the text as they were originally placed. Occasionally we have given translations in footnotes when Heidegger has given only references. Trans. 8 im oKcievoi. Derived from (. In ancient philosophy
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9. The E ssen tial Construction of the Truth, the Thing, and the Proposition The qu estion "W h at is a thing?^has long been decidcd w ith '. ^ tisfaction. i.e.. tn e qucstion is obviously no 1 fn ~ i{ " n m in io n Moreover, the answ er to the question, i.e., the definition of the thing as the present-at-hand ( vorhanden ) bearer of properties present-at-hand on it, has been established (and in its truth is at any tim e capable o f being estab lished) in such a w ay that it cannot be improved upon. For the establishing is also n atural and, therefore, so fam il iar that one m ust especially em phasize it even to notice it. Wherein lies this b a sis for the truth o f the fam iliar de termination o f the essence o f the thing? Answer: In noth ing less than the essence of truth itself. Truth w hat does it mean? The true is w hat is valid; w hat is valid cor responds to the facts. Som ething corresponds to the facts when it is directed to them, i.e., when it fits itse lf to what the things them selves are. Truth, therefore, is fitting (Anm essung) to things. Obviously, not only do single truths have to suit them selves to single things, but the essence of truth m ust also. If truth is correctness, a directing-to ( Sich-richten ) . . . then this m ust obviously be really valid
< ((> signified the foundation in which something else could inhere, also what is implied or presupposed by something else. But at least three senses must be distinguished: (1) C X ij (m atter), he substrate that received form. The so-called material cause (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 983 30); (2) the substance, including matter and form, in which the accidents (! ) inhere (ibid., 9831 , 16). It is interesting that Aristotle says of the substance: -, ovaill roSt n -, ' ( M etaphysics, 1037b 28). For substance means a one and a this, as we m aintain." (The Hasic Works of Aristotle, Richard McKeon, ed. [New York: Ran dom House, 1941], p. 803.) See also the comment of W. D. Ross on his passage in A ristotle's M etaphysics (Oxford, 1953), II, 205; (3) he logical subject to which attributes and properties are predi cated (M etaphysics, 103' 5). ih takes account of (2) and (3) only. He uses Trger, ie bearer, as the most general term to include all that tradionally w as meant by the \ *vov and substantia. Traits.
36
W H A T
IS
A T H I N G ?
all the more for the essential determ ination o f the truth. It m ust fit itse lf to the essence o f the thing (its thingness). It is necessary from the essence o f truth as fitting that the structure o f things be reflected in the structure of truth. If w e thus come upon the sam e fram ework ( Gefge ) in the essential structure (W esen sbau ) o f truth as in the es sential structure of the things, then the truth o f the fam il iar determ ination of the essential structure of the thing is demonstrated from the essence of truth itself. Truth is a fitting tt^ lii^ s, j^ jjui^ ^ ndenee ( Ubereinstinim uhgTwnit the things. But w hat is now the character of what fits itscnTTVnaTdoes the corresponding? What is this about w hich w e say it m ay be true or false? Just as it is "n a tu ra l to understand truth as correspondence to the things, so w e naturally determine w hat is true or false. The truth w hich w e find, establish , dissem inate, and defend we express in words. But a single word such as door, chalk, large, but, and is neither true nor false. Only com bina tions o f w ords are true or false: The door is closed; the chalk is white. Such a com bination of words is called a sim ple assertion. Such an assertion is cither true or false. The assertion is thus the place and seat of the truth. There fore, w e likew ise sim ply say: This and that assertion are truths. A ssertion s are truths and falsities. What is the structure o f such a truth as assertion ? What is an assertion ? The name assertion is ambiguous. We distinguish four meanings, all o f w hich belong together, and only in this unity, as it were, do they give a complete outline o f the structure o f an assertion: assertion s of ( Aussagen von) proposition (S a tz ) assertion s about (Aussagen ber) inform ation (A u sk u n ft ) assertion s to (Aussagen an ) com m unication (M itteilun g) to declare oneself (Sich expression Aussprechen) (A usd ruck) Someone called to court as a w itn ess refuses to give a
37
deposition (A u ssage), i.e., in the first place, he does not speak out, he keeps w hat he know s to him self. Here asser tion means com m unicating, speaking out into the open, in contrast to silent concealm ent (V erschweigung). If the assertion is made it does not consist m ostly of single in coherent words, but is a report (B erich t). The w itness who decides to give a deposition tells (erzh lt). In this report the state o f facts is asserted. The assertions set forth the event, e.g., w hat occurred and the circum stances o f a ju st observed burglary attem pt. The w itn ess asserts: The house lay in darkness, the shutters were closed, etc. The assertion in the wider sense o f com m unication con sists o f "a sse r tio n s in the narrower sense, i.e., o f proposi tions. Asserting som ething in the narrower sense does not mean speaking out, but it means telling inform ation about the house, its condition, and the entire state o f things. To assert now means in view o f the situation and circum stances to say som ething about it from them, as seen from their point o f view . Assertion, that is giving information about. . . . This inform ation is given in such a w ay that assertions are made about what is under consideration, about which inform ation is given. Thirdly, assertion means to talk starting from that which is under consid eration, e.g., from the house, to take what belongs to the house, to attribu te to it w hat properly belongs to it, to ascribe it, bespeak it. What is asserted in this sense we call the predicate. Assertion in the third sense is predica tive ; it is the proposition. Assertion, therefore, is threefold: a proposition giving information and w hich, when carried out vis--vis others, becom es com m unication.0 This com m unication is correct
Compare this summary of the threefold character of asser with -S'/, p. 156: When we take together the three analyzed "leanings of assertion in a unified view of the complete phenome non. we may define assertion as a com municative and determinave pointing out. Sein und Zeit (Tubingen: Max Niemever, 1957), symbolized by "S Z . Trans.
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when the inform ation is right, i.e., if the proposition is true. The assertion as a proposition, as an assertion o f "a , b of H, is the scat of truth. In the structure of the propo sition, i.e., o f a sim ple truth, we distinguish su bject, predi cate, and copula object, assertion, and connective ( Satz gegenstnd, Satzaussage, und Verbindungswort). Truth co n sists in the predicates belonging to the su bject and is posited and asserted in the proposition as belonging. The structure and the structural parts o f the truth, i.e., of the true proposition (object and assertion ), are exactly fitted to that by w hich truth as such guides itse lf to the thing as the bearer and to its properties. Thus we take from the essence of truth, i.e., of the struc ture o f the true proposition, an unambiguous proof for the truth o f the definition which gives the things struc ture. If w e survey again all that characterizes the answ er to our question What is a thing?" then w e can establish three aspects: 1. The definition of the thing as the bearer o f properties results quite "n a tu ra lly out of everyday experience. 2. This definition of thingness w a s established in an cient philosophy, obviously because it suggests itse lf quite "n a tu rally ." 3. The correctness o f this definition o f the essence o f the thing is finally proved and grounded through the es sence of truth itself, which essence o f truth is likew ise in telligible o f itself, i.e., is "n a tu ral. A question which is answered in such a natural w ay and can be grounded ju st as naturally at any time is seriously no longer a question. If one still wanted to m aintain the question it would be either blind obstin acy or a kind of insan ity w hich ventures to run up against the "n a tu ra l" an d w hat stands beyond all question. We shall do w ell to give up this question "W hat is a t hing?" as one that is settled. But before w e expressly give up this settled question, let us interject a question.
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10. The H istoricity (Geschichtlichkeit^ f the Definition of the Thing It w a s shown that the answ er to the question "W h at is a thing?" is the following: A thing is the bearer of proper ties, and the corresponding truth has its seat in the asser tion, the proposition, w hich is a connection o f subject and predicate. We said that this answ er as well as the reason for it is quite natural. We now only ask: W hat does "n a tu ra l mean here? We call "n a tu ra l ( n at rlich ) w hat is understood w ith out further ado and is self-evident in the realm of every day understanding. For instance, the internal construction of a big bom ber is by itse lf understandable for an Italian engineer, but for an Abyssinian from a remote mountain village such a thing is not at all "n atu ral. It is not selfevident, i.e., not understandable in com parison to any thing w ith which such a man and his tribe have everyday fam iliarity. For the Enlightenm ent the "n a tu ra l w as what could be proved and comprehended according to certain determ inate principles o f reason based upon it self, w hich w as, therefore, appropriate to every human as such and to mankind in general. In the Middle Ages every thing w a s "n a tu ra l which obtained its essence, its natura, from God and, because o f this origin, could then form and preserve itse lf in a definite mode w ithout fur ther intervention from God. What w as natural to a man of the eighteenth century, the rationality o f reason as such in general, set free from any other lim itation, would have seemed very unnatural to the m edieval man. Also the conrary could becom e the case, as w e know from the French Revolution. Therefore, it follow s: What is "n a tu ra l" is not natural at all, here meaning self-evident for any given ever-existing man. The "n a tu ra l is alw ays historical. A suspicion creeps up from behind us. What if this so natural appearing essential definition o f the thing were
40
WI I A T
IS
A T H I N G ?
by no m eans self-evident, were not "n a tu ra l ? Then there m ust have been a time when the essence o f the thing w as not defined in this way. Consequently, there also must have been a time when the essential definition o f the thing w a s first worked out. The form ation of this essential defi nition o f the thing did not, then, at som e time ju st fall absolute from heaven, but would have itse lf been based upon very definite presuppositions. This is in fact so. We can pursue the origin o f this es sential definition o f the thing in its main outline in Plato and Aristotle. Not only this, but at the sam e time and in the sam e connection w ith the disclosure o f the thing, the proposition as such w a s also first discovered and, sim i larly, that the truth as correspondence to the thing has its seat in the proposition. The so-called natural determ ina tion of the essence o f the truth from which w e have drawn a proof for the correctness of the essential defini tion o f the thing, this natural concept o f the truth is, therefore, not "n a tu ra l" without more ado. Therefore, the "n atu ral w orld -view " ( natrliche Welt ansicht ), to which w e have constan tly referred, is not selfevident. It rem ains questionable. In an outstanding sense this overworked term "n a tu ra l is something historical. So it could be that in our natural world-view w e have been dominated by a centuries-old interpretation of the thingness of the thing, w hile things actu ally encounter us quite differently. This answ er to our interjected question o f the meaning o f "n a tu ra l w ill prevent us from thoughtlessly taking the question "W h at is a thing? as settled. This question seem s only now to be becom ing more clearly de termined. The question itse lf has become a historical one. As we, apparently untroubled and unprejudiced, encoun ter things and say that they are the bearers of proper ties, it is not w e who are seeing and speaking but rather an old historical tradition. But why do w e not want to leave this history alone? It does not bother us. We can adjust ourselves quite easily w ith this conception o f things. And
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suppose we acknowledge the history o f the disclosure and interpretation of thingness of the thing? This changes nothing in the things: the streetcar goes no differently than before, the chalk is a chalk, the rose is a rose, the cat is a cat. We emphasized in the first hour that philosophy is that thinking w ith w hich w e can begin to do nothing immedi ately. But perhaps m ediately w e can, i.e., under certain conditions and in w ays no longer obviously seen as forged by philosophy and as capable o f being forged only bv it. Under certain conditions: if, for example, w e undertake the effort to think through the inner state of today's nat ural sciences, non-biological as well as biological, if we also think through the relation o f m echanics and technol ogy to our existence (D ase/;; V^then > hiv-i*nn* Hpiir thnt knowledge and qu estioning have here reached Ijm its which demonstrate that, Tn fact. an original reference to thjngs is m issing, that it is only sim ulated bv the progress ol discoveries and technical su cc e sse s." We feel that w hat zoology and botany investigate concerning anim als and plants and how they investigate it may be correct. But are they still anim als and p lants? Are they not m achines duly prepared beforehand o f w hich one afterw ard even adm its that they are "cleverer than w e ? We can, of course, spare ourselves the effort of thinking these paths through. We also can, furthermore, stick to what we find "n a tu ra l, that is, som ething w ith which one
1,1Dasein: Literally, being-there. It is a common German word applicable to the presence o f any thing. It is often trans'iterated in English. Heidegger's use of the term refers to m ans own unique way of existing in contrast to other entities. Trans. 1 1 In Die Frage nach der Technik (Pfullingen: Verlag Neske, 962), p. 13, Heidegger points out the danger in the progress of modern technology for man to misinterpret the meaning of tech n ology; . . endangered man boasts himself as the m aster of earth. Everything man encounters appears entirely as man-made. I 'w e y cr, true thinking leads one to see technology () as that which the forces of Nature are challenged to the revelation and unconcealedness of the truth {\,). Trans.
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thinks no further. Wo can take this thoughtlessness as a standard for the things. The streetcar then goes exactly as before. The decision s which are made or not made do not take place in the streetcar or on the m otorcycle, but som ewhere else that is, in the sphere o f historical free dom, i.e., where a historical being (D asein ) decides its ground, as well as how it decides, w hat level of freedom of knowledge it w ill choose and w hat it w ill posit as freedom. These decisions are different at differing periods and among different peoples. They cannot be forced. With the freely chosen level o f the actual freedom of knowledge, i.e., w ith the inexorableness o f questioning, a people al w ays p osits for itse lf the degree o f its being (D asein). The Greeks sa w the entire nobilitv of their existence in the a b ility to Question. I heir ability to qu estion w as their stand : n - r l fur His t i iiguishmg them selves [Tom those w ho did nnt li;ivi it nnd did not w an t it. They called them b arbarians. We can leave alone the question o f our knowledge about the things and suppose that som eday it w ill set itse lf right on its own. We can admire the achievem ents o f todays natural sciences and technology and need not know how they got that way, that, for instance, modern science only became p ossible by a dialogue carried on (out o f the earli est passion for questioning) w ith ancient knowledge, its concepts, and its principles. We need know nothing and can believe w e are such magnificent men that the Lord m ust have given it to us in our sleep. But w e can also be convinced o f the indispensability of questioning, which m ust exceed everything up to now in significance, depth, and certitude, because only in this w ay can we m aster w hat otherw ise races aw ay beyond us in its self-evidence. D ecisions are not made by proverbs but only by work. We decide to question, and in a very detailed and drawn out way, w hich for centuries rem ains only a questioning. Meanwhile, others can safely bring home their truths.
Various W avs o f Questioning About the Thing
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Oncc during his lone w a lk s N ietzsche w rote down the sen tence: "E n orm ous self-reflection! To becom e conscious not as an individual but as mankind. Let us reflect, let us think back: let us go all the sm all and the great w a y s! ( W ill to Power [W ille zur M ach t], 585). We go here only a sm all wr ay, the little w'ay o f the little question "W h at is a thing? We concluded that the defini-, tions which seem so self-evident arc not "n a tu ra l." The an sw ers w e give were already established in ancient times. When w e apparently ask about the thing in a natural and unbiased way, the question already expresses a prelim i nary opinion about the thingness o f the thing. H istory al ready speaks through the type o f question. We therefore say that this question is a historical one. Therein lies a definite direction for our purposes, should we desire to ask the question w ith sufficient understanding. W hat should w e do if the question is a historical one? And w'hat does "h isto r ic a l m ean? In the first place we only estab lish that the common answ er to the question about the thing stem s from an earlier, past time. We can estab lish that since that time the treatm ent o f this ques tion has gone through various although not earthshaking changes, so that different theories about the thing, about the proposition, and about the truth regarding the thing have regularly emerged through the centuries. Thereby it can be shown that the question and the answ er have, so to speak, their history, i.e., they already have a past. But this is ju st w hat w e do not mean when we say that the question What is a thing? is historical, because every report of he past, that is o f the prelim inaries to the question about the th ing, is concerned w ith som ething that is static. This kind of h istorical reporting ( historischen B erich ts ) is an explicit shutting down of history, whereas it is, after all, happening. We question h istorically if we ask what is still happening even if it seem s to be past. We ask w hat is s|ill happening and whether w e remain equal to this hap pening so that it can really develop.
44
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A T H I N G ?
Therefore, w e do not ask about opinions, view points, and propositions w hich appeared in earlier tim es about the thing in order to arrange them one after another, as in a museum o f w eapons where the javelin s are ordered by p articular centuries. We do not ask at all about the for mula and the definition o f the essence of the thing. These form ulas are only the residuum and sediment o f b asic po sition s taken by historical being (D asein ), toward, and in the m idst of, things taken as a whole, and w hich it took it self. However, w e ask about these b asic positions and about the happening in them and about the b asic move m ents o f human beings (D asein ) that have occurred, m ovements w hich apparently are no longer m ovem ents because they are past. But a movement need not be gone ju st because it cannot be established: it can also be in the s tate of quiescence ( Ruhe). W hat appears to us as though past, i.e.. sim ply as a happening that is no longer going on. can be quiescence And this quiescence can contain a fullness of being and reality ^ w h ich, in the end, essentially surpasses the reality of the real, in the sense ol the actual ( Aktuellen ). This quiescence of happening is not the absence o f his tory, InTnrtxisic lol'tll ol its presence, w hat we normally know as past, and tirst represent, is m ostly only the for m erlyâctu al,'' what once caused a stir or even made the noise w h ich alw ays belongs to history but which is not his tory nroner. What is merely past does not exhaust what has been. This still linn NHng, its " iiv '- 1 ^ -i pe cu 1iar qn iesconce o f a happening ol a kind detcrnlined in t urn by what happen s . Quiescence is only a sell-con talTfed m ovem ent. often more uncannv ( unheim licher ) than movement itse lf. 11. Truth Proposition (A sse rtio n ) Thing There can be various form s and reasons for the quies cence o f the happenings o f ancient tim es. Let us see how
45
it is w ith our question in this rcsncci* We heard that in the tim e o f Plato and A ristotle the definition I the thing w a s set forth as the bearer of properties. The discovery o f the essence of the p r o p o s il ion w a s made at the sam e time. Also sim u ltaneously arose th c cfiaracterization of the truth as the fitting o f the perception to the things, which tru th has its placc in the proposition. All this can be presented in detail and "unequivocally IroHl'thc d iscussions and es says o f Plato and Aristotle. We also can point out how these teachings about the thing, the truth, and the propo sition changed w ith the Sto ics; furtherm ore, how again differences appeared in medieval Sch olasticism , and som e others in our modern tim es, and again, still others in German Idealism. Thus, we would tell a h isto ry" ( Ges ch ich te ) about this question, but not ask h istorically at all, i.e., we would, thereby, leave the question What is a thing? com pletely quiescent. The movement would then consist only in the fact that,w ith the help o f a report about theories, w e m ay contrast these w ith one another. We bring the question What is a thing? out of its quiescence bv inserting the Platonic-Aristotelian determ inations of the thing, the proposition and the truth into specific p ossi bilities, and by putting these up for decision. We ask: Do the definition o f the essence o f the thing and the definition of the essence o f the truth occur at the sam e time only by accident, or do they all cohere among them selves, perhaps even necessarily? If such proves to be the case, how do these definitions cohere? O bviously, we have already given an answ er to this question when we refer to what has been cited to prove the correctness of the essential definition l the thing. Thereby, it is dem onstrated that the defini tion of the essential structure o f truth m ust conform to the essential structure of things on the b a sis o f the essence < > i truth as correctness ( R ich tig k e it ). This establish es a certain interdependence between the essence of the thing, ()l a proposition, and of truth. This also sh ow s itself ex ternally in the order o f the determ ination o f the thing and
46
W HAT
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the proposition according to w hich the subject-predicate relationship is fourth (cf. p. 34). We should certainly not forget that w e cited the reference to the so viewed connec tion as the opinion o f the common and "n a tu ra l" concep tion o f this question. But this "n a tu ra l opinion is abso lutely not natural. This means that its supposed firmness dissolves itse lf into a series of questions. These run as fol\ lows: W as the essen tial structure o f truth and o f the propX osition suited to the structure of the things? Or is it the opposite: W as the essential structure of the thing as a bearer o f attribu tes interpreted according to the structure o f the proposition, as the unity of "su b je c t and predi ca te ? Has man read off the structure of the proposition from the structure of tT T e things, or has he translerred the s tructure o f the proposition into the things? If the latter were the case, then the further question would im m ediately arise: How does the proposition, the interpretation, come to present the m easure and model of how things in their thingness are to be determined? Since the proposition, the assertio n, the n ositing, and the telling are human action s, w e would conclude that man does not" ad ju st him sclfT o l h inps hut the things to man and to the QjSp&S hnmnn suhicct as w hich one usually understands the 1. ^ i . iJrtf Such an interpretation o f the relation of origin between the determ ination o f the thing and that o f the proposition iV seem s im probable, at least among the Greeks. For the I standpoint is som ething modern and, therefore, nonGreek. The p olis set the standard for the Greeks. Everyone today is talking of the Greek polls. Now, among the Greeks, the nation o f thinkers, someone coined the sen tence: '' ctT T iv , 1 '> ws itmv, ' St ' < ( Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not. ) The man who made this state ment, Protagoras, supposedly w rote a w ork w ith the sim ple title > / ?)0(, The Truth. The statem ent o f this proposition is tem porally not too far from P latos time.
47
Perhaps this im plies that the structure o f the thing ad ju sts itself to the structure of the proposition, rather than the contrary, not "su b je c tiv ism ; only later opinions about the thinking o f the Greeks are subjective. If, indeed, the proposition and that truth settled in the proposition, understood as correctness, be the m easure for the deter m ination o f the thing; if now the facts are different and reversed from w hat natural opinion holds, then the fur ther question arises: What is the ground and guarantee that we have really hit on the essence o f the proposition? Whence is it determined what truth is? Thus w e see that w hat happened in the determ ination of the essence o f the thing is by no means past and settled, but at m ost bogged down and therefore to be set in m o tion anew and so still questionable today. If w e do not want sim ply to repeat opinions but to grasp w hat we our selves say and usually mean, then w e im m ediately come into a w hole turmoil o f questions. First o f all, the question relative to the thing now stands thus: Do the essences o f the proposition and o f the truth determine them selves from out o f the essence o f the thing, or does the essence o f the thing determine itse lf from out of the essence o f the proposition? The question is posed as an eith er/or. H owever (and this becom es the decisive quc s tio n ), does this either or it self snflice? Are the essence of .the thing and the essence o f the proposition only bu ilt as m irror images because hnth nt them together deter mine thcm scjvcs from out o f the sam e but deeper lying root? However, w hat and where can be this common ground for the essence o f the thing and of the proposition and o f their origin? The unconditioned ( Unbedingt )? We stated at the beginning that wh^t conditions the essence o f the thing in its thingness can no longer itse lf be thing and conditioned, it must b e a n unconditioned ( Un-bedingtes). Hul also the essence o f the unconditioned ( Unbedingt ) is i.o-determincd bv what has been established as a tiling and as condition ( Be-dingung ). If the thing is taken as ens
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\ \
creation, a present-at-hand created by God, then the un conditioned is God in the sense o f the Old Testament. If the thing is considered as that which, as object, faces the I," i.e., as the not-I, then the 1" is the unconditioned, the absolute I o f German Idealism. Whether the uncon ditioned is sought beyond, behind, or in things depends upon w hat one understands as condition and being con ditioned ( a ls Bedingung und Bedingtsein). Only w ith this question do w e advance in the direction o f the p ossible ground for the determ ination of the thing and the proposition and its truth. This, however, sh a tte rs1 2 the original w ay s of posing the questions concerning the thing w ith w hich w e began. That happening ( Geschehen) o f the form erly standard determ ination of the thing, which seemed long past but w a s in truth only stuck and since then rested, is brought out of its quiescence. The question o f the thing again com es into motion from its begin ning. With this reference to the inner qu estionability o f the question about the thing, we ought now to clarify in what sense w e take the question as historical. To question h isto rically means to set free and into motion the happen ing which is quiescent and bound in the question. To be sure, such a procedure easily succum bs to a m is interpretation. One could take this as belatedly attributing m istakes to the original determ ination of the thing or at least insufficiency and incom pleteness. This would be a childish game o f an em pty and vain superiority and after thought w hich all those latecom ers m ay at any tim e play w ith those o f earlier tim es sim ply because they have come later. Insofar as our questioning is concerned w ith critique at all, it is not directed against the beginning, but only against ourselves, in sofar as we drag along this beginning
12 Heidegger entitles the section in SZ where he calls for a re newal of the question of being from the standpoint of its historicity, The Task of the Destruction of the History of Ontology (SZ, p. 19). Traits.
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no longer as such, but as som ething "n a tu ra l, i.e., in an indifferent falsification. The conception o f the question "W h at is a thing? as historical is ju st as far removed from the intention of merely reporting h istorically about form er opinions about the thing as it is from the m ania for criticizing these opin ions and, by adding together w hat is tem porarily correct, from figuring out and offering a new opinion from past opinions. Rather it is a question o f s ett ini? into motion the original inner happening of this question according to its s implest characteristic moves, w hich have been arrested in. a quiescence. This happening d o es not li* aloo f from us in the dim and d istant past but is here in every proposition everyday opinion, in every approach l[> ihinpn 12. H istoricity and Decision What has been said about the historical character of the question What is a thing? is valid for every philosophi cal question which we put today or in the future, assum ing, o f course, that philosophy is a questioning that puts itself in question and is therefore alw ays and everywhere moving in a circle. We noticed at the outset how the thing determined itself lor us first as single and as a th is. A ristotle ca lls it , this here." However, the determ ination of the singleness ( Einzelnheit ) inherently depends also on how the univer sality of the universal is conceived, for w hich the single is an instance and an example. Also, in this regard, certain decisions set in w ith Plato and A risto tle which still influ ence lo g ic and gramm ar. We further observed that a closer circum scription o f the th is a lw a y s involves the help o f he space-tim e relationship. Also w ith regard to the essen tial determ ination ol space and time, A ristotle and Plato sketched the w ays on which we still move today. In truth, however, our historical being-here (D asein ) is
50
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already on the w ay to a transform ation which, if stifled in itself, only experiences this destiny because it does not find its w ay back to its own self-laid grounds in order to found itse lf anew out of them. It is easy to derive from all that has been said what our task must be, if w e are to set our question "W h at is a thing?" into motion as a historical question. It would first be necessary to set into motion the begin ning of the essential determ ination of the thing and the proposition of the Greeks, not in order to acknowledge how it w a s before, but to pose for decision how essen tially it s till is today. But in this lecture w e m ust forego carry ing out this fundamental task, and this for tw o reasons. The one is seem ingly more external. The task mentioned would not be fulfilled by putting together a few quota tions about w hat Plato and A ristotle said here and there about the thing and the proposition. Rather, w e would have to bring into play the whole o f Greek Dasein, its gods, its art, its polity, its knowledge, in order to experience what it m eans to discover som ething like the thing. In the fram ework o f this lecture all the presuppositions are m iss ing for this approach. And even if these were supplied w e could not follow this path to the beginning, in regard to the task posed. It has already been indicated that a mere definition of the thing does not say much, whether w e dig it out in the past, or whether we ourselves have the am bition to solder together a so-called new one. The answ er to the qu estion "W hat is a tl-iiny' is diOVrent in character. It is not a proposition but a tran sfo rmed basic position or, better still and more cautiously, the initial transtorm ation o! the hitherlo existing position toward things, a change ol ques tioning and evaluation, o f seeing and deciding; in short, of the b c in g-there ( D a-sein ) in the m idst ol what is ( m nult'en des Seien den ). To determine the changing basic position w ithin the relation to what is, that is the task o f an entire historical period. But this requires that w e perceive more
51
s us captive and exactly w ith clearer eyes w hat m ost holds leterm ination of m akes us unfree in the experience and deter the things. This is modern natural science, insofar as it has becom e a universal w ay o f thinking along certain basic lines. The Greek origin also governs this, although changed, yet not alone and not predominantly. The ques tion concerning our b asic relations to nature, our know l edge o f nature as such, our rule over nature, is not a question o f natural science, but this question is itself in question in the question o f whether and how we arc still addressed by what is as such w ithin the w hole. Such a. question is not decided in a lecture, but at m ost in a cen tury, and this only if the century is not asleen and does not merely have the opinion that it is awake. This ques- . tion is made decisive only through discussion. Jn connection w ith the development of modern science^ a definite conception ot the thing attain s a unique nre- ' eminence. According to this, the thing is m aterial, a point of m ass in motion in the pure space-tim e order, or a n ap propriate com bination o f such points. T h e th in g so d e -. fined is from then on considered as the ground and basis^. ol all things. their determ inations and their interrogation. The anim ate is also here, insofar as one does not believe that somcPdav one w ill be able to explain it from outô f lifeless m atter w ith the help o f colloidal chem is try. Even where o ne perm its the a nimate its o w n character, it is conccived as an add itional structure built upon the inani mate; in the sam e way, the implement and the tool are considered as m aterial things, only subsequently pre pared, so that a special value adheres to them . But this reign ol the m aterial thing ( Stoffd in a e s). as the genuine Mibstru ctu rco f a ll things, reaches altogether beyond the sphere of the things into the sphere of the "sp iritu a l* , (G eistigen), as we w ill quite roughly call it; for example, mto the sphere o f the signification o f language, of history, ()l the w ork o f art, etc. Why, for example, has the treat ment and interpretation o f the poets for years been so
dreary in our higher sch ools? Answer: Because the teachers do not know the difference between a thing an d a poem ; because they treat poems as things, which they clo because they have never nolll1till ough the question ol~wTltit a thing is. That today one reads more Nibelungenlied and less Homer m ay have its reasons, but this changes nothing. It alw ays is the sam e dreariness, before in Greek and now in German. However, the teachers are not to blam e for this situ ation ^ nor the teachers ol these teachers, but an entire period, i.e., w e ourselve s il we do not finally open our eyes. The question What is a thing? is a h istorical question. In its history, the determ ination of the thing as the ma terial present-at-hand ( Vorhanden) has an unshattered preeminence. If we really ask this question, i.e., il we pose for decision the p ossib ility of the determ ination of the thing, then w e can as little skip the modern answ er as we are permitted to forget tftc origin ol the question. ~ However, at the sam e time and before all w e should ask the harm less question What is a thing? in such a w ay that w e experience it as our own so that it no longer lets go of us even when w e have long since had no oppor tunity to listen to lectures on it, especially since the task o f such lectures is not to proclaim great revelations and to calm psychic distress. Rather, they can only perhaps awaken w hat has fallen asleep, perhaps put back into order what has becom e mixed up. 13. Sum m ary We now sum m arize in order to arrive at the final delineation o f our intention. It w as em phasized at the out set that in philosophy, in contrast to the sciences, an I im m ediate approach to the questions is never possible. It n ecessarily a lw a y s requires an introduction. The introduc tory reflections on our question "W h at is a thing? now com e to their conclusion.
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The question has been characterized in tw o essential re spects: What is put in question and how it is questioned. First, w ith regard to what is in question the thing w ith an adm ittedly very poor light we have searched the horizon in which, according to tradition, the thing and the determ ination o f its thingness stand. We reached a double result: first, the fram e o f the thing, time-space, and the things w ay o f encountering, the "th is , and then the structure o f the thing itse lf as being the bearer o f prop erties, entirely general and empty: to form the one for a many. Second, we tried to characterize the question in regard to the manner in w hich it m ust be asked. It turned out that the question is historical. W hat is meant by that has been explained. The introductory reflection on our question m akes it clear that two leading questions permanently go along with it and, therefore, must be asked w ith it. The one: Where does som ething like a thing belong? The other: Whence do we take the determ ination o f its thingness? Only from these as they are asked along w ith our question result the clue and guideline along which w e must go if everything is not to tumble around in mere chance and confusion and if the question concerning the thing is not to get stuck in a dead end. But would that be a m isfortune? This is the sam e ques tion as the following: Is there, after all, a serious sense in posing such qu estions? We know that w e cannot begin to do anything w ith its elucidation. The consequences are also accordingly if we do not pose the question and ignore it. If we ignore the w arning o f a high-power line and touch the w ires, we are killed. If w e ignore the question "W hat is a thing? then "nothing further happens. II a physician m ishandles a number of patients, there is the danger that they w ill lose their lives. If a teacher interprets a poem to his students in an im possible man ner, "nothing further happens. But perhaps it is good if
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we speak more cau tiously here. Bv ignoring the qu estion concerning the thing and by insulliciently interpreting*a poem, it appears as though nothing further happens. One da> -Derhans after fifty or one hundred years, nevertheless , so mething has happened. The question "W h at is a thing? is a historical question. But it is more im portant to act according to this historical character in the questioning than to talk about the histori cal character of the question. Herewith, for the purposes and p ossib ilities of the lecture, w e m ust be content w ith an evasive w ay out. We can neither present the great beginning o f the ques tion w ith the Greeks, nor is it possible, in its full context, to display the precise determ ination of the thing, which has becom e preeminent through modern science. But, on the other hand, the knowledge of that beginning as well as of the decisive periods o f modern science is indispensable if we are to remain equal to the question at all.
B.
K a n t s M a n n e r
of
A sk in g A
bout t h e
T h in g
/. The H istorical B asis on Which K an ts Critique of Pure Reason Rests How do we, nevertheless, although in an im provised manner, get on the path {Weg) to the in trinsic "liv in g history of our question? We choose a middle section o f this w ay, one in which, in a creative sense, the beginning and a decisive age are joined together in a new manner. This is the philosophical determ ination o f the thingness of the thing which Kant has created. The essential delinea tion o f the thing is not an accidental by-product in the philosophy of Kant; the determ ination o f the thingness of the thing is its m etaphysical center. By means of an inter pretation o f K ants work w e put ourselves on the path of the inherently h istorical question concerning the thing. K ants philosophy sh ifts for the first tim e the whole o f modern thought and being ( D asein ) into the clarity and transparency o f a foundation ( Begrndung ). This deter mines every attitude toward knowledge since then, as well as the bounds ( Abgrenzungen) and appraisals of the sci 55
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ences in the nineteenth century up to the present time. Therein Kant tow ers so far above all who precedc and follow that even those who reject him or go beyond him still remain entirely dependent upon him. Moreover, in spite o f all differences and the extent of the h istorical interval, Kant has som ething in common w ith the great Greek beginning, which at the sam e time distinguishes him from all German thinkers before and after him. This is the incorruptible clarity o f his thinking and speaking, which by no means excludes the question able and the unbalanced, and does not feign light where there is darkness. We turn our question W hat is a thing? into K an ts and, vice versa, K ants question into ours. The further task of the lecture thus becom es very sim ple. We need not report in broad surveys and general phrases "a b o u t the philosophy of Kant. We put ourselves w ithin it. Hence forth, only Kant shall speak. What w e contribute, from tim e to time, w ill indicate the sense and the direction so that, en route, w e do not deviate from the path o f the question. The lecture is thus a kind o f signpost. Signposts are indifferent to what happens on the highway itself. They emerge only here and there on the edge of the road to point out and to disappear again in passing.1'* The w ay (W eg) o f our question W hat is a thing? leads to K ant's m ajor work, the Critique of Pure Reason, the w hole of which we cannot go through in this lecture. We m ust once more lim it the stretch o f our w ay. But w e shall try to get to the middle o f this stretch ( S tre ck e ) and thus into the center o f this m ajor work in order to understand it in its chief inner directions. If this succeeds, then w e have not becom e acquainted w ith a book w hich a profes sor once w rote in the eighteenth century, but w e have entered a few steps into a historical-intellectual b asic p osi tion which carries and determines us today.
13 This reference to signposts is not facetious. See SZ pp. 76-83, for his enlightening analysis of "sig n s (Zeichen). Trans.
K an ts Maimer o f Asking About the Thing
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1. The Reception of K ants Work in His Lifetim e; Neo-Kantianism Kant once said in conversation during the last years of his life: "I have come a century too soon with my w ritings. After a hundred years, people w ill first correctly under stand me and then study my books anew and adm it them ! (Varnhagen von Ense, Tagebcher, 1 ,46.) Does a vain self-im portance speak these w ords or even the angry hopelessness o f being shoved aside? Neither, for both are foreign to K an ts character. W hat is thus ex pressed is K ants deep knowledge about the manner and method by which philosophy realizes itse lf and takes effect. Philosophy belongs to the m ost prim ordial o f hu man efforts. Of these, Kant once remarked: M an's efforts turn in a perpetual circle, and return to a point where they have already once been; thus m aterials now lying in the dust can perhaps be worked into a magnificent building (K an ts answ er to Garve, Prolegomena, Karl Vorlnder, ed. [6th ed.; Leipzig: 1926], p. 194). Here speaks the superior calm of a creator who know s that "contem p o rary standards are dust and that w hat is great has its own law o f movement. When Kant published the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, he w a s fifty-seven, and, until the time of its publica tion, he had been silent for more than ten years. During the decade o f this silence, 1770-81, Hlderlin, Hegel, and Beethoven lived through their boyhood. Six years after the first appearance o f the work, the second edition w as published. Isolated passages were worked over, some proofs were sharpened. But the total character of the work remained unchanged. Contem poraries stood helpless before the work. It went beyond anything custom ary by the elevation o f its ques'ion-posing, by the rigor of its concept-form ation, by the far-seeing organization of its questioning, and by the
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novelty of the language and its decisive goal. Kant knew this; he realized that this w ork in its entire plan and method w as against the taste of the time. Kant him self once described the ruling taste of his age as the effort to represent the difficult in philosophical things as easy.1 4 Although not understood in its essential purposes, but al w ays apprehended only from an accidental exterior, the w ork w as provocative. An eager tug-of-war developed in w ritings opposing and defending it. Up to the year of K ants death, 1804, the number of these had reached two thousand. It is this condition o f the argumentation w ith Kant to w hich Sch iller's fam ous verse entitled Kant and His Interpreters refers. Wie doch ein einziger Reicher so viele Bettler in Nahrung Setzt! Wenn die Knige bann, haben die Krrner zu tun. ( How a single rich man so many beggars feeds! When kings build, the carters have work.) This sam e Schiller first helped Goethe to a conception o f K ants philosophy and to philosophy in general. Goethe later said that reading one page in Kant affected him "lik e stepping into a brightly lighted room ." During the last decade o f K ants life, 1794-1804, the conception o f his work and consequently the effect o f his philosophy took a certain direction. This happened through the w ork of younger thinkers, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Their philosophy developed on the b a sis of
1 4 "Allein so gtig und bereitwillig Sie auch in Ansehung dieses meines Gesuchs sein mchten, so bescheide ich doch gerne, dass, nach dem herrschenden Geschmacke dieses Zeitalters, das Schwere in speculativen Dingen als leicht vorausteilen (nicht leicht zu machen), Ihre geflligste Bermhung in diesem Punkte doch fruchtlos sein wrde. Prolegomena, p. 193. Trans.
K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing
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Kants (or, rather, by taking off from it) and formed itse lf into w hat is com m only known as "Germ an Idealism . This philosophy leaped over Kant w ith all due respect but did not overcom e him. This could not be done, if for no other reason, because his essential foundation w as not attacked but only abandoned. It w as not even abandoned, because it w as never even taken; it w as only skirted. K ants w ork remained like an unconquered fortress behind a new front, which, in spite o f (or perhaps because o f) its vehe mence, w a s already thrust into em ptiness a generation later, i.e., it w as not capable of generating a truly creative opposition. It seemed as if in German Idealism all philos ophy had reached an end and finally and exclusively had entrusted the adm inistration of knowledge to the sciences. Around the middle o f the nineteenth century, however, there arose the call, "B a ck to K ant.1' This return to Kant sprang from a new historical intellectual situation; at the same tim e it w a s determined by a renunciation o f German Idealism. This intellectual situation toward the middle of the nineteenth century is essen tially characterized by the definite predominance o f a particular form o f science; it is designated by the catchw ord "p o sitiv ism . This is knowledge whose pretention to truth is from beginning to end based on w h at one ca lls " f a c t s " ( T atsachen ); one holds that there can be no argument about facts; they are the highest court o f appeal for the decisions concerning truth and untruth. W hat is proved by experiments in the natural sciences and w hat is verified by m anuscripts and documents in the historical-cultural sciences is true, and is the only scien tifically verifiable truth. The return to Kant w a s guided by the intention of find ing in Kant the philosophical foundation and ju stification
"O tto Liebmann (1840-1912) closcd each chaptcr of Kant und die Epigonen (1865) with his famous call, "A lso m uss auf Kant zlrckgegangen werden! " For reference, see Z. Weber, History of yjilosophy, Frank Thillv, trans., w ith section Philosophy since I 8 6 0 by Ralph Barton Perry (New York: Scribners, 1925), p. 461, n. 1. Trans.
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IS
A T H I N G ?
for the p ositivistie conception o f science. But it w a s sim ul taneously a conscious renunciation of German Idealism, a renunciation which understood itself as the renunciation o f m etaphysics. This new turn toward Kant, therefore, took his philosophy as the destruction of m etaphysics. This return to Kant w a s called Neo-Kantianism, in con trast to the disciples o f K ants lifetim e, the form er Kantians. When from our present position w e survey this re turn to Kant, it m ust im m ediately becom e questionable whether it could have regained, or could even find at all, K ants basic position, which German Idealism had also sim ply skirted or leapt over. That w a s and is indeed not the case. Nevertheless, the philosophical movement of N eo-Kantianism has its undeniable m erits within the in tellectual history of the second half of the nineteenth cen tury. These arc above all three: (1 ) Although one-sided, the renewal o f K ants philos ophy saved p ositivism from a complete slide into the deifi cation of facts. (2 ) K ants philosophy itse lf w a s made fa m iliar in its entire range through careful interpretation and elaboration of his w ritin gs. (3 ) The general investiga tion of the history o f philosophy, especially ancient philos ophy, w a s carried out on a higher plane o f inquiry under the guidance o f K ants philosophy. All this is, o f course, little enough when w e measure it by the standard of the intrinsic task of the philosophy, which, again, also does not mean much as long as it only rem ains a counterclaim , instead o f a counter achievement. M eanwhile, w e see K an ts philosophy in a w ider visual field than Neo-Kantianism did. K ant's h istorical position w ithin W estern m etaphysics has becom e clearer. But this m eans, at first, only an improved historical recognition in the usual sense and not the discussion w ith the b a sic posi tion he first captured. Here w hat he predicted m ust be made to come true: People w ill study my books anew and adm it them. When we are so far, there is no more Kant ianism . For every mere " is m " is a m isunderstanding and
K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thing
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the death o f history. K ants Critique of Pure Reason is among those philosophical w orks which, as long as there is philosophy on this earth at all, daily becom e inexhaustible anew. It is one o f those w orks that have already pro nounced judgment over every future attem pt to "o ver com e" them by only passing them by. 2. The Title of K an t's M ajor Work We are attem pting here to put as learners our question "W hat is a thing? to K ants work. At first it is certain ly com pletely obscure w h at a work w ith the title Critique of Pure Reason has to do w ith our question "W h at is a thing? We shall only truly experience how that is if w e enter into the w ork, i.e., through the subsequent interpretation. However, in order not to leave everything in com plete darkness for too long w e shall a t tempt a prelim inary elucidation ( vordeutende Erluter ung). We attem pt to gain a foothold at the center of this work in order to com e into the movement of our question at once. First, a prelim inary explanation is to be given concerning the extent to which our question is intim ately connected with this w ork regardless o f whether we take over K an ts b asic position or not, or how far we do or dont transform it. We give this enlightenment by w ay of eluci dating the title. This is so arranged that w e im m ediately orient ourselves at the spot in K an ts w ork where our in terpretation of it begins, w ithout first knowing the preced ing parts o f the work. Critique o f Pure Reason everyone knows what "critiq u e and "to criticize mean; "reaso n and w hat a "reaso n ab le man or a "reaso n ab le" sugges tion is, are also understood by everyone. What "p u re signifies in distinction to impure (e.g., impure w a te r) is clear also. Yet w e cannot think anything appropriate to the title. Critique o f Pure Reason. Above all, one would expect a critique to reject som ething u n satisfactory, in sufficient, and negative; one would expect criticism of
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som ething like an impure reason. Finally, it is quite incom prehensible what the Critique of Pure Reason can have to do w ith the question concerning the thing. And yet w e arc com pletely justified in asserting that this title expresses nothing else but the question concerning the thing but as a question. The question is, as w e know, historical. The title means this history in a decisive era o f its movement. The title means this question, and is a thoroughly h is torical one. In an external sense this means that Kant, who w as thoroughly clear about his w ork, has given it a title demanded by his age and, at the sam e time, led beyond it. What history o f the question concerning the thing is ex pressed in this title? 3. The Categories as Modes of Assertion We remind ourselves o f the beginning of the essential determ ination of the thing. This takes place along the lines of the assertion (A u ssage). As a proposition the sim ple a s sertion is a saying in which som ething is asserted about something, e.g., "The house is red. Here "r e d is said of ( zu-gesagt ) the house. That of which it is said, , is what underlies. Therefore, in the attribution (Zu-sagen), as it were, som ething is said from above down to w hat underlies. In the Greek language means "fro m above down to som ething belo w . To say m eans , the saying is . The sim ple assertion is a , a iyuv n
T L VOS.
Much can be said down to a thing, about it (A u f ein Ding kann verschiedenes heruntergesagt, ber es ausge sagt w erden). "The house is red. "The house is high. "The house is sm aller (than that one beside it). The house is on the creek." "The house is an eighteenth-cen tury one." Guided by these different assertion s, w e can follow how the thing itse lf is determined at any given time. Thereby w e do not now pay attention to this particular thing in the
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example, the house, but to that which, in every such asser tion o f this sort, characterizes every thing o f this kind in general, i.e., the thingness. "R e d says in a certain respect, namely, in respect o f color, how the thing is constituted. Viewed in general, a trait or qu ality is attributed to ( zugesagt) the thing. In the attribution, "la rg e becom es size, extension, (q u an tity). W ith the "sm a lle r than, there is asserted w hat the house is, in relationship to another (relation ); "on the creek : the place; "eighteenth cen tury : the time. Quality, extension, relation, place, and tim e are deter m inations which are said in general o f the thing. These de term inations name the respects in which things exhibit them selves to us if w e address them in the assertion and talk about them, the perspectives from w hich w e view things, in which they show them selves. Insofar as these determ inations are alw ays said down to the thing, the thing in general is alw ays already co-asserted ( m itgesagt) as the already present ( als das schon Anwesende). W hat is said in general about each thing as a thing, this "th a t is spoken down to the thing wherein its thingness and gen erality determine them selves, is called by the Greeks / (-yoptvttv). But w hat is thus attributed means nothing other than the being characterized, being ex tended, being in relation to, being there, being now, o f the thing as som ething that is. In the categories the m ost gen eral determ inations o f the being of som ething that is are said. The thingness o f the thing means the being o f the thing as som ething that is. We cannot lay this state o f facts too often and too em phatically before our eyes namely, that those determ inations w hich constitute the being of somctTiing that is, i.e., of the thing itself, have received 1 he irn am c from assertion s about the thing. This name lor the determ ination o f being ( Sein sbest unmutigen ) is not an arbitrary designation. In thus naming the determ ina tions of being modes o f assertedness ( A usgesagtheit) lies a unique interpretation o f being. That since then in W est
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ern thinking the determ inations of being are called "c a te gories is the sharpest expression for what w e have already emphasized: that the structure o f the thing is con nected w ith the structure o f the assertion. If in the past and still today, the S ch o lastic teaching of the being o f what is, "on tology, sets as its proper goal to erect a "th eory of categ ories" (K ategorienlehre ) , it is because therein speaks the beginning interpretation of the being of what is, i.e., the thingness o f the thing from out of the assertion. 4. Ao'yos- R atio Reason The assertion is a kind o f Xiyuv addressing som ething as something. This im plies som ething taken as something. Considering and expressing som ething as som ething in Latin is called reor, ratio. Therefore, ratio becom es the translation o f /o. The sim ple asserting sim ultaneously gives the b a sic form in w hich w e mean and think som e thing about the things. The b asic form o f thinking, and thus o f thought, is the guideline for the determ ination of the thingness ol the thing. The categories determine in general the being ot w hat is. To ask about the bein jf of w hat is, what and how w hat is, is at all, counts as philosophys principal task. To ask in this w ay is first, first-rank ing, and proper philosophy, />/ , prima philosophia. It remains essential-that thought as sim ple a sse rtion. Ays. ratio, is the guideline for the determinat inn n( j_he being o f what is. i.e., for the thingness of the thing. " Guideline (L eitfaden) here means that the modes of asserting direct the view in the determining o f presence (A nw esen h eit), i.e., o f the being o f w hat is. Aoyos and ratio are translated in German as reason (V ernunft). Herein there appears for us, as it were, for the first time a connection between the question about the thing on the one hand, and about "re a so n (C ritique of Pure R eason ) on the other. But therewith has not yet been
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shown how the process o f Western m etaphysics arrived at a critique o f pure reason and w hat this means. We shall now attem pt this in a few rough outlines. 5. The Modern M athem atical Science o f Nature and the Origin o f a Critique o f Pure Reason We have seen that, w ith the exception of the beginning among the Greeks, the rise of modern natural science be cam e decisive for the essential definition of the thing. The transform ation o f Dasein, which w a s basic to this event, changed the character of modern thought and thus of m etaphysics and prepared the necessity for a critique of pure reason. It is, therefore, necessary for m any reasons that w e acquire a more defined conception o f the character of modern natural science. In this w e m ust forego entering deeply into special questions. Here w e cannot even pur sue the main periods o f its history. Most of the facts of its history are known, and yet our knowledge of the innermost xkh jn g connections of this happening is still very poor and dark. It is very clear only that the transform a tion of science basically took place through centuries o f d is c u s s io n about the lu n d a m e n ta lT o iic c P ls and p r in c ip les o f thought, i.e., the b a sic attitude toward things and to ward what is at a ll. Such a discussion could be carried through only w ith com plete m astery o f the tradition of medieval as well as ancient science o f nature. This de manded an unusual breadth and certain ty o f conceptual thought and finally a m astery o f the new experiences and modes o f procedure. All this presupposed a unique passion for an authoritative knowledge, which finds its like only among the Greeks, a knowledge which first and con stan tly questions its own presuppositions and thereby seeks their b asis. To hold out in this constant questioning appears as the only human w ay to preserve things in their inexhaustibility, i.e., w ithout distortion. The transform ation o f science is accom plished alw ays
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only through itself. But science itse lf thereby has a tw o fold foundation: (1 ) w ork experiences, i.e., the direction and the mode o f m astering and using w hat is; (2 ) m eta p h ysics, i.e., the projection of the fundamental knowledge of being, out o f w hich w hat is knowledgeably develops. Work experiences and the projection of being are recipro cally related to one another and a lw ays meet in a b a sic fea ture o f attitude and o f humanly being there (D asein). We shall now try to clarify roughly this basic feature of the modern attitude toward knowledge. But w e do this with the intention o f understanding modern m etaphysics and (identical w ith th a t) the p o ssib ility and necessity of som ething like K ants Critique of Pure Reason. a. The C haracteristics of Modern Science in Contrast to Ancient and Medieval Science One com m only characterizes modern science in contra distinction to medieval science by saying that modern sci ence sta rts from facts w hile the m edieval started from gen eral speculative propositions and concepts. This is true in a certain respect. But it is equally undeniable that the medieval and ancient sciences also observed the facts, and that modern science also w orks w ith universal proposi tions and concepts. This went so far as to criticize Galileo, one o f the founders of modern science, w ith the sam e re proach that he and his disciples actu ally made against S ch olastic science: They said it w as "a b str a c t," i.e., it pro ceeded w ith general propositions and principles. Yet in an even more distinct and conscious w a y the sam e w a s the case w ith Galileo. The contrast between the ancient and the modern attitude tow ard science cannot, therefore, be established by saying there concepts and principles and here facts. Both ancient and modern science have to do w ith both facts and concepts. However, the w ay the fa cts are conceived and how the concepts arc established are decisive.
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The greatne ss and superiority rlju-ingr the sixteenth a nd seventeenth centuries is because all the scien tists were philosophers. They understood that thece are no mere tacts, but that a fact is onlv w hat it is in the Mph) of the fundamental conception and alw ays depends upon how fa r that conception reaches. The characteristic o f positivism , wherein w e have stood for decades and to day more than ever, is contrary to this in that it thinks it can sufficiently manage w ith facts or other and new facts, w hile concepts are merely expedients w hich one som e how needs but should not get too involved w ith, since that would be philosophy. Furthermore, the comedy, or rather the tragedy, of the present situation o f science is, first, that one thinks to overcom e p ositivism through positivism . To be sure, this attitude only prevails where average and sub sequent work is done. Where genuine and discovering research is done, the situation is no different from that of three hundred years ago. That age also had its indolence, just as, conversely, the present leaders o f atom ic physics, Niels Bohr and Heisenberg, think in a thoroughly philo s ophical w ay, and only therefore create new w avs o f nosing questions and, above all, hold out in the question able. Thus, if one tries to distinguish modern from medieval science by calling it the science o f facts, this rem ains b a si cally inadequate. Further, the difference between the old and the new science is often seen in that the latter ex periments and experim entally proves its cognitions. But the experiment, the test, to get inform ation concern ing the behavior o f things through a definite ordering of things and events w a s also already fam iliar in ancient tim es and in the Middle Ages. This kind of experience lies at the b asis o f all technological contact w ith things in the cra fts and the use of tools. Here, too, it is not the experi ment as such in the wide sense o f testing through observa1 n , but the manner of setting up the test and the intent w ith which it is undertaken and in which it is grounded.
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The manner of experimentation is presum ably connected w ith the kind of conceptual determ ination of the fa cts and w av of applying concepts, i.e., w ith the kind o f hypothesis " about things. Besides these tw o constan tly cited ch aracteristics of modern science, science of fa cts and experimental re search, one also usually m eets a third. This third affirms that modern science is a calculating and measuring inves tigation. That is true. However, it is also true of ancient science, w hich also worked w ith measurement and num ber. Again it is a question of how and in what sense calcu lating and m easuring were applied and carried out, and what im portance they have for the determ ination o f the ob jects them selves. With these three ch aracteristics o f modern science, that 1 it is a factual, experimental, m easuring science, w e still m iss the fundamental ch aracteristic o f modern science. The fundam ental feature m ust co n sist in w hat rules and determines the basic movement ol science itself. This characteristic is the manner ol working w ith the tTiTngs and the m etaphysical projection o f the thingness of the things. Ho w are we to conceive this fundamental feature? We entitle this fundam ental feature of modern s c ience for which w e are searching by saying that modern science i is m athem atical. From Kant com es the oft-quoted but still little understood sentence, "H ow ever, I m aintain that in any particular doctrine of natu re only so m uch-grmnne science can be found as there is m athem atics to be found in it. ( Preface to M etaphysical Beginning Principles of N atural Science . ) The decisive question is: What do "m a th em a tics and "m a th em a tica l mean here? It seem s as though we can only take the answ er to this question from m athem atics itself. This is a m istake, because m athem atics itse lf is only a p a r tic u la r th' ^nth'iT i a tica l The fact that today m athem atics in a practical and pedagogical sense is included in the department of
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natural science has its historical basis, but it is not essen tially necessary. Formerly, m athem atics belonged to the septem artes liberales. M athem atics is as little a natural science as philosophy is one o f the hum anities. Philosophy in its essence belongs as little in the philosophical facu lty as m athem atics belongs to natural science. To house philosophy and m athem atics in this w ay today seem s to be a blem ish or a m istake in the catalog o f the universities. But perhaps it is som ething quite different (and there arc people who are even concerned about such things), namely, a sign that there no longer is a fundamental and clarified unity o f the sciences and that this unity is no longer either a n ecessity or a question. b. The M athem atical, M,* How do we explain the m athem atical if not by m athe m atics? In such questions w e do well to keep to the word itself. Of course, the facts are not alw ays there where the word occurs. But w ith the Greeks, from whom the word stem s, we m ay safely make this assum ption. In its form a tion the word "m ath em atical stem s from the Greek ex pression , w hich m eans what can be learned and thus, at the sam e time, w hat can be taught; means to learn, the teaching, and this in a tw ofold sense. First, it means studying and learning; then it means the doctrine taught. To teach and to learn are here intended in a wide and at the sam e tim e essential sense, and not in the later narrow and trite sense o f school and scholars. However, this is not sufficient to grasp the proper sense ol the m athem atical. To do this we m ust inquire in w hat further connection the Greeks employ the m athem atical and from what they distinguish it. We experience w hat the m athem atical properly is when we inquire under what the Greeks c la ssify the mathe m atical and against what they distinguish it within this classification . The Greeks identify the m athem atical, , w ith the following determ inations:
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WHA T IS T H I N G ?
1. '. The things insofar as they originate and come forth from themselves. 2. ,: The things insofar as they are produced by the human hand and stand as such. 3. ,: The things in sofar as they are in use and therefore stand at our constant disposal they may be either , rocks and so on, or >, som e thing specially made. 4. '/: The things in sofar as w e have to do w ith them at all, whether w e work on them, use them, transform them, or w e only look at and examine them , w ith regard to ^: here is taken in a truly wide sense, neither in the narrow meaning o f practical use ( ), nor in the sense of s- as moral action: , is all doing, pursuing, and enduring, w hich also includes , finally: 5. : According to the characterization run ning through these four, w e m ust also say here of : The things in sofar as they . . . but the ques tion is: In w hat respect? In every case w e realize that the m athem atical concerns \ things, and in a definite respect. W ith the question con cerning the m athem atical w e move w ithin our original question "W h at is a thing? In what respect are things taken when they are viewed and spoken o f m athem at ically? We are long used to thinking of numbers when w e think o f the m athem atical. The m athem atical and numbers are obviously connected. Only the question rem ains: Is this connection because the m athem atical is numerical in char acter, or, on the contrary, is the num erical som ething m athem atical? The second is the case. But in sofar as num bers are in a w ay connected w ith the m athem atical there still rem ains the question: Why precisely are the numbers som ething m athem atical? W hat is the m athem atical itse lf that som ething like numbers m ust be conceived as som e thing m athem atical and are prim arily brought forward as
K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing
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the m athem atical? means learning; , what is learnable. In accord w ith what has been said, this denomi nation is intended of things in sofar as they are learnable. Learning is a kind of grasping and appropriating. But not every taking is a learning. Wc can take a thing, for instance, a rock, take it w ith us and put it in a collection of rocks. We can do the sam e w ith plants. It says in our cookbook that one "ta k e s," i.e., uses. To take m eans in som e w ay to take possession of a thing and have disposal over it. Now, what kind o f taking is learning? ;/ things, insofar as w e learn them. But strictly speaking, we cannot learn a thing, e.g., a weapon; w c can learn only its use. Learning is therefore a w ay o f taking and appropriating in which the use is appropriated. Such appropriation occurs through the using itself. We call it practicing. However, practicing is again only a kind o f learning. Not every learning is a practicing. What is now the essential aspect of learning in the sense o f ? Why is learning a tak ing? What o f the things is taken, and how is it taken? Let us again consider practicing as a kind o f learning. In practicing we take the use o f the weapon, i.e., w e take how to handle it into our possession. We m aster the w ay to handle the weapon. This means that our w ay o f han dling the weapon is focused upon what the weapon itself demands; "w ea p o n " does not mean ju st this individual rifle of a particular serial number, but perhaps the model 98. During the practice w e not only learn to load the rifle, handle the trigger and aim it, not only the manual skill, but, at the sam e time, and only through all this, we become fam iliar with the thing. Learning is alw ays also becom ing fam iliar. Learning has different directions: learning to use and learning to becom e fam iliar. Becom ing fam iliar also has different levels. We becom e fam iliar with a certain individual rille, which is one of a certain model and also a rifle in general. W ith practice, w hich is a learning ol its use, the becom ing fam iliar involved in it re mains within a certain lim it. Generally, the thing becom es
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WHAXIS
A THING?
known in general only in that the learner becom es a good m arksm an. But there is m ore to becom e fam iliar with about the thing the rille i.e., to learn in general, lor ex ample, b a llistics, m echanics, and the chem ical reaction of certain m aterials. Furthermore, one can learn on it what a weapon is, what this particular piece o f equipment is. But is there much else still to learn? There is: How does such a thing w ork? ( Welche Bewandtnis es . .. hat.) But to use the thing, to shoot it, we need not know that. Certainly not. But this does not deny that how it w orks belongs to the thing. When a thing we are practicing to use m ust be produced, in order to provide it so that it can be at ones disposal, the producer must have becom e fam iliar before hand w ith how the thing w o rk s (B ew an d tn is). With re spect to the thing there is a still more b asic fam iliarity, w hatever m ust be learned before, so that there can be such models and their corresponding parts at all; this is a fam iliarity w ith what belongs to a gun as such and what a weapon is. This m ust be known in advance, and m ust be learned, and m ust be teachable. This becoming fam iliar is what m akes it p ossible to produce the thing; and the thing pro duced, in turn, m akes its practice and use possible. What w e learn by practice is only a limited part of what can be learned of the thing. The original b asic learning takes into cognition w hat a thing is. w hat a weapon is, and w h at a thing to be used is. But w e already know that. We do not first learn w hat a weapon is when we becom e fam iliar w ith this rifle or w ith a certain model o f rifle. We already know that in advance and m ust know it; otherw ise we could not perceive the rifle as such at all. Because w e know in ad vance w hat a weapon is, and only in this way, does w hat we see laid out before us becom e visible as w hat it is. Of course, w e know w hat a weapon is only in general and in an indefinite way. When we come to know this in a special and determined w ay, we come to know som ething w hich we really already know. Precisely this "tak in g cog-
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nizancc is the genuine essencc of learning, the s-. The are the things insofar as w e take cognizance of them as w hat we already know them to be in advance, the body as the bodily, the plant-like of the plant, the animal-like of the anim al, the thingness of the thing, and so on. This genuine learning is therefore an extrem ely pecu liar taking, a taking where he who takes only takes what he actually already has. Teaching corresponds to this learn ing. Teaching is a giving, an offering; but what is offered in teaching is not the learnable, for the student is merely instructed to take for him self what he already has. If the student only takes over som ething which is offered he does not learn. He com es to learn only when he experi ences what he takes as som ething he him self already has. True learning only occurs where the taking o f w hat one j already has is a self-giving and is experienced as such. | Teaching, therefore, does not mean anything else than to let the others learn, i.e., to bring one another to learning. Learning is more difficult than teaching; for only he who can truly learn and only as long as he can do it can truly teach. The genuine teacher differs from the pupil only in that he can learn better and that he more genu inely w a n ts to learn. In all teaching, the teacher learns the most. The m ost difficult learning is to com e to know all the w ay w hat we already know. Such learning, w ith which we are here solely concerned, demands sticking rather closely to what appears to be nearest at hand; for instance, to the question o f what a thing is. We stead fastly ask, consider ing its usefulness, the sam e obviously useless question of w hat a thing is, what tools arc, w hat man is, what a work < > l art is, w hat the state and what the world are. I here w as, in ancient tim es, a fam ous Greek scholar who traveled everywhere lecturing. Such people were called Sophists. Once this fam ous Sophist, returning to Athens from a lecture tour in Asia Minor, met Socrates on tbe street. It w a s S o cra tes habit to hang around on the
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THING?
street and to talk w ith people, with a cobbler, for instance, over w hat a shoe is. Socrates had no other topic than what the things are. Are you still standing there, condescend ingly asked the much traveled Sophist of Socrates, "and still saying the sam e thing about the sam e thing? "Y e s, answered Socrates, that I am. But you who are so ex tremely sm art, you never say the sam e thing about the sam e thing." The ), the m athem atical, is that "a b o u t things which we really already know. Therefore we do not first get it out o f things, but, in a certain w ay, w e bring it already w ith us. From this w e can now understand why, for in stance, number is som ething m athem atical. We see three ch airs and say that there are three. W hat "th re e is the three ch airs do not tell us, nor three apples, three ca ts nor any other three things. Moreover, w e can count three things only if w e already know "th re e." In thus grasping the number three as such, w e only expressly recognize som ething which, in som e w ay, w e already have. This rec ognition is genuine learning. The number is som ething in the proper sense learnable, a , i.e., som ething mathe m atical. Things do not help us to grasp "th ree as such, i.e., threeness. "T hree w hat exactly is it? It is the num ber in the natural series o f numbers that stands in third place. In "th ir d ? It is only the third number because it is the three. And "p la ce where do places come from ? "T hree is not the third number, but the first number. "O n e isn t really the first number. For instance, we have before us one loaf o f bread and one knife, this one and, in addition, another one. When w e take both together w e say, "b o th of th ese," the one and the other, but w e do not say, "th ese tw o, or 1 + 1. Only when we add a cup to the bread and the knife do we say " a ll. Now w e take them as a sum, i.e., as a whole and so and so many. Only when w e perceive it from the third is the form er one the first, the form er other the second, so that one and two arise, and "a n d be com es "p lu s, and there arises the p o ssib ility of places and
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of a series. What we now take cognizance o f is not created from any of the things. We take what w e ourselves som e how already have. What m ust be understood as m athe m atical is what w e can learn in this way. We take cognizance o f all this and learn it without re gard for the things. Numbers are the m ost fam iliar form of the m athem atical because, in our usual dealing w ith things, when w e calculate or count, numbers are the closest to that which we recognize in things w ithout creat ing it from them. For this reason numbers are the m ost fam iliar form o f the m athem atical. In this w ay, this m ost fam iliar m athem atical becom es m athem atics. But the essence o f the m athem atical does not lie in number as purely delim iting the pure how m uch, but vice versa. Because number has such a nature, therefore, it belongs to the learnable in the sense o f . Our expression "th e m ath em atical" alw ays has tw o meanings. It means, first, w hat can be learned in the man ner we have indicated, and only in that w ay, and, second, the m anner o f learning and the process itself. The m athe m atical is that evident aspect o f things w ithin which we are alw ays already moving and according to w hich we experience them as things at all, and as such things. The m athem atical is this fundamental position w e take toward things by which w e take up things as already given to us, and as they should be given. Therefore, the m athem atical is the fundamental presupposition of the knowledge of things. Therefore, Plato put over the entrance to his Academy the Words: diritati Let one who has not grasped the m athem atical enter h ere !"1 0 These words do not mean that one m ust be educated in only one sub je ct geom etry but that he m ust grasp that the funda mental condition for the proper p o ssib ility o f knowing is
"' Elias Philosophus, sixth century A .D . Neoplatonist, in Aris totelis Categorias Commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca), A. Busse, ed. (Berlin, 1900), 118.18. Trans.
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the knowledge o f the fundamental presuppositions o f all knowledge and the position we take based on such know l edge. A knowledge which docs not build its foundation knowledgeably, and thereby takes its lim its, is not know l edge but mere opinion. The m athem atical, in the original sense o f learning what one already knows, is the funda mental presupposition o f "a ca d e m ic" work. This saying over the Academ y thus contains nothing more than a hard condition and a clear circum scription o f work. Both have had the consequence that we today, after tw o thousand years, are still not through with this academ ic work and never w ill be so as long as w e take ourselves seriously. This short reflection on the essence o f the m athem atical w as brought about by our m aintaining that the b asic char acter of modern science is the m athem atical. After what has been said, this cannot mean that this science em ploys m athem atics. We posed our question so that, in conse quence o f this basic ch aracter of science, m athem atics in the narrower sense first had to com e into play. Therefore, w e must now show in w h at sense the founda tion of modern thought and knowledge is essentially m ath em atical. With this intention w e shall try to set forth an essential step of modern science in its main outline. This w ill make clear what the m athem atical co n sists o f and how it thus unfolds its essence, but also becom es estab lished in a certain direction. c. The M athem atical Character o f Modern Natural Science; N ewtons First Law o f Motion Modern thought does not appear all at once. Its begin nings stir during the later Sch olasticism o f the fifteenth century; the sixteenth century brings sudden advances as w ell as setback s; but it is only during the seventeenth century that the decisive clarification s and foundations are accom plished. This entire happening finds its first system atic and creative culm ination in the English mathe
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m atician and p h ysicist, Newton, in his m ajor work, Philosophiae N aturalis Principia M athem atica, 1686-87. In the title, "p h ilo so p h y indicates general science (co m pare Philosophia experim entalis " ); " principia" indi cates first principles, the beginning ones, i.e., the very first principles. But these starting principles by no means deal w ith an introduction for beginners. This work w as not only a culm ination o f preceding efforts, but at the sam e time the foundation for the suc ceeding natural science. It has both promoted and limited the development o f natural science. When w e talk about cla ssica l physics today, w e mean the form o f knowledge, questioning, and evidence as Newton established it. When Kant speaks o f "scie n ce , he m eans N ewtons physics. Five years after the publication o f the Critique of Pure Reason, exactly one hundred years after N ewtons Prin cipia, Kant published an essay entitled The M etaphysical Principles of N atural Science (1786). On the b a sis of the position reached in the Critique of Pure Reason it is a conscious supplement and counterpart to N ewtons w ork. At the conclusion o f the preface to his piece Kant expressly refers to Newtons work. The last decade o f K ants crea tivity w a s devoted to this sphere o f inquiry. As w e glance at N ewtons w ork (w e cannot do more here), w e thereby also preview K ants concept of science, and w e look at fundam ental conceptions still valid in physics today, although no longer exclusively so. This work is preceded by a short section entitled "D efi n ition es." These are definitions o f qu antitas materiae, quantitas m otus, force, and, above all, vis centripeta. Then there fo llo w s an additional scholium which contains the series o f fam ous conceptions o f absolute and relative time, absolute and relative space, and finally o f absolute and relative motion. Then fo llo w s a section w ith the title Axiom ata, sive leges m otu s" ("P rin cip le s or L aw s of Motio n "). This contains the proper content o f the work. It is divided into three volum es. The first tw o deal w ith the
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motion o f bodies, de motu corporum, the third w ith the system o f the world, de mundi system ate. Here w e shall merely take a look at the first principle, i.e., that Law o f Motion which Newton sets at the apex of his work. It reads: "C orpus omne prcservare in statu suo quiescendi vel movendi uniform iter in directum , nisi quatenus a viribus im pressis cogitur statum illum m utare. Every body continues in its state of rest, or uni form m otion in a straight line, unless it is com pelled to change that state by force impressed upon it. 1 7 This is called the principle o f inertia ( lex inertiae). The second edition o f this work w as published in 1713, while Newton w as still alive. It included an extended pref ace by Cotes, then professor at Cambridge. In it Cotes says about this b asic principle: "N atu ra lex est ab om nibus recepta p hilosophis." ( It is a law o f nature universally received by all philosophers. ) Students o f physics do not puzzle over this law today and have not for a long time. If w e mention it at all and know anything about it, that and to w hat extent it is a fundamental principle, w e consider it self-evident. And yet, one hundred years before Newton, at the apex o f his physics, put this law in this form, it w a s still unknown. It w a s not even Newton him self who discovered it, but Galileo; the latter, however, applied it only in his last w o rks and did not even express it as such. Only the Gen oese Professor Baliani articulated this discovered law in general term s. Descartes then took it into his Principia Philosophiae and tried to ground it m etaphysically. With Leibniz it plays the role o f a m etaphysical law (C. I. Gerhardt, Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz [B erlin, 1875-1890], IV, 518). This law, however, w a s not at all self-evident even in the
