Administrative Law Case Digests: Delegation of Powers

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGESTS
DELEGATION OF POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS vs. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS G.R. No. L-11216 March 6, 1916 Facts: COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water: On June 7, 1915, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners issued and caused to be served an order to show cause why they should not be required to present detailed annual reports respecting its finances and operations respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, in the form and containing the matters indicated by the model attached to the petition. They are ordered to present annually on or before March first of each year a detailed report of finances and operations of such vessels as are operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippine Islands, in the form and containing the matters indicated in the model of annual report which accompanied the order to show cause herein. COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS denied the authority of the board to require the report asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board as authority for such requirement was, if construed as conferring such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board. It is cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that the preparation of the same
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would entail an immense amount of clerical work." ISSUE: Whether or not it is constitutional to require COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a detailed report to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine Islands? Whether the power to require the detailed report is strictly legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the execution of the law? HELD: The order appealed from is set aside and the cause is returned to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with instructions to dismiss the proceeding. RULING: The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility Commissioners relies for its authority, so far as pertinent to the case at hand, reads as follows: Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility as herein defined: (e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and containing such matters as the Board may from time to time by order prescribe. The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers.
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Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is valuable to it, what it needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and equitably with such public utilities and to require them to deal justly and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question, delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or applied. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of legislative power, it said: The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress. In section 20 (of the Commerce Act), Congress has authorized the commission to require annual reports. The act itself prescribes in detail what those reports shall contain. In other words, Congress
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has laid down general rules for the guidance of the Commission, leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of the power so conferred. This, we think, is not a delegation of legislative authority. In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law "down the general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed." nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon. The Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its powers and functions in favor of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information which the State wants but has authorized and board to obtain the information which the board wants. US vs Tang Ho (1922) G.R. 17122 Facts: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose".
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Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price. August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Then, on August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced. The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919. Issue: WON the delegation of legislative power to the Governor General was valid. Held: By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or anyone else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve. These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority. The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative
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power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says: That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution. Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended. The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend. It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime. When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was
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no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53." We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the GovernorGeneral in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void. ALEGRE v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets. He applied to the respondent
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for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to England, but was denied. He was advised by the respondent that he would not be permitted to export the abaca in question without a certificate from the Fiber Standardization Board. So he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the authority vested in the Fiber Standardization Board is a delegation of legislative power. HELD: NO. The Legislature has enacted a law which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp before they can be exported to other countries and the creation of a board for that purpose, vesting it with the power and authority to do the actual work. Such authority is not a delegation of legislative power and is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board or commission. The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or commission, how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the
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administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality. PEOPLE v. VERA Calalang vs. Williams [GR 47800, 2 December 1940] Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animaldrawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940,
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the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila Issues: Whether or not there is a delegation of legislative power? Ruling: There is no undue deleagation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of
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traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL (G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1942) This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioners claim for quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO). ISSUES 1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void. 2. Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.
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FACTS Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00 NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for 1949. This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general on two grounds a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year. b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.
DECISION
1. R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is
not illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive as argued by petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCCs operation. 2. Executive Order 93 is valid because it was promulgated within the 1 year period given. 3. Petition for review DISMISSED with costs PANGASINAN TRANS. CO. v. SERVICE COM LOVINA v. MORENO PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL SEPARATION OF POWERS Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Company, Inc., Facts:
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PUBLIC

The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric Company, requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators. Issue: Validity of SEC. 11 of ACT No. 1446? Held: The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code. We can also perceive a distinction between a private contract for submission to arbitration and agreements to arbitrate falling within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others than the parties to a particular franchise. Here,
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however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it remains true that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally enforced would leave a public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts for a judicial determination of the question in dispute. We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. taThe present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all.l The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
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implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.lawph aw Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter. NOBLEJAS v. TEEHANKEE PAZ M. GARCIA, vs. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., Facts: Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI. Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court was a newly created CFI branch and it had to be organized from scratch. Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, space for his courtroom, other items and supplies must be furnished by the provincial government. The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so. Forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave. Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court. Issue: Whether or not respondent should be charged for dishonesty, violation of his oath of office, gross incompetence, and violation of RA 296 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Ruling: Court is convinced that the complaint must be dismissed. Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since the date he took his oath up to the filing of the
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complaint. In the sense that respondent has not yet performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function. In this case, government officials or officers in duty are bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without any fault on his part. Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges under existing laws as well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice for the reason that He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others. On the other hand, respondent could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded. It is of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge or even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or
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resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that, it is best that this practice is discontinued. Macariola v. Asuncion A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982 FACTS: A complaint for partition was filed by plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 in CFI against Bernardita R. Macariola concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, their common father. A decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in said civil case awarding their share on the properties to both the plaintiffs and Macariola The decision became and subsequently, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which was approved by the latter notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant. However, both counsels of the respective parties assured that the Project of Partition, had been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 and Macariola approving the Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the court that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project of Partition. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita
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Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court, the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive. Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court, while Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338. Thereafter, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, which particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes. Spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon then conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. At the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary. Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed the instant complaint alleging four causes of action: that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge.
The case was referred to Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated. Complainant herein then instituted an action before the Court of First which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. The action was dismissed. Hence, this petition
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RULING: THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES. 1. There is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. In the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. For the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. o respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final, not in litigation anymore. o Furthermore, respondent judge did not buy the lot in directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot 1184-E from the plaintiffs. o Civil Case No. 4234 is of no moment. It can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders. Macariola contended that the sale of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. o no evidence showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Macariola contended that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not signed by the parties. o Respondent should have required the signature of the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition. While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was presented, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe
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that she knew the contents of the project of partition and that she gave her conformity thereto. While it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. in commerce territory. in a determinate
o The provision partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges. o Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its. It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence. o It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the
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2. Respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business.
Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties: 1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney. xxx xxx xxx 5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage
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Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. o No enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent. Respondent Judge didnt violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. No showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. The business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office No provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business. We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under Section 67 Judiciary Act of 1948, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges. And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.
