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SG Click to edit Master title style

Concepts for Transformation from Breaking the Phalanx: A Briefing for The Raytheon Corporation

Briefing Outline
The Past as Prologue: Understanding Why There Was No American Blitzkrieg in 1942 The Current Inter-War Period: Where to from here? Transforming Army Ground Forces: What Does Transformation Really Mean? The Path to Change: New Joint Operational Concepts What is the LRSG Organizational Concept? Summary
1 Presented by Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, US Army

Why Was there No American Blitzkrieg in 1942?

In a period of fiscal constraint, and in the absence of compelling threats, the Army between 1919 and 1939: Focused on traditional rolesre-fought the last successful war or, in the British Case, the Empire - constabulary force Tried to advance the Single Service way of fighting Endeavored to preserve status quo Fought for budget share Tinkered on the margins - no real innovation Experimented with the familiar Until recently promoted BG George Marshall became Chief of Staff, the top leadership cloned itselfthose who did not conform vanished!

Would More $ Have Made a Difference?

Traditional view: Tight budgets and Congressional/public apathy responsible for Army not being ready for World War II Another view: Congress was disinterested in what was happening inside the Army and fiscal constraints were significant, but given the institutional realities in the interwar U.S. Army, it is likely that: The Ground Army would have pressed to fill personnel authorizations and fought for more end strength The Air Army would have built more bombers and bomber formations

Intellectualnot exclusively fiscaldeficits were responsible for the state of the U.S. Army in 1941.

A New inter-war period began in 1989!

Todays service paradigms create frames of reference that: Prescribe the shared strategic view and values, as well as the proper methods, tools, techniques, and approaches to problem solving within and among the services Provide a way in which services view themselves--how the service fights its war Govern how the services deal with each other and with other agencieslimits jointness Delineate the questionsand many of the answersthat are acceptable to services, but this may inadvertently restrict civilian control and policy implementation! Very few officers in the U.S. Army doubtedmuch less challengedthe ruling paradigm during 1920-39. Are senior officers in todays Army very different?

What is Happening Right Now?

Practical technologies are those that do not disturb the institutional inheritance. Alternative systems and concepts are rejected early! But the Strategic Environment has Changed! This is a function of many factors including society and technology. All future military operations, including warfighting, will be joint, expeditionary and combined in character! To cope with the new environment, todays Army must reorganize existing assets to operate differently, regardless of the mission - war, crisis, or peace support! But the US Army, grounded as it is in the distant and recent past (Desert Storm, Somalia, Bosnia), is ill-equipped to deal with a complex future

So, where do we go from here?

LR

SG

What Reconnaissance Discovers, Strike Destroys!

Concepts for transformation from Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century
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Briefing Outline
What did Kosovo Tell us About the Army? Transforming Army Ground Forces What is a Light Reconnaissance Strike Group (LRSG)? What is the LRSG Organizational Concept?
LRSG Reconnaissance Elements and Systems LRSG Stand-Off Attack Complex LRSG Equipment List and Required Sorties LRSG Training-Readiness System

LRSG in the Joint Strike Force with USMC elements LRSG and the Air Force Expeditionary Force LRSG Proposed Stationing in the United States Summary + Back-Up Slides
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 Plans for Future Army (IBCT/FCS-based Objective Create a new Army through Force) look too much like the organizational change to Army today. achieve rapid deployability WW II style Divisions Too Slow, and real Joint Warfighting Too Centralized; Not organized for rapid deployment within JTF. Capability. Must Reorganize force within a new Joint Operational Architecture to fight Joint! Mix of Air and Sea lift will get Army Forces to the fight Quick! Must organize Army to conduct any mission the NCA assigns WARFIGHTING or Peace Support Operations on short notice!

What Did the Kosovo Crisis Tell Us About Todays Army?

The Key to Transformation: Fielding new forces for Joint Warfighting with new, superior capabilities!
Armies confuse transformation with recapitalization. Recapitalization of old structures with new equipment is not transformation. Armies transform when they successfully exploit new technology, new operational concepts, new organizations, as well as new approaches to training and leadership to attain qualitatively superior fighting power. Todays US Army must transform in a way that creates powerful synergies with the new technologies and concepts fielded by air and naval forces.
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Transformation Treats Armys WW II Single Service Legacy Structure as a Constant

xxxx
ARMY HQTRS CORPS HEADQUARTERS (Joint Capable) DIVISION HQTRS (Joint Plugs)

xxx

(Conduct Operational Maneuver)

xx

(Conduct Offensive OPNS in Joint Operational Area)

x II

Six echelons of C2 to direct the soldiers who fight! (Conduct

Tactical Maneuver)

Brigade HQTRS

Battalion Task Force

(FIGHT!)

Company-Team

Platform (tank)

Too Many Echelons - Too Slow to Decide - Too 10 Expensive to Modernize - Too Vulnerable to WMD! 10

New Operational Concepts that Drive Transformation Must Be Joint!

Transformation cannot be single-service in orientation. Thus, the critical question that must be asked in the context of Army Transformation is:

WhatcapabilitiescantheArmyfieldin thefuturethattheJointCommanderis likelytoneed?

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The Light Reconnaissance Strike Group is a Global Joint Asset!

The LRSG is a fundamentally new all arms battlegroup, equipped to exploit lethal, cutting edge technology within a new joint operational framework. The LRSG concept was first outlined in Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, January 1997.
The LRSG is designed to confer the capability for decisive operational maneuver on a JTF in a no-notice, come-as-you are world! The LRSG is designed to merge its maneuver and strike capabilities with a JTF to conduct decisive attack, mobile defense, economy of force or peace 12 12 support (crisis response) operations.

LRSG Has Fewer Echelons - A Faster Decision Cycle - And Is Cheaper to Modernize

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This Light Reconnaissance Strike Group is designed to move by USAF aircraft anywhere in the world in 72 hours!
LRSG 5,000 Troops Brigadier General Commands LRSG

ARMED RECON 2,250 Troops

CMD (C4I) & CONTROL

STRIKE
600 Troops

COMBAT MOBILITY

SPT
700 Troops

700 Troops

450 Troops

3 Groups should be CONUS-based and ready on a rotational basis for immediate global deployment. 14 14 Equipment sets could be leased up to 8 years.

The LRSG Mobilizes Fighting Power that is Proportionally Greater than its Size Indicates!
ARMED RECON

=
= = = =

Twice the Maneuver Strength of a Conventional Maneuver brigade task force!

Robust command structure, IWSR, Cruise Missile & NBC defense within a new Joint Operational Architecture!

CMD (C4I) & CONTROL

STRIKE

The striking power of a conventional artillery brigade! Engineer troops to breech obstacles, mines and sustain the offensive. The power to conduct independent 15 operations for more than a few days!

COMBAT MOBILITY

SPT

Over-the-Horizon Attack Second level Systems Taifun (attack UAV) Second level

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Click to edit Master

System Battery

Click to edit Master title style Non-Line-Of-Sight

text styles
Third level

SYSTEMS IN THE LRSG STRIKE FORMATION

Target Acquisition Battery (Radars)

Fifth Fourth level level (6) MLRS (ATACM) Systems (6) Crusader SOA Systems Fifth level

Stand-Off Attack Third level level Battery Fourth

: Aviation ATTACK CO
(6) UH60 Aircraft (4) MD 600 Armed Scouts
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The LRSG Arrives Ready to Fight!

The (3) LRSGs are involved in one of three 180 day operational readiness cycles in peacetime. This reduces personnel tempo, makes deployments and costs predictable. Training Cycle (six months): Unit and Individual Training under Service control. [Status C1] Deployment Cycle (six months): Units are ready for deployment to Joint Command and Control and become part of the pool that responds to Major Theater of War or Lesser Theater of War contingencies. [Status C1] Reconstitution Cycle (six months): Unit returns to home station for re-fitting, modernization (if required) and leave. [Status C4] Applied to the Army at large, this approach creates a pool of (3) 40,000 man ready, CONUS-based Army Expeditionary Corps that can deploy 24 hours a day, seven days a week to fight, deter or conduct any mission the NCA direct.
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LRSG Deployment Readiness in the Group-based Force Structure

CONUS
CONUS-BASED CLOSE COMBAT ECHELON
AIRBORNEAIR ASSLT GROUPS LIGHT RECONSTRIKE GROUPS COMBAT MANEUVER GROUPS AVIATION STRIKE GROUPS

SIX MONTHS
TRAININGREADINESS PHASE
(2) AIRBORNEAIR ASSLT GROUPS (1) LIGHT RECONSTRIKE GROUP (4) COMBAT MANEUVER GROUPS (1) AVIATION STRIKE GROUP

SIX MONTHS
DEPLOYMENT PHASE CINC CONTROL
(2) AIRBORNEAIR ASSLT GROUPS (1) LIGHT RECONSTRIKE GROUS (4) COMBAT MANEUVER GROUPS (1) AVIATION STRIKE GROUP

SIX MONTHS
RECONSTITUTION

Overseas Presence
ARMY FORCES IN ROK, EUROPE & SWA. (1) AIRBORNEAIR ASSAULT GROUP NONE. ALL LRSGs ARE CONUSBASED (3) COMBAT MANUEVER GROUPS (1) AVIATION STRIKE GROUP

PHASE
ARMY CONTROL

ARMY CONTROL

(2) AIRBORNEAIR ASSLT GROUPS (1) LIGHT RECONSTRIKE GROUP (4) COMBAT MANEUVER GROUPS (1) AVIATION STRIKE GROUP

Setting: Crisis in the Mediterranean. Competing LR factions position cruise missiles and air defense LR SG technology in a port on North African coast to SG deny access to US forces. NCA Direct a Carrier Battlegroup (CVBG) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to position off the coast of the N. African State. Phase I: MEU Seizes Airstrip 50 kilometers from the port city. Phase II: LRSG Deploys to Secure Airstrip. (Assumes C17/C5A availability). Phase III: LRSG and MEU secure Port for use by follow-on Marine/Army Forces (Maritime Prepositioning Force) [Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)].

Joint Maritime Task Force

for Forcible Entry on Day (N+10)
XXX

JMTF

XX

XX

An LRSG Integrated into a Marine-Based JTF!

XX

JSTF
X CVBG X CVBG X AEF X CVW X CVW

JSDTF
X
SLOCPG

JFETF
X MPW X MPW XX X ARG X
LR

X MEU

,,,

X
SLOCPG

SG

LRSG
(-)

X MPS-1

X ARG

X MEU

,,,

Pre-positioned MEB

X MPS-1

XX

ABCT

Pre-positioned MEB

,,,
X X TLAG X TLAG

X APS-1

Pre-positioned HBDE

The LRSG in Joint Operations with an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF)

When Army elements are visible to Air Force, as well as Naval Strike Forces, the LRSG operates in new ways: Linking the LRSG to the AEF concept facilitates air space control on the Joint level. Under JFACC command, the LRSG can contribute to AEF success in the halt phase of future crises and conflicts! LRSG can conduct deep operational maneuver to key operational objectives bypassing or selectively attacking enemy elements immobilized by air, space and missile power. LRSG Strike assets complement, not duplicate AEF/Naval strike efforts.
-Beyond suppressing or destroying enemy air defense and missile assets, LRSG strike assets are effective when immediate responsiveness is 21 required, in complex terrain, when collateral damage is a factor or21 in

During the 1999 Kosovo Crisis, the threat of air attack did not deter the Yugoslav Regime. The arrival of an LRSG in January might have made a difference to Belgrades calculus.
SFOR
BOSNIA - SARAJEVO HERZEGOVINA AOR
MONTENEGRO

49,000 troops XXX 355 Tanks 500 BMPs/BTRs VJ Corps 900 Artillery Systems
BULGARIA
SKOPJE

TIRANA THESSALONIKI

Where the Light Reconnaissance Strike Groups Should Be Stationed

Click to edit Master title style

Click to edit Master text styles Fort Irwin, Second level Second level California Third level Third level level Fourth 29 Palms, California Fifth Fourth level level Fort Bliss, Fifth level Texas

Fort Bragg, North Carolina Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

This positions the LRSGs where they can train; and where USMC Command Elements for MEU/MEBs train and organize for deployments. Alaska could also provide a Joint Training/Maneuver site. Near C17/C5A capable air fields.
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Summary of Key Points

7 The LRSG is designed to contribute to a quick, decisive outcome in Joint Force operations! 7The nation needs Army warfighting forces that deploy rapidly with the combat power, Joint C4ISR operational architecture, doctrine, training, equipment and readiness essential to joint operations under CINC control. 7 The US Army should field (3) Light Recon-Strike Groups where Joint training with the USMC and USAF can occur regularly. 7 Equipment should be leased! Technology is moving too fast. In (8) years, new equipment with new weapon systems will be 24 needed.

Summary of Key Points

(Continued)

7 Adopting the Combat Group organization in the LRSG breaks the WW II paradigm and sets the stage for Army-wide reform, reorganization and genuine transformation. 7 Compression of division and brigade into new echelon to achieve fewer C2 nodes and deep/close/rear functionality is critical to integration with other service components in the JTF. 7 This begins the process of organizing, training and equipping the Army to conduct warfighting, crisis response, peace support operations or any mission the NCA assign, anywhere in the world!

LR

Figure 6-8.
SG
LRSG Complements USMC Organization for Combat

Marine Expeditionary Brigade Regimental Landing Team Equipment: 569 armored and (5291 marines - ashore portion wheeled vehicles, 52 helicopters + only) (100) 463L Pallets in [7] Battlegroups Equipment: 414 light and 3 Armed Recon Squadrons with (81) armored vehicles & 136 trucks AGS, (126) FCS-Tracers, (27) SP 3 battalions 120mm Mortar X 2, (36) armed MD 600s AAV Bn (-) with 108 AAVs (RAH66 Surrogates), (6) UH60s C2 LAV Co (+) with 25 LAVs and refuel/rearm AT Cap with: 1 Strike with (9) HIMARS/ATACM, (400) 28 TOWs UCAVs, (4) MD 600s, (6) armed UH60s 36 Javelin 1 Combat Mobility BN with (24) ACEs 244 Predator + (6) FCS-Tracers Arty Bn with (18) 155 mm 1 C4I Squadron with Joint C4ISR Howitzers (Towed) plugs, (14) AGS + [1] Support Tank Co with 14 M1A1s Squadron LRSG: (5,000 soldiers)