17 Isaac Newton, M athematical Principles of Natural Philoso phy and His System of the World, Andrew Motte, trans., 1729; revised translation, Florian Cajori (Berkeley: University of Cali fornia Press, 1946), p. 13. Trans.
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seventeenth century. During the preceding fifteen hundred years it w as not only unknown, but Nature and Being in general were experienced in such a w ay that it would have been senseless. In its discovery and its establishm ent as the fundam ental law lay a revolution that belongs to the greatest in human thought, and which first provides the ground for the turning from the Ptolem aic to the Copcrnican conception o f the universe. To be sure, the law of inertia and its definition already had their predecessors in ancient tim es. Certain fundam ental principles o f Democ ritus (460-370 b.c.) tend in this direction. It has also been shown that G alileo and his age (p artly directly and partly indirectly) knew o f the thought of Dem ocritus. But, as is alw ays the case, that which can already be found in the older philosophers is seen only when one has newly thought it out for him self. Kant spoke very clearly about this fundam ental fact in the h istory of thought when, after the publication o f his main w ork, som e contem poraries reproached him for saying only w hat Leibniz had " a l ready said. In order to oppose Kant in this w a y Professor Eberhardt of Halle, a disciple o f the WolfT-Leibniz school, founded a special journal, the Philosophische Magazin. The criticism of Kant w as so superficial and, at the sam e time, so arrogant that it found considerable response among ordinary people. When this a ctivity went too far, Kant decided to take up the "d isg u stin g " w ork of a po lemic w ith the title: On a Discovery, According to Which All New Critique of Pure Reason Is Made Dispensable by an Older One. The essay begins as follow s: "H err Eberhardt has made the discovery that Leibnizian philosophy also contains a critique o f reason ju st as the recent one, which, in addition, introduces a dogmaism based upon an exact an alysis o f the p ossib ility o f knowledge, which contains all the truth of the latter, but even beyond that contains a well-grounded enlargement of the sphere o f the understanding. How it could happen that people had not long ago seen these things in that great
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m ans philosophy and its daughter, the Wolffian philos ophy, is not explained by him. But how many discoveries, taken as new, are now seen by som e clever interpreters very clearly in ancient ones after it had been indicated to them what to look fo r! 1 8 This also w a s the case during the age o f Galileo. After the new inquiries were made, people could then again read Dem ocritus. A fter people understood Dem ocritus w ith the help of Galileo they could reproach the latter for not really reporting anything new. All great insights and discoveries are not only usually thought by several people at the same time, they m ust also be re-thought in that unique effort to truly say the sam e thing about the sam e thing. d. The Difference Between the Greek Experience of Nature and That o f Modern Times d,. The experience o f nature in A ristotle and Newton How does the aforem entioned fundamental law relate to the earlier conception o f nature? The idea o f the uni verse (w o rld ) w hich reigned in the W est up to the seven teenth century w a s determined by Platonic and A ristote lian philosophy. Scientific conceptional thought w as especially guided by those fundam ental representations, concepts and principles which A ristotle had set forth in his lectures on physics and the heavens {De C aelo), and which w ere taken over by the m edieval Sch olastics. We m ust, therefore, brielly go into the fundam ental con ceptions of A risto tle in order to evaluate the significance o f the revolution articulated in N ewtons First Law. But w e must first liberate ourselves from a prejudice which w a s partly nourished by modern scien ces sharp criticism
,R Uber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ltere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll," Kant, Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin and Leipzig: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1923), VIII, 187. Trans.
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o f A ristotle: that his propositions were merely concepts he thought up, which lacked any support in the things them selves. This might be true of later medieval Sch olasticism , which often, in a purely dialectical way, w as concerned w ith a foundationless an alysis o f concepts. It is certainly not true o f A ristotle him self. Moreover, A ristotle fought in his tim e precisely to make thought, inquiry, and asser tion alw ays a Xt'/etv r o t s &. (De Cclo 7, 306 a, 6.) ("T o say that which corresponds to w hat show s itself on w hat is. ) I !> In the sam e place, A ristotle expressly says: 81
noirjTUcij9 \<7]
to
Ipyov,
>/*>
to
, (1
. (Ibid., 7,306 a, 16-17.) ("A n d that issue, w hich in the case of productive knowledge is the product, in the knowledge o f nature is the unim peachable evidence o f the senses as to each fa ct. )-0 We have heard (p. 70 f.) that the Greeks characterize the things as and , such as occurs from out of itself, or such as is produced (w a s her-g estellt, gemacht w ird). Corresponding to this there are tw o different kinds of knowledge ('), knowledge o f what occurs from out o f itse lf and knowledge o f w hat is produced. Corre sponding to this the < of knowledge, i.e., that whereby this knowledge com es to an end, where it stop s, what it really depends on, is different. Therefore, the above princi ple states, "T hat at which productive knowledge com es to a halt, wherein, from the beginning it halts or takes its looting, is the work to be produced. That, however, in which the knowledge o f nature takes its foothold is , w hat sh ow s itse lf on that which occurs out o f selI - This is alw ays predominant, the standard, especially for perception, i.e., for the mere taking-in-and-up (in contradistinction to making and concerning oneself busily
Translation of Heideggers rendition. Trans. '' Unless otherwise stated, all following references to the works Aristotle are to The Works of Aristotle, W. D. Ross, ed. and trans., 11 vol. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931). Trans.
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w ith creating on the things) (im Unterschied zum Machen und Sich-zu-schaffen-machen an den Dingen). What A ris totle here expresses as a b asic principle of scientific method differs in no w ay from the principles of modern science. Newton w rites (Prin cipia U ber III, Regulae IV ): "In philosophia experimentale propositiones ex phaeno m enis per inductionem collectae non obstan tibu s contrariis hypothesibus pro veris aut accurate aut quamproximc haberi debent, donec alia occurrerint phaeno mena, per quae aut accuratiores reddedantur aut excep tionibus abnoxiae. ( In experimental philosophy w e are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurate or very nearly true, notw ith standing contrary hypotheses that m ay be imagined, till such tim es as other phenomena occur, by w hich they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions. ) But despite th is sim ilar b a sic attitude toward proce dure, the b asic position o f A ristotle is essen tially different from that o f Newton. For w hat is actually apprehended as appearing and how it is interpreted are not the same. d2. The doctrine o f motion in A ristotle Nevertheless there is beforehand the common experi ence that what is, in the general sense o f Nature earth, sky, and stars is in motion or at rest. Rest means only a special case o f m otion. It is everywhere a question o f the m otion of bodies. But how motion and bodies are to be conceived and w hat relation they have to each other is not established and not self-evident. From the general and indefinite experience that things change, come into exist ence and pass aw ay, thus are in motion, it is a long w a y to an insight into the essence of motion and into the manner o f its belonging to things. The ancient Greek conception of the earth is o f a disc around which floats Okeanos. The sky overarches it and turns around it. Later Plato, A ris
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totle, and Eudoxus though cach differently present the earth as a ball but still as a center o f everything. We restrict ourselves to the presentation of the Aristotlelian conception w hich later becam e w idely dominant, and this only sufficiently to show the contrast w hich ex presses itse lf in the first axiom o f Newton. First, we ask, in general, w hat, according to A ristotle, is the essence o f a thing in nature? The answ er is: r < are Kara . ( ThoSC bodies which be long to nature and constitute it are, in them selves, m ov able w ith respect to location . ) Motion, in general, is ', the alteration o f som ething into som ething else. Motion in this wide sense is, for instance, turning pale and blushing. But it is also an alteration when a body is transferred from one place to another. This being trans ported is expressed in Greek as . * - means in Greek w hat constitutes the proper motion of Newton ian bodies. In this motion there lies a definite relation to the place. The motion o f bodies, however, is , ac cording to them, them selves. That is to say, how a body moves, i.e., how it relates to the place and to w hat it re lates all this has its b a sis in the body itself. B asis (Grund) is and has a double meaning: that from w hich som ething emerges, and that w hich governs over w hat emerges in this w ay. The body is / . What an K tinpnuvi in this manner is, is , the prim ordial mode o f emergence (H ervorgehens), which however re mains lim ited only to pure movement in space. Herein there appears an essential transform ation o f the concept ol physics. The body m oves according to its nature. A moving body, which is itse lf an , is a natural body. The purely earthy body m oves downward, the purely fiery body as every blazing llame dem onstrates moves upward. W hy? Because the earthy has its place below, the fiery, above. Each body has its place according /< >its kind, and it strives toward that place. Around the
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earth is w ater, around this, the air, and around this, fire the four elements. When a body m oves in its place, this motion accords w ith nature, < /> < W . A rock falls down to the earth. However, if a rock is thrown upward by a sling, this motion is essen tially against the nature o f the rock, irapa . All m otions against nature are , vio lence. The kind o f motion and the place o f the body arc deter mined according to its nature. The earth is in the center for all characterization and evaluation o f motion. The rock W'hich falls m oves toward this center, *V ! < >. The fire which rises, , m oves aw ay from the center. In both cases the motion is , in a straight line. But the stars and the entire heavens move around the center, t o . This motion is . Circular motion and mo tion in a straight line are the sim ple m ovements, . Of these two, circu lar motion is fiVst, that is, the highest, and thus, o f the highest order. For v < >rtKwv , the complete precedes the incomplete. Their place belongs to the motion o f bodies. In circular motion the body has its place in the motion itself, wherefore this motion is per petual, and really existent. In rectilinear motion the place lies only in a direction and aw ay from another place, so that motion com es to an end there. Besides these two form s of sim ple motion, there are m ixtures of both, . The purest motion, in the sense o f change of place, is circu lar motion; it contains, as it were, its place in itself. A body w hich so m oves itself, m oves itse lf com pletely. This is true of all celestial bodies. Compared to this, earthy m otion is alw ays in a straight line, or mixed, or forced, but alw ays incomplete. There is an essential difference between the motion of celestial bodies and earthly bodies. The domains o f these m otions are different. How a body m oves depends upon its species and the place to which it belongs. The where de termines the how of its being, for being is called presence {Anwesenheit). The moon does not fall earthward, be
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cause it m oves in a circle, that is, it moves com pletely, permanently in the sim plest motion. This circu lar motion is in itse lf com pletely independent o f anything outside it self for instance, from the earth as center. But, in con trast, to anticipate, in modern thought circular motion is understood only so that a perpetual attracting force (Zug) from the center is necessary for its form ation and preser vation. W ith A ristotle, however, this "fo rce , , the cap acity for its m otion, lies in the nature of the body itself. The kind o f motion o f the body and its relation to its place depend upon the nature of the body. The velocity o f nat ural m otion increases the nearer the body com es to its place, that is, increase and decrease of velocity and the ceasing o f m otion depend upon the nature of the body. A motion contrary to nature, i.e., a forced m otion, has its cause in the force that affects it. However, according to its motion, the body, driven forcibly, m ust w ith d raw from this power, and since the body itse lf does not bring w ith it any b a sis for this forced motion, its motion m ust neces sarily becom e slow er and finally Stop: yap fipahvTipov (Ilcpi As, 277 b, 6. , ibid., _ > , 269 b, 9). This corre sponds d istin ctly to the comm on conception: a m otion im parted to a body continues for a certain time and then ceases, passing over into a state o f rest. Therefore, we must look for the cau ses for the continuation or endur ance o f the motion. According to A ristotle, the basis for natural motion lies in the nature o f the body itself, in its essence, in its m ost proper being (seinem eigensten Sein ). A later Sch olastic proposition is in accord w ith this: Operari (agere) sequitur esse. "The kind o f motion fol lows from the kind o f being. d;i. N ew tons doctrine o f motion How does A risto tles descriptive observation o f nature and concept o f motion relate to the modern one, which
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got an essential foundation in the first axiom o f Newton? We shall try to present in order a few main distinctions. For this purpose w e give the axiom an abridged form: Every body left to itse lf moves uniform ly in a straight line. ("C orpu s omne, quod a viribus im pressis non cogitur, uniform iter in directum m ovetur. ) We shall discuss what is new in eight points: 1. N ewtons axiom begins w ith "corpu s om ne," "every body. That means that the distinction between earthly and celestial bodies has become obsolete. The universe is no longer divided into tw o w ell-separated realm s, the one beneath the stars, the other the realm o f the stars them selves. All natural bodies are essen tially o f the sam e kind. The upper realm is not a superior one. 2. In accord w ith this, the priority of circu lar motion over m otion in a straight line also disappears. And, even in sofar as now, in reverse, m otion in a straight line becom es decisive, still this does not lead to a division o f bodies and of different domains according to their kind of motion. 3. Accordingly, the distinguishing of certain places also disappears. Each body can fundam entally be in any place. The concept of place itse lf is changed: place no longer is where the body belongs according to its nature, but only a position in relation to other positions. (Compare points 5 and 7). < > and change o f place in the modern sense are not the same. With respect to the cau sation and determ ination of m o tion, one does not ask for the cause o f the continuity of m o tion and, therefore, for its perpetual occurrence, but the reverse: being in motion ( B ew egtheit ) is presupposed, and one a sk s for the cau ses of a change from m otion pre supposed as uniform, and in a straight line. The circu larity of the m oon's motion does not cause its uniform perpetual motion around the earth. Precisely the reverse. It is this motion for w hose cause w e must search. According to the law of inertia, the body of the moon should move from
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every point o f its circular orbit in a straight line, i.e., in the form o f a tangent. Since the moon does not do so, the question based upon the presupposition o f the law of inertia and out o f it arises: Why does the moon decline from the line o f a tangent? Why does it move, as the Greeks put it, in a circle? The circular movement is now not cause but, on the contrary, precisely w hat requires a reason. (W e know that Newton arrived at a new an sw er when he proposed that the force according to which bodies fall to the ground is also the one according to which the celestial bodies remain in their orbits: grav ity. Newton compared the centripetal declination o f the moon from the tangent o f its orbit during a fraction o f time w ith this linear distance which a falling body achieves at the surface o f earth in an equal time. A t this point we see im m ediately the elim ination o f the distin c tion already mentioned between earthly and celestial m o tions and thus between bod ies.) 4. M otions them selves are not determined according to different natures, cap acities, and forces, the elem ents o f the body, but, in reverse, the essence o f force is deter mined by the fundam ental law o f m otion: Every body, left to itself, m oves uniform ly in a straight line. Accord ing to this, a force is that w hose im pact results in a decli nation from rectilinear, uniform motion. "V is im pressa est actio in corpus exercita, ad mutandum eius statum vel quiescendi vel movendi uniform iter in directum (P rin ci pia, Def. IV ).2 1 This new determ ination o f force leads at the sam e time to a new determ ination of m ass. 5. Corresponding to the change o f the concept o f place, motion is only seen as a change of position and relative position, as distances between places. Therefore, the de termination o f motion develops into one regarding dis tances, stretches o f the m easurable, of the so and so large.
Jl "An impressed force is an action exerted upon a body, in order to change its state, either of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line. Trans.
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Motion is determined as die amount o f motion, and, sim i larly, m ass as weight. 6. Therefore, the difference between natural and against nature, i.e., forced, is also elim inated; the , vio lence, is as force only a measure of the change o f motion and is no longer special in kind. The im pact, for instance, is only a particular form o f the vis im pressa, along w ith pressure and centripetality. 7. Therefore, the concept of nature in general changes. Nature is no longer the inner principle out of w hich the motion o f the body follow s; rather, nature is the mode of the variety o f the changing relative positions of bodies, the manner in w hich they are present in space and time, which them selves are domains o f p ossible positional orders and determ inations of order and have no special traits any where. 8. Thereby the manner of questioning nature also changes and, in a certain respect, becom es opposite. We cannot set forth here the full im plications o f the revolution o f inquiry into nature. It should have become clear only that, and how, the application of the first law of motion im plies all the essential changes. All these changes are linked together and uniform ly based on the new b asic position expressed in the first law and w hich we call m athem atical. e. The Essence of the M athem atical Project (E n tw u r f)'2 (G alileos Experiment w ith Free F all) For us, for the moment, the question concerns the ap plication o f the First Law, more precisely, the question in w hat sense the m athem atical becom es decisive in it.
22 Perhaps the best insight as to what Heidegger means by "p roject is Kants use of the word in the Critique of Pare Reason. When Galileo experimented with b alls whose weight he him self had already predetermined, when Torricelli caused the
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How about this law ? It speaks o f a body, corpus quod a viribus im pressis non cogitur, a body w hich is left to itself. Where do we find it? There is no such body. There is also no experiment w hich could ever bring such a body to direct perception. But modern science, in contrast to the mere dialectical poetic conception of medieval Sch o lasti cism and science, is supposed to be based upon experience. Instead, it has such a law at its apex. This law speaks of a thing that does not exist. It demands a fundam ental repre sentation o f things w hich contradict the ordinary. The m athem atical is based on such a claim , i.e., the ap plication o f a determ ination of the thing, w hich is not experientially created out o f the thing and yet lies at the base o f every determ ination o f the things, m aking them possible and m aking room for them. Such a fundam ental conception o f things is neither arbitrary nor self-evident. Therefore, it required a long controversy to bring it into
air to carry a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite column of water, or, at a later time, when Stahl converted metal into lime and this again into metal by withdrawing something and then adding it, a light broke in on all investigators of nature. They learned that reason only gains insight into what it produces itself according to its own projects (w as sie selbst nach ihrem Entwrfe hervorbringt); that it must go before with principles of judgment according to constant laws, and constrain nature to reply to its questions, not content to merely follow her leading-strings (B XIII). Literally Entwurf means "a throwing forth; from werfen (to throw) and ent- (indicating separation or severing in the sense of "o u t," "aw a y ," from ," "fo rth "). In present day use it is a sketch, and the word "sk e tch is som etim es used in this transla tion, as well as "p ro ject and "p rojection." Originally a textile term referring to the building of a frame, in the seventeenth cen tury it (entwerfen) took the sense of a preliminary or preparatory sketch. As Heidegger uses it in ST., 145, it is a sketching which is a throwing forth of Dasein in which it "throw s before itself the pos sibility as possibility and as such allow s it to be. It is through understanding as project that the structure of the being of en tities, including Dasein, becomes accessible. Project is construc tive in that it allow s the possibilities of entities to be; in the case ol Dasein to achieve its openness to its own being ( See KM, pp. 209-10). Trans.
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power. It required a change in the mode o f approach to things along w ith the achievement o f a new manner of thought. We can accurately follow the history ol this b at tle. Let us cite one example from it. In the A ristotelian view, bodies move according to their nature, the heavy ones downward, the light ones upward. When both fall, heavy ones fall faster than light ones, since the latter have the urge to move upward. It becom es a decisive insight of Galileo that all bodies fall equally fast, and that the differ ences in the time o f fall only derive from the resistance of the air, not from the different inner natures o f the bodies or from their own corresponding relation to their p artic ular place. G alileo did his experiment at the leaning tower in the town o f Pisa, where he w a s professor o f m athe m atics, in order to prove his statem ent. In it bodies o f dif ferent w eights did not arrive at precisely the sam e time after having fallen from the tower, but the difference in time w a s slight. In spite o f these differences and therefore really against the evidence of experience, Galileo upheld his proposition. The w itn esses to this experiment, how ever, becam e really perplexed by the experiment and Gal ileos upholding his view. They persisted the more o b sti nately in their former view . By reason of this experiment the opposition toward G alileo increased to such an extent that he had to give up his professorship and leave Pisa. Both G alileo and his opponents saw the sam e fa ct. But they interpreted the sam e fact differently and made the sam e happening visib le to them selves in different w ays. Indeed, w hat appeared for them as the essential fact and truth w a s som ething different. Both thought som e thing along w ith the sam e appearance but they thought som ething different, not only about the single case, but fundam entally, regarding the essence o f a body and the nature o f its motion. What Galileo thought in advance about m otion w as the determ ination that the m otion of every body is uniform and rectilinear, when every ob stacle is excluded, but that it also changes uniform ly
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when an equal force afTects it. In his D iscorsi, which ap peared in 1638, G alileo said: "M o bile super planum hori zontale projectum mente concipio omni secluso impedi mento, jam con stat ex his, quae fusius alibi dicta sunt, illius motum aequabilem et perpetuum super ipso plano futurum esse, si planum in infinitum extendatur." ( " I think o f a body thrown on a horizontal plane and every obstacle excluded. This results in w hat has been given a detailed account in another place, that the motion of the body over this plane would be uniform and perpetual if this place were extended infinitely. ) In this proposition, which m ay be considered the ante cedent o f the F irst Law o f Newton, w hat w e have been looking for is clearly expressed. Galileo says: Mobile mente concipio omni secluso im pedim ento." ("I think in my mind o f som ething m oveable that is entirely left to it self. ) This " to think in the m ind ( Sich-im-Geiste-denken ) is that giving-oneself-a-cognition ( Sich-selbst-eine-Kenntnis geben) about a determ ination o f things. It is a pro cedure o f going ahead in advance, w hich Plato once characterized regarding in the follow ing way: avros (( ( Meno 85d), bringing up and taking up above and beyond the other taking the knowledge itse lf from out o f him self. ) There is a prior grasping together in this mente con cipere o f w hat should be uniform ly determ inative of each body as such, i.e., for being bodily. All bodies are alike. No motion is special. Every place is like every other, each moment like any other. Every force becom es determ inable only by the change o f motion w hich it causes this change in motion being understood as a change o f place. All de term inations o f bodies have one b asic blueprint ( Grund r is s ), according to which the natural process is nothing but the space-tim e determ ination o f the motion of points ol m ass. This fundam ental design o f nature at the sam e time circu m scribes its realm as everywhere uniform. Now ii w e sum m arize at a glance all that has been said,
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w e can grasp the essence of the m athem atical more sharply. Up to now we said only its general characteristic, that it is a taking cognizance o f som ething, w hat it takes being som ething it gives to itself from itself, thereby giv ing to itse lf what it already has. We now sum m arize the fuller essential determ ination o f the m athem atical in a few separate points: 1. The m athem atical is, as mente concipere, a project ( E n tw u rf ) o f thingness ( D ingheit ) which, as it were, skips over the things. The project first opens a domain (Sp iel raum ) where things i.e., fa cts show themselves. 2. In this projection there is posited that which things are taken as, w hat and how they are to be evaluated (w rd ig t) beforehand. Such evaluation (W rdigen) and taking-for (D afrhalten ) is called in Greek . The an ticipating determ inations and assertion s in the project arc $. Newton therefore entitles the section in which he presents the fundamental determ inations about things as moved: Axiom ata, sive leges motus. The p roject is axio m atic. Insofar as every science and cognition is expressed in propositions, the cognition which is taken and posited in the m athem atical p roject is o f such a kind as to set things upon their foundation in advance. The axiom s are fundam ental propositions. 3. As axiom atic, the m athem atical p roject is the an tici pation ( V orausgriff ) of the essence o f things, o f bodies; thus the b asic blueprint (G run driss) o f the structure of every thing and its relation toeveryoth er thingis sketched in advance. 4. This b a sic plan (G run driss) at the sam e time pro vides the m easure for laying out o f the realm, which, in the future, w ill encom pass all things o f that sort. Now nature is no longer an inner cap acity of a body, determining its form of m otion and place. Nature is now the realm of the uniform space-tim e context of motion, w hich is outlined in the axiom atic project and in which alone bodies can be bodies as a part o f it and anchored in it.
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5. This realm o f nature, axiom atically determined in outline by this project, now also requires for the bodies and corpuscles w ithin it a mode o f access ( Zugangsart ) appropriate to the axiom atically predetermined objects. The mode o f questioning and the cognitive determination of nature are now no longer ruled by traditional opinions and concepts. Bodies have no concealed qu alities, powers, and cap acities. Natural bodies are now only w hat they sh ow them selves as, w ithin this projected realm. Things now show them selves only in the relations o f places and time points and in the m easures o f m ass and working forces. How they show them selves is prefigured in the project. Therefore, the project also determines the mode o f taking in and studying o f w hat show s itself, experience, the experiri. However, because inquiry is now predeter mined by the outline of the project, a line o f questioning can be instituted in such a w ay that it poses conditions in advance to w hich nature m ust answ er in one w ay or an other. Upon the b a sis of the m athem atical, the experientia becom es the modern experiment. Modern science is ex perimental because o f the m athem atical project. The experimenting urge to the fa cts is a necessary conse quence o f the preceding m athem atical skipping ( ber springen ) o f all facts. But where this skipping ceases or becom es weak, mere facts as such are collected, and positivism arises. 6. Because the project establish es a uniform ity o f all bodies according to relations o f space, time, and motion, it also m akes p ossible and requires a universal uniform m easure as an essential determinant of things, i.e., numer ical measurement. The m athem atical project o f N ew tonian bodies leads to the development o f a certain m ath e m a tics" in the narrow sense. The new form o f modern science did not arise because m athem atics becam e an es sential determinant. Rather, that m athem atics, and a par ticular kind o f m athem atics, could come into play and had come into play is a consequence o f the m athem atical
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project. The founding of analytical geom etry by D escartes, the founding o f the infinitesim al calculus by Newton, the sim ultaneous founding of the differential calculus by Leib niz all these novelties, this m athem atical in a narrower sense, first becam e p ossible and, above all, necessary, on the grounds of the basically m athem atical character of the thinking. We would certainly fall into great error if w e were to think that w ith this characterization of the reversal from ancient to modern natural science and w ith this sharp ened essential outline of the m athem atical w e had already gained a picture o f the actual science itself. W hat w e have been able to cite is only the fundamental outline along w hich there unfolds the entire richness of posing questions and experiments, establishing o f law s and disclosing o f new d istricts of w hat is. W ithin this fundamental m athem atical position the questions about the nature of space and time, motion and force, body and m atter remain open. These questions now receive a new sharpness; for instance, the question whether m otion is sufficiently form ulated by the designation change of loca tion. Regarding the concept o f force, the question arises whether it is sufficient to represent force only as a cause that is effective only from the outside. Concerning the b a sic law o f m otion, the law o f inertia, the question arises whether this law is not to be subordinated under a more general one, i.e., the law o f the conservation o f energy w hich is now determined in accordance w ith its expendi ture and consum ption, as w ork a name for new b a sic representations which now enter into the study of nature and betray a notable accord w ith econom ics, w ith the calcu lation o f success. All this develops w ithin and ac cording to the fundamental m athem atical position. What rem ains questionable in all this is a closer determ ination o f the relation of the m athem atical in the sense of m athe m atics to the intuitive direct perceptual experience ( zur anschaulichen E rfahrung ) o f the given things and to these
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things themselves. Up to this hour such questions have been open. Their qu estionability is concealed by the re su lts and the progress o f scientific work. One o f these burning questions concerns the ju stification and lim its o f m athem atical form alism in contrast to the demand for an immediate return to intuitively-* given nature ( anschau lich gegebene N atur). If w e have grasped som e of w hat has been said up till now, then it is understandable that the question cannot be decided by w ay o f an eith er/or, either form alism or immediate intuitive determ ination o f things; for the na ture and direction o f the m athem atical project participate in deciding their p ossible relation to the intuitively experi enced and vice versa. Behind this question concerning the relation o f m athem atical form alism to the intuition o f na ture stand s the fundam ental question o f the ju stification and lim its o f the m athem atical in general, w ithin a funda mental position we take toward w hat is, as a whole. But, in this regard the delineation of the m athem atical has gained an im portance for us. f. The M etaphysical Meaning o f the M athem atical To reach our goal, the understanding o f the m athem at ical as we have gained it up to now is not sufficient. To be sure, we shall now no longer conceive o f it as a generaliza tion o f the procedure o f a particular m athem atical d isci pline, but rather the particular discipline as a particular form developing from the m athem atical. But this m athe m atical m ust, in turn, be grasped from causes that lie even deeper. We have said that it is a fundamental trait o f mod ern thought. Every sort o f thought, however, is alw ays only the execution and consequence o f the h istorical mode -:t Anschauen: "looking at. The usual English translation, "in tuition, comes from the Latin in and tueor ("to see," "look, 'gaze ). Intuition refers to immediate perception in contrast to conceptual inference. Trans.
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of being ( D asein ) at that time, of the fundam ental posi tion taken toward what is and toward the w ay in W'hich w h at is, is m anifest as such, i.e., to the truth. What w e have exhibited as the m athem atical m ust now receive a clarification in this direction; for only in this w ay w ill w hat w e are looking for becom e visible: precisely that form ation o f modern m etaphysical thought in w hose train som ething like the Critique o f Pure Reason could and had to arise. f,. The principles: new freedom, self-binding and self-grounding We inquire, therefore, about the m etaphysical meaning o f the m athem atical in order to evaluate its im portance for modern m etaphysics. We divide the question into tw'o subordinate ones: (1 ) What new fundam ental position of Dasein show s itse lf in this rise o f the dominance o f the m athem atical? (2 ) How does the m athem atical, accord ing to its own inner direction, drive toward an ascent to a m etaphysical determ ination o f Dasein? The second question is the more im portant for us. We sh all answ er the first one only in the m erest outline. Up to the distin ct emergence of the m athem atical as a fundam ental ch aracteristic o f thought, the authoritative truth w as considered that o f Church and faith. The means for the proper knowledge o f w'hat is w ere obtained by w ay o f the interpretation o f the sources of revelation, the w rit and the tradition of the Church. W hatever more experience and knowledge had been won adjusted itse lf (a s if by it s e lf) to this fram e. For b asically there w a s no w orldly knowledge. The so-called natural knowledge not based upon any revelation, therefore, did not have its ow'n form o f in tellig ibility or grounds for itself, let alone from out of itself. Thus, w hat is decisive for the h istory o f science is not that all truth of natural knowledge w'as measured by the supernatural. Rather it is that this natural knowledge,
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disregarding this criterion, arrived at no independent foundation and character out of itself. For the taking over o f the A ristotelian syllogism cannot be reckoned as such. In the essence o f the m athem atical, as the project w e delineated, lies a specific w ill to a new form ation and self grounding o f the form of knowledge as such. The detach ment from revelation as the first source for truth and the rejection o f tradition as the authoritative means o f know l edge all these rejections are only negative consequences o f the m athem atical project. He w ho dared to project the m athem atical project put him self as the p rojector of this project upon a base which is first projected only in the project. There is not only a liberation in the m athem atical project, but also a new experience and form ation of free dom itself, i.e., a binding with obligations which are selfimposed. In the m athem atical p roject develops an obliga tion to principles demanded by the m athem atical itself. According to this inner drive, a liberation to a new free dom, the m athem atical strives out o f itse lf to establish its own essence as the ground o f itse lf and thus o f all know l edge. Therewith w e com e to the second question: How does the m athem atical, according to its own inner drive, move toward an ascent to a m etaphysical determ ination of Dasein? We can abridge this question as follow s: In what w ay does modern m etaphysics arise out o f the spirit o f the m athem atical? It is already obvious from the form of the question that m athem atics could not become the stan dard o f philosophy, as if m athem atical m ethods were only appropriately generalized and then transferred to philosophy. Rather, modern natural science, modern m athem atics, and modern m etaphysics sprang from the sam e root of the m athem atical in the w ider sense. Because m etaphysics, of these three, reaches farth est to w hat is, in to tality and because at the sam e time it also reaches deepest toward the being o f w hat is as such, therefore it is precisely m eta
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p hysics which m ust dig down to the bedrock o f its m athe m atical base and ground. As w e pursue how modern philosophy grow s up from this ground that it has laid in itse lf w e grasp the historical p ossib ility and necessity o f a critique of pure reason. Moreover, we shall com e to understand w hy this w ork has the form it has and w hy w e shall begin our interpretation o f this work at that place at w hich we shall enter it. f,. D escartes: Cogito Stun; " I as a special subject Modern philosophy is usually considered to have begun w ith D escartes (1596-1650), who lived a generation after Galileo. Contrary to the attem pts, which appear from time to time, to have modern philosophy begin w ith M eister Eckhart or in the tim e between Eckhart and D escartes, we m ust adhere to the usual beginning. The only question is how one understands D escartes philosophy. It is no acci dent that the philosophical form ation of the m athem atical foundation o f modern Dasein is prim arily achieved in France, England, and Holland anymore than it is a cci dental that Leibniz received his decisive inspiration from there, especially during his sojourn in Paris from 1672-76. Only because he passed through that w orld and truly ap praised its greatness in greater reflection w a s he in a p osi tion to lay the first foundation for its overcoming. The follow ing is the usual image of D escartes and his philosophy: During the Middle Ages philosophy stood if it stood independently at all under the exclusive domina tion o f theology and gradually degenerated into a mere an alysis of concepts and elucidations of traditional opin ions and propositions. It petrified into an academ ic kn ow l edge which no longer concerned man and w a s unable to illum inate reality as a whole. Then D escartes appeared and liberated philosophy from this disgraceful position. He began by doubting everything, but this doubt finally did run into som ething which could no longer be doubted,
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for, inasm uch as the skeptic doubts, he cannot doubt that he, the skeptic, is present and must be present in order to doubt at all. As I doubt I must adm it that I am . The " I ," accordingly, is the indubitable. As the doubter, Descartes forced men into doubt in this way; he led them to think of themselves, o f their " I . Thus the I, human su bjectivity, cam e to be declared the center o f thought. From here originated the I-viewpoint o f modern tim es and its sub jectivism . Philosophy itself, however, w a s thus brought to the insight that doubting m ust stand at the beginning of philosophy: reflection upon knowledge itse lf and its pos sib ility. A theory o f knowledge had to be erected before a theory o f the world. From then on epistem ology is the foundation of philosophy, and that distinguishes modern from medieval philosophy. Since then, the attem pts to renew Sch olasticism also strive to dem onstrate the episte mology in their system , or to add it where it is m issing, in order to m ake it usable for modern tim es. Accordingly, Plato and A ristotle are reinterpreted as epistem ologists. This story of D escartes, who cam e and doubted and so becam e a su b jectivist, thus grounding epistem ology, does give the usual picture; but at best it is only a bad novel, and anything but a story in w hich the movement o f being becom es visible. The main work o f Descartes carries the title M edita tiones de prima philosophia (1641). Prim a philosophia this is the . of A ristotle, the question concern ing the being o f what is, in the form o f the question concerning the thingness o f things. M editationes de metaphysica nothing about theory o f knowledge. The sen tence or proposition con stitu tes the guide for the question about the being o f what is (fo r the categories). (The essen tial historical-m etaphysical b asis for the priority o f cer tainty, w hich first made the acceptance and m etaphysical development o f the m athem atical p ossible C hristianity and the certain ty of salvation , the secu rity of the individ ual as such w ill not be considered here.)
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In the Middle Ages, the doctrine o f A ristotle w a s taken over in a very special way. In later Sch olasticism , through the Spanish philosophical schools, especially through the Jesuit, Suarez, the "m ed ieval A ristotle w ent through an extended interpretation. D escartes received his first and fundam ental philosophical education from the Jesu its at La Fleche. The title o f his main w ork expresses both his argument w ith this tradition and his w ill to take up anew the question about the being o f w hat is, the thingness of the thing, "su b sta n ce ." But all this happened in the m idst o f a period in which, for a century, m athem atics had already been emerging more and more as the foundation o f thought and w as pressing toward clarity. I tw a s a tim ew h ich .in accordance w ith this free projection of the world, em barked on a new assau lt upon reality. There is nothing o f scep ticism here, nothing o f the I-viewpoint and su b jectivity but ju st the contrary. Therefore, it is the passion o f the new thought and inquiry to bring to clarification and display in its in nerm ost essence the at first dark, unclear, and often m is interpreted fundamental position, which has progressed only by fits and starts. But this means that the m athe m atical w ills to ground itse lf in the sense o f its own inner requirements. It expressly intends to explicate itse lf as the standard of all thought and to establish the rules which thereby arise. D escartes su bstan tially participates in this w ork o f reflection upon the fundam ental meaning o f the m athem atical. Because this reflection concerned the to tality o f w hat is and the knowledge of it, this had to becom e a reflection on m etaphysics. This sim ultaneous advance in the direction o f a foundation o f m athem atics and o f a reflection on m etaphysics above all characterizes his fundam ental philosophical position. We can pursue this clearly in an unfinished early w ork which did not ap pear in print until fifty years after D escartes death (1701). This work is called Regulae ad directionem ingenii.
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(1 ) Regulae: b asic and guiding propositions in which m athem atics subm its itse lf to its own essence; (2 ) ad di rectionem ingenii: laying the foundation of the m athe m atical in order that it, as a whole, becom es the measure o f the inquiring mind. In the enunciation of som ething su b ject to rules as w ell as w ith regard to the inner free determ ination of the mind, the b asic m athem atical-m eta physical character is already expressed in the title. Here, by w ay o f a rellection upon the essence of m athem atics, D escartes grasps the idea o f a scien tia universalis, to w hich everything m ust be directed and ordered as the one authoritative science. Descartes expressly em phasizes that it is not a question o f m athem atica vulgaris but o f m athe m atica universalis. We cannot, here, present the inner construction and the main content o f this unfinished w ork. In it the modern concept o f science is coined. Only one who has really thought through this relentlessly sober volum e long enough, down to its rem otest and coldest corner, fulfills the prerequisite for getting an inkling o f w hat is going on in modern science. In order to convey a notion o f the in tention and attitude o f this work, w e shall quote only three o f the twenty-one rules, namely, the third, fourth, and fifth. Out o f these the b asic character o f modern thought leaps before our eyes. Regula III: "C irca objecta proposita, non quid alii senserint, vel quid ipsi suspicem ur, sed quid clare et evi denter p ossim us intueri, vel certo deducere, quaerendum est; non a liter enim scien tia acq u iritu r." ("Concerning the o b jccts before us, w e should pursue the questions, not what others have thought, nor w hat w e ourselves con jec ture, but w hat w e can clearly and insightfully intuit, or deduce w ith steps o f certainty, for in no other w ay is knowledge arrived a t. ) 4
24 Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, F. P. Lafleur, trans. (Liberal Arts Press, 1961), p. 8. Trans.
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Regula IV: "N ecessaria est methodus ad rerum verita tem investigandam . ("M ethod is necessary for discover ing the truth o f nature. ) This rule does not intend the platitude that a science m ust also have its method, but it w an ts to say that the procedure, i.e., how in general w e are to pursue things (/0o8os), decides in advance what truth w e shall seek out in the things. Method is not one piece o f equipment o f science among others but the prim ary component out o f which is first de termined what can becom e ob ject and how it becom es an object. Regula V : "T ota methodus co n sistit in ordine et disp osi tione eorum ad quae m entis acies est convertenda, ut aliquam veritatem inveniam us. Atquae hanc exacte ser vabim us, si propositiones involutas et obscu ras ad sim p li ciores gradatim reducamus, et deinde ex omnium sim pli cissim arum intuitu ad aliarum omnium cognitionem per eosdem gradus ascendere tentem us. ("M ethod co n sists entirely in the order and arrangement o f that upon w hich the sharp vision o f the mind m ust be directed in order to discover som e truth. But, w e w ill follow such a method only if w e lead complex and obscure propositions back step by step to the sim pler ones and then try to ascend by the sam e steps from the insight of the very sim plest propo sitio n s to the knowledge o f all the others. ) What rem ains decisive is how this reflection on the m athem atical affects the argument w ith traditional m eta physics ( prim a p hilosophia), and how, starting from there, the further destiny and form o f modern philosophy is determined. To the essence o f the m athem atical as a projection be longs the axiom atical, the beginning o f basic principles upon which everything further is based in insightful order. If m athem atics, in the sense o f a m athesis universalis, is to ground and form the whole o f knowledge, then it requires the form ulation o f special axiom s.
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(1 ) They m ust be absolutely first, intuitively evident in and o f them selves, i.e., absolutely certain. This certainty participates in deciding their truth. (2 ) The highest axiom s, as m athem atical, m ust establish in advance, con cerning the whole o f what is, w hat is in being and what being means, from where and how the thingness o f things is determined. According to tradition this happens along guidelines o f the proposition. But up till now, the proposi tion had been taken only as what offered itself, as it were, o f itself. The sim ple proposition about the sim ply present things contains and retains w hat the things are. Like the things, the proposition, too, is present-at-hand (vorhan den): it is the present (vorhanden) container o f being. However, there can be no pre-given things for a b asi cally m athem atical position. The proposition cannot be an arbitrary one. The proposition, and precisely it, m ust itse lf be based on its foundation. It m ust be a b asic principle the b asic principle absolutely. One must therefore find such a principle o f all positing, i.e., a proposition in which that about which it says som ething, the subjectum (), is not ju st taken from som ewhere else. That underlying su bject m ust as such first emerge for itse lf in this original proposition and be established. Only in this w ay is the subjectu m a fundamentum absolutum , purely posited from the proposition as such, a b a sis and, as such, a fundamentum absolutum at the sam e time inconcussum , and thus indubitable and absolutely certain. Because the m athem atical now sets itse lf up as the principle o f all knowledge, all knowledge up to now m ust n ecessarily be put into question, regardless o f whether it is tenable or not. Descartes does not doubt because he is a skeptic; rather, he must becom e a doubter because he posits the mathe m atical a s the absolute ground and seeks fo ra ll knowledge a foundation that w ill be in accord w ith it. It is a question not only o f finding a fundamental law for the realm of nature, but finding the very first and highest b asic prin-
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cip lc for the being of w hat is, in general. This absolutely m athem atical principle cannot have anything in front o f it and cannot allo w w hat might be given to it beforehand. If anything is given at all, it is only the proposition in gen eral as such, i.e., the positing, the position, in the sense o f a thinking that asserts. The positing, the proposition, only has itse lf as that which can be posited. Only where think ing thinks itself, is it absolu tely m athem atical, i.e., a taking cognizance o f that which w e already have. Insofar as thinking and positing directs itse lf toward itself, it finds the following: w hatever and in w hatever sense anything m ay be asserted, this assertin g and thinking is alw ays an " / think." Thinking is alw ays an " I think, ego cogito. Therein lies: I am, sunt. Cogito, sum this is the highest certain ty lying im m ediately in the proposition as such. In "I p o sit the " I as the positer is co- and pre-posited as that which is already present, as w hat is. The being of w hat is is determined out o f the "I am as the certainty of the positing. The form ula which the proposition som etim es has, "C ogito ergo su m ," suggests the m isunderstanding that it is here a question o f inference. That is not the case and cannot be so, because this conclusion would have to have as its m ajor premise: Id quod cogitat, est; and the minor premise: cogito; conclusion: ergo sum. However, the m ajor premise would only be a form al generalization of what lies in the proposition: "co g ito su m ." D escartes h im self em phasizes that no inference is present. The sum is not a consequence of the thinking, but vice versa; it is the ground o f thinking, the fundamentum. In the essence o f positing lies the proposition: I posit. That is a proposi tion w hich does not depend upon som ething given before hand, but only gives to itse lf w hat lies w ithin it. In it lies: 7 p o sit : I am the one who p osits and thinks. This propo sition has the peculiarity o f first positing that about w hich it m akes an assertion, the subjectum . W hat it posits in this case is the The I is the subjectum of the very first prin-
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ciplc. The I is, therefore, a special som ething which under lies (Zugrundeliegendes ) , subjectum the subjectum o f the positing as such. Hence it cam e about that ever since then the " I has especially been called the subjectum , "su b je c t." The character of the ego as what is especially already present before one rem ains unnoticed. Instead the su b jectivity o f the su bject is determined by th e "I-n css (Ich h eit) o f the "I think. That the " I com es to be defined as that which is already present for represen tation (the "o b je ctiv e in today's sen se) is not because of any I-viewpoint or any su b je ctiv istic doubt, but because of the essential predominance and the definitely directed radicalization o f the m athem atical and the axiom atic. This " I , which has been raised to be the special sub jectum on the b asis o f the m athem atical, is, in its meaning, nothing "su b je c tiv e at all, in the sense o f an incidental qu ality o f ju st this particular human being. This "s u b je c t designated in the "I think, this I, is su b je ctiv istic only when its essence is no longer understood, i.e., is not un folded from its origin considered in term s o f its mode of being ( seinsm ssigen H erkunft). Until D escartes every thing present-at-hand for itself w a s a "su b je c t ; but now the " I becom es the special sub ject, that w ith regard to which all the remaining things first determine them selves as such. Because m athem ati cally they first receive their thingness only through the founding relation to the highest principle and its "su b je c t (I ), they are essen tially such as stand as som ething else in relation to the "su b je c t, w hich lie over against it as objectum . The things them selves becom e "o b je c ts. The word objectum now passes through a correspond ing change o f meaning. For up to then the word objectum denoted what w a s thrown up opposite ones mere im agin ing: I im agine a golden mountain. This thus represented an objectum in the language of the Middle Ages is, ac cording to the usage of language today, merely som ething su b jective ; for " a golden m ountain docs not exist "ob-
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jectively in the meaning o f the changed linguistic use. This reversal o f the meanings o f the w ords subjectum and objectum is no mere affair o f usage; it is a radical change of Dasein, i.e., the illum ination (L ich tu n g )-' ol the being of what is on the b asis o f the predominance of the m athe m atical. It is a stretch of the w ay o f actu al history neces sarily hidden from the naked eye, a history which alw ays concerns the openness o f being or nothing at all. f:t. Reason as the highest ground: the principle of the I, the principle o f contradiction The I, as I think, is the ground upon which, hereafter, all certainty and truth becom es based. But thought, asser tion, logos, is, at the sam e time, the guideline for the deter m ination o f being, the categories. These are found by the guideline o f the I think, in viewing the " I . By virtue o f this fundamental significance for the foundation of all knowledge, the I thus becom es the accentuated and essential definition of man. Up to that tim e and later, man had been apprehended as the anim al rationale, as a ra tional living being. With this peculiar em phasis on the I, i.e., w ith the "I think, the determ ination o f the rational and of reason now takes on a distinct priority. For think ing is the fundamental act o f reason. W ith the cogito su m ," reason now becom es explicitly posited according to its own demand as the first ground o f all knowledge and the guideline o f the determ ination o f the things. Already in A ristotle, the assertion, the Aoyos, w a s the guideline for the determ ination of the categories, i.e., the being of what is. However, the locus o f this guideline human reason, reason in general w a s not characterized
28 "To say Dasein is illuminated means that it is illumined in itself as being-in-the-world but not through any other entity, so that it is itself the illumination (Lichtung). What is present-athand hidden in the dark becomes accessible only for an entity illuminated in this way. (SZ., p. 133.) Trans.
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as the su b jectivity o f the subject. But now reason has been expressly set forth as the I think in the highest prin ciple as guideline and court o f appeal for all determina tions o f being. The highest principle is the I principle: cogito sum. It is the fundamental axiom o f all know l edge; but it is not the only fundam ental axiom, sim ply for this one reason, that in this I-principle itse lf there is in cluded and posited w ith this yet another one, and there fore w ith every proposition. When w e say "co g ito su m ," we express what lies in the subjectum (eg o). If the asser tion is to be an assertion, it m ust alw ays posit what lies in the subjectum . What is posited and spoken in the predi cate m ay not and cannot speak against the su bject. The m ust alw ays be such that it avoids the , i.e., saying in the sense of speaking against (Dagegen sprechen), o f contradiction. In the proposition as propo sition, and accordingly in the highest principle as I-principle, there is co-positcd equally b asically as valid the principle o f the avoidance o f contradiction (briefly: the principle o f contradiction). Since the m athem atical as the axiom atic p roject posits itse lf a s the authoritative principle o f knowledge, the positing is thereby established as the thinking, as the 7 think," the I-principle. I think signifies that I avoid con tradiction and follow the principle o f contradiction. The I-principle and the principle o f contradiction spring from the nature o f thinking itself, and in such a w ay that one looks only to the essence o f the I think and w hat lies in it and in it alone. The I think is reason, is its funda mental act, w hat is drawn solely from the I think, is gained solely out o f reason itself. Reason so compre hended is purely itself, pure reason. These principles, w hich in accord w ith the fundamental m athem atical feature o f thinking spring solely from rea son, becom e the principles o f knowledge proper, i.e., philosophy in the prim ary sense, m etaphysics. The prin ciples o f mere reason are the axiom s o f pure reason. Pure
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reason, \- so understood, the proposition in this form, becom es the guideline and standard o f m etaphysics, i.e., the court o f appeal for the determ ination o f the being ol w hat is, the thingness o f things. The question about the thing is now anchored in pure reason, i.e., in the m athe m atical unfolding o f its principles. In the title, "pure reason, lies the -t of A ristotle, and in the pure a certain special form ation of the mathe m atical. 6. The H istory o f the Question About the Thing: Sum m ary The first chapter o f the history o f the question o f the thing is characterized by the m utual relation of the thing and assertion (), the guideline along which the uni versal determ inations o f being (catego ries) are won. The second chapter conceives the assertion, the proposition, in a m athem atical way, as principle; and accordingly sets forth the principles which lie in the essence of thinking, of the proposition, as such, i.e., the I-principle and the principle o f con tradiction. W ith Leibniz there is added the principle of sufficient reason ( Satz vom Grund), which is also already co-posited in the essence of a proposition as a principle. These propositions originate purely out o f mere reason, w ithout the help o f a relation to som ething pre viously given before one. They are a pure self-giving of that which thinking in its essence already has in itself. It now rem ains to characterize the third chapter in the history of the question of the thing, i.e., to show how a critique o f pure reason could and had to develop from this determ ination of things out of pure reason. For this pur pose it is necessary that w e acquire,although only roughly, an idea of how modern m etaphysics developed according to the m athem atical foundation from Descartes. The philosophical fundam ental axiom s, i.e., the abso lute axiom s, are the I-principle, the principle of contradic tion, and the principle o f sufficient reason. The whole of
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m etaphysics is to be based on them so that these axiom s also dom inate throughout the inner structure of m eta physics, i.e., the cognitive form ation of its entire domain. Up to now this has hardly been mentioned. We have only said that m etaphysics is the question concerning what is, as the w hole and o f the being o f what is. But how do w e mean this, w h at is as a w hole? In the description o f the turn from the earlier knowledge about nature to modern thought, we lim ited ourselves to a part o f what is. Not only that, w e also did not report how this lim ited district (n atu re) belongs into the whole o f what is. However, since the ascendancy o f C hristianity in the W est, not only throughout the medieval period but also through all o f modern philosophy, nature and universe were considered as created. Modern m etaphysics from D escartes to Kant, and also the m etaphysics o f German Idealism after Kant, are unthinkable w ithout the Christian ideas that underlie them. Yet the relation to the dogma of the Church can be very loose, even broken. According to the predominance of the Christian concept of w hat is, a certain hierarchy and arrangement enters into what is, as a whole. W hat is most real and highest is the creative source of all that is, the one personal God as spirit and creator. All o f w hat is that is not godlike is the created. But among all that is created, one is distinctive. This is man, and it is because his eternal salvation is in question. God as the creator, the world as the created, man and his eternal salvation; these are the th ree dom ains defined by Christian thought w ithin what is, as a whole. Since m etaphysics ask s about w hat is, as a whole, w hat it is, w hy it is as it is, m etaphysics proper, in a C hristian sense, is concerned w ith God (th eology), the world (co sm olo gy), and man and his salvation (p sych ol ogy). But, in accord w ith the fundam ental m athem atical character of modern thought, m etaphysics, too, is formed out o f the principles of pure reason, the ratio. Thus, the m etaphysical doctrine of God becom es a theology, but a theologia rationalis, the doctrine o f the world becom es a
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cosm ology, but a cosm ologia rationalis, and the doctrine o f man, psychology, but a psychologia rationalis. It is natural to arrange the w hole state o f modern m eta physics in the follow ing way. For this form of m etaphysics tw o concepts are essential: (1 ) the C hristian conception o f entities as ens creatum and (2 ) the b asic m athem atical character. The first instance concerns the content o f m eta physics, the second its form. However, this characteriza tion according to content and form is entirely too facile to be true. For this structure as determined by C hristianity form s not only the content o f what is treated in thought, but also determ ines the form, the how. Insofar as God as creator is the cause and the ground o f all that is, the how, the w ay o f asking, is oriented in advance toward this principle. Vice versa, the m athem atical is not only a form clamped on over the Christian content, but it itse lf be longs to the content. Insofar as the I-principle, the "I think, becom es the leading principle, the " I and, conse quently, man, reach a unique position within this ques tioning about w hat is. It designates not only one domain among others, but ju st that one to w hich all m etaphysical propositions are traced back and from w hich they stem . M etaphysical thought m oves in the variou sly defined do main of su b jectivity. Later Kant therefore says: All ques tions o f m etaphysics, i.e., those o f the designated d isci plines, can be traced back to the question: W hat is man? In the priority of this question there is concealed the priority o f method coined in D escartes' Regulae. If we use the distinction o f form and content to charac terize modern m etaphysics, then w e m ust say that the m athem atical belongs ju st as much to the content o f this m etaphysics as the C hristian belongs to its form. According to the three fundam ental directions o f m eta physical questioning it deals each time w ith what is: God, world, man. The essence and the p ossibility of this w h at is m ust be determined in each case rationally, out o f pure
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reason, i.e., from concepts gained in pure thought. But if w hat is and how it is m ust be decided in thinking and purely from thought, then before the definitions of what is as God, world, and man, there m ust obviously be a prior guiding concept o f what is as such. E sp ecially where this thinking conceives itse lf m athem atically and grounds itse lf m athem atically, the projection of w hat is as such m ust be expressly made the foundation o f everything. Thus the inquiry into the special realm s m ust be preceded by one w hich a sk s about w hat is in general, i.e., m eta physics as generally asking about w hat is, the m etaphysica generalis. Viewed from it, theology, cosm ology, and psy chology becom e the m etaph ysica specialis, because they inquire into a particular realm o f w hat is. But because m etaphysics is now m athem atical, the gen eral cannot remain w hat is only suspended above the particular, but the particular m ust be derived from the general as the axiom atic according to principles. This sig nifies that in the m athem atica generalis w hat belongs to w hat is as such, w h at determ ines and circu m scribes the thingness o f a thing as such, m ust be determined in prin ciple according to axiom s, especially according to the first axiom, according to the schem a o f positing and thinking as such. What is a thing m ust be decided in advance from the highest principles o f all principles and propositions, i.e., from pure reason, before one can reasonably deal w ith the divine, worldly, and human. The universal, advance illum ination o f all things accord ing to their thingness out of the pure reason o f rational thought as such, the enlightening as this advance clarifica tion o f all things, is the Enlightenm ent, the sp irit o f the eighteenth century. In that century modern philosophy first received its proper form, into which K ants thought grows and which also bears and determ ines his own m ost novel inquiry, the form o f m etaphysics, w ithout which that o f the nineteenth century would be unthinkable.
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7. R ational M etaphysics (W olff, Baumgarten) Between D escartes and the Enlightenm ent stands Leibniz. But he had an effect less through his own thinking and work than through the form of the school of philos ophy he determined. During the eighteenth century scientific and philosophi cal thought in Germany w a s dominated by the doctrine and school o f Christian W olff (1679-1754). He took his philosophical equipm ent from a particular interpretation of the philosophy o f Leibniz. From there he strove for an essential unification o f the philosophical foundation achieved by D escartes w ith traditional m edieval Sch olas ticism and thus at the sam e time a reunification o f Plato and A ristotle. All o f W estern m etaphysical knowledge w a s to be gathered up in the rational clearness o f the En lightenment and the hum anity o f man to be based on itse lf in pure reason. Christian Wolf!' treated philosophy in w id ely distributed German and Latin textbooks. His text book on m etaphysics carries (in the German version ) the significant title, which, after w h at has been said, must now be understandable, Rational Thoughts of God, the World and the Soul o f Man, and A lso o f A ll Things in General (1719). W olff first taught in Halle as professor of m athe m atics and soon transferred to philosophy. His thorough and rigorous w ay o f teaching presented a serious threat to the sh allow ch atter of the theologians o f the tim e; he w as thus driven out o f Halle in 1723 through the efforts o f his theological opponents. He w a s threatened w ith hanging if he remained. He taught at Marburg from 1723^0. H ow ever, Frederick the Great did not agree w ith the method of refuting a philosophy by the threat of the gallow s, and he called W olff back to Halle. There he becam e chancellor of the University, privy councillor, vice-president o f the Petersburg Academy, and baron o f the Holy Roman Em pire. Prominent among the m any students o f W olff were
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Gottsched (1700-76) and Alexander Baumgarten (171462); the latter also w rote a m etaphysics ( M etaphysica, 1739). Moreover, in accord w ith the general trend of the dom inating form o f pure reason, he attem pted the experi ment o f subm itting art to rational principles (and our relation to art, which, according to the prevailing inter pretation, w as ta ste). Taste and w hat is accessible in this cap acity to judge ( namely a r t ) belong to the domain o f the sensible, . Just as thought is subm itted to rational principles in logic, so also there is need for a rational doc trine o f sen sib ility, a logic o f the sensible, *. Baum garten therefore called this rational theory of ah the logic o f sen sib ility or "a e sth e tics. And despite K ants op position to the use o f this title, the philosophical doctrine o f art has been called aesth etics ever since. This circum stance contains much more than the mere m atter o f a title, and can be understood only through modern m etaphysics. It becam e decisive not only for the interpretation o f art, but also for the position o f art in human existence (D asein ) in the age o f Goethe, Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel. Through his teacher, the Wolffian disciple Martin Knutzen, Kant h im self stand s in the tradition of the Leibniz-Wolffian school. All his w ritin gs before the Critique o f Pure Reason move w ithin the sphere o f inquiry and the mode o f thought of the contem porary school-philosophy, even in parts where Kant already goes his own w ays. Only incidentally, it might be mentioned, did Kant move be yond the school tradition and penetrate directly into the philosophy o f Leibniz in sofar as this w a s then possible. In a sim ilarly direct w ay he made the thinking through of English philosophy, especially Hume, fruitfu l for the for mation o f his own questioning. On the whole, however, the school-philosophy of Leibni/.-Wolflian stam p remained so predominant that Kant, even after he gained the new position ol this philosophy (a fte r the publication o f the Critique o f Pure Reason and the w orks w hich followed i t ),
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kept up the tradition of using the textbooks o f the schoolphilosophy in his lectures and o f explaining them para graph by paragraph. Kant never discussed his philosophy in his lectures, although, in later times, the new method of thought could not be com pletely excluded in the d iscu s sion s of the textbooks or "read ers, as they were then called. Kant used the previously mentioned textbook by Alexander Baumgarten in his lectures in m etaphysics and appreciated this textbook "esp ecially for the richness and precision o f its teaching m ethod. ( Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen im W interhalbjahr 176566, K. Vorlnder, ed. [M einer, Der Philosophischen Bibliotek, 1906], XLVIa, 155.) (Compare Prolegomena, 1-3.) In this short piece Kant indicates how he intends to adapt his form er lectures on m etaphysics, logic, ethics, and physical geography to a changed teaching method. He introduces m etaphysics, the m ost difficult among all philosophical investigations, by preceding it w ith a m etaphysical experiential science o f man in order to lead to m etaphysics step by step. This has the advantage in m etaphysics " o f putting into the greatest cla rity the ab stract by presenting the concrete in advance. But this pro cedure has still another advantage. Kant says about it: "I cannot help thinking o f another advantage, which should not be valued as slight, though it is based upon incidental cau ses only, an advantage w hich I w ant to draw from this method. Everyone know s how eagerly attended the first lectures are by the keen and unsettled youth, and how later the lecture room becom es som ew hat roomier. Ontol ogy, a science that is difficult to comprehend, scares him off from continuing; then what he could perhaps have understood cannot be o f the slightest further use to him . The textbook by Baumgarten presents us w ith the form o f the cu stom ary m etaphysics of the eighteenth century, which Kant had before him and which finally forced him to the work by which he lifted m etaphysics from its hinges and put the question anew about m etaphysics.
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The M etaphysica o f Baumgarten divides the entire ma terial o f m etaphysics into exactly one thousand short para graphs. According to Sch olastic organization, the entire work is divided into four parts: (1 ) Ontology ( M eta physica generalis), 4-350; (2 ) Cosmologia, 351-500; (3 ) Psychologia, 501-799; (4 ) Theologia naturalis, 800-1000. But the presentation o f this external form does not tell us much about rational m etaphysics, the m etaphysics o f pure reason, even when w e rem em ber w hat has been said about the fundamental ch aracteristic of modern m eta physics and its foundation. On the other hand, w e cannot go into the total content, which, although in itse lf is not so extensive, docs, however, present a very involved struc ture because of its m athem atical-rational form and for mal proof. And yet it is necessary that w e provide ourselves w ith a more definite idea of this M etaphysica, in order to achieve w ith som e understanding the transition from it to the Critique o f Pure Reason. Let us characterize this m eta physics by discussing three questions: (1 ) How does m eta physics determine its own concept o f itse lf? (2 ) How in this im m ediately pre-Kantian m etaphysics is the essence of truth understood? (M etap hysics would represent the highest human realization o f truth in knowledge.) (3 ) What is the inner structure o f m etaphysics? Bv answering these three questions w'e once more carry out a unified consideration o f the m athem atical b a sis of modern m etaphysics. We w ill see w h at this m etaphysics of pure reason claim s to be. Above all, we shall understand what form the question about the thing has taken in it. 1. How does m etaphysics define its own concept? The first paragraph reads as follow s: "M etaphysica est sci entia prim a cognitionis humanae principia contin ens." ("M etap h ysics is the science which contains [em b races] the first principles of human knowledge. ) This definition of m etaphysics arouses the suspicion that m etaphysics is
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concerned w ith a doctrine o f knowledge, thus w ith epistemology. But up to now m etaphysics w a s considered as the science of w hat is, as such, i.e., of the being of w hat is. However, this m etaphysics, just as the old one, is con cerned w ith what is as w ell as w ith being; and yet the delining concept of m etaphysics does not im m ediately say anything about that. Not im m ediately. The definition, however, say s just as little that the object of m etaphysics is knowledge as such. We must understand this definition o f the concept of m etaphysics in such a w ay that cognitio humana does not mean the human facu lty of knowledge, but that which is know able and known by the pure reason o f man. That is, w hat is. Its "fundam ental p rinciples w ill be exhibited, i.e., the fundam ental determ ination o f its essence, being. But w hy does the definition o f the concept not sim ply say this, as A ristotle already defined it: "Ktmv
n s < r y Oeotfjet to or f/ or ' .
("T here is a science w hich investigates being as being and the attribu tes w hich belong to this in virtue of its own n atu re.") ( M etaphysics, IV, from the beginning.) Why are the know able and knowledge now mentioned? Because, since D escartes, the facu lty o f knowledge, pure reason, has been established as that bv w hose guideline all definitions o f w hat is, the thing, are to be made in rigorous proof and grounding. The m athem atical is the mente concip ere" o f Galileo. In the development of m etaphysics, it is now a question o f positing out of the essence o f pure rational knowledge a sketch o f the being ol w hat is, that w ill be decisive for everything further knowable. This hap pens first in the fundam ental discipline of m etaphysics, in ontologia. According to 4, it is the scientia praedicatorum entis generaliorum. Kant (Op. cit., pp. 115 f.) translates this as fo llo w s: The science of the general attribu tes o f all things. We see from this that the concept o f the thing" is apprehended as very broad, as broadly as pos sible. Thing is anything that is. God, soul, and the world are also things. We further recognize that the thingness of
K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thittg
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things is determined on the b asis o f and by the guideline o f the principles o f pure reason. We have met three such principles, the I-principle, the principle o f contradiction, and the principle o f sufficient reason. With this w e stand im m ediately before the answ er to the second question. 2. In the pre-Kantian m etaphysics o f the eighteenth century, how is the nature o f that truth understood, whose highest human realization in knowledge should be repre sented by m etaphysics? According to the traditional concept, truth ( v e rita s) is the adaequatio intellectus et rei, the correspondence o f thought and thing. Instead o f adaequatio one also says com m ensuratio or convenientia, fitting or agreement. This essential definition o f truth has a dual meaning which guided the question o f the truth even in the Middle Ages. There is still cast over it the reflection and afterglow o f an earlier, more prim ordial, although hardly understood, experience o f the essence of truth at the beginning o f the Greek existence (D asein ). Truth as adaequatio is, in one sense, a definition o f ratio, the assertion, the proposition. A proposition is true in sofar as it corresponds to things. The definition of truth as correspondence, however, not only concerns the proposition in relation to things, but also things, in sofar as they are created, based on the proj ect o f a creative spirit, and as they correspond to it. Con ceived in this way, truth is the com m ensurability of things w ith their essence, thought by God. We are asking, in contrast, What is the essential defini tion o f truth in modern m etaphysics? In 92 o f his Meta physik, Baumgarten gives the follow ing definition. "V eri tas m etaphysica potest definiri per convenientiam entis cum principiis ca th o licis. ( M etaphysical truth [that is, the truth o f m etaphysical knowledge] can be defined as an agreement o f w hat is w ith the first m ost universal Iundamental principles. ) Principia catholica are the prin ciples (a x io m s), specifically the "ca th o lic on es (accord ing to the Greek ), i.e., principles directed upon the
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whole, w hich assert som ething about w hat is in totality and about the being of w hat is. All m etaphysical proposi tions which establish being and its determ inations must conform to these principles. These principles arc ironclad principles o f reason itself: the I-principle, the principle o f contradiction, and the principle o f sufficient reason. The truth about w hat things in their thingness are is deter mined according to the principles o f pure reason, i.e., as we defined it above, in the essential sense: m athem atical. The inner structure of the whole of m etaphysics m ust be formed according to this conception o f truth. Thus w e arrive at the third question. 3. What is the inner structure of this m etaphysics? We can already gather it from the external arrangement and sequence o f the discipline. The foundation is ontology, and the apex o f the building is theology. The first is concerned w ith w hat belongs to a thing as such, to anything that is in general (o r in com m uni), to the enscom m une. Theology is concerned w ith the highest being and that which is, in the m ost essential sense, the summum ens. With regard to content we also find this arrangement o f m etaphysics in the Middle Ages, in fact even in Aristotle. However, w hat is decisive is that, in the m eantime, through the development and self-clarification of modern thought as the m athe m atical, the claim o f pure reason has come to predominate. This means that the m ost general determ inations of the be ing o f w hat is arc to be projected on the ground and w ith the guidance of the m ost universal principles of pure rea son. At the sam e time, however, the entire knowledge o f the world, soul, and God is to be derived from these m ost universal concepts in a purely rational analysis and sequence. So the pure inner law fu ln ess of reason, from out o f its fundam ental principles and concepts, decides about the being o f what is,ab ou t the th ingn essof things. In this pure rational knowledge, the truth about what is for all human reason receives its foundation and form as an indubitable and universally binding certainty.
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Pure reason in this its self-form ation, pure reason in this claim , pure reason as the authoritative court o f appeal for the determ ination of the thingness of all things as such it is this pure reason w hich Kant places into "critiq u e. II. The Question About the Thing in K ants Main Work 1. What Does "C ritiq u e " Mean in K ant? We w ill not pursue how Kant h im self arrives at this "critiq u e and w hat the internal and external history of the origin o f the w ork Critique of Pure Reason is. It is ch aracteristic that w e find out little even from letters o f this silent period o f his. However, even if w e knew more, if w e could exactly reckon w hat influenced Kant and so forth, in w hat sequence he worked out the individual parts of the work, this would neither explain the work itse lf (the creative is inexplicable), nor would this cu riosity about K ants w orkshop serve our understanding, supposing that w e do not already know and comprehend w hat Kant wanted and achieved in his work. This is now our sole concern. More exactly, as prelim inary, w e w ant to under stand the title. We know now w hat pure reason means. It rem ains to inquire w hat "critiq u e signifies. It can here only be a m atter o f giving a prelim inary explanation o f w hat " c r i tique means. U sually w e take this word at once and above all in a negative sense. Critique is for us faultfinding, a pointing to errors, em phasis on incom pleteness and the corresponding rejection. In citing the title "C ritique of Pure R eason w e m ust avoid this comm on and m isleading meaning from the beginning. Moreover, that meaning does not correspond to the original meaning o f the word. "C ri tique com es from the Greek , which means "to so r t (sondern), " to sort o u t" and thus " to lift out that o f spe cial so rt ( das Besondere herausheben). This contrast against others arises from an elevation o f a new order. The
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sense o f the term "critiq u e is so little negative that it m eans the m ost positive o f the positive, the positing o f w h at m ust be established in advance in all positing as what is determ inative and decisive. Therefore, critique is a deci sion in this positing sense. Because critique is a separation and lifting out o f the special, the uncommon and, at the sam e time, decisive, therefore, and only in consequence, is it also a rejection o f the com m onplace and unsuitable. This meaning o f the word "critiq u e appears in a unique w ay o f its own during the second h alf of the eigh teenth century in the d iscussions o f art, o f the form o f the w orks o f art and our relation towards them. Critique meant establishing the standard, the rules, legislation; and this at the sam e time means the elevation o f the gen eral over against the special. In this contem porary direc tion o f meaning lies K ants use of the term "critiq u e , w hich he afterw ard also included in the titles of two other main w orks: Critique o f P ractical Reason and Critique of Judgment. However, this word receives a fuller sense through K ants work. It is this sense which m ust now be outlined. This w ill first m ake it p ossible to understand by im plica tion the negative meaning, which the word also had in Kant. We shall try to m ake this clear by a retrospective glance at what has already been presented, w ithout really having yet gone into K ants work. If critique has the designated positive meaning, the Critique of Pure Reason w ill not sim ply reject and find fault w ith pure reason. To "c r itic iz e w ill rather aim to de lim it what is decisive and peculiar to its proper essence. This laying of lim its ( Grenzziehung) is not prim arily a de m arcation against . . . but a delim iting in the sense o f an exhibition o f the inner construction o f pure reason. The liftin g out of the elem ents and the structure of pure rea son is a lifting out o f different p o ssib ilities o f the uses of reason and their corresponding rules. As Kant once em phasized ( A 768, B 796): the critique m akes a com plete re
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view o f the whole facu lty o f pure reason; it draw s and sketches, in one o f K ants w ords, the "o u tlin e " ( V o rriss) o f pure reason ( B xxiii, N.K.S., p. 25). Critique thus becom es the surveying which se ts the boundaries for the entire domain of pure reason. This sur veying does not take place, as Kant expressly and ever again enjoins, by referring to " f a c t s " ( " F a k tis ), but it occurs from principles; not by determining qu alities met som ewhere, but by determining the w hole essence o f pure reason out o f its own principles. Critique is a setting of boundaries, a surveying project of pure reason. There fore, an essential moment belonging to critique is w hat Kant ca lls the architectonic. Architectonic, the blueprint projected as the essential structure o f pure reason, is as little a mere "orn am en t" ( A ufp utz ) a s the critique is a mere "ce n so r (Z en su r). (F or the use o f the term "arch itecto n ic, see Leibniz, De Prim ae Philosophiae Em endatione, and Baumgarten, M etaphysica, 4, ontologia as m etaphysica architec tonica. ) In the execution o f the "critiq u e o f pure reason so un derstood, the "m a th em a tica l in the fundam ental sense first com es to its unfolding and, at the sam e time, to its being lifted up (A ufhebu ng ), i.e., to its own lim it. This also results from the "critiq u e . Precisely, critique lies in the trend of modern thinking as such and in modern m eta physics in particular. But because o f its b asic character, K ants "critiq u e leads to a new delim iting of pure reason and at the sam e time, therefore, o f the m athem atical. 2. The Relation of the C ritiqu e" o f Pure Reason to the System o f A ll Principles of the Pure Understanding It is no accident that Kant continually accom panies the critique of pure reason bv a reflection on the essence of I lie m athem atical and of m athem atics, by a distinguishing between m athem atical reason in the narrower sense over
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against m etaphysical reason, i.e., the reasoning upon which a m etaphysics, a projection of the being of what is, the thingness o f things, m ust be based; for everything ac tually depends on this grounding of m etaphysics. Let us recall Baum gartens definition o f m etaphysics and of the definition o f m etaphysical truth. Critique of pure reason m eans to delim it the determ ination o f the being o f w hat is, the thingness o f the things, from out of pure reason; it means to survey and project those principles o f pure rea son upon w hose ground som ething like a thing in its thing ness is determined. We can already gather from this that in this "critiq u e the "m ath em atical feature o f modern m etaphysics is re tained, namely, to determine in advance out o f principles the being of w hat is. The real effort aim s at the form ation and grounding o f this "m ath em atical. The principles of pure reason m ust be grounded and dem onstrated accord ing to their own character. At the sam e tim e it lies in the essence of these principles that they exhibit a b a sic rela tion among them selves, belong together uniform ly out o f an inner unity. Kant calls such a unity according to princi ples a system . The critique as a surveying of the inner structure and foundation o f pure reason thus faces the fundam ental task o f exhibiting and grounding the System o f the Principles o f Pure Reason. We know from our earlier discussion that, already for A ristotle, the proposition as sim ple assertion w a s the guideline for the determ inations of being (the thingness) o f things, i.e., the categories. The assertion the house is high is also called a judgment. Judging is an act o f thought. Judging is a particular w ay in w hich reason takes place and acts. Pure reason as judging reason Kant calls understanding, the pure understanding. Propositions and assertion s are a cts of the understanding. The system o f the principles o f all propositions for w hich he sought is, there fore, the system o f the principles of pure understanding. We shall seek to understand K ant's Critique of Pure
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Reason from its ground-providing center. Therefore, we begin our interpretation at the place entitled System o f All Principles of Pure Understanding ( A 148, B 187). The whole passage under discussion includes A 235 and B 294. An aim o f the interpretation w ill be to direct our inquiry and knowledge through this part in such a w ay that there results an understanding o f the entire work. But even this understanding is only in the service o f an insight into the question "W h at is a thing? In preparation, w e can read som e single section s from the w ork, where the real posing o f the question does not im m ediately appear, but which are suited for shedding light on som e of K ants b asic concepts. Attention is called to three such sections: ( 1 ) 4 19, B 33-A 22, B 36.2; (2 ) A 50, B 74-A 62, B 86; (3 ) A 298, B 355-A 320, B 377. In contrast, it is not recommended that one read the prefaces to A and B at this time, and especially not the cor responding Introductions, because they presuppose an in sight into the whole work. In our interpretation w e shall not try to examine and paraphrase the structure o f the w ork from the outside. Rather, w e shall place ourselves w ithin the structure itse lf in order to discover som ething o f its fram ework and to gain the standpoint for viewing the whole. For this w e shall only follow a direction which Kant him self once stated in an incidental reflection. It concerns the evaluation of philosophic w ork: "One has to begin ones evaluation w ith the whole and to direct it to the idea of the work together w ith its ground. W hat remains belongs to the exposition in which much can be lacking and be im proved. (Preussische Akademie edition, op. tit., XVIII, No. 5025.) Critique o f pure reason is first a measuring and survey ing of its essence and structure. The critique does not re je ct pure reason, but for the first tim e sets it w ithin the boundaries o f its nature and its inner unity.
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C ritique is the self-knowledge o f reason placed before itse lf and upon itself. C ritique is the accom plishm ent of the innermost rationality o f reason. "C ritiq u e fulfills the enlightenment ( A ufklrun g ) o f reason. Reason is knowledge from principles and therefore itse lf the facu lty o f principles ( Prinzip ien ) and axiom s ( G rundstze ). A critique o f the pure reason in the positive sense m ust, therefore, set forth the principles of pure reason in their inner unity and com pleteness, i.e., in their system . 3. Interpretation of the Second Main Section of the Transcendental A nalytic: System of All Principles of Pure Understanding" The selection o f ju st this section from the entire work m ay at first appear arbitrary. It can at least be ju stified in that this chapter provides us w ith special insight w ith regard to our leading question, the question of the thing ness o f the thing. Yet, at the moment, even this rem ains only an assertion. The question arises whether ju st this chapter has such a special meaning for Kant him self and for how he conceived his w ork, that is, whether w e'sp cak in K an ts sense when w e call this section the center o f the work. This question is to be answered affirm atively. For in the form ation and unified proof of this system o f all principles of pure understanding, Kant gains the ground upon which the truth o f the knowledge o f the things is based. In this w ay Kant lifts out and delim its (critiq u e) a domain from w hich alone the statu s o f the determ ination o f the thing and the truth o f all m etaphysics up to now can be originally decided: whether the essence o f truth is truly determined in it, whether in it a truly rigorously axi om atic, i.e., m athem atical, knowledge, unequivocally fo l low s its course and thereby reaches its goal; or whether this rational m etaphysics, as Kant says, is only a groping abou t, and indeed a groping about in "m ere concep ts w ithout a relation to the things them selves, thus rem ain ing w ithout ju stification and validity. The surveying o f
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pure reason w ith regard to m etaphysics m ust at the same time gauge ( ab-m essen ), out o f pure reason, how m eta p hysics (according to its definition as the science o f the first cau ses o f human knowledge) is possible. What is the statu s o f human knowledge and its truth? (The follow ing interpretation m akes up for w hat the w riting Kant and the Problem of the M etaphysics ( 1929) lacked. Compare the preface to the second edition, 1950. The title o f that essay is not precise and therefore easily leads to the m isunderstanding that The Problem of M eta p hysics is concerned w ith a problem atic w hose overcom ing w a s the task of m etaphysics. Rather, The Problem of M etaphysics indicates that m etaphysics as such is ques tionable.) Kant offers a review o f this second chapter, in which he treats the system o f all principles. He does so at the beginning o f the chapter entitled "The Ground of the Dis tinction o f All O bjects in General into Phenomena and Noumena (A 235, B 294). In an intuitive sim ile he ex plains w h at m attered to him in establishing the "S y stem of All Principles o f Pure Understanding. "W e have now not merely explored the territory o f pure understanding, and carefully surveyed every part o f it, but have also mea sured its extent, and assigned to everything its rightful place. This domain is an island, enclosed by nature itse lf w ithin unalterable lim its. It is the land o f truth enchant ing name! surrounded by a wide and storm y ocean, and the native home o f illusion, where many a fog bank and many a sw iftly m elting iceberg give the deceptive appear ance o f farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew w ith em pty hopes, and engaging him in enter prises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to com pletion (N.K.S., p. 257). a. K an ts Concept of Experience The m easured and surveyed land, the solid ground of truth, is the domain o f the established and establish able
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knowledge. Kant ca lls this "experience. Thus the ques tion arises: W hat is the essence of experience? The " S y s tem o f All Principles of Pure Understanding is nothing other than a sketch o f the essence and essential structure o f experience. The essence o f a fact (S a ch e ), according to modern m etaphysics, is w h at m akes the fact as such in itse lf possible: the p ossibility, p ossibilitas, understood as that w hich renders p ossible. The question of the es sence of experience is the question of its inner p ossibility. W hat belongs to the essence o f experience? But at the sam e tim e this includes the question: W hat is the essence o f what becom es truly a ccessib le in experience? For when Kant uses the word experience, he alw ays understands it in an essen tially tw ofold sense: (1 ) Experiencing as happening to and an act o f the su b ject I. (2 ) That as such w hich is experienced in such experience. Experience in the sense of the experienced and the experienceable, the ob ject o f experience, is nature, but nature understood in the sense of N ewtons Principia as system a mundi. The grounding of the inner p o ssib ility o f experience is, therefore, for Kant at the sam e time the an sw er to the question: How is nature in general p ossible? The answ er is given in the "S y ste m of All Principles o f the Pure Understanding. Kant, therefore, also says (Prolego mena, 23) that these principles constitute " a physiolog ical (p h ysiolo g isch es) system or system o f nature. In 24 he also ca lls them the "p h ysiological principles. Physi ology is understood here in the original and archaic sense, and not in the sense o f today. Physiology today is the doctrine o f life processes, in distinction from mor phology as the doctrine o f living form s. In K ants usage it meant Ayos - of the , the fundam ental asser tions about nature, however, <iW is now used in N ewtons sense. Only when w e expressly and in a grounded w ay take pos session of the solid ground o f provable knowledge, o f the land of experience and of the map of this land, do w e take a position from which we can decide about the prerogative
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and pretenses o f traditional rational m etaphysics, i.e., about its p ossibility. The setting up o f the system of principles is the taking possession o f the solid land o f the p ossible truth of know l edge. It is the decisive step of the whole task o f the critique o f pure reason. This system o f principles is the result of a unique an alysis o f the essence o f experience. Kant once w rote in a letter to his pupil J. S. Beck, on January 20, 1792, ten years after the appearance o f the Critique o f Pure Reason: The an alysis o f experience in general and the principles o f p o ssib ility o f the latter are the m ost difficult o f the entire critique. (B rief, C assirer X, 114; Akadam ie edition, XI, 3!3fT.) In the sam e letter, Kant gives these instructions for lecturing on this m ost difficult part o f the Critique of Pure Reason: "In a word, since this whole an alysis has only the intention of setting forth the fact that experience itse lf is p ossible only by means of certain synthetic a priori principles, but since this can first be made properly com prehensible only when these prin ciples are actu ally presented, they are to be put to work as quickly as p ossible. Here a tw ofold point m ust be stressed: 1. The decisive thing for the proper insight into the essence o f experience, i.e., the truth o f knowledge, is the s.ctual presentation o f the system o f principles. 2. The preparation for this presentation should be as concise as possible. Hence, w e fulfill only a clear instruction o f K ants when we single out the system o f principles and set up the in terpretation of this section in such a w ay that all prelim i nary requirem ents for it are sum m arized as concisely as possible and are furnished in the development o f the in terpretation itself. b. The Thing as a Natural Thing (N aturding) The system o f principles o f pure understanding is, in K ants m ost exact sense, the inner supporting center of
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the entire work. This system o f principles is to unlock for us the question o f how Kant determ ines the essence o f the thing. What has been said in the preceding about the sig nificance o f the system o f principles already gives us a pre lim inary interpretation ( Vordeutung ) o f how Kant cir cu m scribes the essence of the thing and in what w ay he holds it to be determ inable at all. "T hing this is the ob ject of our experience. Since the inclusive concept o f the p ossibly experienceable is nature, the thing must actu ally be conceived in truth as a natural thing. Kant does explicitly distinguish between the thing as an appearance ( Erscheinung) and as thing-in-itself ( Ding an sich ). But the thing-in-itself, i.e., detached from and taken out o f every relation of m anifestation (Bekund ung) for us, rem ains for us a mere x. In every thing as an appearance w e unavoidably think also of this x. However, only the appearing natural thing is determ inable in truth and knowable as a thing. We shall sum m arize in two prop ositions K ants answ er to the question about the essence o f the thing w hich is accessible to us: (1 ) The thing is a natural thing. (2 ) The thing is the ob ject o f possible ex perience. Here every word is essential, and this in the definite meaning which it has acquired through K an ts philosophical work. Let us now briefly recall the introductory considera tions at the beginning of the whole lecture. There w e placed the question about the thing into the circle of W'hat first o f all surrounds and encounters us every day. At that time the question arose how the o b jects o f physics, i.e., the natural things, are related to the things im m ediately encountered. In view of K an ts essential definition o f the essence o f the thing as a natural thing, w e can judge that from the beginning Kant does not pose the question o f the thingness o f the things that surround us. This question has no weight for him. His view im m ediately fixes itse lf on the thing as an object of m athem atical-physical science. That this view point in the determ ination o f the thing
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ness of the thing becam e decisive for Kant has reasons which we now, after an acquaintance w ith the prehistory o f the Critique of Pure Reason, can easily appraise. How ever, the definition of the thing as a natural thing also has consequences for which w e cannot hold Kant in the least responsible. One could pay homage to the opinion that skipping over the things that surround us and the interpre tation o f their thingness is an om ission for w hich w e can easily m ake up and w hich can be fitted onto the definition of natural things, or perhaps could also be pre-arranged. But this is im possible because the definition of the thing and the w ay it is set up include fundamental presupposi tions w hich extend over the w hole of being and to the meaning o f being in general. If w e do not otherw ise admit it, indirectly w e can at least learn this from K an t's defini tion o f the thing, nam ely, that a single thing for itself is not p ossible and, therefore, the definition o f things can not be carried out by considering single things. The thing as a natural thing is only definable from the essence o f a nature in general. The thing, in the sense o f w h at w e en counter clo sest to us before all theory and science is adequately and first o f all definable in a relational context which lies before and above all nature. This goes so far as to say that even technological things, though they are seem ingly first produced on the b a sis of scientific nat ural knowledge, are in their thingness ( D inghaftigkeit ) som ething other than natural things w ith the superim position o f a practical application. But, all this only m eans again that asking the question of the thing is nothing less than the knowing man taking a decisive foothold in the m idst of w hat is, taken as a whole. In thinking through the question o f the thing sufficiently and in m astering, not m astering or neglecting it, there oc cur decisions w hose temporal scope and span in our his tory are alw ays to be considered only after centuries. This discussion o f K ants step should give us the proper pro portions for such decisions.
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c. The Threefold Division o f the Chapter on the System of the Principles The chapter ("H a u p tst ck ) o f the Critique of Pure Reason which w e shall try to expound begins at A 148, B 187 and is entitled "S y stem of All Principles o f Pure Understanding." The whole chapter, which goes to A 235, B 294, is divided into three sections: I. "The Highest Principle o f All Ana lytic Judgm ents (A 150, B 189-/1 153, B 193). II. The Highest Principle o f All Synthetic Judgm ents (A 154, B 193-A 158, B 197). III. "S y ste m atic Representation o f All the Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding (A 158, B 197-A 235, B 287). There follow s a "G eneral Note on the System o f the Principles (B 288-B 294). W ith this threefold division of K ants doctrine o f the principles, we im m ediately think o f the three principles of traditional m etaphysics: contradiction, I-principle, and the principle of sufficient reason. It is to be supposed that K ants threefold division has an inner relation w ith the threefold number o f traditional principles. The exposition w ill show in w h at sense this is true. First, let us pay atten tion to the titles and first to those of the first tw o sections; we find the concept o f the highest principle, and each time for a whole range o f judgments. The general title of the w hole chapter comprehends the principles as such of pure understanding. Now the discussion concerns principles o f judgment. W ith w hat ju stificatio n ? Understanding is the facu lty of thinking. But thinking is the uniting of rep resentations (V orstellungen) in one consciousness. "I think means "I com bine. Reprcscntationally, I relate som ething represented to another: "The room is w arm "; "W orm w ood is b itte r ; "The sun shines. "The union of representations in one consciou sn ess is judgment. Think ing, therefore, is the sam e as judging or relating repre sentations to judgm ents. (Prolegom ena 22.)
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Consequently, when instead of "pure understanding as in the main title o f the chapter, it now says " judgment in the titles o f the first tw o sections, this refers su bstan tially to the sam e thing. Judgment is only the w ay in w hich the understanding as the facu lty o f thinking carries out the representing. Why in general "ju d gm en t is used, and not pure understanding, w ill becom e clear in the content of the sections. (W hat "p erfo rm s these acts, the perform ance and w hat is performed, is the unity of representa tions, and it is that as itse lf a represented unity, e.g., the shining sun in the judgm ent: "The sun is shining. ) At the sam e time w e obtain from the first tw o titles a distinction o f judgm ents into an alytic and synthetic. In his polem ic against Eberhard, On a Discovery, According to Which All New Critique of Pure Reason is Made D is pensable by an Older One (1790), Kant once remarked that it is "in d isp en sab ly n ecessary in order to solve the chief problem o f the critique o f pure reason to "h ave a clear and distin ct concept o f w hat the critique first understands in general by synthetic judgm ents as distin ct from the ana ly tic. "The aforem entioned distinction o f judgm ents has never been properly comprehended (On a Discovery, op. cit., p. 228). Accordingly, in the titles o f the first and second sections o f the chapter on the "S y ste m of All Principles of Pure Un derstanding, in the distinction between synthetic and analytic judgm ents and the highest principles belonging to them, som ething is pointed out w hich is decisive for the entire range o f questions o f the critique of pure reason. Therefore, it is not an accident that Kant, in the Introduc tion to this work, deals explicitly and in advance w ith "The D istinction between A nalytic and Synthetic Judgm ents ( 6 ff., B ,). But ju st as im portant as the content o f the first two titles is the title o f the third section. This title does not concern principles o f an alytic nor o f synthetic judgm ents, but synthetic principles o f the pure understanding. And
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precisely the system atic "rep resentation (presen tation ) o f these is the essential aim o f the w hole chapter. It now seem s appropriate to preface the interpretation o f these three section s w ith a discussion o f the difference between synthetic and an alytic judgm ents. But in accord ance w ith the overall plan o f our interpretation w e prefer to deal w ith this difference where the text im m ediately de mands it. We pass over the introductory considerations to the chapter since these (A 148- 187) are understand able only w ith reference to the preceding chapters o f the w ork, into w hich w e shall not enter. We begin immedi ately w ith the interpretation o f the first section. 4. The Highest Principle o f All A nalytic Judgments. Knowledge and O bject (A 150 If., B 190 ff . ) In the title to Section I the principle o f contradiction is m eant as it w a s as one o f three fundam ental axiom s of tra ditional m etaphysics. But the fact that this principle is here called the highest principle o f all analytic judg m en ts already expresses K an t's special conception of this principle. With this he distinguishes him self both from the preceding m etaphysics as w ell as from the Ger man Idealism w hich fo llo w s, at least that o f Hegel. K ants general intent in his interpretation o f the principle o f con tradiction is to contend against the leading role which this principle had assum ed, especially in modern m eta physics. This role of the principle o f contradiction as the highest axiom o f all knowledge of being w a s already set forth by A risto tle even if in another sense ( M etaphysics, IV, chap. 3 -6 ). At the end o f the third chapter (1005 b 33) A ristotle says: yap / ' ' >> . ( For this is naturally the starting point even for all the other ft \0(t axiom s. )-
au Heideggers translation: Vom Sein her gesehen ist dieser Satz sogar auch der Grund (Prinzip) aller der anderen Axiome (Grundstze). Trans.
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In 1755, in his qualifying lecture ( H a b ilitatio n ssch rift ), Kant had already ventured a first, although as yet uncer tain, thrust against the dominance in m etaphysics of the principle of contradiction. This little w ritin g bears the significant title Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio (A New Illum ination of the First Principles o f M etaphysical Knowledge). This title could also head the Critique of Pure Reason, w ritten nearly thirty years later. a. Knowledge as Human Knowledge It is true that the elucidation o f the principle o f contra diction in the Critique o f Pure Reason m oves on a differ ent, expressly established plane and in a clear, fully thought out domain. This is im m ediately revealed in the first sentence w ith which the section begins: "The uni versal, though merely negative, condition of all our judg ments in general, w hatever be the content o f our knowl edge, and however it m ay relate to the object, is that they be not self-contradictory; for if self-contradictory, these judgm ents are in them selves, even w ithout reference to the object, null and void. (A 150, B 189, N.K.S., p. 189.) Here it is said in general that all our knowledge is under the condition that all its judgm ents be free o f contradic tion. Nevertheless, beyond this general content, w e m ust note in th is sentence o f K ants som ething different that is decisive for all that follow s. 1. The sentence is about our knowledge, which means human knowledge, not indefinitely any knowledge of any knowing being, not even about a knowledge sim ply and in general, o f knowledge in an absolute sense. Rather it is we, mankind, our knowledge and only it is in question here and in the entire Critique of Pure Reason. Only in refer ence to a knowledge that is not absolute does it m ake sense at all to set up the principle o f contradiction as a con dition; for absolute unconditioned knowledge cannot be under conditions at all. What is a contradiction for finite
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knowledge does not need to be one for absolute know l edge. Therefore, when in German Idealism Schelling and especially Hegel at once posit the essence o f knowledge as absolute, then it is appropriate that for such knowing non contradiction is not a condition o f knowledge, but rather vice versa: contradiction becom es precisely the proper element o f knowledge. 2. It is said that our judgm ents and not our cognitions ( E rk en n tn isse ) m ust be without contradiction; this sig nifies that judgments, as a cts of our understanding, con stitu te an essential, but only one, ingredient of our know l edge. 3. It is said of our knowledge that it alw ays has som e content and is related in one w ay or another " to the ob je c t. Instead o f "O b je k t," Kant often uses the word "G egenstand." In order to understand, in their inner connection, these three em phasized determ inations o f knowledge as human, and to grasp from this K an ts ensuing expositions about the principles, it is n ecessary to present as concisely as possible K ants basic interpretation of human knowledge as it becom es clear for the first tim e in the Critique of Pure Reason. b. Intuition and Thought as the Two E ssential Components o f Knowledge In full consciou sn ess o f the scope o f the definitions that he has to offer, Kant places at the beginning o f his work the proposition which, according to his interpretation, circu m scribes the essence o f human knowledge. "In w h at ever manner and by w hatever means a mode o f knowledge m ay relate to objects, intuition is that through w'hich it is in im m ediate relation to them, and to w hich all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only inso far as the ob ject is given to us. This again is only possible, to man at least, insofar as the mind is affected in a certain w a y ." (A 19, B 33, N.K.S., p. 65.)
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This essential definition of knowledge is the first and com pletely decisive blow against rational m etaphysics. With it Kant moved into a new fundamental position of man in the m idst o f what is, or more precisely he lifted a position, which, at bottom , had alw ays existed, into ex plicit m etaphysical knowledge and laid a b asis for it. That his concern is w ith hitman knowledge is further especially emphasized in the addition to the second edition: to man at le a st." Human knowledge is representational relating of itse lf to objects. But this representing is not mere think ing in concepts and judgm ents, but and this is empha sized by italics and by the construction o f the whole sentence "in tu itio n ( die Anschauung). The really su s taining and im m ediate relation to the object is intuition. It is true that intuition alone as little constitutes the essence o f our knowledge as does mere thought; but thought belongs to intuition and in such a w ay that it stands in the service of intuition. Human knowledge is conceptual, judgment-form ing intuition. Human know l edge is thus a uniquely constructed unity of intuition and thought. Again and again throughout the w hole work Kant em phasizes this essential definition o f human knowledge. As an example, w e can quote passage B 406, which first appears in the second edition where otherw ise precisely a sharper em phasis on the role of thought in knowing m akes itse lf felt. I do not know an object merely in that I think (th is is spoken against rational m etap h ysics), "b u t only in so far as I determine a given intuition w ith respect to the unity of consciou sn ess in which all thought co n sists. ( N.K.S. , p. 368.) Passages A 719, B 747 express the sam e: "A ll our knowledge relates, finally, to p ossible intuitions, for it is through them alone that an object is given. (N .K .S. , p. 581.) In the order of the essential structure o f knowledge this "fin a lly " am ounts to "fir s t," in the first place. Human cognition is in itse lf tw ofold. That is evident Irom the doubleness (Z w ie fa lt) o f its structural elements. I hey are here called intuition and thought. But ju st as es-
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sential as this doubleness in contrast w ith singleness is how this doubleness is structured. Insofar as only the unity of intuition and thought results in a human know l edge, obviously these two permanent parts m ust bear some relation ( V erw and tschaft) and have som ething in common ( G em einsam keit ) in order to be unitable. This is that both intuition and thought are "rep resen tation s ( V orstellungen ). Re-present ( V or-stellen) m eans to put som ething before oneself and to have it before one, as the subject to have som ething present toward oneself and back onto oneself ( etw as auf sich a ls das Su bject zu, auf sich zurck, prsent haben: re-praesentare). But how are intuition and thought distinguished as modes of repre senting w ithin the comm on character of representing? We can now only p rovision ally clarify this: "T his blackboard w ith that we address som ething that stands before us and is presented to us (uns vorgestellt is t). What is there by represented is thus this certain Hat extension w ith this coloring and in this light and o f this hardness and m ate rial, etc. What w e have just enumerated is im m ediately given to us. We see and touch all this without more ado. We see and feel alw ays precisely this extension, this hue, this lighting. The im m ediately represented is a lw a y s "th is, ju st that particular one which is ju st so and so. A repre senting that is im m ediate and therefore presents al w ays ju st this particular one is intuiting. This essence of intuition becom es clearer in co n trast w ith the other mode of representing, i.e., thought. Thought is not immediate, but m ediate representing. What thought intends representationally is not the sin g le "th is, but ju st the universal. If I say "b la ck b o a rd , the intuitively given is grasped and conceived as a blackboard. "B la ck b o a rd w ith that I represent som ething that is valid also for others, corre sponding other givens in other classroom s. The represen tation o f w h at is valid for many, and ju st as such a multivalid one, is the representation of som ething general. This
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universal one, which is common to all that belongs to it, is a concept (B egriff). Thought is the representation of som ething in general, i.e., in concepts. However, concepts are not im m ediately found in advance (vor-gefunden). A certain w ay and m eans is necessary to form them. There fore, thinking is mediate representing. c. The Twofold Determ ination o f the O bject in Kant W hat has been said also m akes clear that not only is knowing (E rkennen) tw ofold, but that the knowable (E rkenn bare), the p ossible ob ject (G egenstand) o f know l edge, m ust also be determined in a tw ofold w ay in order to be an ob ject at all. We can clarify the facts of this case by examining the word Gegenstand. What w e are sup posed to be able to know m ust encounter us from som e where, come to meet us. Thus the gegen" (a g a in st)-7 in Gegenstand. But not ju st anything at all that happens to strik e us (any passing visu al or auditory sensation, any sensation o f pressure or w arm th ) is already an object (Gegen stan d ). What encounters us m ust be determined as standing, som ething w hich has a stand and is, there fore, constant (bestiin d ig).-HN evertheless, this only gives us a prelim inary indication of the fact that the object must obviously also be determined in a tw ofold way. But it has not yet been said exactly w hat an object of human knowledge truly is in the sense o f K ants concept of know l edge. An o b ject in the strict sense o f Kant is neither what is only sensed (Em pfundene) nor w hat is perceived (W ahrgenom m ene). For example, if I point to the sun and add ress it as the sun, this thus named and intended is not the object (in the sense o f "o b je c t of kn ow led ge") in the
^Gegen: Against, also means "tow ard ," "in the direction o l," "opposite to, "in the presence of, etc. Literally, Gegenstand means "standing against. Trans. - s "D as Begegnende muss bestimmt sein als stehend, als etwas, das Stand hat und so bestndig ist. Trans.
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strict Kantian sense, any more than the rock to which I point or the blackboard. Even if we go further and make som e assertion s about the rock and the blackboard, w e do not penetrate into the objective in the strict Kantian sense. Likewise, if w ith reference to the given we repeat edly ascertain som ething, w e still have not reached the comprehension o f the object. We can, for instance, on the b a sis o f repeated observations, say: When the sun shines on the rock it becom es warm . Here, indeed, arc the given, the sun, sunshine, rock, w arm th, and these are determined in a certain judgm ent-like w ay, i.e., sunshine and warm th of the rock are brought into relation. But the question is: In w hat relation? We say more clearly: Every time the sun shines, the rock becom es w arm ; every time I have a perception o f the sun there fo llo w s in me after this percep tion o f mine, the perception o f the warm stone. This b e ing together of the representations of sun and rock in the assertion every time when . . . then, is sim ply a uniting of various perceptions, i.e., a perceptual judgment. Here my perceptions (a s also those of every other perceiv ing " I " ) are alw ays added to one another. This only determ ines how what is presently given to me appears to me. If I say by contrast, Because the sun shines, the rock w ill therefore becom e w arm , then I express a cognition. The sun is now represented as the cause and the becom ing w arm of the rock a s the effect. We could also express this knowledge in the sentence "The sun w arm s the rock. Sun and rock are now joined not sim ply on the b a sis of the su b jectively ascertainable succession of the perceptions, but they are grasped in the universal concepts o f cause and effect in them selves as they stand in them selves and to one another. Now an object ( G eg en stan d ) is grasped. The relation is no longer every tim e when . . . then ; this re fers to the succession of perceptions. The relation is now that o f If . . . then, ("b e ca u se . . . therefore ). It refers to the fact (S a ch e) itself, whether I presently perceive it
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or not. This relation is now posited as necessary. What this judgment says is valid at all tim es and for everyone; it is not subjective but is true o f the ob ject (O b jek t), o f the object (G egenstand) as such. What encounters us in sensation and perception and is intuitively given the sun and sunshine, rock and warm th this "a g a in st" (gegen) only com es to the position o f a state of affairs standing in itse lf when the given has al ready been represented universally and thought in such concepts as cause and effect, i.e., under the principle of cau sality in general. The permanent elem ents (Bestandstiick e ) o f knowing, intuition, and concept, m ust be uni fied in a determ inate w ay. The intuitively given m ust be brought under the universality o f definite concepts. The concept m ust get over the intuition and m ust determine in a conceptual manner w hat is given in the intuition. With regard to the example, i.e., fundam entally, w e m ust note the following: The perceptual judgment (W ahrnehm ungsurteil), "every time when . . . then, does not gradually change over after a sufficient number o f observations, into the ex periential judgm ent (E rfahrun gsu rteil), if . . . then." This is ju st as im possible as it is out o f the question for a when ever to change into an if and a then to change into a therefore, and vice versa. The experiential judgment demands in itse lf a new step, another w a y o f representing the given, that is, in the concept. This essentially different representation o f the given, its apprehension as nature, first m akes p ossible for observations to be taken as p ossible instances o f experi ential judgm ents, so that now, in the light of the experi ential judgm ent the conditions o f observation m ay be varied and the corresponding consequences o f these var ied conditions m ay be investigated. What w e call hypoth esis in science is the first step toward an essen tially dif ferent, conceptual representing as over against mere perceptions. Experience does not arise "e m p irica lly " out of
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perception but becom es p ossible only through m etaphys ics: through a new conceptual representing peculiarly in advance of the given in the concepts o f cause-effect. By this means a ground for the given is established: princi ples. An object in the strict sense o f Kant is thus first of all the represented, wherein the given is determined in a necessary and universal way. Such a representation is hu man knowledge proper. Kant ca lls it experience ( E rfah rung ). Now, sum m arizing K an ts basic interpretation o l knowledge, w e say: 1. Knowledge for Kant is human knowledge. 2. Human knowledge is essen tially experience. 3. Experience realizes itse lf in the form o f m athem at ical-physical science. 4. Kant secs this science and w ith it the essence o f real human knowledge in the historical form of Newtonian physics, which today one still ca lls "c la s s ic a l. d. Sen sib ility and Understanding. Receptivity and Spontaneity W hat we have said about human knowledge up to now should, to begin w ith, make the duality in its essential structure recognizable w ithout presenting this structure in its innermost fram ework. Together w ith the duality o f knowledge arose an initial understanding of the duality of the object. The mere intuitive "a g a in st" (gegen) is not yet an object ( G egenstand ); but what is only conceptually thought in general, as som ething constant, is not yet an o b ject either. This also m akes it clear w hat the w ords "con ten t of knowledge and relation to the o b je ct mean in the first sentence o f this section. The "co n ten t is alw ays deter mined by w hat (and a s w h a t) is intuitively given: light, w arm th, pressure (to u ch ), color, sound. The "relatio n to the o b je ct (O b je k t), i.e., to the object (G egenstand) as such, co n sists in the fact that som ething intuitively given
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has been brought to stand in the generality and unity o f a concept (cause-effect). But w e m ust carefully note that it is alw ays som ething intuitive that is brought to stand. Conceptual pre-senting here takes on an essentially sharpened sense. Therefore, when Kant stresses repeatedly: Through the intuition the object is given, through the concept the ob ject is thought, the m isunderstanding easily suggests it self that the given is already the ob ject, or that the object is an object only through the concept. Both are equally wrong. Rather, it is true that the ob ject stands only when the intuition is thought conceptually, and the object only confronts us if the concept designates som ething intui tively given. Consequently, Kant uses the term "o b je c t in a narrow and proper sense, and in a w ider and im proper sense. The object proper is only what is represented in experi ence as experienced. The im proper object is every thing to which a representation a s such refers be it intuition or thought. O bject in the wider sense is both what w e have m erely thought as such and w h at is only given in percep tion and sensation. Although in every case Kant is sure of w hat he m eans by "o b je c t, there is in this fluent usage an indication that Kant has broached and decided the ques tion o f human knowledge and its truth only in a certain respect. Kant has disregarded w h at is m anifest (d as Offenbare). He does not inquire into and determine in its own essence that which encounters us prior to an objec tification (Vergegenstndlichung) into an object o f exper ience. Insofar a s he apparently m ust return to th isd om ain , as in the distinction o f mere perception from experience, the procedure o f com paring is alw ays from experience to perception. This m eans that perception is seen from ex perience,and in relation to it,a s a "n o t yet. However, it is ju st as im portant, above all, to show w hat experience is no longer, as scientific knowledge, in com parison to percep tion, in the sense o f pre-scientific knowledge. For Kant, in
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view o f rational m etaphysics and its claim s, this alone w a s decisive: (1 ) To assert, in general, the intuitive (se n so ry ) char acter of human knowledge as a fundam ental component of its essence. (2 ) On the b a sis o f this altered definition, to also determine anew the essence o f the second com po nent, thought and concepts. Now we can characterize still more clearly the tw ofold character of human knowledge, and in different respects. Up to now w e called the tw o different elem ents intuition and concept. The former w as the im m ediately represented particular and the latter the m ediately represented uni versal. The alw ays different representations actually take place in correspondingly different behavior and perform ance o f the human being. In intuition what is represented is pre-sented as object, i.e., the representing is a having before oneself w hat encounters. Insofar as it is to be taken as som ething, encountering it becom es w hat is taken up and in (auf- und hingenomm en). The character o f behavior in the intuition is that of taking-in (Hinnehmen), a reception, recipere-receptio, receptivity. In contrast, behavior in the conceptual representation is such that the representing from itse lf com pares w hat is var iously given, and in com paring refers them to one and the sam e and seizes this as such. In comparing spruce-beachoak-bireh w e bring out, seize, and determine w hat these have in common as one and the sam e thing: "tre e . The representing of this universal as such m ust unfold itse lf from out o f itse lf and bring w hat is to be represented be fore itself. Because o f this "fro m itse lf character, think ing as representing in concepts is spontaneous, spon taneity. Human intuition is never able to create what is to be viewed, the o b ject itself, through the achievem ent of its intuiting as such. At most such is p ossible in a kind of im agination or fantasy. But in this the o b ject itse lf is pro vided and viewed not as one that is (Seien der), but as
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imagined. Human looking ( Schauen ) is intuiting or look ing at ( An-schauen),~u i.e., a view directed toward som e thing already given. Because human intuition depends upon som ething view able given to it, the given m ust indicate itself. It m ust be able to announce itself. This happens through the sense organs. By means o f these organs, our senses, such as sight, hearing, etc., are "stirre d (gerhrt), as Kant says. Som ething is done to them; they are approached. That which so attracts us and how the attraction is ini tiated is sensation as affection. By contrast, in thought, in the concept, w hat is represented is such that w e ourselves fashion and prepare it in its form. "In its form this means the how in w hich w hat is thought ( das G edachte), w hat is conceptually represented, is som ething repre sented, namely, in the how o f the universal- On the con trary, the what, e.g., the "tree-lik e," m ust be given in its content. The execution and preparation o f the concept is called function. Human intuition is n ecessarily sensuous, i.e., such that the im m ediately represented m ust be given to it. Since human intuition depends upon such giving ( Gebnng), i.e, is sensuous, therefore it requires the sense organs. Thus, w e have eyes and ears because our intuiting is a seeing and a hearing, etc. It is not because w e have eyes that w e see, nor do w e hear because w e have ears. S en sib ility (Sin n lich k eit) is the cap acity for human intuition. The cap acity o f thought, however, wherein the object as ob ject (der Gegenstand a ls G egenstand) is brought to stand, is under standing. We can now clearly arrange in order the differ ent definitions o f the tw ofoldness o f human knowledge and also lay down the various respects in which, at any given time, these distin ction s determ ine human kn ow l edge: Intuition Concept (thought): the represented as such in the object.
See note 23. Truns.
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Receptivity Spontaneity: modes o f behaving in the representing. Affection Function: the character o f event and result o f the represented. S en sibility Understanding: representing as the ca p acities o f the human mind, as sources o f knowledge. Depending on the context, Kant uses these different form s o f the tw o essential elements. e. The Apparent Superiority of Thought; Pure Understanding Related to Pure Intuition With the interpretation o f the Critique o f Pure Reason and the explanation o f K an ts philosophy in general, one cannot escape from the fact that, according to his doc trine, knowledge is com posed of intuition and thought. But from this general statem ent it is still a long w a y to a real understanding o f the role o f these elem ents and the character o f their unity, and above all to the correct evaluation o f this essential definition o f human know l edge. In the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant takes up the "m o st difficult ta sk o f analyzing experience in its es sential structure, the discussion o f thought and the a cts of understanding, those o f the second component, not only occupy a disproportionately greater space, but the whole direction of the inquiry o f this an alysis of the essence o f experience is aimed at the characterization of thought w hose proper action w e already have met as judgment. The doctrine o f intuition, cm , is the aesthetics. (Com pare A 21, B 35, note.) The doctrine o f thought, o f judg ment, Aoyo, is logic. The doctrine o f intuition includes A \9 -A 49, i.e., thirty pages; B 33-B 73, i.e., forty pages. The doctrine o f thought, A 50, B 74-/1 704, B 732, takes up more than 650 pages. The p riority in the treatm ent o f logic, its dispropor
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tionately greater extent w ithin the w hole w ork, is obvious. Also w e can repeatedly ascertain in particular sections that the question o f judgment and concept, thus the ques tion o f thought, stands in the foreground. We can also easily recognize this fact in the section upon w hich we based our interpretation and which w e designated as the very center o f the work. The headings say clearly enough that it is a question o f judgm ents. The discussion is ex pressly about ( reason ) in the title o f the w hole work. On the b a sis o f this obvious priority o f logic, people have alm ost universally concluded that Kant sees the true es sence o f knowledge in thought, in judging. This opinion w as supported by the traditional and ancient doctrine according to which judgment and assertion are the place o f truth and falsity. Truth is the b asic ch aracteristic of knowledge. Therefore, the question about knowledge is nothing more than the question about judgment, and the interpretation o f Kant m ust therefore begin at this deci sive point. How far this prejudice has prevented penetrating into the center o f the w ork cannot and need not be further reported here. But it is im portant for the correct appro priation o f this w ork to keep these facts continuously in mind. Generally, the neo-Kantian interpretation o f the Critique o f Pure Reason leads to a depreciation o f intui tion as the b asic component o f human knowledge. The Marburg sch o ols interpretation o f Kant even went so far as to elim inate altogether from the Critique of Pure Reason intuition as a foreign body. The downgrading of intuition had the consequence that the question o f the unity o f both com ponents, intuition and thinkingor, more exactly, the question o f the ground of the p ossibility ol their unification took a wrong turn, if it w a s ever se riously asked at all. All these m isinterpretations o f the Critique of Pure Reason as they still circu late in differing variations today have caused the im portance o f this work
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for its essential inherent and single question, concern ing the p o ssib ility o f a m etaphysics, to be neither properly evaluated nor, above all, to be made creatively fruitful. But how can it be explained that in spite of the funda mental and authoritative significance of intuition in hu man knowledge Kant him self places the main problem o f the an alysis o f knowledge into the discussion of thought? The reason is as sim ple as it is obvious. Precisely because Kantcontrary to rational m etaphysics, which put the essence of knowledge into pure reason and into mere con ceptual thought posits intuition as the supporting fun dam ental moment o f human knowledge, thought m ust now be deprived of its form er presumed superiority and exclusive validity. But the Critique could not be content w ith the negative task of disputing the presumption of conceptual thought. It had first and forem ost to define and ground anew the essence of thought. The extended discussion o f thought and concept in the Critique of Pure Reason indicates no downgrading o f in tuition. On the contrary, this discussion o f concept and judgment is the clearest proof that from now on intuition w ill remain the authority w ithout w hich thought is nothing. The extensive treatment o f the one component of know ledge,of thought, is stressed even more in the second edition. In fact, it often looks as if the question o f the essence o f knowledge were exclusively a question o f the judgm ent and its conditions. However, the p riority o f the question o f judgm ent does not have its ground in the fact that the essence of knowledge really is judgment, but in the fact that the essence o f judgment m ust be defined anew, because it is now conceived as a representation re lated in advance to intuition, i.e., to the object. The priority of logic, the detailed treatm ent of thought, is therefore necessary, because thought in its essence does not have priority over intuition, but, rather, is based upon intuition and is alw ays related to it. The priority of
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logic in the Critique o f Pure Reason has its ground solely in the non-priority o f the object o f logic, i.e., in placing thought into the service of intuition. If correct thought is a lw ays based on intuition, then the proper logic belonging to this thought n ecessarily and precisely deals w ith this essential relation to intuition, consequently w ith intuition itself. The m odest extent o f the aesthetic as the initial separate doctrine o f intuition is only an outward ap pearance. Since the aesthetic is now decisive, i.e., every where plays an authoritative part, therefore it m akes so much work for logic. For this reason logic m ust turn out so extensive. It is im portant to note this, not only for the overall com prehension o f the Critique o f Pure Reason as such, but, above all, for the interpretation o f our chapter. For the titles o f our first tw o sections, as w ell as the first sen tence o f Section I, read as though the question about hu man knowledge and its principles sim ply slip s oft into a question about judgm ents, about mere thought. How'ever, we shall see that exactly the contrary is the case. W ith a certain exaggeration w e can even say that the question of the principles o f the pure understanding is the question o f the necessary role of intuition, which necessarily is the b asis fo r the pure understanding. This intuition must it self be a pure one. "P u r e " means "m e re ( b lo ss ), "unencum bered (led ig), "b ein g free from som ething else ; in this case, "free from sensation. Looked at negatively, pure intui tion is free o f sensation, although it is an intuition that belongs to the sphere o f sen sibility. "P u re " therefore means what is based only upon itse lf and existing first. I his pure intuition, presented in an im m ediate represen tation, free o f sensation, this single and only one, is time. Pure understanding means, in the first place, mere under standing detached from intuition. But because under standing as such relates to intuition, the determ ination pure understanding" can only mean understanding based
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on intuition and, indeed, on pure intuition. The sam e isi true concerning the title "pure reason." It is equivocal. Pre-critically it means mere reason. C ritically, i.e., limited to its essence, it means reason which is essentially grounded in pure intuition and sen sibility. The critique of pure reason is at once the delim itation of this reason which is founded upon pure intuition and, at the same time, the rejection o f pure reason as "m e re " reason. f. Logic and Judgment in Kant The insight into these relationships, i.e., the acquisition of the essential concept o f a "pure understanding, is, however, the pre-condition for the understanding of the third section, w hich is supposed to present the system atic structure o f pure understanding. The clarification o f the essence o f human knowledge w e have ju st carried out enables us to read the first sentence o f our section w ith a different eye than at the beginning. The universal, though merely negative, condition of all our judgm ents in general, w hatever be the content of our knowledge, and however it m ay relate to the object, is that they be not self-contradictory; for if self-contradic tory, these judgm ents are in them selves, even without reference to the object, null and void. (A 150, D 189, N.K.S., p 189.) We realize that our knowledge is here im m ediately examined in a certain respect, nam ely, in terms of the second essential component of knowing, the act of thought, the judgment. More precisely it is said here that freedom from contradiction is the "cond ition , though m erely negative, of all our judgm ents in general. This is said o f "a ll our judgm ents in general, and not yet of "a n a ly tic judgm ents, which arc set forth as the theme in the title. Furthermore, he speaks of " a merely nega tive condition, and not about a highest principle (G rund). It is true that the text speaks o f contradiction and o f judgm ents in general, but not yet o f the principle o f
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contradiction as the highest principle o f all analytic judg m ents. Kant here considers judgment as before its dif ferentiation into analytic and synthetic judgm ents. In what respect is judgm ent viewed here? W hat is a judgm ent? How does Kant define the essence of the judg ment? The question sounds sim ple enough, and yet the inquiry im m ediately becom es com plicated. For w e know that judging is the function o f thought. Thought has ex perienced a new characterization through K ants essential definition o f human knowledge: It enters essentially into the service o f intuition. Therefore, the sam e m ust also be valid for the act o f thought o f the judgment. Now one could say that through stressing the subservience of thought and judgment only a particular purpose ( Ab zw eckung) of thought has been introduced. Thought itself and its determ ination have not been thereby essen tially touched. On the contrary, the essence o f thought (jud g m ent) m ust already be defined, in order for thought to enter into this subservient position. The essence o f thought, i.e., the judgment, has, since ancient tim es, been determined by logic. Although Kant did determine a new conception o f knowledge along the lines w e discussed, he could oniy add to the current defini tion o f the essence o f thought (jud ging) the further one that thought stands in the service o f intuition. He could take over unchanged the logic o f the existing doctrine of thought in order to supplement the addition that logic, if it deals w ith human knowledge, m ust alw ays stress that thought must be related to intuition. In fact, this is how K ants position looks w ith respect to traditional logic and thereby also toward its essential defi nition of judgment. What is still more im portant, Kant him self frequently viewed and presented the situation in this way. Only slow ly and w ith great difficulty did he come to recognize that his discovery of the peculiar subservi ence o f thought might be more than ju st an additional definition o f it; that, on the contrary, w ith it the essential
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definition o f thought and thus of logic changes basically. There is a saying of Kant about logic w hich is often quoted, though understood in an opposite and, therefore, false sense. This saying testifies to his sure presentiment of this revolution w hich he had initiated. It is no accident that it occurs only in the second edition: That logic has already, from the earliest tim es, proceeded upon this sure path is evidenced by the fact that since A ristotle it has not required to retrace a single step, unless, indeed, w e care to count as im provem ents the rem oval of certain needless su btleties or the clearer exposition of its recognised teaching, features w hich concern the elegance rather than the certain ty o f the science. It is rem arkable also that to the present day this logic has not been able to advance a single step, and is thus to all appearance a closed and com pleted body of doctrine. ( viii, N.K.S., p. 17.) Roughly speaking, this means that from now on this appearance proves itse lf to be void. Logic is to be newly founded and transform ed. In certain places Kant has clearly arrived at this in sight, but he has not developed it. That would have meant nothing less than to constru ct m etaphysics upon the ground w hich had been cleared by the Critique of Pure Reason. Such, however, w as not K ants intention, since to him "critiq u e (in the specified sen se) had to be first and alone essential. It also did not lie w ithin K ants capacity, because such a task exceeds even the cap acity o f a great thinker. It demands nothing less than to jum p over one's own shadow. No one can do this. However, the greatest effort in attem pting th is im p ossibility that is the decisive ground-movement o f the action o f thought. We experience som ething of this fundam ental movement in quite dif ferent w ay s in Plato, Leibniz, and, above all, in Kant and later in Schelling and Nietzsche. Hegel alone apparently succeeded in jum ping over this shadow, but only in such a w a y that he elim inated the shadow, i.e., the finiteness of man, and jum ped into the sun itself. Hegel skipped over
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( berspringen) the shadow, but he did not, because of that, surpass the shadow (ber den Sch atten ). Neverthe less, every philosopher m ust w ant to do this. This "m u st is his vocation. The longer the shadow, the wider the jump. This has nothing to do w ith a psychology o f the creative personality. It concerns only the form o f motion belonging to the w ork itse lf as it w o rks itself out in him. K ants attitude toward such an apparently dry ques tion, "W h at is the essence o f the judgm ent? reveals som e thing o f this fundamental movement. The relation o f the first to the second edition of the Critique o f Pure Reason sh ow s how difficult it w as for Kant to establish in its w hole range an adequate essential definition of judgment from out o f his new conception of knowledge. In term s of content all decisive insights had been achieved in the first edition. Yet only in the second edition does Kant succeed in bringing forward, at the decisive spot, that essential delineation o f judgm ent w hich accords w ith his own fundamental position. Kant stresses again and again the fundam ental impor tance of the newly proposed distinction o f judgm ents into an alytic and synthetic. This means nothing other than that the essence o f judgm ent as such has been newly de fined. The distinction is only a necessary consequence of this essential definition, and, retrospectively, at the sam e time, a method for designating the newly conceived es sence of the judgment. We must take all that has been said into account, in order not to take too lightly the question: "A ccording to Kant, o f w hat does the essence o f judgment co n sist? and so that we are not surprised if w e cannot find our w a y unilorm ly through his definitions without further ado. For Kant has nowhere developed a system atic description of his essential definition o f judgment on the b a sis of the in sights at which he him self arrived. Certainly this is not developed in his lecture on logic w hich has been handed
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down to us, where, if anywhere, one would expect to find it. In general, this lecture m ust be consulted cautiously be cause (1 ) lecture notebooks and notes are, at any rate, a questionable m atter, especially in the section s which dis cu ss difficult things; and (2 ) in his lectures, Kant pur posely adhered to the traditional doctrines and took their sch olarly traditional order and presentation as his guide. Thus he w as not guided, in these notes, by the inner sy s tem o f the su bject m atter itse lf as it presented itse lf in his thought. Kant chose as the textbook in his logic lectures the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, a Schoolbook whose author, Meier (1718-1777), w a s a student of Baumgarten, the aforem entioned student o f Wolff. W ith this reading o f the treatm ent of the question of the judgment by Kant, w e are compelled, in the m ost exact conform ity w ith Kant, to give a system atically freer, but short, presentation o f his essential definition o f judgment. According to w hat has been said, this w ill autom atically lead to a clarification o f the decisive distinction between an alytic and synthetic judgm ents. The question Of what does judgment c o n sist? can be posed in tw o respects: first, in the direction o f the tradi tional definition o f thought, and second, in the direction of K ants new delineation. This latter does not sim ply ex clude the traditional ch aracteristics of judgment, but in cludes them into the essential structure of judgment. This indicates that this essential structure is not as sim ple as the pre-Kantian logic thought it w as, and as one view s it again today in spite of Kant. The in trinsic b asis for the difficulty in seeing the whole essence o f judgm ent docs not lie in the incom pleteness of K ants system , but in the es sential structure o f judgment itself. At this point w e should rem em ber that w e have already schem atically indicated the organized structure o f the judgment when w e showed (supra, pp. 35-38) how far since A ristotle and Plato Aoyos, i.e., the assertion, has been the guide for the definition o f the thing. We did this
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w ith the aid o f the fourfold meaning of "a sse rtio n . What w e only touched on there now finds its essential elabora tion in a short system atic presentation o f K ants essential definition o f judgment. 5. K an t's E ssen tial Definition of the Judgment a. The Traditional Doctrine o f Judgment We begin w ith the traditional doctrine o f judgment. The differences and changes that appear in its history m ust be left aside. We recall only A risto tles general definition of the assertion (jud gm en t), '/os: kiyuv , rim , " t o say som ething about som ething : praedicere. Therefore, to assert is to relate a predicate to a su b ject "The board is b lack . Kant expresses this universal ch aracteristic of judgment in such a w ay that, at the beginning o f the im portant section "The D istinction between A nalytic and Synthetic Judgm ents" (Introduction, A 6, B 10, N.K.S., p. 48), he rem arks that in judgm ents "th e relation o f a su bject to the predicate is thought. The judgment is a relation in w hich and through which the predicate is a t tributed to or denied o f the su bject. Accordingly, w e have either attributive, affirmative, or denying, negative judg ments. "T h is board is not red. It is im portant to keep in view that w ithout exception, since A ristotle, and also in Kant, the sim ple affirmative (and true) assertion has been posited as the standard fundam ental form o f all judging. Corresponding to the tradition, Kant says o f the judg ment that in it "th e relation o f a su b ject to the predicate is thought." In general, this statem ent proves true. However, the question rem ains w hether this exhausts the essence o f judgment, and whether the heart o f the m atter is under stood. As to Kant, the question arises whether he would adm it that the cited ch aracteristic of judgment he him self applied had hit upon its essence. Kant would not admit that. On the other hand, it is not clear what should be added to the essential definition of judgment. In the end it
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is also unnecessary to add further determ inations. On the contrary, w e must note the opposite, that the given defini tion om its essential m om ents of the judgment, so that it is only a question of seeing how in precisely the given defi nition there lie indications of the essential moments. In order that we m ay take K ants new step w ith and after him, it is advisable, first, to cite briefly the view of judgm ent that prevailed in his time, and to w hich he paid attention. For this purpose w e choose the definition of judgment given by W olff in his large "L o gic. In 39 we read: "A ctu s iste m entis, quo aliquid a re quadam diver sum eidem tribuim us, vel ab ea removemus, iudicium ap pellature. ( That action of mind by which we attribute to a certain thing som ething w hich is different from it tribuer |><*] or hold aw ay from it removere [.] is called judgm ent [iu d ic iu m ].") Accordingly, 40 asserts: "Dum igitur mens iudicat, notiones duas vel coniungit, vel sep arat." ("W hen [a s ] the mind judges, it either connects or separates tw o concepts. ) In accord ance 201 notes: "In enunciatione seu propositione no tiones vel coniunguntur, vel separantur. ( In a proposi tion, or sentence, concepts are either bound or sepa rated .") A student o f a student o f this m aster of conceptual an alysis, Professor Meier defines it as follow s in his Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, 292: "A judgment ( iu diciu m ) is a representation of a logical relation o f several concepts. It is particularly "lo g ic a l that in this definition Logos is defined as a representation o f a logical relation. However, aside from this, the textbook used by Kant only repro duces the definition o f W olff in a trite way. Thus, judgment is "th e representation of a relation between several con cep ts." b. The Insufficiency o f the Traditional Doctrine; Logistics We first contrast this definition o f judgment from the S ch olastic philosophy w ith K ants definition that most
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sharply expresses the greatest difference. It is found in the second edition o f the Critique of Pure Reason in connec tion w ith a section that Kant thoroughly reworked for the second edition, elim inating obscu rities without changing anything o f the fundam ental position. It is the section on the "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding. The essential definition o f the judgment is found in 19 (B 140, N.K.S., p. 158). The paragraph be gins w ith the w ords: I have never been able to accept the interpretation which logicians give o f judgment in gen eral. It is, they declare, the representation of a relation between tw o concepts. "In terp retatio n " ( E rklrun g) m eans to make som ething clear, not to derive som ething cau sally. W hat Kant here rejects as inadequate is ju st the definition of Meier, i.e., o f Baumgarten and Wolff. W hat is meant is the definition of judgment as an assertion, fam il iar in logic since A ristotle, Aey' rivos. However, Kant does not say that this definition is false. He merely states that it is u n satisfactory. He him self m akes use o f this defi nition of judgment, and still uses it several tim es in the period after publishing his Critique of Pure Reason, even after the second edition. In investigations carried on around the year 1790, Kant says: "The understanding show s its cap acity only in judgm ents, which are nothing other than the unity o f consciou sn ess in the relation of concepts in general. ( F ortschritte der M etaphysik," K. Vorlnder, ed., p. 97.) Where a relation is represented, a unity is alw ays represented which supports the relation and becom es conscious through the relation so that w hat we are conscious o f in judgment has the character o f a unity. The sam e w a s already expressed by A ristotle (De Aninia, 6, 430a, 27 f.): There is in judgment ' T L S , " a putting together o f o b jects of thought in a certain un ity." This characterization of judg ment is valid for judgm ent in general. We shall use some exam ples w hich w e m ust em ploy later: "T h is board is b la ck "; "A ll bodies are extended ; "S o m e bodies are heavy." Without exception, a relation is represented here.
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Representations are connected. We find the linguistic ex pression of this connection in the " i s or the "a r e . There fore, this "little relation w ord (K a n t) or "b o n d is called copula. The understanding, therefore, is the facu lty of connecting representations, i.e., o f representing this subject-prcdicate relationship. The characterization o f the assertion as the connection of representations is correct but unsatisfying. This correct, but inadequate, definition of assertion becam e the b a sis for a view and treatm ent o f logic which today and for a number o f decades has been much talked about and is called sym bolic logic ("L o g is t ic " ) . With the help of m athem atical m ethods people a t tempt to calculate the system o f the connectives between assertion s. For this reason, w e also call this logic "m ath e m atical logic. It proposes to itse lf a p ossible and ju sti fied task. However, what sym bolic logic achieves is any thing but logic, i.e., a reflection upon . M athem atical logic is not even logic o f m athem atics in the sense of de fining m athem atical thought and m athem atical truth, nor could it do so at all. Sym bolic logic is itself only a m athe m atics applied to propositions and propositional form s. All m athem atical logic and sym bolic logic necessarily place them selves outside of every sphere of logic, because, for their very own purpose, they m ust apply , the a s sertion, as a mere com bination of representations, i.e., b a sically inadequately. The presum ptuousness o f logistic in posing as the scientific logic o f all sciences collapses as soon as one realizes how lim ited and thoughtless its prem ises are. It is also ch aracteristic for logistic to con sider everything that reaches beyond its own definition of assertion as a connection of representations, as a m atter o f "fin er d istin ctio n s" w hich dont concern it. But here it is not a question o f fine or gross distin ction s, but only this: Whether or not the essence o f the judgment has been hit upon. When Kant says that the cited "in terp retatio n " of judg ment in Sch olastic logic is unsatisfying, this d issa tisfa c
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tion is not sim ply a personal one in regard to his own particular w ish es. On the contrary, this interpretation does not sa tisfy those demands which come from the essence o f the situation itself. c. The Relation o f the Judgment to Object and Intuition. Apperception What is K an t's new definition of judgm ent? Kant said ( B 141, cited above) "th a t a judgment is nothing but the manner in w hich given modes o f knowledge are brought to the ob jective unity of apperception. We cannot yet fully and im m ediately grasp this definition and its deter mining elem ents ( B estim m u ngsst cke ). Meanwhile, som ething strik es the eye. The discussion is no longer of representations and concepts, but o f "given cognitions, i.e., o f the given in knowledge, consequently, o f intuitions. He speaks o f "o b je ctiv e u n ity. Here judging as an action o f understanding is not only related to intuition and object, but its essence is defined from this relation and even as this relation. Through the essential definition of judgment, as it is anchored in intuition and object-relation, this relationship is, at the very beginning, outlined and expressly set into the unified structure of knowledge. From here a new concept o f understanding arises. Under standing is now no longer m erely the facu lty o f connecting representations, but: "U nderstanding is, to use general term s, the facu lty of knowledge. This knowledge co n sists in the determ inate relation o f given representations to an o b je ct----- " ( 17, B 137, N.K.S., p. 156.) We can cla rify this new situation w ith a diagram. This diagram w ill later serve us as a reference point when we develop the essential distinction between an alytic and synthetic judgm ents from this new interpretation of judgment. I he definition o f judgm ent quoted earlier concerns sim ply a relation of concepts, subject and predicate. That
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the representing o f such a relation demands an actus m entis is self-evident, since som e mode o f action belongs to every act o f the understanding. In contrast w ith this the new definition speaks of the objective unity of knowledge, i.e., the unity o f the intuitions, which is represented as a
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unity belonging to the ob ject and determining it. This rela tion o f representations, as a whole, is related to o b jects. Therewith, for Kant, there is also posited the relation to the "su b je c t in the sense o f the I that thinks and judges. In the essential definition o f judgment, this I relation is called apperception. Percipere is the sim ple apprehen sion and grasping of the objective. In apperception the relation to the I is grasped and perceived in a certain w ay, along w ith the object. The standing-over-against (E n t gegenstehen) o f the object as such is not p ossible unless what encounters, in its standing-over-against, is present for that which represents, which thereby at the sam e tim e has itself present along w ith the ob ject, although not as an object, but only in sofar as what encounters in its againstness ( Entgegen ) at all demands a directed relation to that which is aw are of that which encounters. According to the w ay in w hich w e have now contrasted the tw o definitions of judgm ent, i.e., the traditional one and K ants, it looks as though Kant only added som ething to the definition o f judgment which had been om itted up
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till then. But it is not a question of a "m ere extension," but of a more prim ordial grasp of the whole. Therefore, we m ust begin w ith K ants essential definition in order to be able to evaluate the position of the traditional definition. If we take this latter for itself, then w e can clearly see that w e select one component and that this, so taken, repre sents only an artificial construction which has been up rooted from the supporting b a sis o f the relations to the object, and to the knowing I. From this it is easy to judge w hy the traditional defini tions o f judgment never could sa tisfy Kant, i.e., put him at peace w ith the m atter itself. In regard to the question of the p ossib ility o f m etaphysics, the question concerning the essence o f human knowledge had to becom e decisive for him. To understand K ants new definition o f judgment more clearly is nothing else than to clarify the aforementioned distinction between an alytic and synthetic judgm ents. We ask in w hat respect these judgm ents are distinguished. What docs this key respect imply for the new definition of the nature o f judgm ent? The various tw isted, slanted, and fruitless attem pts to come to term s w ith K ants distinction all suffer in advance from being based on the traditional definition o f judg ment, but not on that attained by Kant. The distinction brings into view nothing else than the changed conception of the Logos and all that belongs to it, i.e., the logical. Up to then the essence o f the logical w as seen in the connection and relation o f concepts. K ant's new definition of the logical, contrasted w ith the tradi tional one, is som ething absolutely strange and alm ost nonsensical, insofar as it asserts that the logical precisely does not ju st co n sist in this mere relation of concepts. Ob viously w ith full knowledge o f the scope o f his new defini tion ol the logical, Kant put it into the title o f that impor tant 19: The Logical Form of All Judgments C onsists in the O bjective Unity o f the Apperception of the Concepts
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Which They Contain. To read this as a m ethodical guide means that all discussion o f the essence o f the judgment m ust arise from the entire structure o f judgment as it is established, in advance, from the relations to the object and to the knowing human. d. K ant's D istinction Between A nalytic and Synthetic Judgments What is the purpose of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgm ents? In w hat respect does its clari fication give us a more fulfilled insight into the nature of judgm ent? H itherto we know only that this distinction directs the division between the first tw o section s o f our chapter. We cannot get much from the names. Pursuing them w e can easily fall into error, m ostly because the designated distinction can also be met in the traditional definition of judgm ent and had already been applied even at the time o f its first form ation by A ristotle. A nalytic means an alysis, dissolving, taking apart, Suiipanv; synthe sis, on the other hand, means putting together. If w e observe once again the view of judgment as the relation between su b ject and predicate, then it immedi ately fo llo w s that this relation, i.e., the attributing o f the predicate to the su bject, is a synthesis, e.g., o f "b o a rd and b la ck ." On the other hand, these two relational elements must be separated in order to be com binable. There is an an alysis in every synthesis, and vice versa. Therefore, every judgment as a relation o f representations is not only incidentally but necessarily an alytic and synthetic at the sam e time. Therefore, because every judgm ent as such is both analytic and synthetic, the distinction into analytic and synthetic judgm ents is nonsensical. This reflection is correct. However, Kant does not base his distinction upon the nature of judgm ent as traditionally intended. What an alytic and synthetic mean to Kant is not derived from the traditional, but from the new, essential delineation
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( W esensumgrenzung ). In order really to see the difference and its main point, we call upon the aid o f the diagram and o f exam ples o f analytic and synthetic judgm ents. "A ll bodies are extended is, according to Kant, an analytic judgm ent. "S o m e bodies are heavy ( Prolego mena 2a) is, according to Kant, a synthetic judgment. W ith regard to these exam ples, one could base the differ ence between analytic and synthetic judgm ents by saying that the an alytic judgm ent speaks of " a l l bodies, w hile the synthetic, on the contrary, speaks about "so m e . This difference between the tw o judgm ents is certainly not a c cidental. However, it does not suflice in order to grasp the required difference, p articularly not when we understand it only in the sense o f traditional logic and assert that the first judgm ent is universal and the second particular. "A ll bod ies here m eans "b o d y in general. According to Kant, this "in general is represented in the concept. "A ll bod ies m eans the body taken according to its concept, w ith regard to what w e mean at all by "b o d y. Taking body according to its concept, according to what w e rep resent by it, w e can and even m ust say that body is ex tended, whether it be a purely geom etrical body or a m a terial and physical one. The predicate "extended lies in the concept itself; a mere dissecting o f the concept finds this element. In the judgm ent "The body is extended, the represented unity o f the relation o f su bject and predicate, the belonging together o f both, has the b asis o f its funda mental determ ination in the concept o f the body. If I judge about bodies in any w ay at all, I m ust already have a certain cognition of the ob ject in the sense of its concept. If nothing more is asserted about the o b ject than what lies in the concept, i.e., if the truth o f the judgm ent is based only upon a dissection o f the concept o f the subject as such, then this judgment is an an alytic one. The truth of the judgm ent rests on the analyzed concept as such. The follow ing diagram clarifies the above:
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According to the new definition, there belongs to the judgment the relation to the object (x ), i.e., the su b ject is meant in its relation to the object. However, this relation can now be represented in various w ays. First, so that the object is represented only insofar as it is cited in general, in the concept. In the concept w e already have a knowledge of the ob ject, and by skipping the object (X ), without detouring through X, purely by remaining in the su bjective concept "b o d ily , w e can draw the predicate out o f it. Such an analyzing judgment only presents more clearly and purely what w e already represent in the su bjective concept. Therefore, according to Kant, the an alytic judgment is only a clarifying one. It docs not increase the content of our knowledge. Let us take another example. The judg ment "The board is extended is an an alytic judgment. In the concept o f the board as corporeal lies being extended. This judgment is self-evident, i.e., the putting-into-relation o f su b ject and predicate already has its ground in the con cept w e have o f a board. In contrast, if w e say, The board is b lack , then our assertion is not self-evident. The board could ju st as w ell be gray, w hite, or red. The being red docs not already lie in the concept of a board, as being ex tended does. How the board is colored, that it is black, can be decided only from the object itself. Therefore, to reach the grounds o f the determ ination in w hich this relation of su bject and predicate is based, our representation has to
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take another w ay than in the analytic judgment, namely, the w ay via the object and its particular giveness. Viewed from the analytic judgment this means that we cannot stay w ithin the su b je cts concept and appeal only to w hat belongs to a board as such. We have to step out o f the subject and pass beyond the concept and go by w ay of the object itself. This, however, means that in ad dition to the concept o f the object, the object itse lf must be represented. This additional representation ( Mit-clazitvo rstellen ) of the object is a synthesis. Such a judgment, where the predicate is annexed to the su bject via passage through the X and recourse to it, is a synthetic judgment. For that som ething outside the given concept m ust be added as a substratum , which m akes it p ossible to go be yond my predicate, is clearly indicated by the expression syn th esis." ( ber eine Entdeckung . . . , op. eil., p. 245.) In the sense o f the traditional definition of judgment, a predicate is added to the subject also in the an alytic judg ment. W ith respect to the subject-predicate relationship the an alytic judgment, too, is synthetic. Conversely, the synthetic is also analytic. But this respect is not decisive for Kant. We now see more clearly w hat this general judging relationship am ounts to, when it is selected in isolation and alone alleged to be the judging relationship. Then it is only the neutralized relation of su b ject and predicate which is present in general in the an alytic and synthetic judgment, but in essen tially different w ays. This leveled and faded form is stam ped as the essence o f judgment. It rem ains om inous that it is a lw a y s right. Now our diagram becom es m isleading insofar as it could give the im pression that the subject-predicate relation ship w as first and forem ost the main support, and the rest were just accessories. The dec isive respect in which an alytic and synthetic judgm ents are distinguished is the reference of the subject-predicate relationship as such to the object. If this ob ject is only represented in its concept, and if this is
posited as what is given beforehand, then the ob ject is in a certain sense a standard, but only as the given concept. This concept can yield the determ inations only in sofar as it is dissected, and only w h at is dissected and thus thrown into relief is attributed to the object. The grounding of the judgment takes place w ithin the realm of thedissection o f the concept. The object is a standard in the analytic judgm ent, too but solely within its concept. (Compare: " . . . o f that w hich as concept is contained and is thought in the knowledge of the object. . . . [/1 151, B 190, N.K.S., p. 190]) But, if the o b ject is an im m ediate standard for the subject-predicate relationship, if the asserting is proven by taking its w ay via the object itself, if the object itself p articip ates as the foundation and grounds, then the judgment is synthetic. The distinction classifies judgm ents according to the p ossible difference of the b a sis for the determ ination ol the truth in the subject-predicate relationship. If the b a sis for the determ ination is contained in the concept a s such, then the judgm ent is analytic. If this b a sis is contained in the object itself, then the judgment is synthetic. From out of the object itse lf this judgment adds som ething to the erstw hile knowledge o f the object; it extends ( erw eit ernd). The analytic judgment, however, is only clarifying (erluternd). It must have become clear that the above distinction ! between judgm ents presupposes the new concept o f judg ment, i.e., the relation to the objective unity o f the object itself; and that, at the sam e time, it serves to convey a definite insight into the full essential structure o f the judgment. Nevertheless, w e still do not see clearly what the distinction into an alytic and synthetic judgm ents has to do with the task of the critique o f pure reason. We have defined this p ositively as the essential delim iting of pure reason, i.e., what it has the power to do; negatively
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put, as rejection of the presum ptuousness o f m etaphysics based upon mere concepts. e. A Priori A Posteriori To w hat extent is the designated distinction one of fundamental im portance for the execution o f the critique? We can answ er this question ju st as soon as we have characterized an alytic and synthetic judgm ents in one more respect, which up to now has been intentionally postponed. In the clarification o f the nature of the m athem atical and in the description o f the development o f m athem ati cal thought in modern natural science and modern modes o f thought in general, we ran into a striking fact. For example, N ewtons first principle of motion and G alileos law o f falling bodies both have the peculiarity that they leap ahead o f what verification and experience, in a literal sense, offer. In such principles, som ething has been antic ipated in respect to things. Such anticipations rank ahead of and precede all further determ inations of things. In Latin term s such anticipations are a priori rather than anything else. This docs not mean that in the order o f the historical development of our knowledge these anticipa tions as such becom e fam iliar to us first. Rather, the anticipating principles are first in rank when it is a ques tion o f grounding and constructing our knowledge in itself. Thus a natural scien tist can for a long time have various kinds o f inform ation and knowledge of nature w ithout knowing the highest law o f motion as such; yet what is posited in this law is alw ays already the ground lor all particular assertion s made in the domain of sta te ments concerning processes o f m otion and their regularity. The priority (P rio ritt) o f the a priori concerns the essence o f things. What enables the tiling to be what it is pre-cedes the thing as regards the facts and nature, al
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though we only grasp that which precedes after taking account o f som e of the most obvious qualities of the thing. (On prioritas naturae, com pare Leibniz' "L etter to Voider o f January 21, 1704, in Leibniz, Gerhardt, ed., 11,263.) In the order o f explicit apprehension, w hat ob jectively pre cedes is later. The is wnpov v/jus. Because what ob jectively precedes is later in the order o f coming to know, this ea sily again and again leads to the error that it is also objectively som ething later and thus an un important and b asica lly indifferent fact. This widespread as well as convenient opinion corresponds to a peculiar blindness for the essence o f things and for the decisive im portance o f the cognition of essence. The predominance of such a blindness to essence is alw ays an obstacle for a change in knowledge and the sciences. On the other hand, the decisive changes in human knowledge and scientific attitude are based upon the fact that w'hat objectively precedes ( das sachlich Vorgngige) can be grasped in the right w ay also for inquiry as the preceding (d as Vor herige) and constan tly as an advance projection. The a priori is the title for the essence o f things. Ac cording to how the thingness of the thing is grasped and the being of what is is understood, so also is the a priori and its prioritas interpreted. We know that for modern philosophy the I-principle is the first principle in the order of precedence of truth and principles, i.e., that which is thought in the pure thought of the I as the prim e subject. Thus it happens that, conversely, everything thought in the pure thought o f the su bject holds good a priori. That is a priori which lies ready in the su bject, in the mind. The a priori is what belongs to the su b jectivity o f the subject. Everything else, on the contrary, which first becom es accessible only by going out of the su bject and entering into the object, into perceptions, is as seen from the su b ject later, i.e., a posteriori. We cannot enter here into the history of this distinction a priori, preceding in rank, and a posteriori, correspond
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ingly later. Kant in his w ay takes it over from modern thought and w ith its help characterizes the distinction o f judgments into an alytic and synthetic. An analytic judg ment, w hich has the fundam ental determ ination of the truth o f its subject-predicate relationship solely in the concept, remains from the outset in the sphere o f con ceptual analysis, i.e., the sphere o f mere thought. It is a priori. All an alytic judgm ents according to their essence are a priori. Synthetic judgm ents are a posteriori. Here we m ust first move out o f the concept to the object, from w hich w e afterw ard derive the determ inations. f. How Are Synthetic Judgments A Priori Possible? Let us now look at traditional m etaphysics from the vantage point o f K ants clarification o f the essence of judgment. A critique o f this traditional m etaphysics m ust circum scribe the essence o f thought and judgment achieved and claim ed in it. What kind o f judgment does traditional modern m etaphysics demand, in the light o f K ants theory o f judgm ent? As w e know, rational m eta physics is a knowledge out o f mere concepts, therefore a priori. But this m etaphysics docs not desire to be a logic, analyzing only concepts; but it claim s to know the super sensible domains o f God, the world and the human soul, hence ob jects them selves. Rational m etaphysics w an ts to enlarge our knowledge about such things. The judgm ents of this m etaphysics are synthetic in their claim yet at the sam e tim e priori, because they are derived from mere concepts and mere thought. The question concerning the p ossib ility of the rational m etaphysics can thus be ex pressed in the form ula: How are the judgm ents claim ed in it possible, i.e., how are synthetic judgm ents which are also a priori possible? We say "a ls o , since how synthetic judgm ents are possible a posteriori is understood without difficulty. An enlargement o f our knowledge (sy n th e sis) results whenever w e move beyond the concept and allow
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the givens o f perception and sensation, the a posteriori, the later (a s seen by thought, i.e., bv that w hich precedes [ Vorherigen ] ) , to have their say. How analytic judgm ents a priori are possible, on the other hand, is also clear. They sim ply reproduce by clarifi cation w hat already lies in the concept. On the contrary, it rem ains incom prehensible, at first, how synthetic judg m ents a priori are to be possible. According to what has been said, at least, the mere conception o f such a judg ment is contradictory in itself. Since synthetic judgm ents are a posteriori, w e could replace the word synthetic by a posteriori to see the nonsense o f this question. It runs: How are a posteriori judgm ents p ossible a priori? Or, since all analytic judgm ents are a priori, w e can replace the word a priori by analytic and reduce the question to the form: How are synthetic judgm ents an alytically pos sib le? That is as if w e would say: How is fire p ossible as w ater? The answ er is self-evident. It is: "Im p o ssib le ." The question concerning the p ossibility o f synthetic judgm ents a priori looks like a demand to make out som e thing binding and determ inative about the object, without going into and back to the object. Yet, the decisive discovery o f Kant co n sists precisely in allow ing us to see that and how synthetic judgm ents a priori are possible. To be sure, the question concerning the "h o w o f the p ossibility had for Kant a double mean ing: (1 ) in which sense and (2 ) under w hat conditions. Synthetic judgm ents a priori are indeed, as w ill be shown, possible only under exactly determined conditions, which conditions rational m etaphysics is not able to ful fill. Therefore, synthetic judgm ents a priori are not achiev able in it. The m ost special intention o f rational m eta physics collapses in itself. Note: It does not collapse because it does not reach the set goal in consequence of outer obstacles and lim its, but because the conditions of that knowledge which m etaphysics claim s in its very character are not lulfillable on the basis o f this character.
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The rejection o f rational m etaphysics on the b a sis o f its inner im p ossibility does presuppose a positive demon strating o f those conditions which make p ossible syn thetic judgm ents a priori. Out of the mode of these condi tions is also determined how, i.e., in w hat sense alone, synthetic judgm ents a priori are possible, namely, in a sense about which philosophy and human thought in gen eral knew nothing until Kant. By ascertaining these conditions that is to say, the circum scription o f the nature of such judgm ents Kant not only recognizes in what respect they are possible, but also in w hat respect they are necessary. Namely, they are necessary to m ake p ossible human knowledge as ex perience. According to the tradition o f modern thought, which, despite everything, Kant held to, knowledge is founded in principles. Those principles which necessarily underlie our human knowledge as conditions of its p ossi b ility must have the character of synthetic judgm ents a priori. In the third section o f our chapter there occurs nothing more than the system atic presentation and grounding o f these synthetic and yet, at the sam e time, a priori judgm ents. g. The Principle of the Avoidance o f Contradiction as the Negative Condition of the Truth o f Judgment From the above w e now understand more easily w hy two section s precede this third one. The first is concerned w ith analytic, the second w ith synthetic judgm ents. Upon the background of these first two sections, w hat is pe cu liar and new in the third section and the meaning of the center o f the whole work first becom es visible. On the basis of the achieved clarification o f the distinction between an alytic and synthetic judgm ents, w e also under stand why the discussion concerns the highest principles ol these judgm ents, w hat this means. Analytic and synthetic judgm ents are distinguished
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w ith regard to their different kinds of relations to the object, i.e., according to the respective kinds o f bases for determining the truth o f the subject-predicate relation ship. The highest principle is the positing of the first and proper ground in which the truth of the respective kind of judgment is based. Thus we can say, bv turning the whole thing around: The first tw o section s o f our chapter enable the original insight into the essence o f analytic as w ell as synthetic judgm ents in sofar as they respectively deal w ith what constitutes the essential distinction between the tw o kinds o f judgm ents. As soon as the discussion is o f ana lytic and synthetic judgm ents in K ants sense, then judg m ents and the essence o f the judgment in general are understood in and out o f their relation to the object and, therefore, in accord w ith the new concept o f judgment achieved in the Critique of Pure Reason. When, therefore, our chapter is concerned throughout w ith judgm ents, this no longer means that thought is examined for the sake of itself, but that the relation of thought to the ob ject and thus to intuition is in question. This short system atic reflection on K an ts theory of judgment w as intended to enable us to understand the follow ing discussion of the first section, i.e., to gain an advance view o f the inner connections o f w hat Kant says in the following. A judgm ent is either analytic or synthetic, i.e., the b asic ground of its truth is either in the given su bjective concept or in the object itself. We can consider a judgment as sim ply a subject-predicate relationship. By this w e only comprehend a residue o f the structure o f judgm ents. Even for this residue to be w hat it is, to provide a subjectpredicate relationship at all. it still stand s under the condition that su b ject and predicate are unitable, i.e., that they are attribu table to each other and do not contra dict each other. But, this condition does not yield the com plete basis for the truth of the judgment, because judgment is yet not fully comprehended.
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The mere un itability o f subject and predicate only says that an assertion as \iyuv n riw?, i.e., a saying ( Sp ru ch ) in general, is p ossible at all, insofar as no contradiction hinders it. However, this un itability as a condition for assertion does not yet reach into the sphere of the essence of judgment. In this case the judgment is as yet con sidered w ithout any regard for the giving o f grounds and object relation. The mere un itability of su bject and predicate tells so little about the truth of the judgment that, in spite o f being free from contradiction, a subjectpredicate relationship can be false or even groundless. "B u t even if our judgment contains no contradiction it may connect concepts in a manner not borne out by the object, or else in a manner for which no ground is given, either a priori or a posteriori, sufficient to ju stify such judgment, and so may still, in spite o f being free from all inner contradiction, be either false or groundless." (A 150, B 190, N.K.S., pp. 189 f.) Only now does Kant give us the form ula o f the fam ous principle o f contradiction : "N o predicate contradictory o f a thing can belong to it (A 151, B 190, N.K.S., p. 190). In his lecture on m etaphysics ([E rfu rt: Plitz, 1821], p. 15) the form ula runs: Nulli su b jecto com petit prae dicatum ipsi oppositum . ("T o no su bject does a predicate belong that contradicts it. ) These tw o form ulations do not differ essentially. The one from the Critique o f Pure Reason expressly names the thing to w hich the su bjective concept is related; the lecture names the su bjective con cept itself. In the last paragraph o f our first section Kant explains why he form ulates the principle o f contradiction in this w ay that deviates from the traditional wording. " A l though this fam ous principle is thus w ithout content and merely form al, it has som etim es been carelessly form u lated in a m anner which involves the quite unnecessary adm ixture o f a synthetic element. The form ula runs: It is im possible that som ething should at one and the sam e time both be and not b e." (A 152, B 191, N.K.S., p. 190.) In
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A ristotle the principle of contradiction runs: yap & Tt ^' ' (M eta physics, IV, 3, 1005b, 19). ( It is im possible for the sam e to occur as w ell as not to occur at the sam e time in the sam e and w ith respect to the sa m e ."):i" ( Unmglich kann dasselbe zugleich Vorkommen sowohl als nicht Vorkom men am selben in H insicht auf das selbe. ) WolfT w rites in his Otitulogie, 28: Fieri non potest, lit idem sim ul sit et non s it. ( It cannot happen that the sam e at the same tim e is and is not. ) The term s for the determ ination o f time (U pM , sim ul, zugleich) are conspicuous in these for m ulations. K ants own wording om its at the same tim e. Why is it om itted? At the sam e tim e is a determ ination o f tim e and therefore characterizes the object as tempo ral, i.e., as an o b ject o f experience. However, insofar as the principle o f contradiction is understood only as the nega tive condition o f the subject-predicate relationship in general, the judgment is meant in its separation from the object and its temporal determ ination. But even when one attribu tes a positive meaning to the principle o f contra diction, as is soon done, at the sam e tim e, as a deter mination of tim e, does not according to Kant belong to its formula. h. The Principle o f the Avoidance o f Contradiction as the Negative Form ulation o f the Principle o f Identity In w hat sense can a p ositive application o f the principle o f contradiction be made so that it does not only represent a negative condition of the p o ssib ility of a subject-predi:l" W. D. Ross translates this passage: "It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect. (Aristotle, op. cit., VIII.) Hugh Tredennicks translation runs: It is im possible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the sam e relation. (The M etaphysics [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947], p. 161.) Heidegger seems to trans late this passage more cautiously than these. Trans.
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cate relationship at all, i.e., for all p ossible judgm ents, but also a highest principle for a certain kind of judgm ent? Traditional rational m etaphysics w a s o f the opinion that the principle of contradiction \vas the principle o f all judgm ents in general. Using K ants terms, all judgm ents would include analytic as well as synthetic. This distin c tion o f judgm ents enables Kant to draw more exactly than w a s done up to that time the range of the axiom atic validity o f the principle o f contradiction, i.e., to delim it it negatively and positively. A principle, in contrast to a mere negative condition, is a proposition in which there is posited the ground for p ossible truth, i.e., som ething sufficient for supporting the truth o f the judgment. This ground is alw ays presented as som ething that supports and is sufficient in supporting; it is ratio sufficiens. If the judgment is taken only a s a subject-predicate relation ship, then it is not at all considered w ith regard to the grounds that determine its truth. However, it is in this regard that the distinction of analytic and synthetic judg ments becom es determ inative. The analytic judgment takes the ob ject sim ply according to its given concept and desires only to retain this concept in the selfsam eness of its contents, in order to clarify it. The selfsam en ess of the concept is the only and sufficient standard for the attributing and denying o f the predicate. The principle which estab lish es the ground of the truth o f the analytic judgment m ust, consequently, establish the selfsam en ess o f the concept as the ground for the subject-predicate rela tionship. Understood as a rule, the principle m ust posit the necessity o f adhering to the concept in its selfsam e ness, identity. The highest principle o f analytic judgm ents is the principle of identity. But did we not say that the highest principle examined in this first section is the principle o f contradiction? Were we not ju stified in saying this since Kant nowhere speaks about the principle o f identity in the first section ? But it m ust puzzle us that there is the talk about a tw ofold role
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of the principle o f contradiction. The talk about the p osi tive use o f the principle of contradiction not only speaks o f the application o f this principle as a b a sis for deter m ination, but that this application is p ossible only if the negative content o f the principle is turned into its positive one at the sam e time. Presented in a form ula, it is: We have advanced from A > non A , to A = A. Positively used, the principle o f contradiction is the principle of identity. Kant indeed does not mention the principle o f identity in our section, but in the Introduc tion he labels the analytic judgm ents as those in w hich the connection o f the predicate w ith the su b ject is thought through identity ( A 7, B 10.N .K.S., p. 48); here "id e n tity is presented as the ground o f the analytic judgment. Sim ilarly, in a polem ical pamphlet, Uber eine Entdeckung . . . (op. cit., VIII, 245), analytic judgm ents are designated as those w hich rest entirely either on the principle o f iden tity or contradiction. In the follow ing second section (A 154-55, B 194, N.K.S., pp. 191 f.) identity and contradic tion are mentioned together. The relation o f these tw o principles has not been decided even today. Nor it is pos sible to decide it form ally, because this decision remains dependent on the conception o f being and truth as such. In Sch olastic rational m etaphysics the principle o f contra diction had priority. For this reason Kant intentionally term inates the discussion on the principle o f contradic tion in our section. For Leibniz, on the contrary, the prin ciple of identity becom es the first principle, especially since for him all judgm ents are identities (Identitten). Kant him self points out, against W olff, in his habilitation treatise (Part I: De Principio C ontradictionis, Propositio I) as follow s: Veritatum omnium non datur principium unicum, absolute primum, cath olico n .1 1 Proposito III show s the praeferentia o f the principium id entitatis . . . prae principio contradictionis.
< "The principle alone is not given as the absolutely first and universal of all truths. Trans.
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In an alytic judgm ents, the object is thought only ac cording to its concept and not as an ob ject o f experience, i.e., as a tem porally determined object. Therefore, the principle o f these judgm ents in its form ula does not need to contain any temporal determination. i. K ants Transcendental Reflection; General and Transcendental Logic The principle o f contradiction and the principle o f identity belong solely to logic, and, therefore, concern only the judgm ent considered logically. When Kant speaks thus, he certainly looks beyond the difference in the use of the principle o f contradiction that he introduced, and view s as only logical all thought which in its establishm ent does not take the w ay over the object itself. Logic, in the sense o f "general logic, disregards all relations to the ob ject (A 55, B 79, N.K.S., p. 95). It know s nothing of anything like synthetic judgm ents. All judgm ents o f m eta physics, however, are synthetic. Therefore and this is now all that m atters the principle o f contradiction is not a principle o f m etaphysics. Therefore and this is the further decisive consequence w hich m ediates between section s one and tw o m eta physical knowledge and every ob jective synthetic cogni tion demand another foundation altogether. Other prin ciples must be established. Considering the im portance of this step, we shall try to conceive more clearly the lim itation o f the principle of contradiction as the principle o f an alytic judgm ents, especially w ith regard to the guiding question about the thingness ol the thing. The traditional definition o f the thingness o f the thing, i.e., o f the being of w hat is ( Sein des Seienden), has the assertion (the judgm ent) as its guideline. Being is determined from out o f thought and the la w s o f con ceivability or inconceivability. However, the first section o f our chapter, which w e have ju st dis-
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'
cussed, asserts nothing else than that mere thought can not be the final court o f appeal for the determ ination of the thingness o f the thing, or, as Kant would say, for the o b jectiv ity of the object. Logic cannot be the b asic science of m etaphysics. However, in determining the object, w hich according to Kant is the object o f human knowl edge, it is necessary that thought p articipates, nam ely, as thought referred to intuition, i.e., as synthetic judgment. Hcnce logic, as the doctrine o f thought, also has a say in m etaphysics. According to the transform ed definition of the essence o f thought and judgment, the essence of logic, in sofar as it is related to it, m ust also be changcd. It m ust be a logic w hich considers thought inclusive o f its relation to the object. Kant ca lls this kind o f logic transcendental logic. The transcendental is w h at concerns transcendence. Viewed transcendentally, thought is considered in its passing over to the object. Transcendental reflection is not directed upon o b jects them selves nor upon thought as the mere representation of the subject-predicate relation ship, but upon the passing over ( berstieg ) and the relation to the object a s this relation. (Transcendence: 1. Over to [the other sid e ] as such [H inber zu als so lch es ] 2. Passing up, passing beyond [ b er-w eg.] ) (For K ants definition o f "tran scen d en tal," compare Critique of Pure Reason, A 12, B 25.:2 In a note (A cadem ic edition, op. cit., XV, No. 373), it reads as follow s: A determ ination o f a thing w ith regard to its essence as a thing is trans cen d en tal.") According to this line of thought, Kant calls his philoso phy transcendental philosophy. The system of principles is its foundation. In order to be clearer here and in what follow s w e bring into relief several view s o f the inquiry.
:t-K a n ts Critique of Pure Reason, A 12, B 25, N.K.S., p. 59: "I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as w ith the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori. A sys tem of such concepts might be entitled transcendental philos ophy. T rans.
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We custom arily express our cognitions, and even our questions and modes o f considering, in sentences. The physicist and the lawyer, the historian and the physician, the theologian and the m eteorologist, the biologist and the philosopher all speak sim ilarly in sentences and as sertions. Yet the domains and o b jects to which the asser tions refer remain distinct. Hence, the content of w hat is said differs in each case. Thus it com es about that no other difference is generally noticed than a difference in content when, for example, w e speak in a biological line o f questioning of the division o f cells, growth, and propagation, or when w e talk about biology itself its direction o f inquiry and assertion. People think that to talk biologically about the objects of biology differs from a discussion about biology itse lf only w ith respect to content. He w ho can do the first, and pre cisely he, m ust surely also be able to do the second. However, this is an illusion, for one cannot deal biologi cally w ith biology. Biology is not som ething like algae, m osses, frogs and salam anders, cells, and organs. Biology is a science. We cannot put the biology itse lf under the m icroscope as w e do the o b jects o f biology. The moment w e talk ab ou t a science and reflect upon it, all the means and m ethods o f this science in which w e are w ell versed fail us. The inquiry about a scicnce de mands a point o f view w hose accom plishm ent and direc tion are even less self-evident than is the m astery of this science. If it is a m atter o f an elucidation about a science, then the opinion easily gains a footing that such reflec tions are u n iversal," in distin ction to the "p a rticu la r questions o f the science. However, it is here not sim ply a m atter of qu antitative differences, o f the more or less universal. A qu alitative difference appears, in the es sence, in point o f view, in concept-form ation and in dem onstration. In fact, this difference already lies in each science itself. It belongs to it in sofar as it is a free h isto ri cal action o f man. Therefore, continual self-reflection belongs to every science.
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Let us recall the example: "The sun w arm s the rock. If we follow this assertion and its own essential line of assertion, then we are plainly directed to the o b jects sun, rock, and warm th. Our representation is incorporated into what the object itse lf offers. We do not pay attention to the assertion as such. To be sure, by a specific turn in the point of view o f our representing, we can turn aw ay from sun and rock and consider the assertion as such. That happened, for instance, when w e characterized the judgment as a subject-predicate relationship. This sub ject-predicate relationship itself has nothing in the least to do w ith the sun and the rock. We take the assertion, the "The sun w arm s the rock, now purely logically. Not only do wr e thereby disregard the fact that the asser tion refers to natural o bjects. We do not regard its objec tive relation at all. Besides this first representational di rection (d irectly to the o b je ct) and besides this second (to the o b jectless assertory relation in itse lf) there is now a third. In the characterization of the judgment The sun w arm s the rock, w e said that the sun is understood as the cause and the warm th o f the rock as the effect. If, in this respect, we hold on to the sun and the warm rock, w e are indeed directed toward sun and rock, and yet not directly. We do not only mean the sun itse lf and the warm rock it self, but w e now consider the object "su n in regard to how this object is an object for us, in what respect it is meant, i.e., how our thought thinks it. We do not now take a direct view of the ob ject (sun, warm th, r o c k ) but w ith regard to the mode of its o b jectiv ity ( G egenstndlichkeit ). This is the respect in w hich w e refer to the ob ject a priori, and in advance: as cause and effect. We are now not only not directed to the object o f the a s sertion, but also not to the form of the assertion as such, but rather to how the ob ject is the object of the assertion, how the assertion represents the object in advance, how our knowledge p asses over to the object, transcendit, and
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how, thereby, and in w hat objective determ ination the ob je ct encounters. Kant calls this w a y of considering tran scendental. In a certain sense the object sta ys in our view and in a certain sense so does the assertion, because the relation between the assertion and the ob ject is to be grasped. This transcendental consideration, however, is not an external hooking up o f psychological and logical modes of reflection, but som ething more prim ordial, from w hich these tw o sides have been separately lifted out. Whenever, w ithin a science, w e reflect in som e w ay upon that science itself, w e take the step into the line o f vision and onto the plane o f transcendental reflection. M ostly w e are unaware o f this. Therefore our deliberations in this respect are often accidental and confused. But, ju st as w e cannot take one reasonable or fruitful step in any science w ithout be ing fam iliar w ith its ob jects and procedures, so also we cannot take a step in reflecting on the science w ithout the right experience and practice in the transcendental point of view. When, in this lecture, w e constan tly ask about the thingness o f the thing and endeavor to place ourselves into the realm of this question, it is nothing else than the exercises o f this transcendental viewpoint and mode of questioning (Fragestellung). It is the exercise o f that w ay o f viewing, in which all reflection on the sciences necessarily moves. The securing o f this realm , the ac knowledged and knowing, taking possession o f it, being able to w alk and to stand in its dim ensions, is the funda mental presupposition o f every scientific Dasein which w an ts to comprehend its historical position and task. i. Synthetic Judgments A Priori N ecessarily Lie at the B asis o f All Knowledge When we approach the domain o f the o b jects of a sc i ence, the ob jects o f this domain are already determined
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such and so in advance. However, this does not occur ac cidentally nor from a lack o f attention on our part as if this pre-determination o f the object ever could be pre vented. On the contrary, this pre-determination is neces sary, so necessary that w ithout it w e could not stand be fore ob jects at all, as before som ething according to w hich our assertion s are directed and on which they are m easured and proven ( au sw eisen ). How can a scientific judgment correspond w ith its ob ject? How, for instance, can a judgment about art history really be an art-histori cal judgment if the object is not defined in advance as a work of art? How can a biological assertion about an ani mal be truly a biological judgment if the anim al is not already pre-defined as a living creature? We m ust alw ays already have a knowledge of content, of what an object is according to its objective nature, i.e., for Kant a synthetic knowledge. And w e must have it in advance, a priori. O bjects could never confront us as ob je c ts at all w ithout synthetic judgm ents a priori; by these o b jects we "th e n guide ourselves in particular investiga tions, inquiries, and proofs, in which w e constan tly ap peal to them. Synthetic judgm ents a priori are already asserted in all scientific judgm ents. They are pre-judgments ( Vor u rteile ) in a true and necessary sense. How scien tific a science is depends not on the number o f books w ritten, nor the number o f in stitu tes and certainly not on the use fulness it offers at the moment. Rather, it depends on how explicit and defined is its w ork w ith w hich it strives to do som ething on its pre-judgments. There is no presuppositionless science, because the essence o f science co n sists in such presupposing, in such pre-judgments about the object. Kant has not only affirmed all this, but has also shown it, and not sim ply shown but also grounded it. He has set this grounding as a com pleted w ork into our h is tory in the form of the Critique of Pure Reason. If we take the essence of truth in the traditional sense
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as the correspondence o f the assertion w ith the object and Kant, too, takes it in this w ay then truth understood in this w ay cannot be, unless the object ( Gegenstand ) has been brought to a standing-against ( Gegen-stehen) in ad vance, by synthetic judgm ents a priori. Therefore, Kant calls synthetic judgm ents a priori, i.e., the system o f prin ciples o f pure understanding, the "so u rce o f all truth ( A 237, B 296, N.K.S., p. 258). The inner connection of what has been said w ith our question about the thingness o f the thing is obvious. For Kant, true ( w ah rh aft ) things., i.e., things o f which a truth for us can com e to be, are objects o f experi ence. However, the object only becom es accessible to us when w e transcend the mere concept to that other which first has to be added to it and placed beside it. Such putting-along-side ( B eistellung) occurs as a synthesis. In the K antian sense, w e encounter things first and only in the domain o f synthetic judgm ents; and, accordingly, we first encounter the thingness o f the thing only in the con text o f the question o f how a thing as such and in advance is p ossible as a thing, i.e., at the sam e time how synthetic judgm ents a priori arc possible. 6. On the Highest Principle of All Synthetic Judgments If w e put together all that has been said about the outer lim its o f analytic judgm ents, then the two first principles of the second section w ill becom e understandable:
The explanation o f the p o ssib ility o f syn th etic judg m en ts is a problem w ith w h ich general logic has nothing to do. It need not even so much a s kn ow the problem by name. But in tran scen d en tal logic it is the m ost im portant o f all q u estio n s; and indeed, if in treating o f the p o ssi bility o f syn th etic a priori judgm ents w e a lso take account o f the con d itio n s and scop e o f their valid ity, it is the only question w ith w h ich it is concerned. For upon com pletion o f th is en quiry, tran scen d en tal logic is in a p o sitio n com
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pletely to fulfill its ultimate purpose, that of determining the scope and limits of pure understanding. In the analytic judgment we keep to the given concept, and seek to extract something from it. If it is to be affirmative, I ascribe to it only what is already thought in it. If it is to be negative, I exclude from it only its opposite. But in synthetic judgments I have to advance beyond the given concept, viewing as in relation with the concept something altogether different from what was thought in it. This relation is consequently never a relation either of identity or of contradiction; and from the judgment, taken in and by itself, the truth or falsity of the relation can never be discovered. (A 154 f., B 193 f., N.K.S., pp. 191 f.) The "altogether different is the object. The relation of this "altogether different to the concept is the represen tational putting-along-side ( B eistellen ) of the object in a thinking intuition: synthesis. Only w hile w e enter into this relation and m aintain ourselves in it does an object encounter us. The inner p ossibility o f the object, i.e., its essence, is thus co-determined out o f the p ossib ility of this relation to it. In w hat does this relation to the ob je ct con sist, i.e., in w hat is it grounded? The ground on which it rests m ust be uncovered and properly posited as the ground. This occurs in the statem ent and establishm ent of the highest principle o f all synthetic judgments. The condition of the p ossibility o f all truth is grounded in this posited ground. The source o f all truth is the prin ciples o f pure understanding. They them selves and there fore this source o f all truth go back to a still deeper source, w hich is brought to light in the highest principle o f all synthetic judgm ents. With the second section of our chapter, the w hole work o f the Critique of Pure Reason reaches its deepest basis, founded by it itself. The highest principle o f all synthetic judgm ents (or, as w e can also say, the b asic determ ination of the essence of human knowledge, its truth and its ob-
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ject) is expressed in this form ula at the end o f the second section: . . The conditions o f the p o ssib ility o f experi ence in general are likew ise conditions o f the p ossib ility of the ob jects of experience. . . (A 158, B 197, N.K.S., p. 194.) W hoever understands this principle understands K ant's Critique o f Pure Reason. W hoever understands this does not only know one book among the w ritin gs o f philosophy, but m asters a fundamental posture of the his tory o f man, which we can neither avoid, leap over, nor deny in any way. But w e have to bring th is by an appropri ate transform ation to fulfillment in the future. The third section also takes precedence over the second, the latter being only an unfolding of the former. There fore, a com plete and definite understanding o f this deci sive second section is p ossible only if w e already know the third one. Therefore, w e shall skip the second section and only return to it after the exposition o f the third, at the close o f our presentation o f the question o f the thing in the Critique of Pure Reason. All synthetic principles o f the pure understanding arc system atically presented in the third section. W hat m akes an ob ject into an object, w hat delim its the boundaries of the thingness of the thing, is described in its inner connec tion. Also in the exposition o f the third section w e immedi ately begin w ith the presentation o f the particular princi ples. The p relim inary consideration need be clarified only so far as to gain a more definite conccpt of the principle in general and of the point of view o f the division o f the principles. For that purpose, the first sentence o f the third section gives us the key: That there should be principles at all is entirely due to the pure understanding. Not only is it the facu lty o f rules in respect o f that which happens, but is itsell the source o f principles according to w hich every thing that can be presented to us as an object m ust con form to rules. For w ithout such rules appearances would
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never yield knowledge of an ob ject corresponding to them. ( 158 f., B 197 f., N.K.S., pp. 194 f.) 7. S ystem atic Representation o f All the Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding a. The Principles Make Possible the O bjectivity of the Object; The P o ssibility of E stablish in g the Principles In our pursuit o f the question about the thingness o f the thing, w e were led to K ants doctrine o f the principles of the pure understanding. In what w ay? For Kant the thing accessible to us is the object o f experience. Experi ence for him means the humanly p ossible theoretical knowledge of w hat is. This knowledge is tw ofold. There fore, Kant says: "Understanding and sen sibility, w ith us, can determine o b jects only when they are employed in con ju n ction ." ( A 258, B 314, N.K.S., p. 274.) An object is determined as object by the conjunction, i.e., by the unity of w hat is intuited in intuition and w hat is thought in thought. To the essence o f object ( G egenstand ) belongs the "a g a in st (Gegen) and the standing (S tan d ). The essence of this "a g a in st, its inner p o ssib ility and ground, as w ell as the essence of this "stan d in g , its inner p ossib il ity and ground, and, finally and above all, the prim ordial unity o f both, the "a g a in stn e ss as w ell as the "co n sta n cy, constitute the o b jectiv ity o f the object. That the determ ination o f the essence o f the object re su lts from principles at all is not im m ediately obvious. Nevertheless, it becom es understandable when w c attend to the traditional direction o f the question of the thing in W estern philosophy. According to this, the b asic m athe m atical ch aracteristic is the decisive: the recourse to axiom s in every determ ination of what is. Kant rem ains within this tradition. However, the w ay he conccives and establish es these axiom s brings about a revolution. The hegemony of the highest principle of all judgm ents hith-
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crto, the principle o f contradiction, is removed from its position o f dominance. What principles replace it? First of all, it m ust be noticeable that Kant does not speak o f axiom s. "A x io m s are for him a certain kind of principle a priori, nam ely, those which are im m ediately certain, i.e., which are verifiable w ithout further ado from intuition ol an object. However, such principles are not under discussion in this present context, which is already indicated since it is concerned w ith principles o f the pure understanding. But, as principles they m ust also include the grounds for other principles and judgm ents. Thus they them selves cannot be based on earlier and more uni versal cognitions. (A 148 f., B 188, N.K.S., pp. 188 f.) This does not exclude the fact that they have a foundation. Only the question rem ains wherein they have their foun dation. Principles which ground the essence of an object cannot be grounded upon the object. The principles can not be extracted by experience from the object, since they them selves first make p ossible the o b jectiv ity of the ob ject. Nor can they be grounded in mere thought alone, be cause they are principles o f objects. Consequently, the principles do not have the character o f general form al log ical propositions, such as "A is A, o f which we say that they are self-evident. Recourse to common sense fails en tirely here. In the realm o f m etaphysics it is "a n expedient which alw ays is a sign that the cause o f reason is in des perate str a its. ( A 784, B 812, N.K.S., p. 622.) What the nature of the b asis o f proof for these principles o f the pure understanding is and how they distinguish them selves through the nature of the b a sis o f their proof m ust be shown from the system o f these principles itself. b. Pure Understanding as the Source and Faculty o f Rules; Unity, Categories I hat the determ ination o f the thing in Kant leads back to principles is an indication for us that Kant rem ains
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within the tradition. However, this historical characteri zation is still not an explanation of the content. When Kant defines the essence o f thought anew, he m ust also dem onstrate, on the basis o f this new form ulation of the nature of understanding, w hy and to w hat extent princi ples belong to this. Kant w a s the first to be able not sim ply to accept and affirm the rule o f principles, but to ground it from the na ture o f the understanding itself. The first proposition o f the third section points to this connection. There he says expressly that the pure understanding is itself the source o f the principles. We m ust show how far this proves to be true, especially w ith reference to all that w e have heard up till now about the nature o f the understanding. Gen eral logic, which defines the judgm ent as the relationship of the representations of su bject and predicate, knows the understanding as the faculty o f connecting representa tions. Thus, just as the logical conception of the judgment is correct but insufficient, so also this conception of the understanding rem ains correct but u n satisfactory. The understanding m ust be viewed as a representing that re fers to the object, i.e., as a connecting o f representations so constructed that the connecting refers to the object. The understanding m ust be form ulated as that represent ing w hich grasps and con stitu tes this reference to an ob ject as such. The connection between su b ject and predicate is not merely a connecting in general, but a definitely deter mined connecting every time. Let us recall the objective judgment The sun w arm s the rock. Here sun and rock are represented objectively in that the sun is conceived of as the cause, and the rocks becom ing warm as the effect. The connection o f su bject and predicate occurs on the grounds o f the general relation o f cause and effect. Con nection is alw ays a putting-together ( Zusam m ensetzen) w ith regard to a p ossible kind o f unity which character izes the together" (Zusam m en). In this characterization
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o f the judgment, the prim ordial sense o f Aoyos as a gather ing-together ( Sam m lung) still faintly shines through. Each kind o f subject-predicate connection in judgm ents presupposes and bears in itse lf the representation o f a unity as the guiding regard, according to w hich and in whose sense the connecting occurs. The anticipating rep resenting o f such unities, which guides connection, belongs to the essence o f the understanding. The representations of these unities as such and in general are "co n cep ts, ac cording to the definition given earlier. Concepts o f such unities belonging to the understandings action of connect ing arc, however, not derived from any o b jects given be forehand; they are not concepts which have been drawn out o f perceptions o f individual o b jects. The representa tions of these unities belong to the functions o f the under standing, to the essence o f connecting. They lie purely in the essence o f the understanding itse lf and for this reason are called pure concepts of the understanding: categories. General logic has worked out a variety o f form s of judgment, modes o f subject-predicate connection which can be arranged in a table o f judgm ents ( U rteilstafel ). Kant took over from tradition and augmented this table o f judgm ents, the exhibition and classification of the dif ferent modes o f subject-predicate connection (A 70, B 95). The dim ensions o f classification are quantity, quality, re lation, and m odality. The table of judgm ents can, there fore,give an indication o f ju st a sm a n y k in d s o f unities and concepts o f unity, which guide the different connecting. According to the table o f judgments, one can form ulate a table o f the concepts o f unity o f the pure understanding, ol its root concepts (Stam m begriffe) ( A 80, B 106, N.K.S., P 113). If anything at all is introduced as a condition for the unifying and unified positing o f som ething manifold, this represented condition is used as the rule o f the con necting. The understanding is fundam entally the cap acity lor rules, since the anticipating representing o f unities,
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w hich regulates this connecting, belongs to the essence of the understanding as a connection o f representations, and since these regulating unities belong to the essence o f the understanding itself. Therefore, Kant says: "W e may now characterize it [the understanding] as the facu lty of rules ; and he adds: "T his distinguishing mark is more fruitful, and approxim ates more closely to its essential na ture. (A 126, N.K.S., p. 147.) The sam e is said in our spot at the beginning o f the third section: The understanding is the "fa cu lty of rules. Here the m etaphysical definition of the essence o f the understanding show s itself. But in the section in question, the definition o f the es sence o f the understanding traces back still one step further into the essence. The pure understanding is "n o t only the faculty o f rules, but even the source of rules. This m eans that the pure understanding is the ground of the n ecessity of rules at all. That w hich sh ow s itself ( Sich zeigendes) must have in advance the p ossibility o f coming to a stand and constancy, so that what encounters, what show s itself, i.e., w hat appears, can come before us at all as standing before us ( Gegenstehendes ). However, what stands in itse lf ( Insichstehendes) and does not fall apart ( N ichtauseinanderfahrendes) is what is collected in itself ( I nsich gesam m elt e s), i.e., som ething brought into a unity, and is thus present and constant in this unity. This con stancy is w hat uniform ly in itse lf and out of itself exists as presented toward. ( Die Stndigkeit ist das einheitliche in sicli von sich aus An-w esen.) This presence to it is made p ossible with the participation o f the pure understanding. Its a ctiv ity is thought. Thought, however, is an 7 think ; I represent som ething to m yself in general in its unity and in its belonging together. The presence ( Prsenz) of the object sh ow s itse lf in the representing, in w hich it be com es present to me ( auf mich zu Prsentwerden) through the thinking, i.e., connecting representing. But to whom this presence o f the object is presented, whether to me as a contingent " I w ith its moods, desires, and
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opinions, or to me as an I that puts behind itself every thing "su b je c tiv e , allow ing the object itse lf to be what it is, this depends on the " I , namely, upon the compre hensiveness and the reach o f the unity and the rules under which the connecting o f the representations is brought, i.e., fundam entally upon the range and kind o f freedom by virtue o f w hich I m yself am a self. The pre-senting ( vor-stellend) connecting is only pos sib le for the understanding if it contains in itse lf modes of uniting, rules o f the unity o f the connecting and determin ing, if the pure understanding allow s rules to emerge and is itse lf their origin and source. The pure understanding is the ground o f the n ecessity of rules, i.e., the occurrence of principles, because this ground, the understanding it self, is necessary in fact, according to the essence o f that to which the pure understanding belongs, according to the essence o f human knowledge. If w e human beings arc m erely open to the pressure of all that in the m idst o f which w e are suspended, we are not equal to this pressure. We m aster it only when we serve it out o f a superiority, i.e., by letting the pressure stand over against us, bringing it to a stand, thus forming and m aintaining a domain o f possible constancy. The m etaphysical necessity o f the pure understanding is grounded in this need that the pressure m ust be free standing. According to this m etaphysical origin o f the source of principles, that source is the pure understand ing. These principles, in turn, are the "so u rce of all truth, i.e., o f the p o ssib ility for our experiences to be at all able to correspond to objects. Such correspondence to . . . is only p ossible when the wherewith ( W o m it ) o f correspondence already com es be fore us in advance and stands before us. Only so docs som ething objective address us in the appearances; only so do they becom e recognizable w ith respect to an object speaking in them and "corresponding to them. The pure understanding provides the p o ssib ility o f the correspond
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ence to the ob ject thanks to the o b jectiv ity o f appear ances, i.e., o f the thingness of things for us. c. The M athem atical and Dynam ical Principles as M etaphysical Propositions On the b a sis o f this explanation, w e can understand the decisive proposition w hich introduces the third section. ( A 158, B 197 f., N.K.S., p. 194 f.) The principles o f pure reason lay the groundwork for the o b jectiv ity o f objects. In them nam ely in their connection those modes of representation are achieved in virtue of w hich the "a g a in st o f the object and the "sta n d of the object are opened up in their primordial unity. The principles al w ays concern this tw ofold unity of the essence of the ob je ct (G egenstand). Therefore, they m ust first lay the ground in the direction o f the against, the "a g ain stn ess (G egenheit), and sim ultaneously in the direction o f the stan d (S tan d es), the constancy. Thereby, from the es sence of the principles follow s their division into two groups. Kant calls them the m athem atical and dynam ical principles. W hat is the objective reason for this distin c tion? How is it intended? Kant defines the natural thing as the thing approach able by us, the body which is as an object of experience, i.e., of m athem atical-physical knowledge. The body is som ething in motion or at rest in space, so that the m o tions, as changes of place, can be determined num erically in terms of their relations. This m athem atical determ ina tion of the natural body is not an accidental one for Kant, not only a form of calculating that is merely added on to it. Rather, the m athem atical, in the sense of w hat is mov able in space, belongs first o f all to the definition o f the thingness o f the thing. If the p o ssib ility of the thing is to be m etap hysically grasped, there is need for such princi ples in which this m athem atical character of the natural body is grounded. For this reason, one group of the princi-
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pies o f pure understanding is called "th e m athem atical principles. This designation does not mean that the prin ciples them selves are m athem atical belonging to mathe m atics, but that they concern the m athem atical character of natural bodies, the m etaphysical principles which lay the ground of this character. The thing in the sense o f a natural body is, however, not only w h at is m ovable in space, what sim ply occupies space, i.e., is extended, but what fills a space, keeping it oc cupied, extending, dividing, and m aintaining itself in this occupying; it is resistance, i.e., force. Leibniz first set forth this character o f a natural body, and Kant took over these defining determ inations. That w hich is space-filling, which is sp atially present, w e know only through forces which are effective in space ( A 265, B 321, N.K.S., p. 279). Force is the ch aracter by which the thing is present in space. By being effective (w ir k t) it is actual (w irk lich ). The actu al ity ( W irklich keit ), the presence, the Dasein o f the things, is determined from the force (d yn am is), i.e., dynam ically. For that reason Kant ca lls those principles o f pure under standing which determine the p o ssib ility o f the thing w ith respect to its Dasein the dynam ical principles. Here, also, is to be noted what has been said regarding the designa tion "m ath em atical. These are not principles o f dynam ics as a discipline in physics, but m etaphysical principles which first render p ossible the physical principles of dy nam ics. Not by accident does Hegel give the title "F orce and Understanding to an important section in the Phe nomenology of the Spirit, in which he delim its the nature ol the object as a thing o f nature. We find this tw ofold direction o f the determ ination of natural bodies, the m athem atical and the dynam ical, clearly prefigured by Leibniz. (Compare G erhardt, op. cit., IV, 394 I.) But only Kant succeeded in dem onstrating and explaining its inner unity in the system of principles of the pure understanding. The principles contain those determ inations of things
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as appearances, w hich belong to them in advance, a priori, w ith reference to the possible form s o f the unity of the understanding-like conjunctions, i.e., the categories. The table o f categories is divided into four parts. This division corresponds to that ol the principles. The m athem atical and dynam ical principles are each divided into two groups, the whole system into four: (1 ) Axiom s o f intuition. (2 ) Anticipations o f percep tion. (3 ) Analogies o f experience. (4 ) Postulates of em pirical thought in general. We shall attem pt in the fol lowing to understand the titles o f the principles from the exposition itself. Kant rem arks expressly, "T hese titles I have intentionally chosen in order to give prominence to differences in the evidence and in the application o f the principles. (A 161, B 200, N.K.S., p. 196.) Under discus sion are the principles o f quantity, quality, relation, and m odality. The understanding o f the principles is gained only by going through their dem onstrations; for these dem onstra tions are nothing other than the exhibition of the "p rin ci ples, the grounds upon which they are based and from whence they create what they them selves are. For this reason everything depends on these dem onstrations. The form ulas o f the principles do not say much, especially since they are not self-evident. Therefore, Kant has put a great deal o f effort into these dem onstrations. He re worked them for the second edition, especially the first three groups. Each is constructed according to a definite schem a, which corresponds to the essential contents of these principles. The wordings ol the particular principles and, above all, their titles are also different in the first and second editions. These differences give im portant in dications o f the direction which K ants intention to clarify takes, and how the real meaning o f these principles is to be understood. Once again w e take everything in view in order to have
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available hereafter the essen tials o f the positing and proof o f the principles of pure understanding. The principles are "P rin cip les of the E xp osition " o f appearances. They are the grounds upon w hose b a sis the exposing of an ob ject in its appearing is possible. They are the conditions for the o b jectiv ity o f the object. From what has now been said about the principles of pure understanding in general, w e can already more clearly discern in w hat sense they are synthetic judgm ents a priori and how their p ossib ility m ust be proved. Syn thetic judgm ents are such that they extend our knowledge ol the object. This generally happens in that we derive the predicate by w ay of perception from the object, a posteri ori. But w e are concerned now w ith predicates as determ i nations of the o b ject, which belong to it a priori. These de term inations are those from which and upon the ground of w hich it is first determined in general w hat belongs to an o b ject as object, those determ inations which bring to gether the determ inations o f the o b jectiv ity of the object. They m ust obviously be a priori; for only insofar as we know in general about o b jectiv ity are we able to experi ence this or that possible object. But how is it possible to determine the ob ject as such in advance before experi ence, and for it? This p o ssib ility is shown in the proofs ol the principles. The respective proofs, however, accom plish nothing m ore than raising to light the ground of these principles them selves, which finally m ust be ever one and the sam e and w hich w e then encounter in the highest principles o f all synthetic judgm ents. Accordingly, the authentic principles of the pure understanding are those in which is expressed each time the principle ( Prin z ip ) o f the propositions (S tz e ) of the four groups. Thus, the real principles (G rundstze) are not the axiom s, an ticipations, analogies, and postulates them selves. The real principles are the principles of the axiom s, anticipations, analogies, and postulates.
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d. The Axiom s of Intuition Let us now notice the difference ol the wording of A and B ( A 162, B 202, N.K.S., p. 197) already mentioned. ( 4 ) "P rin cip le o f the pure understanding: All appear ances are, in their intuition, extensive m agnitudes. ( B ) "T heir principle is: All intuitions are extensive m agnitudes." The wording in B is not alw ays more precise than in A. They supplement one another, and are therefore o f special value, because this large domain, discovered by Kant, w a s still not as thoroughly clarified by him as he envisioned in the task o f a system of transcendental philosophy. But for us who com e after him, ju st the inconsistencies, the back and forth, the new sta rts, the envisioned still in process are more essential and fruitful than a sm ooth system wherein all the joints are filled and painted over. Before we go through the process o f proof for the first principle w e ask w hat the discussion is about, i.e., con cerning the "elem en ts ( B estan d st cke ). We know that it deals w ith the determ ination o f the essence o f the ob ject. The ob-ject ( G eg en stan d ) is determined by intuition and thought. The object is the thing insofar as it appears. The object is appearance. Appearance never m eans sem blance ( S ch ein ) here, but the ob ject itself in its being present and standing there ( D astehen ). In the sam e place in which, at the beginning o f the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant nam es the tw o elem ents o f knowledge, intuition and thought, he also characterizes appearance. "T h at in the appearance which corresponds to sensation 1 term its m atter; but that which so determ ines the m anifold of ap pearance that it allo w s o f being ordered in certain rela tions, I term the form o f appearance. (A 20, B 34, N.K.S., p. 65.) Form is the wherein ( W orinnen ) of the order of colors, sounds, etc.
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d,. Quantum and Quantitas The first principle concerns appearances "w ith respect to their intuition, thus w ith the object in regard to its "a g a in st (gegen), the encountering, the coming-before-us (Vor-uns-kom m en). In this respect it is said that appear ances as intuitions are extensive magnitudes. What do "m agnitu de and "exten sive m agnitude" mean? The German expression "G r sse " is equivocal in general and especially in relation to Kant. For this reason Kant likes to add distinguishing Latin expressions in pa rentheses, or he often uses only the Latin in order to tie down the distinction which he w a s first to posit clearly. We find at the end o f one paragraph and at the beginning of the one follow ing the tw o labels for magnitude ( G r sse ) (A 163 f., R 204, N.K.S., p. 199): magnitude as quantum and magnitude as quantitas. Magnitude as quan titas (Cf. Re/le.x. 6338a, Akademie ed., op. eit., XVIII, 659 II.) answ ers the question "H ow b ig ? It is the measure, the how much of a unity taken many tim es. The magnitude of a room is so and so many m eters long, wide, and high. However, this magnitude o f the room is only p ossible be cause the room as spatial at all, is an up,down, back,fron t, and beside; it is a quantum. By this Kant understands what w e can call sizable ( G ro ssh afte ) at all. On the other hand, magnitude as quantitas is the m easure and mea surement o f the sizable. At any given tim e it is a determ i nate unity in w hich the parts precede and com pose the whole. In contrast, in magnitude as quantum, in the siz able, the whole is before the parts. It is indefinite in regard to the aggregate (M enge) of parts and in itse lf continuous. Q uantitas is a lw a y s quantum discretum . It is possible only through a subsequent division and a corresponding com bination (sy n th e sis) within and upon the ground o f the quantum. This latter, however, never becom es w hat it
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is only through a synthesis. Magnitude as quantitas is a lw a y s som ething that can be compared, because deter mined by so and so many parts, w hile the spatial ( Raumh a fte s) disregarding qu antitas is alw ays in itsell the same. Magnitude as quantitas alw ays has to do w ith the gen eration o f magnitudes. If this happens in the progress from parts to parts to the whole through successive piec ing together o f the separated parts, then the magnitude ( q u a n tita s) is an extensive one. The magnitude o f the amount (aggregate) is extensive. (Re/lex. 5887, cf. 5891.) Magnitude as quantitas is a lw ays the unity of a repeated positing. The representation of such a unity contains at first only w hat the understanding in such a repeated p osit ing "d oes for itse lf ; there " i s nothing contained therein which ca lls for sensory perception. ( Reflex. 6338a.) Quantity is a pure conception of the understanding. But this is not true o f magnitude as quantum ; it is not pro duced through a positing but is sim p ly given for an in tuiting. du. Space and time as Quanta, as form s o f pure intuition What does it mean that appearances as intuitions are extensive m agnitudes? It is evident from the com parative definitions o f magnitude as quantitas and as quantum that quantitas alw ays presupposes quantum, that magni tude as measurement, as so much, m ust alw ays be a mea surement o f som ething sizable. Accordingly, appearances as intuitions (i.e., intuitions as su ch ) m ust be quanta, siz able, if they are to be qu antities at all. According to Kant, however, space and tim e are ol such a nature (qu an ta). That space is a magnitude does not mean that it is som e thing so and so big. Space is at first precisely never so and so big, but it is w hat first m akes p ossible magnitude in the sense of quantitas. Space is not com posed of spaces. It does not co n sist of parts, but each space is sim ply a lim ita-
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tion o f the whole o f space, and in such a w ay that even the bounds and border presuppose space and spatial ex tension, and remain in space, just as the part of space rem ains in space. Space is a magnitude (quan tum ) in w hich the finite, m easurably-determ ined parts and com bi nations alw ays com e too late, where the finite o f this sort sim ply has no right and achieves nothing for the defini tion of its essence. For this reason, space is called an "in finite m agnitude (A 25, N.K.S., p. 69). This does not mean "en d less w ith respect to finite determ inations as quanti tas, but as quantum, w hich presupposes nothing end-like as its condition. Rather, on the contrary, it is itself the condition of every division and finite partitioning. Space and time are equally quanta continua, basically sizable, in-finite m agnitudes and, consequently, possible extensive magnitudes (q u a n tities). The principle of the axiom s o f intuition reads: "A ll appearances are, in their intuition, extensive m agnitudes." (A 162, N.K.S., p. 197.) But how can intuitions be extensive m agnitudes? For this they m ust be b a sica lly sizables (qu an ta). Kant rightly calls space and lim e such. But space and time still are not intuitions; they are space and time. E arlier w e defined intuition as the im m ediate repre senting o f a particular. Something is given to us through this representing. Intuition is a giving representing, not a m aking one, or one w hich first form s som ething through com bining. Intuition (Anschauung) in the sense o f som e thing looked at ( A ngeschaut)1 1 1 is the represented, in the sense o f a given. In the spot where Kant defines space as an in-finite magnitude, he says, however, "S p a ce is represented as an infinite given m agnitude" (A 25, N.K.S., p. 69), and "S p ace is represented as an infinite given m agnitude (B 40, N.K.S., p. 69). The representing which brings space as such before us is a giving representation,
:,:l In interpreting both Kant and Heidegger it is helpful to re call that the Latin and English "intuition is the usual translation ol the ordinary German word "looking a t" ( Anschauung). Trans.
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i.e., an intuition. Space itse lf is som ething one looks at and in this sense is intuition (Anschauung). Space is im mediately given. Where is it given? Is space anywhere at all? Is it not rather the condition ol the p ossib ility ol every w here and "th e re and h ere"? One spatial char acteristic is, for example, proxim ity ( Nebeneinander ). However, we do not acquire this "b e sid e (neben) by first comparing o b jects lying beside one another. In order to experience these o b jects as beside one another, we must already im m ediately represent the beside, and, sim ilarly, the before, behind, and above, one another. These extensions do not depend upon appearances, upon what sh ow s itself, since we can imagine all objects om itted from space, but not space itself. In all cases of things showing them selves in perception, space as a whole is represented in advance necessarily and as im m ediately given. But this one, general given, this repre sented, is not a concept, is not som ething represented in general such as " a tree in general. The general represen tation "tr e e contains all individual trees under it as that o f which it is assertable. Space, however, contains all par ticular spaces in itself. Particular spaces are sim ply re spective lim itation s o f the one originally single space as an only one. Space as quantum is im m ediately given as a single " th is . To im m ediately represent a particular is called intuiting (anschauen). Space is som ething intuited, and it is som ething intuited and standing in view in ad vance of all appearing o f o b jects in it. Space is not appre hended through sensation, it is som ething intuited in ad vance a priori i.e., purely. Space is pure intuition. As this purely intuited it is what determ ines in advance everything em pirically given, sensibly intuited, as the "w h erein " in which the m anifold can be ordered. Kant also ca lls it form, that which determines, in contrast to m atter, which is the determ inable. Seen in this w ay, space is the pure form o f sensible intuition, specifically that of the external sense. In order that certain sensations might
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he referable to som ething outside of me (i.e., to som e thing in another place in space other than the one in which I find m yself), this extension o f the outside and the out-to ( H inaus-zu ) must already be given. Space, according to Kant, is neither a thing that is it self present at hand (an sich vorhandenes Ding) (N ew ton), nor a m anifold of relationships w hich result from the relations o f things that are them selves present at hand (an sich vorhandene Dinge) (L eibniz). Space is the sin gle whole o f beside one another, behind and over one an other, which is im m ediately represented in advance in our receiving w hat encounters. Space is only the form of all appearance o f the outer senses; i.e., a w ay in which we take in w h at encounters us. It is thus a determ ination o f our sen sibility. It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that w e can speak o f space, o f extended things, etc. If w e depart from the su bjective condition under which alone w e can have outer intuition . . . the repre sentation o f space stands for nothing w hatsoever. (A 26, B 42, N.K.S., p. 71.) The corresponding holds good for time. W ith this gen eral clarification o f the nature o f space w e have been try ing only to make understandable w hat it means when Kant defines space as a pure intuition and thereby w an ts to have achieved the m etaphysical concept o f space as such. For it seem s strange at first how anything at all is delim ited by being characterized as an intuition. Trees, desks, houses, and men are also intuited. But the essence of the house co n sists in no w ay in being an intuition. The house is intuited in sofar as it encounters us. But being a house does not mean being intuited. Nor would Kant ever define the essence o f the house in such a way. But what is right for the house should also be fair for space. This would certainly be true if space were a thing o f the sam e sort a s a house, a thing in space. But space is not in space. Kant does not say sim ply: Space is intuition, but "pure intuition and "fo rm o f external intuition. Also, intuiting
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is and rem ains a mode of pre-senting {Vor-steilen) som e thing, a w ay o f approach to som ething and a kind of given ness of som ething, but not this som ething itself. Only if the w a y in w hich som ething is given con stitu tes this som ething in its "b ein g would a characterization of som ething as intuition becom e p ossible and even neces sary. Space, taken as intuition, then means not only that space is given in such a w ay, but that being space co n sists in such a being given. Indeed, Kant so m eans it. The spa tial being of space co n sists in the fact that it places space ( einrum t) into w hat show s itse lf ( das sich Zeigenden), the p ossib ility o f showing itse lf in its extension ( A usbrei tung ). Space places space ( rumt ein) by giving position and place, and this placing into is its being. Kant expresses this placing by saying that space is w hat is purely intuited, w hat show s itse lf in advance, before all and for all; and as such it is the form o f intuition. Being-intuited (Angesch au tsein ) is the space-placing sp atial being o f space. We do not know o f any other being of space. Neither do w e have any p ossib ility o f inquiring after such. Undenia bly, there are difficulties in K an ts m etaphysics of space entirely disregarding the fact that a m etaphysics that no longer contains any difficulties has already ceased to be one. Only the difficulties o f the Kantian interpretation of space do not lie where m ost people like to find them, be it from the standpoint o f psychology or from the standpoint o f m athem atical natural science (theory o f relativity). The chief difficulty lies not in the form ulation o f the prob lem of space itself, but in attributing space as pure intui tion to a human su bject, w hose being is insufficiently de fined. (On how the problem of space is constructed out of a fundamental overcom ing of the relationship to the sub je ct, compare S Z 19-24 and 70.) It is now im portant for us to show only how space and time are at all conceivable as intuitions. Space gives itse lf only in this pure intuiting, wherein space as such is held-before ( vor-gehalten ) us in advance and is pre-sented as som ething capable of being viewed ( A n b lick b ares ),
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som ething "pre-form ed (vor-gebildet) as that sizable character o f the beside one another and over or behind one another, a m anifoldness which gives out o f itse lf the p ossibility o f its own delim itations and boundaries. Space and time are pure intuitions. Intuition is dealt with in the "A e sth e tic." Intuition, accordingly, is what be longs a priori to the o b jectiv ity of the object, w hat allow s appearances to show them selves; pure intuition is tran scendental. The transcendental aesthetic gives us only a prelim inary view. Its real them atics reaches its goal only in the treatm ent o f the first principle. d:t. The proof o f the first principle. All principles are based on the highest principle o f all synthetic judgm ents W ith w hat has been said the essen tials have been pre pared for our understanding of the proof o f the first principle and the principle itself. The proof co n sists of three propositions w hich are clearly distinguished from each other. The first proposition begins w ith "A ll, the second w ith "N o w is and the third w ith "T hu s. {A 162, B 203, N.K.S., pp. 197 f .) :tl U nm istakably these three prop:i4 Full text of proof from Kemp Sm iths translation (pp. 197 f.): "(A ll) appearances, in their formal aspect,contain an intuition in space and time, which conditions them, one and all. a priori. They cannot be apprehended, that is, taken up into empirical con sciousness, save through that synthesis of the manifold whereby the representations of a determinate space or time are generated, that is, through combination of the homogeneous manifold and consciousness of its synthetic unity. (N ow) consciousness of the synthetic unity of the manifold [and] homogeneous in intuition in general, insofar as the representation of an object first becomes possible by means of it, is, however, the concept of magnitude (quantum). (Thus) even the perception of an object, as appear ance. is only possible through the same synthetic unity of the man ifold of the given sensible intuition as that whereby the unity of the combination of the manifold [and] homogeneous is thought in the concept of a magnitude. In other words, appearances are all without exception magnitudes, indeed, extensive magnitudes. As intuitions in space or time, they must be represented through the same synthesis whereby space and time in general are deter mined." We have added (A ll), (N ow), and parentheses around Thus" to correspond to Heideggers reference. Trans.
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ositions are connected in the form o f a syllogism : m ajor premise, minor premise, and conclusion. Each of the fol lowing proofs is constructed in this w a y the proofs for the anticipations and analogies which, as is true of the proofs o f the axiom s, are found only in the second edition. We carry out the three step s of the deduction by clari fying w hat is still unclear in each proposition. The proof begins by indicating that all appearances show them selves in space and time. With regard to the manner o f their appearing, in regard to their form, they contain an intuition o f the kind mentioned. What does this mean in regard to the objective character of appearances? We say, "The moon is in the sk y. According to its sensible and perceptual givenness it is som ething shining, colored, w ith variously distributed brightness and darkness. It is given outside us, there, in this definite form , o f this mag nitude, at this distance from other heavenly bodies. The space the wherein of the givenness o f the moon is lim ited and bounded to this shape, o f this magnitude, in these relationships and distances. Space is a determined space, and only this determ ination con stitu tes the space o f the moon, the sp atiality o f the moon. Being determined to this shape, this extension, this distance from others, is grounded in a determining. The determining is an ordered putting in connection, a lifting out o f particular extensional parts which are them selves homogeneous in their parts, for instance the parts o f the circum ference o f the shape. Only as the m anifoldness o f an in itself indefinite space is divided into p arts and is put together out o f these parts in a particular sequence and w ith determined lim its can the bright-colored show itse lf to us as moon-shape w ith this magnitude and distance, i.e., become received and taken up by us in the domain o f w hat alw ays already encounters us and stands-over-against-us ( Gegen-unsstehenden). That which appears, according to its intuition and the form o f its intuitedness, that is, w ith respect to space and
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its prior undifferentiated m anifoldness, is a such and such determined one: a composed homogeneity. This com positeness, however, is so only on the ground o f a unity of the shape represented therein in such and such a way, i.e., the magnitude. Unity governs in the synthesis and regu lates the representation and consciousness of it. With this we have set in relief the essential content o f the m ajor premise. The minor premise begins w ith w hat w as last said, i.e., w ith the consciousness o f the synthetic unity of the m anifold ( B 203, N.K.S., p. 198). Consciousness o f the synthetic unity of the m anifold [and] homogeneous in intuition in general, insofar as the representation o f an object first becom es p ossible by means o f it, is, however, the concept o f a magnitude (q u a n ti)." Here it is stated through w hat the unity of som ething m anifold becom es p ossible at all. Let us begin with w hat is m anifold and homogeneous itself. Homo geneity is the consequence of serializing and connecting of the m any equal ones into one, a result of m ultiplicity w ith out differences. The unity o f such is alw ays a "s o and so much, i.e., quantity as such. Unity as such o f a m ulti plicity as such is the governing notion of connecting (Ver binden), o f an "I think, a pure concept o f the under standing. But in sofar as this concept of the understand ing, u n ity," as the rule o f unification, refers to som ething sizable, to quantum as such, it is the concept o f a quanti. This concept, quantity, brings w h at is homogeneous and m anifold to a stand in a unified collectedness (Gesam m eltheit). By this means the representation o f an object, the I think and the over-against for the I, first becom e pos sible. Now, as suggested in the m ajor premise, insofar as appearances appear in the form o f space and time the first determ ination of the encountering as such is this com posite, shaped unification w ith respect to quantitas. Now the conclusion follow s w ith necessity: It is thus the sam e unity and unification w hich permit the encoun tering o f the appearances as shaped, so and so big, in the
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separations of space and time, and which bring the homo geneous to a stand in the com position o f quantities of a m ultiplicity (M enge). Therefore, appearances are from the beginning extensive m agnitudes w ith respect to their intuition and the w ay o f their encountering standingagainst (G egenstellen). The quantum, space, is alw ays determined as these appearing spatial form ations only in the synthesis o f quantity. The sam e unity of quantity per m its w hat encounters to stand-over-against (entgegen stehen) collectedly. With this the principle has been proved. However, thereby it is also established w hy all principles w hich say som ething about the pure m anifold ness o f extension (e.g., the shortest distance between two points is a straight line) as m athem atical principles are valid for the appearances them selves, w hy m athem atics is applicable to the o b jects o f experience. This is not selfevident and is possible only under certain conditions. These are presented in the proof of the principle. There fore, Kant ca lls this principle the "tran scend ental prin ciple of the m athem atics o f appearances (A 165, B 206, N.K.S., p. 200). Under the title "A xio m s o f Intuition these axiom s are not them selves laid down or discussed. The principle is proved in that the ground of the objective truth of the axiom s is posited, i.e., their ground as neces sary conditions of the o b jectiv ity of ob jects. The applica b ility of the axiom s of the m athem atics of extension and number, and, therewith o f m athem atics as such, is neces sarily justified, because the conditions o f m athem atics it self, those o f qu antitas and quantum, are at the sam e time the conditions o f appearance o f that to which m athe m atics is applied. With this we hit upon that ground which m akes pos sible this ground and all others, to w hich every proof of every principle o f the pure understanding is referred. This is the connection which w e now for the first time bring more clearly into view: The condition o f experiencing appearances (here w ith
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regard to shape and siz e ) namely, the unity of the syn thesis as quantity this condition o f experiencing is at the sam e time the condition of the p ossib ility o f an object of experience. In this unity the encountering m anifoldness of the "a g a in st (G egen) first com es to a "sta n d (S tan d ) and is ob ject (G egenstand). The particular quantitas of spaces and tim es m akes p ossible the reception o f the en countering, the apprehension, the first perm itting o f a standing-against o f the object (d as erste Gegenstehenlassen des G egenstandes). Our question about the thingness of the thing, about the o b jectiv ity of the ob ject, is an swered by the principle and its proof as follow s: because o b jectivity as such is the unity o f the collection of som e thing m anifold into a representation o f unity, and is a conception in advance, and because what is m anifold en counters in space and time, what encounters m ust itself stand against us in the unity o f quantity as extensive magnitude. Appearances m ust be extensive magnitudes. Thereby is asserted about the being of o b jects them selves som ething which docs not already lie in the conception o f som e thing in general about which w e assert in a judgment. With the determ ination o f being an extensive magnitude som ething is syn th etically attributed to the object; but it is attributed a priori, not on the ground o f perceptions o f single ob jects, but in advance, out of the essence of experience as such. What is the hinge upon which the whole proof revolves, i.e., w h at is the ground upon which the principle itself rests? What is, therefore, prim ordially expressed by the highest principle itse lf and thus brought into the light? W hat is the ground o f the p o ssib ility of this principle as a synthetic judgment a priori? In it the pure concept of the understanding, quantity, is transferred to the quan tum space, and so to the o b jects which appear in space. How can a pure concept o f the understanding become de terminant at all for som ething like space? These totally
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heterogeneous pieces m ust conform in som e respect if they are to be united at ail as determ inable and determin ing, and it m ust be in such a w ay that there is an object by virtue o f this unity o f intuition and thought. Because these questions repeat them selves in each of the principles and their proofs, they are not to be an swered right now. We first w an t to see that these questions constan tly and unavoidably return in the treatm ent o f the principles. However, w e do not w ish to postpone the answ er until the close o f the exposition o f the principles, but shall expound it after the discussion o f the following principle, in the transition from the m athem atical to the dynam ical principles. e. The A nticipations o f Perception The ground and inner p o ssib ility o f the ob ject is posited in the principles. The m athem atical principles grasp the object w ith respect to the "a g a in st and its inner p ossi bility. Hence, the second principle as w ell as the first speaks o f appearances w ith respect to their appearing. "The principle w hich anticipates all perceptions, as such, is as fo llo w s: In all appearances sensation, and the real which corresponds to it in the o b ject ( realitas phaenome non), has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree. ( A 166, N.K.S., p. 201.) "Their principle is : :,r' In all ap pearances, the real that is an object of sensation has in tensive magnitude, that is, a degree. ( B 207, N.K.S., p. 201.) Here appearances are taken in another respect than in the first principle. In the first principle appearances are considered as intuitions w ith respect to the form of space and time in w hich the encountered encounters. The principle o f the "an ticip ation s o f perception does not a t tend to the form, but to that which is determined through
3r,N.K.S. leaves out "Their principle i s : Trans.
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the determining form. It is the determ inable as m atter of the form. M atter does not mean here the m aterial stuff present at hand. M atter and form are understood as con cepts of reflection, and indeed as the m ost general ones which result from reflecting back ( R ckbesinnung ) on the structure o f experience. ( A 266 ff., B 322 ff., N.K.S., p. 280.)'' In the proof o f the an ticip atio n s the discussion is of sensations, o f the real, and also again of magnitude, spe cifically o f intensive magnitude. It is now not a question o f axiom s of intuition, but of basic asp ects o f perception, i.e., the sort o f representing "in which sensation is to be found (B 207, N.K.S., p. 201). e,. The several meanings o f the word "se n sa tio n ; the theory o f sensation and modern natural science In human cognition the cognizable m ust encounter and m ust be given, because w hat is, is som ething other than ourselves, and because w e have not ourselves made or created what is. One does not first have to show a shoe to a shoem aker for him to know w hat a shoe is. He know s this without the encountering shoe, and know s it better and more exactly w ithout this, because he can produce one. By contrast, what he cannot m ake must be presented to him from som ewhere else. Since w e human beings have not created what is as such as a whole and could never create it, it must be shown to us if w e are to know o f it. In this showing of w hat is in its openness, that doing (Tun) has a special task which show s things by creating them in a certain sense, the creation of a w ork of art. Work m akes world. World w ithin itse lf first reveals things. The
:l,i Heidegger refers here to the fourth section of the "Appen dix: The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection: Matter and Form. " These two concepts underlie all other reflection, so in separably are they bound up with all employment of the under standing. Trans.
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p ossib ility and necessity o f the work o f art is only one proof that we com e to know what is, only when it is spe cia lly given to us. However, this usually happens through encountering things in the realm of everyday experience. For this to occur, they m ust approach us, affect us, obtrude and in trude upon us. Thus occur im pressions, sensations. Their m anifoldness ( M an n igfaltigkeit ) is divided into the differ ent areas of our senses: sight, hearing, etc. In sensation and its pressure w e find that which con stitu tes the d is tinctive difference between em pirical and a priori know l edge ( A 167, B 208 f., N.K.S., p. 202). The em pirical is the a posteriori, that which is second, viewed from us con sidering us as first. It is alw ays subsequent and playing along side o f us. The word sensation, like the word "rep resentation, has at first tw o senses: in one sense it means w h at is sensed red as perceived, the sound, the red-sensation, the sound-sensation. It also m eans the sensing as a state o f ourselves. Yet this differentiation is not its point (Bewenden). W hat is designated as sen sation is for this reason so equivocal, because it occupies a peculiar inter mediate position between the things and the human beings, between object and su bject. The interpretation and explanation o f the essence and role o f sensation changes according to how w e interpret w hat is objective and according to the conception of the subjective. Here let us only cite an interpretation w hich prevailed very early in W estern thought and is not com pletely overcom e even yet. The more one passed over to seeing things according to their mere appearance, their shape, position, and exten sion (D em ocritus and P lato), the more obtrusive in con trast to spatial relation becam e that w hich fills intervals and places, i.e., the sensory given. Consequently, the givens o f sensationscolor, sound, pressure, and impact becam e the first and forem ost building blocks out of w hich a thing is put together.
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As soon as things were broken up into a m anifold o f the sensory givennesses, the interpretation of their uniform essence could proceed only by saying: Things are really only collection s of sensory data. In addition they also have value and an aesthetic value, and in sofar as w e know them a truth value. Things are collections o f sensations w ith values attached. In this view sensations are repre sented as som ething in them selves. They are them selves made into things, w ithout first saying what that thing might be, through w hose splitting the fragm ents (the sen satio n s) rem ain as allegedly original. But the next step is to interpret the fragment-things, the sensations, as effects o f a cause. P h ysics establish es that the cause o f color is light w aves, endless periodic undula tions in the ether. Each color has its determined number of vibrations per second. For example, red has the wave length o f 760 and 400 billion vibrations per second. That is red. This is the ob jective red in contrast to the mere subjective im pression o f the red sensation. It would be even nicer if w e could trace the red sensation back to a stim ulation o f electric currents in the nerve pathways. When w e get that far w e know w hat things are objec tively. Such an explanation o f sensation appears to be very scientific, and yet it is not, insofar as the domain of the givenness o f sensations and what is to be explained, i.e., color as given, has at the sam e time been abandoned. Be sides, it goes unnoticed that there is still a difference, whether w e mean by color the determ inate color o f a thing, this red on the thing, or the red sensation as given in the eye. This last-m entioned givenness is not given im mediately. A very com plicated and artful focus is neces sary to grasp the color sensation as such in contrast to the color of the thing. If w e observe apart from any theory ol knowledge the givenness o f the color of the thing, e.g., the green o f a leaf, w e do not find the slightest cause
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which might produce an effect on us. We are never aware o f the green o f the leaf as an effect on us, but as the green o f the leaf. Where, however, the thing and the body are represented as extended and resisting things, as in modern m athe m atical physics, the view able m anifold sin ks to one o f sen sory givennesses. Today the given for experimental atom ic physics is only a m anifold o f light spots and streaks on a photographic plate. Now few er presuppositions are neces sary for the interpretation o f this given than for the inter pretation o f a poem. It is only the solid ity and tangibility o f the measuring apparatus w hich gives rise to the appear ance that this interpretation stands on firmer ground than the allegedly subjective b a sis of the interpretations of poets in the arts. Fortunately, there first still exists (apart from the light w aves and nerve cu rren ts) the coloring and shine of things them selves, the green o f the leaf and the yellow of the grain field, the black o f the crow and the gray o f the sky. The reference to all that is not only also here, but m ust be constan tly presupposed as that which the phy siological-physical inquiry breaks up and reinterprets. The question arises as to what more truly is (w a s ist seiender), that crude chair w ith the tobacco pipe depicted in the painting by Van Gogh, or the w aves which corre spond to the colors used in the painting, or the states of sensation which we have "in u s w hile looking at the pic ture? The sensations play a role each time, but each time in a different sense. The color of the thing is, for instance, som ething different from the stim ulus given in the eye, which we never grasp im m ediately as such. The color o f the thing belongs to the thing. Neither does it give itse lf to us as a cause o f a state in us. The things color itself, the yellow , for instance, is sim ply this yellow as belonging to the field o f grain. The color and its bright hue are alw ays determined by the original unity and kind o f the colored thing itself. This is not first composed o f sensations.
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The reference serves only to make it clear to us that it is not im m ediately clear what is meant by sensation. The undelimited am biguity o f the word and the uncontrolled diversity of the fact intended only reflect the uncertainty and bafflement which prevent a conclusive definition of the relation between man and thing. Furthermore, the opinion reigns that the comprehen sion o f things as a mere m anifold o f sensory givens is the presupposition for the m athem atical-physical definition of bodies. The theory o f knowledge according to which knowledge essen tially co n sists o f sensations is held to be the reason for the rise o f modern natural science. But the contrary is really the case. The m athem atical starting point concerning the thing as som ething extended and m ovable in space and time leads to the consequence that the usual everyday given ( das umgnglich alltglich Gegebene) is apprehended as mere m aterial ( a ls blosses M aterial) and is fragmented into the m anifoldness o f the sensations. Only the m athem atical starting point effected a favorable hearing for a corresponding theory o f sensa tion. Kant also rem ains at the level o f this starting point. Like the tradition before and after him, he skip s that sphere of things in which we know ourselves im m ediately at home, i.e., things as the artist depicts them for us, such as Van Goghs sim ple chair w ith the tobacco pipe which w as just put down or forgotten there. ev. K ants concept o f reality; intensive magnitudes Although K ants critique rem ains from the beginning within the sphere o f the experience o f the ob ject o f m athe m atical-physical natural knowledge, his m etaphysical in terpretation of the givenness o f sensations differs from all before and after him, i.e., it is superior to all o f them. The interpretation o f the o b jectivity of the object in regard to the sensory given in it is carried out by Kant in the p osit ing and proof of the principle o f the anticipations of per-
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ccption. It is ch aracteristic o f the usual interpretations of Kant that the}' have either overlooked this section alto gether or m isunderstood it in every respect. The proof of this is the bafllement w ith which a fundamental concept is manhandled, which plays an essential role in the prin ciple. We are referring to the concept o f the real and of reality. The clarification of this concept and o f its application by Kant belongs to the first elem entary course in the intro duction to the Critique o f Pure Reason. The expression "r e a lity " is usually used today in the sense o f actu ality or existence. Thus one speaks o f the question of the reality of the external w orld and one means by this the discussion whether som ething really and truly ex ists outside o f our consciousness. To think Real politisch means reckoning w ith the actu ally existing situ ations and circum stances. Realism in art is the mode o f representation in w hich one copies only w hat is actual and w hat one takes to be actual. We have to drop the currently fam iliar meaning of real ity " in the sense of actu ality in order to understand w hat Kant means b y the real in appearance. This meaning of "r e a lity " current today, moreover, corresponds neither w ith the original meaning o f the word nor the initial use o f the term in medieval and modern philosophy up to Kant. Instead, the present use has presum ably come about through a failure to understand and through a m isunder standing of K an t's usage. Reality com es from realitas. R ealis is w hat belongs to res. That m eans a som ething (S a ch e). That is real which belongs to something, w hat belongs to the what-content ( W asgehalt ) o f a thing, e.g., to w hat con stitu tes a house or tree, w hat belongs to the essence of something, to the essentia. R eality som etim es m eans the to tality o f this defi nition of its essence or it m eans particular defining elements. Thus, for example, extension is a reality of a natural body as well as weight, density, resistance. All such is real, belongs to the res, to the som ething "n atu ral
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body, regardless o f whether the body actually exists or not. For instance, m ateriality ( Stofflich keit ) belongs to the reality o f a table. For this the table does not need to be real in the present-day sense o f "r e a l. Actual being or existence is som ething which m ust first be added to the essence, and in this regard existentia itse lf w a s considered a reality. Only Kant first dem onstrated that actuality, being present-at-hand, is not a real predicate of a thing; that is, a hundred p ossible dollars do not in the least differ from a hundred real dollars according to their reality. It is the sam e, one hundred dollars, the sam e w hat ( W as), res, whether p ossible or actual. We distinguish actu ality from p o ssib ility and necessity. Kant unites all three categories under the title o f m odality. From the fa ct that "r e a lity is not found in this group, w e can see that reality does not mean actuality. To which group does reality belong? What is its m ost general sense? It is qiialLLy quale a so and so, a that and that, a what. "R e a lity a s thinghood ( S ach h eit ) answ ers the question of what a thing is and not whether it exists. ( A 143, B 182, N.K.&., p. 184.) The real, that w hich con stitu tes the res, is a determ ination of res as such. Pre-Kantian m etaphysics explains the concept o f reality in this way. In K an ts use of the m etaphysical concept of reality, he fo llo w s the text book of Baumgartcn in which the tradition of medieval and modern m etaphysics is discussed after the m anner of the classroom . The fundam ental ch aracter o f realitas according to Baumgarten is determ inatio, determ inateness. Extension and m ateriality are realities, i.e., determ inations which belong to the res, "b o d y . Viewed more exactly, realitas is a determ inatio positiva et vera, a determ inateness belong ing to the true essence o f .something, and posited as such. The opposite concept is a w hat w hich does not determine a thing positively, but in regard to w hat is m issing in it. Thus blindness is a p rivation ( Fehlen ) which is lacking in what is seeing. However, blindness, obviously, is not noth
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ing. W hile it is not a positive determ ination, it is a nega tive one, i.e., a "negation . Negation is the concept op posite to reality. Kant gives a new critical interpretation to realitas, as he does to all the fundam ental concepts he takes from tradi tional m etaphysics. O bjects are the things as they appear. Appearances alw ays bring som ething (a w h at) to a show ing of itself. What thereby presses and attack s us and ap proaches us, this first what and thinglike ( S ach h afte ) is called " the real" in appearance. "A liqu id sive obiectum qualification is the occupation o f space and tim e." (A ka demie edition, op. cit., XVIII n. 6338a, p. 663.) The real in appearances, the realitas phaenomenon ( A 168, B 209) is that which, as the first what-content ( W asgehalt ), m ust occupy the void of space and time, in order for anything to appear at all, so that appearance and the press o f an against ( eines Gegen) become possible. The real in the appearance, in K ant's sense, is not w hat is actually in the appearance as contrasted w ith w^ hat is inactual in it and could be mere sem blance and illusion ( Schein und D unst). The real is that which m ust be given at all, so that som ething can be decided w ith respect to its actu ality or inactuality. The real is the pure and first necessary w hat as such. Without the real, the something, the object is not only inactual, it is nothing at all, i.e., w ithout a what, according to w hich it can determine itse lf as this or that. In this what, the real, the object qualifies itse lf as encountering thus and so. The real is the first quale o f the object. Along w ith this critical concept o f reality Kant also uses the term in the traditionally wider sense for each thinghood, w hich co-determ ines the essence o f the thing, the thing as an object. Accordingly, we frequently meet w ith the expression "o b je ctiv e reality, precisely in a fun damental inquiry o f the Critique of Pure Reason. This tw ist has induced and promoted the epistem ological m is understanding o f the Critique of Pure Reason. The term
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"o b je ctiv e reality w a s explained in our discussion of the first principle. Here it is a question as to whether and how the pure concepts o f the understanding, which, although not taken em pirically from the object, at the sam e time belong to the content of the object; for example, whether quantity actually has objective reality. This question is not whether quantity is actu ally present-at-hand, or whether som ething outside consciou sn ess corresponds to it. Rather it is asked whether and w hy quantity belongs to the ob ject as object. Space and time have "em p irical reality." Besides sensation and the real, the discussion in the second principle is about intensive magnitude. The dis tinction in the concept o f magnitude between quantum and quantitas has already been discussed. If w e speak about extensive magnitude, then magnitude is called quantitas, the measure of size ( G rssen m ass ), and speci fically that o f an aggregate added piece by piece. The in tensive, the intensio, is nothing else than the qu antitas o f a qualitas, or a real, e.g., the m oons shining surface. We ap prehend the extensive magnitude of the object when we measure its spatial extension step by step. Its intensive magnitude, on the other hand, we apprehend when w e do not attend to the extensive size, nor pay attention to the surface as surface, but the pure what o f its shining, the "h o w great o f the shining, o f the coloring. The quantitas of the qu alitas is the intensity. Every magnitude as quan titas is the unity o f a m ultiplicity; but extensive and inten sive magnitude are this in different w ays. In extensive magnitudes the unity is alw ays apprehended only on the grounds of, and in the gathering together of, the many im m ediately posited parts. In contrast, intensive magnitude is im m ediately taken as a unity. The m ultiplicity which be longs to the intensity can be represented in it only in such a w ay that an intensity o f negation down to zero is approached. The m u ltip licities o f this unity do not lie spread out in it in such a w ay that this spreading yields a
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unity by adding together the many stretches and pieces. The single m u ltiplicities o f the intensive magnitude stem , rather, from the lim itation of the unity of a quale; each of them, again, is a quale, they are many unities. Such unities arc called degrees. A loud tone, for instance, is not com posed of a determined number of these tones, but there is a gradation by degrees from soft to loud. The m ultiplici ties of the unity o f an intensity are many unities. The m ultiplicities o f the unity o f an extension are single units o f a m ultiplicity. Both intensity and extension, however, permit them selves to be ordered as numerical quantities. But the degrees and step s o f intensity do not thereby be come a mere aggregate of parts. e3. Sensation in Kant, understood transcendentally; Proof of the second principle Now w e understand the principle in its general con tent: "The principle which anticipates all perceptions, as such, is as follow s: In all appearances sensation, and the real which corresponds to it in the object ( realitas phae nom enon), has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree. (A 166, N.K.S., p. 201.) In B 207 (N.K.S., p. 201) this prin ciple reads: "In all appearances, the real that is an object o f sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree. We first grasp this principle, however, only on the b a sis o f the proof which dem onstrates wherein as a principle o f pure understanding this principle grounds. The steps o f proof are at the sam e time the interpretation o f the principle. Only by m astering the proof shall we be in a position to evaluate the difference between versions A and B and decide about the superiority o f the one over the other. It rem ains noteworthy that the principle says som e thing about sensations, not on the b asis o f a psychological em pirical description or even a physiological explanation o f its form ation and origin, but by w a y of a transcendental consideration. This m eans that sensation is taken in ad-
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vance as som ething which com es into play w ithin the rela tionship o f a stepping over to the object and in the deter m ination o f its o b jectivity. The essence o f sensation is delim ited through its role w ithin the transcendental rela tionship. In this w ay Kant w in s a different fundam ental position w ithin the inquiry about sensation and its function in the appearance o f things. Sensation is not a thing for which causes are sought, but a given whose givenness is to be made understandable through the conditions o f the pos sib ility o f experience. These sam e circum stances also explain the designation of these principles as anticipations of perception. The proof has the sam e form again even though the m ajor and minor prem ises and conclusion are spread out over more sentences. The minor prem ise begins ( B 208): Now from em pirical consciousness to pure . . the transition to the conclusion begins: Since, however, sen sation is not in itse lf . . the conclusion: " I t s magnitude is not extensive. . . ." S 7 We w ill try to build up the proof in a sim plified form so that the jo in ts show up more distin ctly. Since w e have already conveyed the essential definitions o f "se n sa tio n ,"
:!T"N ow from empirical consciousness to pure consciousness a graduated transition is possible, the real in the former completely vanishing and a merely formal a priori consciousness of the mani fold in space and time remaining. Consequently there is also pos sible a synthesis in the process of generating the magnitude of a sensation from its beginning in pure intuition equals zero, up to any required magnitude. Since, however, sensation is not in itself an objective representation, and since neither the intuition of space nor that of time is to be met with in it, its magnitude is not extensive but intensive. This magnitude is generated in the act of apprehension whereby the empirical consciousness of it can in a certain time increase from nothing equals zero to the given measure. Corresponding to this intensity of sensation, an inten sive magnitude, that is, a degree of influence on the senses (i.e., on the special sense involved), m ust be ascribed to all objects of perception, insofar as the perception contains sensation. (B 208, N.K.S., pp. 201 f.) Trans.
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"re a lity , and "in ten sive m agnitude," no difficulty rem ains as to content. First w e m ay be reminded again o f the probandum of the proof. It is to be dem onstrated that the pure concept o f the understanding (here the category of q u a lity ) determ ines appearances in advance w ith respect to their what, their encountering aspect, that as a conse quence o f this qu ality of appearances a quantity (in the sense o f in ten sity) is possible, thus w arranting the appli cation o f number and m athem atics. W ith this proof it is also dem onstrated that an against cannot encounter at all w ithout the presentation ( V orh alt) of a what, so that in any receiving there m ust already lie an anticipation o f a what. M ajor prem ise: All appearances in addition to the space tim e determ inations contain, as w hat sh ow s itse lf in per ception, that w hich m akes an im pression (K ant ca lls this the m atter), w h at affects us, lies exposed and occupies the space-tim e domain. Transition: Such an ex-posing and a present given ( Auf und Vorliegendes) ( p ositu m ) can be perceivable as so ly ing before and occupying only by being represented in ad vance in the light o f a w hat-character, in the opened range o f the real in general. Only upon the open background of the what-\\ke can sen sibles becom e sensations. Such a re ception o f the w hat as it encounters is "m om en tary ( au gen blicklich ) and does not rest upon a consequence o f an apprehension that puts together. The aw areness of the real is a sim ple having-there ( Da-haben ), allow ing it to be posited; it is the positio of a positum. Minor prem ise: It is p ossible that in this open field of the real w hat occupies a place alternates between the ex trem ity of full pressure and the void of the space-tim e do main. W ith respect to this range o f the pressure there is in sensation a sizable that does not piece together an increas ing aggregate, but alw ays concerns the sam e quale, yet al w ay s o f a varying so-large. Transition: The how-large, the quantity o f a quale, i.e., of som ething real, is, however, a definite degree o f the
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sam e what. The magnitude o f the real is an intensive mag nitude. Conclusion: Consequently what affects us in appear ance, the sensible as real, has a degree. Insofar as the degree as quantity m ay be determined in number, and number is a positing in accord w ith the understanding of "h o w many tim es one, therefore w hat is sensed as an encountering w hat can be brought to a stand m athe m atically. Therewith the principle has been proven. According to B 207 ( N.K.S. , p. 201): "In all appearances, the real that is an object o f sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree." More exactly, the proposition ought to read: In all appearances, the real, which con stitu tes the constancy and the against-like ( das Gegenhafte-Stndige ) o f sensa tions. . . . The proposition by no m eans asserts that the real has a degree because it is an ob ject o f sensation. Rather, because the im pressing w hat o f sensation is a reality for the representing which allo w s the standing against ( Entgegenstehenlassen ) and since the quantity o f a reality is but the intensity, therefore sensation (a s the som ething [ Sach h eit\ o f the o b je ct) has the objective character o f an intensive magnitude. On the other hand, the wording of the principle in A is subject to m isunderstanding and nearly contrary to w hat is really meant. It suggests the m isconception that sensa tion has, first o f all, a degree and then in addition the reality w hich corresponds to it, differing from it in its thingness and standing behind it. But, the principle w an ts to assert that the real has first and properly as quale a quantity o f degree and therefore also does sensation, w hose ob jective intensity rests upon the prior givenness of the reality character of what can be sensed. The wording o f A is, therefore, to be modified in the follow ing w ay: "In all appearances sensation, and that m eans first the real, w hich lets the sensation show itself as an o b jectivity, has an intensive m agnitude." It seem s as though w e have arb itrarily changed K ant's
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text hei'e. However, the different wordings of A and B dem onstrate how much effort Kant him self expended to force his novel insight on the transcendental nature of sen sation into the understandable form o f a proposition. c,. What is strange about the anticipations. R eality and sensation Just how new the principle w as for Kant h im self w e easily recognize from the fact that he con stan tly won dered at the strangeness which the principle expresses. And w hat can be stranger than this, that even where w e are dealing w ith such things as sensations, w hich assail us, which w e only receive, that just in this "to w a rd u s ( auf uns zu ) a reaching out and an anticipation b y us is possible and necessary? At first glance, perception as pure reception and anticipation as a reaching and grasping be forehand {entgegen-fassendes Vorgreifen) are thoroughly contradictory. And yet it is only in the light o f the reaching and anticipating presentation o f reality that sensation be com es a receivable, encountering this and that. On the one hand w e believe that to sense or perceive som ething is the m ost ordinary and sim plest thing in the world. We are sentient beings. Certainly! But no human being has ever sensed a "som eth in g or a w h a t alone. Through w h at sense organ could this ever take place? A "som eth in g is neither seen, heard, smelled, tasted, nor felt. There is no sense organ for a "w h a t or for a "th is and "th a t. The u/trt/-character o f what can be sensed must be pre-sented beforehand and anticipated in advance within the scope and as the scope of w hat can be received. W ithout reality there is no real; w ithout a real, no sensi bles. Since such an anticipating beforehand can be as sumed least in the domain o f receiving and perceiving, and to make this strangeness recognizable, Kant gives the name "a n ticip a tio n to the principle of perception. Seen in general, all principles in which the predeterm ination of
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the object is expressed are anticipations. Som etim es Kant uses this term alone in the w ider sense. Human perception is anticipating. An anim al, too, has perceptions, i.e., sensations, but it does not anticipate. It docs not permit the im pressing to encounter in advance as a w hat that stands in itself, as the other w hich stands toward the anim al as an other and thus sh ow s itse lf as existing. Kant rem arks in another place ( Religion Within the L im its of Reason Alone) that no beast can ever say "I . This m eans that it cannot bring itse lf into a stand point as that against which an ob jective other could stand. It m ust not be inferred from this that the anim al has no relation to food, light, air, and other anim als, and even in a very orderly fashion w e need only recall how anim als play. But in all this there is no attitude toward w hat is any more than there is toward what is not. Their lives run their course on this side o f the openness o f being and nonbeing, though at this point the far-reaching question m ay arise as to how w e know w hat is happening in the anim al and what is not. We can never know it im m ediately, a l though m ediately w e can gain m etaphysical certainty about being an anim al. Anticipation o f the real in perception is strange not only by com parison w ith anim als but equally in com pari son w ith the traditional conception o f knowledge. We are reminded of the in advance (im vorhinein) which at an earlier occasion w a s cited in the distinction between ana lytic and synthetic judgments. The synthetic judgment has the peculiarity that it m ust step out o f the subjectpredicate relationship to som ething w holly other, to the object. The first fundamental grasping-out ( H inausgriff ) by representation in the direction o f the having-there (Daliaben ) an encountering w h a t as such is the anticipation of the real, that synthesis, provision, in which a w hat sphere is represented at all, from which appearances are to be able to show them selves. Therefore, Kant says in the concluding sentence of his treatm ent o f the anticipations
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o f perception: But the real, which corresponds to sensa tions in general, as opposed to negation = 0, represents only that som ething the very concept of which includes being [i.e., presence of som ething]'1 * and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an em pirical consciou sn ess in gen era l." ( A 175 f., B 217, N.K.S., p. 208.) The anticipating representation o f reality opens our viewing for any being-what (W as-scien des) in general (here this means "b ein g ) and thus form s the relation on the basis o f which the em pirical consciou sn ess is at all consciou sn ess o f something. The w hat in general is the "transcendental m atter ( A 143, B 182, N.K.S., pp. 183 f.) the what which belongs in advance to the p ossib ility of an againstness {Gegenhaften) in the object. Psychology m ay describe sensations in w hatever w ays; physiology and neurology m ay explain sensations as processes o f stim ulation, or however; physics may dem onstrate the causes o f sensations in ether w aves and elec tric w aves all these are p ossible sorts o f knowledge. But they do concern the question of the o b jectivity of o b jects and o f our im m ediate relationship to these. K ants discov ery o f the anticipations o f the real in perception is espe cia lly astonishing if one considers that, on the one hand, his esteem o f Newtonian physics and, on the other, his fundamental position in D escartes concept o f the su b ject are not suited to promote the free view o f this unusual anticipation in the receptivity of perception. e-. M athem atical principles and the highest principle. The circu larity o f the proofs
II w e now take together both principles in a shortened form , we can say that all appearances are extensive mag nitudes as intuitions, and they are intensive magnitudes a s sensations: quantities. Such arc p ossible only in
38 Heideggers interpolation. Trans.
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quanta. All quanta, however, are continua. They have the feature that no separable part of them is ever the sm allest possible. Therefore, all appearances, in the what of their encountering and in the how o f their appearing, are con stant. This character of appearances, the constancy, which concerns its extension as w ell as its intensity, is discussed b y Kant in the section concerning the second principle for both principles together (A 169 ff., B 211 ff., N.K.S., pp. 203 If.). Thereby the axiom s of intuition and anticipations are united together as m athem atical princi ples, i.e., as those w hich m etap hysically estab lish the pos sib ility o f an application o f m athem atics to o bjects. The concept of magnitude in the sense o f quantity finds its support in science and its meaning in numbers. Number represents quantities in their determ inateness. Because the appearances come to a stand as an againstness ( G egenhaftes) in general and in advance only upon the ground of the anticipating collection, in the sense of the concepts o f unity (categ o ries), quantity and quality, therefore m athem atics is applicable to ob jects. Therefore it is p ossible on the ground o f a m athem atical construc tion to meet w ith som ething corresponding in the object itself and to prove it by experiment. The conditions of the appearing o f appearances, the particular qu antitative de term inateness o f their form and m atter, are at the same time the conditions o f standing-against (G egenstehen), the collectedness and constancy o f the appearances. Both principles o f the extensive and intensive magni tude o f all appearances enunciate (but in a particular respect) the highest principle o f all synthetic judgments. This fact must be observed if the character o f the above proofs o f the principles is to be comprehended. Apart from specific difficulties in content, there is som ething strange about these proofs. We seem con stan tly tempted to say that all thought processes move in a circle. This difficulty o f the proofs needs no special pointing out. However, a clarification of the reason for the difficulty is
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necessary. This does not lie merely in the special content o f the principles, but in their nature. The reason for the difficulty is a necessary one. The principles are to be proved to be those determ inations w hich first m ake an experience o f o b jects p ossible at all. How is som ething like that proven? By showing that the principles are them selves only p ossible on the b asis of the unity and the belonging together o f the pure concepts o f the under standing w ith that w hich intuitively encounters. This unity o f intuition and thought is itse lf the nature of experience. Therefore, the proof co n sists in showing that the principles o f pure understanding are made p ossi ble by that which they ought to m ake p ossible experi ence. This is an obvious circle. Certainly, and for the understanding o f the process of the proof and o f the char acter o f w hat w e arc discussing it is indispensable not only to suspect this circle and so to create doubts about the cleanness of the proof, but to recognize the circle clearly and to carry it out as such. Kant would have grasped little o f his own task and intention if he had not been aw are of the circu lar character o f these proofs. His assertion that these propositions are principles, a l though, w ith all their certainty, never as obvious as 2 x 2 = 4, points this out. ( A 733, B 761, N.K.S., pp. 589 f.) f. The Analogies of Experience The principles arc rules according to which the standing-against of the object form s itse lf for human pre-scnting ( V or-stellen ). The axiom s of intuition and the antici pations o f perception concern the againstness of an against from a double point o f view: first, the wherein of what is against, and second, the '///-ch aracter of the against. The second group o f principles, on the other hand, con cerns (relative to the p o ssib ility of an ob ject in general) the p o ssib ility o f an o b je cts standing, of its constancy,
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or, as Kant puts it, the existence ( D asein ), "th e actu ality, o f the o b ject, or in our words, the being-present-athand (Vorhandensein). The question arises w hy the analogies o f experience do not belong to the principles of m odality. The answ er must be because Dasein is definable only as a relation o f the states o f appearances among them selves and never im m ediately as such. An object stand s first and is first disclosed as standing when it is determined in its independence of any acci dental act o f perception of it. "Independence from . . . is, however, only a negative determ ination. It is not su f ficient to estab lish in a p ositive w ay the standing o f the ob ject. This is obviously only p ossible by exposing the ob ject in its relationship to other o b jects and if this rela tionship has the con stan cy and the unity o f a self-su b sist ing connection w ithin which particular o b jects stand. The constancy o f the o b ject is, therefore, grounded in the con nection (n exu s) o f appearances or, more exactly, in w hat m akes such a connection possible in advance. fi. Analogy a s correspondence, as the relation of relations, and as the determ ination o f its being that (D ass-sein s) Connection (n exu s), like com positio, is a mode o f con junction (co n iu n ctio ) (B 201, n.) and presupposes in it se lf the guiding representation o f a unity. However, now it is not a question of those conjunctions, w hich set to gether the given, that w hich is encountered, in its whatcontent according to sp atiality, reality, and their degrees; it is not a question of the conjunction o f w hat is alw ays o f the sam e sort (hom ogeneous) in the u/z/-content of ap pearance (com positio, i.e., aggregation and co alitio n ). Rather, it is a question o f a conjunction of appearances w ith respect to their som etim e existence (D asein ), their presence. The appearances, however, change, occur at
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different m om ents w ith different durations, and hence differ from each other (heterogeneous) w ith respect to their existence (D asein). Because it is now a m atter of the determ ination o f the constancy o f the object, conse quently upon its stand in the unity o f its connection w ith the rest, and thus upon the determ ination o f its existence (D asein ) in relation to the existence (D asein ) o f the others, it is a m atter o f a conjunction of w hat is hetero geneous, a unified standing together in different tim e re lationships. This standing together o f the whole o f ap pearances in the unity o f the rules o f its togetherness (Zusam m en ), i.e., according to law s, is, however, nothing other than nature. "B y nature, in the em pirical sense, w e understand the connection of appearances as regards their existence according to necessary rules, that is, ac cording to law s. There are certain law s w hich first m ake a nature possible, and these law s are a p riori." (A 216, B 263, N.K.S., p. 237.) For these "origin al la w s, expressed in the principles, Kant reserves the heading "A nalogies of Experience. It is not a question now as in the preceding principles o f "in tu itio n and "p ercep tion ," but o f the whole o f knowledge, wherein the to tality o f o bjects, na ture as presence, is determined. It concerns experience. But w hy "A n alo g ies ? W hat does "an alo g y m ean? We shall here try a reversed procedure. By clarifying the title w e w ill prepare for an understanding o f these principles. First o f all, let us again recall the contrast between these principles and the preceding ones. The m athem at ical principles concern those rules o f the unity of con joining according to w hich the object determines itself as an encountering w hat in its what-content. The p ossible form s of the encountering can be constructed in advance upon the ground o f the rules of quantitative com position in the domain o f the extension of space and the intensity o f w hat is sensed. The m athem atical construction o f the w hatness o f appearances may be verified and proven from experience by exam ples (A 178, B 221, N.K.S., p.
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210). In the follow ing principles it is not a question o f the determ ination o f w hat encounters in its w hatness, but o f the determ ination as to whether, how, and the fact that w hat encounters does encounter and does stand here, i.e., of the determ ination of the existence ( D asein ) o f the ap pearances w ithin their connection (or context). The existence ( D asein ) o f an object, whether and that it is present-at-hand, can never be im m ediately forced and brought before us a priori by a mere representation of its p ossible existence. We can only infer the existence of an ob ject (th at it m ust be here) from the relation of the ob ject to others, not by im m ediately procuring the ex istence. We can look for this existence according to defi nite rules; w e can even reckon it as necessary, but w e cannot by this means conjure it up now or ever. It m ust first allo w itse lf to be found. When it has been found, w e can recognize it and "id e n tify it by certain m arks as that fo r which w e were seeking. These rules for looking and finding the existential con nection o f appearances ( Daseinszusam m enhang der Erscheinungen) the existence o f the one non-given ap pearance in relation to the given existence o f the others these rules for the determ ination o f the relations of ex istence o f ob jects are the analogies o f experience. Ana logy means correspondence, a relation, nam ely, o f how . . . so ( Wie . . .s o ) . W hat stands in this relation are again relations. Understood according to its original concept, analogy is a relation o f relations. M athem atical and m eta physical analogies differ according to what stands in this relation. In m athem atics the "h o w . . . so contains rela tionships, which, in short, are homogeneously construable: ju st how a is to b, so c is to d. If the relation o f a and b is given, and c also, then, according to the analogy, d can be defined and construed, and can itse lf be provided by such a construction. In m etaphysical analogy, on the other hand, it is not a question of purely qu antitative relations, but of qu alitative ones, relations between what
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is heterogeneous. Here the encountering o f the real, its presence, does not depend on us, but w e depend on it. In the domain o f w hat encounters us, if a relation o f two that encounter is given, as well as som ething that corresponds to one of the tw o givens, then the fourth itse lf cannot be inferred in such a w ay as though it were already present through such an inference. Moreover, according to the rule o f correspondence, w e can only conclude the rela tion of the third to the fourth. From the analogy w e ob tain only an indication about a relation of som ething given to som ething not given, i.e., an indication of how, from the given, w e m ust look for the non-given and as what we must meet it when it sh ow s itself. Now it becom es clear w hy Kant can and must call the determining principles of relationship o f the existence of appearances among them selves "an alo g ies. Since it is a question o f the determ ination of existence, that and whether som ething is, but since the existence o f a third is never brought about a priori, but can only be encoun tered, and, indeed, in relation to som ething present-athand, the rules which are necessary here are alw ays for a correspondence: analogies. There lies, therefore, in such rules an anticipation o f a necessary connection of percep tions and appearances in general, i.e., o f experience. The analogies are analogies o f experience. fu. The analogies as rules o f the universal time-determination Therefore, the "p rin cip le of the analogies of experi ence reads a s fo llo w s in B 218 ( N.K.S ., p. 208): Experience is possible only through the representa tion of a necessary connection of perceptions." Or in more detail (A 176 f., N.K.S., p. 208): "A ll appearances are, as regards their existence ( D asein ) su bject a priori to rules determining their relation to one another in one tim e.
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The key w ord is "tim e , and it indicates the connection in which these principles as rules have their anticipatory power. Kant, therefore, expressly ca lls the analogies "ru les o f universal tim e-determ ination (A 178, B 220). "U niversal time-determination designates that time-determination which is present in advance o f all em pirical time m easurem ents in physics, and it is present in ad vance specifically as the ground of the p ossibility o f such measurement. Since an object can stand in relation to time with respect to its duration and w ith respect to the sequence in w hich it occurs w ith other o b jects and w ith respect to its being at the sam e tim e another, Kant dis tinguishes "th ree rules o f all relations o f appearances in tim e ( A 177, B 219, N.K.S., p. 209), that is, the existence of appearances in time w ith respect to their relation in time. Up to now we have not directly discussed time. Why does the relation to time move into the foreground in the analogies o f experience? What has tim e to do w ith what these principles regulate? The rules concern the relation of appearances among them selves in regard to their "ex istence (D asein ), i.e., the constancy (Stn d igk eit) of the object in the totality o f w hat con stitu tes (B estan d ) ap pearances. Constancy in one sense means that which stands here (D astehen ), the presence. But constancy also means continuance ( Fortw hren ), enduring (Beharren). In the term co n stan cy w e hear both in one. It suggests continuous presence, existence o f the object. We can eas ily see that presence and presentness contain a relation to time ju st as do continuance and enduring. Principles which are concerned w ith the determ ination o f the con stancy o f the object, therefore, n ecessarily and in an ex ceptional sense have to do w ith time. For us, the question is in w hat w ay. The answ er presents itse lf when w e think through one o f the principles and run through its proof. We choose for this the first analogy. (A 182 fi., B 224 ff., N.K.S., pp. 212 If.)
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By w ay o f introduction w e briefly point out how Kant circum scribes the nature of time. We restrict ourselves, thereby, to what is necessary for an understanding of these principles. Rightly seen, however, w e first directly discover the essen tials of K ants concept of time only through the form ation and proof o f the analogies. Until now time w a s discussed only in passing when the nature of space w as being defined. There w e attributed to time w hat corresponds to w hat w a s said of space. W c also lind that Kant introduces the discussion of time together w ith that o f space in the transcendental aesthetic. We say "in tro d u ces intentionally, because what is said there concerning time neither exhausts w hat Kant has to say nor is it the decisive part. Corresponding to space and by the sam e fundamental proofs, time is first exhibited as pure intuition. Co-exist ence and succession are represented in advance. Only by this pre-senting-in-advance ( Voraus-vor-stellung) can one represent to oneself that several encountering things are sim ultaneous or one after the other. . . . Different tim es are not sim ultaneous but successive (ju st as different spaces are not su ccessive but sim u ltan eo u s). (A 31, B 47, N.K.S., p. 75.) Different times, however, are only parts of one and the sam e time. Different tim es are only as de limited in one single whole time. Time is not first com posed by a piecing together, but is unlim ited, endless, not made by a com position, but given. The originally united, single to tality of succession is represented im m ediately, in advance, i.e., tim e is an a priori intuition, a "pure in tuition. Space is the form wherein all outside appearances en counter us. Time, however, is not lim ited to these; it is also the form o f inner appearances, i.e., the appearing and succession o f our modes o f relation and experiences. For this reason time is the form of all appearances in general. "In it alone is actu ality (i.e., existence, presence) of ap pearances p ossible at a ll. (A 31, B 46, N.K.S., p. 75.) The
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existence o f each appearance, as existence, stands in a re lationship to time. Time itse lf is "unchangeable and per m anent, it does not run out. . . Time itse lf does not alter, but only som ething w hich is in tim e. (A 41, B 58, N.K.S., p. 82.) In each now time is the sam e now; time is constan tly itself. Time is that enduring which alw ays is. Time is pure remaining, and only insofar as it remains are succession and alteration possible. Although time has a now-character in each now, each now is unrepeatably this single now, and different from every other now. Accord ingly, time itse lf perm its different relations between ap pearances w ith regard to itself. What encounters can stand in different relations to time. If it is related to time as permanent, i.e., to time as quantum, as sizable, then existence is taken according to its time-magnitude and it is determ inable in its duration, i.e., as to how much of time as a whole. Time itse lf is taken as a magnitude. If the appearing is related to time as the succession of nows, then it is taken as it is successively in time. If it is related to time as the sum total, then the appearing is taken ju st as it is now in time. Accordingly, Kant designates three modes o f time; duration, succession, and co-existence. With regard to these three p ossible relations o f the exist ence o f appearances to time (the tim e-relations), there are three rules for their determ ination, three principles that have the character o f analogies: I. Analogy: Principle o f Permanence. II. Analogy: Principle of Succession in Time, in A c cordance w ith the Law o f Causality. III. Analogy: Principle of Co-existence, in Accordance w ith the Law o f Reciprocity or Community. We shall try to grasp the first analogy, i.e., to follow its proof. Here it might be well to remember again the gen eral nature o f analogies. They are to be established as those rules which, in advance, determine the constancy ( Stiin d igkeit ) of the object ( Gegenstand ), the existence ol the appearance, in their relation to one another. But
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because the existence of appearances cannot be at our disposal, this rule cannot present and produce existence through a priori construction. It only gives a direction for looking for relations along which w e can infer from one existence to another. The proof o f such rules has to dem onstrate w hy these principles are necessary and wherein they are grounded. f;t. The first analogy and its proof. Substance as a time-determination The principle of permanence reads: All appearances /contain the permanent (su b sta n ce) as the object itself, and the tran sitory as its mere determ ination, that is, as a w ay in which the ob ject e x ists. ( A 182, N.K.S., p. 212.) In order that this sentence m ay be read at once as an anal ogy, it is im portant to pay attention to the and ," i.e., to the citing o f the relation o f permanence and the tran si tory. Kant points out that "a t all tim es," not only in philosophy but also in common sense, som ething like sub stance, permanence in the change o f appearances, is pre supposed. The principle tacitly underlies all experience. "A philosopher, on being asked how much sm oke weighs, made the reply: Su btract from the weight o f the wood burnt the weight of the ashes which are left over, and you have the weight o f sm oke. He thus presupposed as unde niable that even in fire the m atter (su b sta n ce) does not vanish, but only suffers an alteration o f form . (A 185, B 228, N.K.S., p. 215.) But Kant em phasizes that it is not enough for one only to "fe e l the need for the principle of permanence as a basis. It m ust also be dem onstrated: (1 ) that and w hy there is som ething permanent in all ap pearances; (2 ) that the changeable is nothing else than a mere determ ination o f the permanent, i.e., som ething that stands in a tim e-relation to permanence as a timedeterm ination. K ant's proof is again presented in the form of a syllo
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gism. The proof concerns rules for the determ ination of existence, but existence means " to be in a tim e, and, as Kant rem arks, it is to be taken as a mode of time (A 179, B 222, N.K.S., p. 210). Therefore, the hinge on which the proof turns must be time, in its peculiar nature in its re lation to appearances. Since a proof in the form of a syllogism has its form al turning point in the minor premise, the decisive thing m ust be said in the minor premise, which m ediates between the m ajor premise and the conclusion. M ajor premise: All appearances i.e., all that which encounters us humans encounter in time and, there fore, w ith respect to the unity o f their connection, they stand in the unity o f a time-determination. Time itself is the original enduring; original, because only as long as time endures is som ething enduring in time possible. Therefore, permanence as such is w hat faces us and un derlies in advance all that encounters us: the substratum . Minor premise: Time itself, as absolute, cannot be per ceived as itself, i.e., the time wherein everything that encounters has its spot is not perceivable as such. If it w ere perceivable, the particular tim e-spots {Zeitstellen) o f what encounters, and, therewith, what encounters in its time-spot could also be determined a priori in it. In contrast, time, as the permanent in all appearances, de mands that all determining o f the existence o f appear ances, i.e., their being-in-time ( In-der-Zeit-sein ), refer in advance and above all to this permanent. Conclusion: Thus, first and above all the standing of the ob ject m ust be conceived from out o f permanence, i.e., the representation o f enduring in change belongs in advance to the character ( Sach h altig k eit) o f an object. However, the representation o f enduring in change is w hat is meant by "su b sta n c e " in the pure concept of the understanding. Consequently, according to the necessity of this principle, the category o f substance has objective reality. There is constant alteration in the o b ject of ex
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perience, o f nature. Constant alteration is that mode of existence w hich follow s another mode o f the existence of the same object. The determ ination of alterations, thus o f natural events, presupposes permanence. Alteration is determ inable only in relation to permanence, since only the permanent can be changed, w hile the transitory suffers no alteration (Vernderung), but only a change (W echsel). The accidents by means of which the determ i nations o f substance are grasped are, therefore, nothing other than various modes o f permanence, i.e., o f the ex istence o f substance itself. The whole o f the constancy o f o b jects is determined upon the ground of the relation of their alterations among one another. Alterations are modes o f the presence of forces. For this reason the principles w hich concern the existence o f o b jects are called dynam ical. A lterations, however, are alterations o f som ething permanent. Perma nence m ust determine beforehand the horizon within which objects in their connection are constant. Accord ing to Kant, however, permanence as continual presence is the fundamental character of time. Time thus plays a decisive role in the determ ination o f the constancy of objects. In all the proofs of the dynam ical principles this role o f time com es to the fore through the decisive assertion about the nature o f time which is brought to bear each tim e in the m inor premise. Time, on the one hand, is the sum total w ithin which all appearances encounter; w ith in which, therefore, the standing o f o b jects is determined in their relations of permanence, o f succession, and o f co existence. On the other hand, as is alw ays asserted in the minor premise, time itse lf cannot be perceived. W ith re gard to the p ossible determ ination o f the presence o f ob je cts at any time, this m eans nothing less than that the m om entary position in tim e and time relation o f an ob je ct can never be constructed a priori out o f the pure running on o f tim e as such, i.e., can never them selves be
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intuitively produced and presented a priori. What is ac tual of time, i.e., w h at is im m ediately present, is only the particular now. There rem ains only the p ossibility of de termining the time character o f a not im m ediately given but nevertheless real object, from out of what is ju st then present, thus determining it a priori in its p ossible timerelation to w hat is present; and thereby to gain a guide line for how the object is to be sought. The o b je cts ex istence ( D asein ) itse lf must alw ays chance to occur in addition (zu-falien). Accordingly, if the whole o f appear ances in its ob jectivity is to be capable of being experi enced by us at all, then well-founded rules are required which would contain an indication o f the time relations as such in which the encountering must stand, so that the unity o f the existence of appearances, i.e., a nature, is possible. These transcendental tim e-determ inations are the analogies of experience, the first of w hich w e have been discussing. The second analogy reads according to B 232: All alterations take place in conform ity w ith the law of the connection o f cause and effect; w hile according to A 189: Everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes som ething upon w hich it follow s according to a rule. (N.K.S., p. 218.) The proof of this principle presents for the first time the foundation o f the law of cau sality as a law for the ob jects o f experience. The third analogy reads in B 256 as follow s: All substances, in so far a s they can be perceived to co-exist in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity; w hile according to A 211: All substances, so far as they coexist, stand in thoroughgoing com m unity, that is, in mutual in teraction ." (N.K.S., p. 233.) This principle and its proof, aside from its content, is of special im portance for K ants argument w ith Leibniz, as all the "an alo g ies really throw a special light on the change in the fundam ental position o f the tw o thinkers.
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In closing w e refer to the second group o f the dynam ical principles, the last group in the whole system of principles. g. The Postulates of Em pirical Thought As Such gi. The ob jective reality of the categories. The m odalities as su bjective synthetic principles We know that the system of principles o f the pure un derstanding is ordered and divided according to the order and division o f the table o f categories. The categories are representations o f unity which arise in the nature of the act o f understanding itself, w hich serve as rules of judg mental connection, i.e., the determining of the encounter ing m anifold in the object. The four titles for the four groups o f categories are quantity, quality, relation, and m odality. In retrospect w e see more clearly: In the axiom s o f intuition it is demonstrated in what sense quantity (a s extensive m agnitude) belongs neces sarily to the nature o f the ob ject as som ething encoun tering. In the anticipations of perception it is demonstrated how qu ality (re a lity ) determines w hat encounters in ad vance as an encountering. In the analogies, the principles o f correspondence, o f what-stands-in-relation and its determ ination, it is dem onstrated in w hat sense the ob ject w ith respect to its con stancy can only be determined on the b a sis o f a previous view o f the relations in which w hat encounters (the ap pearances) stands. Since these relations must represent and include in advance all o b jects capable o f coming to appearance in any w ay, they can only be relations of what is inclusive of all appearances namely, relations o f time. The three groups o f principles corresponding to the cate gories o f quantity, quality, and relation have this in com-
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inon: they determine in advance what belongs to the fac tual nature o f the ob ject as som ething encountering and constant. W ith regard to these categories, these three groups o f principles show that (and in w hat sen se) the categories constitute in advance the factual nature o f the object, its thinghood ( S ach h eit) as such and as a whole. These three categories are the realities o f the nature of the object. The corresponding principles prove that these categories as these realities make the object ( Gegen sta n d ) p ossible and belong to an object ( O b jek t ) as such. They show that the categories have objective reality. The principles so far discussed constitute the founda tion through w hich a horizon is first formed at all, w ithin which this and that and many can encounter and stand in connection as som ething objective. What more, then, is the fourth group o f principles (the postulates o f em pirical thought) to accom plish? This group corresponds to the categories o f m odality. The term already indicates som ething ch aracteristic. Modal ity: modus, mode, manner, a how namely, in contrast to the what, to the real as such. Kant introduces the dis cussion o f the fourth group o f principles w ith the remark that the categories o f m odality have a "sp e c ia l char acteristic (A 219, B 266, N.K.S., p. 239). The categories of m odality (p o ssib ility, actu ality or existence, n ecessity) do not belong to the factual content o f the nature of an ob je ct. Whether, for instance, a table is possible, actual or necessary, does not touch on the thinghood (S ach h eit) of "ta b le . This rem ains alw ays the sam e. K ants w ay of expressing this is that the categories o f m odality are not real predicates o f the object. Accordingly, neither do they belong to the content o f ( sach h altig ) the nature of o b jectiv ity at all, nor to the pure concept of that which delim its the nature o f the object as such. Rather, they assert som ething o f how the concept of the object is re
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lated to its existence and the modes o f its existence, that is to say, according to w hich modes the existence of the object is to be determined. The principles which say som ething about this cannot, therefore, like the foregoing, concern the question if and how the categories (p o ssib ility, actu ality, n ecessity) have objective reality, since they do not belong at all to the reality of the object. Because the principles cannot assert anything like this, neither can they be dem onstrated in this respect. There are, therefore, no proofs for these prin ciples, but only elucidations and clarification s of their content. g.. The p ostulates correspond to the nature of experience. The m odalities refer to experience and no longer to conceivability The p ostulates o f em pirical thought as such indicate only what is required in order to define an object as pos sible, actual, or necessary. There also lies in these re quirem ents ("p o stu la te s ) the delim iting of the nature o f p ossibility, actuality, and necessity. The postulates correspond to the nature o f that through which objects are definable at all: the nature of experience. The p ostulates are m erely assertion s of a requirement w hich lies in the nature o f experience. This, therefore, com es into play as the standard by w hich the m odes of existence and, therewith, the essence of being is mea sured. Accordingly, the postulates run as follow s (/1 218, B 265 f., N.K.S., p. 239): 1. That w hich agrees with the form al conditions of experience, that is, w ith the conditions of intuition and o f concepts, is p ossib le." Kant conceives of "p o ssib ility as agreement w ith what regulates in advance the appearing of appearances: w ith space and tim e and their qu antitative determ ination. The p ossib ility o f a representation can be decided only as the
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representation obeys what w as said about the object in the first group o f principles. Rational m etaphysics, on the contrary, had until then defined p o ssib ility as non contradiction. According to Kant, what does not contra dict itse lf is indeed thinkable. However, nothing about the p o ssib ility o f the existence o f an object is settled by this p o ssib ility of thought. W hat cannot appear in space and time is an im possible ob ject for us. "2. That which is bound up w ith the m aterial condi tions o f experience, that is, w ith sensation, is a ctu al." Kant conceives o f actu ality ( W irklich keit ) as connec tion w ith w hat sh ow s us som ething real, having content ( S ach h altig es ): w ith sensation. The actu ality o f an ob ject can be decided only in that the representation obeys w hat is said about the object in the second group of principles. Rational m etaphysics until then, on the con trary, form ulated actu ality only as a complement to pos sib ility in the sense o f conceivability: existentia as com plementum p ossib ilitatis. But w ith this nothing is settled about actu ality itself. What could still be added to p ossi bility w ithin pure understanding is only the im possible, but not the actual. The meaning o f actu ality is fulfilled and borne out for us only in the relation between repre senting and the encountering o f the real of sensation. Here w e are at the point at w hich the m isunderstand ing o f the conception o f reality begins. Because the real, specifically as a given, alone bears out the actu ality o f an ob ject people have wrongly identified reality ( R e a litt) w ith actu ality ( W irklich keit ). Reality, however, is only a condition for the givenness o f an actuality, but not yet the actu ality o f the actual. 3. That which in its connection w ith the actual is de termined in accordance w ith universal conditions o f ex perience is (th at is, exists a s ) n ecessary." Kant conceives o f n ecessity as determ ination by that which, out of agreement w ith the unity o f experience as such, estab lish es the connection w ith actuality. The
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necessity o f an object can be decided only in that the representation obeys w hat is said in the third group of principles concerning the constancy of the object. Ra tional m etaphysics, until then, on the contrary, under stood necessity merely a s w hat cannot not be. However, since existence is defined only as a complement o f the p ossible and this only as what is conceivable, this defini tion o f necessity also remained w ithin the domain of conceivability. The necessary is what is unthinkable as non-existent ( unseiend ). However, w hat w e have to think need not for this reason exist. We can never recognize the existence o f an object in its n ecessity at all, but alw ays only the existence of a state of an ob ject in relation to another.
*
g;i. Being as the being of the o b jects of experience. M odalities in relation to the power of cognition From this elucidation o f the contents o f the postulates, w hich is synonym ous w ith the essential definition o f the m odalities, w e gather that Kant, in defining the modes o f being, at the sam e time delim ited being to the being of the object o f experience. The merely logical clarification s o f p ossibility, actuality, necessity, as in rational m eta physics, are rejected. In short, being is no longer deter mined out o f mere thought. From whence then? The re curring form ula "w h a t agrees w ith , "w h a t is connected w ith , is strikin g in the postulates. P o ssib ility, actu ality, n ecessity are understood out of the relationship between our cap acity to know (an intuiting determined in accord ance w ith thought) and the conditions o f the p ossib ility o f objects conditions w hich lie in our knowing cap acity itself. The m odalities (p o ssib ility, actu ality, and n ecessity) add no content ( Stich h altiges ) to the content ( Sachhal tigk eit) of the object, and yet they are a synthesis. They put the object into a relationship to the conditions o f its
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standing-against ( Gegen-stehen ). These conditions, how ever, are also those very ones o f the letting-stand-against ( G egenstehenlassen ) o f experience, and, therefore, of the actions of the su bject. The postulates, too, are syn thetic principles, although not objective, but only su b jec tively synthetic. This is to say that they do not put to gether the content o f the object, but they put the whole nature o f the ob ject as determined by the three first principles into its p ossible relations to the su bject and to its modes o f intuitively-thought representing. The m odal ities add to the concept of the ob ject its relation to our cognitive faculty. (A 234, B 289, N.K.S., pp. 251 f.) There fore, also, the three modes of being correspond to the first three groups of principles. W hat is asserted in these presupposes the m odalities. In this sense, the fourth group o f synthetic principles o f pure understanding re m ains superior in rank to the others. Conversely, the m odalities arc determined only in relation to w hat is pos ited in the preceding principles. g,. The circu larity o f the proofs and elucidations Now it is clear that ju st like the proofs o f the other principles, the elucidation o f the postulates, too, m oves in a circle. Why is there this circu lar movement, and what does it say? The principles are to be proved as those propositions which establish the p ossibility o f an experience of ob je cts. How are these propositions proven? It is done by showing that these propositions them selves are possible only on the ground of the unity and agreement of the pure conceptions o f the understanding w ith the form s of in tuition, w ith space and time. The unity o f thought and intuition is itsell the essence o f experience. The proof con sists in showing that the principles o f pure understand ing are p ossible through that which they them selves m ake possible, through the nature o f experience. This is
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an obvious circle, and indeed a necessary one. The princi ples are proved by recourse to that w hose arising they make possible, because these propositions are to bring to light nothing else than this circu larity itself; for this con stitu tes the essence o f experience. In the concluding part o f his w ork Kant says o f the principle o f pure understanding that it has the peculiar character that it m akes possible the very experience which is its own ground o f proof, and that in this experi ence it m ust alw ays itse lf be presupposed ( A 737, B 765, N.K.S., p. 592). The principles are such propositions which ground their ground of proof and transfer this grounding to the ground o f proof. Expressed differently, the ground w hich they lay, the nature o f experience, is not a thing present-at-hand, to which w e return and upon which w e then sim ply stand. Experience is in itse lf a circular happening through w hich w hat lies w ithin the circle becom es exposed (erffnet). This open (Offene), however, is nothing other than the between (Z w isch en ) between us and the thing. h. The Highest Principle of All Synthetic Judgments. The Between What Kant hit upon and what he constan tly tried to grasp anew as the fundam ental happening is that w e hu man beings have the power o f knowing what is, w hich we ourselves are not, even though w e did not ourselves m ake this what is. To be w hat is in the m idst of an open vis-avis what is, that is con stan tly strange. In K ants form ula tion this means to have o b jects standing against us as they them selves, even though the letting encounter (das Begegnen-lassen) happens through us. How is such pos sible? Only in such a w a y that the conditions o f the p ossi b ility o f experiencing (sp ace and time as pure intuitions and the categories as pure concepts o f the understanding) are at the sam e time the conditions of the standingagainst o f the objects o f experience.
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What is expressed in this w ay Kant has established as the highest principle of all synthetic judgm ents. It now becom es clear what the circu larity in the proof of the principles means. It means nothing else than this: Funda m entally these principles alw ays express only the highest principle, but in such a w ay that in their belonging to gether they explicitly cite all that which belongs to the full content o f the nature of experience and the nature of an object. The ch ief difficulty in understanding this b asic section of the Critique o f Pure Reason and the w hole work lies in the fact that w e approach it from our everyday or scien tific mode o f thinking and read it in that attitude. Our a t tention is directed either toward what is said of the ob je ct itse lf or toward w hat is explained about the mode in w hich it is experienced. What is decisive, however, is neither to pay attention only to the one nor only to the other, nor to both together, but to recognize and to know: 1. that we m ust alw ays m ove in the between, between man and thing; 2. that this between exists only w hile w e move in it; 3. that this between is not like a rope stretching from the thing to man, but that this between as an anticipation ( V orgriff ) reaches beyond the thing and sim ilarly back behind us. Reaching-before ( Vor-griff ) means thrown back ( R iick-w u rf ). Therefore, when, from the first sentence onward, we read the Critique o f Pure Reason in this attitude, from the start everything m oves into a different light. Conclusion We have sought to press forward to the doctrine of the principles, because in this center o f the Critique o f Pure Reason the question about the thing is newly put and an swered. We said earlier that the question o f the thing is a historical one; now we see more clearly in w hat sense
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this is the case. K an ts questioning about the thing ask s about intuition and thought, about experience and its principles, i.e., it ask s about man. The question "W h at is a thing? is the question Who is m an? That does not mean that things becom e a human product ( G etniichle ), but, on the contrary, it means that man is to be under stood as he who alw ays already leaps beyond things, but in such a w ay that this leaping-beyond is p ossible only w hile things encounter and so precisely remain them selves w hile they send us back behind ourselves and our surface. A dimension is opened up in K ants question about the thing w hich lies between the thing and man, w hich reaches out beyond things and back behind man.
In the pages to follow, four main topics w ill be discussed: (1 ) the sort o f questions that are philosophical (to ex plain such questions as "W h at is a th in g ?"); (2 ) the text itself, dealing w ith section s A, in which the question What is a th in g ?" is raised; B-I, which exam ines the basic assum ption system involved in modern science; and -, which presents the w ay Kant fundam entally altered the grounds on which this scientific assum ption system w as based and the lim its w ithin which it can be valid; (3 ) the relationship o f Heidegger to Kant; (4 ) the later Heidegger and future philosophy. Heidegger's first section (A ) is preparatory and is de signed to give the reader a fresh start, freeing him from som e o f the preconceptions he is likely to have. Although w ritten as a sim ple common-sense discussion, it con tains all of Heidegger's m ajor points. This an alysis w ill attem pt to relate these points as raised in section A w ith their carefully detailed an alysis in section s B-I and B-I I. However, before examining the text itself, we must dis cu ss the meaning of the question "W h at is a thing? , and, 247
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as this question is one version of the sort ol question philosophy alw ays ask s, we must briefly discuss what sort of questions are philosophical.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS The task of philosophy differs from that of science, for, unlike science, philosophy exam ines not our conclusions but the basic conceptual m odels we employ the kind of concepts and ordering patterns we use. Philosophy con cerns not the explanation o f this or that but questions such as "W h at, really, is an explanation?" For example, is som ething explained when it is divided into parts and if we can tell how the parts behave? This is but one type o f explanation. It w o rks fairly well for a car (although it does not tell w hat m akes it ru n ), less w ell for a biological cell (w h o se p arts are not alive and do not explain its life ), and very poorly for explaining per son ality (w h at are the "p a r ts " of a p erson?). Or, choosing another o f the m any types, has som ething been explained when we feel that we "un derstan d it because we have been shown how it fits into some larger context or broader organization? These questions, philosophic ques tions, are not designed to determine the explanation of this or that, but to discover what an explanation is. Yet, as we have seen, there are m any different kinds of ex planations. In any one case, w hich shall w e use? Or should we try to use them all, and, if so, when and with what ad vantages and p itfalls? How is our choice among these varied explanations to be m ade? Should it depend on the field in which w e work, on what we want an explanation for, or on the style of the tim es? When w e ask questions o f this sort, we seem to be talking about nothing in particular; as Heidegger points out, such philosophic issu es at first seem to be empty. Yet, they very basically affect w hatever w e study, for,
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depending upon w hich mode o f approach we use, dif ferent questions and hypotheses w ill be form ulated, d if ferent experiments set up, different illu stration s cited, different arguments held to be sound, and different con clusions reached. Much in our conclusions about any thing com es not from the study of the things but from the philosophical decisions im plicit in the w ay w e start. Ideally, a clear division could be made between w hat is asserted of the things and what is only ch aracteristic of one's preferred type of explaining. But these tw o arc so intermeshed and interdependent that the very research, findings, and ob jective results o f one approach w ill seem to those holding another approach as com pletely irrele vant or poorly asked about and answered from start to finish. It would be convenient to be able to say, "These asp ects I found by studying my subject m atter, and about them you m ust accept what I say; whereas those other aspects o f my results stem m erely from the sort o f ap proach I alw ays use, from 'the w a y I slice things,' and so you neednt accept that side o f my co n clu sio n s." But the effects o f ones approach cannot be separated out. Even w hat we ask, the questions w ith w hich we begin (a s well as every subsequent step and finding), is already a re sult of, and is form ulated w ithin, a certain context and a certain w ay of conceptualizing things. Since it is philosophys task to discuss, clarify, and decide about such choices, philosophy cannot be based on a study o f how the things are in order to see what approach is m ost suitable. How w e find the things to be already depends upon our approach. Thus, the question "W hat is a thing? is one w ay of putting the b asic ques tion of approach. The "th in g ," as w e have things today, is a certain sort of explanatory schem e, a certain sort of approach to any thing studied. Heidegger finds this approach current in both science and ordinary common sense. It is an ap proach that renders w hatever w e study as som e thing in
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space, located over there, su bsistin g separate It om and over against us and having certain properties of its own. It is as obvious as that orange-colored chair over there," or an atom , " a cell, a se lf, " a sense datum , a body. Although E in stein s p hysics has changed this thingmodel som ewhat, Heidegger view s E instein s theory as a more complex m odification of the same basic thing-model (20, 15).* We assum e the thing so naturally that only a far-reaching discussion such as Heideggers can make us realize how constan tly we approach everything in this way, how this approach cam e about, and how a different approach is possible. These are the sort ol aim s that are the task of philosophy. Heidegger tells us that science begins and can begin without explicitly examining its b asic approach. Science begins w ith contem porary problem s, w hich arise in the context of how the people o f the time approach things. Although philosophic questions are often decided in science, this occurs only im plicitly. In proceeding further, science m akes further decisions, but these are made through action. Fashions in science change, and, therewith, much seem ingly important work becom es irrelevant. But, since it is not the task of science to examine its im plicit decisions directly, it can begin w ithout prelim inaries. Heidegger argues that philosophy, however, cannot sim ply begin. It a sk s a question "w ith w hich nothing can be started (2, 2). Therefore, the question o f the thing is a question w ith which one cannot begin. Thus, w e are faced w ith a dilemma: Since philosophy cannot sim ply start w ithout abandoning its task, which is to examine how we are to begin, how we are to approach and conceptualize; how, then, can philosophy ever begin and proceed at all?
* In this analysis the first reference given w ill be to the English translation of What Is A Thing?, and the second, in italics, to the German text.
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Another w ay to put this dilem ma is to talk about "ex perience. People often say that they w ant their know l edge to fit (or to be based on ) experience. But different modes o f study involve different sorts of "experience. For instance, one might know som ething from reading a dial on a complex experimental apparatus, or one might know som ething from cu lturally learned common-sense observation. When these and other sorts of "experience" occur they already m ake sense, even before interpreta tions are form ulated. The p h ysicists dial reading is ob viously an "exp erience" into which much thought has already gone, and common-sense o b jects around us are also experienced only w ith interpretations already in them. What w e appeal to, check against, and call experi ence is alw ays already organized and cut up, defined and made. Thus, philosophys problem is not solved by basing philosophy on experience. Once w e have chosen how to have "experience (and on what selected and shaped asp ects o f it our statem ents can be "b a se d ), w hat philos ophy must first examine has already been decided and concluded. Hence, the b asic philosophical choices and decisions are already settled in any settled acceptance of "experience." So far these have been presented as if they were quite free "ch o ice s, as if one could adopt any sort of method, type o f concept, sense o f explanation, form of thing, and type o f "exp erience." But this is not so. In Heideggers view we cannot today, for instance, ignore our m athe m atics and science and em bark on som e new beginning that bears no relation to science (95, 73). Nor can we ignore our com m on-sense perspective. One is alw ays in a given situation, at a particular pass in history. The choices confronting us arc choices in our current h istorical con text. Although a decision to assum e our present context re lieves us ol w hat could otherw ise seem an endless and arbitrary relativity of choices, Heideggers decision to
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study this context is made in order to put it into question, to reopen questions that at present appear settled. In this exam ination Heidegger sees the answ er to our dilem m a of how philosophy can start at all w ithout abandoning its b asic task, how it can examine basic approach and not sim ply fall into the existing approach. While we cannot accept our present approach unexam ined, neither can we sim ply reject it, for in rejecting it w e would still be standing in it and we would still be using it, constantly, im plicitly, in spite o f ourselves. We m ust, then, examine this approach as we have it, realizing that it has developed as a series of answ ers to a series of questions asked long ago, settled long ago, and now no longer asked. Our now unquestioned, im plicit approach w a s once a new answ er to a question that w as then open. If we find our w ay back to those questions, we w ill not only see them as live questions and as they were answered at that time, but w e w ill be, thereby, in a position to an sw er them differently. Regaining these questions as live and open is the only w ay to get behind our unexamined assum ptions, to see how they are now our b asis, and to change them (49-50, 3#). Heidegger ca lls this "reopen ing a question, or taking a question that is now "q u ie s cen t and "se ttin g [it] into m otion again (49, 38). In order to move beyond the current context, the cur rent w ay w e see "th in g s and "experience, the w ay we have knowledge and questions, Heidegger presents the historical steps and philosophical decisions that brought us to the current approach. He reopens decisions that w ere made and are now im plicit (are now "happening ) in our assum ed approach. Philosophy thus m akes the current, im plicit context explicit and thereby provides the opportunity to carry further, add to, or change "th in g s" (49-50, 38)! Thus, Heidegger says that only philosophy builds the roads that create and alter what things are. But does he not say that science and ordinary commonsense living in any culture do this also (65-66, 100; 50, 78 )? Yes, but they do it im plicitly. Philosophy adds a
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different power in explicating im plicit decisions, thereby reopening them and posing them for further decision (10, 41, 53-54; 8, 31, 41). Heidegger tries to reopen som e o f these crucial deci sions that made things and experience as w e now have them, decisions set by Plato and A ristotle, G alileo and Newton, Leibniz and Kant. The book reopens especially those b asic cultural decisions that at first were involved chiefly in modern science, although they also cam e to determine how w e now view and live w ith and in any thing. Thus far w e have seen w hat philosophy does and how, for Heidegger, it is p ossible only as it exam ines its own role in history. But are w e not today quite aw are of the thing-model and its lim itation s? Is there now already a sufficiently widespread critica l attitude of this sort? Since the pub lication o f Sein unci Zeit in 1927, an entire generation of thinkers scien tists, authors, artists has lived and w rit ten in the clim ate that Heidegger (w ith Dilthey and Hus serl ju st before him ) helped create. Because o f this in tellectual clim ate, nearly all thinkers since the thirties have been at least indirectly influenced by Heidegger and his im m ediate predecessors. We ow e to Heidegger much o f current thought, w ith its em phasis on getting beyond mere m odels by appealing to the w ider context o f ordi nary living. In reading What Is A Thing? (w hich w a s first published in Germany in 1962, although it co n sists o f lectures given in 1935),' we do m uch more than reinforce todays general attitude that science co n sists o f man-made m odels within
1 Bv 1935 Heidegger had already courageously withdrawn from support of Nazism, which had at first seemed to him a hopeful re volt against rationalized, technologized culture. He withdrew at a time when very few could see ahead, and his early support should not be remembered without also remembering his early w ith drawal. On the other hand, why this type of philosophy w as not a better guide for his political decisions and how this type of phi losophy relates to political allegiance, are certainly questions to reopen!
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a human world. Wc cannot remain content w ith this mere attitude, this im plicit assum ption about science. Only if we see an exact an alysis of science in the human context, if that is spelled out, explicated, can w e move further. We must go behind our own current clim ate of thought, which Heidegger helped to create, and examine Heideg gers exact an alysis o f the thing-model. The thing-model is, despite our current attitudes, still second nature to us. In the following pages I w ill be more exact and w ill at tempt to state som e main points that should make the reading of Heideggers book easier and more enjoyable (fo r the w ay in which the book reveals and delineates cer tain m ajor asp ects b asic to our thinking is extremely enjoyable, once barriers to its understanding have been overcom e).
2. THE TEXT Section A In citing the housemaid who laughed at the ancient philosopher Thales when he fell into the well w hile ob serving the stars, Heidegger agrees that philosophy can look like a laughable endeavor o f no particular use; while searching for the ultim ate grounds of things one can easily fall into a w ell, and in a well one fa lls a long time before hitting the ground. (W e are searching for the "grou n d " or b asis o f how anything appears and is ap proached and studied.) Also, the maid is right in that it is best to look carefully at the ordinary things around us before looking far aw ay. As we shall see later, Heidegger goes beyond Kant and other philosophers, for he does begin w ith the ordinary things around us. To be more accurate, he begins with us and the things around us, as we are among them at this time in history. Kant does not do this, nor, in Heideg
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ger's view, do the natural sciences. Throughout the book, therefore, Heidegger adds the larger human context to the discussion o f Kant and o f science. We come today upon a scene in which "th in g s are held to be o b jects around us, separable and m ovable in space. But, already at the start o f the discussion (4-6, 3 -5 ), Heidegger prepares for his own larger context, which in volves humans as well as things. Thus, he sets up three sorts o f things: (1 ) the ob jects around us, (2 ) our human attitu des and procedures, and (3 ) the to tality o f these two in interdependence together. And, as he says later, the third is really first (16, 74; 12, 57). Within this larger con text, our inquiry here w ill center on the things w e find around us. In order to grasp how these seem ingly inde pendent things com e to be as we ordinarily find them around us w e w ill have to concern ourselves also w ith our own human speech and attitu des and w ith the context that encom passes both us and them. Heidegger uses such phrases as "th e being o f w hat is or "th e thingness o f the thing, and means by that the basic w ay (m odel, approach, fram ew ork) in which w e meet these things. This is not som e m ysterious, addi tional, floating "B ein g, for it is only the mode of being of these things around us, how they are (9, 7). But that in volves more than they do. What they are also involves the context in which, together with us, they com e to be the w ay they are for us. Heidegger next discu sses the difference between the things of common sense and those sam e things as ren dered by science. Why does he discu ss this difference here? He w an ts to make clear to us that the things w e run into are not sim ply given, as they seem, but have alw ays already involved a certain "ap p roach , w hich could be different. Once we note these tw o very different w ay s in which we render things, w e can no longer consider the things according to either as sim ply given, independent of us.
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The w ays in which science and everyday common sense present "th in g s" arc not at all the sam e. For example, in ordinary term s, the sun " r is e s " and "s e ts , w hile science says that it does not (13, 10). What is the relation between these tw o things the thing of science and the thing of common observation? Heidegger finds that an under standing o f an original reference to things is m issing these days between the things as rendered by science and the ordinary things around us (41, 31). To relate these two current approaches o f ours w e w ould have to under stand how approaches come to be. It is one o f the tasks of this book to show this, and to show the common origin of these two. Heidegger says that ordinary things are alw ays partic ulars, this one or that one, whereas science studies only universalities (15, 11-12). He asks: Does modern science drop out particularity? The common sense things around us are alw ays this one or that one, but, for science, any specific thing or event m ust be "d eriva b le from general theories. We say that w'e lack an explanation (scien tific accou n t) o f a thing as long as we cannot yet derive its nature and occurrence from universal, b asic theoretical postulates (axiom s,p rem ises, principles, Grundstze, pos tu lates). This is the b a sic "a x io m a tic character o f mod ern science with w hich Heidegger deals in detail in the latter part o f this book. In contrast, any ordinary thing is alw ays this one, a singular, particular thing. Heidegger next sh ow s that the p articularity o f things seem s to depend com pletely on their space and time, that each is here or there, now or then. If tw o things are alike (15-16, 23; 12, 17), this one is different from that one only because it is here now, w hile the other is there, or is here later. It is space and tim e that make ordinary things particulars. Here he poses a question that he deals w ith only later: Scientific propositions, too, concern events in space and time, and not only generalizations. How' does
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science use space and tim e so that events can be both specifically determined and derivable from universal theory (1 i 1, 129; 86, 101)? Kant assum ed that human space and time are those of N ew ton's physics (77, 59), and he showed how N ewtons "a b so lu te space and time are really generated in the w ay man thinks about and perceives any law fu l and spe cific ob ject. (Later we shall see exactly how this is done.) While Heideggers notion of man is fuller than K ants Newtonian man, he, too, derives space and time in the sam e b asic w ay as did Kant: Space and time are gener ated in the encounter between man and the things that humans point out, locate, and make specific. But Heidegger ask s: Is space really involved in the very make-up o f specific things? Is not space merely a system o f external relations obtaining between things? He sh ow s (19, 198; 15, 153) that even if we break a thing to get to the space "in sid e w e find external relations between its parts, bits, and pieces. Space seem s to be not really " in the thing but only the "p o ssib ility of ar rangements of its parts (in, out, next to, etc.). How does this p o ssib ility o f spatial structuring come into what a thing is? "P o s s ib ility is an important concept in this book and alw ays refers to how our b a sic approach first m akes things: it is our p ossible mode o f approach that m akes it "p o ssib le for things to be as they are encountered, lo cated, and found by us (21, 189; 16, 148). The thing is given there, over against us. This encounters externality is an arranging that m akes and gets into the thing. And ju st as w e did not see space in the thing directly, we certainly never see or perceive tim e as such, or in things. Yet, only space and tim e are in the particularity of each Ihing. w h at does Heidegger trace this ch aracteristic of things, that they are alw ays "th is one or "th a t one (and,
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thus, to what docs he trace space and time, since space and time lend things their p articu larity)? He traces the things character o f being alw ays "th is one to the things relation to us or our relation to the thing. IVc point at things and so call them "th is on e" or "th a t one (24-25, 202; 18-19, 157). Thus, again (a s he did when he set up the three kinds of "th in g s ), Heidegger invokes the larger, ordinary, human context in which w e and things appear together. In that interplay between us and things, space and time are generated. Heidegger argues that w ords such as " t h is and that, the dem onstrative pronouns, should not be called "p r o nouns, that is, su b stitu tes for nouns. The use of the w ords " t h is and th at is the m ost original and earliest mode o f saying anything and thereby selecting and determining a thing (25, 19). Only after our interplay w ith things do they come to have a resulting nature of their own. The noun becom es p ossible only on the b a sis o f our pointing. Our dem onstrative definitions precede more developed definitions, i.e., "th in g s arise only in the context o f their relation to us and our pointing them out. And so w e arrive at w hat might be called the main theme of the book, the betw een." Heidegger is not saying that a thing is som ething subjective. What a th is is does not depend upon our caprice and our pleasure. What it is does depend upon us, but it also equally depends upon the things (26, 20; also 243, 188). This "b etw een is not as though first we and things could have existed sepa rately and then interacted. Rather, w hat a person is is alw ays already a having things given, and a thing is al ready som ething that encounters. As we have seen, w hat a thing is (fo r instance, the sun) depends on whether we take the thing of science or the thing o f comm on sense. As Heidegger phrases it, "The things stand in different truths (14, 11). What a thing is
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alw ays depends on som e interplay with us, upon some truth in which it stands. But Heidegger never speaks of mere view points con cerning w hat things are. He is concerned w ith concrete situations, w ith things w e run into, w ork on, and use (both the common sense things and the scientific airplanes we fly). That the airplanes we build actually fly is no mere viewpoint! It is through action in concrete situ atio n s that 'th in g s" com e to be acted on and taken as of a certain character. The character of things is therefore no mere viewpoint, but is made in our actions and in the situations. With our approach w e create. And by explicating the im plicit approach, philosophy can reopen old decisions and make further crucial decisions that have equally concrete effects on w h at things are. Conversely, only in perceiving and acting on things do we constitute ourselves as hu mans, ju st as only thereby do the things becom e things. Heidegger now illu strates this interplay "b etw een man and things with som e exam ples from Hegel. Hegel showed that the seem ingly obvious and solid things, this here and "th is now, change constan tly and are relative to us. Space and tim e are generated in the interplay between us and things. The "th is here now depends on me and is a different "th is here n o w " when I turn. The mere here n ow is not enough to make a thing." It lacks a lasting truth and is only its changing relation to us. Thus, the temporal and spatial asp ects o f this interplay "b etw een us and things is not alone sufficient to determine a thing. A second m ajor consideration m ust be taken up (32, 24). This is our opportunity, therefore, to d iscu ss the two m ajor considerations along which everything in this book is divided: ( a ) sensation and ( b ) concepts, or, more b a si cally, ( a ) givenness and ( b ) collection in a cla ss, or (a ) particulars and ( b ) universals: ( a ) the here-nowr "th is one and ( b ) "w h a t it is. What som ething is is alw ays a universal (m any other
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things can be the sam e "w h a t ). IT w e call "th is one here now a "c a t , we thereby take and know it a s the sam e as many other things not here now, which are also cats. "C a t is thus a universal or a class. What is a ca t? We can delin eate the traits that make som ething a cat, and each of these traits is also a universal: many other things (other ca ts and still other things) are furry, or are anim als, etc. These are "co n ce p ts in K ants sense o f that word. For Kant (/1320, B 377), a concept is a "ch a ra cteristic m ark (hat defines the m embers o f a class. Concepts are com m onalities; they are the sam e wherever and whenever they occur. A thing is a "th is here now that "b e a r s such universal "tr a its . Heidegger ca lls time and space (a s w e ju st left them, ab o ve) the "re a lm (32, 24) in which things encounter us (now , and from over there), in w hich things can be "g ive n as over against us. Concepts, however, organize. They stabilize the llow o f sentience; they make it into something. They bring it to a lasting stand. Only both make a thing. An object in German is a Gegenstand, liter ally, a standing-against (137, 140, 184, 190; 107-110, 144, 148). Both givenness and concepts are really interplays "b e tw een us and things, for givenness is tlieir mode o f en' countering us, and the concepts of traits are our w ay of determining and defining them. Thus, both givenness and concepts are our w ays. And both are the things w ays. Yet it is clear that both belong to us only in regard to how givenness and concepts make things, and belong to things only as encountering us. But to w hat does Heidegger trace this conceptual traitconstitution o f things? He traces it (37, 28) to the struc ture of our speaking to each other about a situation ( much as, earlier, he traced the time-space realm of the partic ularity o f th is or th a t thing to our pointing things out to each other). Traditionally in philosophy, a sentence had been an-
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alyzed as a connection between a su bject and a predi cate. Heidegger puts the sentence into the larger context o f a persons expressing him self to others about a situ a tion in which facets of the situation are stated, and som ething (the predicate) is asserted about some facet (the su b je ct). What is said, the predicate, becom es the " tr a its of a "th in g . The su bject of the sentence is the thing, not as seen or perceived but as hypothesized as one "un der its many traits. The su bject "b e a r s the traits. This ancient mode o f the underlying subject, as fam iliar and pervasive as it is, seem s foolish, and its widespread use m ust be puzzling unless it is seen in the light of its derivation from the context o f uttering som ething in speech. 01 course, once it is seen in this way, one is hardly inclined to assum e that this model is sim ply a given thing that has this structure of its own accord and apart from us. In Heideggers view , the underlying trait-bearing thing w a s modeled after the sentence. Thus, w e have the second o f the tw o m ajor considera tions: the thing as bearer of traits (or cla sse s), this, too, deriving from w ithin an interplay "b etw een man and things. It is vital that givenness and concepts are really seen as tw o different considerations. In modern tim es it is a Kantian contribution to in sist upon the difference. ; D escartes, Leibniz, and many others before Kant did not view perception and thought as really different. Percep tion w a s viewed as still-unclarified thought. It could be wholly analyzed and reduced to thought units. But that meant that there w a s no realm o f givenness of here-now "th is one and that one. Hence, Leibniz had to hold the principle o f in discernibles : Two things cannot be alike in every one o f their conceptualizable traits. They would be only one thing (23, 17). For Leibniz, only traits, not space and time, could distinguish tw o things. Why does this m atter here? Because that view gave all power to | axiom atic concepts and none to givenness. In that view,
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reason determ ines everything and depends only on itself (a rational, axiom atic, m athem atical-physical system ). That w as the Renaissance w ay "th in g s" were. Heidegger w an ts to show that it w as this lim itless power o f pure reason that Kant lim its" in his Critique. Kant lim its the rational bv show ing how concepts are only the w ays in which sensory givens go into the make-up o f the things we experience. These have been some of the main prob lem s which Heidegger discu sses in the first section and upon which he builds the latter sections o f the book. Even though it seem s so "n a tu ra l," the "th in g is a historical product (37, 28). Things would not need to be as they are, over there, m ovable in space, lasting through time, each thing with its traits (u n iversals) held, carried, and borne by an individuating space-tim e posi tion. That orange chair over there" is a historical product. It is som ething made. A furniture m anufacturer made it along certain lines of use and taste that a designer had before he designed the chair (71-72, 55). And the "m e re observer is also a maker, but in a special, narrowed case that occurs in a setting o f cultural making. As its charac ter as a chair is made, so also are its general ch aracteristics as a thing made, along the model o f m ovable units in space and time, a model that the p hysicists first made, i.e., postulated axiom atically. We might w ish sim ply to reject this model of the thing because it is a "m ech an istic, lifeless, rigid model. There is a current tendency among som e groups to denigrate scientific conceptual methods without actu ally grasping their nature, and to reject pseudo-explanatory models altogether. In line with this tendency we might w ish to reject the thing-model in favor of a sim ple appeal to the ordinary, or in favor of a reaffirmation o f life and human creativity. But if w e do only that we w ill fail to move beyond the thing-model, because without examining it fully, we w ill not notice how it pervades the w ay we think,
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meet, and deal with alm ost any thing. Thus, w e might re ject the m echanistic, thinglike ways o f thought where we do see them clearly, and yet w e w ill operate w ith them and w ith nothing else in all w e see and do. As Heidegger argues, only by studying the model in depth, only by ap preciating the questions it answered (putting w hat it decided into question an ew ) can w e really get beyond it. Heidegger gives som e examples (51-52, 39): We tend to approach poems as things and thereby make the study o f poetry "d reary. We fail to understand plants and ani m als because we tend to approach them as "th in g s, i.e., as m ovable bodies in space, as the orange chair over there. We have becom e so accustom ed to this "th in g that we approach anything as a separable "th in g over there. A plant is considered as a "livin g thing, as b asically a thing or body w ith m ysterious added-on traits o f life. W orks o f art are considered "th in g s w ith aesthetic traits som ehow added on. Sim ilarly, w e often view personality, and even ourselves, as a "p erso n ality structure, or a " s e lf " (a s if it were a thing, in side), or as having "p er sonality co n ten ts or "p erso n ality tra its as if a person were a structure w ith parts, a container w ith things in side, or a su bject bearing traits. A thing has a separate location in space, and hence we impute a separate location to anything we approach as a thing. This model of the thing leads to a great many separations: w e separate su b jects and objects, inside and outside, feelings and situ ations, individuals and inter personal relationships, individual and com m unity, the time moment now and tim e a moment later, sym bol and knower, body and mind, etc. These m any d ivisions are not separate issues, since each involves the sam e type o f con ceptual constru ct of things, each as separately located, a unit "th in g existing here now in a certain unit of space and at a "m o m en t," i.e., a unit bit o f time. Time, too, is conceived as made up o f bit things, units, m om ents. W hy? 1 1 is not because w e som ehow perceive and study tim e and
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find it to be such. One does not perceive time as such. We conceive time as m om ents because our approach is one of thing units. Section B -I Here, Heidegger traces the thing-models history. We w ill likely take for granted that "sp a ce is everywhere the sam e until we realize that the notion o f such a space w as lacking among the Greeks. Instead, they thought that each thing had its own proper place, and that the move ment of a thing w a s alw ays back to its proper place. Un less externally restrained, an earthen thing tended down w ard and a fiery one "u p w ard . Each thing thus tended to move in a certain w ay o f its own accord, and this w as termed each thing's "in tern al principle o f m otion. Greek things were not mere bodies that had to be moved. If allowed to do so, they moved them selves back to their own places (83-84, 64-65). Thus, there were different kinds of places in the Greek model. We realize that outown everywhere-uniform space, too, is very much a model, perhaps better than the Greek, perhaps not, but at any rate not self-evident. In the Newtonian model, ju st as in the Greek, the nature o f space is related to what thing and motion are. For us there is no "in tern al principle o f m otion by which a body m oves itself. Rather, bodies are moved, put into motion only by som ething else, and they remain in motion until stopped by som ething else. All our "p rin cip les of m otion are "ou tsid e p rincip les": som ething else out side the body is alw ays posited to explain w hy a body com es into motion. Our law s o f motion are the sam e for all places, and, hence, there is "sp a ce , everywhere ju st the same. Of course the earthen things, when allowed to, can still be observed to move "d o w n w ard ju st as they did in ancient Greece. But how we grasp what things are differs. We posit gravitational attraction outside the thing to explain why it m oves.
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When the different m otions of different things are ex plained by different outside causes, all "b o d ie s (th in g s) are viewed as fundam entally the sam e in their basic nature. Of course they do not all look or act the same, but then w e think of them as made up o f little "th in g s (a few types, each alw ays the sam e: atom s, electrons, protons), and we explain all differences as different ar rangements of these sam e things. What, where, and when anything is or moves w ill alw ays be derivable according to the sam e b asic principles. The world is conceived as made o f arrangem ents of uniform units o f m atter and space (92-93, 71-72). If two constellation s are made of the sam e parts and in the same patterns, exactly the sam e events w ill occur. And if time and space do not make tw o otherw ise identical constellation s different (a s for Leibniz they do n ot), such tw o things would really be only one thing. Heidegger term s this aspect of the scientific approach its basic "m a th em a tical character. He calls modern science m athem atical, not because it so widely em ploys m athem atics but because this basic plan of uniform units m akes it p ossible to quantify everything one studies. It m akes everything am enable to m athem atics. Heidegger discusses tw o related reasons for calling the basic scientific approach "m ath em atical, i.e., tw o reasons lor m athem atics becom ing such an important tool in this approach: First, because it is a model of uniform units and hence m akes uniform measurement possible every where, and, second, because it is "a x io m a tic that is it is posited (a s an axiom in geom etry). Furthermore, Heidegger argues that the model copies our own thought procedures. Its uniform units are uniform thought steps transformed into a ground plan postulated as the basic structure o f things. Here these tw o lines o f argument w ill be discussed in turn: 1) The approach to things as consisting of uniform units m akes m athem atics applicable to things: numbers are com positions of uniform units. Seventeen co n sists ol
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the sam e units as fourteen, only there are three more of them. Since the units are the sam e, it would not m atter which three of the seventeen units were considered to be three more than fourteen. T h e iv js a serial procedure employed in counting. In this procedure w e obtain various numbers because we alw ays keep in mind the units al ready counted. Our counting "sy n th e size s" (pu ts to gether) fourteen and another, another, and another. We keep what we have with us as w e add another sam e unit. Our own continuity as w e count gets us to the higher number. As Kant phrased it, without the unity o f the I think, there would be only the one unit counted now, and no com position of num bers. We get from fourteen to seventeen by taking fourteen with us as we go on to add another, another, and another. Thus, our activity of thinking provides both the series of uniform steps and the uniting o f them into quantities. These units and numbers are our own notches, our own "an oth er, our own unity, and our own steps. Why do tw o plus tw o equal four? The steps are alw ays the sam e; hence, the second tw o involves steps o f the sam e sort as the first tw o, and both are the sam e uniform steps as counting to four. Thus, the basic m athem atical com posing gives science its uniform unitlike "th in g s and derivable com positions (70-71, 54). Therefore, everything so viewed becom es am enable to m athem atics (93-94, 72). 2) But Heidegger term s the modern model o f things "m ath em atical (97, 74) for a second reason. He argues that "m ath em atical means "a x io m a tic : the basic nature of things has been posited as identical to the steps of our own proceeding, our own pure reasoning. The law s of things are the logical n ecessity o f reasons own steps (102, 75) posited as law s o f nature. It is this that m akes the model "m ath em atical and explains w hy m athem atics acquired such an im portant role. The everywhere-equal units of the space of uniform motion o f b asically uni form bodies are really only posited axiom s. They are the uniform step s o f pure, rational thought, put up as axiom s
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of nature. D escartes had said it at its "co ld e st (101, 78) and m ost extreme: Only a method o f reducing everything to the clear and distin ct steps o f rational thinking grasps nature. Is not such an approach sim ply unfounded? Every thing may follow from the starting assum ptions, but what are they based upon? How can that be a valid method? Heidegger says that the axiom atic method lays its own ground (98, 75). He thus gives the term "a x io m a tic a meaning it does not alw ays have: he m akes it reflexive (a s D escartes method w a s ). "A x io m a tic" means not only to postulate axiom s and then deduce from them; it does not refer to ju st any unfounded assum ptions one might posit and deduce from. Rather, Heidegger em phasizes that the axiom s that rational thought posits assert the nature o f rational thought itself. Axiom atic thought p osits itself as the w orld s outline. It is based on itself. It creates the model o f the world, not only by but as its own steps of thought. As w e have seen, it is rational thought that has uniform unit steps and their com posits, logical neces sity and so forth. The axiom atic ground-plan o f nature is sim ply the plan o f the nature o f rational thought a s serted o f nature. This, then, is the b asic "m ath em atical character o f modern science. It is founded on the "a x io m atic" method o f "pure reason, which, as we shall see, Kant retains but lim its. Heidegger now sh ow s the extent to which sciences axiom atic thought-plan had reigned. Even God w a s sub ject to it. Philosophically explicated (D escartes and Leibniz), the law ful character o f nature meant that Gods thinking (the thinking that creates nature) w a s axio m atic, logical thought. The power o f axiom atic thought is thus lim itless. It creates nature. And so it w as held that God him self could not act otherw ise than he does and that he is subservient to logical thought. Nature could not p ossibly be otherw ise than along the lines o f that which fo llo w s logically. Heidegger recalls that medieval philosophy had be
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queathed three different main topics o f philosophy: God (theology), w orld (co sm olo gy), and man (psychology) (111, 86), which are sim ilar to Heideggers three sorts o f "th in g s (6, 5). All three now becam e determined bv m an 's axiom atic thought. There w a s thus a rational theology," a rational psychology, and a "ration al co s m ology. Reason w as lim itless. Using pure reason, man could conclude not only about man, world, and God but about w hat w a s possible and im possible in any p ossible reality. This unlimited power of pure reason leads to K ants task o f setting its lim its. We m ust notice, however, not only the vast extent of this power and the evident need to lim it it but that this power is founded on the role that thought has in generating the b asic scientilic groundplan, unity, and law fu lness o f things! Kant lim its the power o f reason only by showing more exactly how its power is legitim ately founded. He sh ow s how thought legitim ately participates in the form ation of anything w e experience. But first, Heidegger prepares for his discus sion of Kant by reopening the question o f the time: Why is the axiom atic model applicable to nature? Heidegger show s the vast role that cam e to be assigned to rational thought. Then Kant lim its it by showing the roles of thinking in the experience o f things, the generating of space, time, units, the unity of anything, and the law fu l ness o f events. We recall Heideggers earlier discussion of the need for the thing to be an underlying "bearer o f traits. A persons "th is here n ow is alw ays changing. Som ething m ust stand steady: it is the thing, w hich underlies all its visib le and changing traits. This view goes back to A ristotle, for whom the thing w a s analogous to the subject o f the sentence and the traits w ere the predicates. The Greek term for m atter means "w h a t underlies, and its Latin translation is "su b je c t. Thus, already for the Greeks, the thing as the underlying m atter w a s viewed in term s of the subject to which predicates are lied in thought.
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With the rise o f modern science the axiom atic method of purely logical steps of thought has replaced the under lying m atter that holds the traits together and explains how they change. (F or instance, in D escartes' example ( M editations , II), a piece o f w ax is first w h ite and then charred. The scientific explanation requires that the wax really be an underlying analytical fram ework. Both the perceived w hite and charred m ust be reduced to these underlying thought-dim ensions.) Heidegger points to the change in meaning that the word "su b je c t underwent from being "w h a t underlies as the su b ject of the sentence and the m atter o f the thing to its modern meaning as the "p e rso n and "su b je c tiv e thought. The thing that underlies is now our own thought! For Kant, too, the unity o f things and of space and time (in fact, all necessary connective un ity) com es from "I th in k." If there were not a single thinker and perceiver, thoughts and perceptions would be isolated: if you both saw and tasted a lump o f sugar, it would be as though you saw w hite and someone else tasted sw eet. The one ness o f our thinking is "w h a t underlies" (as, for example, when w e count units w e take them along and thereby unite them as we go on counting). Thus, the su bject that "b e a r s " the traits or predicates is the thought unity of the experiencer. But this "I think is not an object; it is only the unity of our process in knowing sensory objects. For Kant, rational logic is no longer valid independent o f sensation. Sensation is no longer sim ply "co n fu se d " thought that must be reduced to analytic clarity derivable from axiom s. Rather, the sensory given and rational thought are two different ingredients o f any experience. K ants Critique o f Pure Reason considers axiom atic thought to be only our human, finite thinking (rather than world-constituting ration ality). This fundam entally alters the whole approach (135, 105-106). As human and finite, our axiom atic thinking is limited to its roles in the make
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up of sensory experience. Alone it does not constitute an object. Thereby, rational m etaphysics com es to be seen as invalid speculation. With Kant (and Heidegger), this valid, lim ited role o f our thinking has alw ays already occurred whenever we experience. It is not som ething w e "g et from or "add to experience. Thus, the m athem atical asp ects o f nature are not som e grid that wo place over what w e experience, but our approach to sensible things. Only w ith som e ap proach does one encounter anything. Kant thought only the Newtonian approach w as really b asic to human ex perience; Heidegger view s this as histo rically variable. But they agree that things are never experienced except as some approach has already played its role. Only then is anything such as "experience rendered possible, for experience is alw ays already organized (fo r example, laid out, sequential, quantifiable, predictable, and under stood as w hatever it is an experience o f). We never ex perience som ething totally unrecognizable, unidentifiable, and out o f context. Even if wr e were to have such an ex perience, w e would identify it by time, place, and w hat led up to it. Thus, the Kantian Critique, and Heidegger too, w ill do nothing to overthrow those asp ects o f the axiom atic method that im ply that experience is made partly by thought. The best example o f this is the scien tific experiment. Heidegger argues that the basic character of modern science is m issed if one says that it differs from earlier science by being experimental. For Heidegger, the fact that modern science is "exp erim en tal is only another result o f its being b asically axiom atic: an experiment is no mere observing. An experiment in the modern sense alw ays first sets up a hypothetical fram ework. We set up the conditions and procedures in advance; only w ithin them is nature allowed to answer, and it can say only yes or no. It m ust respond w ithin our fram ework (67-68, 93; 52, 72). ( Bacon had said that it is not enough to observe
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nature. We m ust "to rtu re nature and see w h at then hap pens under the circum stances w e set up and put into action. And Kant cites Bacons point in his Preface.)Heidegger argues that o b jects in science are made in a w ay sim ilar to the w ay w e m ake tools. (Again, here he provides the broader, ordinary man-world context within which science and all else a rise.) The use o f a tool is known in advance and determines the structure w e give it when we invent and make it (71-72, 55). A context of culture and use is alw ays already im plicit when anything is made. As tools are made, the things of science and the results o f experiments arc also made and involve a prior cultural knowing a pre-existing context o f man and world in w hich the thing is made a s (and can then be taken a s ) that kind of thing. For the Greeks there w as a b asic difference between made things and things of nature (83, 63). Only natural things had their own nature and internal origin o f motion. Som ething artificially made had its being moved only from the outside, by being made. For axiom atic science all things are only as we m athem atically "m a k e them. Later in this an alysis w e w ill discuss Heideggers at tem pts to move beyond the current technological situ a tion, in w hich nature is som ething w e make. Heidegger sees vast dangers in it, just as he criticizes the view of human nature, art, and life as "th in g s. We have seen that the thing is made. W ill man the m aker reduce him self to an axiom atically made "n atu re that can say only yes or no w ithin a fram ework set in advance? Of course this making o f nature w orks only when nature says " y e s to the fram ew ork and apparatus we devise. But nature and reality are "w o rkin g fo rces (93, 72). Nature "w o r k s for us w ithin the term s w e pre-set. 1hus, the experimental character o f modern science is
. . constraining nature to give answer to questions of rea sons own determining (B xii-xiii).
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another aspect of its "a x io m a tic character: our deter mining what things are. As w e w ill see now, Kant ex plained and lim ited this puzzling fact. Section B -II Kant accepts the axiom atic character o f thought (184, 144), as can be seen from his own axiom atic w ay o f pro ceeding. He sets up a "sy ste m and derives experience from the principles he sets up (122, 94-95). Kant also retains the m athem atical approach to ex perience: as w e still often do, Kant view s experience in term s of units. The m athem atical method has been ap plied to break things up into sense-data un its felt pres sure sensations, heard b its o f sounds, seen color bits, etc. as if these were self-subsistin g, separate unit-things (209, 162). But for Kant these are not experience. Ex perience is never had except as it involves much more than such unit sensations. For example: I am hit on the arm by a rock. The sen satio n s are the pressure, the sound thud, and the gray, etc. However, these sensations occur here (on my left arm ), now (w h ile the sun is shining), and at a certain, given, m easurable intensity. For Kant, sensations never occur without being definitely located in space and time, nor do they occur w ithout a certain intensity.3 It is not
;! These w ays in which conceptual aspects participate in experi ence to make up objects are w ays in which objects become in dividually and specifically "determ ined (186, 202; 146, 157). We must alw ays see em pirically ju st where and when something oc curs, and with what intensity, and in which necessary explanatory connections. These specifications determine a specific thing. Any objective thing is necessarily determined along these respects, and as long as we do not know all these we have not determined the thing objectively. Thus, explanatory concepts belong to the determinate charac ter of any thing, as Leibniz held, but so do space and time loca tions, as Newton held. Leibniz argued, against Newtons absolute space, that space is
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possible to have an experience o f pressure such that I would not know where, or would not as yet know when, or not yet sense any degree of intensity. Finally, sensations are never experienced except as connected to other events. I would not consider it "p o ssib le that I am being hit, but not by anything related to anything previous ( if I had only this m om entary appearance of pressure and a floating gray shape). If a rock hit me I would wonder who threw it. Someone "m u st have. Or it "m u st have lallen from somewhere. It "cou ld n ot have popped out of nowhere ju st in front o f m y arm. Experience is only "p o ssib le as a tissue o f already connected events. Of course w e m ay not as yet know who threw it, or
only a system of relations between bodies. Thus, motion is alw ays only relative. Motion is a change of location, but location for Leibniz w as definable only relative to other bodies and not in an absolute space. If this body moves, one can just as well say that all others move in various w ays with respect to it, and it is at rest. Things are real, but space is only their relation. Newton, however, found that a body in motion develops centrif ugal force. Yet nothing like this happens to the objects at rest, although they have motion with respect to the first body. Thus, an objects spatial location (and change in location, which is motion) must somehow be absolute. The space system must be capable of determining which body is in motion, and not merely the spatial relations between them. In this context it is very important for Kant to show how spatial location has a determinative role in making up what the object is. Thus, for Kant, space and time are not concepts but (as Heidegger put it) realm s" in which anything encounters, or, in Kants words, the form of anything sensorily given, i.e., outside us and sequentially. Kant thus showed both the quantitative idealization aspect of time and space, which has a conceptual origin, and the determina tive role that space and time location must play in specifying any possible sensory object, this one rather than another one like it. (And thus, too, Leibnizs principle of indiscernibles comes to an end, precisely because it had been an expression of the lim itless and sole power of axiom atic thought without its function in inter play with givenness.) But, for Kant (B136 and 138), the united and uniform quantita tive character of space is fundamentally organized only by the observers thought connections. In this latter respect Kant antici pates Einstein, for whom also the measurers framework is an inherent part of what space is and how it determines things.
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even if it w as a rock. If it looks very strange we may not yet know what it is. But w e know it cannot be ju st a sensory datum o f grayness and pressure, floating and unconnected to any other observable events. Thus, the explanatory connective relations are alw ays already necessarily involved in any sensory experience, and even if we do not yet know what they are w e flatly in sist that they are there and that w e m ust study until w e find them. It m ay require long and highly specific em pirical study to determine w hat the object is, i.e., w hat necessary rela tions actually obtain between this sensation and other sensations. (S a y w e eventually discover that it is a meteor, a leftover bit from a planetary explosion attracted to Earth bv gravitation.) We do not ju st invent the specific conceptual relations that explain and tie together the ap pearances w e sense. But in advance of determining w hat a given connection is, we already know and in sist that som e necessary ob jective connections do obtain. The gen eral system o f necessary relations is set in advance. W ith out it the pressure and gray shape could be purely floating appearances, but w e consider that "im p o ssib le . The necessary relations are ob jectively there, they are already, in experience. We work until we discover them spe cifically. Thus, in the scientific approach any experience alw ays already involves definiteness in spatio-temporal quanti tative and intensity respects, and necessary conceptual connections between events. The peculiar tw ist here is that it is ju st the conceptual connections (o f thought) that m ake sensations into o b jects rather than mere sub je ctive appearances. This Kantian puzzle is resolved when w e realize that connections are not p ossible without that which they connect. Therefore, these are valid thought-connections only as they are the connections of sensory givens. Kant begins w ith the interplay. "E xp erience is an interplay.
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Only w ithin it are there a thinker and things. There is no human su b ject except as a receiver and thinker o f ex perience. There are no things except as received and thought in experiencing. As Heidegger view s it, German nineteenth-century Idealism , although later than Kant, failed to absorb this insight o f K ant's: that the whole experiential inter play is already involved in anything like a self. Sim ilarly, Positivism failed to absorb K ants insight: that the ex periential interplay is already involved in anything like a separate thing. Therefore, in Heideggers own historical sequence, Kant com es after German Idealism and Posi tivism . (Only as a result o f the much later neo-Kantianism w as Kant understood, says Heidegger (60, 46). It w as one hundred years late (57, 43), as Kant him self pre dicted.) How do conceptual connections function in given sen sation s? An "o b je c t is really sensations. But sensations have a definite size and duration in space and time (Categories, group 1) and intensity (group II), and Kant ca lls such determ inate sensations appearances. (Sen satio n s never actu ally appear any other w a y .) And, when such deter m inate sensations are further determined by explanatory conceptual connections (group III) so that their occur rence fo llo w s from law s, Kant calls such sensations ob jects. (A s unconnected, such appearances could only be su b jective.) We really see only the gray shape, even when w e see it now and here, so large and as a rock, w hich m ust have been thrown. Thus, o b jects are sensations, but the conceptual connectives have alw ays already functioned in any actual experience. Kant ca lls this conceptual tying together of sensations into o b jects "sy n th e sis. But it is only from experience that we learn what specific connections do obtain be tween tw o events (and w hat space-tim e relations and what intensity ob tain ). Only the fram ework of the type
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o f measures and questions is conceptual. It w as in this sam e sense that we said earlier than an experiment poses the hypothetical fram ework in advance of the results, and only w ithin this fram ework does the experiment have precise results. Only w ithin the fram ework does it pro vide objective, em pirical answers. But such science raises the b asic question: In w hat w ay does the given exert control over the specific con ceptual connections? Thought steps such as in logic or counting m ust be such that sensory givens can control them! When and why? Thus, Kant alters the b asic view that until then had been held traditionally, concerning w hat such a thought step, a judgm ent, is. As had been discussed by Descartes and Leibniz, a judgment w a s only a connection between tw o concepts (the su b ject and the predicate in a sen tence). Heideggers example, The board is b la ck (155, 122). A judgm ent w as viewed as a connection between tw o concepts, a merely logical step from one to the other, tying the two. Now Kant show s that there is a type of thought step that connects not only concepts but, in the sam e act, connects the grid ("r e a lm ," Bereich, m anifold) in w'hich any possible sensations w ill occur. Heidegger em phasizes that for Kant the view o f judg ments as mere connections between tw o concepts (S u b je ct and Predicate) is insufficient. Kant seeks the sort o f connection between tw o concepts that sim ultaneously organizes whatever sensory givens can occur. Kant calls such a connection syn th etic." The question of judgm ent is now not On what basis are a su bject and a predicate tied together ( S - P )? Rath er, the question is How does an S -P tie go to make up (syn th esize) an experience o f an object (S P -O )? It is not a thought coupled to another thought, but a thoughtcouple coupling all p ossible sensations, thereby making an object (157, 123). But there are four w ays in w hich synthetic thought
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connections w ork in an experience o f objects. These arc the four principles, the Kantian dem onstrations, which Heidegger d iscusses in the last part o f the book: I. For Kant, "tw o plus tw o equals four is a "sy n thetic judgment. By explaining his view on this, w e can best shed light on the first role conceptual connections play in m aking up experience ("T he Axiom s of Intuition, 194, 151). Judgments are "a n a ly tic when the su bject already means the predicate. ("B ach elo rs are unmarried. ) What D escartes said applies to such judgm ents: One need only avoid contradiction. Thus, the principle of non-contradiction is the "to p principle of all analytic judgm ents. But, in opposition to D escartes, Kant holds that the principle of non-contradiction is not enough (173, 181-182; 135, 142). M athem atics first involves a synthesis that is nec essary for all experience. Synthetic judgm ents involve a further step o f thought not given by non contradiction alone. But the "to p prin ciple o f synthetic judgm ents involves not merely the two concepts o f this step of thought but also imagination and the unity of the thinker. "T w o plus tw o, considered as mere concept, seem s to give enough inform ation to give us four, and thus seem s analytic. But w e are con cerned w ith how the concepts are formed in the first place, and wo are concerned w ith how, in being formed, they also synthesize the realm for all o b jects. In forming the concept o f "tw 'o and o f "fo u r w e must add, count, and keep or unify the steps to form the number. (S im i larly, if w'e imagine drawing a line, \vc keep w hat w e have imagined drawing as w e draw further, or we would get no line, only m om entary b its.) The unity o f one a ctivity of thought provides the connective union. Kant ca lls the judgment "sy n th e tic " because in the connection o f the steps of counting w e generate the continuous quantifiable grid for all p ossible ob jects. Wc generate the quantifiable space (a s w e draw lin es) and the sequence of time (a s we
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cou n t). Space and time are b a sically those of imagined drawing and counting units. Hence, the connections be tween our steps o f thought "sy n th esize the imagined "sch e m a ta of space and time. Thus, conceptual connections are involved in the gen eration o f the continuous imagined grid o f units o f space and tim e, and anything ever sensed or imagined m ust appear w ithin them. Because o f this synthesis or com position o f units, w e can also define the purely an alytic relationships of the concepts. But, for Kant, the synthesis (th e m aking) of concepts alw ays precedes their analytic relationships. Concept form ation precedes the an alysis of already formed concepts. The origin o f the connections in a con cept m ust first be shown. And concept form ation m ust be so accounted for that w e can see how the experience of object is thereby patterned. In this instance w e have seen the form ation o f numbers and the thought steps o f counting in such a w ay that the uniform unit com posi tion of experience in space and time w a s also shown. Heidegger, too, show s how time, space, and unit things are generated in the interplay between man and thing. We are our concerns, fears, and hopes, and, because w e are a projection into the future, we generate time. (Hence w e m ust not think o f ourselves as "th in g s" present in tim e.) For Heidegger, w e generate space in the context of pointing to and distancing o b jects as over there, plotting out a system o f orientations in a social interaction w ith others amid things (2 5 , 19). But the uniform , quantitative grid o f size and duration is only one o f the w ays that con nections between conceptual steps also connect experi ence. Let us turn to a second. II. Quantitative m easurement is applicable, not only to space and time locations and durations o f sensations, but also to their intensity. K ants "an ticip atio n s of per ception (2 0 6 , 160) concern this second and different way.
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Space and time alone, only imagined, m ake geom etry and arithm etic applicable to anything. Why is degree o f in tensity a different sort o f thought connection? Because som ething actually sensed m ust appear. But even before it appears we know it must have a m easurable in tensity. To color shades, light, intensity, degree o f pressure, etc., the (co n cep tu al) continuum o f degrees and m athem atical measurement is again applicable. This is the second w ay in which connections between concepts also thereby syn thesize a connective continuum for sensory experience. III. The first two have been K ants "m ath em atical principles. In these the thought steps and connections are inherent in the sensory appearance itself. In contrast, the third concerns connections between different occur ences of givens (224, 174). Kant ca lls the third and fourth dynam ical. From som ething now given we can often infer that som ething else must soon happen. Let us say we know that the inferred alw ays had happened when ever this sort o f thing first happened. But our sequential memory alone cannot ensure that it m ust happen in the sam e sequence again. If we do not know why this alw ays happens when that does, w e m ay well be wrong or we may have neglected to account for som e intervening change. At any rate, we did not yet have the ob jective connection. Only if we know w hy this m akes that happen can w e say that it "m u st" happen again. Thus, explana tory conceptual connections (ju st as D escartes said ) pro vide the ob jective scientific connections o f any p ossible appearances. But, even so, w e might be wrong. We are sure only that the general structure of experience is along these lines. There is som e explanation connecting events. The spe cific explanations are con stan tly discovered, improved, and extended. They m ust be found from experience. When we find that w e were wrong, we find that what we thought w as an "o b je ctiv e explanation really w as not.
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Thus, w e experience o b je cts only in term s of necessary connections between events, i.e., the explanatory relations we seek. IV. Finally (236, 183), since experience is p ossible only w ith us, not for o b jects apart from us, what can ra tional thought conclude in advance as to w hat is p ossible or im possible? For Kant, God, nature, and man are no longer su bject to the logical law s o f rational thought. Logical p o ssib ility is not experiential p ossibility. Only that is possible in experience which conform s to the above three groups o f principles (I, II. III). Except as thought connections also synthesize actual sensory ex perience, thought alone is not decisive about w hat is p ossible or im possible. In these four principles, Heidegger sh ow s that Kant dem onstrates the role of each conceptual principle in experience by a syllo g istic sequence. The first (m a jo r) prem ise tells som ething that is the case in all experience. The second (m in o r) premise states that this aspect o f ex perience is p ossible only as a certain conceptual connec tion has already participated. The principle Kant is prov ing then fo llo w s by logical necessity. But despite this elegant method of proof, the proofs are all circu lar : the principle that is concluded (proven) is really m erely shown to have been already involved in the first premise. In short, the dem onstration show s how the principles are already involved in experience. This "c ir c le " (224, 241; 174, 187) is of great im portance to Heidegger and lies in the very nature o f ontology (the study of how what is is con stitu ted ). W hatever is is al w ays already patterned in interplay w ith us before we ever make explicit what and how it is. Our "understand ing prestructures everything in those respects we have outlined. We have alw ays already been involved in any thing we have experienced. Our approach has functioned already. To m ake it explicit is what Kant calls the "tra n s cendental task. We can show only circu larly how w e are
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alw ays already involved. The human su b je ct's process is alw ays already involved im plicitly and thought along w ith the thing when the thing is approached as a separate entity out there. Thus, the roles o f thought in synthesizing what things are "leap ahead o f" things in Heideggers w ay o f putting what Kant called "tran scend ental. Philosophy m akes explicit how we have already approached and par ticipated in the making o f the thing (a s well as, in the sam e process, in the making of ourselves as selves or sub je cts). But such explicating can alter (h ow w e app roach) things. Therein, Heidegger sees the power of philosophy.
3. HEIDEGGER AND KANT One reason, among others, that it w a s n ecessary to go so exactly into K ants approach is that Heideggers philos ophy fo llo w s K ant's in so many b asic w ays w ith this difference: Heidegger begins w ith man in the context of the ordinary world rather than in the context o f science. This difference gives a very different ring to everything Heidegger says. We w ill take up here how K ants "tra n scendental roles that thought plays (in what ob jects are) becom e Heideggers "tran scend ence the w ay hu man beings feeling, explication, language, and action "sk e tc h out the world, set up situ ations, and thereby partly create what the things are. Heidegger, like Kant, view s tim es order as generated by us in our interplay w ith things. For Heidegger, how ever, this is not the linear time generated by m athem at ical thought but a tim e generated by the broader human process o f "being-in-the-world, feeling, speaking, and acting in situ ations. Hence, it is a time in which the im port of the past is being modified by how one is now con cerned about what one is about to do. Ju st as for Kant the human su bject (the I think that provides the synthesizing and steps o f thought) is not
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itse lf an object, so for Heidegger the human being is not a thing, but rather the process of approaching things. A human person is a being-in and a being-toward, alw ays a caring for, w orrying about, trying to avoid, striving for, being afraid of, hoping for, etc. Man is this projecting. (Heidegger ca lls it the care structure.) I am my being-in the situ ation s (the sentence I am trying to w rite, the point 1 am getting at, the book I am finishing, the situ a tion J am trying to create, the p itfalls I am trying to avoid, e tc .). Heidegger in sists, as did Kant, that in any experience or situation the crucial w ays w e participate in creating things and situ atio n s have already functioned. Heidegger points out that apart from our own striving or fearing there cannot be a situation in the first place. A situation is not like given things in the room, but like my trying to find something, or get out, or in, or w hatever I am trying to do there, perhaps w hat I w ish I could and cannot. But there is no fact that I cannot do it until I first p roject it by wanting to do it, and this im plies my purposes, fears, or concern. Kant had shown that even for the things in the room to be given, thought has already functioned in constituting and objectively connecting sensations into objects. Thus, the role Kant assigned to scientific thought Heidegger assign s to the w ider human feeling, living, and thinking. For Heidegger, as for Kant, our transcending has al w ays functioned in advance o f ( it "lea p s ahead" and helps create) the facts we experience. But what for Kant w as called "exp erience" (the connected system of experienced nature as rendered by scien ce) becom es, for Heidegger, our alw ays finding ourselves "th ro w n into situ ations. Just as o b jects involve our being affected by sensations, so for Heidegger a situation is my situation because it can affect me (in term s of affect, feeling, B efindlichkeit). Like Kant, Heidegger asserts the partial independence of both the human role and the things role. We can define neither
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except as the interplay has already functioned, but what can be done with the things is not at all arbitrary, not ju st anything w e like. Kant derived the transcendental principles from pure concep ts o f the "un derstan din g" (V erstan d) (144, 112). For Heidegger, how human feeling sets up situ ation s is called "understanding (V erstehen) and is pre-conceptual. A context o f meaning is projected by the w ay w e are feelingly in our situ ations. (S itu atio n s are made by our concerns in terms o f which they are situ ation s for us.) With w ords w e can then explicate this "understanding of our situ ations, w hich w as already im plicit in our felt being-in situ ations. It is an error to consider feeling as som ething within us that could exist without constituting a situation, and to consider situ ation s as external, apart from how w e feel our thrownness and vulnerability. That view considers feelings along the thing-model as if they were little things located inside us. My fear is my vulnerability to being affected in the situation, and it con stitu tes the threat. The threat that could m aterialize or that I could avoid is my situation. What I feel is not my feeling but my situation. The situ ation is not p hysically defined facts but the sig nificance and facts created by how I am and could be in them. Therefore, Heidegger says that man is his p ossib il ities. As lor Kant, so for Heidegger: we do not "un d erstan d relationships that are given in the facts except as w e have already created those facts by how we have already func tioned. And Heidegger is perfectly deliberate in so using the word "understanding along K an ts lines, as creating ("sy n th e tic ) things and situ ations before w e can ex plicate (K ant called it "a n a ly ze ). Here, too, and in the sam e sense, the synthesis of meanings precedes their analysis. But, as w e have seen, "ex p licatio n (Auslegung) for Heidegger is not merely conceptual and analytic, but is it
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self a further creative process. Thus, w hile the primary human "un derstan din g" is a feeling process, the further human processes o f explicating in language and thought are also co n stitu tive of w hat man is. This means that w hat we are as humans and how we con stitu te situations and things is alw ays partly and irreducibly linguistic. We have seen that Heidegger traces the m etaphysical model of the thing as the "b earer o f tra its back to modes of speech (the su bject "bearin g p redicates). Our approach to w'hat is (the thing) w a s modeled on the nature o f the proposition that, in turn, stem s from the context o f peo ples ordinary speaking to each other about facets o f their situation (37, 64, 152-153; 27, 49, 119). Explication and speech, as well as felt understanding, project p ossib ilities and render things along certain lines. They are processes that transcend, sketch, and thus partly create w hat things are. Thus philosophys power. Language and thought add their own structures and do not merely draw out the sig nificances of feeling. They are o f a different order. Expli cation must be based on w hat w as already understood in feeling, but "b ase d on does not mean "e q u a l." Rather, it m eans "herm eneutic, a process of further drawing out and further creating, w hich, when authentic, expresses my directly felt "th ro w n n ess and creatively explicates w hat I am, i.e., my felt being-in my situations. In keeping the role Kant gives to "understanding," but expanding it to be prim arily feeling and only then ex p licative thought, Heidegger follow s Schleierm acher and Di 1 1hey. Dilthcy had outlined a method o f Verstehen in which one interpreted human products, in stitution s, and literary w orks as expressions o f a felt experiential process that made its own sense. For Dilthev, mere logic uses only certain very thin derivatives from the felt continuity of human experiencing. Of course for Kant too (and D escartes and oth ers), logical relationships and logical necessity were derived from the continuity (Kant called it "u n ity ) of human processes as, for example, the unity and continuity of
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the "I think in counting units and keeping them so as to com pose numbers. But to Dilthey this meant that logical relations were extrem ely thin derivatives from the broad lived and felt process o f experiencing and its continuity. This continuity w a s the adaptive and his torically elaborated process of the living human organism and w a s first o f all felt. It made its own experiential sense and had its own experiential meanings in its organism ic, structural, and functional context. Thus, to attem pt to explain som ething experiential by som e logical construction w as, for Dilthey, like explaining man by one of his own thinnest derivatives. Instead, Dilthey proposed view ing any human product as pat terned by an experiential process w ith experiential signifi cances. Thus, the felt "understanding o f the inquirer would parallel (and explicatively elaborate verb ally) the "understanding im plicit in the felt experiential process itself. Dilthey, too, w as deliberate about the Kantian use of "understanding," and saw h im self as providing a "critiq u e of h istorical reason to augment K ant's Critique o f purely conceptual reason. And, for Heidegger, history is alw ays im plicit in any m ans w ays o f feelingly being-in and setting up his situ a tions. The individual is a creative "rep etitio n of his torical meanings in an alw ays already historical con text. I can attem pt to live from out of my own authen tically felt meanings, but I can do this only by explicating and elaborating the histo rically given meanings I actually already feel and live. Just as w e said o f philosophy in Heideggers view , so also he view s the individual as open ing up new avenues, but only as he begins by feeling and explicating that which he already is. Nothing else is au thentic. Nothing else can be creatively elaborated. To avoid w hat one authentically is leaves one totally alien ated and at the m ercy o f routines and patterns given by others. Of course in such avoidance, when one is "fa lle n into everydayness, one still has ones desire to m aintain
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this avoiding, but one usually avoids explicating that as w ell. Explicating it would be ones m ost authentic move and would lead through everydayness beyond it. Therefore, in Sein und Zeit Heidegger begins precisely w ith "everyd ayn ess and explicates its felt under standing. One cannot authentically and creatively elaborate everything, nor would one w an t to. I m ust choose what shall be im portant to me. In som e very few chosen re spects I can attem pt to w ork genuinely, creatively. In m ost respects each day I w ill remain more or less in everydayness. Either w ay I stand on and in a historically produced context and h istorical meanings. Not only the other people o f past history but the other people o f now are already an inherent part o f w hat a person is. One is alw ays a being-with and a being-toward others, and human situ ation s are not p ossible without this. Even being painfully lonely or needing to be alone is p ossible for human beings only because being-with is an inherent aspect o f w hat they are. Chairs and tables neither feel lonely nor need to be alone. Thus, Heidegger overcom es H usserl's problem o f the existence of others by finding ones living w ith and toward others as already part o f w hat it is to be a person. Again, here he fo llo w s Kant, who overcam e the so lip sistic prob lem s left by Berkeley (fo r example, "R efu tation of Ideal ism , B274), by not allow ing the existence of su b jects except as they are already a perceiving and thinking of o bjects. Heidegger, by widening "understanding to the feeling and acting in situ ations, includes the others as they are for and to us in situ ations, that is to say, as hu m ans w hose concerns and cares are part o f our situations. Thus, neither they nor I, as selves, are su bjective things inside, but alw ays already a feeling and living-in situ a tions, and situ ation s are partly created by our under standings. Just as K ants "I think is not an object but partly con stitu tes o bjects, so, for Heidegger, people are not o b jects but situation-constitutors. My being toward
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others is alw ays already involved in any situation as I find m yself thrown in one.' Thus, both history and my being toward present other people are already involved in the felt understanding that has functioned to make me what I am, as I am a being-in the situ ation s that are authentically situ ation s for me. 4. THE LATER HEIDEGGER AND FUTURE PHILOSOPHY Heideggers em phasis in later years has been consistent with his earlier work, but in an im portant sense he has added som ething. He has made very clear exactly in what new sense one ought to interpret his earlier w ork. There
1The way in which being-toward others is inherent in what a person is cannot be split from the persons living among things (as though these were our relations to other people and those were our relations to things). Rather, anything that encounters us is already the sort of thing it is (a door or a gun) by virtue of its having been made along lines of use and purpose by people, both historically in devising such a thing and currently as the makers of this thing. We have already seen what Heidegger does to the "understanding, to which Kant gave the roleof partly constituting objects. Heidegger widens it to include human feeling and living. Hence, for Heidegger, a thing is no longer limited to its being a body in physics and chem istry, but also includes what it is as a use-object partly constituted by human situations. But in having that sort of being, every thing through and through involves the other people who made it and who are implied in it. Even the things of physics are humanly made and imply physicists and history, although such things involve narrowing the usual experi ence to a "m ere observing. We do not usually receive the pure sense of mere hearing. We do not usually hear "a sound; we hear a door slamming downstairs. As Heidegger says (209, 162), ordi narily experienced things must first be "broken up" into separate bits of sense data," and only by this careful and deliberate pro cess can we then have sense data. A science that employs care fully narrowed perception and deliberate mere looking (as he says in Sein und Zeit) can have a perfectly legitimate place in Heideggers view. But, it requires a very complicated and artful locus" (209, 163). It must be recognized as a narrowed focus within the wider human world and the wider human experiencing, which involves other people, history, and human making.
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are tw o w ays in w hich one could interpret all this insistance that things alw ays already involve our making, de fining, projecting, transcending, approaching. One might conclude that being is what we make it, w hat w orks for us, w hat we define and devise. But Heidegger denies pre cisely this view o f being. A different interpretation is really intended in all his work: Heidegger has all along reminded us that w hat things are is made by our ap proach, but being is not the made things. Being is the pos sib le interaction, a third which is first. It is not the things we made. Being is the whole context in w hich such making and defining can make, define, reveal, and bring forth. Being is predefined; it is the whole, infinite, as yet undis closed richness o f all p o ssibilities, o f all possible de fining and making. In this w ay arises Heidegger's great interest in the preSo cratic philosophers, since they w ere concerned w ith predefined being, "th a t in which all defined things come to be and perish again. It seem s to Heidegger that this w as lost with Socrates. From Plato through Nietzsche, Heidegger sees one con tinuous development (w ith m any decisive steps, som e o f which he traces in this b o o k ). From Plato on, being is taken as that w hich is clear, already defined, and co n sti tuted. Being is w hat is formed and what w orks. Modern technology is the ultim ate development of this approach. Heidegger term s the structure posited by technology a "G e ste ll, which in German com bines the meanings of "p o sitin g " and "stru ctu re, and also has the connotation o f an apparatus or a contraption. As w e look about us in the city today, w e find ourselves surrounded by man-made things, by technologically determined routines and view s. There has been a silencing o f nature, including our own nature. Heidegger sees vast danger in this w ay o f construing being as som ething formed and made. That view is idola try. It forgets our role in making anything formed. It m isses being and m ay enslave us to w hat we have made.
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Not only might man blow up the w orld w ith technology, technology has already gone far toward making man its appendage, m aking man into a thing whose nature can say only yes or no w ithin the structuring of technological projecting. The danger is man (and being) as made! Both "u n d isclo sed " being and man must be grasped in their roles in the making of anything. "B ein g needs m an, says Heidegger in Die Technik und die Kelire. To "re scu e ourselves from the danger of technology we must look precisely there "w h ere the danger is. Tech nology sh ow s us not just a few contraptions but a much larger fa ct the interplay. Man is in danger o f becom ing som ething made o f man and being. Instead, he must take him self as maker. So viewed, being is not what is made, but that va stly w ider sense o f being as the not yet made, in w hich we bring forth anything that is made. Mans approach at a given historical time is a certain w ay, and hence things are a certain w ay. At another time the m odels are different, and so are things. Evidently, then, being can be defined neither by this nor by that model or approach. Rather, being is this whole condition in which different human approaches can differently de termine w hat things are. This is also w hat Heidegger means by overcom ing met a p h y sics.' We m ust think beyond any one model, for any
'*Kant had overcome the speculativo metaphysics of his time. He showed that reason is valid only in its transcendental role of partly making experience. Kant w as then able to show that apart from this experiential power the purely rational speculative schemes could be argued for or against equally well (K ant's antinom ies). Kant posited "things in themselves as a limiting notion. We cannot know anything about things in themselves, for anything known is related to us, given to us, partly made bv our reception. The notion of things in themselves allowed Kant to treat the things of experience not as things in themselves but as partlyinvolving us. Heidegger puts being in relation to man, but. like Kants things in themselves, being has no made form. It is that "in which is formed anything we participate in forming. But Heidegger envisions the next development in man as going beyond this merely made and as approaching this being in another way.
2 90
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IS T H I N G ?
model is still only that sam e approach that began w ith Plato and cam e to its height w ith N ietzsche and tech nology. A new approach to being is coming, says Heideg ger. What is this new approach to being? He cannot tell us. It w ill be the w ork of an entire culture, not the w o rk of one man (50, 38). No philosopher can jum p over his own shadow (150 151, 118). Heidegger m eans that no philosopher can jum p over the historical context in which he w o rks and which he alters. No one can get out o f the lim its of his own h istorical time to deal w ith the further changes that his own philosophical decisions have made necessary. (Only Hegel did it, but by "ju m p in g into the sun, i.e., beyond history altogether, to the idea o f an absolute end of all history. But that is purely theoretical. We are alw ays still w ithin history.) And so Heidegger cannot jum p over his own shadow. Each o f his recent w ritin gs ends with his standing at the edge of an a b yss, pointing into the fog o f a coming new approach to what is. Can we move beyond Heideggers shadow ? On the one hand, we are not to fall back into models, m etaphysics, this or that assum ption system , w hich ren ders what is as m erely these or those created things. On the other hand, an "ap p roach to being, as far as Heideg ger has gone, a lw a y s is a model, a fram ework, a sketching out o f "th in g s, be they sim ilar to our things or different. Thus, the new approach he envisions poses a dilemma: It cannot be a new "ap p roach ; it must be a different sort of thing altogether and, in fact, precisely not ju st a "th in g . In the first half o f our century (and due partly to Hei degger and o th ers) there has already occurred a funda mental split between m odels and concrete living. There is no longer a "th in g , w ith a single inherent form seem ingly o f its own, nor does man view h im self as having one given inherent human nature. That is exactly w hy w e
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speak of "m o d e ls" or "ap p roach es ; those words indicate variety and relativity. The rigid bodies Newton located in absolute space have given w ay to E instein s relativity to the m easurer in physics. The cu b ists gave us things not from one but from many sim ultaneous perspectives. Pure form without representing anything permitted vast, wonderful, formal virtu osities, for example, in art and in logic and m athem atics. Amazing achievem ents becam e possible w ith the variety that form s could have when Ireed from life. Non-Euclidian geom etries, modern design, architecture in reinforced concrete, proliferations of specialized social roles all these attest to the new power achieved w ith form s freed from w hat had been thought to be the con strain ts o f their "n a tu ra l contents. But w hereas in the past man had lived and felt him self in his roles and definitions, now the relativity and contradictions ol so m any different form s do not permit that sort o f inherent identification w ith a role or form. We are no longer any o f the m any roles, values, or form s of expression. Form sp lit from living leaves living in choate. Thus, living hum anness has more and m ore ex pressed itse lf bv inchoate protest against reason, against em pty roles and forms. This protest has som etim es been beautiful and som etim es not. How shall form (m odel, construct, "ap p roach ) and man come back together in a new w a y ? It m ust be a new way, since there can no longer be a genuine restora tion o f som e one model, form, m etaphysics, value system , social role, or artistic style. "N e w w a y " does not mean the old im position of som e one model, but a method of using many m odels, a method of using this human model ing power rather than staying within som e one model for a century or two. As I see it, the process o f forming must itself be the new type o f "ap p roach . What has happened occasion ally and som e centuries apart must now becom e routine for us. It is not this or that model, but the process o f model-creating itself.
292
WHAT
IS A T H I N G ?
In modern life, to get through even one day an indi vidual cannot depend solely on the models and interpre tive patterns he is given by his culture. These contradict, they are too many, and often they do not solve the situ a tion in which he finds him self. To deal w ith what he is up against they are too few. He m ust reinterpret, newly in terpret, invent meaning, create myth, and generate new futures and new significances in order to mold the already given troubling meanings of his situation. Recently, Kuhns an alysis1 ' (highly consistent w ith Hei deggers analyses in this boo k) has clarified the basic difference between merely carrying out the im plications of a given scien tific model and creating a new one. Kuhn term s the creation o f a new model a scientific revolu tion ." I have termed it the creation o f meaning.7 The process (or doing) that creates and schem atizes cannot itse lf be explained by some supposedly underly ing or axiom atic model or scheme. In retrospect one finds that ones doing has set up a situation that is im plicitly meaningful in w ays that can be explicated. Such explica tion m ay look like a logical account o f w hat occurred, but it is an error to view it as the cause o f the process. The ex plication is a product o f the process. It is a model or scheme created by the process, and w e must see that the process as concrete doing is prior. But is not such an approach to being as the process o f meaning making really an invitation to arb itrari ness? Is it not m erely saying that there arc no criteria, that you can have it any w ay you like? Anything you say or do is a s good as anything else you might say or do; it all depends on your interpretation. E xistentialism often
,! Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chi cago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 7 Eugene Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning (New York: The Free Press, 1962).
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sounds like that.s But this is not at all the case! We know this from how difficult it is to devise courses o f action and interpretations that take account o f all in the situ a tion and leave us feeling whole and unconflicted. That is w hy the situation in physics remained unresolved for so many years, and why Einstein worked for so many years. That is w hy w e so often fail to devise any action or meaning that resolves hang ups. There are alw ays plenty o f easy alternatives for saying and doing som e thing that fails to resolve anything. To really resolve the hang u p s" is a very different and far more difficult m atter than just picking one or an other o f the many available schem es and actions that w ill not resolve anything. In practice w e know the dif ference from the ease o f one and the difficulty of the other, from our frequent failure to devise the latter, and from the unhappily unm istakable consequences of such failures. Thus, the use o f this human power of de fining is anything but arbitrary, anything but a choice from among many available alternatives. It is a highly controlled process o f devising meanings that m ust take account o f more facets than have ever yet been for mulated. E xisten tialism seem ingly places a gap o f arbitrariness between every moment and the next, just because exis tentialism denies the logical, deductive type o f continuity. What sort o f ethics, for example, can come from a view that rejects every statab le criterion o f value or rightness, and view s it as created by, but not determining, human
KIt is a question that besets the method of linguistic analysis also. The rules for the use of a word are not in the dictionary; they are implicit in our knowing how to speak. One explicates these rules, not by leaning on a m odel," but by leaning directly on our knowing how to talk and act in situations. Current philos ophy of both sorts is very much at the juncture at which Heideg ger pictures it. There is a pre-conceptual court of appeal.
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IS A T H I N G ?
action ? Must it not result in high-sounding rationaliza tions for doing absolutely anything one pleases? And, sim ilarly, how can there be a b a sis for discussing being or science if one purports to explicate some not fully formu lated situ ation ? To say that it cannot be deduced or checked against a schem e how is that more than saying that it m ust alw ays remain unfounded? Heidegger helped light and w in the battle against equat ing concrete living w ith a scheme, won the battle against reading some theoretical schem e into things, and showed that living humans are the reason for schem es and not the reverse. Therefore, w e m ust understand the seeming gap as these oppositions to the earlier ration alistic and logistic view. We m ust reopen the question to which Heideggers ap parent gap o f arbitrariness is the answer. That question w as: Is there som e rational or scientific thinglike defined order that determ ines world and man? His answer: No. Having seen the question to which Heideggers "N o is the answer, w ^ e can now separate out a different question that is too often merged w ith the first. Our second ques tion is: Arc there other criteria, other w'ays w e might characterize and recognize an authentic, successful in venting and form ing from those many, easily achieved w ays o f interpreting, inventing, and forming that seem to offer solutions but really leave us in pain, in conllict, sick, or about to em bark on som ething w e w ill later say we knew better than to do? Even if there is no logical or rational scheme o f things except one that is histo rically derived and in the process o f being changed by us might there be a (n on sch em atic) w ay o f recognizing the scientific revolution and telling it apart from mere nonsense or evil? And, as Heidegger states so w ell, further reinterpre tations in life or philosophy are p ossible only on the grounds of the ones w e are already in, the given ones. We
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cannot genuinely throw aw ay our interpretations, values and reactions, problem s and anom olies, no m atter how em ancipated we are in general, no m atter how convinced we are in general that our values are merely relative, that science uses "o n ly m odels. In fact, they are not just relative," they are "rela tiv e to " the situ ations in w hich they inhere, the problem s they helped pose. Unless we carry all this further w e cannot get out of it. Therefore, scientific revolutions and everyday problem s are so dif ficult to solve adequately (and so easy to avoid or deny verbally in obviously futile and merely pained w a y s). But is there nothing then that can be said to differen tiate the authentically experienced, context-inclusive, un conflicted manner of meaning-making from an alienated, inauthentic, m erely irresponsible manner of have it w h at ever w ay you like? In different kinds o f situ ations there are different recognizable m arks, som e private and some observable (even in objective research). What basically sets the authentic manner of meaning-making apart is that it m oves from the defined to the as yet undefined (th e felt, concrete sense o f the whole situ a tio n ), and then from out o f that to another, new or modified, more ade quate form. This movement can apply to anything formed things, w ords, art, w ays o f acting, or social roles.9 The next form is not ju st another model taking the place o f the first; it is a "z a g in a continuing "zig-zag
On this and on the points made above, the reader may wish to examine my other writings: Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Experiential Ex plication and Truth, Journal o f Existentialism , VI, (1966), 22; "A Theory of Personality Change," in Personality Change, ed. by Worchel and Byrne (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962); "F ocu s ing Ability in Psychotherapy, Personality and Creativity," in Re search in Psychotherapy, ed. by J. Shlien (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1967), Vol. I ll; "What are the Grounds of Explication?, The Monist, XLIX (1965), 1; "E x pressive Meanings," in Invitation to Phenomenology, ed. by J. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965).
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process between ones live sense and the realm o f form s. The next definition can change one's felt sense. To de fine a situation alters w hat one is about. Saying som e thing in w ords has an effect on what one w an ts to say it clarifies, intensifies, or sh ifts it. From such an experien tial sh ift one can move to a further step o f forming; one can suspend any given form ulation and turn to the preconceptual, which alw ays im plicitly includes the whole com plexity o f w hich w e are sensitive, and which develops further in interaction, and is carried forward in a zig-zag that is experientially (though not lo gically) continuous. There are a number of different kinds o f moving rela tionships between form s and concrete experiencing. I give experiencing the "in g form because it is activity. In various distinguishable w ays, experiencing lets us create an endlessly greater variety o f relevant form s than the few rigid ones that culturally given perception and social roles hold steady for us. This experiential zig-zag move ment is the approach that is more than an approach. Eugene T. Gendlin The University of Chicago
Index of N a m e s
Aristotle, 34, 35m., 40, 45, 4950, 78, 80-83, 85, 106, 108, 112, 116, 118, 132, 153, 155, 172
B aliani, G iovanni B a ttista , 78 B aum garten, Alexander, 112
G alileo G alilei, 66, 79-80, 88,
90-91, 116, 165

G oethe, Johann W olfgang von, 58, 113 G ottsched , Johann C hris toph, 113 Hegel, Georg W ilhelm , 28, 28/1., 58, 113, 132, 134, 15051, 191 H eisenberg, W erner, 67 Hume, D avid, 113 K ant, Im m anuel, 5, 34, 55(1. K nutzen, M artin, 113 Leibniz, G o ttfried W ilhelm von, 23-24, 79, 94, 98, 108,
15, 117, 121, 152, 155,213

Bohr, N iels, 20, 67 D escartes, Rene, 17, 94, 98-
106, 112
D em ocritu s, 79-80, 208 E berh ard , Johann A ugustus,
79, 131
E ck h art, M eister, 98 Eddington, S ir Arthur, 13 Eudoxus, 83 Fichte, Johann G ottlieb, 58 F red erick the G reat, 112
112, 121-22, 150, 166, 174, 191, 199, 235

298
Indices
299
Meier, Georg Friedrich, 154 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm 55 Joseph von, 58, 113, 134, 150 Schiller, Johann Christoph Newton, Sir Isaac, 76-78, 80, Friedrich von, 58, 113 82, 85-88, 91, 94, 97, 126, Socrates, 73-74 165, 199 Sudrez, Francisco, 100 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 43, 150 Thaies, 3 Plato, 2, 33, 40, 45-46, 49-50, 75,82,91, 112, 150, 208 WoliT, Christian von, 78, 87, Protagoras, 46 112, 152, 154-55, 172
Index of G er m an
Term s
Abzweckung (p u rp o se ), 149 Aktuellen (a c tu a l), 44 Anblickbar (c a p a b lc o f being

v ie w e d ), 200
Aufklrung (en lig h ten m en t),

124
auf-und hingenommen ( taken

up and in ), 142
Angeschaut ( som ething

looked a t ), 197
Auf-und Vorliegendes (ex

p osing and a present g iven ), 218 auf uns zu (to w a r d u s), 220 augenblicklich ( m om en tary), 218 Ausdruck (e x p re ssio n ), 36 Ausgesagt heit (a sserte d n e s s ), 63 Auskunft (in fo rm a tio n ), 36 Aussage (d e p o sitio n ), 37; ( a s se rtio n ), 62 Aussagen an, von, iiber ( a s sertio n s of, ab ou t, to ), 36 ausweisen (p ro v en ), 180
Angeschaut sein (bein g-intu

ite d ), 200
Anmessung (fittin g ), 35 Ansatz (ap p ro ach ), 28 An-schauen (lo o k in g a t ), 143 anschauen (lo o k in g a t ), 95.;
(in tu itin g ), 198
Anschauung (in tu itio n ), 135,

197-98
an sich (in its e lf), 33 Anwesende (p r e se n t), 63 Anwesenheit (p r e se n ce ), 64,

84
Aufhebung (bein g lifted u p ),

121
300
bedingen (to co n d itio n ), 8
Indices Bedingtsein (being condi tioned), 48 Bedingung (condition), 4748 Begegnen-lassen, das ( the let ting encounter), 242 Begriff (concept), 137 Begrndung (foundation), 14, 55 Beharren (enduring), 229 Beistellung ( putting-alongside), 181 Bekundung (manifestation), 128 Bericht (report), 37, 43 bestndig (constant), 137 Bestand (what constitutes), 229 Bestandstcke (permanent elements), 139, 194 Bestimmungsstcke ( deter mining elements), 157 Bewegtheit (being in mo tion), 86 Bewenden (point), 208 bloss (mere), 147
301
Dastehen (standing there), 194, 229 Ding an sich ( thing-in-itself), 5, 128 Ding fr uns ( thing for us), 5 Dinghaftigkeit ( thingness), 129 Dingheit (thingness), 7, 92 Dingsein (being-a-thing), 19 Dunst (illusion), 214 Ebene (level), 28 Eigenschaften ( properties), 34 ein je dieses (one such this one), 15 ein rumen (to place space),
200
Dafrhalten (taking-for), 92 Dagegensprechen ( speak against, contradict), 107 Da-haben (having-there), 218, 221 Dasein (existence), 41-42, 44, 49-50, 55, 65-66, 89, 96-98, 106, 113, 117, 191, 225-29, 235 Daseinszusammenhang ( ex istential connection), 227 Ding, das (thing), 5, 15, 128
Einzelnheit (singleness), 49 Empfundene (what is sensed), 137 Entgegen (againstness), 158, 204 entgegen-fassendes Vorgrei fen (reaching and grasping beforehand), 220 Entgegenstehen (standingover-against), 158 Entgegenstehenlassen (al lowing to stand against), 219 Entscheidung (decision), 9 Entwurf (project), 88-89, 92 Erfahrung (experience), 140; anschauliche (intuitive di rect experience), 94 Erfahrungsurteil ( experien tial judgment), 139 Erkennbare (the knowable), 137
Index op G e r m an
Term s
Abzweckung (purpose), 149 Aktuellen (actual), 44 Anblickbar (capable of being viewed), 200 Angeschaut ( something looked at), 197 Angeschaut sein (being-intu ited), 200 Anmessung (fitting), 35 Ansatz (approach), 28 An-schauen (looking at), 143 anschauen (looking at), 95/j.; (intuiting), 198 Anschauung (intuition), 135, 197-98 an sich (in itself), 33 Anwesende (present), 63 Anwesenheit (presence), 64, 84 Aufhebung (being lifted up),
121
Aufklrung (enlightenment), 124 auf-tind hingenommen ( taken up and in), 142 Auf-und Vorliegendes (ex posing and a present given), 218 auf uns zu (toward us), 220 augenblicklich ( momentary), 218 Ausdruck (expression), 36 Ausgesagtheit (assertedness), 63 Auskunft (information), 36 Aussage (deposition), 37; (a s sertion), 62 Aussagen an, von, iiber (as sertions of, about, to), 36 ausweisen (proven), 180 bedingen (to condition), 8
300
Indices Bedingtsein (being condi tioned), 48 Bedingung (condition), 4748 Begegnen-lassen, das ( the let ting encounter), 242 Begriff (concept), 137 Begrndung (foundation), 14, 55 Beharren (enduring), 229 Beistellung (putting-alongside), 181 Bekundung (manifestation), 128 Bericht (report), 37, 43 bestndig (constant), 137 Bestand (what constitutes), 229 Bestandstcke (permanent elements), 139, 194 Bestimmungsstcke ( deter mining elements), 157 Bewegtheit (being in mo tion), 86 Bewenden (point), 208 bloss (mere), 147
301
Dastehen (standing there), 194, 229 Ding an sich (thing-in-itself), 5, 128 Ding fr uns ( thing for us), 5 Dinghaftigkeit ( thingness), 129 Dingheit (thingness), 7, 92 Dingsein (being-a-thing), 19 Dunst (illusion), 214 Ebene (level), 28 Eigenschaften ( properties), 34 ein je dieses (one such this one), 15 ein rumen (to place space),
200
Dafrhalten ( taking-for), 92 Dagegensprechen ( speak against, contradict), 107 Da-haben (having-there), 218, 221 Dasein (existence), 41-42, 44, 49-50, 55, 65-66, 89, 96-98, 106, 113, 117, 191, 225-29, 235 Daseinszusammenhang ( ex istential connection), 227 Ding, das (thing), 5, 15, 128
Einzelnheit (singleness), 49 Empfundene (what is sensed), 137 Entgegen (againstness), 158, 204 entgegen-fassendes Vorgrei fen (reaching and grasping beforehand), 220 Entgegenstehen (standingover-against), 158 Entgegenstehenlassen (al lowing to stand against), 219 Entscheidung (decision), 9 Entwurf (project), 88-89, 92 Erfahrung (experience), 140; anschauliche (intuitive di rect experience), 94 Erfahrungsurteil (experien tial judgment), 139 Erkennbare (the knowable), 137
302
WHA T
IS
A T H I N G ?
Erkennen (knowing), 137 Erkenntnisse (cognitions), 134 Erklrung ( interpretation), 155 erluternd (clarifying), 164 erffnet (exposed), 242 Erscheinung (appearance), 128,227 erweiternd (extending), 164 erzhlen (tell), 37 etwas (something), 5-6
Gegenstehen (standing be fore), 188 Gegenstehenlassen ( permit ting a standing-against), 205, 241 Gegen-uns-stehenden (what stands-over-against-us), 202 Geistigen (spiritual), 51 Geinchte (product), 244 Gemeinsamkeit (sharing in common), 136 gerhrt (stirred), 143 Gesammeltheit (collected ness), 203 Fakt is ( facts), 121 Geschehen (happening), 48 Fehlen (privation), 213 Geschichte (history), 45 Fortwhren (continuance), Geschichtlichkeit ( historic 229 ity), 39 Fragestellung ( mode of ques Grenzziehung (laying of tioning), 179 lim its), 120 Frwort (demonstrative pro Grsse (magnitude), 195 noun), 25 Grssenmass ( measure of size), 215 Grosshafte (sizeable), 195 Gebung (giving), 143 Grund (b asis), 83; (prin Gedachte, das (what is ciple), 148 thought), 143 Grundriss (blueprint), 91-92 Gefiige (framework), 36 gegen (against), 137, 139-40, Grundstze (axioms), 124; (real principles), 193 184, 195,205,214 Gegenhaft (againstness), 222-23 Hervorgehens ( emergence), Gegenhafte-Stndige, das 83 (against-like constancy), Hinausgriff ( grasping-out), 219 221 Gegenheit (againstness), 190 Hinaus-zu (out-to), 199 Gegenstand (object), 134, Hin-nehmen (taking-in), 142 137-40, 143, 181, 184, 190, 194, 205, 231, 237 Icliheit (I-ness), 105 Gegenstndlichkeit ( objec Identitten (identities), 174 tivity), 178
Indices im vorhinein (in advance),

221
303
In-der-Zeit-sein ( being-intime), 233 inmitten des Seienden ( in the midst of what is), 50 Insichgesammelt (what is collected in itself), 188 / nsichstehende (what stands in itself), 188 je diese ( just these), 15-18,23 je diese Dinge (these things), 15 je dieses (this one), 15-18, 23-24, 28 Jediesheit ( being-this-one), 14-15 je fr sich (each-for-itself), 15 Jenseitige (ulterior), 25 jeweilig (particular), 30 Jeweiligkeit (particularity), 16 Kategorienlehre ( theory of categories), 64 ledig (unencumbered), 147 Leit jaden (guideline), 64 Lichtung (illumination), 106 Logistic (symbolic logic), 156 Mannigfaltigkeit ( manifold ness), 208 Menge (aggregate), 195; (m ultiplicity), 204 Mit-dazu-vorsteilen ( addi tional representation), 163 mit gesagt (co-asserted), 63
Mitteilung (communication), 36 Mglichkeit (possibility), 21 Natiirding (natural thing), 127 natrliche Welt-ansicht (nat ural world-view), 40 neben (beside), 198 Nebeneinander (proximity), 198 Nicht auseinanderfahrende (what does not fall apart), 188 Objekt (object), 134, 139-40, 237 Offenbare, das (what is man ifest), 141 Offene (open), 242 Ort ( place), 16 physiologisch ( physiologi cal), 126 Prsenz (presence), 188 Prinzip (principle), 124, 193 Prioritt (priority), 165 Raumhafte (the spatial), 196 Raum-Zeit-Bezug ( spacetime-relation), 19 Raum-Zeit-Stelle (spacetime-position), 19 Realitt (reality), 239 Richtigkeit (correctness), 45 Ruck (jo lt), 2 Rckbesinnung ( reflecting back), 207 Riick-wurf (thrown back), 243
304
W H A T
IS A T H I N G ?
Ruhe (quiescence), 44 Sache (fact), 126, 138; (a something), 212 Sachhaft (thinglike), 214 Sachhaltig (belonging to the content of), 239-40 Sachhaltigkeit (character), 233; (content), 240 Sachheit (something), 219; (thinghood), 213, 237 sachlich Vorgngige, das (what objectivily pre cedes), 166 Sammlung (gathering-together), 187 Satz (proposition), 36, 193 Satzaussage (assertion), 38 Satzgegenstand (object of a proposition), 38 Satz vom Grund ( principle of sufficient reason), 108 Schauen (looking), 143 Schein (semblance), 12, 194, 214 schon Anwesende, das (the already present), 63 Seiender (one that is), 142 Sein des Seienden (the being of what is), 175 Seinsbestimmung ( deter mination of being), 63 seinsmssige Herkunft (ori gin considered in terms of its mode of being), 105 Sich-Aussprechen ( to declare oneself), 36 sich-im-Geiste-denken ( to think in the mind), 91
Sich-richten (a directing-to), 35 Sich-selbst-eine-Kenntnis geben (giving-oneself-acognition), 91 Sich-zeigendes (what shows itself), 188, 200 Sinnlichkeit (sensibility), 143 sondern (to sort), 119 Spielraum (domain), 92 Spruch (saying), 171 Stammbegriffe (root con cepts), 187 Stand (standing), 184, 190, 205 Stndigkeit (constancy), 229, 231 Stoff ding (material thing), 51 Stofflichkeit (m ateriality), 213 Strecke (stretch), 56 Tatsachen (fa cts), 59 Trger (bearer), 34, 35n. Tun (doing), 207 bereinstimmung ( corre spondence), 36 berspringen (pass over, skip over), 8, 93, 151 berstieg (passing over), 176 ber-weg (passing beyond), 176 umgnglich alltglich Gege bene, das (the usual every day given), 211 Um-iins-herum ( round-aboutus), 7 Unbedingt (unconditioned), 9,47
Indices unheimlicher (more un canny), 44 unseiend (non-existent), 240 Unterlage (foundation), 34 Vernderung (alteration), 234 verbessern (reform), 10 Verbinden (connecting), 203 Verbindungswort ( connec tive), 38 Vergegenstndlichung (ob jectification), 141 Vernunft (reason), 64 verrcktes (deranged), 2 Verrckung (shifting), 2 Verschweigung (conceal ment), 37 Verwandtschaft (relation), 136 Vorausgriff (anticipation), 92 Voraus-vor-stellung ( presenting-in-advance), 230 vordeutende Erluterung (preliminary elucidation), 61 Vordeutung (interpretation), 128 vor-gebildet ( pre-formcd),
201
305
Vorhanden ( the present-athand), 5, 11,35,52, 105, 199; (existing), 34 Vorhandensei)i ( being-present-at-hand), 225 Vorherige, das (the preced ing), 166, 168 Vorriss (outline), 121 Vor-stellen (pre-senting, rep resenting), 200, 224 vor-stellend (pre-senting), 189 Vorstellung (conception), 32; (representation), 130, 136 Vor-uns-kommen ( comingbefore-us), 195 Vor-urteile (pre-judgments), 180
vor-gefunden (found in ad vance), 137 vor-gehalten ( held-before),

200
Wahrgenommene (what is perceived), 137 wahrhaft (true), 181 Wahrnehmungsurteil ( per ceptual judgment), 139 (w hat), 210, 213 Wasgehalt (what-content), 212, 214 was ist seiender (what more truly is), 210 Was-seiendes ( being-what),
222
Vorgreifen (beforehand),
220
Vor-griff ( reaching-before), 243 Vorgriff (anticipation), 243 Vorhalt (presentation), 218
Wechsel (change), 234 Weg ( path), 55-56 werfen (throw), 89. Wesensbau (essential struc ture), 36 Wesensumgrenzung ( essen tial delineation), 161 wirklich (actual), 191
306
WH A T
IS A T H I N G ?
Wirklichkeit (actuality), 191, 239 wirkt (being effective), 191 Wissenschaften (sciences), 1 Womit (wherewith), 189 Worinnen (wherein), 194 Wrdigen (evaluation), 92 wrdigt (evaluated), 92 Zeichen (signs), 56 Zeitpunkte (time point), 21 Zeitraum (time-span), 16-17 Zeit st eilen ( time-spots), 233 Zensur (censor), 121 Zeugraum (equipment room), 21
Z M -fallen (to occur in addi tion), 235 Zug (characteristic), 18 zu-gesagt (said of), 62; (at tributed to), 63 zugleich (at the same time), 172 Zugrundeliegendes ( some thing which underlies), 105 Zu-sagen (attribution), 62 Zusammen (together), 186; ( togetherness), 226 Zusammensetzen (putting-to gether), 186 Zweifalt (doubleness), 135 Zwischen (the between), 242
I n d e x oh L a t i n
Term s
accidens (accident), 34 actus mentis (action of the mind), 158 adaequatio (correspond ence), 117 animal rationale (rational animal), 106 axiomata sive leges motus (principles or laws of mo tion), 77, 92
compositio (composition), 225 coniunctio ( con junction), 225 convenientia (agreement), 117 copula (bond), 156 cosmologia rationalis (ra tional cosmology), 110 determinatio ( determinate ness), 213 dynamis (forcc), 191 ens commune (things in gen eral ), 118 ens creatum (created thing), 47, 110 essentia (essence), 212 existentia (existence), 213, 239
cogito (I think), 98, 104, 106-7 cognitio humana (what is knowable by mans pure reason), 116 commensuratio (fitting), 117 complementum possibilitatis (complement to possibil ity), 239
307
308
WHAT
IS
A T H I N G ?
experientia (experience), 93 experiri ( to experience), 93 fundamentum (basis, ground), 104 fundamentum absolutum (absolute ground), 103 hie (this here), 24 ille ( that far away), 25 inconcussum (unshakable), 103 iste ( that there), 24 indicium (judgment), 154 lex inertiae (law of inertia), 78 mathematica universalis (universal mathematics),
101
metaphysica architectonica (architectonic metaphys ics), 121 metaphysica generalis (gen eral metaphysics), 111 metaphysica specialis (spe cialized metaphysics), 111 moto corporum, de (on the motion of bodies), 78 mundi systemate, de (on the system of the world), 78 systema mundi (system of the world), 126 .. theologia rationalis (rational theology), 109 transcendere (to pass over), 178 tribuere (to attribute), 154 tueor (to look, gaze), 95n. veritas (truth), 117 vis centripeta (centripetal force), 77 vis impressa (impacted force), 88
mathematica vulgaris (com mon mathematics), 101 mathesis universalis (univer sal teaching), 102 mente concipere (to con ceive in the mind), 91-92, 116
Index oe G r e ek
Term s
< < (the sensible), 113; (sensibility, perception), 144 a (truth), 46 (at the same time), 172 > (pronoun), 25 (evaluate), 92 (fundamental propo sitions, axioms), 92 ( simple movements), 84 (holding away), 154 ,'' (beginning), 83; (beginning of mo tion), 83 (by violence), 84, 88 Suiiptait (taking apart, analy sis), 160 ( force, power, capac ity), 85
309
eV ei (that far away, there), 25 ' ( knowledge), 81 (according to them selves), 83 (in general, on the whole), 117 (from above to below), 62 (assertion, attribu tion), 62, 107, 154 (category), 63 -s- (motion in a straight line), 84 Kara ( motion with respect to location), 83 (to sort, separate), 119 (in a circle), 84 Xtyciv (to address, assert as something), 64
310
WHAT
IS A T H I N G ?
yos (reason), 108, 145; (judgment), 144; (gather ing together), 187; (asser tion), 106, 108, 126, 152-53, 156, 178 ru fm O ijiu L T iL ( the mathemati cal, what can be learned), 69, 71, 73-74 (mathematics, learn ing), 69, 71, 73, 75, 91 , ( to learn), 69 (motion), 83 ' (mixture), 84 /itoSos- (method), 102 (doing, making), 70 T ( things made or done), 70, 81 (things dealt with), 70 ; (dealing with, doing, acting), 70 (what is former in nature), 166
\ ( first philos ophy, metaphysics), 64, 99 (chance, contin gency), 34

t c X o s (aim, end), 81 tc ( this here, a particu lar), 49
\<(. (what underlies,
substance), 34, 62, 103, 105 w T T tpov 7 rp o *i y/pti'i ( what is later toward us), 166 < ( that which makes itself manifest), 81 (to say), 62 (a saying), 62 (being transported), 83, I
86
( things which come ' forth), 70, 81 < (nature), 83, 126; (against nature), 84; | (in accordance 9 with nature), 84

What Is A Thing by Martin Heidegger

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W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

Translators Note Preface

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W avs o f Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W avs o f Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing

Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing

K an ts Maimer o f Asking About the Thing

K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing

K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thing

K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing

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K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing

K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing

K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing

K an ts Manner o f Asking About the Thing

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K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing

K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing

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K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing

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K ant's Manner of Asking About the Thing

K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing

K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thing

K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing

K an ts Manner o f Asking About the Thing

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K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing

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K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing

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K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thittg

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K an t's Manner of Asking About the Tiling

K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing

K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing