The Purpose of International Relations

EH Carr, State Propaganda and an Informed Public Opinion

by Ross Eventon

A thesis submitted to the International Relations Department of Webster University in

partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of MA International Relations
May 2009

London, United Kingdom

© Copyright by
Ross Eventon
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
(2009)
The author hereby grants to Webster University permission to reproduce and distribute
publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part for
educational purposes.
 WEBSTER UNIVERSITY

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The Purpose of International Relations

EH Carr, State Propaganda and an Informed Public Opinion

by Ross Eventon

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ii
 ABSTRACT

The Purpose of International Relations

EH Carr, State Propaganda and an Informed Public Opinion

by Ross Eventon

This paper returns to the thought prevalent at the inception of the discipline in order to
assess how those issues deemed most relevant have been addressed in contemporary
scholarship. Despite EH Carr developing his Realist approach with the aim of
undermining State propaganda, this problem remains as, if not more, relevant in
modern society. In contrast to Carrʼs approach, mainstream IR scholarship within the
theoretical paradigms is consistently uncritical and status-quo. Consequently, this
paper revisits the critical Realism of EH Carr and his purpose for the discipline. The
transformation of this Realism is then traced through Classical Realism to
contemporary NeoRealism. Thereafter, the paper examines the mainstream theoretical
paradigms to illustrate the prevailing approach to International Relations and establish
where the critique advocated by Carr has been transposed. The final section is
concerned with the purpose of International Relations, arguing that the movement away
from critical thought towards an allegiance to the State, as opposed to the public, is
systematic of a widespread, and dangerous, obedience to the State within the
discipline. Concluding, the paper advocates the return to a critical approach to
international affairs, signifying the reversion to a disciplinary obligation to the public as
opposed to the State.

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.............................................................................................................. 1
Chapter I: Realism................................................................................................... 4
Chapter II: The Contemporary Paradigms............................................................. 27
Chapter III: The Purpose of International Relations .............................................. 40
Conclusion............................................................................................................. 50
References ............................................................................................................ 53















































































iv
 






































How
is
it
possible
for
this
small
clique
to
bend
the
will
of
the
majority,
who
stand
to
lose
and

suffer
by
a
state
of
war,
to
the
service
of
their
ambitions?

An
obvious
answer
to
this
question

would
seem
to
be
that
the
minority,
the
ruling
class
at
present,
has
the
schools
and
press,

usually
the
Church
as
well,
under
its
thumb.

This
enables
it
to
organize
and
sway
the

emotions
of
the
masses,
and
makes
its
tool
of
them.



Albert
Einstein
in
a
letter
to
Sigmund
Freud

v
LITERATURE REVIEW

This paper is a summary of thought and approaches within the theoretical paradigms and,

as such, it largely constitutes a literature review in itself. In regard to the first part of the

paper, discussions of the theoretical paradigms are usually left to textbooks. However,

when Realism is discussed, Carrʼs ʻRealismʼ is taken together with other Realists despite

the significant difference in their approaches. Michael Cox, in his appraisal of Carrʼs work,

has gone some way towards correcting this.1 Although the difference between Carr and

the later realists is occasionally acknowledged, I felt it necessary to show the development

of Realism from a critical to a status-quo approach. Craig Murphy has rekindled Carrʼs

ideas, in a way similar to my discussion here, by tracing what he calls the “democratic

impulse” (the desire to have a more informed democratic opinion on foreign affairs).2

However, Murphyʼs discussion is brief, Carrʼs approach is outlined quickly and the

ʻdevelopmentʼ of Realism is not shown in the way I felt it necessary to do here. The

second chapter focuses on the approaches of the mainstream International Relations

paradigms, again an issue often left to the textbooks or publications devoted to

International Relations theory.3 However, in this case I present a comparative analysis of

Carrʼs thought to the mainstream schools in order to show the consistent uncritical, State-

serving nature of contemporary International Relations theory and a marked shift in the

purpose of the discipline. The third and final chapter is itself a literature review, analysing

some of the most important and recent works regarding the purpose and future of IR and

IR theory. My position with regard to these works will become evident in the course of the

1
Cox, M. ʻE.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisalʼ Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2004
2
Murphy, C. ʻCritical Theory and the Democratic Impulseʼ in Jones, R. ed. ʻCritical Theory and World
Politics”, Lynne Reiner Publishers, London, 2001
3
See the bibliography for the works relating to the relevant paradigms.
vi
paper, but it is enough to say here that I feel contemporary discussions of the discipline

negate to address the most pressing issues and display a worrying level of allegiance and

subservience to the State.4 


4
See footnotes in chapter III and also the bibliography for the works appraised in this discussion.

vii
INTRODUCTION

International Relations (IR) as a field of academic study was inaugurated and formalised in

1919 at the University of Aberystwyth in Wales.5 Funded by concerned philanthropists

following World War I, the discipline was charged with raising the level of education

regarding international affairs, so that the ignorance that led to the destruction of the First

World War could not be repeated.6 Such a task requires a particular philosophy regarding

how a discipline should be structured and what approaches it should take in order to, if not

achieve, move towards itʼs goal. As a social science, IR has been preoccupied with the

creation of theory to explain the behaviour we observe among nation States. Given this,

we can assume that through achievements in theoretical understanding IR scholars hope

to determine and eventually undermine the factors that cause interstate warfare. Despite

such efforts, it is difficult to observe substantial progress towards alleviating the scourge of

war. Although Europe has not fallen into large-scale conflict as in the early parts of the

20th century, war is still as endemic a part of the international arena as ever. Moreover,

one of the most prominent features of contemporary State violence has continually been

the cloaking of actual intentions in ideologies and false pretexts. Whilst a significant and

growing body of literature concerns itself with exposing this State propaganda, as well as

academic and media complicity, these have come largely from outside of the discipline.7

5
Throughout this paper, International Relations will be represented as ʻIRʼ and will refer to the academic
discipline.
6
Hedley Bull observes that the “responsibility of students of International Relations was to assist the march
of progress” in order to “overcome the ignorance, the prejudices, the ill-will, and the sinister interests that
stood in itʼs way.” Cited in Hollis, M. Smith, S. ʻExplaining and Understanding International Relationsʼ,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2003. p.20
7
See, for example, regarding foreign policy, the works of Noam Chomsky, Edward Herman, Alexander and
Patrick Cockburn, Tariq Ali, Mark Curtis, Howard Zinn, William Blum, Ha-Joon Chang, Milan Rai and
Arundhati Roy amongst others.
In light of this, it may be fruitful to revisit the issues deemed most pressing at the beginning

of the discipline and to determine how or to what extent these problems have been

confronted or resolved. EH Carr, one of the most important early IR scholars, developed

his ʻRealistʼ approach in order to counteract State and academic propaganda.8 For Carr,

the aim of this approach, and the discipline itself, was to create a more informed public

opinion on international affairs. However, despite these beginnings, over the course of the

twentieth century Realism changed significantly and came to dominate the discipline in a

form almost unrecognisable to Carrʼs.

In this paper I will outline Carrʼs approach and trace the removal of his ideas from later

Realist scholarship. I will focus, in particular, on his purpose for the discipline and the

issues he deemed in most need of scholarly attention; the critical analysis of the State and

State propaganda. Following this discussion of the Realist school, I will look briefly at

other mainstream paradigms to ascertain the predominant approach to IR and to

determine where Carrʼs ideas are most faithfully represented amongst the modern

theorists. IR, in adopting theory, has separated scholars into competing paradigms of

thought that determine the general principles on which the practitioners of the discipline

operate.9 These paradigms have come to dominate IR and consequently they frame the

discourse, and have a significant effect on the worldview, of IR students.10 IR is

fundamentally concerned with teaching, hence a discussion of those paradigms presented

as most relevant, prominent or important to students can go some way in assessing the

type of approach to international affairs within the discipline that is dominant and most

8
In this paper, the ʻStateʼ refers to the government and political elites. The ʻpublicʼ will be the general
population.
9
Nicholson, M. and Bernet, P. ʻThe Epistemology of International Relationsʼ in Groom, AJR. ʻCritical Theory
and Postmodernism in International Relationsʼ Pinter Publishers, London 1994. p.198
10
Ashley. ʻThe Poverty of Neo-Realismʼ in Keohane, R. ʻNeo-Realism and itʼs Criticsʼ, Columbia University
Press, New York, 1986
2
likely to prevail in future. In the final section the paper will attempt to determine why critical

thought has moved away from the mainstream of the discipline by engaging and

contributing to the contemporary debate regarding the purpose of IR.

3
CHAPTER I
Carr and Critical Realism

Edward Hallett Carrʼs The Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis 1919 - 1939: an introduction to the study of

international relations is widely considered the first significant contribution to the discipline

and the seminal work of early, in the context of the institutionalised academic study of

international relations, ʻRealistʼ thought. The Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis is a critical analysis of

the state of international affairs, particularly the prevailing approach to IR espoused by

those Carr terms ʻidealistsʼ or Liberals, for whom “wishing prevails over thinking,

generalisation over observation and...little attempt is made at a critical analysis of existing

facts.”11 Carr countered this view with his ʻRealismʼ, which constituted a critical, and

“somewhat cynical” approach to International Relations.12 As a result a number of

assumptions are made. For Carr, egoistic power-seeking States were the main actors in

international relations and conflict was rooted in the clash of interests between the “have”

and “have-not” States.13 When defining the concept of State power, Carr assumed three

key components: military power, economic power and the power over opinion.14 He

deemed the latter to be “not less essential for political purposes than military and

economic power” and “closely associated with them.”15 The consequent section Carr

devotes to propaganda acts as a warning of its role within both democracies and

11
Carr, E H. “The Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis: an introduction to the study of international relations”, London,
Macmillan, 1948. p.8 It should be noted that there has been some confusion regarding exactly who the
idealists, and the realists for that matter, actually were. For some, Carr is considered to have deemed
ʻidealistʼ every approach other than his own.
12
ibid, p.10
13
ibid, p.60
14
ibid, p.108
15
ibid, p.132
4
totalitarian States; the contrast between the two being less than “clear cut.”16

Democracies or “the groups who control them” were not, he observed, “altogether innocent

of the arts of moulding and directing mass opinion.”17 He noted that the increasing

prominence attached to power over opinion was largely a result of the “broadening basis of

politics” which increased the number whose opinions were politically important.18 The

conditions that led to this broadening of politics also “created instruments of unparalleled

range and efficiency” for “moulding and directing” public opinion. The most important of

these was universal popular education because, invariably, the State providing the

education decides its content. With increases in technology, however, the means had

grown to include “the radio, film and popular press” whose management had “become

concentrated in fewer and fewer hands.” A situation, which he warned, “makes inevitable

the centralised control of opinion.”19 Highlighting the efficacy of this problem, Carr wrote:

The issue is no longer whether man shall be politically free to express their opinions, but whether freedom of

opinion has, for large masses of people, any meaning but the subjection to the influence of innumerable
20
forms of propaganda directed by vested interests of one kind or another.

Carr recommended that, because “the close connexion between these different forms of

power is so vital” and “has been so much neglected in theoretical discussion,” further

investigation in these areas would be the most fruitful approach at the present time.21

Discussions of State propaganda of this sort were not uncommon in Carrʼs time. Reinhold

Niebuhr, an important early 20th Century theologian and political thinker who had a

16
ibid, p.133
17
ibid, p.133
18
ibid, p.132
19
ibid, p.134
20
ibid, p.135
21
ibid, p.143

5
significant influence on Carr and later Morgenthau, warned in his Moral Man and Immoral

Society that “the stupidity of the average man will permit the oligarch, whether economic or

political, to hide his real purposes from the scrutiny of his fellows and to withdraw his

activities from effective control.”22 The facts in society, he contended, will be created by

the “disproportion of power” and the justifications for political action will be “dictated by the

desire of men of power to hide the nakedness of their greed.”23 Discussing the

beneficiaries of this propaganda, Niebuhr observed that the ʻnational will,ʼ expressed by

the government, is determined not only by the populace but also “the prudential self

interest of dominant economic classes.”24 This “selfish exploitation of the instruments of

coercion by the groups who wield them” was considered by Niebuhr to be inevitable. He

summarised the situation, writing:

The economic overlords of a nation have special interests in the profits of international trade, in the

exploitation of weaker peoples and in the acquisition of raw materials and markets, all of which are only

remotely relevant to the welfare of the whole people. They are relevant at all only because, under the

present organisation of society, the economic life of a whole nation is bound up with the private enterprise of
25
individuals.

For his part, Carrʼs work went to significant lengths to discredit propagandists, of both

academia and the State. In The Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis, Carr criticised the ideological guises

which States use to mask their intentions, including the consistent proclamations of

statesmen that our weapons are “vital, defensive and benevolent” whilst others are always

22
Niebuhr, R. “Moral Man and Immoral Society”, Charles Scribnerʼs Sons, London, 1932 p.21
23
ibid, p.8
24
ibid, p.88
25
ibid, p.89 Murphy notes that Carr and Niebuhr both wrote for a democratic audience including citizens.
Niebuhr was also closely linked to the industrial labour movement. See Murphy, C. “Critical Theory and the
Democratic Impulse” in Jones, R. ed. 2001. p.66
6
“offensive and wicked.”26 Similarly, he ridiculed the declarations of our actions always

being “virtuous” and beneficial to the world and us.27 His main target, however, were

Liberal scholars, whom he felt, misunderstanding the nature of international relations,

advocated “supposedly absolute and universal principles (peace, harmony of interests,

collective security, free trade)” which “were not principles at all, but the unconscious

reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a

particular time.”28

As with Niebuhr, throughout The Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis Carr discusses the purpose and

beneficiaries of this propaganda. When outlining the idea of the ʻState,ʼ Carr

acknowledged it is merely a “fictitious group person”; albeit a “necessary fiction” and an

“indispensable instrument of modern society.”29 Consequently, he recognised that when

we speak of the ʻStateʼ making decisions we actually refer to those in a position to

influence policy. In democratic societies then, he noted, “immense corporations are called

into existence, which are too powerful and too vital to the community to remain wholly

independent of the machine of government.”30 He warned that with elite groups

representing the State in this way, “opinion is conditioned by status and interest” and this

“ruling class or nation” not only “evolves opinions favorable to the maintenance of its

privileged position” but can, using economic and military power, “impose these opinions on

others.”31 In particular, Carr attacked the often-proclaimed notion of the ʻnational interestʼ;

26
Carr, E H. 1948 p.74
27
ibid, p.80-81
28
Carr, E H. ʻThe Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis: an introduction to the study of international relationsʼ, London,
Macmillan, 1981. p.80
29
Carr, E H. 1948 p.149
30
ibid, p.135
31
ibid, p.143

7
The doctrine of the harmony of interests...is the natural assumption of a prosperous and privileged class,

whose members have a dominant voice in the community and are therefore naturally prone to identify its

interest with their own. In virtue of this identification, any assailant of the interests of the dominant group is

made to incur the odium of assailing the alleged common interest of the whole community, and is told that in

making this assault he is attacking his own higher interests. The doctrine of the harmony of interests thus

serves as an ingenious moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and
32
maintain their dominant position.

These discussions of propaganda and elite interests within the State form a significant part

of Carrʼs other works; a testament to the importance he attributed them. In his The New

Society, in which he analysed the present state of society and offered recommendations to

move towards a fairer system of social organisation, he stated that propaganda had

become “as essential a function of mass democracy as advertising of mass production”

where the leaders are concerned with the “moulding and manipulation of opinion” as

opposed to its reflection.33 Noting the increasing gap between the nature of debates

among leaders and the terms in which these are presented to the public, Carr contended

that the “spectacle of an efficient elite maintaining authority and asserting its will over the

masses by the rationally calculated use of irrational methods of persuasion is the most

disturbing nightmare of mass democracy.”34 This “nightmare” could be alleviated only if an

“educated mass democracy” could be created. In moving towards this, the most

necessary task was to “unmask the irrational by stripping from its hypothetical fig-leaf of

false reason.”35 Continuing the theme in his Conditions of Peace, under a chapter titled

ʻCrisis of Democracyʼ he argued that liberal democracy was effectively destroyed by 1920

as “the holders of economic power...now more and more openly descended into the

32
Carr, E H. 1981. p.102
33
Carr, EH. ʻThe New Societyʼ, Macmillan, London, 1951. p69, p76
34
ibid, p.78
35
ibid, p.79, p.106
8
political arena.” This consequently made organised economic power the dominant factor

in politics.36 Under these existing democratic institutions, Carr argued, the will of the

majority was “impotent to assert itself against the domination of organised economic

power.”37 Realism then, as Carr imagined it in The Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis, must “unmask”

the propaganda of Statesmen and scholars to show a “hollow and intolerable sham” which

“serves merely as a disguise for the interests of the privileged.”38 In fact, the subversion of

these mechanisms was the task Carr envisaged for the discipline of International Relations

in general. At his inauguration to the International Relations Chair at Aberystwyth

University, he stated that “the holder of the chair should endeavour...to promote a truer

understanding of the nature of international relations, and thereby contribute to the

creation of a balanced and well informed public opinion on international problems.”39

In summary, Carrʼs approach was a critical Realist paradigm concerned primarily with

undermining domestic State propaganda and academic complicity. The result would be a

more informed public opinion and a lifting of the ignorance that had served as the

motivation for the disciplineʼs creation. Having outlined some key elements of Carrʼs

thought, I will now assess the Classical Realist approach, which superseded Carrʼs

Realism and came to dominate the discipline in the middle of the twentieth century.

36
Carr, EH. ʻConditions of Peaceʼ, Macmillan, London, 1943. p.21
37
ibid, p.26
38
Carr, EH, 1948 p.93
39
Carr, EH. ʻPublic Opinion as a Safeguard to Peaceʼ, International Affairs Vol. 15, No.6, 1936. pp.848

9
Hans Morgenthau and Classical Realism

Following Carr, the US based émigré Hans Joachim Morgenthau became the most

important contributor to Realist IR scholarship. Morgenthauʼs Classical Realist theory and

approach are outlined in his Politics Among Nations, which subsequently became an early

textbook for the discipline. Borrowing from Carr, Morgenthau took the power-seeking

State as the main object of focus in International Relations. However, crucially, conflict for

Morgenthau is not the result of a ʻhave-have notsʼ dynamic among States but instead

stems from manʼs intrinsically evil human nature and his innate lust for power.40 The world

as we know it is therefore a direct result of these characteristics.41 Rather effectively, this

assumption removes the opportunity for critique of powerful nations that was inherent

within Carrʼs ʻunequal Statesʼ dynamic. As will be shown, a large proportion of

Morgenthauʼs work is essentially an apologia for powerful States, particularly the US. The

Realism of the kind advocated by Carr is replaced by a uncritical approach favouring

academic compliance with the home-State over a duty to the public.42

For Morgenthau, power comprised “anything that establishes and maintains the control of

man over man.”43 In a section titled ʻThe Struggle for the Minds of Men,ʼ he engages the

role of propaganda, which, he argues, along with military force and diplomacy, is one of

the means through which a State tries to achieve its aims. Morgenthauʼs analysis of

propaganda, however, is fundamentally different to that of Carr. The discussion here is on

the use of external propaganda, as a weapon of the State against enemies, and is not a

40
Morgenthau, H. ʻPolitics Among Nationsʼ, Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1971. p.29-35
41
Morgenthau, H, 1971 p.3-4, 48
42
Justin Rosenberg has called Politics Among Nations, a “diplomats manual to statecraft”. Rosenberg, J.
ʻEmpire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relationsʼ, Verso, London, 1994.
p.16
43
Morgenthau, H, 1971, p.9
10
critique but constitutes advice on increasing its efficacy. Examining the reports that US

propaganda failed amongst farmers in China, whom they bombed, he observes “the

inherent qualities of American ideas in terms of their truth and of the good they contain

were extremely relevant for success or failure.” The failure then was a result of “the

apparent irrelevance of democratic propaganda in the light of the experiences of the

common man.” That is, “the policies the US supported, or seemed to support, made

successes in the war of ideas possible.” The bombing itself, or the pretext for it, is not

critiqued, but the failure of the propaganda is lamented. In order to rectify such problems

he offers advice on how the United States can better achieve itʼs goals. Effective

propaganda, he writes, “must determine popular aspirations of those to whom the appeal

is made” and “must determine to what extent psychological warfare is capable of

supporting political policy.”44 Discussing Korea, the appearance of “white intervention”

could be refuted by “subsequent political, military and economic policies, which will

establish in the life experiences of the Korean people the anti-imperialistic, democratic

objectives of US policy.” Therefore, the immediate answer to the “psychological liability of

a given political or military policy” is not propaganda, but “policies that will establish the

psychological preconditions for successful propaganda.”45 After mentioning how to make

economic and technical aid “fully effective as a weapon of propaganda,” Morgenthau

confronts the issue of public opinion at home in the US. Here he advocates the

government use the “simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade” which are

“useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a

given policy.”46 In a similar discussion in his work Truth and Power, Morgenthau

expressed the hope that “a future historian...will write the story of the far flung, systematic

and largely successful efforts embarked upon by the government to suppress the truth and
44
ibid, p.327
45
ibid, p.329-330
46
ibid, p.330

11
bend it to its political interests.”47 Whilst Carr saw the role of the Realism and the scholar

as critiquing the States use of propaganda, implicitly aligning the scholar with the public,

Morgenthau displays an elitist political philosophy, whereby Realism, and the Realist

scholar, become an adviser, not a critic, of the State.

Like Carr, Morgenthau also discussed the role of ideology in State propaganda, but again

the difference is noteworthy. Morgenthau sees statesmen cloaking real intentions in

ideology as part of the “very nature of politics.”48 This is important, he argues, and a

necessary tool of statesmen, because it “is the only way a nation can attain the

enthusiasm and willingness to sacrifice without which no foreign policy can pass the

ultimate test of strength.”49 This is especially true in the US, he notes, where the weight of

American power in international affairs “is to a peculiar degree dependent on the moods of

American public opinion.”50 When examining which types of ideology are most efficient, he

advises that “peace and international law are eminently qualified to serve” in this respect.51

These are ideologies that can prove particularly effective since “the popular mind, unaware

of the fine distinctions of the statesmanʼs thinking, reasons more often than not in the

simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil.”52 Walter

Lippmann, a contemporary of Morgenthau and influential 20th century political thinker,

shared his contempt for public inclusion in politics:

Where mass opinion dominates the government, there is a morbid derangement of the true functions of

power. The derangement brings about the enfeeblement, verging on paralysis, of the capacity to govern.

47
Morgenthau, H. ʻTruth and Powerʼ, Praeger, London, 1970. p.26
48
Morgenthau, H, 1971, p.85
49
ibid, p.86
50
ibid, p.130
51
ibid, p.87
52
ibid, p.142
12
This breakdown in the constituted order is the cause of the precipitate and catastrophic decline of western
53
society.

Unsurprisingly Morgenthau, commenting on this work, found it to be “animated by a noble

and moving faith.”54

Whilst Carr declared the scholar should aim to bolster the public knowledge of international

affairs, Morgenthau advised statesmen that they must “resist the temptation to sacrifice”

what they consider a good policy “upon the alter of public opinion.” Governments must, he

continues, come to recognise that “conflict between the requirements of good foreign

policy and the preferences of public opinion is in the nature of things.” Furthermore,

government “must realise that it is the leader, not the slave, of public opinion; that public

opinion is not a static thing to be discovered and classified...but that it is a dynamic ever

changing entity to be continuously created and recreated by informed and responsible

leadership.” This “moulding,” he contends, is the “historic mission” of the government.55

Regarding the nature of political debate in democratic societies, Morgenthau remarks

uncritically that little information and few ideas “unfavorable to the national point of view”

are allowed to reach the public. Instead, “with few exceptions, only men and organisations

of considerable means and those who hold opinions approved by them can make

themselves heard in the arena of public opinion.” These assertions are, he says, “too

obvious to require elaboration.”56

53
Lippmann, W. ʻThe Public Philosophy,ʼ Little, Brown and Co, Boston. 1955. p.14-15
54
Morgenthau, H. ʻDilemmas of Politicsʼ, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958 p.380
55
Morgenthau, H. 1971, p.142
56
ibid, p.254

13
The notion of the national interest, critiqued by Carr, was a concept on which Morgenthau

wrote extensively throughout his academic career. So important did he deem this factor,

that in Dilemmas of Politics he argued any theory of international politics should take the

concept of ʻnational interestʼ as its primary focus.57 Defining his Realism in Politics Among

Nations, Morgenthau assumed that unitary State actors seek interests, defined as power.58

Elsewhere in the same work, he clarifies that the “unitary” State is in reality “the individuals

who, when they appear as representatives of their nation on the international scene, wield

the power and pursue the policies of their nation” and “it is to them that we refer when we

speak in empirical terms of the power and of the foreign policy of a nation.”59 Morgenthau

is surely aware of the paradox in his ideas. Human nature, in his theory, is considered to

be dominated by a selfish lust for power except, that is, among statesmen who unselfishly

pursue the national interest rather than their own. In other works, however, Morgenthau

was more revealing in his discussion of these issues. For example, when discussing the

legitimacy of the term ʻnational interest,ʼ he conceded that on a sub-national level, there

are group interests, particularly “ethnic and economic,” which tend to “identify themselves

with the national interest.”60 Mentioning the role of economic interests in foreign policy, he

considers it doubtful that these have had an impact on planning except in “a few

spectacular cases”. More worrying, he states, is the “peculiar vulnerability of the national

interest of the United States to usurpation by the interests of other nations,” most notably

“communist subversion.”61 This denial of the plausibility of elite interests effecting policy is

confusing in light of later discussion, where he argues “no social action can be completely

free of the taint of egotism which, as selfishness, pride or self deception, seeks for the

actor more than is his due.” This discussion continues in his work Truth and Power. Here

57
Morgenthau, H. 1958. p.54
58
Morgenthau, H. 1971. p.8
59
ibid, p.98
60
Morgenthau, H. 1958. p.69
61
ibid, p.69
14
Morgenthau acknowledged that the gap between what the American government does and

what it says it does is “as wide as ever.” A significant factor in influencing what America

does, he asserts, is the distribution of power, which has “survived all reform movements.”62

This distribution is characterised by “unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of

ruling groups, who possess a near monopoly of the most effective technologies of

communication, transportation and welfare.”63 The result then, is that power has shifted to

certain “technological elites, military and scientific,” who are not democratically

responsible.64 Perhaps most tellingly, Morgenthau reiterated the properties of the national

interest in an article in the liberal journal New Republic. The national interest, he says, is

not defined by a man or political party but “imposes itself as an objective datum upon all

men applying their rational faculties to the conduct of foreign policy.” However, he later

notes that the “concentrations of private power which have actually governed America

since the civil war” had “preserved their hold on the levers of political decision.”65

The preceding discussion has shown that whilst Morgenthau was aware the ʻnational

interestʼ was a largely deceptive term, he chose not to acknowledge this in his theory

outlined in Politics Among Nations. As we have seen, an excavation of a number of his

works is needed to determine his views. If acknowledged, the implications for any

discussion of national interest are profound. Given his own remarks, if Morgenthau were

to have faithfully transplanted these ideas into his theory it would not be radical to replace

the term ʻnational interestʼ with ʻclass interest.ʼ However, his decision not to include this

critical aspect may be largely due to what Morgenthau saw as the role of IR theory and the

discipline as a whole.

62
Morgenthau, H. 1970. p.4
63
ibid, p.7
64
ibid, p.215
65
Morgenthau, H. cited in Chomsky, N. Otero, CP. ʻEducation and Democracy,ʼ Routledge, London 2003
p.147

15
Theory, he says, must “bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomenon.”66 A better

understanding of this phenomenon can put the scholar “in the position of the statesmen” to

“determine what rational options are when faced with a problem.”67 Taking into account

Morgenthauʼs approach outlined earlier, it is unsurprising whose statesmen he is referring

to. Clarifying his allegiance, he writes:

Since in the world the US holds a position of predominant power, and hence of foremost responsibility, the

understanding of the forces that mold international politics and of the factors that determine its course has

become for the United States more than an interesting intellectual occupation. It has become a vital
68
necessity.

Similarly, when listing questions regarding which kind of weapons/soldiers are useful

where and when, Morgenthau follows with the statement: “Upon the quality of the answers

we [scholars] give to these and similar questions today will depend the future power of the

US in relation to other nations.”69 He also implores academics to discover what the

industrialisation of Brazil, China and India will signify for the military strength of these

countries; to attempt to rank the worldʼs nations in terms of power; and ultimately, the

“supreme intellectual achievement” would be “detecting under the surface of present

power relations the germinal developments of the future.”70 For Morgenthau then, IR

should be inextricably linked to the home-government, for whom the academic then

becomes a military adviser or strategy analyst concerned with prediction as opposed to

critique.

66
Morgenthau, H. 1971. p.3
67
ibid, p.5
68
ibid, p.21
69
ibid, p.118
70
ibid, p.146-153
16
Given this allegiance to the State, Morgenthau deemed it important to, in terms of theory,

justify government behaviour. For example, when analysing military foreign policy in

Politics Among Nations, he argues policies that seek to maintain the status-quo cannot be

imperialistic, whereas actions intended to increase a Stateʼs power invariably are.71 This is

an exceptionally biased conclusion that largely exonerates the powerful nations from

accusations of imperialism; unsurprising perhaps given Morgenthauʼs earlier statement of

allegiance to the US. Moreover, he argues that a policy of prestige (a display of power

through violence) is an indispensable element of “rational foreign policy.”72 Therefore, the

United States can use its power to violently impress the notion upon Latin America that it is

an “unchallengeable force in the region” and this would not be constituted as imperialistic

because the US is only trying to maintain the status quo; a state of affairs that has already

acquired a “a certain moral legitimacy.”73 74 Consequently, the cold war itself was a war of

prestige, and not imperialism, as the US and USSR sought to “win the support” of the

uncommitted nations.75 Morgenthau contends that because of the legitimacy of status-quo

non-imperialistic policy, there is no need to use ideology and it can be stated for what it is.

The US then, the most powerful State in the world, implicitly has no need for ideology. For

the student of IR, he argues later on in the work, “one of the most important and difficult

tasks” is to “see through ideological disguises.”76 Given the previous discussion, it is

evident that, for students in the US, this does not apply to their own government.

Prediction and advice, not critique, become the goals for theorists in IR. Examining the

scholar-government relationship, Morgenthau noted that the intellectual can respond to

71
ibid, p.37
72
ibid, p.77
73
ibid, p.76
74
ibid, p.86
75
ibid, p.77
76
ibid, p.93

17
ʻpowerʼ (government) in four ways; retreat to the ivory tower, prophetic confrontation

(confront those in power), give expert advice to the government or surrender.77 The option

of informing the public is not mentioned.

The contrast in approach between Carr and Morgenthau is, as we have seen, significant.

Morgenthau, although aware of the same issues as Carr, adopted a uncritical State-

serving approach to IR and conveyed a contempt for public opinion and democracy.

Considering Realism in this new form came to dominate IR, this transformation has had

widespread implications for Realism and the discipline itself. Regardless, the two scholars

are considered part of the same Realist paradigm, although Morgenthau is more widely

considered the “founding father of the discipline.”78 After Classical Realism, the most

contemporary version of Realist theory is typified by the work of Kenneth Waltz and his

structural or ʻNeoRealistʼ approach. Therefore, this will be the focus of the next section.

77
Morgenthau, H. 1970. p.15
78
Hoffmann, S. ʻAn American Social Science: International Relationsʼ in Hoffmann, S. ʻJanus and Minerva:
Essays in the theory and practice of international politicsʼ Westview Press, London 1987 p.6
18
Kenneth Waltz and NeoRealism

Kenneth Waltz, in his Theory of International Politics, attempted to create a

structural/systemic theory of international politics and in doing so initiated the ʻNeoRealistʼ

school of thought in IR. Waltz argued that a theory concerned with the structure of the

international system is necessary because the condition of international politics cannot be

inferred by analysing the internal composition of States; theories which do this he

considered “reductionist.”79 Whereas Morgenthau stressed the importance of the inherent

evil of man, Waltz departs from this fundamental assumption and contends that the nature

of international politics instead be attributed to the systemʼs anarchical structure; that is,

the lack of international government. As with Morgenthau, this assumption largely

exonerates powerful nations from any accusations of responsibility for the violent nature of

international affairs.

It may be worthwhile briefly outlining the systemic NeoRealist theory of international

relations developed by Waltz. The premise for a systemic level of analysis is derived from

the observation that throughout history, despite having numerous different compositions of

actors with vastly varying characteristics (empires, city states, nation states, tribes etc.) we

repeatedly experience the same phenomena (e.g. wars and conflicts). Waltz states

“despite changes in attributes of actors, there is repetition and similarity in international

outcomes.”80 Hence, he assumes that the causes are systemic; results of constraints

exerted by the structure of the system in which States find themselves.81 Within the

theory, States are considered to strive at minimum for their survival and at maximum for

79
Waltz, K. ʻTheory of International Politics,ʼ Addison Wesley Publishing Company, London, 1979. p. 64.
80
Waltz, K. 1979 p.63
81
ibid, p.72

19
world domination, and in doing so engage in ʻself-helpʼ behaviour.82 The ʻnational interestʼ

then is a result of a State, having examined its security requirements, trying to meet

them.83 Waltz defines ʻpowerʼ as a combination of internal (economic capability and

military strength) and external (building alliances or weaken opposing ones) factors. The

major assumption of his work, which defines it as systemic, is that “a systems structure

acts as a constraint on the systems units.”84 Although he acknowledges internal factors

are important in deciding upon action, the systemʼs structure constrains the actions that

can or should be followed. He argued that not all States would react to these pressures in

the same way, but instead interpret the signals sent to them by the system and behave

how they see fit. Nor does he assume that States are rational. Consequently he mitigates

for States who read the structure incorrectly by asserting that they will be punished by the

system.85 In this way, States that read the signals from the system correctly will benefit,

whilst, Waltz argues, those acting against the constraints will not.86 The ʻbalance of powerʼ

concept is key to Waltzʼs theory. Importantly, this balance is considered not to be reached

intentionally by States; a State can decide to ʻbandwagonʼ behind powerful States or

opposed them. Either way, it is assumed that they will unwittingly reach a level of

equilibrium. The purpose of the balance of power theory, according to Waltz, is not to say

how a State will react to a certain structure, but what it is it will have to react to.87 Waltzʼs

theory then, argues that States unwilling to respond to changes in the ʻbalance of powerʼ

will inevitably suffer.

82
ibid, p.91
83
ibid, p.134
84
ibid, p.58
85
ibid, p.118
86
ibid, p.192
87
ibid, p.122
20
Taking NeoRealism as a normative guide for statesmen, it is evident that they must seek,

in the powerful nations, to maintain the status quo; regardless of public opinion.

Therefore, State propaganda is condoned in order for statesmen to engage in a ʻbalance

of powerʼ game. NeoRealism does not to attempt to change the nature of international

politics, but to recommend and justify courses of action within the current framework. It is

perhaps to be expected then, that among Western scholarship (i.e the powerful nations in

world affairs), Waltzʼs work is considered the most influential book on IR of its

generation.88

Where as Morgenthau and Carr discussed States and propaganda, admittedly from

different angles, Waltzʼs work, largely because of the systemic focus, has little time for an

examination of these issues. He does note, however, that States are the “primary vehicles

of ideology” and, regarding the ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries, observes;

“International movements were captured by individual nations, adherents to the creed were

harnessed to the nationʼs interest, international programs were manipulated by national

governments, and ideology became a prop to national policy.”89 The discussion is minimal

and not critical. When he does confront these issues, it is in the context of advice for the

US government:

The US can justify her actions abroad in either or both of two ways. First, we can exaggerate the Russian or

communist threat and overreact to slight dangers. The domino theory is a necessary one if a traditional

rational in terms of security is to be offered for periphery military actions. Second, we can act for the good of

other people.

88
Brown, C. ʻUnderstanding International Relationsʼ, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005. p.45
89
Waltz, K. 1979 p.173

21
Analysing the ʻStateʼ, Waltz assumes it is a unitary actor, largely mitigating discussion

regarding the internal distribution of power and influence. However, he confronted the

notion of the State as an individual unit in his earlier work, Man, the State and War. There,

he acknowledged that “it does violence to the common sense” to think of the State, which

is “after all an abstraction and consequently inanimate,” as acting. Regardless, he adopts

this assumption because it is considered “an important point for any theory of international

relations.”90 As with Morgenthau, the role of the scholar is implicitly to support the home

government. Thus, in A Theory of International Politics Waltz devotes a significant

proportion of the work to justifying US actions and advising the US government on future

policy. Notably, he argues against the emergence of a united Europe, which could align

with the USSR, and later devotes a chapter to analysing the US and its ability to manage

the world.91 Considering US interventions since World War II, he notes the “US has

responded expensively in distant places to wayward events that could hardly effect

anyoneʼs fate outside the region.” These “miscalculations” are risky as they can threaten a

change in the balance of power. However, he justifies “overreaction” as the “lesser evil

because it costs only money and the fighting of limited wars.”92 The millions of deaths as a

result of the “overreaction” in Indochina are not mentioned. Referring to Edward W

Brookes assessment of the Vietnam War as a “just” effort to secure what is “best for South

Vietnam, and most honorable and decent for ourselves,” Waltz adds “he was right.” In

light of this, he contends that “States, and especially the major ones, do not act only for

their own sakes...they also act for the Worldʼs common good.” The problem however is

simply that “the common good is defined by each of them [individual States] for all of us,

90
Waltz, K. ʻMan, the State and Warʼ, Colombia University Press, New York, 1959 p.175 Waltz discussed
the three images of focus for a theory of international politics; man, the state and the system. This is
considered an important piece of scholarship that laid the foundations for the systemic/structural focus of A
Theory of International Politics.
91
Waltz, K. 1979. p.202. Chapter 9 is referred to.
92
ibid, p.172
22
and the definitions conflict.”93 The “countries at the top...blend necessary or exaggerated

worries about security with concern for the State of the system.” That is, they seek to

maintain the status quo. Waltz briefly alludes as to what this has entailed for the US: “In

attempting to contrive an international security order, the United States also promoted its

economic interests and gave expression to itʼs political aspirations for the world.”94

However, the influence of economic interests on policy is not warranted any further

discussion.

Continuing his State-serving philosophy, Waltz writes, “if political outcomes are determined

by what States are like, then we must be concerned with, and if necessary do something

to change, the internal dispositions of the internationally important ones.”95 This is not,

however, self-referential. The quote follows a citation of Morgenthau who was discussing

US concern with the domestic situation of Russia.96 This approach was also apparent in

Man, the State and War. Mentioning the ideas of Laswell, who argued for the re-

orientating minds as opposed to governments, Waltz responds: “Would Laswell, if he could

have his wish rather change the Soviet system of education or the Soviet system of

government?”97 Similarly, quoting Klinebergʼs statement, “we cannot know everything, but

the more we know the better,” Waltz interprets we to mean the United States government,

asking “are we in a cold war with the Soviet Union because we do not understand

communist societies well enough?”98 When he does mention references to introspection

93
ibid, p.205
94
ibid, p.199
95
ibid, p.62
96
Morgenthau argues that Russia should be more domestically liberal and that American concern with this
was not “meddling in the domestic affairs of another country...rather it reflects the recognition that a stable
peace, founded on a stable Balance of Power, is predicated on a common moral framework that expresses
the commitment of all the nations concerned to certain basic moral principles, of which the preservation of
the Balance of Power is one.” Morgenthau, H. ʻDetente: The Balance Sheet,ʼ The New York Times, March
28th 1974.
97
Waltz, K. 1959. p.55
98
ibid, p.55

23
Waltz is dismissive. For example, he quotes Cottrell who argued, “research can show how

structure or other conditions must be altered to deprive presently powerful elites of their

ability to choose war, or how some presently existing condition must be altered so that

these elites will then choose not to go to war.” Waltzʼs response is that Cottrell

“overestimates the efficacy of reason.”99 Later, he condemns as “hopeless” the Liberal

objective for a system of social organisation that supports the utility of the people based on

public opinion, and not the utility of the minority.100

Aside from Waltz, another notable Realist, Robert Gilpin, in his War and Change in World

Politics, addresses the role of the scholar and the discipline. Referring to Carrʼs contention

that IR should “seek to establish methods of peaceful change,” he disagrees, stating: “The

real test for the peaceful State is to seek a peace that protects and guarantees itʼs vital

interests and its concept of international morality.”101 Evidently, the IR academic and

theorist should assist in realising this goal for his or her State. Like Waltz and

Morgenthau, Gilpin notes uncritically that the behaviour rewarded and punished by the

international system will “coincide with the interests of the most powerful members of the

social system.”102 Regarding the ʻnational interest,ʼ he acknowledges that fictitious States

“have no interests.” Instead, “the objectives and foreign policies of States are determined

primarily by the interests of the dominant members or ruling coalitions.” Despite this

acknowledgement, Gilpin sees this system as benign, with either “national security and

power” or “domestic economic stability ensuring the welfare of the populace” being

pursued by statesmen.103

99
ibid, p.75
100
ibid, p.102-119
101
Gilpin. ʻWar and Change in World Politicsʼ, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1981. p.8
102
ibid, p.9
103
ibid, p.18
24
John Mearsheimer, an influential theorist, developed offensive-Realism, whereby all States

are assumed to seek hegemony, in contrast to Waltzʼs defensive-Realism, where States

are considered to act for their own survival.104 Mearsheimer is explicit in his reason for

creating the theory, stating, “offensive realism is how States should act.”105 In his

conclusion he alludes to his conception of the role of the IR scholar, and IR theory, when

he asks “what are the implications of the preceding analysis for future American national

security policy?”106 That is, in an arena where every State seeks to rule the world, how

should the United States behave? A philosophy for the discipline shared, as we have

seen, by other Realists. Also, like earlier Realists, he acknowledges the role of ideology

and propaganda in politics, recognising in particular that public discourse in the US is often

“couched in the language of liberalism” and that “a discernible gap separates public

rhetoric from the actual conduct of American foreign policy.” The reason for this deception

is, he argues, because “Americans dislike realpolitik” and, as a result, the pronouncements

of policy elites are “heavily flavoured with optimism and moralism.” Again, the discussion

is not critical, and the deceiving rhetoric of “policy elites” who “behind closed doors…make

national security policy” is benign because they act “according to the dictates of realist

logic.”107 Henry Kissinger, a prominent Realist scholar-turned-Statesmen and key

architect of Cold War foreign policy in the US, was possibly most forthright in his

understanding of the role of the academic adviser or “expert” in society. They should, he

writes, at a “high level...elaborate and define the consensus” of those who have a “vested

interest in commonly held opinions or assumptions.” His prior discussion is regarding the

104
Hegemony signifies dominance or leadership of one country or social group over others
105
Mearsheimer, J. ʻThe Tragedy of Great Power Politicsʼ, W.W.Norton and Co, London, 2001. p.11
106
ibid, p.401
107
ibid, p.25

25
interests of political and business elites. It is implicit that it is these interests that “experts”

should be elaborating.108

The previous analysis has traced the Realist approach from EH Carr to contemporary

thought in the core texts of the school. A number of issues have arisen. First, it is clear

that the Realism advocated by Carr was very different, minus assumptions regarding

power seeking States, from the later Classical and NeoRealist schools. Second, the

purpose of Realism, the scholar and IR, as Carr saw it, has shifted from “unmasking

selfish vested interests” to create a better informed public, to supporting, advising and

justifying the actions of the home-State. As a consequence, the issues deemed most

pressing by Carr at the beginning of the discipline have been widely neglected in the

Realist paradigm. Given these developments, the paper will now turn to the contemporary

mainstream theoretical paradigms in order to determine the prevalent approach to IR and

the extent to which the issues raised by Carr have been addressed.

108
Kissinger, H. “American Foreign Policy”, Widdenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1969. p.28
26
CHAPTER II
The Contemporary Paradigms

The analysis that follows focuses on some of the primary texts within mainstream IR

paradigms. This is not meant to be a comprehensive discussion; the body of work is

simply to large. But we can look at the core texts of the mainstream schools in order to

determine their approach and their purpose for the discipline. After addressing these

schools of thought, I will then examine the paradigm to which Carrʼs ideas have been

transposed. Liberalism, often presented as the main competitor to Realism, will first be

discussed. Thereafter the paper will look at two emerging and influential paradigms,

Constructivism and the English School. Finally, moving away from the mainstream, the

paper will look at the Critical Theorists whose ideas have become more prominent since

the 1980s.109

Liberalism

Liberalism in International Relations is a paradigm based on fundamentally different

assumptions to Realism. As opposed to the Realists, Liberals see human nature as

essentially good, with a human concern for others making progress possible. Bad

behaviour is therefore the product of corrupting institutions and social arrangements, which

motivate people to act selfishly and harm others. As a result of these assumptions, war is

109
I have taken the reading lists for the paradigms from a range of textbooks (see the bibliography).
Although the discussion here leaves out a number of paradigmatic approaches, I have chosen mainly those
that are presented as important within the core textbooks. The pattern continuously emerges whereby a
substantial amount of space is given to the Realist and Liberal Schools, then follows Constructivism and the
English School and thereafter comes Critical and Postmodernist approaches. It is debatable whether this
ordering or level of attention is justified, but importantly it is largely presented to the student of IR in this way,
and hence, in such a short paper, these will be the areas of focus. I also realise that many critical
approaches exist within theories of International Political Economy (dependency theory, world systems
theory etc,) but my discussion is concerned predominantly with mainstream IR paradigms.

27
not considered inevitable but can be overcome by collective action.110 With its emphasis

on individual rights, private property and representative government, Liberalism is

essentially a domestic theory.111 However, as with Realism, contemporary Liberalism has

ʻinternationalisedʼ and developed a ʻneoʼ variant that focuses on the structure of the

international system. The structural approach developed by NeoLiberal theorists accepts

the core assumptions of NeoRealism, but differs regarding the ability of States to

cooperate and the role of international organisations. The result has been a profound

convergence between the two approaches. Baldwin, identifying the similarities, has shown

that in the six areas where the schools differ, the divergence is largely a question of the

amount of importance the theories attribute to these factors. The most prominent issue

being whether States cooperate under absolute or relative gains.112 NeoLiberalism then,

has emerged as a uncritical, status quo approach differing only superficially from

NeoRealism. Despite their fundamentally different assumptions to Realists regarding

human nature, it is significant that Liberals would choose the same approach to IR theory.

Moreover, it is evident that NeoLiberals share a State-facing purpose for the discipline with

the Realists. Robert Keohane, a prominent NeoLiberal whose After Hegemony is

considered the archetypal work of the school, has argued that theory is “useful” because it

could, for example, have better guided US foreign policy in the 1950ʼs.113 Implicitly in this

sentence, but also throughout his work, he expresses the belief that a ʻgoodʼ IR theory

could appeal to the statesmen and “change the premises” of US policy. The record so far,

110
Kegley, C. ʻControversies in International Relations Theoryʼ St Martins Press, New York 1995. p.4
111
Doyle, M. ʻWays of War and Peaceʼ Norton and Company, London, 1997. p.208
112
Baldwin, D. ʻNeoLiberalism, NeoRealism and World Politicsʼ in Baldwin, D. ed. ʻNeoRealism and
NeoLiberalism: The Contemporary Debate” Columbia University Press, New York, 1993. p.4-8 The areas
are anarchy, International co-operation, priority of State goals, intentions vs capabilities, institutions and
regimes, and relative or absolute gains. In each case, he notes, the difference is the assumed relative
influence or importance of each of the factors. Grieco also discusses the relative-absolute discussion in his
ʻAnarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Internationalismʼ included in
Baldwinʼs book.
113
Keohane, R. 1986. p.3
28
he contends, is due to the “limitations of Realist assumptions.”114 (This belief that

Governments are readily receptive to ʻbetterʼ theories will be discussed in more detail later

in the paper). Regarding the problems raised by Carr, these are discussed briefly in

Keohaneʼs influential collaboration with Joseph Nye. The authors mention the role of elite

interests, which are “dressed up with the cloak called national interests.” However, their

brief discussion is in a section titled “Limits of Systemic Explanations,” i.e. issues outside

the remit of the NeoLiberal approach.115

Away from the ʻNeoʼ school, Immanuel Kantʼs ʻdemocratic peace,ʼ based on the

assumption that democracies do not go to war with each other, has been the subject of a

significant amount of Liberal scholarship. Although works focusing on these areas have

the opportunity to discuss and try to improve the extent or nature of democracy enjoyed,

such efforts are rarely forthcoming. David Held, who is prominent in this area, in his

Democracy and the New International Order, accepts that “liberal representative

democracy” has certain problems, including the “connection between the spheres of public

and private” and “connections between public authority and economic power.”116 No more

discussion is afforded these issues and instead a highly normative cosmopolitan

democracy model, “a system of governance which arises from and is adapted to the

diverse conditions and interconnections of different peoples and nations,” is outlined.117

Similarly Russett, one of the most important contributors to the debate regarding the

democratic peace, uses his work to largely exonerate State violence in the name of good

theory. At the beginning of his work, he equates “democracy” with “polyarchy;” the latter

meaning literally ʻrule by the manyʼ in a representative democracy with substantial interest-

114
Keohane, R. Nye, J. ʻPower and Interdependenceʼ Longman, New York, 2001. p.viii
115
ibid, p.135
116
Held, D. ʻDemocracy and the New International Orderʼ in Archibugi, D. Held, D. eds. ʻCosmopolitan
Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Orderʼ Polity Press, Oxford 1995 p.97-98
117
ibid, p.106

29
group influence on government.118 Thereafter he is content to use the terms

interchangeably. A discussion of whether in a polyarchy, with its concentrated sectors of

power, the public opinion could be influenced is not forthcoming. There is also a refusal to

engage with a discussion of whether propaganda plays a role in these societies. Russett

contends that in “democracies, the constraints of checks and balances, division of power,

and need for public debate to enlist widespread support will slow decisions to use large

scale violence and reduce the likelihood that such decisions will be made.”119 This is not

the case, he continues, with leaders of non-democratic States who are not constrained to

this effect. In the course of his study, Russett notes that democratic States frequently go

to war with non-democratic States. Attempting to exonerate the “democracies,” he argues

that because non-democratic leaders are not constrained by the public and can resort to

violence more easily, they are likely to demand heavier concessions from those

governments that are constrained. In this case, large-scale violence may be initiated by

the democratic society in order to prevent them having to make such concessions.120 He

goes on to analyse whether US intervention in Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Brazil, Chile

and Nicaragua, where the leaders were democratically elected, could refute the

democratic peace thesis. He argues they donʼt, because all of these countries were

ʻanocraciesʼ at the time.121 This is a statement rather at odds with the historical record, but

is one that serves to further ʻproveʼ the democratic peace thesis.122 He also argues

“American officials might believe they were defending at least the chances for democracy”

in these countries, despite later noting “where governments were overthrown the

replacements were less democratic than their predecessors” with the caveat “though that

118
Russett, B. ʻGrasping the Democratic Peaceʼ Princeton, University Press, New Jersey 1993. p.14
ʻPolyarchyʼ definition in McLean, I. McMillan, A. ʻThe Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politicsʼ Oxford University
Press 2003
119
ibid, p.40
120
ibid, p.40
121
ibid, p.121, p.122
122
ibid, p.24
30
was not necessarily the US intention.”123 At the beginning of his work Russett advises that

the “rich countries,” post Cold War, should push for democracy and “free markets.”124

Only at the end of his analysis does Russett concede that “a misunderstanding of the

democratic peace could encourage war making against authoritarian regimes.” He could

have added ʻrepresent a suitable pretext.ʼ Other Liberals have adopted similar status-quo,

uncritical approaches. John Ikenberry, for example, studying US hegemony contends it

has contributed to a liberal world order that has made the world more stable. He

concludes that “US hegemony is fundamentally reluctant, penetrated and highly

institutionalised - or in a word, liberal.”125

Outside of the mainstream scholarship within the Liberal paradigm there have been some

efforts to address the issues being discussed here. This group of scholars, who challenge

the assumption that the international arena and its institutions are essentially liberal i.e.

they are critical of the international order, are labelled “radicals.”126 Freund and Rittberger,

for example, echo Carrʼs discussion of elites when they argue “political leaders seek power

and want to remain in power, while societal actors pursue - above all - economic interests.”

Responsive governments will consequently “pursue foreign policy in accordance with the

economic interests of domestic actors.”127 Andrew Moravcsik has, since the late 1990ʼs,

attempted to develop a theory in this mould, whereby the key variable is “the mode of

domestic political representation, which determines whose social preferences are

123
ibid, p.123
124
ibid, introduction.
125
Ikenberry, J. ʻLiberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Orderʼ in Paul, T.V. and Hall, J.A.
ʻInternational Order and the Future of World Politicsʼ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. p.139
126
Dunne, T. ʻLiberalismʼ in Baylis, J. Smith, S. ʻThe Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to
International Relationsʼ, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006. p.197
127
Freund and Rittberger quoted in Dunne, T. Kurki, M. Smith S. ʻInternational Relations Theories: Discipline
and Diversity,ʼ Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007 p.99

31
institutionally privileged.”128 Burnheim, also concerned with these issues, has called for a

more democratic system where “functional authorities should be directly accountable to the

communities and citizens whose interests are directly affected by their actions.”129

It is an inditement of the political philosophy of mainstream IR that these views are

considered “radical”; particularly in the Liberal school with its emphasis (or stated

emphasis) on the corrupting nature of institutions.130 Liberals, who advocate

representative governments, would be assumed to be the most concerned with making

States more democratic, i.e. the public better informed, but this has not been the case in

the mainstream. Burchill has noted “the purpose of theoretical enquiry is to find ways of

making international politics more pacific and just.”131 However, in the main, Liberal

scholars have attempted to make international politics seem more pacific and just.132

128
Moravcsik, A. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, International
Organization 51, 4, Autumn 1997 p. 530
129
Burnheim quoted in Held, D. McGrew, A. “The Global Transformations Reader” Polity Press, Oxford,
2000. p.411
130
Dunne (see note 126) actually takes the discussion of these “radical” values to the level of absurdity when
he contends this group of scholars would like to “turn back the clock of globalization to an era in which local
producers cooperated to produce socially responsible food in the day and wove baskets or watched street
theatre in the evening”. The implicit assumption is that a call for more democratic institutions is a call for
societal regression. A discussion of the role of elite economic interests is not as ʻradicalʼ as Dunne seems to
think. Possibly the most well known classical liberal figure, Adam Smith, observed that in foreign and
domestic affairs it would be the “merchants and manufacturers” whose interests the State would attend to.
Smith, A. ʻAn enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nationsʼ 1976 Book IV p.180
131
Burchill, S. in the introduction to Burchill, S. Devetak, R. Linklater, A. Paterson, M. Reus-Smit, C. True, J.
ʻTheories of International Relations,ʼ Palgrave Macmillan, London 2005 p.18
132
Dunneʼs chapter on Liberalism in Baylis and Smith is particularly confused. He consistently mixes moral,
economic, and political liberalism. Likewise, ignoring Carr, those who profess Liberal values are
consequently considered Liberal, regardless of the evidence. Possibly the most recurrent example of
Liberals, and IR scholars in general, not heeding Carrʼs advice are the discussions of Woodrow Wilson (who
was targeted by Carr to much Liberal furore at the time, particularly David Davies who inaugurated the
Woodrow Wilson Chair at the University of Aberystwyth). Wilson is consistently referred to as “a liberal
visionary,” the epitomy of “State centred Liberalism” (to take a few examples from the bibliography) etc.
However, under Wilson the US invaded Mexico, Haiti (overthrowing the parliamentary system), Dominican
Republic and Nicaragua. His secretary of State praised him for opening the “doors of all the weaker
countries to an invasion of American capital and American enterprise.” Wilson himself had stated
“concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of State, even if the sovereignty of
unwilling nations be outraged in the process...the doors of the nations which are closed must be battered
down.” He supported the “righteous conquest of foreign markets” because “our domestic markets no longer
suffice, we need foreign markets.” Number 5 of his fourteen points requests “A free, open-minded, and
absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in
determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal
32
Possibly, as Keohane has stated, the hope is that these theories will convince

governments to act differently. In contrast, Kenneth Waltz, in his critique of Liberalism,

has argued, echoing Carr, that the “peace and justice which liberals claim is spreading

beyond the central core, will be defined to the interests of the powerful.”133

My intention here has been to show the uncritical nature of mainstream Liberal thought in

IR, as well as outline the approach that has been taken in order to progress towards a

more “pacific and just” world. In the main, Liberals have focused on stressing the liberal

aspects of the world system in the hope that Statesmen will see their mistakes and act

differently. Similarly, Liberalism has been marked by highly normative discussions that

recommend future arrangements for the international system. As we have seen, those

who do question the liberal nature of the system or shift the focus to a critical analysis are

marginalised as ʻradicals.ʼ

Constructivism and The English School

Much like mainstream Liberalism, scholars of the English and Constructivist schools have

adopted a predominantly uncritical approach to International Relations. Both paradigms

emphasise the roles of norms, rules and institutions to a greater extent than the Realists

and Liberals. Hedley Bullʼs The Anarchical Society is considered the masterwork of the

English School.134 The book is an “enquiry into the nature of order in world politics” which

accepts Waltzʼs anarchy framework with autonomous self-helping States but focuses as

well on the extent to which ʻsocietyʼ exists in varying systems (bi-, multi- or uni-polar) of

weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.” As stated earlier, the
discrepancy has gone largely unnoticed in IR scholarship, and Wilson is everywhere a ʻLiberal.ʼ See Zinn, H.
ʻA Peopleʼs History of the United States: The Twentieth Century,ʼ Harper Perennial, New York 2003 p81.
133
Waltz cited in Burchill, S. ʻLiberalismʼ in Burchill, S. Devetak, R. Linklater, A. Paterson, M. Reus-Smit, C.
True, J. 2005 p.35
134
Brown, C. 2005 p.51

33
world order.135 Like Waltz, Bull takes the State as a unitary actor without investigation into

internal distributions of power. There is also a clear refusal to critique State propaganda in

the way Carr advocated. Bull argues, for example, that modern States only go to war for

security reasons, which can include “the making safe of governments abroad with

congenial ideologies.” As Carr discussed 40 years before, security is almost universally

the rhetoric of all State violence, but Bull is willing to accept it as a reason for violent action

without further analysis.136 In this uncritical approach, as with the Liberals, the hope of

Bullʼs theory is implicitly that a modification of Waltzʼs work to include discussions of

ʻsocietyʼ, which it must be tacitly assumed is the most pressing issue at the present time,

will help to prevent ignorance that leads to war.

Somewhat similarly to the English School, the aim of the Constructivists is to draw

attention to the ways in which actors in world politics are socially constructed. In this

respect, they see the Realist and Liberal theories as being “under socialized.”137

Essentially, it is an ontological disagreement that separates the Constructivists from these

other schools. Alexander Wendt, in his Social Theory of International Politics, takes a

systemic approach similar to Waltz, but he sees the structure of the international system

as a distribution of “ideas” as opposed to power-seeking States. Consequently, an idealist

ontology, as opposed to materialist with Waltz, is adopted.138 Wendt also makes the

assumption that States “really are agents” as opposed to “useful fictions or metaphors.”

The reason he does this is because decision makers routinely speak in terms of “national

interest,” “needs,” “responsibilities,” and “rationality” and it is “through this talk that States

135
Bull, H. “The Anarchical Society”, Palgrave, London, 1977. Intro and p.4
136
ibid, p.189 Bull displays a similar allegiance to the Realists; when listing countries he considers to have
resorted to war simply to spread an ideology, his list is wholly comprised of enemies of the West: Soviet
Union, China, Cuba, United Arab Republic and Algeria.
137
Wendt, A. ʻA Social Theory of International Politicsʼ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999. p.4
138
ibid, p.5-6
34
constitute themselves and others as agents.”139 As a result, Wendtʼs theory is highly

abstract, by his own admission, and consequently critical only in terms of ontological

differences, and not in terms of approach.140 In a paper titled What is International

Relations For? Wendt outlined his purpose for the discipline. The overall aim for the

scholar, he argues, is to develop a science for the “purposive control over the

constitutional evolution of the world system.” If the world is going to develop a “constitutive

order (i.e. the UN, EU, WTO, NATO etc),” Wendt says, “It makes sense to think skeptically

about how we might direct this process.”141 He therefore advocates the “steering” of this

constitutive order by academics who must attempt to influence States, and not civil society,

because this is a better way of “getting things done.”142 The scholar of IR, he continues,

should try to “create expectations in the same way that advertisers create tastes.”143

Whether this “steering” could be misused, or whether it should be more democratically

decided upon, are issues not confronted.

Analysing the assumptions of the two main texts in these schools is by no means a fair

reflection of the broad scope of thought which these paradigms engender.144 However, my

aim has been to show the core assumptions, level of focus of the schools and their

differences from the Liberal and Realist approaches. As we have seen, both have chosen

a structural/systemic theory that aims to place more attention on ideas, norms, institutions

and their socially constructed nature. Consequently, the same issues raised with the

NeoLiberal and NeoRealist position apply here; namely, a focus which moves away from

139
ibid, p.10
140
Wendt admits the approach is abstract, but elsewhere has contended that he is a critical theorist because
he differs from Realists in this way. I disagree with this, as a critique of a predominant ontology does not
constitute a critical theory in my opinion.
141
Wendt, A. ʻWhat is International Relations For?ʼ in Jones, R. ed. 2001. p.207
142
ibid, p.215
143
ibid, p.222
144
Also, as Brown has noted, these are two schools which prove notoriously hard to pin down. Brown, C.
2005 p.48

35
the State allows far less space for a critical analysis of internal distributions of power and

influence. The aim of these schools then, is to bring different ontological and

epistemological factors to the forefront of IR theory. What is implied is an understanding of

these factors can lead us to better understand the international system and consequently

find ways to alleviate the most pressing international problems.

Critical Theory

It is perhaps unsurprising that those scholars most closely linked to Carrʼs critical approach

should now work within a paradigm loosely termed ʻCritical Theory.ʼ Away from the

mainstream, this Marxist influenced body of work represents a diverse range of thought

that aims for a “restructuring of social and political theory,” which challenges the

mainstream approaches and proposes alternatives.145 As Robert Cox famously asserted,

Critical Theory, which envisages the possibilities of structural transformation, is different

from mainstream “problem-solving theories” where the permanence of existing structures

is tacitly assumed and not challenged. 146 Problem solving theories, he argued, serve

“particular national, sectional or class interests which are comfortable within the given

order.”147 For critical theorists then, the aim is to “produce an analysis of society that aims,

eventually, to facilitate and support a process of emancipatory social transformation.”148

It is within this broad school that the critiques of Realism and Liberalism that I have

outlined, as well as the role of elites and the implications of domestic propaganda in

society raised by Carr, have been most comprehensively discussed. The Critical Theorists

145
Brown, C. “Critical Theory and Post-Modernism in International Relations” in Groom, AJR. “Contemporary
International Relations”, Pinter Publishers, London, 1994. p.58
146
Cox, R. ʻApproaches to World Orderʼ, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. p.53
147
Cox, R. ʻSocial Forces, States and World Orders,ʼ in Keohane, R. ed. 1986 p.209
148
Jones, R. 2001. p.67
36
are often separated into four groups; NeoGramscians, the Frankfurt School, Post-

Modernists and Feminists. All have developed different approaches to combating the

problems of the mainstream. However, it is among the NeoGramscians, and particularly

the work of Robert Cox, that, since the 1980ʼs, Carrʼs approach has been most faithfully

adopted.149

Cox has articulated and developed the ideas of Antonio Gramsci who, whilst imprisoned in

fascist Italy, analysed the subservience of intellectuals to State power. Gramsci noted

disapprovingly, “The role of the intellectual is to represent the ideas that constitute the

terrain where hegemony is exercised.” They must therefore supply intellectual and moral

support for the domestic hegemonʼs dominant political role to the point that “what is politics

to the productive class becomes rationality to the intellectual class.”150 Bringing these

ideas into the contemporary debate, Cox has argued that we cannot accept the notion of

ʻnational interestʼ unless we account for the “way in which dominant groups in the State

have been able, through concessions to the claims of subordinate groups, to evolve a

broadly accepted mode of thinking about general or national interests.”151 The similarity

here with Carr is particularly evident. Observing these problems, Coxʼs remedy is to

propose an alternative theoretical perspective and to develop a historical materialist

theory, in the Marxist tradition, that tries to “find the connections between the mental
149
It should be noted that the Post-Modernists have raised some of the points regarding realism that I
discussed in chapter I. In particular, Richard Ashleyʼs critique of NeoRealism is, in my opinion, the most
comprehensive discussion of the problems inherent in Waltzʼs approach. However, I have not included the
Post-Modernists because theirs is largely an ontological and epistemological challenge to the mainstream
approaches, bringing in discussions of discourse, the “other” in international relations, semiotics, genealogy
and “inter-textualism” and other ideas. Furthermore, I am unable to comprehend or see the purpose and/or
aim for a large body of the work. Fortunately I am not alone. Fred Halliday for example, discussing the
Postmodern approach and its language has referred to it as largely “meta-babble.” A position with which I
agree. Kenneth Waltz, in his reply to Ashleyʼs critique of NeoRealism is unable to respond fully because he
cannot understand the points Ashley is making. As Waltz then argues, the extremely convoluted language of
the Postmodernists only adds to the elitist discourse for which the social sciences are justifiably criticised. I
think this is a sensible point to make.
150
Gramsci, A. cited by Augelli, E. and Murphy, C. in Gill, S. “Gramsci, Historical Materialism and
International Relations”, Cambridge, 1993. p.131
151
Cox, R.1996. p.56

37
schema through which people conceive action and the material world which constrains

both what people can do and how they think about doing it.”152

The NeoGramscians raise many of the issues that Carr saw as problematic. However it

should be noted that Cox is saying, albeit in a more complex way, ideas that had been

articulated just as clearly within the discipline almost half a century earlier.153 Furthermore,

and possibly a cause for concern, Cox has attempted to internationalise these ideas as

opposed to analysing the extent to which dominant groups in the State (the ʻhistoric blocʼ

in Gramscian terms) might influence domestic factors which determine the ability to resort

to violent international action. In this respect, it is somewhat of a departure from Carrʼs

discussion of the role the State plays in influencing domestic opinion.

Having briefly reviewed the mainstream IR paradigms, it has been illustrated that Carrʼs

critical approach has been pushed to the periphery of the discipline and is now addressed

mainly by the ʻradicalʼ Liberals and a certain section of the Critical Theorists. In the

mainstream, an uncritical approach prevails, where the IR theorist is devoted to advising

and appealing to the home-State for ʻbetterʼ policy; a purpose for the discipline markedly

different from that imagined at itʼs inception. Much like the work above, Craig Murphy has

traced the history of Critical Theory and what he calls “the democratic impulse in IR”; that

is, the desire for a more democratic and informed society. Noting the removal of Carrʼs

critical approach by Morgenthau and later Waltz, he found that the primary challenge to

this “uncritical” Realism came from writers who have not come to be considered part of the

“canonical tradition of International Relations.” These were largely authors who presented

an alternative and more critical view of US foreign policy, including Noam Chomsky,

152
Cox, R. in Keohane, R. 1986 p.242
153
See Carrʼs sentence at footnote no.31
38
Michael Harrington, William Appleman Williams and Walter Lefeber.154 In particular

Murphy cites Anatol Rapoport who argued that intellectuals should aim at a “critical

enlightenment” in “areas where obsolete thinking and habits and vested interests

perpetuate superstitions that stand in the way of removing a very real threat to

civilization.”155 Why those writers who challenge the mainstream approaches should be

excluded from the “canonical tradition,” and why Carrʼs ideas should have moved from the

mainstream to the ʻradicalʼ end of the discipline, will be the subject of the next chapter.

154
Murphy, C. in Jones, R. 2001 p.67
155
Rapoport, A. cited in ibid, p.72

39
CHAPTER III
The Purpose of International Relations

Analysing the mainstream IR paradigms it has become evident that the aim of creating a

better-informed public, advocated by Carr and the disciplineʼs founders, has been replaced

by an obligation to the government; consistently seen as the proper outlet for theoretical

ideas. Furthermore, mainstream IR theory is now largely an apologia and justification of

the status-quo, particularly concerned with providing advice and predictions for the home-

government. This approach, and the movement of Carrʼs critical thought away from the

mainstream, is systematic of a prevalent subservience to the State within the discipline.

Outside of the theoretical paradigms, this subservience is evident in the debates regarding

the purpose, aim and future of IR and IR theory. Discussions of this type centre largely on

recommended areas of more concentrated study and cases for and against various

ontological or epistemological factors.156 The issue of domestic State propaganda is rarely

156
Some of the more prominent examples: Ken Booth, in his contribution, has argued for a return to “Utopian
thought.” James Rosenau has advocated more attention be paid to “Collective Mind Theory.” And Fred
Halliday has recommended more research into areas such as, amongst others, ecology, migration,
communications, demography, transnational communities, historical sociology, gender, social revolutions in
the history and formation of the international system, culture, language and the illegal side of globalisation.
Regarding theory, David Singer famously raised the level-of-analysis problem in IR, discussing the
implications of a chosen “level” of theoretical focus. He compared the relative merits of systemic and State-
focused theory and, concluding, argued for a more structured approach to empirical analysis. Zalewski, in a
paper titled ʻAll These Theories Yet The Bodies Keep Piling Upʼ: Theory, Theorists, Theorising, has the
opportunity to critique the role of mainstream contemporary theory but instead argues for more attention to
be paid to feminist and post-modernist approaches. Regarding the role of theory, Zalewski concludes,
counter intuitively, that comments such as ʻall these theories yet the bodies keep piling upʼ may “foster a
back to basics mentality which implies a retreat to the comfort of theories.”
Zalewski, M. ʻʻAll These Theories Yet The Bodies Keep Piling Upʼ: Theory, Theorists, Theorising.ʼ Halliday,
F. ʻThe Future of International Relations: Fears and Hopes.ʼ Rosenau, J. ʻProbing Puzzles Persistently: A
Desirable but Improbable Future for International Relations Theory.ʼ all in Booth, K. Smith, S. Zalewski, M.
ʻInternational Theory: Positivism and Beyondʼ, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996.
Singer, D. ʻThe Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1, The
International System: Theoretical Essays. (Oct., 1961), pp.77-92.
Halliday, F. ʻIR in a Post-Hegemonic Worldʼ, International Affairs, Volume 85, Number 1 January 2009. p44-
46.
40
addressed and scholars in the mainstream exhibit a consistent unwillingness to critique the

government. Fred Halliday, for example, Professor Emeritus of IR at the London School of

Economics, in a recent article titled IR in a post-hegemonic world, examines the state of

the discipline. After making recommendations for new areas of concentration, he then

discusses “humanitarian intervention,” which was a form of “liberal internationalist action in

promotion of human rights and of peace” and a “dominant hope of the 1990s.”157 The

military actions of the 1990ʼs, to which Halliday refers, have since undergone significant

amounts of scrutiny and analysis, in light of which the pretext of humanitarian intervention,

espoused by the US and UK governments, is extremely spurious.158 Ignoring this

evidence Halliday exhibits a persistent, and extremely worrying, acceptance of State

propaganda and reluctance to question the motives of the home-government.

A discussion regarding the obligations of IR, i.e. to whom the discipline should be

responsible, is more rare. When these do arise, scholars frequently exhibit a commitment

to the State and reluctance to engage the public. William Wallaceʼs assessment of the

relationship between the scholar and the State is particularly instructive. His well-known

argument is that the academic has a duty to constructively criticise the government: to, in

his words, “speak truth to power.” In their responses to his paper, Ken Booth and Steve

Smith both expose the futility of Wallaceʼs argument, stating that governments consistently

Booth, K. ʻSecurity in Anarchy; Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice,ʼ International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3,
1991.
157
Halliday, F. 2009. p.48
158
See Ali, T. “Masters of the Universe: Natos Balkan Crusade”, and Cockburn, A. and St Clair, J. “Imperial
Crusades: Iraq, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia” among others. In particular regarding the reasons for the
“humanitarian intervention” in Serbia in 1999 see Norris, J. ʻCollision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovoʼ.
Norris, a top aide in the clinton administration at the time, confirms that the bombing was undertaken
because Serbia was not conforming to US-run neo-liberal economic reforms. This is given added legitimacy
in the foreword written by Strobe Talbott, the head of the Pentagon/State Department intelligence Joint
Committee during the bombing, where he says that this is the book to read to best understand the thinking in
the Clinton administration at the time. Somalia is a similar case, where the US supported the brutal Barre
dictatorship throughout the 70ʼs and 80ʼs and then sent troops after the worst of the famine (the pretext for
intervention) had passed. Oxfam and Save the Children condemned the military action, but both were
pressured to call off these criticisms by the British Government.

41
reject views that are not conducive to their own; something both scholars recalled

experiencing. Compounding this, they cite empirical evidence that statesmen, once in

power, do not change their implicit theories about the world. However, despite these

points, neither discusses whether IR should have the public, rather than the government,

as its audience.159 Michael Nicholson continued the debate in an article titled Whatʼs the

use of International Relations? and exhibited a similar view. He argues that the academic

has to decide whom to advise when offering policy advice and this should be based upon

an assessment of the best way to achieve the scholarʼs political goals. The choice is then

between the home-government, another government (if we “do not like our government”

very much), Greenpeace or Amnesty International or, “more lucratively,” Shell or BP. At

no point, even when the government is for some reason disliked, are the general public

discussed as an appropriate outlet. Nicholson argues that to be engaged in policy in this

way is “not merely worthy but also necessary” and being an adviser is “the proper function

for an academic.”160 Commenting on Wallaceʼs “speak truth to power” recommendation,

he contends this is not enough when addressing selfish political and business elites who

will not accept a policy that will inconvenience them. Exhibiting a strict commitment to the

State, he suggests the solution for the scholar is to find more congenial ways of influencing

power, such as providing “profitable alternatives” to current activities. This is important, he

writes, “because we can talk truth to power until the cows come home but it will make little

difference if the truth told is uncongenial.” By means of demonstrating his approach,

Nicholson advises subsidies be provided to arms companies to encourage them to shift

159
Wallace, W. “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats”, Booth and Smith reply in Linklater, A. ed.
“International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science”, Routledge, London, 2002 Vol 5 p.1975
Booth recommends, fairly cryptically, “showing how various versions of the power/truth relationship operate
between civil society and the State.”
160
Nicholson, M. ʻWhatʼs the use of International Relations?ʼ, Review of International Studies, 26, 2000
p.183-185
42
away from supporting “unsavory regimes” into “some different forms of production.”161 The

other option, not mentioned, would be to expose the role of these arms companies to the

public, who, in a democratic society, are in a position to effect government policy.

Nicholson goes further, stating that if theorists are unable to offer predictions on which

government can base policy we should “stop pretending” and “disband the discipline.”

Ignoring the effects of privately concentrated and centralised control of the media, he

contends that IR will then become “a careful reading of the newspaper.”162 Following his

appraisal, it is implicit that if we have nothing to say to powerful elites, we have nothing to

say at all. At no point is there a discussion of the academic being accountable to the

public and, consequently, speaking truth about power. Displaying a now familiar elitist

philosophy, Nicholsonʼs approach is typical of a rather systematic contempt for the general

public amongst IR scholars and a consistent subservience to the State. Recognising this

half a century earlier, Martin Wight, commenting on the discipline, observed this “moral

poverty,” which, he argued, was due largely to the “intellectual prejudice imposed by the

sovereign State.”163

This prejudice and consequent contempt for democracy is seen perhaps most clearly in an

important piece of scholarship in practice. Samuel Huntington, former chairman of the

department of government at Harvard, one of the most influential post World War II

political scientists and a US government adviser, co-authored a report for the Trilateral

Commission in 1975 titled The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of

Democracies. The “crisis,” the report concludes, is that the US has entered a phase of too

much or “excessive” democracy that may present a threat to those in power. “Ignorant

161
ibid, p.188
162
ibid, p.187,191
163
Wight, M. ʻWhy is there no International Theory?ʼ in Wight, M. Butterfield, H. ʻDiplomatic Investigationsʼ
George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London 1966 p.20

43
and meddlesome” outsiders, who should be “spectators” and not “participants,” had begun

participating in politics in order to defend their interests. Their involvement in the political

process, the report states, represented a departure from the preferential system under

President Truman whereby he had “been able to govern the country with the cooperation

of a relatively small number of Wall Street lawyers and bankers.” This system was

deemed a better “moderation of democracy.”164 This work and itʼs conclusion are worth

contrasting with Carrʼs chapter also titled ʻCrisis of Democracy,ʼ discussed earlier, in which

the threat is not a democratic public but economic power influencing government. The

conclusion of the report is obviously not indicative of all IR academics, but it to some

extent shows how, in practice and theory, scholars in the highest echelons of IR academia

persist with an undemocratic philosophy of subservience to the State as opposed to the

public; a far-cry from the initial role that, it was hoped, the discipline could come to

embody.

Stephen Chan, contributing to this debate and displaying a similar contempt for the public,

has critiqued the current relationship between scholars and Statesmen. He argues,

correctly in my opinion, that academics should not be a “priest class that mediates

between rulers and ruled.” However, he contends that critical theorists have been harmed

by their inability to communicate their ideas to the public and, thereafter, his discussion

descends into an insulting caricature of the general population. He advises scholars who

wish to engage with the populace that they “craft a sense of care” using “media accessible,

164
Crozier, M. Huntington, S. Watanuki, J. “The Crisis of Democracy; Report on the Governability of
Democracies to the Trilateral Commission” New York University Press, New York, 1975. The report is also
concerned with rise of “value-orientated intellectuals” who "assert their disgust with the corruption,
materialism, and inefficiency of democracy and with the subservience of democratic government to
'monopoly capitalism'" and who consequently “devote themselves to the derogation of leadership, the
challenging of authority, and the unmasking and delegitimization of established institutions” including those
that are responsible for the “indoctrination of the young.” Control of these institutions should be maintained,
the report recommends, by the “responsible men”, “technocratic and policy-orientated intellectuals” who will
work within and not challenge the pre-established framework of thought.
44
instantly digestible semiotics” (or ʻsoundbitesʼ to the layman). This approach is necessary,

he says, because the academic is dealing with “three minute consciousness of

abbreviated attentions.”165 Similar issues were discussed over thirty years ago by Stanley

Hoffman who, in his critique of IR in the US, noted a number of problems with the

discipline. In particular, he warned that IR was tied too closely to government, that

academic research and policy-makers priorities had tended to converge, and that there

existed a scholarly dependence on the State and “the ambitions of itʼs political elite.”166

Remarking on these points he concluded that IR had come “too close to the fire” and

needed to move away from the perspective of the powerful. Hoffmann also evaluated who

should be the recipients of academic advice. He observed that the most fruitful, although

not in his eyes commendable, approach for the IR scholar was to be an “efficient

Machiavellian” and advise the government. These scholars who “advise the prince on how

best to manage his power and on how best to promote the national interest,” would

inevitably become the well-paid strategists and researchers turned consultants and policy

makers.167 Despite these points, when discussing scholars who wish to engage the public

(the “populist dream”) he determines this is a “romantic hope” to think that people “can be

aroused and led to force the elites that control the levers of action, either out of power

altogether or to change their ways.”168 This is clear appeal to scholars not to try and upset

165
Chan, S. ʻCritical Theory, Praxis and Postmodernismʼ, in Girard, M. Eberwien, W. Webb, K. “Theory and
Practice in Foreign Policy Making: National Perspectives on Academics and Professionals in International
Relations”, Pinter Publishers, London, 1994 p.30-33. Chan advocates this condensing of information into
appealing sound-bites because “popular culture in popular society has no difficulty accepting the grafted and
glamourous image of Daniel-Day Lewis as the Last of the Mohicans, will purchase Hello! in more prodigious
quantities than New Left Review, and conceives of solidarity, humanism and action in terms of Bob Geldofʼs
Band-Aid Archetype.” p.32
166
Hoffmann, S. 1987 p.6-13
167
ibid, p.18
168
ibid, p.19 Hoffmann also says that encouraging the population in this way may lead to more problems,
specifically it may inspire intelligentsia that want to displace certain elites in developing countries or inspire
established elites in the developing world who want to “boost national power against foreign dominance.”
The result then is unlikely to be a world of peace and justice but a world of revolutions and news conflicts
and inequities.

45
the status-quo and not attempt the “romantic hope” of working towards a more democratic

society.

Looking briefly at these works, a consistent picture emerges, whereby the State is seen as

the appropriate outlet for academic ideas and the public is largely ignored. This prevailing

desire to be involved with State policy is evidenced in a study of the academic-statesmen

relationship by Girard, Eberwein and Webb. Interviewing IR scholars they found a clear

desire for recognition by, and influence on, policy-makers; a desire not reciprocated by the

latter. They also noted that theorists in particular were to a large extent reliant on

practitioners of foreign policy for information and access; there was a “structural

dependence” that “raises problems which might appear insurmountable.” 169 Significantly,

their study highlights the inability of academics to influence the policy makerʼs ideas if

recommendations were not within a predetermined framework of thought.170 They found

that the policy maker, who, they contend, it is naive to think of as politically neutral, “obeys

a political, organisational and/or perhaps a personal logic.” Likewise, they argue that IR

theorists greatly desire to see their theory accepted and “pass the test of practicality.”171

The result then is a tailoring of ideas to accommodate the views of the policy maker. Or as

Michel Girard writes, “international political analysis is haunted by the ambition to become

also a theory of practice, that is to say, a theory that allows the behaviour of the actor to be

169
Girard, M. “Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy: Epistemological Problems and Political Realities”, in
Girard, M. Eberwien, W. Webb, K. 1994. p.4
170
One of Keith Webbʼs chapters in the study concerns the relationship in the UK and is particularly
enlightening. He observed it was consistently academics who sought to make contact with statesmen (as
opposed to the other way around) and, of those in contact, only 7% thought they had any influence on policy
outcomes. He also noted that those academics who are sought by statesmen are “perceived to be in the
same ball park” in terms of their policy opinions. Despite this, academics exhibited a strong desire to be part
of the policy making process. As a side-note, perhaps unsurprisingly, he also found that 67% of direct
entrants into the British Foreign Commonwealth Office were from Oxford or Cambridge University. Webb, K.
ʻAcademics and Professionals in IR: a British Perceptionʼ in Girard, M. Eberwien, W. Webb, K. 1994.
171
Girard, M. in Girard, M. Eberwien, W. Webb, K. 1994. p.10
46
followed through.”172 This sentence alone goes a significant way in explaining why

mainstream IR theories are status-quo and not critical of the State. Regardless, Girard

concludes, possibly because he doesnʼt see any of this as problematic, that “relations

between academics and practitioners are thus, without doubt, destined for a brilliant

future.”173 Elsewhere in the work, Keith Webb argues that the academic shouldnʼt try to be

a policy maker, but should aim to assist the professional with information, sensitization and

criticism.174 All of which must, it is now implied, be within a certain framework of pre-

existing thought on foreign policy issues. Although Girard does not consider this an issue,

Richard Flack summarises succinctly the problem of such a relationship;

The experience of the twentieth century has made it obvious that an alliance between intellectuals and

power-orientated organisations is problematic. The logic of States and parties requires the subordination of

truth to that of organisational maintenance and growth. The organisationally mobilised intellectual is, by

definition, not free to set his or her agenda of enquiry, to publish freely his or her knowledge and
175
understanding or to say fully what is on his or her mind.

As Hoffmann observed, there are undoubtedly benefits to being uncritical of the State;

employment being a significant reason. It is unlikely that a genuine critic of the

government is likely to enter itʼs ranks, or even the “canonical tradition” of IR, or be

consulted as an adviser. In addition, links have been created between the State and

academia, ʻthink tanksʼ being the main example. If the academic instead engages the

population, the links are less prestigious and certainly not as lucrative.176

172
ibid, p.9-10
173
ibid, p.7
174
Webb, K. ʻAcademics and Practitioners: Power, Knowledge and Roleʼ in Girard, M. in Girard, M.
Eberwien, W. Webb, K. 1994. p.23-25
175
Flack, D. ʻMaking History and Making Theory: Notes on How Intellectuals Seek Relevanceʼ, in Lemert,
C.C. ed. ʻIntellectuals and Politics: Social Theory in a Changing Worldʼ, Sage, London, 1991. p.9-10
176
In the US, the Council on Foreign Relations and in the UK, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, were
created specifically to develop a bridge between academics and the State and to help guide policy. Halliday,

47
For the theorist, as unlikely as it is in human affairs, a theory that can predict, rather than

critique, may go some way to proving the scholars worth to policy-makers within the State.

The inability to do this thus far has been a particularly sore spot, especially for IR theorists;

who failed to predict the end of the Cold War (a point raised by historian John Lewis

Gaddis). That this is lamented is indicative of the desire, in the words of Hoffmann, for a

paradigm “masterkey” which will bring “practical recipes” for the government; finally

proving the worth of the IR theorist to those in power. An attitude he called a “fascinating

sort of national ideology.”177

The implications of this subservient uncritical approach coupled with a prevalent elitist

political philosophy cannot be overstated.178 Mainstream scholarship has developed the

impression that the functionaries of the State are the only worthwhile audience for their

ideas and this is how they can “get things done.” The allegiance of the theorist then shifts

from creating a better-informed public to better serving the needs of the government. The

aim is to determine what the State should do, as opposed to informing the public of what

States are doing. This approach leads, as we have seen, to a movement away from

critique into theories that can hopefully be used in practice by statesmen. The most crucial

ramifications, however, are in regard to State propaganda. An approach to IR that aligns

itself with the government as opposed to the public will neglect critique of the State and itʼs

attempts to influence public opinion. In fact, particularly within the Realist paradigm, this

practice is largely condoned. Consequently, the role of State propaganda in influencing

F. ʻRethinking International Relations,ʼ Macmillan, London 1994 p.8 Murphy, citing Robert McCaughey, has
offered the view that critical scholars are comfortable remaining politically detached from the social
movements they seek to represent. He also contends that as more opportunities open for these kinds of
scholars within the academic institutions, the need to serve as popular intellectuals of social movements
fails. Murphy, C. in Jones, R. 2001 p.75
177
Gaddis, J. ʻInternational Relations Theory and the end of the Cold Warʼ International Security, 17, 1992-
1993 p.5-58 and Hoffmann, S. ʻAn American Social Science: International Relationsʼ p.8
178
Mexican economist Victor Urgundi has argued that the predominance of an uncritical culture in IR is
similar to the predominance of neo-liberal thought within the Economics discipline; with equally disastrous
implications for the poor or politically weak. Cited in Murphy, C. in Jones, R. 2001 p.72
48
and misleading the public has been insufficiently addressed within IR. However, the

problems are as acute, if not more, than when Carr discussed them in the early twentieth

century. A brief look at contemporary military action will illustrate the extent to which

reasons for actions are cloaked in ideology and false intentions; the US/UK invasion of

Iraq being the most pertinent example. To leave these issues on the periphery on the

discipline, and to have neglected them in the mainstream for so long, is to ignore one of

the most important contributing factors to war perpetuated by democratic States.

There are also worrying implications for the student of IR. The mainstream uncritical

status-quo approaches of Liberalism, Realism, Constructivism and the English School are

presented to the student as the most significant. This serves, to borrow Richard Ashleyʼs

phrase, to “neuter the critical faculties” of the student. These problems may have far-

reaching connotations in practice. Michael Banks, in a work titled The International

Relations Discipline: Asset or Liability for Conflict Resolution?, observed that many

scholars he encountered held status-quo views which meant they were more inclined

towards “the partisan manipulation of a conflict than towards it impartial mediation.”179

Therefore, in the climate of State obedience evidenced within contemporary IR paradigms,

it is unlikely that these issues will be confronted without significant changes in scholarly

allegiance. A discipline that does revert to an allegiance with the public, as opposed to the

State, could work in earnest towards alleviating some of the most pressing issues of

international affairs. An outcome that seems unlikely under the prevailing approach.

179
Banks, M. ʻThe International Relations Discipline: Asset or Liability for Conflict Resolution?ʼ in Azar, EE.
Burtton, JW. eds. ʻInternational Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practiceʼ Wheatsheef Books Ltd. Sussex
1986 p.24

49
CONCLUSION

This paper has addressed a number of issues. First, the critical approach of EH Carr was

outlined. Then the development of ʻRealismʼ into a paradigm significantly different from

Carrʼs, in its approach and purpose for the discipline, was evidenced. Thereafter, in

chapter II, the mainstream paradigms were discussed and Carrʼs ideas were found to

reside most prominently amongst the ʻradicalʼ Liberals and the NeoGramscian Critical

Theorists. The result is that the critical approach, as well as a commitment to creating a

better informed the public, has moved from the mainstream to the periphery of the

discipline. Chapter III discussed why this may be the case, arguing that IR displayed a

systematic subservience to the State in terms of theoretical approaches and the aim of the

discipline.

Today there remains confusion over the purpose and nature of the discipline itself. In a

social science concerned with human affairs, the scholarʼs motive for investigation will

affect the approach taken; in Carrʼs words “purpose precedes and conditions thought.”180

Therefore, a substantial amount of thought needs to be placed on why we do International

Relations. What are the most pressing issues and how should we best approach them are

important discussions that need to take place. Similarly, scholars have to be aware that, in

such a politicised discipline, their theory will have implications in a way that does not exist

in the natural sciences. Principle questions to ask then are, what are the goals of this

approach? And who is it for? The answer to the latter has consistently been “the

government.” The implications are profound and harmful for anyone genuinely concerned

180
Carr, E.H. 1948 p.8
50
with State violence. The result has been the compromising of theory to fit the needs of

statesmen and a neglect of the most pressing and acute problems of the international

arena. This prevalent attitude may go some way to explaining why scholars are

consistently reluctant to criticise or question their own governments action, and why works

of this type are instead left to activists and certain journalists outside of the discipline.

Carr, observing the development of the discipline in this way, wrote to a friend “whatever

my share is in starting this business [IR], I do not know that I am particularly proud of it.”181

If we are concerned with alleviating the scourge of war, then we must, to quote Michael

Banks, “decide what are the most significant questions that our discipline needs to answer,

and select from the competing ideas the ones which most pervasively deal with those

questions.”182 EH Carr, and Einstein for that matter, thought it was the indoctrination of the

population, the use of propaganda and ideology by political and business, and we can add

academic, elites to sway the opinions of the masses that was the most pressing issue. IR,

instead of confronting these issues, has aligned itself with the political elites. Modern

society, with its ever-greater concentrations of centralised power, has only exacerbated

these factors, but as we have seen, they have not been significantly addressed within the

discipline; for reasons that have been outlined. Instead, the majority of the work has fallen

to those outside of IR and its “canonical tradition.” A serious analysis of contemporary

military violence perpetrated by liberal democratic States evidences the extent to which

political elites continue to hide their actual intentions from the general population; often

with the support of academics and the media. IR scholars have the responsibility of

addressing these problems and informing the public regarding such issues; to speak truth

about power. As we have seen, attempts to advise and influence the government directly

181
EH Carr in a letter to Stanley Hoffmann cited in Michael Coxʼs introduction to Carr, EH. 1981 p. xiii
182
Banks, M. in Azar, EE. Burtton, JW. eds. 1986 p.7,23

51
will have little effect and constitute largely futile attempts at alleviating international

problems that IR is, or should be, concerned with. If the discipline hopes to move towards

achieving its originally stated goals of removing ignorance from international affairs, then a

dramatic change will be required, not in issues of ontology or epistemology, but in a shift of

allegiance from the State to the public, from status-quo to critique. In this way, almost a

century after it was first proposed, we can move towards a revival of the “democratic

impulse,” to ensure a more informed public opinion on world affairs.

52
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