A.M. No. 93-10-1296-RTC August 12, 1998 RE: SUSPENSION OF CLERK OF COURT ROGELIO R.

JOBOCO, RTC, BRANCH 16 NAVAL, BILIRAN Facts: This is a series of complaints and counter-complaints between Judge Bonifacio S. Maceda, then Acting Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 16, Naval, Biliran (now RTC Judge in Las Pias, Metro Manila) and Atty. Rogelio R. Joboco, then Branch Clerk of Court of the same Regional Trial Court (now Assistant Prosecutor in Samar). Judge Maceda charges Atty. Joboco of (1) Infidelity in the Custody of Case Records, (2) Dishonesty, (3) Sabotaging Judicial Reforms, (4) Grave Misconduct, Usurpation of Judicial Authority, Tampering of Subpoena, (5) Insubordination, (6) Falsification of Accomplishment of Certificate of Service, and (7) Agitating Workers to go on Mass Leave and Notorious Undesirability. Atty. Joboco, on the other hand, alleges (1) Oppression, (2) Continuing Oppression, (3) Gross Ignorance of the Law, (4) Abuse of Position, (5) Gross Abuse of Discretion Using his Position, and (6) Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. Issue: Held: Although we are inclined to impose the penalty of suspension on Atty. Joboco, his subsequent appointment as 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor of Calbayog City has made the aforesaid sanction impracticable. The diversity and multiplicity of Atty. Joboco's transgressions clearly reflect his defiant demeanor and contumacious character which cannot be countenanced in the judiciary. Such recalcitrant attitude manifested by Atty. Joboco in his capacity as Branch Clerk of Court not only diminishes his integrity as an officer of the court but degrades the dignity of the judicial system as well. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we find Atty. Rogelio R. Joboco GUILTY of the following charges: Infidelity in the Custody of Court Records, Usurpation of Judicial Authority, Grave Misconduct and Tampering Subpoena in Criminal Case No. 1536, Falsification of Certificates of Service, Misconduct for attempting to utilize the court employees for the ends of the local IBP and Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL). He is hereby FINED in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). All other charges against him are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The charges against Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, ADMONISHED for having abused his authority by unjustly refusing to sign the certificates of service of his Clerk of Court which resulted in the withholding of the latter's salary. He is likewise ADVISED to exert care and consideration in his dealings with his office staff in order to avert any future repetition of these administrative misdemeanors. Whether or not Atty. Joboco is guilty of violating Canon 6 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics?

A.M. No. MTJ-97-1142 November 6, 1997 (OCA-IPI No. 96-221-MTJ) JOEL ALMERON and EVANGELINE ALMERON, complainants, vs. JUDGE AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO, Municipal Trial Court, Koronadal, South Cotabato, respondent. BELLOSILLO, J.: JOEL ALMERON and his wife EVANGELINE in a letter complaint dated 18 October 1996 alleged that their twelve-year old daughter Jojielyn was raped sometime in April and again in September 1996 by one Wilfredo Pino. As a result, two (2) criminal complaints for rape were filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Koronadal, South Cotabato, presided over by respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido. 1 However, without conducting a hearing and without forwarding the records to the Office of the Public Prosecutor, respondent Judge granted bail to the accused in the amount of P200,000.00 for each count of rape. The amount upon motion of the accused was reduced to P120,000.00. In addition, complainant spouses alleged that bail was posted using property of a person who has already been dead for seven (7) years. On 22 January 1997 the Court directed Judge Sardido to answer the accusation which he did in his "Comment/Compliance" dated 20 February 1997. In his defense respondent Judge alleged that he initially wrote the words " NO BAIL" on the face of the criminal complaints; however before he could issue a warrant of arrest, Atty. Bonifacio Pagunsan, counsel of the accused, engaged him in a legal argument inside his chambers about the feasibility of granting bail to the accused; that according to the " 1996 Bail Bond Guide" of the Department of Justice rape not committed with the use of a deadly weapon, by two or more men or not resulting in the insanity of the victim, or in the commission of a homicide by reason or on the occasion thereof, is penalized with reclusion temporal and bailable in the amount of P200,000.00; accordingly he changed "No Bail" to P200,000.00 and reduced it to P120,000.00 after finding that the amount was excessive for the provincial folk; that he approved the property bond not knowing that the bondsman was already dead relying instead on the presumption of regularity in the performance by the notary public of his notarial function. On 30 April 1997 this case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. In a Memorandum dated 11 August 1997 the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be fined P10,000.00 for granting bail to the

accused charged with rape on two (2) counts without a hearing thereby denying the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong. We adopt the foregoing recommendation. Any self-respecting member of the bench or bar knows, or should know with little effort, that simple rape is punishable with reclusion perpetua as provided in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. 2 Likewise, as lucidly provided in Sec. 7, Rule 114 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, no person charged with such an offense, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Hence a litany of cases emphasizes that bail is discretionary and not a matter of right on the part of the accused. 4 In exercising such judicial discretion, however, a judge is required to conduct a hearing wherein both the prosecution and the defense present evidence that would point to the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt. 5 The discretion of the judge lies solely in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the evidence presented during the hearing but not in the determination of whether or not the hearing itself should be held 6 for such a hearing is considered mandatory and absolutely indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong. 7 Thus, when a judge grants bail to a person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment without conducting the required hearing, he is considered guilty of ignorance or incompetence the gravity of which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence. 8 This is because members of the judiciary are supposed to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules, 9 more so with legal principles and rules so elementary and basic that not to know them, or to act as if one does not know them, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 10 In the instant case, respondent Judge does not deny that he granted bail without a hearing to a person accused of two (2) counts of rape. He attempts to excuse himself by saying that he was misled by the "1996 Bail Bond Guide " of the Department of Justice which provides that simple rape is punishable by reclusion temporal and bailable at P200,000.00. 11 However, as already stated, ignorance of this type cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence. 12 Besides, the fact that he was even misguided only manifests his weakness and reinforces his gross ignorance. As early as in their freshmen year, aspiring members of the legal profession are already taught that felonies are defined and their corresponding penalties found in the Revised Penal Code, probably one of the most important codes in the legal profession. Hence, respondent Judge should not have been misled, purportedly at the prodding of the counsel for the accused, that the " 1996 Bail Bond Guide" of the Department of Justice prevails over the explicit provisions of the Revised Penal Code on rape, especially considering that the Guide is addressed and intended for the guidance of all regional state prosecutors, city/provincial prosecutors and their assistants , and provides in its "whereas" clauses that bail shall not be recommended where the penalty is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. 13 In his ignorance respondent Judge not only deprived the prosecution due process of law by denying it the opportunity to contest the application for bail 14 but likewise acted in a manner contrary to Rule 2.01, Canon 2, of the Code of Judicial Conduct 15 in allowing counsel for the accused to engage him in a legal discussion inside his chambers, without the presence of any representative of the prosecution, about the possibility of granting bail to the accused. Thus, respondent Judge's disregard of an established rule of law (not conducting a hearing in an application for bail) thereby depriving the prosecution the opportunity to prove the strength of the evidence of guilt of the accused which amounts to gross ignorance of the law subjects him to disciplinary action. 16 In Cabilao v. Judge Sardido, 17 an administrative case for grave ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and abuse of discretion, the same respondent Judge was fined the amount of P5,000.00 and sternly warned against the commission of same or similar acts. Considering the foregoing and the seriousness of the present offense which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith, respondent should be imposed a stiffer penalty so that he would better grasp the importance of being proficient in both substantive and procedural laws, particularly in this case, on the subject matter of bail. This could be achieved without need for the Court to issue any "bail bond guide," as respondent judge suggests, since the present Revised Rules an Criminal Procedure and jurisprudence on the matter are clear and enlightening enough. ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido is fined P10,000.00 payable in two (2) equal monthly installments of P5,000.00 each, to be deducted from his monthly salary. He is sternly WARNED that, considering that this is the second time that he is administratively sanctioned by this Court, the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely including, if warranted, his dismissal from the service. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-04-1537

March 25, 2004

ARTEMIO SABATIN, complainant, vs. JUDGE EFREN B. MALLARE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, NATIVIDAD-LLANERA, NUEVA ECIJA, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.: The instant administrative case arose when Artemio Sabatin, in an Affidavit-Complaint 1 dated January 15, 2001, charged Judge Efren B. Mallare, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Natividad-Llanera, Nueva Ecija, with gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, relative to Criminal Case No. 2751-N entitled People of the Philippines v. Artemio Sabatin for illegal possession of firearms. The complainant, the accused in the said criminal case, alleged that pursuant to Search Warrant No. 017-N-2000 issued by the respondent judge, elements of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of General Natividad, Nueva Ecija under the command of P/Sr. Insp. Franklin Versoza Simon, entered his home and conducted a search thereon without his consent. The complainant averred that the search warrant in question was actually issued against his brother Pedrito Sabatin. When the complainant pointed this out to the police, P/Sr. Insp. Simon merely instructed his men to erase the name "Pedrito" and replace it with "Artemio," making it appear that the warrant was, indeed, issued in the complainants name. The complainant further alleged that he was arrested and brought by the policemen to their station for investigation, but was later released. He then received a subpoena after a few days, and it was only then that he learned that a criminal complaint had been filed against him for illegal possession of firearms. The complainant, in turn, filed a complaint for illegal search, unlawful arrest, arbitrary detention and falsification of public document against P/Sr. Insp. Simon and his men before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG). On August 5, 2000, the complainant filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 017-N-2000 before the respondent judges sala. After several postponements, the preliminary investigation was again set for November 8, 2001. The complainant narrated the events as follows: 17. Na bago dumating and araw na iyon ay nakatanggap ako ng MOTION TO DISMISS, petsang Oktubre 12, 2000, para sa mga demanda ko [sic] ilalim ng I.S. No. H-3275-78 sa Cabanatuan City, galing sa inireklamo kong mga pulis, at kabilang sa mga UNANG PAGKAKATAON ay nahawakan ko ang kopya ng "SEARCH WARRANT NO. 017-N-2000", na maliwanag na nanggaling pala sa Branch 30 ng Regional Trial Court ng Cabanautan City, pero ang nakapirmang hukom ay si Judge EFREN B. MALLARE , bilang Acting Presiding Judge, gaya nang makikita sa kopya ng nasabing SEARCH WARRANT", na minarkahang ANNEX "K"; 18. Sa pagka-diskubre naming ang Branch 30 ng Regional Trial Court ng Cabanatuan City ang nag-"issue" ng pinalsipikang SEARCH WARRANT, ako, sa pamamagitan ng aking abogada, ay duon nag-"file" ng MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT NO. 017-N-2000, kasabay ng kinakailangang i-"file" ko sa 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court ng Gen. Natividad-Llanera, Nueva Ecija, ng aking OMNIBUS MOTION TO WITHDRAW MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT NO. 017-N-2000 AND TO TRANSFER ITS RECORDS TO BRANCH 30, RTC, CABANATUAN CITY, WITH ADDED MOTIONS TO SUSPEND PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE INSTANT CASE UNTIL RESOLUTION ON THIS PENDING INCIDENT AND TO FURNISH ACCUSED OF ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS/EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION N ITS PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, parehong may petsang Oktubre 30, 2000. 2 The complainant was surprised when Judge Federico F. Fajardo, Jr. of the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, issued the following Order on November 7, 2000, to wit: This is a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 017-N-2000, dated July __, 2000 which appears to have been issued by Judge Efren B. Mallare. Upon a careful examination of the said Search Warrant, the caption thereof appears to be RTC-Branch 30, Cabanatuan City. However, the Presiding Judge of RTC, Br. 30 is the undersigned presiding judge and not Judge Efren B. Mallare. Judge Mallare is the Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of General Natividad and Llanera, Nueva Ecija. The undersigned did not issue the questioned search warrant. He is not the Executive Judge who is the only one authorized to issue search warrants for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The Executive Judge of the RTC, Cabanatuan City is the Hon. Johnson Ballutay of RTC, Branch 25, Cabanatuan City. Further, the questioned search warrant is not at all connected with any case pending in this Court, and therefore, this Court is not the proper forum for the quashing of the said search warrant. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to quash search warrant is hereby returned to the accused and his counsel, with the advise that it be referred to the Hon. Executive Judge, RTC, Cabanatuan City or Judge Efren B. Mallare for appropriate action. 3

The respondent judge thereafter issued an Order dated December 4, 2000, to wit: After a careful perusal of the grounds relied upon by the accused in seeking for the quashal/dismissal of this case, the Court noticed that the same appeared to be well taken as the records would readily show that the Chief of Police, PNP, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija has applied for a search warrant against one Pedrito Sabatin alias Boyet and this has been admitted by the then Chief of Police Franklin Versoza Simon as per his comment dated 13 September 2000 (p. 27, rec.), although he misspelled the name Pedrito to Pablito by advancing reason that an error was committed when said first name was typewrote (sic) and in order to obviate any leakage thereof, a correction has been made from Pedrito/Pablito to Artemio Sabatin alias Boyet which led to the filing of the instant case. In short, the search warrant issued by this court against one Pedrito Sabatin alias Boyet, after it has complied with the requisite for issuing search warrant (Sec. 3, Rule 126 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure), has not been fully implemented. Furthermore, the case filed before this Court against one Artemio Sabatin y Miguel alias Boyet cannot be entertained by this court for this court has never issued any search warrant against said accused; and, therefore, any evidence taken from him maybe considered inadmissible for the search undertaken by the PNP of Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija, is considered unlawful. WHEREFORE, finding the Motion To Quash/Dismiss Criminal Complaint meritorious, the same is hereby granted and this case is hereby dismissed. 4 According to the complainant, the respondent judge issued the questioned search warrant despite his lack of authority to do so in order to protect P/Sr. Insp. Franklin V. Simon. He also alleged that the respondent later on denied that he issued the questioned warrant in order to escape possible administrative sanctions. In his Comment, the respondent averred that the normal procedure in criminal cases was to set them for preliminary examination in order to determine probable cause. However, in this case, the complainant (accused therein) through counsel practically waived the early resolution of the preliminary examination by filing several motions. Thus, the complainant cannot now question the delay in the early termination of the criminal case, for had it not been for the filing of said motions, the preliminary examination could have been terminated since September 2000 as provided for in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The respondent further stated, thus: To recapitulate; therefore, the undersigned believes that being an Acting Presiding Judge of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Gen. Natividad-Llanera, N.E., he has performed and [is] still performing, in good faith, the duties and responsibilities vested upon his office. In fact the records will speak for itself, and being the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, he has always been dedicated to his work and never committed any absence, and this fact can also be attested by the records of that Court which also speak for itself. Lastly, if ever the undersigned committed an error, the same had been committed in good faith and that the attached pertinent documents in the criminal case filed against Sabatin will readily reveal that the undersigned did not commit the accusation lodged against him in this administrative case.5 The respondent then prayed that the instant administrative case be dismissed for lack of merit. Upon the Court Administrators recommendation that a formal investigation was necessary to resolve the factual issues, the case was referred to Executive Judge Tomas B. Talavera, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City.6 The Executive Judge made the following findings: To this Court, it appears that the complainant is no longer interested in pursuing this case. If he still has any interest in the prosecution of this case he should have notified this Court of his whereabouts by furnishing his new address so that he could have been notified about the ongoing investigation. In this regards (sic), this Court was not able to acquire any evidence that would substantiate the allegations of the complainant in the present administrative case. It will be impossible for this Court to rule in favor of the complainant lacking the latters evidence, whether oral or documentary, not to mention his un-cooperation ( sic) in the investigation of this administrative case. Be it noted that it was the respondent who was religiously attending the investigation is borne out by the record of the case. On the other hand, complainant did not appear even once though on April 24, 2003, he was notified through his wife Vilma Sabatin evidencing his lack of interest to further prosecute this administrative case.7 The Executive Judge apparently re-set the case for hearing for a total of four times, due to the complainants repeated failure to appear.8 It was, thus, recommended that the present administrative case be dismissed for lack of evidence, as well as the complainants lack of interest to prosecute the case.9 We do not agree with the Investigating Judge.

The Court would like to stress that the dismissal or withdrawal of charges and the desistance of witnesses does not automatically result in the dismissal of an administrative case. 10 The withdrawal of the complaint does not have the legal effect of automatically exonerating the respondent from any administrative disciplinary action. It does not operate to divest this Court with jurisdiction to determine the truth behind the matter stated in the complaint. 11 Furthermore, the need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein.12 Pursuant to the foregoing, it was incumbent upon the Investigating Judge to delve into the matter subject of the complaint, considering that the pleadings submitted by the complainant and the respondent, as well as the annexes thereof, were forwarded by the OCA precisely for his perusal. The Court, in numerous cases, has even acted upon administrative complaints filed by anonymous complainants on the following rationale: Although the Court does not as a rule act on anonymous complaints, cases are excepted in which the charge could be fully borne by public records of indubitable integrity thus needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant, whose identity and integrity could hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest.13 The records in the instant case clearly show that the respondent is administratively liable. A perusal of the questioned search warrant shows that although it was issued by Branch 30 of the RTC of Cabanatuan City, the signatory therein was the respondent. Judge Federico F. Fajardo, Jr. then presiding judge of Branch 30, Cabanatuan City denied that the questioned warrant was issued by him. The respondent then made a volte-face and denied that he ever issued any search warrant against the complainant in his Order dated December 4, 2000, where he also granted the complainants motion to quash. Furthermore, in resolving the complainants motion to quash almost four months after it was filed, the respondent violated Rule 3.05 of The Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and to act, one way or the other, on pending cases within the prescribed period therefor.14 Undue delay in resolving a pending motion constitutes gross inefficiency,15 and constitutes a less serious charge, punishable under Section 9 of Rule 14016 of the Rules of Court. Judges are duty-bound to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence at all times.17 The pursuit of excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed on them and the institution they represent.18 Judges are also human, although they are expected to rise above human frailties. At the very least, there must be an earnest and sincere effort on his part to do so. Considering that they are the visible representation of the law and of justice, the citizenry expects their official conduct as well as their personal behavior to always be beyond reproach. 19 WHEREFORE, for gross inefficiency and dishonesty, the respondent Judge Efren B. Mallare is meted a FINE of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000). SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57343 July 23, 1990 LUISA ECHAUS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EMILIO GONZALES and VIVIAN GONZALES, respondents. Celso de las Alas for petitioner. Mary Carolynn S. Que-Albay for private respondents.

NARVASA, J.: Time honored and of constant observance is the principle that no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed, and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, 1 and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. 2 This is so even if the order or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party. 3 In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of any party or even motu proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained finality. 4

The appellate proceedings at bar originated from an action for collection of an indebtedness of P141,000.00 instituted in the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City by the Spouses Emilio Gonzales and Vivian Gonzales against Luisa Echaus. 5 The action resulted in a judgment containing the following dispositive portion, to wit: 6 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant for the principal amount of P97,600.00 with interest thereon at ten percent (10%) per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint on December 14, 1978 until fully paid plus the costs of the suit. The plaintiffs are directed to return the watch which the plaintiffs claim to be valued at P8,000.00 but which value is not acceptable to the defendant, upon full payment by the defendant of her obligation to the plaintiffs. Luisa Echaus was duly served with notice of the judgment, and within the thirty-day period then prescribed for taking an appeal, filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond, as well as a motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal. 7 The respondent Judge denied the appeal it appearing, in his view, "that the decision rendered in this case ... was based strictly on the admission, agreement and waiver made by both parties at the previous pre-trial.." 8 Echaus promptly filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing her appeal. She also filed the requisite record on appeal. About a week later, however, the respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of the plaintiffs, the Spouses Emilio Gonzales and Vivian Gonzales. 9 Echaus hied herself off to the Court of Appeals, praying for the issuance of writs of certiorari and mandamus to annul the decision and orders of respondent Judge, and compel him to give due course to her appeal. 10 Her action was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-10149-R. Her plea for the writ of certiorari ("to set aside the decision .. in the stated Civil Case No. Q-26572") was denied, but her plea for the writ of mandamus was GRANTED by the judgment dated February 18, 1980 of the Court of Appeals which accordingly ordered the Judge "to give due course to the appeal of petitioner in the same said case." 11 The Gonzales Spouses' attempt to have this Court reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals was unsuccessful. Their petition for review on certiorari 12 was denied by Resolution dated July 11, 1980 because filed late and having, in any case, no merit. On December 9, 1980, Echaus filed with the Trial Court an "Urgent Motion to Transmit Record on Appeal and other Pertinent Papers to the Appellate Court," which she set for hearing on December 15, 1980. 13 The Gonzales Spouses also filed on the same date but apparently at an earlier hour, 14 a "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal," which they set for hearing on December 18, 1980. 15 Echaus then presented an "Urgent Supplemental Motion to Implement ... (Judgment) of Court of Appeals dated February 18, 1980" 16 which judgment, as aforestated, required respondent Judge to give due course to her appeal. According to Echaus, at the hearing on December 15, 1980 of her aforesaid motion to transmit record on appeal and other papers to the Court of Appeals, respondent Judge verbally approved the record on appeal in open court, this allegedly being "evidenced by the calendar of Branch V .. (showing) the word 'APPROVED' written opposite the incident 'Urgent Motion to Transmit Record on Appeal, etc.,' with crossed markings. " 17 What was subsequently released by the Court, however, under date of December 15, 1980, was an order signed by His Honor holding "approval of defendant's record on appeal .. in abeyance until after the consideration and resolution of plaintiffs' .. Motion for Execution Pending Appeal' which is set for hearing on December 18, 1980 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning." 18 On December 19, 1980 Echaus moved for reconsideration of the Order of December 15, 1980. Without however waiting for its resolution, she filed on December 29, 1980 a motion in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10149-R praying inter alia that the Trial Judge be required to comply with the decision of February 18, 1980 and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for having thus far refused to do so. 19 After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals denied Echaus's motion for lack of merit, by Resolution dated March 18, 1981. 20 It observed that "there was no wilful or deliberate refusal to comply with the decision .. dated February 18, 1980;" that what respondent Judge had been commanded to do by the decision was that he "should .. proceed to give due course to the appeal by considering and acting" thereon, but immediate transmittal of said record could not be compelled in the premises "because the correctness or accuracy .. (thereof) should be first passed upon and certified by the court a quo," even if there were no opposition thereto. The Court also pointed out that deferment of approval of the record on appeal had been ordered by the Trial Judge in keeping "with the proper and orderly procedure to the end that all pending incidents .. before him be first resolved .. in order that said incidents be not rendered moot and academic by the approval of said ... record on appeal;" and that, citing Laurilla v. Uichangco, et al., 104 Phil. 171 A verbal order or a mere notation in the minutes of the calendar of the court a quo .. indicating approval of the .. record on appeal is, in our view, not yet the ultimate and requisite formal order of approval of said record on appeal that would divest the court a quo of its jurisdiction to act on pending incidents. Even a written order approving a

record on appeal may still be subject to a motion for reconsideration of an opposing party. If a written order which has not acquired finality may still be reconsidered by the court, with more reason can respondent judge modify his verbal order that has not been implemented nor even made known to the other party in the case. The Court of Appeals finally resolved that "as the motion for execution pending appeal is conceded to have been filed by the plaintiffs before the court below had approved (but only verbally) petitioner's record on appeal, the court a quo therefore still retained its jurisdiction to resolve the pending motion for execution pending appeal." Echaus subsequently asked the Court of Appeals to reconsider the Resolution. The Court of Appeals refused. But in its Resolution denying reconsideration, dated June 22, 1981, 21 the Court declared that it was prompted .. to enjoin the respondent judge to act upon and set for hearing and resolve at the soonest time possible, the stated motion for execution pending appeal if this incident is still pending before that Court, so that there will remain no further reason or cause for withholding his resolution on the petitioner's record on appeal or such other pleadings and orders as may be necessary for the perfection of petitioner's appeal. Then upon the formal approval of the record on appeal the case can be transmitted to this Court, in compliance with the judgment rendered in this case that the petitioner's appeal be given due course. All these, respondent judge is strongly urged to act upon with promptness and dispatch. These Resolutions-of March 18, 1981 and June 22, 1981 are challenged in the appellate proceeding at bar, initiated by petition for review on certiorari presented by Echaus. In this Court, Echaus argues that it was reversible error for the Court of Appeals to have "ignored the fact that .. (her) appeal had in fact been perfected when the Trial Judge (verbally) ordered the record on appeal approved on December 15, 1980 and, in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Cabilao et al. v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, 17 SCRA 992, any further action on the part of the Trial Judge in the case, particularly on respondent spouses' motion for execution pending appeal is null and void." 22 The argument is patently without merit and is here given short shrift. In line with the fundamental principles set forth in the opening paragraph of this opinion, the oral order approving the record on appeal had no juridical existence; to give it that existence it had to be reduced to writing and promulgated (i.e., Med with the clerk of court). 23 But even if it had been written and promulgated, indeed even if it had already been properly served on the parties, it nonetheless was yet plainly within the power of the Judge to recall it and set it aside. For every court has the inherent power, among others, to "amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice." 24 And this Court has had occasion to rule that a trial court may set aside its order approving a record on appeal prior to the transmittal of the record. 25 So, even conceding arguendo, efficacy to the oral order approving Echaus's record on appeal, the respondent Judge nevertheless had the power to recall said order, or, as he actually did, hold approval thereof in abeyance until after he had resolved other pending incidents. This Court thus perceives no error on the part of the Appellate Court in giving its imprimatur to that act of the respondent Judge in the light of the attendant circumstances. To all intents and purposes, Echaus's record on appeal had never been approved. Now, the doctrine prevailing at the time was that prior to the approval of the record on appeal, the Trial Court retained jurisdiction to grant execution pending appeal, that approval being in fact the operative act denoting the end of the court's power to grant execution pending appeal. 26 The respondent Judge, therefore, cannot be deemed to have acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or to have gravely abused his discretion, in deferring action on the record on appeal so that he might first resolve the motion for execution pending appeal. Of course, as is by now known to all, the rules for taking an appeal to the Court of Appeals, and for execution pending appeal have since been altered and simplified. Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, appeals from final judgments or orders of the Regional Trial Court are taken to the Court of Appeals simply by filing a notice of appeal. 27 The requirement to file an appeal bond 28 or record on appeal has been done away with, except in special proceedings or actions in which multiple appeals are allowed in which cases a record on appeal is still needed. 29 Under the same BP129, an appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by either party; and in the exceptional cases where a record on appeal is still required, the appeal is perfected upon approval thereof. 30 It should however be noted that a motion for execution pending appeal filed before perfection of an appeal by mere notice, may still be acted upon and granted after such perfection but before transmittal of the record to the appellate court. 31 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. This Decision is immediately executory.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119 June 30, 2008 [Formerly A.M. O.C.A. IPI No. 07-2709-RTJ] ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE, complainant, vs. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY, respondent. RESOLUTION CARPIO MORALES, J.: By letter-complaint dated May 19, 20061 which was received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on May 26, 2006, Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (complainant) charged Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of "demean[ing], humiliat[ing] and berat[ing]" him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 of Civil Case No. 35142003-C, "Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan, et al" in which he was counsel for the plaintiff. To prove his claim, complainant cited the remarks made by respondent in the course of the proceedings conducted on February 27, 2006 as transcribed by stenographer Elenita C. de Guzman, viz: COURT: . . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines? ATTY. MANE: No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor. COURT: No, you're not from UP. ATTY. MANE: I am very proud of it. COURT: Then you're not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form and substance. 2 (Emphasis supplied) Complainant further claimed that the entire proceedings were "duly recorded in a tape recorder" by stenographer de Guzman, and despite his motion (filed on April 24, 2006) for respondent to direct her to furnish him with a copy of the tape recording, the motion remained unacted as of the date he filed the present administrative complaint on May 26, 2006. He, however, attached a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes taken on February 27, 2006. In his Comments3 dated June 14, 2006 on the complaint filed in compliance with the Ist Indorsement dated May 31, 20064 of the OCA, respondent alleged that complainant filed on December 15, 2005 an "Urgent Motion to Inhibit,"5 paragraph 36 of which was malicious and "a direct assault to the integrity and dignity of the Court and of the Presiding Judge" as it "succinctly implied that [he] issued the order dated 27 September 2005 for [a] consideration other than the merits of the case." He thus could not "simply sit idly and allow a direct assault on his honor and integrity." On the unacted motion to direct the stenographer to furnish complainant with a copy of the "unedited" tape recording of the proceedings, respondent quoted paragraphs 4 and 37 of the motion which, to him, implied that the trial court was "illegally, unethically and unlawfully engaged in 'editing' the transcript of records to favor a party litigant against the interest of [complainant's] client." Respondent thus claimed that it was on account of the two motions that he ordered complainant, by separate orders dated June 5, 2006, to explain within 15 days 8 why he should not be cited for contempt. Complainant later withdrew his complaint, by letter of September 4, 2006, 9 stating that it was a mere result of his impulsiveness.

In its Report dated November 7, 2007,10 the OCA came up with the following evaluation: . . . The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from pursuing an administrative complaint does not divest the Court of its disciplinary authority over court officials and personnel. Thus, the complainant's withdrawal of the instant complaint will not bar the continuity of the instant administrative proceeding against respondent judge. The issue presented before us is simple: Whether or not the statements and actions made by the respondent judge during the subject February 27, 2006 hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. After a cursory evaluation of the complaint, the respondent's comment and the documents at hand, we find that there is no issue as to what actually transpired during the February 27 th hearing as evidenced by the stenographic notes. The happening of the incident complained of by herein complainant was never denied by the respondent judge. If at all, respondent judge merely raised his justifications for his complained actuations. xxxx . . . [A] judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. A judge must at all times be temperate in his language. Respondent judge's insulting statements which tend to question complainant's capability and credibility stemming from the fact that the latter did not graduated [sic] from UP Law school is clearly unwarranted and inexcusable. When a judge indulges in intemperate language, the lawyer can return the attack on his person and character, through an administrative case against the judge, as in the instant case. Although respondent judge's use in intemperate language may be attributable to human frailty, the noble position in the bench demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and language. xxxx Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should always observe courtesy and civility. In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a controversial tone or a tone that creates animosity. Judges should always be aware that disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be mutual concession of respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected but free to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. If a judge desires not to be insulted, he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm. It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only did respondent judge make insulting and demeaning remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary "lecturing" and "debating". . . xxxx Respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the motion to inhibit filed by complainant, but, instead, he opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. If respondent judge felt that there is a need to admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he should have called him in his chambers where he can advise him privately rather than battering him with insulting remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking him from what school he came from publicly in the courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is highly reprehensible. It betrays the judge's lack of patience and temperance. A highly temperamental judge could hardly make decisions with equanimity. Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from lecturing the counsels or debating with them during court hearings to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and integrity. While judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality. 11 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. 12 By Resolution of January 21, 2008,13 this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed. Respondent complied on February 26, 2008,14 manifesting in the affirmative.

The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads: Rule 3.04. - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants. An author explains the import of this rule: Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be courteous to counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced and also to all those others appearing or concerned in the administration of justice in the court. He should be considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon his court. He should be courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate language during the hearing of a case. In his conversation with counsel in court, a judge should be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. He should not interrupt counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their positions. Nor should he be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or premature judgment. A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to the courts, to their clients and to the adverse party and his lawyer, so as to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business before the court . He may utilize his opportunities to criticize and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not do so in an insulting manner.15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, quoted verbatim, taken during the February 27, 2006 hearing show that respondent made sarcastic and humiliating, even threatening and boastful remarks to complainant who is admittedly "still young," "unnecessary lecturing and debating," as well as unnecessary display of learning: COURT: xxx Sir do you know the principle or study the stare decisis? ATTY. MANE: Ah, with due respect your COURT: Tell me, what is your school? ATTY. MANE: I am proud graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University. COURT: Were you taught at the MLQU College of Law of the principle of Stare Decisis and the interpretation of the Supreme Court of the rules of procedure where it states that if there is already a decision by the Supreme Court, when that decision shall be complied with by the Trial Court otherwise non-compliance thereof shall subject the Courts to judicial sanction, and I quote the decision. That's why I quoted the decision of the Supreme Court Sir, because I know the problem between the bank and the third party claimants and I state, "The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy." Sir, that's very clear, that is what fair market value and that is not assessment value. In fact even you say assessment value, the Court further state, "the assessed value is the fair market value multiplied. Not mere the basic assesses value. Sir that is the decision of the Supreme Court, am I just reading the decision or was I inventing it? ATTY. MANE: May I be allowed to proceed. COURT:

10

Sir, you tell me. Was I inventing the Supreme Court decision which I quoted and which you should have researched too or I was merely imagining the Supreme Court decision sir? Please answer it. ATTY. MANE: No your Honor. COURT: Please answer it. xxxx COURT: That's why. Sir second, and again I quote from your own pleadings, hale me to the Supreme Court otherwise I will hale you to the bar . Prove to me that I am grossly ignorant or corrupt. ATTY. MANE: Your Honor when this representation, your Honor . . . COURT: No, sir. ATTY. MANE: Yes your Honor . . . COURT: No sir unless you apologize to the Court I will hale you to the IBP Because hindi naman ako ganon. I am not that vindictive but if this remains. You cannot take cover from the instruction of your client because even if the instruction of a client is "secret." Upon consideration, the language of the pleader must still conform with the decorum and respect to the Court. Sir, that's the rule of practice. In my twenty (20) years of practice I've never been haled by a judge to any question of integrity. Because even if I believed that the Court committed error in judgment or decision or grave abuse of discretion, I never imputed any malicious or unethical behavior to the judge because I know and I believe that anyone can commit errors. Because no one is like God. Sir, I hope sir you understand that this Court, this Judge is not God but this Judge is human when challenge on his integrity and honor is lodged. No matter how simple it is because that is the only thing I have now. Atty. Bantin, can you please show him my statement of assets and liabilities? ATTY. MANE: I think that is not necessary your Honor. COURT: No counsel because the imputations are there, that's why I want you to see. Show him my assets and liabilities for the proud graduate of MLQU. Sir, look at it. Sir, I have stock holdings in the U.S. before I joined the bench. And it was very clear to everyone, I would do everything not be tempted to accept bribe but I said I have spent my fifteen (15) years and that's how much I have worked in fifteen (15) years excluding my wife's assets which is more than what I have may be triple of what I have. May be even four fold of what I have. And look at my assets. May be even your bank can consider on cash to cash basis my personal assets. That is the reason I am telling you Atty. Mane. Please, look at it. If you want I can show you even the Income Tax Return of my wife and you will be surprised that my salary is not even her one-half month salary. Sir, she is the Chief Executive Officer of a Multi-National Publishing Company. That's why I have the guts to take this job because doon po sa salary niya umaasa na lamang po ako sa aking asawa. Atty. Mane, please you are still young. Other judges you would already be haled to the IBP. Take that as a lesson. Now that you are saying that I was wrong in the three-day notice rule, again the Supreme Court decision validates me, PNB vs. Court of Appeals, you want me to cite the quotation again that any pleadings that do not conform with the three-day notice rule is

11

considered as useless scrap of paper and therefore not subject to any judicial cognizance. You know sir, you would say but I was the one subject because the judge was belligerent. No sir, you can go on my record and you will see that even prior to my rulings on your case I have already thrown out so many motion for non-compliance of a three-day notice rule. If I will give you an exception because of this, then I would be looked upon with suspicion. So sir again, please look again on the record and you will see how many motions I threw out for non-compliance with the three-day notice rule . It is not only your case sir, because sir you are a practitioner and a proud graduate of the MLQU which is also the Alma Mater of my uncle. And I supposed you were taught in thought that the three-day notice rule is almost sacrosanct in order to give the other party time to appear and plead. In all books, Moran, Regalado and all other commentators state that noncompliance with the three-day notice rule makes the pleading and motion a useless scrap of paper. If that is a useless scrap of paper, sir, what would be my ground to grant exception to your motion? Tell me. xxxx COURT: Procedural due process. See. So please sir don't confuse the Court. Despite of being away for twenty years from the college of law, still I can remember my rules, In your motion you said . . . imputing things to the Court. Sir please read your rules. Familiarize yourself, understand the jurisprudence before you be the Prince Valiant or a Sir Gallahad in Quest of the Holy Grail. Sir, ako po ay mahirap na tao, karangalan ko lang po ang aking kayang ibigay sa aking mga anak at iyan po ay hindi ko palalampasin maski kanino pa. Sir, have you ever heard of anything about me in this Court for one year. Ask around, ask around. You know, if you act like a duck, walk like a duck, quack like a duck, you are a duck. But have you ever heard anything against the court. Sir in a judicial system, in a Court, one year is time enough for the practitioner to know whether a judge is what, dishonest; 2), whether the judge is incompetent; and 3) whether the judge is just playing loco. And I have sat hear for one year sir and please ask around before you charge into the windmill. I am a proud product of a public school system from elementary to college. And my only, and my only, the only way I can repay the taxpayers is a service beyond reproach without fear or favor to anyone. Not even the executive, not even the one sitting in Malacanang, not even the Supreme Court if you are right. Sir, sana po naman inyo ring igalang ang Hukuman kasi po kami, meron nga po, tinatanggap ko, kung inyo pong mamarapatin, meron pong mga corrupt, maaari pong nakahanap na kayo ng corrupt na Judge pero hindi po lahat kami ay corrupt. Maaari ko rin pong tanggapin sa inyong abang lingcod na merong mga Hukom na tanga pero hindi po naman lahat kami ay tanga. Ako po ay 8:30 or before ay nandito po ako sa husgado ko. Aalis po ako dito sa hapon, babasahin ko lahat ang kaso ko para ko po malaman kung any po ang kaso, para po pagharap ko sa inyo at sa publiko hindi po ako magmumukhang tanga. Sir, please have the decency, not the respect, not to me but to the Court. Because if you are a lawyer who cannot respect the Court then you have no business appearing before the Court because you don't believe in the Court system. That's why one of my classmates never appeared before Court because he doesn't believe in that system. He would rather stay in their airconditioned room because they say going to Court is useless. Then, to them I salute, I give compliment because in their own ways they know the futility and they respect the Court, in that futility rather than be a hypocrite. Atty. Mane hindi mo ako kilala, I've never disrespect the courts and I can look into your eyes. Kaya po dito ko gusto kasi di po ako dito nagpractice para po walang makalapit sa akin. Pero kung ako po naman ay inyong babastusin ng ganyang handa po akong lumaban kahit saan, miski saan po. And you can quote me, you can go there together to the Supreme Court. Because the only sir, the only treasure I have is my name and my integrity. I could have easily let it go because it is the first time, but the second time is too much too soon. Sir, masyado pong kwan yon, sinampal na po ninyo ako nung primero, dinuran pa po ninyo ako ng pangalawa. That's adding insult to the injury po. Hindi ko po sana gagawin ito pero ayan po ang dami diyang abugado. I challenge anyone to file a case against me for graft and corruption, for incompetence. xxxx COURT: I will ask the lawyer to read the statement and if they believe that you are not imputing any wrong doing to me I will apologize to you. Atty. Hildawa please come over. The Senior, I respect the old practitioner, whose integrity is unchallenged. Sir you said honest. Sir ganoon po ako. You still want to defend your position, so be it.

12

Atty. Hildawa I beg your indulgence, I am sorry but I know that you are an old practitioner hammered out by years of practice and whose integrity by reputation precedes you. Please read what your younger companero has written to this Honorable Court in pleading and see for yourself the implications he hurled to the Court in his honest opinion. Remember he said honest. That implication is your honest opinion of an implication sir. Sir 1, 2 and 3. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. If that is your honest opinion. Remember the word you said honest opinion. Alam mo Atty. Mane I know when one has to be vigilant and vigorous in the pursue of pride. But if you are vigilant and vigor, you should never crossed the line. Sir, what is your interpretation to the first three paragraphs? ATTY. HILDAWA: There will be some . . . COURT: What sir? ATTY. HILDAWA: . . . indiscretion. COURT: Indiscretion. See, that is the most diplomatic word that an old practitioner could say to the Court because of respect. Sir, salamat po. xxxx COURT: Kita po ninyo, iyan po ang matatandang abogado. Indiscretion na lang. Now you say that is your honest opinion and the old practitioner hammered through years of practice could only say indiscretion committed by this judge. Much more I who sits in this bench? Now is that your honest opinion? 16 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Court thus finds the evaluation by the OCA well-taken. An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyer's oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem. A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent felt that his integrity and dignity were being "assaulted," he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse. This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court.17 Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by any of the following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand. WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge and is REPRIMANDED

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therefor. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2038 October 19, 2007 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2250-RTJ) Attys. ROWENA V. GUANZON and PEARL R. MONTESINO of the Gender Watch Coalition, Assistant City Prosecutor ROSANNA SARIL-TOLEDANO, Bacolod City, and Atty. ERFE DEL CASTILLO-CALDIT, Complainants, vs. Judge ANASTACIO C. RUFON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Bacolod City, Respondent. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: For our resolution is the February 11, 2005 letter-complaint 1 filed by complainants Atty. Rowena V. Guanzon and Atty. Pearl R. Montesino of the Gender Watch Coalition, Assistant City Prosecutor Rosanna Saril-Toledano, Bacolod City, and Atty. Erfe del Castillo-Caldit against respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, same city, for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rule on Gender-Fair Language, use of foul, or obscene and discriminatory language, discrimination against women lawyers and litigants and unethical conduct. In his comment2 dated January 20, 2006, respondent judge vehemently denied the charges. On March 14, 2006, the Court referred the case to Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. On July 13, 2006, Justice Salvador set the case for preliminary conference. Only complainant Guanzon and respondent judge appeared. Because of the distance between Bacolod and Manila, the parties found it quite difficult and expensive to attend subsequent hearings of the case. Respondent submitted a pre-trial brief proposing stipulation of facts. Complainant Guanzon, for herself and in representation of complainant Montesino, filed a preliminary conference brief enumerating the charges in their complaint and the probable witnesses and documentary evidence they intended to present in support thereof. Later, complainant Guanzon submitted an affidavit of complainant Toledano, who was then a resident of the United States, imputing bias and abuse of authority to respondent for granting bail in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-24800 and 03-24801. Complainant Caldit executed a letter withdrawing her complaint against respondent. In view of the parties failure to attend the proceedings, Justice Salvador resolved the case on the bases of the pleadings and documents filed by the parties. On March 5, 2007, Justice Salvador submitted her Report and Recommendation reproduced hereunder: The Issue WHETHER OR NOT SUFFICIENT CAUSE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENT ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDGES AND THE RULE ON GENDER-FAIR LANGUAGE, USE OF FOUL OR OBSCENE AND DISCRIMINATORY LANGUAGE, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS AS WELL AS UNETHICAL CONDUCT. Findings and Conclusions A careful scrutiny of the record shows sufficient ground for a reprimand and an admonition to respondent to act with utmost temperance, sensitivity and circumspection in the discharge of his functions. xxx xxx xxx

Concededly, complainants in administrative proceedings have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaint (Araos v. Luna-Pison, 378 SCRA 246). The fact that, owing to the unavailability of the parties, no hearings were conducted in the case to thresh out the issues presented by their various pleadings and incidents did not, however, totally discount the existence of factual bases for the charges leveled against respondent. In her November 8, 2006 affidavit (pp. 169170, Rollo), Cynthia Bagtas-Serios significantly gave the following account of respondents deportment which goes into the heart of the complaint, viz.: xxx xxx xxx

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In one of the first hearings of my case, when Atty. Rowena Guanzon was not assisting me but another counsel, I was shocked when Judge Anastacio Rufon, inside the court with so many people present, said to me "next time you see your husband, open your arms and legs." I felt humiliated and insulted, and was glad that the hearing did not proceed because the respondent was not present. The following day, I called Atty. Rowena Guanzon and reported Judge Rufons foul language and intolerable conduct to her (p. 170, ibid.). xxx xxx xxx

Respondent had, of course, taken great pains to refute the foregoing allegations (pp. 215-219, ibid.), complete with transcript of stenographic notes taken in Civil Case No. 99-10985 (pp. 220-240, ibid.) as well as the orders issued in the case (pp. 241-243, ibid.). In denying the charges leveled against him, however, appropriate note may be taken of the fact that respondents January 20, 2006 comment admitted his use of "frank language" in court when exhorting litigants to settle their differences and his resort to "strong and colorful" words whenever he has had a drink or two, albeit after office hours (pp. 81-82, ibid.). Even more significantly, the July 12, 2006 letter of complainant Caldit which was attached as Annex "4" to respondents own Pre-Trial Brief contains the following tell-tale assertions, viz.: xxx xxx xxx

Respondent should bear in mind that a judge holds a position in the community that is looked up to with honor and privilege (Ramos v. Barot 420 SCRA 406). Although judges are subject to human limitations (Misajon v. Feranil, 440 SCRA 298), it cannot be over-emphasized that no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench (Resngit-Marquez v. Llamas, Jr., 385 SCRA 6). Because a judge is always looked upon as being the visible representation of law and, from him, the people draw much of their will and awareness to obey legal mandates (Garcia v. Bueser, 425 SCRA 93), it has been rightfully ruled that moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue in the judiciary; it is a necessity (Office of the Court Administrator v. Sayo, Jr., 381 SCRA 659). In closing, it would be remiss not to remind respondent of the fact that all judges should always observe courtesy and civility (Fineza v. Aruelo, 385 SCRA 339) and also be temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and language (Fidel v. Caraos, 394 SCRA 47), especially to those appearing before him (Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Yrastorsa, Sr. 422 SCRA 26). The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Imbang v. Del Rosario, 421 SCRA 523). In view of the fact that public confidence in the judiciary is very easily eroded by irresponsible and improper conduct of judges (Navarro v. Tormis, 428 SCRA 37), respondent should remember to avoid improprieties and the appearance of impropriety in all of his activities (Veloso v. Caminade, 434 SCRA 7). Recommendation WHEREFORE, premises considered, the REPRIMAND of respondent is recommended alongside a stern admonition that he should, henceforth, take care to act with utmost temperance, sensitivity and circumspection in the discharge of his functions. We sustain the finding of Justice Salvador that respondent judge uttered in open court intemperate and obscene language injurious to the sensitivity and feelings of complainants who are all women. Judicial decorum requires a magistrate to be at all times temperate in his language, 3 refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting "to language of vilification." 4 It is very essential that they live up to the high standards demanded by Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary5 which provides: SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. x x x In Fidel v. Caraos,6 we held that although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language.7 Thus, we declare respondent judge guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct considered a light charge under Section 10(1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, punishable under Section 11(C) of the same Rule, by: 1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00, but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or 2. Censure

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3. Reprimand 4. Admonition with warning ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon is found guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct and is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

A.M. No. MTJ-88-184 October 13, 1989 CALI A. IMPAO, DANIEL M. ESPERAT and NENA E. HERRERA, petitioners, vs. JUDGE JACOSALEM D. MAKILALA, respondent. A.M. No. MTJ-88-217 October 13, 1989 ROSAMAR V. MAREGMEN, ELLEN G. VILIARUEL and GINA D. NATIVIDAD, petitioners, vs. JUDGE JACOSALEM D. MAKILALA, respondent. A.M. No. MTJ-88-221 October 13, 1989 EMPLOYEES OF THE MTC, MAGANOY AND MCTC OF AMPATUAN-SULTAN SA BARONGIS, PROVINCE OF MAGUINDANAO petitioners, vs. JUDGE JACOSALEM D. MAKILALA, respondent. Rosamar V. Maregmen for petitioners in AM-MTJ-88-217. RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Maganoy, Maguindanao and Designated Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of AmpatuanSultan Sa Barongis, Maguindanao was charged in three separate complaints by the employees of the above mentioned courts with gross misconduct, falsification, abuse of authority and neglect and irregularity in the performance of duties. The three letter-complaints were designated as Administrative Matter Nos. MTJ-88- 184, MTJ-88-217 and MTJ-88-221. Complainants alleged that from September 1985 up to the last week of April 1988, Judge Makilala held office every Monday at his residence in Maganoy and the rest of the week stayed at his residence in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Respondent judge allegedly refused to hold office at the newly constructed municipal building where a suitable space for a court was furnished by the municipal government of Maganoy. It is alleged that whenever hearings are held in his residence, respondent judge would always appear in sleeveless shirt and slippers while the party-litigants and their counsels were in business attire. While respondent judge required his staff to strictly observe the Civil Service Rules on office attendance, he allegedly had no qualms in filling up his daily time record as if he rendered full service when in fact he was always absent because of his illness and when he was not absent, he only stayed in court for a short period [Affidavit of Ellen Villaruel and Gina Natividad, Annex "D", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217]. The complainants also charged respondent judge with unduly favoring two court personnel-Josue Calzado, Process Server of Maganoy Municipal Court, and Jose Subaldo, Process Server of Ampatuan Sultan Sa Barongis Municipal Circuit Court because they were allegedly used by respondent judge in his house as driver-mechanic, house guard or errand-boy. Calzado and Subaldo were given high performance ratings by respondent while all the other employees were given failing marks. Complainants averred that Judge Makilala found pleasure in scolding them in front of other people, uttering insulting words like "mga baboy kayong mga Kristiyano," [Affidavit of Rosamar Maregmen, Annex "C-3", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184.] On one occasion, Judge Makilala allegedly told visiting soldiers to choose from among his female staff members whom they wanted to rape. He also told the male court employees not to waste their time and to start having sexual intercourse with the female employees from Ampatuan [Joint Affidavit of Daniel Esperat and Cali Impao Annex "G", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217]. At one time respondent judge threatened his female staff members that if he could not dismiss them, he will have them ambushed on their way home to Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat. The

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employees were so alarmed by this threat that they reported the matter to the Office of the Provincial Commander of Maganoy. Complainants also alleged that Judge Makilala punched Daniel Esperat, Court Aide of the MTC of Maganoy, because the latter failed to deliver the entire volume of nipa ordered by respondent for the roof of his house. After punching Esperat, respondent judge allegedly went inside his house to get his gun and threatened to kill Esperat. Esperat then ran away and later went to the provincial hospital for treatment. A medical certificate issued by Dr. Teogenes F. Baluma, which was attached to the letter-complaint of Esperat, shows that he suffered a "swelling contusion" on the right side of the abdomen. Respondent judge is also charged with having accepted a bribe from an accused in a criminal case. Datu Cali Impao, Court Interpreter of the MTC of Maganoy, narrated that during the hearing of the case entitled People v. Mario Labrador, respondent Judge Makilala gave a sign to the accused to follow him (respondent) inside his chambers. When they emerged from the chambers, Judge Makilala immediately ordered the dismissal of the case. Later, respondent proudly announced to his staff that he got four hundred pesos (P400.00) from Labrador which will be used in purchasing the office supplies needed by the court [Affidavit of Datu Cali Impao, Annex "C", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184]. To support the foregoing allegations, complainants submitted affidavits from the employees concerned. They also submitted the affidavits of Datu Gambay A. Upam, a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maganoy, and Olandigan A. Sulaik, the Municipal Secretary of Maganoy, who both corroborated the claim of the complainants that Judge Makilala seldom reported in the municipal court in Maganoy [Annexes "D" and "D-1", Adm. Matter No. MTJ- 88-184]. Also attached to the complaints as annexes were copies of a "diary" kept by Nena Herrera, Stenographic Reporter of the MTC of Maganoy, containing a record of the behavior of respondent judge from April 1988 up to the time he was suspended, including the insulting utterances he made and the time of his arrival in and departure from the municipal court. The diary was signed not only by Nena Herrera but also by the other court employees. On August 22, 1988, the court employees under respondent Judge Makilala went on mass leave to show their protest against respondent judge's behavior towards them. On September 13, 1988 the Court issued a resolution referring Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-221 to Judge Ismael C. Bagundang of the Regional Trial Court of Maganoy, Maguindanao for investigation, report and recommendation, and ordering the suspension of respondent judge pending the investigation of the charges against him. Subsequently, the Court issued a resolution dated September 22, 1988 ordering the consolidation of Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184 and Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217 with Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-221 earlier referred by the Court to Judge Bagundang in the September 13, 1988 resolution. The Court reiterated the order of suspension of Judge Makilala and required respondent judge to file a consolidated comment within ten (10) days from notice. In his consolidated comment, respondent judge denied the charges against him and claimed that the allegations were fabricated by the complainants to get back at him for his strict enforcement of the Civil Service Law. On the use of his residence as the MTC of Maganoy from 1974- 1984, respondent explained that it was with the approval of the municipal government because at that time there was no municipal building and the municipal government had to rent private buildings and houses for its use as its offices. He claimed that in 1984 he refused to transfer to the new municipal building because the municipal government had not fixed the space allotted for the municipal court. However, from 1985 up to the present, the municipal court and office have always been in its permanent space in the Maganoy Municipal Building. As to his alleged absences and short stay in court, respondent insisted that this was due to the lightness of his caseload, and that the records will show that he has no pending or unfinished work [Ibid., p. 4]. Lastly, respondent asked the Court to reconsider his suspension pending the investigation of the charges against him considering his old age and his long service without any previous record of serious official misconduct [Ibid., p. 5]. A counter-complaint against the court personnel was also filed by respondent judge for alleged violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and dishonesty and immorality. The initial investigation of the case was conducted on October 17, 1988, during which respondent judge manifested that he will file a motion to inhibit the investigating judge due to partiality. On November 17,1988 respondent filed his motion to inhibit Judge Bagundang but the latter denied the same. Respondent then filed the motion with this Court but it was likewise denied by this Court in a resolution dated December 12,1988. Meanwhile, on the scheduled hearing on December 5, 1988, respondent's motion for postponement on the ground of Judge Makilala's illness was granted by the investigating judge but with a warning that henceforth the hearings will continue even without the presence of the respondent. The hearing was resumed on January 16,1989, but neither the respondent nor his counsel were present. No

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explanation was given for the absence of respondent and his counsel, hence the hearing proceeded as scheduled and was terminated on January 19,1989. On January 30,1989 Investigating Judge Ismael C. Bagundang submitted to this Court a report, with the following findings: . . . there is reasonable ground to believe that Judge Makilala really abused his authority against his staff, the utterances made by him that he will have his staff be raped (sic), calling the staff "mga baboy kayong mga kristiyano" which utterances have been duly blottered in the Office of the Provincial Commander of Maganoy, the seeming biased attitude of Judge Makilala by giving failure rating for the majority of the staff while giving high performance rating to Jose Calzado and Jose Subaldo, is clear indication that he really harrassed (sic) his staff. The boxing of Daniel Esperat because [he] failed to deliver on that particular day the nipa intended for the roofing of his private house, is an act unbecoming for (sic) him as a Judge. The threatening remarks that he have (sic) uttered on several occasions against the staff of Maganoy and Ampatuan-Sultan sa Barongis, uttered almost daily is a clear sign that he really harrassed (sic) the employees. The entry that he made in his daily time record from 1987 to 1988, that he reports to the office Monday thru Friday when in truth and in fact he only goes to Maganoy every Monday and stays most of his time in Tacurong residence and when cases were filed, the cases has (sic) to be brought to his residence at Tacurong for his signature, is a clear indication that he has falsified his daily time record and is a violation not only of the Civil Service Law but also with (sic) the Revised Penal Code. The taking of money from Mr. Labrador for the sum of P400.00 under the guise of donation for the purchase of supplies for the use of the court, is a clear violation of the provision of the law regarding bribery [Report of the Investigating Judge, p. 5]. Judge Bagundang recommended that respondent judge be separated from the service and that all his retirement benefits be forfeited in favor of the government [Report of the Investigating Judge, p. 6]. After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds that the findings and conclusions contained in the report of Investigating Judge Bagundang are supported by the evidence on record. The Court agrees with the investigating judge that the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the complainants convincingly established the charges against the respondent. The Court finds nothing in the records which would warrant the reversal of the investigating judge's findings and conclusion. In his Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing Officer filed with this Court on May 12,1989, respondent judge assailed the findings of Judge Bagundang on the ground of "gross denial of due process" because his counsel was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who testified against him [Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing Officer, p. 4]. It is readily apparent from the records of the case that the above contention is manifestly devoid of merit. Respondent and his counsel were present during the hearings on November 17 and 18,1988 [TSN, November 17, 1988, pp. 2-3; TSN, November 18, 1988, pp. 2-3]. Respondent's counsel crossexamined witnesses Nena Herrera and Daniel Esperat during the November 18, 1988 hearing [TSN, November 18, 1988, pp. 3-37]. As to the other five witnesses, namely,Cali Impao, Noemi Socias, Belen Pasaforte, Ellen Villaruel and Rosamar Maregmen, the failure of respondent's counsel to crossexamine them was entirely the fault of respondent and his counsel. They failed to heed the warning of the investigating judge that the hearings on January 16 to 20 would continue even without the presence of respondent. Despite due notice both respondent and his counsel did not appear in the scheduled hearings nor did they explain the reason therefore. By their unexplained absence, respondent and his counsel effectively waived respondent's right to cross-examine the other witnesses. Judge Makilala contends that "when the sickly, old respondent failed to appear in the investigation, proof must be shown [by the investigating judge] ... of such efforts of giving [respondent the] opportunity to be present." It is further contended by respondent that since his two counsel "are both residents of Cotabato City with telephone connection in their respective homes," the investigating judge could have "easily contacted [them] to find out why they failed to be present on the scheduled investigation." [Ibid., p. 4.] The above contentions sadly reflect ignorance of the requirements of due process. As a lawyer and a municipal judge for a number of years, respondent should know that it is not incumbent upon the investigating judge to call up respondent's counsel to inquire into the reason for their nonappearance in the scheduled hearings. Nor is it for the investigating judge to prove that he gave respondent "an opportunity to be present." It is the duty of the respondent's counsel to be present during the hearings and to inform the court of the reason for their absence. Disagreeing with the investigating judge's recommendation, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo Suarez recommended that Judge Makilala be instead considered resigned from the service as of the time he was suspended with full payment of retirement benefits. The Deputy Court Administrator is of the opinion that the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of retirement benefits is too harsh

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considering that Judge Makilala is "already in the twilight years of his career as a judge" and is now "sickly and in need of medical check-ups and constant medication" [Memorandum of Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, p. 10]. The Court is not unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge Makilala is suffering from a lingering illness. Respondent himself alleges in his Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing Officer that he cannot travel long distances nor do any job requiring physical exertion because the nature of his illness, known as polycythemia vera, requires that his blood be drained periodically. However, the seriousness of respondent's illness cannot justify his failure to perform his duties nor does it excuse him from the consequences of his misconduct and abuse of authority. If indeed respondent found it difficult to discharge the functions of a municipal judge, then he should have retired voluntarily instead of clinging to his office at the expense of the litigants, his staff and the general public. Considering the number and the serious nature of offenses committed by respondent judge, the Court believes that the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of retirement benefits should be imposed upon him. It is an important judicial norm that a judge's private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety [Luque v. Kayanan, G.R. No. L-26826, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165; See Section 3, Canons of Judicial Ethics]. As held by this Court in the case of De la Paz v. Inutan, Adm. Matter No. 201 MJ, June 30,1975, 64 SCRA 540: . . .The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests, specially in the station of municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close and direct contact with the people before anybody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow ... The behavior of respondent judge complained of and proven in this case, i.e., his acceptance of a bribe, his holding office and conducting hearings at his residence, his falsification of his daily time record, his failure to observe proper decorum in conducting court proceedings, his intemperate language and threats against the personnel of his courts, and his use of physical violence against Daniel Esperat, among others, shows beyond doubt his unfitness to occupy the position of a municipal judge. Respondent judge violated the established norms for judicial behavior, and the best interest of the judiciary demands that respondent be dismissed from the service. WHERERORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala guilty of serious misconduct and abuse of authority and is hereby DISMISSED from the service. Any retirement benefits due him are hereby ordered FORFEITED to the government. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1821

August 12, 2004

JOSE E. FERNANDEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE JAIME T. HAMOY, Regional Trial Court, Branch 130, Caloocan City, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM: This is an administrative complaint against Judge Jaime T. Hamoy for Abuse of Authority, Dereliction of Duty and Violation of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 1 Complainant Jose E. Fernandez is the counsel for plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3645 entitled, " Hadji Adil Musahari, Plaintiff versus Shop-O-Rama, et al., Defendants," and Civil Case No. 2744 entitled, "Philippine International Development, Inc., Plaintiff versus Associate Citizens Bank, Defendant ," both of which were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 15, then presided by respondent Judge. Despite the lapse of more than ten years, respondent Judge failed to render judgment in the said cases. After respondent Judge was transferred to the RTC of Caloocan City, complainant learned that he brought the records of the subject cases to his new station. On January 7, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to the Court Administrator seeking help in the speedy disposition of his clients' cases.2 Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez referred the letter to respondent Judge for comment or appropriate action.3

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When nothing was heard from respondent Judge, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo directed respondent to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt. Again, respondent Judge failed to comply.4 On April 3, 2001, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez sent a First Tracer to respondent Judge reiterating the directive for him to file comment within five days from receipt. Still, respondent Judge failed to do so. For his repeated failure to comply with the directives of the Office of the Court Administrator, a Resolution was issued requiring respondent Judge to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to file comment; and to submit the said comment within ten days from notice.5 Respondent Judge finally filed an Explanation/Compliance, alleging that he simply forgot to submit his comment; that he misplaced the records of Civil Cases Nos. 3645 and 2744; that his Utility Aide in Caloocan City mixed up the records of the said cases with the records of cases assigned to the Caloocan court; that the missing case records were found only when the old records were transferred to the newly-acquired storage/filing cabinets; that he was unable to act on the cases notwithstanding the discovery of the records because he had to attend to the many family-related cases, being then the only designated Family Court; that his docket became more congested when the other courts forwarded to his sala cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Family Court; and that he had no intention of disregarding the directives of the Court Administrator or of this Court. 6 Subsequently, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation that he had already decided Civil Case No. 2744 on July 11, 2003 and Civil Case No. 3645 on June 20, 2003. 7 In compliance with the directive of this Court, respondent Judge manifested his willingness to submit the administrative complaint against him for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. 8 The Office of the Court Administrator, after evaluation, recommended that respondent Judge be fined the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) for his failure to decide the subject cases within the reglementary period, with warning that any further delay in the disposition of cases will subject him to a more severe penalty of either suspension or dismissal from service. We agree with the recommendation of the Court Administrator that respondent is administratively liable for gross inefficiency, dereliction of duty and violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. However, we find the recommended penalty not commensurate to the gravity of the nonfeasance and malfeasance committed. In his Comment, respondent Judge attributes the delay in the resolution of Civil Cases Nos. 2744 and 3645 to the mix-up of the records with those of the other cases assigned to his court. Such an excuse hardly merits serious consideration. Respondent Judge cannot be absolved from liability for the inefficiency of his court personnel.9 Judges are charged with the administrative responsibility of organizing and supervising his court personnel to secure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, requiring at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.10 Indeed, he is ultimately responsible for ensuring that court personnel perform their tasks and that the parties are promptly notified of his orders and decisions. 11 It is his duty to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court to enable him to monitor the flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely disposition.12 More importantly, judges have a duty to decide their cases within the reglementary period. On meritorious grounds, they may ask for additional time. It must be stressed, however, that their application for extension must be filed before the expiration of the prescribed period. 13 A close scrutiny of the records does not disclose any attempt by respondent Judge to request for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the aforementioned cases. Not only did he consign the cases in limbo for an unreasonable period of 13 years, worse, respondent Judge brought the records of the unresolved cases to his new station without clearance from the Office of the Court Administrator. Upon his transfer to another post, respondent Judge should have asked the permission of the Court Administrator to bring the records of the cases to his new assignment or should have apprised the parties of his action with respect thereto. This way, the Office of the Court Administrator and the parties involved are aware of the progress of the cases instead of leaving them in the dark. More importantly, this would dispel any suspicion that the respondent Judge was unduly holding on to the records for corrupt or ill motives. Members of the judiciary have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. A judge who failed to do so has to suffer the consequences of his omission. Any delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith in the judiciary. The office of a judge exists for one solemn end to promote the ends of justice by administering it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding over that court is the visible representation of the law and justice. These are self-evident dogmas which do not even have to be emphasized but which we always advert to when some members of the judiciary commit legal missteps or stray from the axioms of judicial ethics.14 More importantly, failure to resolve cases

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submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. 15 Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: Rule 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. In line with this, the Court has laid down administrative guidelines to ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied with. Thus, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 states, in pertinent part: 3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. . . (emphasis and italics supplied) A judge's inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions. 16 A judge should, at all times, remain in full control of the proceedings in his sala and, more importantly, should follow the time limit set for deciding cases.17 Furthermore, respondent Judge should be held liable for his failure to obey directives from this Court and the Court Administrator. In his Comment, respondent Judge admitted that he received the directives from the OCA and from this Court but that he "forgot" to comply. Needless to say, judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, much more so this Court from which all other courts should take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere request and should not be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.18 Respondent Judge's impious defiance of the directives of the OCA and of this Court borders on contumacy which deserves no compassion. He cannot simply shrug off his noncompliance and pass the blame to his faltering memory to justify his inaction. His explanation displays a cavalier attitude which mocks the lawful authority of this Court. In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. 19 Respondent Judge must bear in mind that the exacting standards of conduct demanded of judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.20 Aside from respondent Judge's gross inefficiency, the records show that despite the pendency of the cases subject hereof, he was able to collect his salaries upon his certification that he has no pending cases to resolve. A certificate of service is an instrument essential to the fulfillment by the judges of their duty to speedily dispose of their cases as mandated by the Constitution. A judge who fails to decide cases within the prescribed period but collects his salary upon a false certificate is guilty of dishonesty amounting to gross misconduct and deserves the condemnation of all right thinking men.21 In view of the primordial role of judges in the administration of justice, only those with irreproachable integrity and probity must be entrusted with judicial powers. In fine, the Court holds that respondent Judge committed gross misconduct and gross inefficiency under Rule 140, Section 8(3) of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, which are classified as a serious offense punishable by any of the sanctions enumerated in Section 11 of the same Rule, to wit: SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office with salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. It appears that this is not respondent Judge's first offense. He had been previously admonished by the Court in a Resolution dated March 20, 2002 for failure to decide motions and pending incidents

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within the reglementary period, and was warned that any subsequent transgressions he commits would be dealt with more severely.22 All told, respondent Judge failed to live up to the exacting standards of his office. The magnitude of his transgressions, taken collectively, renders him unfit to don the judicial robe and to perform the functions of a magistrate. Therefore, the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service is warranted. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 130, is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations. Respondent Judge shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this decision.

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1275

June 8, 2000

CARLITO C. AGUILAR, complainant, vs. JUDGE VICTOR A. DALANAO, respondent. MENDOZA, J.: This is a complaint against respondent Judge Victor A. Dalanao of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Luna, Kalinga for abuse of authority committed while he was acting judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Tabuk, Kalinga. In his complaint1 dated October 14, 1998, complainant Carlito Aguilar alleges the following: 1. Abuse if authority arising from bias, partiality and personal interest: Facts: While Criminal Case No. 3385, for the offense of Malicious Mischief, (concocted criminal acts) was pending for a few months, the respondent Judge Victor A. Dalanao, suddenly issued a Warrant of Arrest against herein complainant and served by PNP personnel on a Friday March 7, at 4:30 P.M. The arresting officers hauled undersigned to the Office of the respondent Judge Victor A. Dalanao but he was allegedly gone. It must be stated that the distance of complainant's house where he was arrested was six (6) kilometers more or less. So, undersigned requested the Police Officers to accompany him to the residence or any place where the Judge could be located. The wife of complainant followed to bring the cash amount she borrowed to post for any bond. Luckily we found the respondent Judge and undersigned was released. 1wphi1.nt As a well informed citizen, undersigned complainant knows very well that the Judge should not issue warrants of arrest at weekends most especially in a light cue but I was informed from the talk of the police that the purpose to arrest undersigned was to have me detained during the week end. The above acts of the respondent Judge made me conclude that he abused his power and discretion because he is one among the hoodlums in robes as President Estrada calls. 2. Abusive acts of a Judge in taking over a case that was already dismissed case by mother Judge and revived it. Facts: This refers to Case No. 483 for Forcible Entry, which was filed by Editha Apita, et al. over the same parcel of land against the complainant for the case filed before the Regional Trial Court docketed as Civil Case No. 405 for Recovery of Possession and Annulment of Spurious Documents. 1) The case was dismissed already by Judge Martha J. Dugayon. Her Decision or Order was not reversed by her. All of a sudden respondent Judge Victor A. Dalanao took over and rendered a Decision among others as follows: a. Stating in the Decision that Civil Case No. 405 was already dismissed. This statement is grossly false. As a matter of fact the Decision as promulgated is a falsification.

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b. While the case is only a Forcible Entry, the respondent Judge decided issues within the jurisdiction of Civil Case No. 405 which is pending up to the present. c. Actually Judge Dalanao made a resolution that are still pending to be resolved by Judge Milnar Lammawin of the Regional Trial Court. d. The above acts are clearly to help the defendants in Civil Case No. 405 to make it appear as already resolved. e. All the above acts appear to have been done for some material interest to help the parties who are defendants in the Regional Trial Court. 2) When the respondent Judge verbally ordered complainant's counsel to prepare his position piper on Civil Case No. 483 for Forcible Entry, he acted with grave abuse of discretion. Facts: On July 13, 1998 after the respondent Judge conducted his preliminary investigation on PP vs. Josephine Doctor for Falsification Case No. 3453, he verbally ordered complainant's counsel to prepare his position paper and same was complied but when complainant went to submit said position paper complainant was informed that the case was already decided and was given a copy of the Decision which was made ahead on July 10, 1998. 2 Respondent filed a comment dated March 25, 1999. 1. He alleged that when Criminal Case No. 3385 was transferred to him from Judge Martha Dugayon, he found "no explicit order of the Court then placing this case under the coverage of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, and considering the previous action of the Court, [he] was made to believe that the case will be heard under the ordinary procedures, . . . and in order to acquire jurisdiction of the person of the accused, [he] directed the issuance of the warrant of arrest." 3 2. Anent the charge of reviving a case which was already dismissed by his predecessor, respondent claims that the order of dismissal, dated November 28, 1996, in Civil Case No. 483 had not become final in view of the filing of a motion for reconsideration by plaintiff therein. In fact, complainant, as defendant in that case, filed an opposition to the motion and there was no objection to the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was not allowed. Hence, complainant should be considered to have waived his objection based on this ground. 4 3. Respondent admits that he decided Civil Case No. 483 without waiting for the position paper of defendant therein (complainant in this case). He claims, however, that he rendered his decision after a considerable period within which complainant could have filed his position paper. 5 The Office of the Court Administrator to which this case was referred, while finding the charge of abuse of authority to be without merit, nonetheless finds respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law. For this reason, it recommends: 1. that the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as an administrative matter; 2. that respondent Judge Victor A. Dalanao, Acting Judge, MCTC, Luna Kalinga be FINED the sum of One Thousand Pesos for being ignorant of the basic laws and principles. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. 3. that the other charges be DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being judicial. Except for the amount of penalty, we find this recommendation to be well taken. Respondent's claim that Criminal Case No. 3385 was not subject to the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure because he found no order in the records of the case declaring it covered by the Rule is plainly untenable. The case is for Malicious Mischief under Arts. 327 and 329 of the Revised Penal Code, for which the penalty is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, or 2 months and 1 day to 6 months, since the amount of the damage alleged was P2,000.00. The 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure covers "criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom."6 Although the Rule does not apply "to a criminal case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal case subject to the ordinary procedure," 7 there is nothing to show in this case that there was a related criminal case subject to the ordinary rules of criminal procedure. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 3385 was covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. The absence of an order declaring the case subject to the Rule was immaterial. Section 2 of the Rule provides:

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Determination of applicability. Upon the filing of a civil or criminal action, the court shall issue an order declaring whether or not the case shall be governed by this Rule. A patently erroneous determination to avoid the application of the Rule of Summary Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action. Pursuant to 16 of the Rule, no order of arrest against the accused (herein complainant) should have been issued unless he failed to appear when required. Further, respondent revealed his ignorance of the rules by reconsidering the previous order dismissing Civil Case No. 483. His explanation is to the following effect: In the case at bar, it was then my opinion that the dismissal was erroneous on the following grounds: First, there was really no Forum Shopping, while there was the identities of the subject matter and the parties in Civil Case No. 483 for Forcible Entry and Civil Case No. 405 for Recovery of Possession with Damage and Annulment of Spurious Forged Document, there was no identity of Cause of Action. The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against Forum Shopping is when final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration (Fortech vs. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998). Second, the plaintiff was not heard and third, from the pleadings, the plaintiff's Cause of Action appears to be meritorious, and fourth, there is a waiver on the part of the defendant of the issue of the Motion for Reconsideration being a prohibited pleading, and last, to have sustained the dismissal, would have deprived the opportunity for the parties to ventilate their cause. "For if the application and operation of the Rules tend to subvert and defeat, instead of promoting and enhancing justice, their suspension is justified. (People v. Flores, et al., G.R. No. 106581, March 3, 1997).8 This is contrary to 19(c) of the Rule on Summary Procedure which prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration in cases covered by it. As noted by the OCA, "[w]hen the law is clear, there is no room for interpretation. It is respondent's duty to apply the law regardless of his personal conviction. Respondent committed the same mistake when he did not immediately deny the Motion for Reconsideration. The fact that complainant subsequently filed a similar prohibited pleading would not justify respondent's action." In the similar case of Castro v. De Guzman,9 this Court held: As appearing on record, Criminal Case No. 46-93 is clearly a suit for malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code. It is totally surprising then for a judge who was twenty years of service as a magistrate to be completely nescient of the basic rule that the subject suit for malicious mischief is covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The series of patent errors committed by the respondent Judge in immediately issuing a warrant of arrest on the same day the complaint for malicious mischief was filed, thereby completely disregarding the provisions of Section 12(b) and Section 16 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, and in not making a determination of whether or not the case is governed by the summary rules which clearly violates the provision of Section 2, can not be countenanced by this Court. In disregarding the rules and settled jurisprudence, the respondent judge showed gross ignorance, albeit without any malice or corrupt motive. The lack of malicious intent however can not completely free respondent Judge from liability. When the law is elementary, so elementary not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.1avvphi1 This Court has impressed on judges the need to be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence, for the study of law is a never-ending and ceaseless process. 10 As found by the OCA, respondent has shown himself grossly ignorant of the law in issuing the questioned orders in the above cases. However, in accordance with our ruling in similar cases, 11 a fine equivalent to one-half of his salary for one month should be imposed on him. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes upon respondent a FINE equivalent to one-half of his salary for one month, with STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

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