3. The 3rd and 4th causes of action are
not related to the subject. IN RE: RODULFO MANZANO POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES A. RULE-MAKING POWER PHILIPPINE LAWYERS VS AGRAVA G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959 This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in
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his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. Facts: On May 27, 1957, respondent Agrava issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations. Petitioner contends that anyone has passed the bar exams and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law, has good standing, thus duly qualified to practice before the Patent Office, and therefore the act of requiring members of the Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to be allowed to practice before said office is a clear excess of his jurisdiction and violation of the law. On the other hand, respondent claimed that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he had prescribed and scheduled. (a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the
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highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys. (c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute x x x In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person x x x has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, x x x an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself which provides: The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. x x x Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being
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similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison: SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office. Issue/s: WHETHER OR NOT MEMBERS OF THE BAR SHOULD FIRST TAKE AND PASS AN EXAMINATION GIVEN BY THE PATENT OFFICE BEFORE HE COULD BE ALLOWED TO PRACTICE LAW IS THE SAID OFFICE. whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitute or is included in the practice of law. WHETHER OR NOT DIRECTOR OF THE PATENT OFFICE IS AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT AN EXAMINATION FOR PATENT ATTORNEYS IS CONTRARY TO LAW. Decision: The petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any
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entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied). Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
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so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours). The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court. FRANCISCO PASCUAL v THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS G.R. No. L-10979 June 30, 1959 FACTS:
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There are two cases (Seizure Identification Nos. 1899 and 1990) which were brought on appeal to the Supreme Court from the decisions of the respondent Commissioner of customs, affirming the decisions of the Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila which decreed the forfeiture of two shipments from Hong Kong to Manila, one with 42 and the other with 27 packages of foreign made candies, for illegal violations of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 in relation to section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code (forfeiture of prohibited merchandise) which requires a license from the Monetary Board or release certificates to be able to receive goods from any foreign country. Appellants Contentions: 1. The imported goods do not involve dollar remittances or the sale of foreign exchange (as was contemplated in circular 44) and that Congress has not authorized the Central Bank to issue regulations governing imports that do not require the sale of foreign exchange, because according to him, it would not have enacted into law Republic Act No. 1410. 2. Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 were promulgated by the Monetary Board without the concurrence of at least five members and without the approval of the President ISSUE: Whether or not the sixty-nine (69) packages of candies in question are subject to forfeiture for violation of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 in relation to section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code (forfeiture of merchandise prohibited by law). HELD:
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The decision of the Commissioner of Customs decreeing the forfeiture of the candies is AFFIRMED. The importations, assumed to involve the sale of foreign exchange, were in violation of circulars 44 and 45 for failure to obtain the corresponding dollar allocation or foreign exchange license from the Central Bank as required by Circular No. 44 of said bank. Section 74, Republic Act No. 265 authorized the Monetary Board, with the approval of the President, to temporarily suspend or restrict sales of exchange and to subject all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to license during an exchange crisis in order to protect the international reserve and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in to take constructive measures to combat such a crisis. Circular No. 44, prohibiting the release by the Commissioner of Customs of any item of import without the presentation of a release certificate issued by the Central Bank or any authorized agent bank in a form prescribed by the Monetary Board, and Circular No. 45, requiring "any person or entity who intends to import or receive goods from any foreign country for which no foreign exchange is required or will be required of the banks, to apply for a license from the Monetary Board to authorize such import," are measures taken to check the unregulated flow of foreign exchange from the country and are within the powers of the Monetary Board. Contention Number 1: The contention that The Monetary Board was not authorized by congress assumes that the importations do not require the sale of foreign exchange, a fact which appellant Francisco Pascual failed to establish. It is a recognized general mercantile practice that importations involve the sale of foreign exchange. This being so, importations that do not involve the sale
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of foreign exchange must be shown or proved. In default of such showing or proof as in fact the petitioner failed to prove in the instant case, it would be safe to assume that the importations in question involve the sale of foreign exchange which is covered by Circular No. 44 of said bank (which are measures taken to check the unregulated flow of foreign exchange, the authority of which was conferred to the Monetary Board by Congress by virtue of Section 74, R.A. 265 (see above). Contention Number 2: . is not supported by evidence. Circular Nos. 44 and 45 have been published in the Official Gazette. As such, presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, the ordinary course of business followed, and the law complied with. DOMINGO B. TEOXON vs. MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION FACTS: The petitioner sustained physical injuries in line of duty as a former member of a recognized guerilla organization which participated actively in the resistance movement against the enemy, and as a result of which petitioner suffered a permanent, physical disability. For having been permanently incapacitated from work, he filed his claim for disablility pension with the Philippine Veterans Administration under the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65. However, respondents in turn would limit the amount of pension received by him in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by them. Petitioner filed his suit for mandamus before the CFI of Manila alleging that he filed his claim for disability pension under
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the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65, for having been permanently incapacitated from work and that he was first awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00 a month contrary to the terms of the basic law as thereafter amended. 3 His claim, therefore, was for a pension effective May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month, for each of his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the difference of P50.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963. He would likewise seek for the payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. Respondent, while admitting, with qualification, the facts as alleged in the petition, would rely primarily in its special and affirmative defenses, on petitioner not having exhausted its administrative remedies and his suit being in effect one against the government, which cannot prosper without its consent. The CFI found for respondents. Hence this petition. ISSUE: W.O.N. rules and regulations promulgated by administrative agencies can prevail over a statue. HELD: Petition is affirmed. CFI is reversed. The Court cited the case of Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, promulgated just a month before the case at bar, where it categorically held that a veteran suffering from permanent disability is not to be denied what has been granted him
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specifically by legislative enactment, which certainly is superior to any regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine Veterans Administration, presumably in the implementation thereof. It added that the decision of the CFI where it held that the respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to process applications for pension, using as guide the rules and regulations that it adopted under the law and their decisions, unless shown clearly to be in error or against the law or against the general policy of the Board, should be maintained" is clearly erroneous. The Court also cited United States v. Tupasi Molina, which held that "Of course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." As well as its ruling in People v. Santos, wherein it held that an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, "the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed." Finally, the Court said there must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. No deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an administrative agency "cannot amend an act of Congress." Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were in accordance with what the Veterans' Bill of Rights provides.
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Benito Manuel vs. General Auditing Office G.R. No. L-28952 December 29, 1971 FACTS: Petitioner Benito C. Manuel applied for retirement, effective December 31, 1967, according to law, 3 after having to his credit more than (20) years of service in the government, included in which were four successive terms as Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan from January 1, 1952 to December 31, 1967. Such application was approved on December 5, 1967. He had likewise sought the commutation of his vacation and sick leave, filing with the Municipal Treasurer of Lingayen, Pangasinan on December 22, 1967 a communication to that effect. In his memorandum filed with respondent General Auditing Office to which the matter was referred, he stressed that he was entitled to unused vacation and sick leave earned from May 31, 1957 (date of effectivity Republic Act No. 1616) to December 31, 1967, or a period of 10 years and 7 months, and since his highest salary was P600.00 a month, the total amount which should accrue to him is P6,000.00, (one month for every year). ISSUE: Whether or not an elective official may be entitled in the event that he voluntarily retires or be separated from the service without fault on his part to the commutation of his vacation and sick leave HELD: 1. It is expressly provided under Section 286 of the Revised Administrative Code that vacation and sick leave shall be cumulative, any part thereof not taken within the calendar year earned being
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carried over the succeeding years with the employee voluntarily retiring or being separated from the service without fault on his part, being entitled to the commutation of all such accumulated vacation or sick leave to his credit provided that it shall in no case exceed ten (10) months. "Officials and employees retired under this Act shall be entitled to the commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate received, which they have to their credit at the time of retirement." 2. Why then did respondent decide otherwise? It may have been due to a misreading of Section 2187 of the Revised Administrative Code. What must have misled respondent was a failure to take due note that this section deals solely with a situation when a municipal mayor is absent from his office because of illness. It does not cover therefore the specific case here presented of the right of the elective official to a commutation of his vacation and sick leave upon his retirement or separation from the service through no fault of his own. Moreover it must have felt justified in view of the endorsement of the Commission of the Civil Service, who applied Section 9 of Civil Service Rule XVI, included in which is the express injunction that the leave is not cumulative. Further reflection ought to have cautioned it that certainly this rule is far from being applicable as on its face it is based on the aforesaid Section 2187, which as noted is not in point. "The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment, may be found in the early case of United States v. Barrias decided in 1908. Then came, in a 1914 decision, United States v. Tupasi Molina, a delineation of the scope of such competence. Thus: 'Of
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course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. 3. Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the claim of petitioner to a commutation of his vacation and sick leave not exceeding ten (10) months must be upheld, inasmuch as the facts show that the total amount sought to be paid to him was precisely in accordance with the controlled legal provisions. The ruling now on review must be versed and petitioner's plea granted. WHEREFORE, the ruling of March 1, 1968 of respondent office refusing to allow in audit the claim of petitioner Benito C. Manuel for commutation of his leave earned as Mayor for the period January 1, 1952 to December 31, 1967 is reversed and the application of petition for such commutation granted. Without pronouncement as to costs. Lupangco vs Court of Appeals Issue: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination? Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer
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with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. Rule: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
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should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors Montecillo vs. CSC G.R. No. 131954. June 28, 2001 FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, Series of 1991, on the ground that its issuance amounted to an abuse of respondents power to promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the Civil Service Law. Employee positions in the Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) were reclassified during the latter part of 1995 to conform with position descriptions and corresponding salary grades in the civil service. Accordingly, while the personnel structure of the MCWD was being modified, three of its employees -petitioners Asela B. Montecillo, Marilou Joan V. Ortega and Charrishe Dosdos -applied for promotional appointment to the position of Secretary to the Assistant General Manager or Private Secretary C, as the position later came to be known. At the time of their application, petitioners had been occupying the position of Department Secretary and were employed in the MCWD for six to seven years. When their appointments were forwarded to the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSC FO) by MCWD General Manager Dulce Abanilla, the CSC FO refused to approve petitioners appointments as permanent on the ground that the position applied for was a primarily confidential and co-terminous position. This ruling was upheld by the
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CSC Regional Office and affirmed on appeal by respondent. ISSUE: WON CSC abused its rule-making power HELD: AFFIRMED. Respondent was expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be classified as primarily confidential under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. To our mind, this signifies that the enumeration found in Section 6, Article IV of the Civil Service Decree, which defines the noncareer service, is not an exclusive list. Respondent could supplement the enumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. of 1991, by specifying positions in the civil service, which are considered primarily confidential and therefore their occupants are co-terminous with the official they serve. The assailed memorandum circular can not be deemed as an unauthorized amendment of the law. On the contrary, it was issued pursuant to a power expressly vested by law upon respondent. As such, it must be respected by this Court as a valid issuance of a constitutionally independent body.
SMART VS NLRC (G.R. No. 151908 August 12, 2003) FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators
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which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. The Memorandum directed CMTS operators to: a. strictly comply with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000 requiring the presentation and verification of the identity and addresses of prepaid SIM card customers; b. require all your respective prepaid SIM cards dealers to comply with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000; c. deny acceptance to your respective networks prepaid and/or postpaid customers using stolen cellphone units or cellphone units registered to somebody other than the applicant when properly informed of all information relative to the stolen cellphone units; d. share all necessary information of stolen cellphone units to all other CMTS operators in order to prevent the use of stolen cellphone units; and e. require all your existing prepaid SIM card customers to register and present valid identification cards. Another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities, reads: This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use pursuant to MC 13-6-2000. In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs used by subscribers of prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use. Also, the billing unit shall be on a six (6) seconds pulse effective 07 October 2000. Islacom and Piltel filed an an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000,
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with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Both alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. Petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention which was granted. Court issued a temporary restraining order. Motion to dismiss and reconsideration were denied by the RTC. Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals which was granted, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function is under the jurisdiction of regular courts. HELD: CA reversed. Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
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Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail. Not to be confused with the quasilegislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same
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law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. A.1. INTERNAL RULES MAGLUNOB VS THE NATIONAL ABACA & OTHER FIBERS CORPORATION (NAFCO) G.R. No. L-6203 February 26, 1954 FACTS: Petitioner-appellants plead that they are landless war veterans and recognized and deserving guerillas qualified to acquire public lands under RA No. 65 and as such to enter upon, occupy, settle and take possession of parts of the parcel of land involved herein. They contend that pursuant to Rep. Acts. Nos. 8 and 65, the directive of the President of the
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Philippines dated and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, they are entitled to have an award of the parts of the parcel of land they have been in possession. According to them, NAFCO is duty bound legally to make such award, the petitioners pray for a writ to compel the respondent corporation to respect their right over the parts of the parcel of land occupied by them and to execute lease contracts or deeds of sale to give effect to such right in compliance with the orders of the President referred to. On the other hand, respondent alleges that the parcel of land described in the complaint is owned, as evidenced by Torrens transfer certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds in and for the Province of Davao, managed and financed by the Furukawa Plantation Company, separate, apart and distinct from that of the respondent. Rep. Acts Nos. 8 and 65 and the directives of the President invoked by the petitioners confer no specific legal right upon the petitioners and impose no ministerial duty upon the respondent to award to war veterans and deserving guerillas parts of the parcel of land owned by the Furukawa Plantation Company. They further assert that petitioners are have no specific legal right to acquire the parcel of land in question and the respondent has no ministerial duty to award to them the parts of the parcel of land allegedly occupied by them; that Rep. Act No. 8 gives only authority to the President of the Philippines "to designate an existing office, agency or instrumentality of the Government, to take over and administer the properties acquired under the provisions of this Act and the disposition of these properties shall be made in accordance with the existing laws;" Lastly, RA No. 65 gives to the persons mentioned in sections 1 and 2 of the Act, all other qualifications being equal, "preference to purchase public
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lands and government-owned or managed agricultural farms or subdivisions, to obtain homesteads, concessions and franchises, and other privileges for the exploitation of the national resources which are permissible and made available by existing laws or the like;" However, granting that petitioners have a preferential right, they have lost it, because since the passage of the law more than three years have already elapsed. In view of this answer and upon motion of counsel for the respondent a preliminary hearing was held as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. ISSUE: WON RA No. 65 grants specific legal right to petitioners; WON the respondent has specific legal duty enjoined by law to perform in connection therewith. RULING: After hearing the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the parcel of land in question belongs exclusively to a corporation whose board of directors happens to be the same board of directors of the respondent NAFCO and for that reason the respondent cannot alienate the lands in question to the petitioners. A motion for reconsideration was denied. From the order of dismissal the petitioners have appealed. If NAFCO is the manager of the parcel of land or is managing the plantation therein, it is not the real party in interest or the party against whom the action should be brought . At the preliminary hearing under section 5, Rule 8, the party asserting a fact must prove it by competent evidence. The duplicate for the owner of the Torrens certificate of title must have been presented or the original in the office of the Registrar of Deeds must have been exhibited to the
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Court. Nevertheless, there is another ground which makes it unnecessary to remand the case for further proceedings to ascertain who is the owner of the parcel of land involved in the litigation, because granting that the parcel of land is included among those that should be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 65, still the petitioners have no specific legal right and the respondent has no specific legal duty enjoined by law to perform in connection therewith. It is only a preference and that involves a discretion to determine whether the applicants for lease or sale of parts of a parcel of land under the management of the respondent are entitled to such lease or purchase under the provisions of Republic Act No. 65. Going over the provisions of the directives referred to in the petition for mandamus we fail to find any which confers upon the petitioners a specific legal right and imposes a duty upon the respondent enforceable by mandamus. And it must be so, because executive orders or directives of the President are administrative in nature and they cannot, generally, confer any right because this is only conferred by law. Upon the second ground, the order appealed from dismissing the petition for mandamus is affirmed, without costs. INTERPROVINCIAL AUTOBUS CO., INC. vs. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE [G.R. No. L-6741. January 31, 1956] FACTS: Plaintiff-petitioner is a common carrier engaged in transporting passengers and freight by means of TPU buses. Sometime in the year 1941 the provincial revenue agent for Misamis Occidental examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had been issued by the
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Plaintiff. The company was not able to preserve the receipt stubs from 1936 to 1938 but was able to preserve those for 1939 and 1940. The provincial revenue agent for Misamis Occidental ascertained the number of receipts by referring to the conductors daily report for the said period 1936 to 1938. Both the said daily reports of Plaintiffs conductors and the available stubs did not state the value of the goods transported thereunder. However, respondent assumed that the value of the goods covered by each of the freight receipts amounted to more than P5, and assessed a documentary stamp tax of P0.04 on each of the receipts. The tax thus assessed amounted to P7,776.24, which was collected from the deposit of the Plaintiff in the PNB. Plaintiff demanded the refund of the amount, and upon refusal of the Defendant, Plaintiff filed the action. The CFI rendered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. The CA reversed the decision of the CFI and absolved the DefendantRespondent from the complaint. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES:
(1)
Did the Secretary of Finance infringe or violate any right of the taxpayer when he directed that the tax is to be collected in all cases where the bill of lading or receipt does not state that the shipment is worth P5 or less, or, in the language of the Petitioner-Appellant, when he (Secretary) created a presumption of liability to the tax if the receipt fails to state such value?
RULING: 1.) NO.

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The source of this argument stems from the validity of Department of Finance Regulation No. 26 which provides: SEC. 121. Basis of the tax and affixture of stamps. Bills of lading are exempt from the documentary stamp tax imposed by paragraphs (q) and (r) of section 1449 of the Administrative Code when the value of the goods shipped is P5 or less. Unless the bill of lading states that the goods are worth P5 or less, it must be held that the tax is due, and internal revenue officers will see to it that the tax is paid in all cases where the bill of lading does not state that the shipment is worth P5 or less. The above regulations were promulgated under the authority of section 79 (B) of the Administrative Code (originally section 2 of Act 2803), which expressly provides: The Department Head shall have power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit to do so, all rules, regulations, orders, circulars, memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law, necessary to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law . So, did the Secretary violate any right? (short answer: NO.) It cannot be denied that the regulation is merely a directive to the tax officers; it does not purport to change or modify the law; it does not create a liability to the stamp tax when the value of the goods does not appear on the face of the receipt. The practical usefulness of the directive becomes evident when account is taken of the fact
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that tax officers are in no position to witness the issuance of receipts and check the value of the goods for which they are issued. If tax officers were to assess or collect the tax only when they find that the value of the goods covered by the receipts is more than five pesos, the assessment and collection of the tax would be well-nigh impossible, as it is impossible for tax collectors to determine from the receipts alone, if they do not contain the value of the goods, whether the goods receipted for exceed P5, or not. The regulation impliedly required the statement of the value of the goods in the receipts; so that the collection of the tax can be enforced. This the PetitionerAppellant failed to do and he now claims the unreasonableness of the provision as a basis for his exemption. We find that the regulation is not only useful, practical and necessary for the enforcement of the law on the tax on bills of lading and receipts, but also reasonable in its provisions. The regulation above quoted falls within the scope of the administrative power of the Secretary of Finance, as authorized in Section 79 (B) of the Revised Administrative Code, because it is essential to the strict enforcement and proper execution of the law which it seeks to implement. Said regulations have the force and effect of law. In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the Government, by Law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct, control and management of the work of the particular department of the Government; to authorize certain persons, in charge of the management,
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control, and direction of the particular department, to adopt certain rules and regulations providing for the detail of the management and control of such department. Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law, whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of the law Such regulations, once established and found to be in conformity with the general purposes of the law, are just as binding upon all of the parties, as if the regulations had been written in the original law itself. For the foregoing considerations, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is declared void (for lack of jurisdiction- SC really has exclusive appellate juris. in cases involving the legality of any tax,etc) and that of the Court of First Instance, reversed and the RespondentAppellee (nevertheless is) absolved from the complaint. With costs against the Petitioner-Appellant. A.2. PENAL REGULATIONS HELD: US vs. BARRIOS NO FACTS: In the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila the defendant was charged with a violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs, duly published in the Official Gazette and approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice. After a demurrer to the complaint was overruled, it was proved that, being the captain of the lighter Maude, he was moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows:
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'"No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power." Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows: "For the violation of any of the foregoing regulations, the person offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court." The counsel of the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First, that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the Acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power. ISSUE: WON it is an undue delegation of legislative power to authorize the Collector to promulgate such law.
Rules for local navigation prescribed by the collector of a port as harbor master pursuant to statutory authority may be sustained as not an undue exercise of a delegated legislative power. The fixing of penalties for criminal offenses is the exercise of a legislative power which can not be delegated to a subordinate authority. By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain
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exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 supports this conclusion. "SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed. "SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court: Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section, or by both." There is no difficulty in sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming within the terms of section 5. Lighterage, mentioned in the Act, is the very business in which this vessel was engaged, and when heavily laden with hemp she was navigating the Pasig River below the Bridge of Spain, in the city of Manila. The necessity of confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations is. recognized throughout the world, as each region and each harbor requires peculiar rules more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within their proper scope, are
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in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power. The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] of Act No. 355, of the Philippine Customs Administrative Act, as amended by Acts Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500. This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question. "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.) This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. In the case of the United States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Rep., 402), an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make such rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect improvements of the Mississippi
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River, and providing that a violation thereof should constitute a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the misdemeanor was declared not under the delegated power of the Secretary of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant to him of power to prescribe rules for the use of canals. (U. S. vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep., 207.) But a law authorizing him to require alterations of any bridge and to impose penalties for violations of his rules we held invalid, as vesting in him a power exclusively lodged in Congress. (U. S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 406.) The subject is considered and some cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in re Kollock (165 U. S., 526), which upheld the law authorizing a commissioner of internal revenue to designate marks and stamps on oleomargarine packages, an improper use of which should thereafter constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court saying (p. 533): "The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail. The regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with, the law itself. . . ." In Massachusetts it has been decided that the legislature may delegate to the governor and council the power to make pilot regulations. (Martin vs. Witherspoon et al., 135 Mass., 175.) In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company (88 Cal., 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty under statutes authorizing them to do so, the court saying: "Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulations with reference to the navigation of Humboldt
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Bay, the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature." Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned. We are also of the opinion that none of the subsequent statutes cited operate to repeal the aforesaid section of Act No. 1136. So much of the judgment of the Court of First Instance as convicts the defendant of a violation of Acts Nos. 355 and 1235 is hereby revoked, and he is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 25 dollars, with costs of both instances. So ordered. THE UNITED STATES, vs.FRANK TUPASI MOLINA Facts: Frank Tupasi Molina was charged of a crime of perjury, in violation of Section 3, Act no. 1697, when defendant signed a petition to be permitted to take the examination for the position of municipal policeman and made a false declaration under oath that he was qualified to the examinations for municipal police and have not been charged of any crime During trial, prosecution presented evidence that the defendant was sentenced and imprisoned for disturbing public peace. Defendant argues that said Act was not applicable in the present case since this Act was only authorizing the appointment of commissioners, to make official investigations, fixing their powers, for the payment of witness fees, and for the punishment of perjury in official investigations. Issue:
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WON lower court committed error in applying section 3 of Act 1697. Held: No Under Section 3 of Act No. 1697 it provides that: Any person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty or perjury, and shall be punished, etc. Act No. 2169, provides for the reorganization of the municipal police of the municipalities or provinces and subprovinces, it further provides that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare general regulations for the good government, discipline, and inspection of the municipal police, "compliance wherewith shall be obligatory for all members of the organization." Section 9 of said Act provides that: "To be eligible for examination, a candidate shall have the following requirements: . . . (6) Have no criminal record." In accordance with the requirements of said law, the Director of Constabulary prepared an examination manual, prescribing at the same time rules for conducting examinations, which examination manual was approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Police, and thereby was given the force of law. We have, therefore, a law which authorizes the administration of an oath in the present case.
EH 405
A violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the Government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation, constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of law. In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the Government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct, control, and management of the work of the particular department of the Government; to authorize certain persons, in charge of the management, control, and direction of the particular department, to adopt certain rules and regulations providing for the detail of the management and control of such department. Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law, whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of the law. We held in the many cases that said section 3 was a provision punishing the crime of perjury generally. We find no reason, either in law or in the argument of the appellant in the present case, to modify or reverse our conclusions in that case. The defendant was guilty of the crime charged. PP. v. MACEREN GR No. L-32166 FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries,
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promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years. It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
EH 405
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water." ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN ISSUING ADMINISTARTIVE ORDERS. HELD: The Court is of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
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Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32). However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas. n examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order. Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide
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for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Mu;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712). The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6). The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osme;a, 68 Phil. 328). Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29,
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1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349). A.3 INTERPRETATIVE RULES Hilado vs. Collector GR L-9408, 31 October 1956 Facts: Emilio Hilado filed his income tax return for 1951 with the treasurer of Bacolod City, claiming a deductible item of P12,837.65 from his gross income pursuant to General Circular V-123 issued by the Collector of Internal Revenue. The Secretary of Finance, through the Collector, issued General Circular V-139 which revoked and declared void Circular V-123; and laid down the rule[s] that losses of property which occurred in World War II from fires, storms, shipwreck or other casualty, or from robbery, theft, or embezzlement are deductible in the year of actual loss or destruction of said property. The deductions were disallowed. Issue: Whether Internal Revenue Laws were enforced during the war and whether Hilado can claim compensation for
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destruction of his property during the war. Held: Philippines Internal Revenue Laws are not political in nature and as such were continued in force during the period of enemy occupation and in effect were actually enforced by the occupation government. Such tax laws are deemed to be laws of the occupied territory and not of the occupying enemy. As of the end of 1945, there was no law which Hilado could claim for the destruction of his properties during the battle for the liberation of the Philippines. Under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1948, the payment of claims by the War Damage Commission depended upon its discretions non-payment of which does not give rise to any enforceable right. Assuming that the loss (deductible item) represents a portion of the 75% of his war damage claim, the amount would be at most a proper deduction of his 1950 gross income (not on his 1951 gross income) as the last installment and notice of discontinuation of payment by the War Damage VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., v. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor: . Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.
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Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term 'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal. The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act." There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative
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rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis, op. cit., p. 194.) . A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows: .
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(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so. Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to: (f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month. It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by appellant, does not support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or regulation. What was there said
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was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a circular. Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of law that any circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a rule or regulation which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect. The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to the present case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if they refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the employer pays to his employees, is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161. We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employersmembers of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is
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true that in previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their wellaccepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS v. SSS A. QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS 1. INSPECTION, INVESTIGATION AND ADJUDICATION ANG TIBAY vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
EH 405
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940 FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of National Labor Union Inc. (NLU). NLU averred that Toribios act is not valid as it is not within the Collective Bargaining Agreement. They also alleged that there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood (NWB). They further contend that NWB is dominated by Toribio himself hence he favors it over NLU. NLU prays for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before, as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the Court of Industrial Relations. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law. HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (Section 1).
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In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character; (1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
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(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. The SC further held that that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. Thus, the motion for a new trial was granted, and the entire record of the case was remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS L. CARMELO v. ARMANDO RAMOS Facts:
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Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee "to investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of this Office. Petitioner is the chairman of the committee. The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear before it. Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administrative proceedings," petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt. After hearing, during which petitioner was required to show a prima facie case, the trial court dismissed the petition. The lower court held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under oath. It appears that in a statement given to investigators of the Office of the Mayor, Ramos admitted having misappropriated on several occasions, sums of money given to him by the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and that this fact had not been discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain employees in the City Treasurer's office at Casa de Alba where Ramos was a bookkeeper as stated above. Issue: The main issue in this case is WON the power, if any, of committee, like the committee of which petitioner is the chairman, to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal? Held: Petition is bereft of merit.
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The rule is that Rule 64 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows: Powers incidental to taking of testimony. When authority to take testimony or evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or other body, such authority shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer oaths and summons witnesses and shall include authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character. One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses. There is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city employees. SC does not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation implies also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be require by the compulsory process of subpoena. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the Administrative Code are applicable to the
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City of Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government. Even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, is that the Mayor can not delegate this power to a body like the committee of the petitioner. VIVO v MONTESA G.R. No. L-24576 July 29, 1968 Facts: The private respondents Juan, Pedro, Julio, Marcelo, Jose, Manuel and Benito, all surnamed "Calacday" arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong, the first four on 18 November 1959, and the last three on 6 December 1959. Upon their arrival they sought admission as Filipino citizens. After investigation, a board of special inquiry, in its decisions of 7 and 11 December 1959, found them to be the legitimate sons of a Filipino citizen, one Isaac Calacday, and thus admitted them into this country. The Bureau of Immigration then issued to each of them an identification certificate as a Filipino citizen. Sometime in February, 1963, however, Isaac Calacday confessed before an immigration official that the seven respondents were not his sons. He retracted his confession in March, 1963, in an investigation in the Department of Justice, with the explanation that, in a fit of anger, he disclaimed, under oath, paternity of the respondents because they refused to give him money (Annex "I" to Answer). On 9 May 1963, Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the herein private respondents, stating in said warrants their deportability under Section 37 (a) (1) and Section 37 (a) (2) in relation to Section 29(a) (17) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, for having entered the Philippines "by means of false and
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misleading statements and that they were not lawfully admissible at the time of entry, not being properly documented for admission." The warrants directed any immigration office or officer of the law to bring the respondents before the Commissioner, for them to show cause, if any there be, why they should not be deported. Manuel Calacday was subsequently arrested. The others remained at large. On 26 April 1965, the respondents filed before the respondent court a petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 60906, praying for three principal reliefs, namely: to restrain the arrest of those petitioners who have not been arrested; to release Manuel Calacday who had been arrested; and to prohibit the deportation of all the petitioners, all upon the claim that they are Filipino citizens. RTC granted the petition. Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings Held: We agree with petitioning Commissioner that the court below is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of respondents Calacdays. These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the Immigration authorities under Sections 28 and 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act (C.A. No. 613). That jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim of Filipino citizenship, where the Commissioner or Commissioners have reliable evidence to the contrary; and said officers should be given opportunity to determine the issue of citizenship before the courts interfere in the exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative decisions.
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in Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531, 533, this Court said: While the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board as an instrument of the Chief Executive to deport undesirable aliens exists only when the person arrested is an alien, however, the mere plea of citizenship does not divest the Board of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners should make "a showing that his claim is frivolous" (Ng Fung Ho vs. White, 259 U.S., 275), and must prove by sufficient evidence that they are Filipino citizens. [Kessler vs. Strecker (1939) 307 U.S., 21, 35-36.] If such is the primary duty of petitioners, it follows that the Deportation Board has the necessary power to pass upon the evidence that may be presented and determine in the first instance if petitioners are Filipino citizens or not. This is inherent-in, or essential to the efficient exercise of, the power of the Deportation Board (Laurencio vs.Collector of Customs, 35 Phil., 37). It is well to note here that when the petition for certiorari and prohibition (the respondent judge considered it as such) was filed, deportation proceedings had been started against the respondents (petitioners below) but had not been completed. In view of the non-completion of the proceedings, the Board of Commissioners has not rendered as yet any decision. The respondents Calacdays, therefore, are not being deported. Before the Board reaches a decision, it has to conduct a hearing where the main issue will be the citizenship or alienage of the respondents. Therefore, there is nothing so far for the courts to review. It is clear from the order complained of that the court below misapprehended the import of the warrants issued by the Commissioner herein. Said warrants required the respondents to be brought to the immigration authorities, not to be deported, but "to show cause, if any
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there be, why he should not be deported from the Philippines", as expressly recited therein. There was no case of "summarily arresting and deporting" the respondents Calacdays, as unwarrantedly assumed by the court below. The Calacdays have alluded in this Court to certain documents in support of their claim to Philippine citizenship. The proper procedure is for said respondents to appear before the Immigration officials and there submit these documents as evidence on their part to show cause why they should not be deported. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writ prayed for is hereby granted, the order issued in Civil Case No. 60906 of the Court of First Instance of Manila is set aside, and the proceedings ordered discontinued. But the warrants of arrest heretofore issued by the petitioner, Immigration Commissioner, against herein respondents Calacdays are declared null and void, without prejudice to said respondents being required to furnish bonds in such reasonable sums as the Immigration Commissioners may fix, in order to guarantee their appearance at the hearings and other proceedings in their case, until final determination of their right to stay in the Philippines PLDT v. PSC EVANGELISTA v. JARENCIO FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305,
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entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: 3 b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines. c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... . h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency. For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. 4 Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent
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Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein." ISSUE: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations. HELD: YES. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10 We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness,
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administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted subparagraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasijudicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under subparagraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none. There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be . CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. G.R. No. L-40245 1975 April 30
EH 405
Facts: The Philippine Airlines Inc provides both domestic and international air service. In its domestic service PAL provides, among others, services between Tuguegarao and Manila (designated as Flight 213) and between Baguio and Manila (designated as Flight 205). On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of twenty (20) passengers from Baguio to Manila who cannot be accommodated in its regular flight. To accommodate these twenty passengers, PAL required the aircraft operating Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass Baguio City on its way to Manila and pick up these passengers. Flight 213 at that time was carrying only five (5) passengers. Claiming that PAL should have first obtained the permission of the CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD (CAB) before operating the flagstop and that such failure is a violation of Republic Act No. 776, the CAB imposed a fine of P5,000.00 upon PAL in a resolution. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by PAL, the CAB reduced the fine to P2,500.00 PAL, in its motion for reconsideration, argued that there is nothing in Republic Act No. 776 in general, nor in Section 42(k) thereof in particular, which expressly empowers CAB to impose a fine and order its payment in the manner pursued in this case and under CAB Resolution No. 109(70). It further stressed that "the power and authority to impose fines and penalties is a judicial function exercised through the regular courts of justice, and that such power and authority cannot be delegated to the Civil Aeronautics Board my mere implication or interpretation". Issue:
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Whether or not CAB possesses the necessary legal authority to impose a fine. Ruling: We have no quarrel with appellant PAL's contention that the C.A.B. has no power to impose fines in the nature of criminal penalty and that only courts of justice can do so. It could easily be discerned from a scrutiny of the provision on Chapter VII of Republic Act 776, on "Violation and penalties" that whenever the law provides a penalty for a violation involving fine and/or imprisonment (criminal in nature), the words "in the discretion of the court" always appear (Sec. 42 (E) (F) (G) (N) Republic Act 776) for the very simple reason that the C.A.B. is not authorized to impose a criminal penalty, but in those cases where the violation is punishable by a fine or civil penalty, the law does not include the words "in the discretion of the court. There exists but an insignificant doubt in Our mind that the C.A.B. is fully authorized by law (Republic Act 776) to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations. To deprive the C.A.B. of that power would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own initiative to determine whether to "impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise" "fines and civil penalties", a power which is expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator whose orders or decision may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the CAB. Besides, to deprive the C.A.B. of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general supervision and control over air carriers if they can just disregard with impunity the rules and regulations designed to insure public safety and convenience in air transportation. If everytime the C.A.B. would like to
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impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and regulations it would have to resort to courts of justice in protracted litigations then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a competent, efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers in their vital role of rendering public service by affording safe and convenient air transit. There is no doubt that the fine imposed on appellant PAL in CAB resolution 109(70) and 132(70) is that fine or civil penalty contemplated and mentioned in the foregoing provisions of Republic Act 776 and not a fine in the nature of criminal penalty as contemplated in the Revised Penal Code, because the "fine" in this case was imposed by the C.A.B. because of appellant PAL's violation of C.A.B. rules on flagstops without previous authority on "May 12, 1970 and on previous occasions", said C.A.B. explaining clearly in its resolution No. 132(70) that the "imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules, regulations or requirements of the government regulating agency. In other words, it is an administrative penalty which administrative officers are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution. Republic Act 776 created the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Civil Aeronautics Administration. In the exercise and performance of their powers and duties, they shall consider among other things, "as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity" certain declared policies which include (c) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantage of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound
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economic condition in, such transportation, and to improve the relation between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers; (f) To promote safety of flight in air commerce in the Philippines The CAB has the power to "investigate, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, whether any individual or air carrier, domestic or foreign, is violating any provision of this act, or the rules and regulations issued thereunder, and shall take such action, consistent with the provisions of this Act, as may be necessary to prevent further violation of such provision, or rules and regulations so issued" (Section 10(D) Republic Act 776). Likewise, the CAB has the power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order" of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to "imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any provision of this Act or rules and regulations issued thereunder." It has the power also "either on its own initiative or upon review on appeal from an order or decision of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase, or compromise, such fine and civil penalties, as the case may be. ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION v. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY FACTS: Jose Hernando acquired ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the
EH 405
subdivision project, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. On October 14 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Mr. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA. The motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent NHA, which sustained its jurisdiction to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction over the present controversy. HELD: NHA was upheld by the SC. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasiPage 44

judicial authority to administrative agencies is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree", states that National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree. Presidential Decree No. 1344, clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following manner: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices: B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
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broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute. There is no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) and JUAN A. ALEGRE G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992 Facts: Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte. Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. So, private respondent filed a lettercomplaint against RCPI with National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a request for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the company. Taking cognizance of the complaint, NTC
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directed RCPI to answer the complaint and set the initial hearing. NTC held that RCPI was administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service under Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and imposed the penalty of fine payable within thirty (30) days from receipt in the aggregate amount of one thousand pesos. Hence, RCPI filed this petition for review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates. ISSUE: Whether or not Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) has jurisdiction to impose fines HELD: The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC to render it. NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded. No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's Office
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to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that: Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective (Globe Wireless case). EPZA vs. CHR, et. Al G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992 Facts: EPZA (petitioner) purchase a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and before petitioner could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000-financialassistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were private respondents (TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA). Ten years later, respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies". Alleged in their complaint was the information that EPZA bulldozed the area with acts in violation of their human rights. CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA to desist from
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committing such acts . Two weeks later, EPZA again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air. CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her first order and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders, but same was denied by the Commission (CHR). Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders. In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the restraining order. The CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection. Issue: WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to
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compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of. Held: Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued by the respondent Commission on Human Right are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the TRO which this Court issued is made PERMANENT. In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for,
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if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication. The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose. MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION v. BUMOLO FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day. Private respondent filed with the
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Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order. ISSUES: 1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98- 206 SPC No. 98-143 an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District Board of Canvassers for Malabon and Navotas with Prayer for the Nullification of the Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as Congressman." SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation as congressman. 2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid. RULING: On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by private respondent. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing preproclamation cases. It states: "Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in
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Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it." The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vicepresident and members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the COMELEC under the Constitution to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to "decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections." We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due
EH 405
process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations. Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it was merely exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of canvassers. We cannot accept public respondent's argument. Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide
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whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasijudicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent. The COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998 in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206 is ANNULLED. THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS FACTS The property being fought over by the parties is a 10.36-hectare property in Baguio City called Dominican Hills, formerly registered in the name of Diplomat Hills, Inc. The property was mortgaged to the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) which eventually foreclosed the mortgage thereon and acquired the same as highest bidder. On April 11, 1983, it was donated to the Republic of the Philippines by UCPB through its President, Eduardo Cojuangco. The deed of donation stipulated that Dominican Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in human settlements and economic development and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human Settlements.
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President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 85 abolishing the Office of Media Affairs and the Ministry of Human Settlements. All agencies under the latter's supervision as well as all its assets, programs and projects, were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS). On October 18, 1988, the PMS received an application from petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property. HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC) consented to act as originator for UNITED. A Memorandum of Agreement was signed by and among the PMS, the HIGC, and UNITED. The Memorandum of Agreement called for the PMS to sell the Dominican Hills property to HIGC which would, in turn, sell the same to UNITED. The parties agreed on a selling price of P75.00 per square meter. Private respondents entered the Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor. Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION filed an action for injunction, in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4. Private respondents were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied in an Order dated March 18, 1996. While Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, the ASSOCIATION, this time represented by the Land Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc filed a complaint praying for damages,
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injunction and annulment of the said Memorandum of Agreement between UNITED and HIGC. Demolition Order No. 1-96 was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City Mayor and the City Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that private respondents returned and reconstructed the demolished structures. To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed on September 29, 1998 a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order in the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo. Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status quo order, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. ISSUE IS THE COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS [COSLAP] CREATED UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 561 BY THE OFFICE OF THE PHILIPPINES EMPOWERED TO HEAR AND TRY A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS WITH PRAYER FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND THUS, ARROGATE UNTO ITSELF THE POWER TO ISSUE STATUS QUO ORDER AND CONDUCT A HEARING THEREOF? ASSUMING THAT THE COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS HAS JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER, IS IT EXEMPTED FROM OBSERVING A CLEAR CASE OF FORUM SHOPPING ON THE PART OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS? RULING COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It may not assume jurisdiction over cases which are already pending in the regular courts. Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 speaks of any resolution, order or decision of the COSLAP as having the "force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision." The qualification places an unmistakable emphasis on the administrative character of the COSLAP's determination, amplified by the statement that such resolutions, orders or decisions "shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same." An agency is defined by statute as "any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or governmentowned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein."
section
3(2) of Executive Order 561 patently indicates that the COSLAP's dispositions are binding on administrative or executive agencies. Private respondents, in filing multiple petitions, have mocked our attempts to eradicate forum shopping and have thereby upset the orderly administration of justice. They sought recourse from three (3) different tribunals in order to obtain the writ of injunction they so desperately desired.
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EH 405

A scrutiny of the pleadings
filed before the trial courts and the COSLAP sufficiently establishes private respondents' propensity for forum shopping. We lay the premise that the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the plaintiff or principal party, and not by his counsel. Hence, one can deduce that the certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. In the case at bar, private respondents' litany of omissions range from failing to submit the required certification against forum shopping to filing a false certification, and then to forum shopping itself. First, the petition filed before the COSLAP conspicuously lacked a certification against forum shopping. Second, it does not appear from the record that the ASSOCIATION informed Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City before which Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, that another action, Civil Case No. 3382-R, was filed before Branch 61 of the same court. Another group of homeless residents of Dominican Hill, the LAND REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. initiated the latter case.
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Administrative Law Case Digests: Delegation of Powers

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGESTS