E. Constitutional Limitations - Art. III, Bill of Rights 1) Due process and equal protection - Sec. 1 a.

Void of vagueness People vs Rosenthal and Osmea, 68 Phil 238 G.R. No. L-46076 and L-46077 People of the Philippines vs Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea June 12, 1939 Laurel, J. (Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.) FACTS: 1) Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea, Defendant-appellants, were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O. Oil Company, whose main objects and purposes of are to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products. 2) The RTC found the Defendant-appellants guilty in two cases of selling shares to individuals without first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license from the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law (*see NOTES below for text). 3) The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially depended upon a promise of future promotion and development of the oil business, rather than on actual tangible assets. Defendant-appellants argued on their appeal that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on three grounds: 1) that it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer; 2) that it does not afford equal protection before the law; and 3) that it is vague and ambiguous. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the law is unconstitutional in any of the three grounds raised by the Defendant-appellants. RULING: 1) No, the law is not unconstitutional in any of the three grounds raised by the Defendant-appellants. The Supreme Court cited the case of Hall vs Geiger-Jones: It is well-settled principle of law in this state that by legislative act a commission or board may be empowered to ascertain the existence of facts, upon the finding of which may depend the right to continue in the practice of a profession or a regulated business. The Supreme Court cannot grant the Defendant-appellants contention that Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional, arguing that it denies equal protection of the laws because the law discriminates between an owner who sells his securities in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in repeated and successive transactions. The Supreme Court stated that: legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those entrusted therewith. The Supreme Court further stated that they: cannot give separate attention to the asserted discriminations. It is enough to say that they are within the power of classification, which a state has. A state "may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, with reduced fines. NOTES: 1) Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581, Blue Sky Law: ACT NO. 2581 AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE OF CERTAIN CORPORATION SHARES, STOCKS, BONDS AND OTHER SECURITIES SECTION 2. Sale of securities, when permitted. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, association or corporation, either himself or through brokers or agents, directly or indirectly, to sell or cause to be sold, offer for sale, take subscriptions or negotiate for the sale, in any manner whatsoever except as herein provided, of any speculative securities in the Philippine Islands other than those expressly exempted without a written permit from the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands as hereinafter provided. Exclusive of the securities specifically excepted in section three of this Act, every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, shall be under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer, paying to the same the tax of twenty pesos: (a) A statement showing in detail the plan on which the proposed business

or enterprise is to be conducted; (b) A copy of all contracts, bonds or other instruments which it is proposed to make with or sell to contributors; (c) A statement which will show the name and location of the person, partnership, association or corporation; (d) An itemized account of the actual financial condition and the amount of property, debts and liabilities of the person, partnership, association, or corporation, and any and all other information that may be desired by the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands. Said statements shall be verified by the oath of a member of the partnership, association or corporation or by the oath of a duly authorized officer, if it be a corporation, or by a duly authorized agent of said person, partnership, association or corporation. xxx SECTION 5. Examination. It shall be the duty of the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands to examine the statements and documents filed, and if said Treasurer shall deem it advisable he shall make or have made a detailed examination of the affairs of any person, partnership, association or corporation desiring to engage in business in the Philippine Islands under this Act. The expenses of such examination, not to exceed twenty pesos per day with actual and necessary expenses, shall be paid by such person, partnership, association or corporation. Whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this Act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to offer the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale. After the issuance of such certificate or permit the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands shall have authority at any time to examine the affairs of such person, partnership, association or corporation as to the manner in which they are transacting business under such certificate or permit, and said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit. An appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance and Justice. b. Void for overbreadth Blo Umpar Adiong vs COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 G.R. No. 103956 Blo Umpar Adiong vs Commission on Elections March 31, 1992 Gutierrez, JR., J. FACTS: 1)

The Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate during the May 11, 1992 elections, filed a petition to assail COMELEC's Resolution No. 2347 (*See NOTES below for full text), which prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places, such as cars and other moving vehicles. According to Petitioner such prohibition violates Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 (*See NOTES below for full text). The Petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements will bring about grave and irreparable injury as he is a neophyte in the field of politics. The Petitioner further contends that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition), he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas." The Court finds merit in the petition.

2)

3)

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2347 is constitutional, and therefore, valid. RULING: 1) No, COMELEC Resolution No. 2347 is unconstitutional, and therefore, invalid (void). The Resolution is unconstitutional on several grounds: First, the prohibition cited in the Resolution unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in Sec. 4, Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights (*See NOTES below for full text). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case, and that, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him; secondly, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and expressed in the resolution is void for overbreadth, as "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or

prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." The Resolution puts a very broad restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted, that it infringes upon even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle, which is also in direct violation of another provision of the Constitution: Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights, which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. Hence, the Supreme Court granted the petition, and declared as null and void the portion of Section 15 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 2347 (decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.) NOTES: 1) COMELEC Resolution No. 2347: Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election propaganda: (a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof. Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. It is unlawful: xxx xxx xxx (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied) 2) Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646: Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether private, or public, except in the common poster areas and/or billboards provided in the immediately preceding section, at the candidate's own residence, or at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party: Provided, That such posters or election propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided, Further, That at the site of and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2) and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet each may be displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally; 3) Sec. 4, Article III of the Constitution: ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. 4) Sec. 4, Article III of the Constitution: ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. 5) Over breadth (overbroad law): A principle of Judicial Review that holds that a law is invalid if it punishes constitutionally protected speech or conduct along with speech or conduct that the government may limit to further a compelling government interest.

c. Equal protection People vs Carlos, 78 Phil 535 G.R. No. L-239 The People of the Philippines vs Apolonio Carlos June 30, 1947 Tuason, J. FACTS: 1) In August 1944, the Defendant-appellant alighted from a truck near the house of a Martin Mateo, with members of the Japanese military force and pointed to the formers house, whereupon the soldiers broke into the dwelling and seized the Mateo with hi s other family members, and put them in the truck. Mateo was taken to Fort Santiago and tortured, and was released six days later. Mateos brother was a guerilla who escaped from the Japanese, information that Carlos knew. 2) Defendant assails the validity of the Peoples Court on trying the case on treason, claiming that it violates the equal protection clause. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the Peoples Court Act is constitutional. RULING: 1) Yes, the Peoples Court Act is constitutional, as it was created under the stress of an emergency and national security. The equal protection clause cited by the Defendant-appellant, is not applicable, as it does not prevent a state or municipality from adjusting its legislation to different situations and discriminating against different things, provided there is reasonable classification. In fact, the Peoples Court is designed to extend greater protection to persons charged with collaboration with the enemy. The extension o f the detention of persons charged with treason before the filing of the information is also not arbitrary, for the provisos rest on some real and substantial difference or distinction bearing a just and fair relation to the legislation. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court with costs against appellant. 4) Neither excessive fines, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment - Sec. 19, Par. 1, RA 7659 People vs Dela Cruz, 92 Phil 906 G. R. No. L-5790 People of the Philippines vs Pablo Dela Cruz April 17, 1953 Bengzon, J. (Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur) FACTS: 1) In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the Defendant-appellant, Pablo De La Cruz's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased from him a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty centavos, 10 centavos above the fixed retail price. 2) As the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good terms with Pablo de la Cruz the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in this criminal prosecution, because Executive Order No. 331 (issued by authority of Republic Act No. 509, (*See NOTES below for full text) that fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of commodity. 3) Defendant Pablo De La Cruz is sentenced to five years imprisonment along with a fine of 5 thousand pesos plus costs. Additionally, defendant is barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for 5 years by the CFI of Manila. 4) Defendant appealed his case claiming that: a) charges against him have been fabricated, b) the imposed punishment is wholly disproportionate to the offense, and c) that R.A. 509 prescribes excessive penalties. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the charges against the defendant has been fabricated 2) Whether or not R.A. 509 prescribed excessive penalties

3) Whether or not the imposed punishment been disproportionate RULING: 1) No. The peoples case in this matter (decided at the CFI in Manila) has been established beyond reasonable doubt. 2) No. It is in the opinion of the judges that is a merchant oversteps his bounds and sells in excess of the fixed prices, the profits that he may gain may come in the thousands of pesos, thus established penalties are not disproportionate. 3) Many of the justices are in the opinion that the imposed punishment is not unusual and cruel as damage caused to the state is not measured exclusively by gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one violation would mean others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls. Some however are deeply moved by the plight of this modest store owner and thus decreases the penalties (6 mos. Imprisonment, 2 thousand peso fine) exercising discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision and reduced the imprisonment to six months and the fine to two thousand pesos. NOTES: 1) Republic Act No. 509: SEC. 12. Imprisonment for a period of not less two months nor more than twelve years or a fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who sells any article, goods, or commodity in excess of the maximum selling price fixed by the president; . . . . In addition to the penalties prescribed above, the persons, corporations, partnerships, or associations found guilty of any violation of this Act or of any rule or regulations issued by the president pursuant to this Act shall be barred from the wholesome and retail business for a period of five years for a first offense, and shall be permanently barred for the second or succeeding offenses. People vs Ferrer G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 People of the Philippines vs Hon. Simeon Ferrer December 27, 1972 Castro, J. (Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.) FACTS: 1)

Criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against respondent Feliciano Co at the Court of 1st instance, Tarlac. On May 1969 to December 5, 1969, Co became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any other illegal means o For the purpose of establishing totalitarian regime Co moved to quash saying Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Concurrently, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed in same court, charging respondent Nilo Tayag et. al (5 others) with subversion. Tayag moved to quash saying statute is: 1) Bill of Attainder; 2) vague; 3) expressed more than one subject; 4) denied him equal protection of laws. Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the information against the two accused. The Government appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.

2)

3)

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Republic Act 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) is a Bill of Attainder/Ex Post Facto Law. RULING: 1) No, RA 1700 is not a Bill of Attainder/Ex Post Facto law. Only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. (US v. Lovett 328 US 303 1946). In order for an Act to qualify as Bill of Attainder, following requisites must be present: 1)

statute specifies persons/groups; 2) statute applied retroactively and reached past conduct, 3) penalties are inescapable, and 4) there is a lack of judicial process. Statute simply declares CPP as organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of Sect. 4 of the Article: Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and when membership is accepted or retained with knowledge that the organization is engaged in an unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membership with such knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawful enterprise in which it is engaged. The Acts focus is on conduct not on person. Membership, to be unlawful, must have membership knowledge; membership was acquired with intent to further the goals of the organization via overt acts. The statute is prospective in nature and not retroactive; Sect. 4 prohibits acts committed after the approval of the Act, and members given an opportunity to renounce membership to escape liability. That CPP as an organized conspiracy to overthrow Government should not be the basis of guilt; following guidelines set by court under RA1700: subversive organizations beside the CPP, must be proven that purpose is to throw Government and establish domination of a FOREIGN power. In the case of CPP, membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. Hence, the Supreme Court set aside the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 and the two cases were remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio. NOTES: 1) Bill of Attainder: act of legislature declaring a person or group guilty of some crime and punishing them without privilege of a judicial trial. US vs Diaz-Conde G.R. Nos. L-18208 The United States vs Vicente Diaz-Conde February 14, 1922 Johnson, J. (Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur) FACTS: 1)

On the 6th day of May, 1921, a complaint was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, charging the defendants with a violation of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655). Upon said complaint they were each arrested, arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. The cause was finally brought on for trial on the 1st day of September, 1921. At the close of the trial, and after a consideration of the evidence adduced, judge M. V. del Rosario, judge, found that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P120 and, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law. From that sentence each of the defendants appealed to this court. At the time of the contracts delivery execution, there were no usury laws in force in the Philippines. The appellants contend: (a) That the contract upon which the alleged usurious interest was collected was executed before Act No. 2655 was adopted; (b) that at the time said contract was made (December 30, 1915), there was no usury law in force in the Philippine Islands; (c) that said Act No. 2655 did not become effective until the 1st day of May, 1916, or four months and a half after the contract in question was executed; (d) that said law could have no retroactive effect or operation, and (e) that said law impairs the obligation of a contract, and that for all of said reasons the judgment imposed by the lower court should be revoked; that the complaint should be dismissed, and that they should each be discharged from the custody of the law.

2) 3)

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Defendants are guilty of violating Act No. 2655, a law that took effect AFTER the execution and delivery of the contract. RULING: 1) No, Defendants are not guilty of violating Act No. 2655, a law that took effect AFTER the execution and delivery of the contract. Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties, necessarily impairs the contract itself. If a law impairs the obligation of a contract, it is prohibited by the Jones Law, and is null and void. The laws in force in the Philippine Islands prior to any legislation by the American sovereignty prohibited the Legislature from giving to any penal law a retroactive effect unless such law was favorable to the person accused. (Articles 21 and 22, Penal Code.) Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action, is an ex post facto law. In the present case Act No. 2655 made an act which had been done before

the law was adopted, a criminal act, and to make said Act applicable to the act complained of would be to give it an ex post facto operation. Hence, the Supreme Court revoked the decision of the lower court, ordered the dismissal of the complaint and discharge of the Defendants, with costs de officio.

Valenzuela vs People G.R. No. 160188 Aristotel Valenzuela vs People of the Philippines June 21, 2007 Tinga, J. FACTS: 1)

Petitioner and an accomplice (Calderon) were sighted by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard at the Super Sale Club, SM North EDSA hauling cases of Tide detergent, valued at Php12,090 and loading them into a cab, during which Lago intercepted them. The two tried to flee but were eventually apprehended. They were brought to the SM Security Office before being transferred to the police. The RTC decided that they were guilty of consummated theft. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft because at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. CA affirmed the RTCs decision.

2)

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated. RULING: 1) Court considered the theft consummated as it concluded that under Article 308 of the RPC, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. It can only be attempted or consummated (The 3 stages are differentiated in Art. 6, RPC). Court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. It is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since all the acts of execution had already been done. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be present: 1) That there be taking of personal property; 2) That said property belongs to another; 3) That the taking be done with intent to gain; 4) That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and 5) That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 2) Re: Spanish text over English translation: In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with apoderamiento, or unlawful taking, to characterize theft. Justice Regalado notes that the concept of apoderamiento once had a controversial interpretation and application. Spanish law had already discounted the belief that mere physical taking was constitutive of apoderamiento, finding that it had to be coupled with the intent to appropriate the object in order to constitute apoderamiento; and to appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. However, a conflicting line of cases decided by the Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that there must be permanency in the taking or an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the stolen property; or that there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner already constituted apoderamiento. Ultimately, as Justice Regalado notes, the Court adopted the latter thought that there was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking . We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched the success of his appeal on our acceptance of the Dio and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our deference to Viada yields to the higher reverence for legislative intent.

3)

Hence, the Supreme Court denied the petition with costs against petitioner.

People vs Formigones G.R. No. L-3246 The People vs Abelardo Formigones November 29, 1950 Montemayor, J. FACTS: 1)

In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From there they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father. On December 28, 1946, Abelardo Formigones caused his wife, Julia Agricola, lethal injury with a bolo. Having done so, he then carried his wife to the living room and lay down beside her. This was how he was found by the people summoned by his eldest daughter, who witnessed the stabbing. He pleaded guilty to the Court of the First Instance in Camarines Sur citing jealousy as his motive for he believed his wife was being intimate with his brother. He was found guilty of parricide and received the sentence of reclusion perpetua and the Solicitor General filed for an appeal on the grounds that he is an imbecile.

2)

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the court should impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for parricide, on the ground that the accused is an imbecile (and therefore exempt from criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code), which is reclusion perpetua to death. RULING: 1) No, even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances of a qualifying nature, and without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law. Article 64, par.5 of RPC does not apply to this case, only Art. 63. 2) In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. 3) No, the defendant is still charged with reclusion perpetua. The two mitigating circumstances, his diminished will power and his act of passion driven by jealousy (Art. 13 of Revised Penal Code) has been considered by the court but he is credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court with the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs. Case also recommend to the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.

People vs Silvestre G.R. No. L-35748 The People vs Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza December 14, 1931 Villareal, J. (Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur) FACTS: 1)

November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo Nio, and under pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves, followed him home to the village of Masocol, and remained there. The accused, Martin Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with said Romana Silvestre, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas de la Cruz. On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered together with the appellants herein after supper, Martin Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it. Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to the house, he answered that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre. As Martin Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything to him, not even Romana Silvestre, who was about a meter away from her codefendant. Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once to communicate with the barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had just heard Martin Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a hundred arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back they saw their home in flames, and ran back to it; but seeing that the fire had assumed considerable proportions, Antonia took refuge in the schoolhouse with her 1 year old babe in her arms, while Nicolas went to the home of his parents-in-law, took up the furniture he had deposited there, and carried it to the schoolhouse. The fire destroyed about forty-eight houses. Tomas Santiago coming from the barrio artesian well, and Tomas Gonzalez, teacher at the barrio school of Masocol, and Felipe Clemente, an old man 61 years of age, coming from their homes, to the house on fire, saw Martin Atienza going away from the house where the fire started, and Romana Silvestre leaving it.

2) The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted them of the crime of arson as follows: Martin Atienza principal by direct participation, sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of cadena temporal, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal Code; and Romana Silvestre as accomplice, sentenced to six years and one day of presidio mayor. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Romana Silvestre was rightly convicted as accomplice of the crime. RULING: 1) No, Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions. In the case of Romana, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice. Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent. Hence, the Supreme Court reversed the decision and acquitted Romana Silvestre, and affirmed decision for Martin Atienza. Silvestre to pay 1/2 of the costs.

People vs Talingdan G.R. No. L-32126 The People of the Philippines vs Nemesio Talingdan, Teresa Domogma, et al. July 6, 1978 Per curiam (Barredo, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur) FACTS: 1) On the night of June 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and their children, arrived together in their house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their relationship had pdf 2) been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2) different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living with them, go down the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should she get pregnant, the child would not be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of more than three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several times; the latter went down the house and sought the help of the police, and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the latter left the place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he would kin him. Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house; as she approached them, she heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him". ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Teresa Domogma was rightly convicted as an accessory to the crime. RULING: 1) Yes, Teresa Domogma was rightly convicted as an accessory to the crime. Her subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. With the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants Hence, the Supreme Court sentenced to DEATH Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to offset them to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

C. Liability for incomplete elements 1) Impossible crime - Art. 4, par. 2 Intod vs Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 52 People vs Saladino, 89 Phil 807 (unrep) 2) Uncompleted crimes a. Attempted and frustrated felonies, in general - Art. 6 & 7 US vs Eduave, 36 Phil 209 b. Examples of specific felonies i. Physical injuries (Art. 263 - 266), Homicide (Art. 249), Murder (Art. 248) People vs Borinaga, 55 Phil 433 People of the Philippines vs. Basilio Borinaga G.R. No. 33463 December 18, 1930 Malcolm, J. FACTS: 1)

On a date prior to March 4, 1929, Harry H. Mooney, an American and resident of the municipality of Calubian Leyte enters to a contract with Juan Lawaan to construct a fish corral. Basilio Borinaga, the defendant appellant in this case, was an associate of Lawaan with regards to this construction. On May 4, 1929, despite the construction of the fish corral yet to be finished (1/3 of the job left), Lawaan, along with some of his men, went to Mooneys shop to collect the full amount of the contract. Mooney, as expected, did not tender payment. Lawaan left th e shop, threatening Mooney before doing so. On the evening of the same day, Mooney visits the store of his neighbor, Perpetua Najarro, taking a seat in front of Perpetua with his back facing an open window. Subsequently, Perpetua sees Basilio Borinaga strike Mooney with a knife from behind but fortunately the knife strikes the back of the chair that Mooney is sitting in. Mooney is thrown out of the chair, but is otherwise uninjured. Borinaga runs toward the market. A few minutes later, Borinaga returns to Perpetuas store, knife in hand, seemingly with the intent to continue what he had started. Now on their guard, both Mooney and Perpetua turned a flashlight on the defendant, frightening him and causing him to once again run away. Witnesses have said that Borinaga was heard threatening to stab Mooney before the alleged attack, complaining of missing Mooney after the first attempt, and complaining that he had missed his mark after the second attempt. The foregoing facts led to Borinagas prosecution in the CFI of Leyte for the crime of frustrated m urder. The defendant presented a defense of alibi, but was not given credence. The defendant was convicted as charged and was sentenced to 14 yrs, 8 months and 1 day of imprisonment reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties and costs. Defendant then appeals to the SC to reduce the charge from frustrated murder to attempted murder.

2)

3)

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime perpetrated is attempted murder or frustrated murder as per Article 3 of the Penal Code (Article 6 of the RPC). RULING: It was decided by the SC that the defendant performed all the acts of execution to qualify the crime as frustrated murder. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the assailant completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from further acts and what is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act was passed. Hence, SC affirms the judgment of the CFI with costs of this instance against appellant. DISSENTING OPINION by Justice Villa-real, Justice Johnson and Justice Street: This is important: With the foregoing facts of the case, in order for the crime to have been considered frustrated murder it would have been necessary for the defendant to have inflicted a deadly wound upon a vital spot of the body of Mooney. The acts of execution did not produce the death of Mooney, nor could it have produced it anyway as the blow did not even reach his body. It is the preventing of death after ALL the acts of execution that constitutes a frustrated felony and not the prevention of PERFORMANCE of the acts of execution. The crime therefore should be considered attempted murder instead of frustrated murder - Judgment affirmed. Discussion of this case is on Page 110 of Reyes. Jurisprudence has been superseded by People vs Kalalo.

III. Circumstances Affecting Criminal Liability A. Justifying Circumstances - Art. 11

1) Self-defense People vs Decena, 235 SCRA 67 G.R. No. 107874 People of the Philippines vs George Decena y Rocaberte August 4, 1994 Regalado, J. (Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur) FACTS: 1)

On December 25, 1990, accused Decena allegedly stabbed to death Jaime Ballesteros in San Fabian, Pangasinan. The case for the prosecution was based mainly on the testimony of Luzviminda Ballesteros, a 14-year old daughter of the victim. She recalled being asked by her mother, Teresita Ballesteros, to fetch her father, Jaime Ballesteros, who was then watching a game in the basketball court. On her way to the basketball court, Luzviminda met her father walking home in an intoxicated state. Suddenly, she saw Decena rushing towards her father with a long bladed weapon, prompting her to warn her father to run for safety by shouting in the vernacular "Batik kila, Tatay!" However, Jaime simply raised his hand, which allowed Decena to stab him on the right chest just below the nipple. Decena then fled from the crime scene, while the victim also managed to run but stumbled and fell to the ground. Luzviminda then called her mother, saying: "Mother, come! My father has been stabbed by George Decena." Her mother immediately called for a tricycle and rushed Jaime to the Provincial Hospital where, however, the victim was declared dead on arrival.

2) Decenas defense, however, states that it was Jaime, who, when drunk in the basketball game before returning home, held Decena by the neck with one arm and poked a fork against it by the other. The barangay tanod also surnamed Decena then took the fork from Jaime and advised George Decena to go home. Jaime allegedly followed. Decenas uncle testified that it was Jaime who tried to attack Decena and that the latter was able to parry the blow. During the struggle that ensued, Decena was able to twist the wrist of his combatant and thrust the knife towards his person thereby causing Jaimes death. 3) Decena stood on trial and offered a plea of not guilty. The lower court found Decena guilty of murder, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. He then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on August 26, 1992 for lack of merit, hence this appellate review wherein he contends that the lower court errored in disregarding his claim of self-defense, and in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor, granting arguendo that he is guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused acted in complete self-defense in killing Jaime Ballesteros, thus absolving him from criminal liability. RULING: No. The basic requirement for self-defense, as a justifying circumstance, is that there was an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. It must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life of the accused in danger and forced him to inflict more or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefor reasonable means to resist said attack. It is an old but respected and consistent rule that courts must determine by a balance of probabilities who of the participants in a fight had, in the natural order of things, the reason to commence the aggression. The case at bar calls to mind the scenario and logical view that when a person had inflicted slight physical injuries on another, without any intention to inflict other injuries, and the latter attacked the former, the one making the attack was an unlawful aggressor. The attack made was evidently retaliation, which is different from an act of self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased to exist when the accused attacked him. In self-defense, the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the person making a defense. The crime committed, therefore, was homicide. Hence, the Supreme Court modified the judgment of the lower court, by finding accused-appellant George Decena y Rocaberte guilty of the crime of homicide, and imposing upon him an indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In all other respects, the said judgment is affirmed.