Chemical Corps Historical Studies Number 5-Mechanized Flame Thrower Operations in World War II

CHEMICAL CORPS
HISTORICAL STUDIES
MECHANIZED
FLAME THROWER
OPERATIONS
NUMBER 5
IN WORLD WAR II
HISTORICAL OFFICE
G"'teEy CHIEF OF THE CHEMICAL CORPS
Scanned by MilSpecManuals
MECHANI TRRO\il'..R
I N IIJJl II
LT COL LlXlNAHD L. MeX!)'N!Y. CML C R'lS.
Historical Off ice
Office of the Chec !cAl Corp!'
14 February 1951
Scanned by Mi lSpecManuals
'!'l>le 18 the :first draft of J"l1Ul8
'nlrowf!r OoerntloD8 in Vorld Vl'!.r II.. 'l'bia
study i8 DOt presented 8S 8 d.finitiYe and
officlnl hl_to17. but 1_ renrodnced for cur-
rent within the
tftbl18hment the of &
definl \lye history.
And relatl.9 to
and adequacy of ere InYited. At the
close of the the find fOTa3
for use In auch to the
Chief, Historical Office, Office of the Chief
Officer.
ii
Chapter
I
II
TABLE OF COIITH<TS
:.Jechanized Flace Thrower. . .
Early Field Improvisations.
A. South Pacific Area.
B. Area.
C. Central Pacific Area.
:C. European Thea ters
Auxiliary Type Tank Flame Thrower . .
A. lfarianas Operation (July 1944).
1. Supply Situation .
2. Employment. . . . . . . . .
J. Comments. . . . . . . . .
B. PeleUu (15 _ 30 September 1944).

c. lwo ,Jil!l8. (landing made 19 Jo'ebruary 1945).

1
1
2
4
5
8
10
10
10
10
11
12
D. Ryukyus Operation (1 April - 21 .fane 1945). 15
1. PreP3ration. . ... 15
2. Employment.. . . . . 18
J. Lessons Learned . . 20
soutm.est Pacific Area.
1. Supply Situation.

2. Employment.

. . .
3. Comments. . . . .

F. ?lans lor the Kyusru. Operation.
G. Mediterranean Theater of Operations
H. F.Urooean Theater of Operations.
1. Requirement E.stab1ished and fleceipt of
Shipment. . . . . .
2. Instal.l.ati on and 'i'raining
J.. ntenance and Servicing
111
21
21
24
Z7
28
JO
31
Jl
39
46
hapter
III
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Tactical Doctrine .
Fuels and Propellants
Rance ..
FUel. . . . ..
Logistics . . . . . .
..
Solutions to Logtstical Problems.
Reported U l!Ie. . . .
?41st Tank Batta1.1on (First Ar'fIIYJ
70th Tank Battalion (First Army) ..
14th Armored Division (Seventn Army).
747tb Tank Batt.lion (Nin,n Army)
?09th Tank Battalion (Ninth Army)
70lst Tank Battalion (Ninth Army)
?4Jd Tank Battalion {Ninth Army).
8th Armored Division (Ninth Army)
?36th Tank Battalion.
Critique. . . . . . . . . . . ...
Main Armament Type Tank. Flame Throwers .
A. Marianas Operation. . . ...
1. Procurement and in the Theater.
2 . Training. . . .

3. Tactical Employment ..
4. Comments. . .
48
51
51
53
54
55
59
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
68
69
75
75
75
?9
?9
82
8. Peleliu Operation 83
1. of t\'avy llark I Flame Thrower
and Preparation for Emplo::ment . 83
2 . T%ployment. En
3. COlll1llents. . 90
C. Leyte Operation 92
D. 1wo Jlma ....
1. Procurement and ?reparation
2. Employment.

3. Corru:lents ..

E. Ryukyus Campaign.
1. Requirements and Procurement.
2 . Employment. . . . . . . . . .
71Jth Tank Battalion, Armored Flame
Thr01';er, Provisional. .
Enem..v Defense!!! at Okinawa . .
i V
93
93
95
9'!
104
104
108
108
128
Chapter
IV
F.
G.
H.
J. and Recpmmendations.
Fuel.
Extension Hose .

Ecployment in Luzon . . . . . . . .
1. The F:/-7 (Q lJode1) Flame Thrower.
Combat Tests. . . .
Plans f or the Kyushu
1. Intelligence.
2. Plans ...
European Theater.

1. Employment by the British and
Organization for
Crocodiles . . .
Canadians
2.
r/qsps , .
?actical Doctrine . . . .
Highlights of Employment.
Crocodiles.
The

Critique. .
&.tploy:nent by
U.S. Troops
Brest . . .
9ritish Hnits Attached to
. . . . .
Operations wi th 2d Armored Division
Greensweiller Attack.
Friealdenhoven Attack
Merzenhausen Attack.
VI Corps Operations .
78th Infantry Division .
3. Rri tish Hechani zed fo'lame Throwers E!nployed
by U.S. Troops ....... .
Procurement from the British ..
Crocodiles. . . . . . ....
l\'asps and Fonsons . . . ...
Employment of Sherman-Crocodiles .

Requirement Established for i:ain Armament
Throwers . . . . . . . .
Employment of Flarn.e Thro .... ers by the Enemy.
v
132
138
139
l42
l42
l43
150
150
153
155
155
157
157
157
158
160
160
168
172
174
174
100
100
181
181
181
182
182
182
182
187
189
190
194
and Evaluat ion

A. SUI'!1l'.Ary. . .

1. and Supply

2 . 1' e.ctica l tooct rine and Cmp l oyrnent

3. :.'ai ntenrmco and ServicinG

B. Eva l uation

. .

.

Yi

201
201
201
203
206
207
1
2
J
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
APPI'llDICES
Flame Thro\1er , Armored, $e If_Propellt'! d.
Inst. al lat i on,
. !ai nte nance and Oper at i on. . . . . '" . . .
EXperience Gained and on Flame
'!'hrower , Armored, Se lf_Propelled . ..
I:Bi ly Operat i ons of Navy I Flame Thrower on Pel eli u
Day by ray Log of Flame Tank Operations on Iwo Jima. .
Operational Direct ive , eG Tent h Army
A.rrnor e d I l ame Thrower. . . . . . .
Tank Ba ttalion
fay by Day Account of the ?13th Tank Battalion, Armored
:'lame Throv;er , Provisi onal, at Oki nawa
Theory of Flame Thror.er Fue l .
Operat i ons lfq I nfantry Division
Ger.:nM I"lame Throwers and Flane Thr ower Fuels .
Signifi c ant rates in SHPJ.. and Adj acent Areas .

209
238
262
285
302
307
J78
404
407
426
PHOTOGRAPHS
No.
Following Page
..
10
<
14
"

75
4 75
5 75
0

00
7

107
8

110
9 110
10

115
11
120
U

UO
13 U7
14 150
15 156
16 176
17

179
viij
PHOTOGRAPHS (continued)
No. Page
18 :230
19 :231
:20

:23:2
:2l
:233
:2:2 :234
:23

:235
:24 :236
:25 :237
:26
384a
1x
PREFACE
'This :listor:}, 01 -"e('han-:zeo rl;::r.e 'thr"mer Opera t.i ons i.n
'!':or ld 'I'ar II Wa s pp"!)Orec by l.t Col Leonar c L.
Cc::l for-::erly assistant ('hemical Officer , V. S.
i t. (01 !:cKinney pre;uret. the ;nanuscri pt . includinc a
ccr.,arable manuscri pt on the History of
Throv:ers , our ine t wo six-week peri ods of 1. n the Cffice
of the Chie f , Chemical COl PS .
The Tt'!aQer wi l l observe that t. he f"'IRnllSCri!)t is noi in
t he exac t f or r.! of \'1hat m:"cht l IP tf-rnec str ictly narr<:l tive
h:i star i ('111 r ("car ('l bu tis I' a ther a cOr.1hi na t ion of a narra_
tive anC: a staff 'i'he pr eparati .:m of t.he
vol ume alonf the se I j nes nas (!:I.c t ateC: sF.ver al fac t ors .
The traininL ane r esearc l-t and cevelopment C'1{;encies of the
CheMical LOrrS required the p.3r Hest possible p'J.blication
of dil ta nn ,t. he ::le nt of i ll .,'ar I I ,
such (iata t f'l !>e i n the f orn most reaCil:1 ada;:>table to their
i...'nI::ediate ':'hese c emands accollnt for the inclusion
verbati::-:. of nJuner olts (:etailed oper l'lt,ionn1 rp?Qrts . 1I.1so, the
fact that I. ;'P authm' cou l d be aV/ay f r ,1f'\ his po"it.ion
\'lith t!le u-.partrent of AEriculture f or only II linj tee time
x
'Prevented }Xltt.in t he manuscript :i n t.he .o.cst cOl,plete
f or m. At the: SR.>:lt:' tims , the ploceci oy :'istol'ical
t:i. vision, S$ USA, on the preparation of voluoes f or thF-
official !'epartment of the ':. rmJ' hj s t or y has pr eve ntec per -
sonl'"1",1 of the tlistorical Office fr or.t cOint,; nore extenRive
pditorial wor :{ !"!n the manuscript.
; i thin the l i:r.itations by thf' fact ors indicatd
above , an atte:npt has t><>en [!'I.ane to a'1 <.If'curate ac-
(!fmnt of C"IPr. harl1. zed flame thr0Wer p.r::,lo:;mpnt an" t.he 1'"1'.Imer O'JS
involvf!rl . I t is not 3. c'ef5nitivp. but is
::t. reli.:thle .?nalysis prf'parer. by R person wpll
qualifi.o on thp b=:lsis of bot.h sO:..lnd research techniques ar.d
thea t er experience , especially in the Pac ific areas the
. eapon VIas empl oyed most e xtensive l y .
The volume !,".lrport s t.o ;.rresent: t."'e charg('teristics of
the v8,l'iO"olS t:rpes of !!Iechani-z.ed flane th!'O\';ers ' .. 'nich were
cp.ve lop<>c : y:hllt ty!JP.s ,vere availat>ll to both .o\ llied an': enf"T:l:i
po,leI' Sj \ hen anc. :i n \'lhat ql.:.ant ities the Variol\f: models
i n thp theaters; the development of ft:. els; an accC"Jnt of thp.
conbat e:1.pl oyt:lent of the weapon i n the the ... ters anO ar eas
t;hf're A"':I e rican tr00ps ir.vnlved ; and trl ?!, ol) l erls of
traininc , log:stics , fuel s anc
xi
ants. of the ground coobat situation is included to
indicat. e whether flane tareets llere enaount ered and . if so,
the nature of the targets and how they affectp-d use of
the \'!eapori. l .n acco\.!r.t of enemy employment of :uechanizecl
t hrowers is also included . A hrief account of the
mechanized flame thro\,lers developed by the ,Ulied and enemy
powers was included in the Chemical Corps Historical Study
Ko. 4 on Portablp- Tht'owp-r Operations in Y.'arld l,ar II.
Scanned by MiiSpecManuals
CHAPTER I
Mechanized Thrower
Eerly Field Improvi8ations
The req\llrement for a tank-!I'I.ounted flame thrower woe r ealh.ed
1
early in the var. In the Pacific theaters, Japane,e positions Were
nearly always defended by small arms fire which weB not hazardoul
for a medium tank, but always dangerous for infantrymen. Standard
complaints mR.de by the infantry regarding the portable flame thrower
were ita ahort ranp,e, vulnerability, excess wei e,ht . end low fuel
capacity when required for burning off areas in dense jungle to re-
veal hidden po sitions. It was obvious that most of these criticisms
could be .alleviated by means of a flame thrower. It
wa e also r ecognized in the field that a larte tank flame
thrower, thickened f u el, would better utilize the p roper-
ties of gelled gasol ine. The prevailing thoUht on need of an
ermored flame thro .... er 1s best 1l1ust!"ated. by attempts in 1943 to
modify the M1Al flame for installation in tank s.
1
For a detai led account of mechanized thro .... er requirements.
9ts.ndard12:ation. Mti. dl'!scription of th"l VArious
tyPes and !!'IOdel., se"! Corp. Historical Study No.4,
Portable Flame Thr o .... er Operations in ... orld W"l.r II. pp. 17-30.
- 1 -
A. South Pacific
After the battle of GuAdalcanal, experimentation
vas conducted in the South Pacific Area in modifying the NlAl flame
thrower so that it could be mounted on tRnks. Several obstacles
were encountered during this exnerimentation. For example, the
officer of one tanlc battalion located in New Caledonis.
tried mounting the gun in the pistol nort on the side of the
tank, because he felt that the range of the flame thrower was too
2
short to allow firing in front of the moving tank. During the
battle for New Georgia, the experimentation was stepned up in the
of developine a satisfactory tank flame thrower for reducing
bunkers which holding un A workable mounting was
perfected, but not in time for t'Tll!"loyment in the operat'ion. However,
XIV Corps reported that it 'l'lOuld :.nrobably find use for the in
future The improvised mounting involved shortening and
modifying the MIAl flame gun so as to fit it into the ball and
socket joint \vhere the bow machine cun normally was located. Two
!UAI fuel units w':'re placed in the tank, on the floor in front of
the assistant driver's seat and the other in the rear of the assistant
3
driver's seat, Where the ammunition usually was carried.
2
CWS T of Opns Ltr 6, 8 Oct 43, p. 10.
Ltr, Hq XIV Corns to C CivS (Thru: 26 Aug 43,
sub: Report 0 f ti nf Flame Thro .... ers in Tanks. In
CML\iG.
- 2 -
3d Marine Di vidon cut thirteen and a half inches off the
bov machine gun barrel so tha.t it might be vi thdrawn and the modi-
fied flame gun into thA ball and socket, when the occasion
arose for its use. A bracket vas built inside the tank to hold
either th9 flame gun or the macHne gun. when not in use. Tvo fu'?l
tanks vere instglled in the tank,and plans vere made to equip tvo
4
tanks in each light tank platoon in this manner.
An A rmy unit the flame gun of the hydrogen and elec-
drilled a hole in the armor in front of the bov
machine gun, and attached the fuel 1i09 and nozzle to the top of
the machine gun. For ignition they used tracer or incendiary bullets
in the regular ratio of five to one. The ignition of the fuel vas
not entirely satisfactory, since it was necessary to fire the fuel
on the target and then hi t the tura ted targe t ,.,i th the tracer
bullets. The tracers would not ignite the fuel while it was in
5
the air. Another modification involved mounting the modified MlAl
gun on the bow gun barrel jRCket so that either weapon
6
be used as
4
Ltr, Cml 0 USAFISPA to COWS, 3 Nov 43, sub: Thrower
in Light Tanks. In CMLWG.
5
Ibid.
6
Ltr, Hq USAFISPA to C CWS, 20 May 44, sub: Improvised Mounting
of Flame Thrower in r.f 3Al Tanks. AG 470.6. In CML'rIG.
- 3 -
It was not un t il t he Battle of Bougei nville that any of the
above i mp r ovi sat ions were tried in combat . In february 1944 it was
decided to extend t he perimeter by a dvanci ng on Japaneae po siti ons
acr08s the River. The mis8ion vas entrusted t o en i nfan t ry
regiment supported by tanks and 4. Z-inch mortars. The
at tack start ed at 0700 on a Sunday Two comoanies of mo r-
tars l a i d down an HE concentre.t1on on the enemy po st tion s, while
the other two companies l aid a smoke to cover the river
cros sing. The Japane se pOSitions were neutralized by the improvised
flame throwinc tanks . The engagement lasted only an hour and a hal f,
but cost eight tanks and over 100 i nfantrymen.
B. Southwest Paci fic Area
The Merine Tank Be..ttalion mounted sever a l lolLU flOJDe tr...ro,.,-
ers i n pri or to the Britain operation. The modified f lame
guns wer e i nst alled in the ball nnd socket j oint, replacing the bow
machine gun . All att emp ts t o employ these flame thr owers r esul ted
i n misfires a nd it was concl uded that the MlAl gun was too f ragile
to withstand t he vi brations of the- tR.nk. In ')na speCific i nste.nce,
CO'"'T.l sny :B of the let Tank Battalion, ..... hile supporting the
112th Caval ry on Peninsul a , attempted to use its i mprovised
fl8l:le tank On an ene:ny bunker l ocated on the r ever se slope
of a small hill . The t ank supported by two other tanks
- 4 -
which covered the bunker while the tAnk i nto po-
s itt on at the top of embankment. Thp. flame thrower was fired ,
but the fuel fai l ed to I t i gnited only when the Marine
operator risked his life by unbuttoning the observation and
7
hurling an Ml4 grenade.
Based on the eX'Oerie:1ce of the 1st Marine Sixth Arr:,y
thereaf ter discouraged all fi el d of moun ting :4lAl
flame throwers on tanks . Tti s action wa s In accorcl.f'.:1ce with 1n-
s truc t1 on s publi shed by the Chi ef . Che"!! i cal ' '''ar f a r e Servi ce , and
in the belief that tank thrower s would 800n be aVRileble f r om
8
the zone of interior .
C. Central Pacific Area
After the Battle ?f Tnrawa it became evident that , i f the 108s
of life to be held down, new were needed for
dug- i n positi ons . of the urgently needed was arnared
flame thrower . In preparati on for the bot h the
4th Division and the 7th I nffmtry Divisi on mounted modified
M1A! fl3.llle thro\\'ers on t.anks and LVT1a (:SUffl'l.loes) . Twelve li ght
7
8
Hq US Forces , APO 323 Force- Arawe ) , Hlst Rpt. 24 Nov 43-
10 Feb 44. In Rist Recor ds Sect , AGO .
T of Cpns Ltr 16, 12 Jul 44, n .
0-51_ ,
- 5 -
tanks, supporting the 7th Infantry Division, were equipped with
!Tlodified i-.n.Al fla.rne throwers at Oalm. In order to increase the
fuel capacity to thirty gallons, special fuel tanka were con-
by the Honolulu Iron Works. The flame gun was mounted
9
In the bow machine gun pod tion. Flame throwers were also
mounted on amphibious tanks (LVT's). An attempt was made to
waterproof these guns with rubber covers, but the covers failed and
the electric ignition sy<>t,em out by salt water during
the landing. The fla.!!!e throwers, having proved unserviceable in
the landing phase. ,.,ere not e!!!'Dloyed 8f'ain during the operation.
Because of the of the the fr811ityof
the !ofliJ. flame gun, and the relBti vely small fuel c,?:paci t;)'. the
tank-mounte.d flame throwers were only nominally successful. The
7th Infantry Di vi sion reported using thi s f19.me thrower 8ainst a
small groun of the enemy, dug in on the far sidp of one island. In
this instance, the light tank was able to go directly up to th"! po-
s1 tion and ze it wi th the flame thr.o';<ler. The 4th Yarine
Dl vi sion e!l'l]Jloy ed th"\ improvi sed t.?nk thrower in the
Roi-Namur o-nerl?, tion to rout a grOtIn of Japanese from a tent. ',fuen
the flames hit the tent, the enemy ran out end were cut do\"Yl by the
10
mac hi n e gun s.
9
Hist CWS Mid Pac, Vol. I, Sect 3, pp. 21, 22.
10
Lt Col Gilbert G. White, CilS. "Armor for the Flame Thrower,"
Bull, Vol. 30, No.4 (Aug-Oqt 44), p.9.
"
At tl:J!! completion of the Marshall Islands operatton, the 184th
Infantry, 7th Division, the development of an armored
flame throwing vehicle with a czpacity of several hundred gallons
11
of fuel. The commanding 7th Infantry Division, st&ted
that an armored flame thrower of long range and high fuel capacity
12
was demanded. The following report indicates the conditions during
the fighting at Kwajalein, in which a flame thrower of hi gh fuel
capacity would have been of great value:
11
12
During the operation thp. left flank turned more
more to the use of A c0lil!'any cO'TI!llant'l,er had
n lesson - while the m1d:norning battle ','Ias proceeding -
seven Jap s crawled from a rubble nile wi t.hin twenty
of the Command Post where they had been for hours,
and had almost got t en back to their own lines. Casualties
kept mounting from sniper fire breaking out in rear of the
ass&ult line. The captain, therefore, ordered his serreant
to lo&d up with offensive grenades rr nd gasoline at the dump
and then syst ema.tically turn everyt hing burna'ble on the
ground around the c ompany. Soon the whole area was ablaze
and the smoke beCAme so thick that it enveloped one of the
platoons like fog. The suffered acutely from it; the
eyes of some became so swoll en seeing was painful.
Put the intense uhysi cal discomfort, the firing
of the area y!"I, s welcomed by th"l men end it gave t hem in-
creased confidence in uosi t ion. This and
many other peculiari ties of the op eration would be hardly
184th Inf, Rnt on FLnrrLOCK Opn.
USAFCPA, Particiuation in t he Kwajalein and :3iliwetok Opera-
tions, p. 194.
- 7 -
uncerstandahle t o thosE' who haC'. not the r.wajalein
battle. TlI s cene was , chaotic; it 'was li ke
tr:' ing tl) fi Ght one r S way across the lnncscape or a nii';ht,-
mare. Be tYleen road and the l agoon , ttle t.;.I'ot..p.o hac' been
stood on end o;y the ai.r and artilleQ ',ihere
there were grpat craters from the air bombs. salJe ounes had
ber;n tossed UP arounG theLl. Arnone the s;].n<3 piles were l:lasses
of debris , some fifteen t o fEet high, where a builC'ine
had been blown apart anc its corrugated sheeting and splintpreci
timbers V!E're sticJ.::j ng our at , 'eir cl ant l es . Then perhaps 3.:nll
('raters anel rrroups of ene:n;' dead, Clany I)f them hearllesf) or vr: th
Unbs l)lm.'n i.iway. Thei r bodies lay thic!c amonG the
concrete ,j. llboxes or uncler the t,Y:istecJ ano u prooteri palm t,rees
whi c h b l ocked th1:' of our infantry . ; .a lls l;yi nE ha lf ovcz',
battered [ouncCitj ons , r.lOunds that could never he sur e Wprf'
8imply ea:rt.h or the upwar d of an undergrounc! enemy
hideout - l ook vihere you ''IO\11d, ordf'r c ould not be f01,ln(;
where . To gpt, t en feet from v:here he stood, a riflf'man could
lop-certain only that hp )'Jol11d hiwe to his way ane thRt
his foregounc was never safe; j_t was SOf(letiCies necessary to
dr,tour 100 feet to trave l fifteeJl :'11' t")ent:' , beca'Jse of the
\\TE"ckace between. OnE" resillt Via s that the infantry VIas C0D-
st,antI:' with l or a l si t uati ons for y,j1ich no speri" l
h3vP it. The or de r to hurn t he &rca
Vias an examplE:' of th:s; :t wasn ' t i n t,he book, >mt it Vi a ::>
done.
lJ
f. European Theaters
'.'er:: little Vi33 l i onf' in the I 'ic l d of i.mprovisin;,: mechanized flame
thr oY/ers in thE: ' :eciter l' anean and Eur opean A l3I'itish report
,: _' 191./, indicated tha t United States f orces in I taly had installed
.'l portablf' flame gun in a tank. but that it had not been tried
i'1 c ombat 311(1 that, cl ue to it. s li:nit.ed r a n?:' of only its
13
"A DRY on In! Jour, Aug 44, p. 19.
- 8 -
14
\oi l'S douctful. Simila.r i nstAllations were cede 1n
se'lerfll OTpl'n i7ations 1n t ite 9.l.r'ouea.!"i. TheAter. In Cctobe r 1944 the
93t I!".fe!l ;.ry t he !"I op"'!"atlnr 'dth the 'Tint h Ar "'y. reoorted
t he installa t ion of 2n "lAl uortable fl.,:n" thro .... er in a :;tedium tanr. .
':' here "" -;'1 8, r.owever , no the t th" el'!\llp:nE'nt be'! n used
15
i n corr."'at . I n th'" followintE; -r: onth tho> c!1.e rni cal officer" Third
indica ted that an divisi on had made a sirnl1pr lnstal-
15
l etian and t ht-tt a r epo rt on i ts usefuln<! 88 might aOon "::Ie available .
14
15
16
of V.il Tne; , 11" otes fr om th" Allied
Force - Vi 91 t to A.nziO, 28 Ap r - 2 1944 . '1 In CML'dG.
3 . 1.:1; . 28, 1;:; Oct 44, Sect X. I n C .... l C Sch Li b , \Tlnth A
C1'! l Sec t. file
Pers ltr, C'T] l 0 :'hi r c! A t o C C',iS , .;. tlov 44. I n
- 9 -
CHAPTER II
AUxiliAry Type Tank Flame Thr ower
A. Mari anas Operation (July 1944)
1. Supol y Situation . F..a.rly i n Decemb,!T 1943 the Co,,:nandtng
Genaral, Central Pacific r e que st ed i nform.e. t ion f r om tl:.e 'IIRT
on status of
Based on the "';OT I s reu l y . requi til t ions wer e i n
the l at t er Ph:- t of D"Jcember 1943 fo r fo rty E4.-5 flame thro .... ers. I t
.... as :,oped that these Wp. spons .... auld srrive in time for the Mari:'lne.s
bu t they .... ere Mt r eceived. 3nd type te.nk fll'l.l!Ic
thro .... ers ",,"r
o
not evail&': le for installation In Ar my tanks fo r this
1
operatIon.
Tr.e lI.ar i!les . however . obtai ned . ever s l fla":1e thro\;'-
e ra And i nstalled them in tanks . See Fi g. 1.
2 . Emnloyment . Tr.
n
3d 3d Marine Division , wa s
equi pT' e .; ... ith six 34-5 flame tr. r olo(er s. ba ttalion lll.lH!ed. I n
annul t on GuRl'll , 21 July 1944 . The mechani zed tl'lro\oter .... as fir-:;t
on 22 Jul y at Assn POi ot tha MMrlne posi -
t i on .... AS cave frol!l l':"'.i ch snip"lr fire WA S beln(" r eceived . The flU'ie
Sl:.pP:>r ted by t.'l arr.1o!" ':! d t::l.!"1':: , anproeched the r:1outh of the {;t!.ye
1
Rist CWS 1!1e. Pac , Vol . !I , II CI, n . 70.
- 10 -
Figure 1.
fired of its twenty-five gallon charge into the entrance.
Upon examining the cave, it wns di scovered th.e.t seventeen Japanese had
been burned to death. Another flamp. tank was employed, this
same date, on a cave near Chonito Cliff. Latp.r examination of the
cave revealed 100 burned rifles and thirty bodies. On 23 July, one
of these tanks Ws.s used Against a machine 61lIl in a cave at
Adelup Point. The machine gun \'!as destroyed and the JapanElse ran out
of a rear entrance, where they were shot down by th<>. infnntry. On 24
July a cave was investigated by throwine into it. The cave con-
tained ammunition which was destroyed the On 28 July the
2d Battaljon, 21st Marines, was hp.ld up by sniper fire from a small
cave on the side of a hill near a quarry. The flame thrower was
fired into the cave, and three Ja-pa.nese ran out. of anothor entr::tnce
where they Were ldlled by infantrymen. On 2(:) July the 1st Battalion,
21st Marines, loca.ted three of the enemy in a cs,ve. Ali i'1terpreter
tried to coax out to surrender, but they refused. Three short
bursts were fired into the cave by one of the tanks. The Japanese
began to scream and told thl?- interp:-eter that they WOuld. come out.
2
One was accidently killed. but the rest surrendered.
2
3. The tank battalion commander reported that when
Ltr, CO 3d Tk Bn to CG 3d Mar Div, 12 Nov 44, sub: and
Recommendl?tions on Flame Thrower E4-5 Used in M4,A,8 Tanks by
this BE'.tta11on in Guam Operation. In
- 11 -
modified for \1,8e on tanks, th"'! E4-5 ye.s far superior to the Ml and
MlA! flame throwera and that Table of Organization
for esch tank company of fifteen tanks include of these auxil-
iary t yPe name tlu-ower s . A IRl'ge flp..lTle thro"""r of this type Wa B
not rec oimendea because ther'!'! vould b e a tendency toyarda decreaBing
the tank 1s mobility and a necessity for removior, armament
9t itll1t1on Yiroes Yere reS',Jons1ble for several n:isfire8. l/hen
the fuel vas filled by means of press ure applied to an oil drum,
the safety if it had been idle for several days, would blov
off. Vibretion from tank cauaed the J Oints on the connections
between the pressure cylinder and t he fuel tank to If'ak. The gun for
the 01-5 1o(orJr::ed veIl, except that the insulation burned off the spB rk
plug vi res on a fe", of t he guns and the gas trigger vas not so designed
that it would close .... hen releesed 'b;r the Op<!rator and, therefore, re-
3
qulred unnecessary manual
B. Peleliu (15 - 30 Sentember 1944)
The E4-5 flame throw'!'!rs next employed by the 1st Marine
Division on PE'leliu Island. These flame throvere v ere not used
extenSively during operation because of the mechanicel dif-
ftcultip-s pncountered. The Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps,
3
ill.!!.
- 12 -
in tP..at if main armament flame throwers. similar
to the ones furnished by the Navy (Navy Mk I) during the operation.
we!'e developed, he belie"!ed that all operational justification for
the E4-5 flame thrower would cease to exist. Among the deficiencies
noted were: (1) All flame throwers vere unserviceable upon receipt,
because all safety heads were zet at 250 pounds pressure per
inch instead of 500 as required. This deficiency wes corrected dur-
ing period prior to combat. (2) Twenty-five percent
failures of elements on blower assemblies due to fracture
were experienced, r esultinf' in Jalll!!led blowers and burned out blower
motors. (3) Fifty percent of the pistol grips broke. and nush roc!s
bent out of alignment because of exposed mounting. (4) Twenty per-
cent of ignition fuel lines clogged. even though the ignition
fuel was strained through chamois and silk. (5) tension wiring
shorted out due to melting of inS11lation by barrel heat during train-
1ng, but this deficiency vas remedied, prior to combat, by vrapping
4
tape around the wiring.
c. Iwo Jim.? (landing 19 February 1945)
In order to equip the tank battalions of the three Marine divi-
SiODS scheduled for the lwo Jim'3. Operation. the V Arnphi bious Corps
obtained fifteen of the twenty-five gallon units,being made by
4
Hist CWS Mid Pac, Vol. III. Annex II cl, Ref 157.
- 13 -
The Central Pacific Base Command for the Tenth Army, and made bow
flame guns for the units in their own shops at Oahu. (ltg. 2.) The
Marines objected to the periscope mount because of the hole drilled in
the perisoope ring, which vas vulnerable to Japanese magnetic mines and
the gun, they said, mounted in such a position, was vulnerable to gren-
5
ades. They reported that, upon ignition, the ship of the flame gun
in the operator's hand caused a 10s8 of several seconds of fire. In
addition, the wide traverse of the perisoope gun was reporten to dis-
courage infantrymen from giving close support to the tank in combat.
6
The 4th Marine Tank Battalion was equipped with twenty-four 14-5 flame
throwers. These proved valuable despite limited range and fuel
capacity. After the operation the 23d Marine Regiment recommended
that &11 tanks, except the J'I&in name thrower tanks, be equipped
7
with thi6 type flame thrower. However, the 4th Marine Tank Battalion
reported that the current allowance was adequate.
8
The 5th Marine Division was equipped with two E4R2-5R1 flame
throwers per tank platoon. It waB said that these weapons would have
been most effective during beach operations, but, due to faulty igni-
tion, they failed to function when needed and were not used again in
5
6
7
Memo for file, Office of Cml 0 POA, 31 Oct 44, sub: Flame Thrower
Demonltration, 31 Oct 44. In Bist OWS Mid Pac, Vol. III, Ref 70.
Armd F Bd, Rpt of Conference on Mechanized Flame Thrower,
23 Mar 45.
4th Mar Div, Opns Rpt, Iwo Jima, Annex F. RCT 23.
8
!ill . .Annex J (4th Tk Bn Bpt), 18 Apr 45.
- 14 -
Figure 2.
9
the operation.
The auxiliary type tr..rower would undoubtedly ha.ve been
used a great deal more at Iwo Jima had it not been for the presence
10
of main armament flame throwers which proved more effective.
D. Byu.kyus Operation (1 - 21 June 1945
1. Prepare.tion. After considerable study the Tenth Army, on
12 September 1944. stated its requirement for mechanized flRJlle tr.row-
ers. requirement included 8 minifllW'l of one 9Ild a marlfllW'l of
two periscope-mounted auxiliary type flame throwers per medium tank
platoon to be utilized in the operation, or total of either eigrty-
eight or 176 flame throwers of this type. It was stipulated that
the flame gun be an added weapon, utilizing a tank not to exceed a
twenty-five gallon caoacity, which should preclude the for
any material reduction in the ammunition carried for the primary
weapons of the tank, and that the periscope flame gun should be
capable of being mounted or from wi thin the ta'1.k while it
11
was "buttoned up." In J'uly 1944 the Chief, Chel'lical .arfare
Service. reported that the periscope mount flame gun for twenty-
9
Armd F Rpt on the Construction of Flame El2-7Rl,
Me.r 45. In
10
Act Rut, 3d M?..I' Div Reinforced, Iva Jima.
11
1st Ind 470.71/3 (G-3), 12 Sen 44, on Ltr, USAPOA to CG
Army, Aug 44, sub: Requirements for Vehicular Haunted Fla'lle
Throwers . In P.ist CWS Yid Pa.c, Vol. III. Annex II cl, Ref 26.
- 15

five gallon E4 fu!"1 unit "'as ct9v"l10';'ment. Based on this
informe, tion Chief Chemici'll Officer, POA, wrote a letter in which
he outlined the for throwers for use in
the Pacific, and requested information as to the status of supply. The
reply, dAted 13 September 1944, stated that it was not anticipa.ted
that the periscope mounted flame gun, designated the E6Rl, would be
available befort'll March 1945 and, furthermore, th?.t the twenty E4-5
flame throwers requisitioned in December 1943 would probably not be
13
delivered before 15 Janua.ry or 1 March 1945. It became evident,
therefore, that if Tenth Army was to be equipped with flame throwers
for future operations, they would ha.ve to bp. manufactured in Hawaii.
In August 1944, pictures and drawings of a periacope flame gun which
had been developed from e. modi f1 ed MlAl gun at Fort Knox, Zt'ln tucky ,
e,rrived in Oahu. Armed with these pictures and drawings, a "Seabee"
group constructed a demonstrat i on model, using the E4-5 fuel unit.
Experiments showed that by bendinr. a. piece of met&l tubing and at-
taching e ffPark plug and electrodes, in place of the rather cumbersome
hydrogen igni tion system of the gun, the high tension
spark electrode could be by with the storage ba.ttery
in the tank. The bent tube could be produced at Peerl Harbor and made
into a gun which c ould be installed and removed without much
difficulty. Pressure and fuel units were turned out at Pearl Harbor.
12
CWS T of Opns Ltr 16, 12 Jul 44, p. 10.
13
1st Ind, Spe 44 on Itr, CWS 470.71, eml 0 PCA to C CWS (Attn:
AC CWS for Fld Opns), 25 Aug 4.:1., sub: Ta'1k
by NDRC. In
- 16 -
unit as a fuel unit was mounted on the
right sponso'l of the t ?J1.
1r
, to the of' the assi s tant driver's
seat. Tte ppriscope WR S coupled to the periscope by a orjft
Tin I the i passi n? t hrouB"h a on'" and one-half inch r ole
drilled in the per:!. scope ri ne. The ran."e of thi s gun, "'i th thick-
ened fuel, WQ S pnp roxi :'1e.tel y the s r JTle as tha t of the M2- 2
14
flncne
wa s initia ted to mount flnne throwers on tte ba!'ie
of ei f. h teen per stand." r d t &nk battalion, to be errrploy",d by Ten t h
Ar r1y in the Ryuk:lus oper a ti on . I'1 s taJ lation vIEtS completed in
1944 in the I:'.nd 711th Tan1{- Battalions, wh1. c h were
in Oahu, and a tr.l;l.ining program for ene. crewmen
wa s be g'ID. Peri f' COp e t hrowers and a team 0 f one officer and
ei enH s t C' d men were flo,,'Tl to V:"yte for the an c1 ':fJ1k
20th Ar:'1o red Gr o1l!l , XXIV COMS, " .. hic'1 ", ,,,, ro. prep .?,r:i ".[ for
the Ryukyus invasion. in these two bat t a lions wr. s com-
thr01;-lerS in the 7f3'7th Tank w".1 ch w? s n ot to be oy"'d
by Tenth Ar m:! in tte A teAm of f our off \ cers
e.nd f Ot'.r en li r.1 en '.1!l!' sent to to ("on(1:t: ct schools fo" in-
str' ll" to r T; e"'sonnel of the " Ct h Ar mored Gr oup . A totA.l of t',renty-fi.'re
officer s Nl d enli sted were in schools
15
vhich .... e"'" c onc.1l cted betweel'l ." 25 J<>nup. r:l 1945.
14
If'
Hist C\';'S !Hd Pac, Vol. III, Annex II cl, p. 3.
Ltr, Lt Col J A.. rnes E. Fl l1 me Instr'lC'tor ",ea1Tl, OPEC
to CG Corps, 1 :Feb 45, sun: Peri "'rrower
Installation ana. 'Irai:.:" :ls on L'3yte. I n [{ist CWS l-::..ti Pcc, \" 01. III
II Cl. Ref 64.
- 17 -
Scanned
Eighteen p"riscoll e-mounted fle.'!!.'!! throwers ..,,,re now to Ne",
Caledonia for installation in t he 7l 0th Tank :Battalion. The ahip-
ment "'88 &Cco!!m8.nied by !m instal lati on crew of naval offi c er
and fOUT enUsted men , !lIl d a traininf: team of one offi cer a.r..d one
16
enU sted man.
Four of these ba t talions ... ere a ttachAd for the Ryukyus opera-
tion as follo ... s:
706th
?lOth
711th
763d
Tank Battalion
11 II
" "
" "
- 77th Divi si on
- 27th "
7th II
_ 96th It
2. Employmen t. On 9 June 1945, after the operation , Tenth
Army reported that nei t her the p erilcope-mounted flame thro",er nOT
the bow gun. ",ith which the Mari ne di vi8i on8 vere equi pped, had been
emp loyed dur ing the operation. There WAre variou s r eaaons for thia.
It was beli eved thAt the availability of main arnament flame throwera
had eli mina ted the need for amall one s. The 27th Infantry Division
rt'mor t ed that the auxiliary we8!'0ns were not used becaulle 8 CO::1Pa.n::
froo the 713th Providonal ?lame Thrower Tank Battalion, which "' 8S
equ1'oped with main a r mamen t flame throwers, .... as available at all
17
times . OperatoT s reported the ranee on the auxiliary flame
tank va 8 too fue l capacity t oo and that they were
16
Biat CWS Mi d Pac, Vol. II, II cl, p. 41.
17
27th Inf Div. Opns Rpt - Okinava, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 45.
- 18 -
afraid of it because of the increased fire hazard. The 7th Infantry
Divieion prepared over 12,000 gallons of thickened fuel for
18
the 71lth Tank Battalion and brought it into the combat area. In
the early pha.e of the campaign this bat t alion lost three flame
tanka. two of which burned after receiving direct hits from Japaneae
artillery. The flame thrower fuel unit in one of these tanka
burning of the tank crew to death and wounding two. The third
19
tank struck a mine and the flame thrower fuel tank explo cled. New.
of accidents soon spread to other tank battalions and created
a fear of flame throwers. Operators were afraid of
them because of the increased fjre hazard and cO!!lplained that the
range was too short and the fuel capaci ty too small. Some of the
tank men emptied their auxiliary flame throwers ancl. had no intention
20
of using them.
The 7th Infantry Division reported that Japanese medium and
heavy artillery was the principa.l anti-tank obstacle on Okinawa. A.
great deal of accurate direct and indirect hits were received by the
tanks. In one company every tank was put out of action or destroyed
by this devastating fire. Radiators were punctured, suspension
destroyed, gun tubes damaged beyond repair, final drive housings were
18
7th Inf Div, Opns Rpt-Ryukyus Campaign, 1 A:pr-21 Jun 45.
19
20
711th Tk :En, Action Against Enemy Rpt, Ryukyus Campaign,
1 Apr-30 Jun 45.
Ltr, OmI 0 Tenth Army to emI 0 CPEC, 9 Jun 45, sub:
Throwers. In Blst CWS Mi d Pac, Vol. III. Ref 114.
- 19 -
broken, and in two cases flf>.:ne throwe r s and burned their
crews to del'J.th. The only defense against artill e ry attack wa s ma.in-
21
tenance of maximum defilade. An indica ti on of the dan&er of fire
1n tanks 1s obtained by analyzing the losses of the 706th Tank Battal-
lion which supported the 77th Infen try Divi si on during the operation.
Twent y-six tanks in this battalion werg cOTIPletely destroyed, six by
satchel charges, four by mines, and sixte"! n by anti-tw.k gun'lnd artil-
lery fire. Of the fifteen t hat burned, t hirteen burned after being
') ?
hit by artillery fire end two burned a : ter strik1n{" mines."''''' It is
!'lot known how many of the tankA, if any, contained filled flame thro\"ers
at the time, but it is kno ... m tha t after this camnaign bot h th" battalion
and the 77th Division were strongly opp osed to auxili a ry flame
3. Lessons Learned. It is possible this weapon did not get
a fair trial at Okinawa oecause of the prejudices buil t up against it
during the ea rl y part of t he operation. H01Vever, it was eclip sed by
t he much mor e spectacular an d effective main armament flame t hro .... 1ng
tank. After this c !?mpai gn, t he Comma ndi ng General, XXIV Corps, ex-
pressed the opinion tha t the auxiliary flame thrower should be t aken
out of the tanks and the main armament flame thrower establi shed as
a si nrle purpose weapon. He explained t rili t the average tanker is gun
21
7th Inf Div, Opns Rut, Byukyue Campaign, 1 Anr-21 Jun 45.
22
706th Tk Bn, Ryukyus Opns Rpt, 30 Jun 45.
- ;::.0 -
consci ous as a result of his eb.r l:,- t 'rRi ni n;:' , and. that .. ould resori
23
tv t he use of the gun wh9n he shoul d : 0 on n mitzion . Af ter
the divis ion i s exper i enCA at Oki na .... 2. . Comnandlnf; Ge'1.oral. 77tt-
I nfantr:, Division . a.le,o favored the empl oy:n9nt of armore d flarn 9 t hr o ... :-
ers as a rrhl'lry "eanon . He felt tha t the adcH t i c!'!. of the auxiliary
type flame thrower an extra fire
t anks equippec. ... ti th 8:::. 11 thro\o'er exploded and
24
eve:". tank \ot3,S not :::'I enetrated. Frior to the e:1.d of
the operation , Ten th ArIl1;"-" r eq..J.es t ed ir:llnedh"te stiplllcn t of fv::- t y
t al".ks f r om Oahu and thirty fr om the Uni ted to rep lace co:nbat
losses. The que stion B.!'OS9 a t the Ce:-lt,rel Pacific Cor,:,:::a."ld a s t o
whether or not flema thro ..... shoul d installe:l ir. a n:," of these :s.nks.
This questi on .... as r eferred t o Tenth Army , ..... ':. ich t !'>.at i t did not
wan t any of t be tanks equipped '..;ith fl3.:lle ..:.se he.a.
be en cade of the weapon .
E. Soutr.W' est Paci fi c Area
1. Suppl y 5itup. ti on. Aiter attecpt to empl oy
modified Kl..Al flame throwers 0:1. l,!arine tanks in ... :Dri tain opera.-
ti on (Dece:nber 1943- J:'!nua ry 1 t dec t<le d to a\'s i t tr.e arr1 val
23
Rpt , Lt Col '1/11 11 am R. Maull (C1.lS Re-oresentative on the Bor den
Missi on) , to
Tab B. p. 8 .
I..l!! .. p . 9 .
C C',{S, 28 Sep
I n
45 , sub: 'Rell ort of Offtci a l "'rt'vel ,
- 21 -
of mechanized. tr..ro .... srs from the United Statel. In June 1943
CHef. Chel'!'ica1 Warfare Service, reported thAt several agen.cies
had been working on the development of armored flame throwers for
some time and that one model was almost completed. This weapon was
25
said to havp- a of over 200 yprds. This first report was
followed, in October 1943, by e. which st p,.ted that completion
26
of the first "''<..6 exp"!cted during the current month. In
Decemb9r 1943 the Chief Officer, USASOS, requested informa-
tion from the Chief, CWS, on the status of deve lopment of the Q
Model flame thrower, and was thn t t h is nodel had been desi g-
nRted as the E-7 for installation in M5 field tests h2d dem-
onstrated that :' he ex-oerimental .. n. s t oo C'.l:ncE'rsome and it was
now expected thRt it would be [1 consiiterable beforE' the weapon
would be available for combat
27
In January 1944 the Chief, C'.l5, use.
reported that worv:: on tank-moun ted flame throwers was progre 5si ng
rapidly with procurement authori7.ed for eighty units, to be kno ... as
the E-5 flame thro'.""r. It was believed that the first eif,hty E--5
flame throwers would be completed by the latter part of Ja.n.uery 1944.
Further information Was furnished to the effect th8t weapon was
desi(":ned tc o?cra.te in the A.nd M3Al light tanks. end in the M4A2
medium tank. In March 1944 a rer ort from the Chief. described
25
CWS T of Cpns Ltr 2 , 14 Ju..r. p. 7.
26
GW5
IT'
of Opns Ltr 6, 8 Oct 43, p. 5.
-
27
Memo GSCW 319.25, Cml 0 USASCS to C CWS, no sun; 1st
Ind, 28 Dec 43 . GSCi'i 319.25 . In
- 22 -
the E4-5 auxiliary type thrower, and stated thAt limited pro-
28
curement had oeen approved for the South Pacific. Based on thil
information, the Sixth ArIllY, in Karch 1944, submitted a requisition
for fifty E4-5 unita.
29
These weapons were requisitioned on the
basis of one per mediu.'T1 tank platoon. In July 1944 the eMef, CWS,
reported that no throwers had oe en to
date, out the E4-5 vas in the process of oeing standardized
30
and that Bome had aIr p.ady been shipped to active t ::.':'cters. In
August 1944 a thrower team, consisting of three CWS officers,
visited Sixth Army units and installed one E4-5 flame thrower, which
had brought along for demonstration 'Jur:'J0ses, 1n a surplus tank
of 603d Tank Company, 1st CevAlry Divisi on . The flame thrower
vas demonstrated to officers of the Sixth A.rmy. After the de"1onstra-
tion the requi 5i tion, had. been submi tted in was folloved
up in the hope of assurinf' del1v"!ry before the FhiliTlpine invasion.
Inforl!lbtion' we s received th&t delivery could not be ma de for
It wes then l oarned fifty E4-5 flame throw,:,rs had been received
in the South Pacific Area, and that it might b
o
possible to obtain
ten of them for units in the Southwest Pacific Area. I Corps re-
quested ten of trse flame out the request was turned down
on the oasis that they were needed by units in the South Pacific
28
CWS T 0 f Opn s Ltr 11, 9 Mar 44, p. 6.
29
30
31
2d Ind, 0 Sixth Army to C Cml 0 USASOS on Itr, A5et C
for Fld Opns to C Cml 0 USASOS, 9 Aug 44, sub: Flame Thrower
'!lank Development by }TURC. In C!f.LWG.
CWS T of Opns Ltr 16, l? Jul 44, p. 8.
Ltr, Cr.ll 0 USA.SOS to Cml 0 I Corps, 21 .AU 44, no sub. In CgL'r'I'G.
- 23 -
The 603d Tank Company took its fla'll'>. throwe-r in to t'lt
did. not get li..n:'.oaded in for the assault and was unable to use
it after the fighting started in the terrain. There is
no record that thi s flame throl.;er WI'lS b"Jfore the company
reached Luzon. In 194!'5 tho Chief, CHS, reportee!. tha t a. fairly
substantial nuober of E4-5 flame throwers had been shi np ed to active
theaters and that the Marine Division had used them with success
32
on Guam. In April 1945 the first shipment of twenty-five E4-5
flame thro'r" crs prrived in the Southwest Pacific Area and, in view of
the pending invasion of Kyushu, were turned over to Sixth Army for
combat testi llf! in st8#'es of the Luzon operation.
2. Ernploympnt. 'tlhen XIV Corps joined Sixth Army in Luzon it
'brought with ita tank battalion ,,hich. h".d been e quiTlned wi th E4-5
throwers in the South Pacific Area. These flame throwers were
uS"Jd successfully whil"! th"! t were sU!lnorting the 37th Infantry
Division durinr the house-to-hou se fiFhtin[ in Manila. In one par-
ticular instance, a flam"! thrower, within a few minutes, success-
fully neu trali;> ",d a barri c:: ded b'.li1 dine; which hl:\.<1 defied the in fentry
for two days. The 603d Tsnk Company also employed its flame
33
thrower in actions in and around Manila. This flame thrower was
usee. effecti vely to burn 8.way underbrush and thus spe'3d the ad.vance
. 34
of the division.
32
CWS T of Opns Ltr 21, 31 Jan 45, p. 22.
Rpt, eml 0 Sixt)1 Army, Luzon Opn, 9 Jan-30 Jun 45. In CMLWG.
34
Ltr, Cm1 0 1st C/?v Div to Cml 0 Sixth Army (Thru: Cml 0 XIV
Corps), 14 45, su1,l: Rpt of Activities, pp. 1-4. In
Sixt!' A Cml Records, 37J .8 luzor"l Opn IQ ts, ORB.
- ,?4 -
',/ hen the shipment of E4R?-4R3-5Rl f18>me thro,,'ers erri ved_. I
Corps beg a'1 installing- one weapon !)Br t :m": p latoon in t he 77 .5th TAnk
Eat t eli on. The Assi stan t Che!"ical Officer, Infa.'1 try Di_v i si on,
three enlisted men of the 183d Chemical Service Platoon, who h?d
hA.d exnerience in Guadalcanal in installinr: this flame tl'u'ower in
tanks, we r e made available to the tank 'tat tali 'm to assi st in the
work. After the flame throwers had been installed, a three-day school
""8S eon-ducted in the bA. t talion to train operators, ",n.inter.aDee, :mo.
service men. When the school ended, the moved out

for c onbat testin{" of the .... eapon. At t hi s time I Corps troops were
fi gnting in the Sierra Madre l--'ount:1ins and fe' .,' oI'portuni for
er:;ployment of tanks. Th'? batt plion first u sed the we9.'Don on 27
April 1945. The 2d Plp-toon, CO::1pany E, 77."ith Tank Battalion, was
supporting the 3d Battalion, 129th Infantry 37th Division. After
the cepture of the city of Baguio, the 3c. Battalion proceedec_ north
along the Ba,e::uio-':'rinid a d road. Xcmy caves containin(! anti-tF.lllk guns
and shipers \'rere encoun tared in the hi 11 s ?lonf, the road end the
platoon follo'tlred the usual polrey of sending two tanks in front of
the i nfantry. These t?>nks !J1ac hin3 gunned a nd c a ve openinfs
8.nd any suspicions Rreas on the hillsides. On t h!? northern ou tskirts
of Baguio th e second t ank fired six rounds of 7fi-m"1 . and a quan ti ty
of machine gun a!l1lT1unition into h!o "by t,.,o-foot 0pen-
ing in 6 twenty YArds fr om the fr om whi ch sniner fire was
coming. As the tank mo ved past the CAVe opening, a Bp tchel charge

Pers ltr. eml 0 I Corp s to C C"7S, ?n AOT 45. In
- 2!"i -
was thrown which caused a explosion, but did not the
tank, backed up Rnr. fired six rounds of 75-Mm. and
a consi.derable amount of anur.uniti on int.o the c,qve. The
tank moved on but, as the infantry up, they were hp.lted "y rifle
fire from the of the cave, which held them bact for thirty
minutes while a.n M4Al Medium tank, mounting one of the flame
guns, "brought forwa.rd. The f1err.e tank moved opnosi te the cave
and maneuvered into position crosswise of the road. Six short
blasts of flame, estimated at a"bout one-half a tank (twelve gallons),
were fired into the CHve at a range of twenty yards. Two
immediately ran fr0'i1 the ca.ve, their clothes aflame. One was shot
down, "but the other ran up the and turned as if to jump
on the tar.k. He "' A.S killed "by th3 tank's gun fire. The brush and
grass near the cave were set on fire and numerous exploslons occurred
within the cave. After the explosions had ceased the Cave was ex-
amined and the burned bodies of tht .... ty Japanese were found inside.
The artillery and machine gun fire from the tank hPd not "been effec-
36
tive "because of a turn in the near the mouth of the cave.
On ' 30 June, prior to the end of the Luzon operation. three other
flEVlle mi asions were fired b:' the 775th Tank Battalion in support of
the 25th and 37th Di vi sions in I Corn s' zone of a-c tion. The 5'lccess
of t .... o of these missions far to increase the confidence of thi'!
36
USAFFB Ed Rrt 296. IVse of Flame Throwers E4-5 in
Luzon, 27 Aoril 1945."
- 26 -
battalion and the 13th Armored Group in the flame thrower wr i ch
had proved its effectiveness, wbere the tank's other weapons oo.d
37
failed.
3. Comments. Combat tests indicatpd several modlfica-
tiona were necess,<;l.ry before the E4R2-4R3-5R-l would be entirely
satisfactory. Irregula.ri ties in the manu:f' acture caused malfunc-
tioning of the flame gun, and certain components of the assembly
were not dependable. modifications of 8.11 flame throwers
were made at the time of their installation in the tanks, and rec-
commendations were 1mbmi tted to the Chief, Chemical ll[U"fa",e Service,
that these modifica. tions 'be included in future -procurement of th.,.
38
weapon.
One of the most serious defects was ignition failure. Ig-
nition was slow until it was founc'l . tha.t 100 octane gasoline, inste8d
of 60-70 octane, ensured immediate ignition. Plugging of the
atomi zer hole, which ureven ted igni ti on, persi sted, even ",1. th properly'
filtered gasoline, the diameter of tho hole was increased from
.015 to .020 inches. Thiz incr f ase allowed 90 to 100 secondsienitlon
flame, was more than enough to fire the entire load of fifty
39
gallons in three-second bursts.
37
Rpt, Cml 0, Sixth Army, LU7.on Cpn, 9 Jan-30 Jun In
CMLt{G.
38
Ibid.
39
Rpt, Cml 0, I Corps, Oml Cpns a.nd Tech Rpt 2,
9 May 45; pp. 7, 8. In Cl(LiiG.
- 27 -
F. Plens for the Ky'.lsl:u Operation
On 1 July 1945 Sixth Army was relieved of all combat
tions in the Philippines and w.?s dir"'cted to for the Kyushu
operation which was for 1 November 1945. The preparation
of armored forces f or this fell to the 13th Armored Group.
t1 on had been received that the auxiliary flame thro\o!er (the
!4R2-4RZ-5Rl had, by thi s time, been standard17.ed as the M3-1-3) had
not been used extensi Yely either at Iwo Jima or Okinawa of
the pres"lnce of main flame thro",rers. However, intelligence
r9'Oorts indicatQd E! requirement for a great many armored flame
throwers in southern KYushu and of main armament flame
thrower s available wps not Raequate to mQet this FUrther-
more. the experience of the uni ts of the 13th Armored Group wi th the
auxiliary flame thrower on Luzon proved that it was a valuable
when properly employed, and that trained technicians and
could keep it in operating condit.1nn - a decision was
made early in August 1945 to equip each medium tank platoon with
two M3-4-3 flame throwers. The War Department was requested to
equip each medium tank wi th six flame throwers before sh:!.p-
ping them to the thea tar, and sufficient stocks were either on hand
or enroute to the theatp.r . to equip the tanks :"lready assigned to
40
Sixth Army for the operation. Each company was also to be
40
Rpt Lt Col William R. (C\:S Repres8ntp, tive on the Borden
Mission) to C C'IIS, 28 45, sub: Report of Official
Tab III, pp. 33-35. In
- 28 -
e4ul pped ... lth one Bervie'" kit and ooe fue l fi lli ng ld.t, t-UO .
I n addi tion, each chemical servi ce platoon was to be equipped
with tr.e '<its i n or der to be to s ervice tanks at tached
to the divisions .
The 13t t Group instituted a tralnlnp to
ensure adequatel y trai ned end operators , ani the
Warfare Trai ning a t Manila establi shed c la88e8
to trein t echnicians for both the ar mored fo rces and the chemical
service platoons. Bulk fuel mixing wss to be done by the chemical
service platoon a of divisions to vhich th!i tank units were
attached. .&1 so , these cheni cal servi ce platoons were re qui red
to train maintenance mechanic s, ... ... aul d a ssist the tank
when
I n addition to the M3-4-3 on
tanks , the 11. 3 f uel tank 8..'1:i pressure bo ttle, ... i th
pressure reduc ing val ve s end gaUes a8 ori gi nally desi gned for
spcngon mounting in medium tanks, ... es teinf?: :nO'o.lnted or. MlAl
4. 8- inch mort ar cart . The ho se extensi on end the
flame gun from the E4 manifo l d kit were being on this
I t was planned to of ur.its to infantry
b@ttall on desiring such equi pcent. Requests had already been
made cy several dIv1sions be fore Japan for peace .
- 29 -
G. Mediterranean Theater of Operations
American made mechanized flame throwers were not used in Italy.
None were ever requi8i tioned by theater end. there was a general
feeling that no military requirement existed for auxilisry type
tank flame thrower. AftAr tho Sicilian CampAi gn Patton,
tnen commanding the Seventh Army, reported that he considered such
a weapon to have !!o tactical value. Furthermore, he doubted that
a larger flame thrower, with a lOO-yard would have any tacti-
41
cal in future operations. Such reports from the field de-
layed development of a sui table mechanized flame thrower in the
United States and contributed to the fact that no military require-
ment been established in - time to meet the needs of the Pacific
area8. In September 1944, two units of an early model, the E4R2-
4R3-6Rl which Was designed for installation in tanks, was
flown to ltaly for demonstr a tion to interested persons in the
theater. These units were inst a! l ed in tanks of the 6th
:Division, and tested in a simulated attack by infantry and engine er
42
uni ts. }to requirement for such a weapon was indicat.ed. The
consensus was that no mechanized flame thrower th&t replaced any
of the tank's armament or that had a range of less t han 100 yards
43
Was desired. This opinion was probably influenced by the fact
41
42
Rad, Patton to CO NATOGSA. 10 Sep 43. In MTOUSA eml records,
470.7l-Apr aratus f or Usi ng . ORB.
OW'S f of Opns Ltr 20 , 30 Nov 44, p-p. 5- 6. I n CML,'/ G.
43
Ltr, New Developr.1:mts Div, (Office of Inspector General) to
OC C\'/S, 5 Apr 45 , sub: Me mo .Gen Waitt t o Col Lane, 16 Mar 4!'i,
Re: Visit to I n CmI C Seh files - Smoke.
- 30 -
that British Cr ocodiles had begun to arrive in ltal7 in
.,
1944 for uae 'by the British Eighth Army. liter a ser ies o.t
conferences hel d on the subject of mechanized thrower. ,
r eported in 1 944 thAt no re-
quirement existed for an auxiliary type flame thrower. To aupport
this deci8i on , the fact was cited the Germans had not been
9ucces::ful in t hp. e!:i' loyment of tan\e-mounted fl e.rne throvers, and
that, wit h the exception of a brief 1n combat,
oper6ttons in I tal y vere mos t unfavorable for the u.e of tanks
becp-use of the e%tremely mountainous terrain. Hoveve r , it was
that, givon a less a defi nite re-
qulrement existed for a lilai n armament flame thr o..,er for use
45
against cer tain defense methods of the enemy.
ii . Eur opea!'I Thee.t! r of Coeration .
1. Requirement Established end Receipt of Shipmenh. On 28
and 29 J une 1943 a flame thr ower conference wa s r.eld at Duobarton
Oaks . MarvlAnd, at which the st atus of t he mechanized
flace thro ... er we s revi ewed. Reprs Ben ta t1 va s from Canada, Gr es. t
Rist Monogra.ph (Eritish) III, Flar.le ';{ar!are , p. 81. In
CMLWG.
Ltr. C Cell 0 t o C C'5 .
Tan k Developl'1ent by NDRC .
ORB.
14 Dec 44, sub: Fl ame
In records, 470 .71.
- 31 -
Britain. and the United attended and pooled the
of their armies. It was brought out that the Russians exce8ded the
other Allied countries in mechsnized thrower and
46
that the United State s lagged hehind the Briti ah and Canadians.
Intensive for the of Europe was initiated
after the Dumbarton Oaks conference and there was a rather
general feeling that the mechanized thro\ver It:ou1d prove valuable
against the defen s es. HavinE, no suitable flame weapon of their
own, the United States Army was willing to accept the British Croco1ile
47
trai 1er HCMever, the usinp,' arms could not agree on an accept-
a"ble typo. and for lare mechanized flame throwers soon
di ed down. 48
The Armored then requested the Chemical Warfare
Servi ce to c oncer..trate on developi nc; and Tl'r'ocuring a n au;r:ili<>r y type
49
In March 1944 the CO!r.r:a:1din.: General, European S;h9at'3r, re-
quested on'? unit, cor::rp19te Hitr. accessories anc i n structions for
installation. was also as to how soon 100 units could
47
48
){AR, Great Britain No. (; 0315, 6.':l2-B-4026 , Notes 0:1 Flame
'I'hrower Confer'mce at Dumbarton Oaks, June 28-'29. 1943 , dat9d
2S Aug 43, Incl 1. In
Pers ltr, Cr.1l Advisor G-3 SHAEF to Bri f Gn Alden H. ',laitt, Asst
C CWS, 22 Jul 44, no sub. In
Rpt, l-taj E. ',;. Hollingsworth to P:c e s Ar mc F Bd , 4 Nov 43, sub:
Report on rrip to Secure I nformati on on Flame
49
Ltr, GEOFJ3 P/508, Armc. F Bd to CG Armd Cmd, 3 Fet 44. In CML'dG.
- -
be made avail able. In reply to this reque.t. it stated thP. t a
comp lete E4-5 model could be shipped by Aprtl and that delivery of
100 units could be made on 1 J une. Del i very of 100 ESRl-5 un its,
for installation in 1i r ht t anks, could be made on same dete.
However , on 31 May the theater requested shipment of the
fir st unit, whIc h had been promised for April. Thi s reque st was
followed on e June by another request for priority on p r o-
duction of the 100 Jl!4- 5 uni ts for irn!'nediate operatlone.l use . The
firs t unit was finally shipped by air on 12 June. fo llowed by a
second s hi pment of f our ur.its on 20 June . remainder of the
100 units war. promised fr om Jul y production , provi ded difficult ies
ro
I n production did not increase .
The first un1 t received ..... as installed at once In a mediu:n
tank demonstra ted to interested of Ge neral
F!f"e.dquartere . Alt hough it l ooked "posi tively pFlthetic" wh!!n dem-
51
onstrat ed the CrOCOdile,
it was kno ... .rn to bE" in production ,
end First Army i mr.ledl atelr i ni tint ed a r eques t based on ni ne per
medium tank battali on .
52
Thie request was i n Supr eme
pendi ng furthe r demonstration of t hp weapon 'by t",'O officers
50
51
S2
Reds , 9 44 , C!t- OUT-6014 , 15 Y.A. r 44, CX-IN-2::Z:S27 .
31 !.:8Y 44 and 9 JW1 44.
Pers ltr, C C':'l l 0 EroUSA to Asst C C'i/ S for !'ld 20 Jul 44,
In CHL,iG.
Ltr. CG ruSA to CG 1
for H4 Seri es Medi um Tank .
t us . AGO ORB.
O::; S7!1S
Jul 44, sub : Flame Thr ower
12th A Gp rec or ds , 470 . 71-Appara-
whom the War Department had lent to the theater for that purpose.
At the request of the Commanding General, Army Group, a
demonstration was given in Normandy on 23 August for representative.
of the First and Third Arm! e8. The equipment functIoned perfee tl7.
giving an effective range of from forty to fift7 yarde. The fuel
was contained in a twenty-five gaJlon sponson tank and a twenty-
five gallon tank to give a total capacity of fifty
gallons. The sponson fuel tank replaced seventeen rounds of 75-mm.
a!llllluni tion.. The flame gun on thi stank wP,s interchangeable wi th
the bow machine gun. In the demonstration the tank
parallel to a hedgerow covered with vegetation, while bursts of
ignited thickened ..... ere fired at intervals. Quite a lot of
the flame penetrated the hedgerow and it was conceded that the
flame would cause anyone behind the hedre to flee from his position,
if he had time to do so. The two officers from the War Department,
who demonstrated the weapon, stated that there were 150 of these
flame throwers available in the United States and that production
..... as under ..... ay.53 Raving witnessed this demonstrati on, the armored
units of the Centrnl Group of Armies on 6 September 1944 established
an immediate requirement for 333 units, and General Bradley requested
immediate delivery of the 150 available units and delivery of the
remainder at the earliest possible date. This requirement wAs
53
Hemo, OmlO to ACofS G-3, 12th A Gp, 25 Aug 44, sub: Fle..'!le
Thrower Demonstration. In 12th A Gp records, 470.71-
AGO
- 34-
based on hine flame throwerft per medium tAnk battalion or one
per platoon.
54
General Bradley's request was by
Eieenho\'fer on 8 September and th"! items requisitioned from the
United States with a "Oriority for fast water
Representatives of the J1rst Army were not too pleased with
the effectiveness of the E4-5 flame thrower, but they decided to
accept the weapon, believing that they could have delivery on them
in time for use against the Siegfried Line. When First Army units
entered Germany on 11 the need for mechanized flame
throwers was tremendously increased. At the Army's request,
:!Ili senhower re.dioed the New York Port of to expedi te de-
livery of the weapons. In the meantime, First Army had installed
the four units, received the first part of July, in the 70th Tank
Battalion and haQ conducted a achool to train men in their operation
and employment. The deadline for delivery of flame throwers to the
First Army, which l'1..ad been given top priority, was late October
when the against the Siegfried Line was scheduled to resume.
On 25 Sep tember the New York Port of Embarkation was imformed that
total requirements through 31 December would be 630 units, and that
a total of 1,012 would be required by the end of January. Delivery
54
55
Ltr, CG Central Gp of Armies to CG Com/Z (Forward), 6 Sap 44,
sub: Flame Thrower. In Army Gp records, 470.71-ipparatus.
1st Ind, 8 Sap 44 on ltr. CG TJ SA to CG ETOUSA, 1 Jul 44,
sub: Mechonlzed Flame Thrower E5Rl-5 for M4 Series Medium
Tank. In 12th Army Gp record.s, 470.
- 35 -
of 450 units early in Oct()ber wp.s urgently requested.
56
first shipment of fifty flame throwers in
Britain about 10 October 1944. Group requested that
units be flown to the Continent and allocated as follows:
thirty to First Army, three to Third Army, and seventeen to Ninth
Army. General Patton had never established a for these
flame tr..rowers, and the three un! ts allocated to Third Army were for
57
test purposes only. On 14 October, Zone informed
General Bradley1s Headquarters tha t fifty more of the first order of
58
150 units were to arrive on the Continent on 20 October.
By 5 November the fifty units had arrived at Army, where
it Was discovered that the transmission fuel tanks had not been in-
eluded. It was immediately by radio, thp. t thirty be flown
59
from the United State s. Washinf, ton ,called the theater by te1eyhonc
to that the tanks had not been with the
flame throwers oecause t he;! wer e not yet of: the production line.
Fir st A!'r:; ... ;a s a1 so tol d trlr!t spon son tanks could no t be conver ted
56
57
58
59
(1) Rad, CIt.-IN-14345, 15 Sep 44. (2) Rad, Com Z E'IOUSA, Action
Femc&rk, KY. Info to: AGWAR, 12th Army Ref lTO Ex 50119,
25 Sap 44, sub: Throwers, Mechanized, In 12th
Army Gp records, 4
7
1).71-Apparatus.
Armd Sec, 12th Gp for CWS G-4, G-3, 12 Oct 44, sub:
Flame Throwers ];4-5. In l?th Army Gp recorc.s. 470. ?1-Apparatus.
Rad., Co:n Z ETO:: SA, C',oIS, signed Lee, to 12t:-: Army Gp Ref No
EX-54458 , 14 Oct 44, sub: Throwers E4-5. In 12th Army Gp
records, 470.71-Apparatus.
:aad, FUSA to 12t h Army Gp, I nfo to: Com Z (Fwd), Pef No C:S-5283,
5 Nov 44, sub: 'l ransmi ssion Tanks for E4-5 Flame Tr.rower. In
12th Army Gp records, 470.71-A,"'lparatus.
- 3E -
fate
S'!IP'lE1ITS IlF FLM:E T! IRDrl'llS AlW
SERVICE KITS TO ETO . (ABSTRACTED rno'.' T'lli FI LES OF
OC Cl'S, SUPPLY DIVISION, STOCK COI!TROL BRANCH)
Uni ts Shipped
. . .
. r an 5 ::n. on
with Sponsrm ruel Gr o1.lps
Compl't,1;!
!J nits ! L\ fOl 'Jroup Shipped
ELJl2- 1."J- 5Hl (F4.'<2) on I:,' ..
f1: SK
..
" .i.

he.narks
12 -Jun 44 1 Flown to Lnndon .
20 Jul 44 4
2
18 Sep L.4 50
10) to i n
';:J Sep 44
5C
10) telephone c on_
28 Se p 44 50 10) of
5 44.
10- 17 (l c t 44
30 6
64 14
30 Oct
10 rov
44 151 To cC':':Jplet,p.
above uni ts.
13 Nov 1,4
50 10 94
17
15 flov
44
61 12 57
12
5
LeC 44 25
5
')
Sec
44 50
8 DEC
44
25
5
20_28
f.ec
44 50 10
15 Jan 45 33 13
19 Jan 45 75
27 Jon
45 5C
12
3

45 26
19- 24 :far 4 5 25 8
(21
45
136 44)
Held at Port
-
not sh' poec
Totals : 1. 23 97 303 59
302
:'otal FlaMe
Thr ower s : 726
'fotal Service
Kits; 156
Eote : FT = Flame 7hr ov.'er
o5K = Service , it
- 27 -
to transmission tanks and that the required tanks would be ready
for early in November.
50
The fuel tanks actually left
the United States oy mail ship on 14 November. By middle of
November the first shipment of 150 utl. i ts, 100 of which were scheduled
to arrive in June, was on hand. Twelfth Army Group allocated these
aa follows: seventy-five to First Army, thirty to Third Army, and
61
forty-five to Ninth Army . On 2,? november, Thircl reflectinG
Patton's attitude, indicat e d it could see no
use for the flame ttro"",ers and recomm':mded that the thirty
62
units allocated to them be held in the deoot, subject to call.
Shipments continued to arrj ve in the th<:3.ter until April.
when theater stocks had beyond the demands. The Seventh
Uni ted states Ar:ny, which w.? s op erati ng un der Sixth Ar m;y Group on
the right flanr., received its first shipment of twenty-five flame
63
throwers in the latter part of December.
60
61
62
63
conversation between Rri {" Gen Hu,sh 'd. Rowan and
Col 'Tor':' ::"'. Gil1 <:t , 5 Nov 44. In CML':IG.
TWX. 12th Army Gp t o CG Cor!'! Z, n.d. In files of C"11 Sect.
9th Army. T-16A, Alloc. & Req. for FT's, C School
Library.
(1) Rad, Third Army, ei ,"'ned Fatton. to CG l2t!; Army Gp, Attn:
G-3, F-1992, 22 l>,ov 44, S'.1'b: 34-5 FlamE>. ThrO\1ers. In
12th Army Gr records. 4
7
0.71-Apparatus. (?) Rad. CM-IN-27889 ,
29 A;pr 45.
Hi st. Rp t. Sec, Seventh Army, 1 Dec - 31 Dec 44. In CML,;G.
- 38 -
2. Installation and Training. The first four flame throwers
received in the Euro-;Jean Theator of Opera.tions ... ere issued. to the
70th Tank. Battalion,First Army, and installed by personnel of the
battalion. Thus, when flame arrived for the 743c. end
747th Tank Battalions. First Army. there were trained men to in-
struct the personnel of those battalions in installing and opera-
64
ting units.
To expedite installation and training. the theater requested
the War Department to send OTer three quali fied junior officers to
asist 1n the tank units. These three officers arrived on 24 November
and were in addition to first two officers. who were gent to
65
the theater in to demonstrA.te the weapon. These five
thrower erperts were then made available to the First, Third, Seventh,
and Ninth Arreies for training pA.rsonnel in the installation
operation of flame throwers. by 20 November all o'ltfi ts
were engered in heavy fifhting installation.and trainine were. in
general. relegated to periods when units were withdrawn
from combat. situation tended not to delay iDstallation,
but to discourage it.
66
64
65
66
Ltr. Actg eml 0 12th Army Gp to Cli'l O's Third and
Armies. 27 Oct 44, Bub: E4-5 Flame Throwers. In files
of Cml Sect. Ninth Army, T-16-A. Cml C Sch Library.
FrO!!! "Chemical \larfare Service Officers on ACtive Duty. it
In OCCmlO, Pers Div, Br.
6th Army Gp, A/A. Rpt, 1 l 'eb 45, for of Nov, p. 3.
- 29 -
On 18 January 1945. Ninth Army reported that of fifty-
five units received. twenty-nine had been installed; nin'e of them
fitted with transmission fuel tanks and the rest with only the
67
twenty-five gallon Gponson tank. A school had been conducted
from 2 to 5 January. at which twenty-one men from the 747th Tank
Battalion had been trained. of the 57tl:. Chemical
also attended this school in order to become
E8
in flame thrower maintenance. with which they wero. chArged.
In the Seventh Army. no flame throwers were received until
the f:rst of the ye"r. an
r
l the tactical si tuation at thCl t time pre-
vented rapid installation. By 23 ?ebruary 1945 only nineteen units
hed been installed. These were distributed as follows: four to the
12th Armored Division, to the 14th Armored Division, three to
the 191et Tank Eattali cln, 2nd three to tr.e 7SIst Tanir "Battali on.
Schools had been held and opentors and mein t enance men had. been
69
trained.
All of the installation ",ork proceeded under severe handLcaps.
The weather was cord and wet, and. freQuently the tanks had to be
67
68
69
Ltr, emI 0 Rinth Army to HQ CO!T' Z ETO (CVIS), 18 Jan 45,
sub: Flame Throvrer, :s4R2-5Rl. In files of
Cml Sect, Ninth AJ"'!1Y. T-16-A, Crr I C Seh Lib.
Sq Army, Office of C'fll 0, 7 Jl'\n 45, "Outline of Flf'...me
'!'brower (E4Rl-5Rl )School. II In
Memo, 2d Lt Alvine R. Irvine for 0 Seventh Army. Feb
45. Bub: Rpt on E4-S Flame Throwers. In Crl Sect, Seventh
Army. 470.71 Flame Thro ..... ers. Fuels No.2. Feb-Sen 45. ORll.
- 40 -
70
wi thdrawn combat so that flame throwers could be insta.lled.
There was a shorta.ge of tanks, and commanders vere adamant
in their refusal to install flame guns at the cost of any of the
71
tank' s t.
Other difficulties, such as mechanical failures and vari ous
technical were encountered when installations were made
in the field. Detailed instructions in the method of installing
the flame thro\"ers were con tained in TB CWl?, Flrune Throwers
Mechanized, E4R2-5Rl and E4R2-5Rl and E4R?-4R3-5nl, dated 16 October
1944, but these instructions were not sufficiently comprehensive.
changes h " d to be made in th'!! interior arrangement o f the
itself, and these were not anticipated in the manual. As a
result, consiCierable time WAS recuired to install a unit. In one
typical instance, installation wa.s at the rate of O!l e and F! hp..lf
tanks p er da;V. This VIP S ::'(lostecl t o t.hree ,)E'r day, however, when
a'1o ther "'elder W!" S errmlo ;ved end ,,,hen wa s con tinued a t n1 ght.
This i!lstallation took -olece in the 701st Tan
1r
kttal1on, :Hinth
Army, with the assistance of personnel from .the 57th Chemical
Maintenance Comnany. Improvised machine work was done by the
70
71
In tervs, Hi st Br, OC wi tl-t Col Gilbert H. '::hite, C',/S,
Off Asst C for 16 Jul 45; with Lt Edwi!l G. Poos,
CWS, Tech Command, Ed8' ewoodArsenal, Hd., 12 Jun 45; and
with Cap t Ja'Tles K. LittYJits, War Plans Br, OC CI'TS,
28 Aug 45.
Ltr, Ci{ Sect ETOUSA to C C1;{S, 7 Feb 45, sub: Information
Required by CWS. mc'w's 400/359. In eMU/G.
- 41 -
72
Illth Maintenance Company. The general procedure laid
down by the provided for installation by Ordnance, under
73
the of CWS. With the exception of the initial in-
stallations, "'hich were by officers from thf" United
the directed procedure was usually carried out. After
installation, the flame throwers were checked and tested by
chemical maintenance compAnies, then turned over to ordnance main-
tenance comanies, "d th CWS personnel assi in the installation
74
when to do eo. There were, however, instances wh",re
installation was carried out by tank ba ttal10ns themselves, wi th-
out assistance or instructions The basis of issue of .E4-5's was
nine each per tank battalion and, although the full issue was 1n-
75
stalled 1n the tanks of some battalions, many of the units were
never installed. Although originally had been insistence on
the twenty-five gallon transmission fuel units, tank crews objected
to it it took up 8?ace. As a result, it usually was not
installed.
72
(1) Ltr, Oml 0, Ninth Army to eml 0 12th Army Gp, 30 Apr 45,
sub: .echanized llama Thrower Activities (E4R2-5Rl). In
CMLWG. (2)Ltr, Cml 0 Army to C Oml 0 l2tr Army Gp,
e JAn 45, sub: Etnd Maintenance of E4-5 Flam'!thrower,
Inc1 3, 22 Dec 44, Report on 31s1t to 57th Cml Maint Co. In
Om.WG.
Memo, ';Ie <:!l0ns Br, F1d Req Div OC CiTS for Tne Div OC CiI'S, 20
Jan 45. In Weapons Br !lles.
74
75
Ltr, ETCWS 400/359, eml Sect ETOUSA to C CWS. 7 Feb 45, sub:
Information Required by the CWS. In CMIWG.
Ltr. eml 0 ETOUSA; iQ Cml 0 12th Army Gp, 83 Mar 45, sub: lI'lame
ThrowE'lr. In tilee of Cml Sect, 'l-
r
1n th Army. T-16-A.. Oml C Sch
Li brary.
- 42 -
By of Li ne Bnd
At tr.t s tt:n!'! it w.? s r enortec. thp t fl Al"e thr owers hpc. been instp..lled
?6
end c!istr1bu+.ed as f ollo .... s :
First
Army
?86t h Tank

"
"
? 46th
" "
Third Army
11th Armored D1 vi 0; 10n
12th
" "
?48th Tnnk
??8th
, ,
Ninth Anny
747t h Tank BEl. t tA.li On
70I e t
"
.,
74:'d
"
"

"
"
?09th
,
"
9 un! ts
3
,
9
"
10 Unit s

,
-
10
"
2
"
9 Un1 ts
9
,
9
"
9
"
9
"
8th AMl ored !:Ii v1. on - 19
,
Seventh Army
14th
?56th
70th
Armored Divisi on -
Ten
lr

II II
17 Units
::t "
9 '
There had been verious difficulties involved in the i nstall-
ati or. and ope r ation of th-e flame thrower. Many of thea.,
?6
Ltr, Rq ETO CWS to C
!leme 1n !TO.
c ETCt; SA. 11
In CML\l G.
- -
A'f) r 45 , sub : E4-5Rl
by field expedients; othert! ... erl!! t o the Chief.
Chemical 'fiarfpre Service. SOT:!" of thes .. "nd their
77
are listed belovo
77
1. H1f:t p ressu!" '3 connection .... as -too close to
body of tank to the proper f1tt! r.G '
.... by an elbow f1tt1n r i n
field.
2. Certain types of tantcs had braces so
that the spon son mount c,;ulc. not be install ed. to
correct this, the was either notched or
3. Rupt ure discs blew out frequently due to
e l ec t rolytic ac '.;ion two Ul'. li kt> ::letala. T\-ls
\<Ies ,,;:o rr '!!ct'!!d by u s i :lg a p l a stic cO'l.t l nr. on the r.iscs .
4. diaphragm failed i n cany
It wa s f elt t h&t the fai l ure was the result
of too severe testi:'l.g durin2: pr oduc ti on. Spare parts
taken from the kit t o correct t h1 s defl ciency.
5. Ga901!.ne ij:'ni tion \' s lves we r e f ound to be
f aulty a t fi r st. '<Jut this d1ffi culty was el101-
nated.
6 . of the gasol I ne nozzle on tho i e -
nl t i on !'lead. "'e,s cut do .. m by p l ac ing a
shiel d 'het'-leen t he fuel :louI e and the i r n1 t l on
no z;le o 'n:is shi e ld 0" .:1.5 placed on all guns sl'li '?p ed
t o the the first one hundred fifty
(1 50)
7. Poor 1
h
:l itl on '-IUS Rlmost enti rely
by the use of the ign1ti on and by
the long el'!!ctrode plub o
!.'ill.
- 44 -
8. Leaky valves on the unit s th":nsel ves c9ue",d
trouble in a 8 03.11 of cases. This wa s
by s1 ::!!i ly replaci ng the !al ves .
9. RoUE;h. hanclinc ctlused the !' ... of fill-
ing man i fol ds for high pressure bot tles. car e-
ful was onl y solut ion to this o r oblem.
10 . Th'!'!"e .... 'as a lac k of spar e ps r ts , vhich could
only be co rrected at the sour ce of supply.
11. Bad fue l wes encountered, due to
cold weather age . wo e corr ected by eddi ng
gasoline to the fuel in the field, 0:' supp lying
freshly mi xed f uel.
12 . NHroe,-en bot tl es bought fr o:n suppl1 c!'s on
the continent l ost prps sur e . i:i th use of air com-
proseot's 1n the field, the , reseurs i n these
ders "" t'.s built up .
13. Due to breakage i n s!-: i'pnen t , about ten
cen t of the uni ts required mE".jor main ten!l.nce work .
TechniCAl tra ining !">.ad c .<l.. rri ed out 'by mAny schools con-
ducted throughout the armiee . The p !'ogram of tra i ni ng in Ninth
Army was tnical: schools l a sting fro:n four to six days \::ere con-
ducted in six of tank battAli ons - the ?Olst, ?09th, ?36th,
743d , and 60 th. lnst n;.ctlon wes given on all phpses of
f1rinIS pr ocedur e , servi c ing , and meintp.nance. Pa rticular emphasis
was given to firing p r oc eu:.u-e , habi t r a t her th:m nenory i s
the facto r to t-
a
r elied upen ... under enemy f1:-e .
A typical school scr.edul e i!; gi belo'W:
- 45 -
!fo. of Drays
t t o 1
1 to II
1 to 3
Subje cts
Gener al fl ow sys tem, of
sQrvi cing operations.
Fl ame by students from . 50- cal.
A4 stand, refueli ng recharging
operat ions. (Average fuel
400 e;allon 8. )
Maintenance c lass (for per-
80nne1 onl y . )
Fi eld work, f iring from tanka against
targets
Cl as se8 at these school s wer e made up of bo\.' b .ln"'t ers , tank
commanders , maint enance men, service men . Platoon sergeant s
and p latoon leaders, although not cember s of the cl a88, attended
instructi on a t ver i ous tl me a.?8 This trainin.;: was not a.1'1ro'a.ys too
f or the final flame thrower traini ng school
l asted onl y two and a half days because the tanks had to move out
to combat.
3. Maintenance and Servicing' Cont inuous and specialized
maintenance was requi red to keep the E4- 5 flame thrower operable
in the field, The t echn i cal deficiencies, which were identified
as characteri st ic of the mAde sp ecialized mai ntenance easen-
tisl. Co nsequently mai ntenance program was set in the various
78
Ltr. Cml 0 Nin th to 0 12th Army Gp t 30 Apr 45 ,
sub: Mechanized Flame Thrower Act i vi ties (E4R2- 5Rl) .
In CMLwG.
- 46 -
armies to ensure proper functioni ng of the weapon 1n combat . These
pr ograms divi ded the work on t he basis of t he capabilitiel of each
79
echelon. I n general , the scheme was as fol l ov.:
(1) Tirst Echelon (performe d by gunner )
(a) Tighten loose connec tions.
(b) Blowing resi dual fuel from ho se
lines .
(2 ) Second !chelon (performed by Tank Battal-
ion Service Company)
(a) Adjusting wir e baffle to divert part
of gasoline from nozzle to spark
pl ug.
(b) Clean1ng snd lubricat ion of gun .
(e) Rep laci ng of spare parte.
(d) Renewing ehctr ic fuze in swi tch box.
(e) I nspecti D bll d replacing diaphragm
aeaembl1ee.
(f) Adj ust i ng gun mechanism.
(g) Charging of fuel and pressuri ng unit s.
(3) Rear Echelon (Ordnance Maintenance Batt.alion
in division; Chemical Maintenanc e
Company for separate tank bat talione )
(a) 111 mac ni ne work.
(0) Rebuildi ng equipmen t.
Higher echel on maintenance was to have been performed by the
chemical mAintena,nce compani es, but the mechani cal and techni cal
deficiencies encoun tered conti nued to such an ex tent that over- al l
79
0 Seventh Army t o 0 each Corps , Div and eech Unit,
Ch.,:nicnl Offrcer' s Ci.rculer LeHer i:o. 7, 20 Feb 45. p . 5.
(2) Ltr, Sq :TO USA CWS to COnI a !:TO, 11 .0;:" 45, sub:
-Z4-5Rl Flame Tl".rower i n E'IQ. Both in Q(LWG.
- 46 ... -
became concentrated in the
For example. i n the Ninth Army t he poli cy wa s to out fl ame
t hr ower mai nt9nAnce teams from the 57th
on an aver age of once ever y t .... ') weeks. The tea.'!! , ....
possi bl e , made necessar y repl ac ements or r epairs on $pot .
81
Thi s type of ser vi ce to the tank battalions , however , was sor.o",wh2.t
limi t ed by a shortage of tranS':)or tati on faciliti es .
t rained for E4- 5 mai ntenance re qui r ed tool s hnd
parts. I n the first shipmen t s these wer e included. wi th each flame
gun. Aft er s ervice kits were supplied t o the thea ter i n the ratio
of one kit t o five E4- 5 units , the fl8lD.e t hr owers wer " shltlped
without tools or parts. Based on in the thea t e r ,
officer s re'"'orted to th-:! Cr.lef, CWS, O!'l.
prOblems which were causad by deficiencies in flame
thrower mechanism. The Che!:li cal ','1er1'arl! S", rvi ce took
step s t o eliminate suc h defi c iencie s and to the necessary
new pRrts or available to the thee. t el' .... hil e ths fl ame
ur.j t s were still be ing in cornbat .
82
eo
81
82
C',,'S Spare Per ts Team
19 Jun 45 , p . 78.
i n the and ZTO, Fi nal Roeport,
In
Ltr , Cml 0 1l1nth Ar C:; to C:'Jl 0 12th Arcu' Gp . 30 Apr 45,
sub : i zed Flame 1'p..ro ... er A ti vi ties (Z4R2- 5Rl ) .
I n ClI, LIrIG .
Ltr. AC C' ..... S f or Fl d Opns t o Cml 0 l :->t"
BUb; :4-5 Mechanized '!hro":ers .
- 47 -
An:.;!' G!l. 7
I n CML',,C.
4. Tactical Doctrine . By the time tha t the E4-5
bad been introduced into the Thea ter , officia l
been published by the t-tar D!'!partment i n Tra ining Ci r cul ar 'Jumber 35,
dated 8 Hay 1944. In gen'!lral. the doc trine s tre ssed' four basi c
principl es: (1) the p r i :nary miss i on of flame t hrowe r s
"'1'1.8 identical with that of t he portabl -e , as a ..,eap on of Dsycholog-
ica l ... erfare to confuse a nd the enemy: ( 2) mechan ized
flAme throwers were to b- used in confo r mity with existi ng doctrine
for the employment. of tPJlks; (3 ) i t wes an p.u:T1l1 p..ry 'Ourpose
wes'Oon , t o u sed on l y in t Rct1cal situp..t1ons .... here other wean ons
not effective: and (4) a s in tank the use of the
mechani zed fl ame wa s severel y li mited by t errain and
weatr.er.
fr om t h .. fiel d rev"! a l thl:l t the fl ame thro"'er exhi b-
ited f ar grea ter p syc hological value i n t han in the Pacifi c.
For examnl e. i n one ac t ion, wherf! t he :!4-5 ' s wer e err:p l oyed , t t.e
flame t hr o.., era to within Qnnr oxi ma tel y 120 ya rde of a
German machi ne gun nes t, but c oul d get no De sp i te t ha t
fact, wa s fired and , although no r ef'. c hed the t ar get,
the Germans surrendered.
In t he manuals which set forth t he doc tri ne fo r t actical
employmen t of t anks , offensive t ank ect jon weB conc eived a. s a
&sSBult or at t Ack, ..,ith p roceedi ng in successive waveg
- 48 -
in co-operation with engineer. infantry, reconnaissance. and
83
artillery elements. the flame gun wes provided as
additional weapon in tank it was so as to
be easily adapted to the prevailing doctrine governing tan":
ilJ'arfare. This objective was accomplished by desiGning the gun
of the 14-5 sO that it was interchangeable with the .30-caliber
bow machine gun in the M4A2 medium tank. The fir5t published
instructions on the E4-5 indicp.ted that the flame th.ro1t.'er gun
and the .Zo-caliber machine gun could interchan:e:ed " .. hile the
vehicle was on a mission. This change could be accomplished in
about one minute. A later technical bulletin painted out that
the flame gun was not intended as a permanent part of the tank's
armament, and that it could interchanged with the 30-ca11 ber
gun by t:he assi stan t driver before, during, or after a mission.
Employment of armor, therefore. was pOSSible without any
in tactical doctrine.
8S
That tanks equipped. wi th flame throwers were used in
accordance with published doctrine for assault by ar Mored units
is attested by a ce.ptured German document enti tled, IIViev; of
83
84
85
FM 17-33, Dec 44, Tank Battalion, Ch. VI, Sect.. II, and
1M 17-36, 7 Jul 44, Supplement No.1, EmplOyment of
wi t h Infan trz.
(1) TECW 2, 12 Feb 44, Flame Throwers E5Rl-5 and
per. 36, p. xi. TC ;:15, p. 1. (3) TBCW. 17, 16
Oct 44, Flame Throwers, Mechanized and E4R2-4R3-
ill, par. 4", p. 54.
USCW Commi tte", ,Report of Readiness for Chemical as
of 1 July 1944, 'P. 55. In C.L'IW.
- 49 -
84
American Combat Hethocls," which 8tated that "in attacking pill-
boxes. two to four tanks fire against the 200 to
300 meters, after which tanka 'Wi t h flac:le thro ... :ers advance and
86
knock out the pillbox." Initially, it was expected that the
87
flame thrower tank would be used against the Sic,f fried line,
and, in accordance with doctrine, they wOllld be used to tlbutton
up" pillboxes, after the engineers nad breached the dr agon' a
teeth and before t he infantry had destroyed the obstacle with
88
demolition charges. With thP..t plan in mind, the 747th
Battalion, one the first to avail themselves of the gt1n,
installed t!'l..ree E4-5' s in each company 's tanks, lito make the
capture of pillbOxes and an ti-tank eli tches eas ier. "89 ";hen the
twelfth Army Group r eceived its first of E4- 5 's, it
appeared that the? would have
ll
inn"U.l'l8rable flame targets," in
the invasion of GermMY and that many woul d. be "improvi sed she l ters
wi th only small arms the r ein which can. be tely taken." 90
86
Report No. 10, ETO, 12 Dec 44.
87.
88
89
Ltr, Dr G. Broughton to OC CWS, 16 Sep 44, 15, In
Tech Li bary, Aeml C, Md.
5th Inf Div, Or ani zati on of As sault S"' cti on ruld Use of
Supporting Arms, (AGF Rpt Ho . ETO 19 Oc t 44,
C, p. 2.
7 47th 11n, AlA R? t, Nov 44.
90
Pers ltr, Crd 0 1 2t h Arm;,- G9 to DC C}S, 7 Nov 44. In
Cl!LHG.
- 50 -
!hroughout Jnnuary therefore, tre ?41th Tank
tactical training, with tank fl nme throwers supportinr.
91
infantry
As a resu lt of experience in the use of flame against spe-
cific loc .!<. l1zed ol:-JecUv'!!s, flp-!lle throwe:- s wer e discover .. d to be
effectivg in up villRges and strong pOints
",' here p.nd rear guards . obtained adequate cover a gaInst
other on,.92 Th 't h t . b tt 11 b "
.. U, er, t e a..'l .': It 3. on wrs r o!:en uOlm.
fOr platoon attachments, to.,' i th !!lechanized !lame thro"!er attached
o.
to ir. fantry battalion of the divisi on. .. ,UthoUh in violation
o f exlstlnp, doctriM g6veorning the '!!mploT'!lent of tanks, tris waS
don '!! ir. ore.er to \',1. th local si twotion!; hich ... ere frequently
,:,!\countered.
5. Fuels ar.d ::ropellants. Range. The :::4-5 was
t o p r ovide the nrmi"s with flame thrower, but it was of
lr.tportance that U:e new apnaratu 8 be ccpsble of f1rlnr. at a
range greatly in 57- CeSS of of the portable tyPes. Tactical
91
7,,7th Tk En. AlA Rpt. Jan 4'.
92
Pers ltr , C Cr.ll 0 E'X)::SA to Ar:" CV/S !'or :F'ld Cpns, 2 Scp
44 lind incl, "!fotes on Trin to Far Shore , '1 dated 26
Aue, 44 , p. E. !n
93
?86th '!' k '3n , MA 45.
- 51 -
planninb for combat of the E4-5 was based on the idea
tr..a t r 'C'nges comparabl", to that of the Bri ti sh Crocodi Ie (approxi-
94
iUf-.. t l y ei ghty Y"l.rds effective renl"'e) would 1:- e obtai ned. ',:1". en
d. e ;;lonstrated to the armies in Europe, the :naximum r an e e of
the "'/ 8a1'on ','N'i f' rer;or ted. as being twen ve ya r ds. The 6?co'1d
demonr trati on \-.'3.S supervised by onp.of the Chemical Warfe.re Service
flame t hrol\' er specialists, f! nd the reported range was thirty-fi ve
95
"", rds. Exten sive field testing was later c 2,rri ed out by t he First
and r :.!".t.'h Armies. In these tests, which were conducted under elmu-
lb.ted combat condi tions. the rJint h Ar m:l r-:roortecl an avera,,;e range
of forty to fifty-five yard s , with a of seventy yards.
In tests conducted by the First Army. approximately 75 percent of
t.:1e ranges were fort:,' ya rds a nd in 58 percent of the tests the
ran?,es .. -;ere fi fty yards or more. In these tests, a thickened
f" ... :, 1 , or a c omt ination of t hickened fuel and gasoline was used.
94
95
17, F Oct 44, p. 5, stated t hat t!1e effective range
was beh., een 50 a!ld 70 yards, Yli th the u se of th:ckened
f u el.
(1) This i nformation was circulated i n Brougr..ton's News
Letter 15, 1 (' 5ep 44, and seems t o h8.ve "be en in
er ror. Dr. Br o-J.f-'hton did. not attend the de mons tra-
ti em . (Interv wit!> : t Col G:l 'J ert White.) (2) In a
Bf A to C Tech :;)iv from AC C:1S for Aaterie1, 9 Oct 44.
the sta t eme!lt \Vas corrected to read tha t th., average
e f fecti ve ranEo; e- \0"'. 8 EO yards a nd 12th Arrrry
Gp, Fir " t Arrny , e.. nd Nin tr Ar oy , acc "':"J tec. the \,' ea-o on
on the "b asi s of the demonstration. In CHIMG.
- 52 -
That ranges were not uniform was to tte tech-
ni c al deficiencies of th. 'O equipment. However, r:mct of tte uneven
p erformance of the t hrower was t o
problems, i.e. incendi ar y fuel. Techn i cal and p roblems
'IIer e ';. he SalDS as t he On es encountered. wi t h n or table flame
but more s orious.
:fuel. Unc.er the combat condi tions which exi sted when
the E4-5 was introa.uced into t he Eillrop e an The eter, it was almost
impossible to mix f uel wit h napalm in tbe Ileld in the <iuantities
required.. There we r e freqaent comp laint s the t fU9l ,.as too t hick
in cold weat her, bo th for filli ng tanks end fo r obtaining
satisfactory ranges. In ins tance in the 70t h Tank Battalion
it took one and e. r.alf r,ours to force just on e qu art of fuel i n to
96
a fuel tanK. On severCi..L occasions, expe riments '' ."re made wi th
unthickened fuels - mo t or oil and gasoline - but t he range obtained
from this type fuel was a lso too sho rt.
97
Moisture caus ed t he
n apalm mix to lose its vi scosity.98 Peptizers were introduced
96
97
98
6th Armd Gp , AlA Rp t, !Jov 44.
Ltr, 2d Lt Tholil9. s ',L Leland , Jr., Office of Cml 0 First
to Cml 0 Fi r s l Army, 30 Dec 44. sub: Flame Ac ti vi-
,ie6 in the 74lst Armd 3n. In
This wa s a standing difficulty in all It wa s
r ep or t e d from CPBe t hat: fiNo factor as
irnportar.t i n a f f ecting the reliabil i of
performance of our present fls."Oe gun. II 43d Cml Lab Co,
The Theory of Flame Thrower Fuels I, 9 Jul 45 .
- 53 -
to e ive the ccnslstency of British "K u type f uel. but t Us solu-
tion t o th!'! p r ob lem added t o the exhtif'.g logi stiesl problems.
3ri ti sh fu.!'!ls ';ere used a l most exclusi vely i n preferenc e t o napalm.
'!"he field tests c.escrihed above were coniuc t!'!d wi t h :British fue l.
6 . Logiotlc s . No t onl y WI' S t he po:>rformance of Bri tish fue l
sat! sfactory . cut it w,:: s 10giz t1cally prefer a.ble for the US
si nce it poured. 'O'esily and wa s supp lied to the field forces ready-
mi xed. I t r equired time to prep"'!.re the- napal m :nix, the mixi ng
equi p!!lent ...... 5 cumbersome. and it was necessary to force it i nto
t1:e fue l
99
U!'.i ts unde:- pressure, even when the right vi scosity was
;>1:tai ned i n t he ;jixin&. A!1othe>r related logi stice.l p robl em was tr:e
p r op ellant wa s ",it!1er c c:;:pre ssed air or nit r ogen. The hi g h pr-ess-
ure in general was t he source of co '"! si derable griE'f in the
c-p crati on of t he thrower. Xi trog"'n c yli nders \-l ere of !:,any
types ',.,it h differe:l t t hrct..':' t. , were oft e n recei ved witr.
1 d h
f h\..' 10C D it
0;[ p ressure , an t , ere no t enougn 0 t e:n on .. anu. e s-p .e
\V' [-Il"n inj.:: & 8.!'.(I. !"or testing t he co ... tonts of cyl ina.ers
99
I!'BC'd 17.
100
(1 ) ttr, eml 0 ia nt\;. to 0 0 lZt h Arr.t;Y Gp . 31 Dec
44 . bub : Report on 'Iour . 26 to 30 Dec 44. (2 ) Lt r, Crr.l
o Hi nth Ar iny to C C'"1 l 0 Ar rr.;; GyJ , 8 Jan 45, sub: use
and of E4-5 Flar:te Thrower . l!'l
CW3. VI I Corps , requested the battAl i ons to turn
in of authori7.ed nitrogen , the 750th could not do so
because they only cylinders. 6t h Armd Gp. A/ A
Rpt. Nov 44.
- 54 -
before usir.6. Ficcidents occurrec:. 'i,il en 0XYF:en-filled cylinders
were not u sed properly.lOl This did not reflect carelessness so
as it did the unfamiliarity of opereting personnel with
servici c.E Breakage of the pressure
hose was and. a s issued. the 1:o so9 ' .. too short for con-
venience.
102
To simplify logistical problems, , it wa s suggested
103
two or three air compressors be p r ocured fron Ordnance.
Solutions to Logistical Problems.. To <,.vo id the cumber-
some method of filling the fuel units. t he flame thrower fuel fill-
inb ki t, E6 , was mFde available for use wi th the mechani z'9d, as
104
well as with the portable flame thrower. source of pres-
sure. hov.ever, WtiS still dependent on the gas c;rlincers. On the
basi s t:r.a t cha rgin" in the :fi""ld ','f i:h. c ompressed air
"'{ould be prefernble to m&intainin[: stoc k s of ni tr og"! n
it Was decided to use comp res s ed a ir \"herever possi'c: l e .
101
(l)uC'.i 17. ( 2 ) It:. one suc!". accident, one member of a ere\';
wa s and several injured. Cml Sect
Ris t Rnt, ' l - Feb In C:,;L'dG.
102
Lt r, em1 0 Ar 'TIY to C C"11 0 12th Gp, 8 Jc.n 45 ,
sub: Use 2. n d of t ':1'" -;.; 4-5 Thrower. In
CML(;G.
103
Ltr, Cml 0 to C C 12t ':1 Gp, 2? Dec 44,
sub: 0'1 Vis::t t o 57th Mai n tena nce Co muany.
In CML'dG.
104
TBCW' 18.
- 55 -
beginning early in 1945, the artlies supplied. wi th compressors
105
designed for this purpose.
The importance of the logistics factor was recognizp.d
the ':;;echnical Divisio:1 of tr.!? Chemical i'lerfs.re Section, E'roUSA,
a solution. Since the armies preferred re&dy-mixed.
easily-poured fuels (the basic reason for preferring British fuel
to na:pa1m), it was decided: (1) to obtdn a nortable mixer of the
type ieve10ped by either the or the British; (?)to
a copy of the prototype; e.!1r! (3) to ort.ain a static mixing
plf'..nt in the Pa.ris Drea where gallons per hour could be
mixed.
A mixer was borrowed from the British, the 17th Chemical
Maintenance Company constructed a ffi odel and a mixinr
105
TM 3-376 A, p. 28. See also 3-377, Air
Gasoline Engine Driv"3n, 7CrM, Hl, 7 Aug 44. The in-
itial issue, for us":! with flame throwers, was
to have been 147 for 1944. On the basis of the 31 Dec
1944 troop list. distribut1 :m was' to be: 1 per division
(all types). 1 per 3 ree;iments operatinf,' indepen.c.!?ntly.
1 per 6 combat engineers ond infantry batt?lions. For
use ",-i th the mechani zed flame thrower, \-[ould be
1 ppr tank battalion. plus 1 per nrmored division.
Draft of ltr, 6 Jul 44, to CG ASF from SF CUJ , sub: Class
IV Item, Air, Gasoline Engine Driven 7 CFM
Ml for Procurement Planning. Records indicate tr.at. the
first shipment of (lE) compressors was on 5 Oct 44; the
last r;hipment (4),17 Feb 45. (SPCVR-D)
- 56 -
106
established at St. a subur: of Far:G. 1ryt h
Cor..pany Was assi gned to the Seino B.:;se Section. The
mobile mirl'1t: plant improvlseCl to refuol mechanized. flr-,,'ll'2
in forward Co:r:r:lUni c.s.tions Zone. major difficul ty in
utilizing the fa.cili ty was t :wt op':!ra-ci onE!, l dat a, on 't.' ;-; ich to pl!'in
107
for require:r:e!lts, ".' 25 ':! i tho.r II non-existent or va,;ue." The pl."lnt
used for pre-mixinE; n:malm was a converted dye p lan t. mixt ure
used was six percent 1.25 percent xyl enol, and 92.75
gasoline. Ther e was, however, a. shortage of barr els storage
108
and ship:::1ent.
The armie :w. d. exprienceo. lo; i s tic a nd
ta'>:en steps to d.eol wi tr ther:. In t he nnth Arrrw, se r vice e C"lJip-
C1ent needed for ref'.l('li ng 8nd recharg ing the E4-5 Wl;l.S carri ed
aboard. a truck, wti ch was issued to each medium
in excess of TIO and E allowances. basic load carried CO!l -
siated of 300 callons of fuol, '1itro[en
106
107
108
Th o. statement wa.s mad.e th:o.t, II':'he jCi Cl t 3ction of 3u!,:?1y
Di vision and :'ecr"nical Divi C' i:m s'lccessf'c.lly s ol",,;1 the
problem of furni shing a sui table read;" flame thrower
il"'. sufficient quantit;.' to Armi e s. II Lt!', CW So.ct
E':'OUS.A to OC C'(15, 8 Aug. 45, su':j: Act ivitie s 07 'Tec h Div,
Ci-I Sect in mo. In. o::'cb ACC.
Ltr, CiiS :STOUSA to C C',;S, 19 t.f.i, no sub . In -..:ea-c ons
Br, CC C:r:l C.
Ltr, Dr G. Broug1oton to OC C"liS, Mar 41) , 1;0. 37a . In
Tech Library, ACC.
- 57 -
one service kit. five gallons of (preferably white).
three fifty-fi .;r11on he&vy duty drums (ICC5A-14 or 16-55).
109
C\!1d a ::-ac\( for holci:1.f tho. cylinders. Under combat condi tiona.
h0\l'ver, there 'v.'ere c cc" si ons ,,'!"l en tion for
fuel Ilnd p re ssnre was not availabl
o
AS a consecf'-". ence,
one b&.tt .:.lion report 'Jd A..."l o'Perati on wit h no reserve fuel-
wit t only the 10a1 c &rried in each of nine tanks available for
110
use aga;nrt the en-::ooy.
In the Seventh Army an twas mad.e where':ly stocks
of ni trogen snd hydrofen cyl inders were kep t in the 12th Chemical
!"alntenMce Company and ".r er" accessible to all units. Sufficient
ini tinl stocks were set up aIl e p!"o,r1 e1 1:'&.8e for securin[' re-
for issues anginaer depot stocks.
On receipt of five air cO!:Tpressors, a ple.n w[' s devised to r.'1ount
three of them on one-ton trailers, one each t o be to
tr.e tl: re e che r.1 ical maintenance detach:n:mts sl-trmortin.<': the cher-lcal
mortar battalions. In this way, :.ir compressor !': could be made
available to front line troops and coxpressed air be u sed in
111
lieu of
109
, , r...
.........
111
Ltr, Cml 0 Ninth to . Cml 0 12 th Army Cp, 30 Apr 45.
sub: Mechanized Flame Thrower Activities (E4R2-5Rl).
In Ci-fL'" G
Ltr, C;nl 0 Army to OC CIIS, 4 Apr suo: Trainin[
and Usaee of E4-5 I'lamp. Thrower (22 Har-l .A1:'r).InCML'rIG.
C!!11 Sect, Seventh J.rrrv, Hist Rpt, :F'eb 45. In CMLWG.
- 58 -
7. Reported Use. The auxiliary mechanized flame throwers,
for the reasons already indicated. were not extensively
in th
Q
European Theater 0: Operatione. On basis of
ref,orts, weapon was employed on one occasion in the
Army, on two occasions ir. the First Army.and on six occalions 1n
the Ninth Army. The follovint is a brief account of these in-
stances of employment.
74lst Tank Battalion \First Army). On 15 September
1944. two medium tanks equipped with flame throwers reported to
battalion. At the time of repor ting, these tanks were not
equipped wi th either radiOS. transmi tters, or tank helmets. The
enrine in one tank hed lost power. These tanks we r e properly
equipped, repaired, and. attached to Comnany C for combat teste.
1he crews fearful of t he fuel carried in the vehicles and
a pr0no
1
mced rel uc tance to enter combat. the
tanks could be useo., one dev eloped \ransmi ssion tro'J.'hle and was
found to have a gun. It was evacuated to an Ordnance
repair shop. On 18 September the tank was employed
against a pillbox th3.t l-:as holding up the advance. It had to
approach to \\'i thin twenty-five yards for thl! flame to reach the
embrasure, and the result was a comnlete The infantry
W3. S to occupy the TIosi tion and it was doubtful .... hether the
enemy had suffered any casualties. This action, counled with
- 59 -
the mechanical difficulties experienced the flame tanks,
left a bad impression with the battalion commander. He felt
that a 7B-mm. white phosphorus shell wae Just as effective as
a flame thrower, and he definitely stated that he would prefer
to have these vehicles returned to their parent organizat ion,
which would permit the return of the two standard tanks which had
been exch?.ng- ed for them. He A-dmitted, however, thA-t t he on"l-0_a3
T
's
training given the crew could hardly be "'xpec t ed to produce sat is-
112
factory results.
70th Tank Battalion (First Army). The 70th Tank Battal-
lion received f irst four sent to tho. ater and connuc-
ted training . The new weapon was initially empl oyed in
October 1944. In this the fuel to ignite and the
tank had to bac k up ano. use its 75-mm. gun again st t h", p o nHi on.
The malfunc t ioning traced t o acid in the solder u sed on tho.
i gnition valve, which ruineD the valve seat. This condition ex-
isted in all of the earl y flame throwers, but was remedied by
using synthetic rubber from s German gas can to form the valve
seat. This experience, however, left the crews rather dubious
113
of the nevT weapon.' The battali on used its flame t fi..rowers
112
113
Ltr, Combat Observer, V Corps to CG 12 Army Go. 13 Oct
44, Observer' s Report No.4. In
Ltr, Co mba t Observer, Fq V Corps to CG 12th ,/ .rmy Gp, 11
Oct 44, Observer's Report No. 1.
- 60 -
successfully at a later date on Siegfried Line. In one in-
stance, a tank a pillQOX near Brandsheid, Germany,
resulting in th!'! o.f eighteen enlisted man and one
114
officer.
14th Armored Di vi sion (Seven th Army). }rine flame thro'V!-
ere were issued to this division in Janu?ry 1945. One was instal-
led. This single weap on was employed in combat during the same
month. In this instance, four medium tanks abreast formed part
of the line of at tack in An ad'lance by the di vi si on. One of these
tanks contained the flame thrower. As they adVAnced toward the
edge of a wooded area in the German Gambsheim bridgehead, for the
purpose of clearing the woods of enemy machine.gun nests, they
found that the infantry on both si de s was hl?ld up by an enemy
gun. The enemy positinn was well out of range of
flame thrower, it was fired. Although the flame
had reached only half way to the position, twenty Germans immedi-
ately surrender 3d.. The result was most gratlfyinF" and caused the
1.1vision to requ",st i1!'.rnedlate installation of the eight
115
weapons.
114
115
Ltr, Hq ETO C'dS to C Cml 0 Hq ETOUSA. 11 Apr 45, sub:
!4-5Rl ]'lame Throwers in EIQ. In CHV.iG.
Ltr, eml 0 Seventh Army to CTl G-3 Sixth Army Gp.
1 Feb 45. sub: Use of E4-5 Flame Throyer. In Crnl Sect,
Seven th Army records, 4
7
0.71-:name Throwers, F'cl"\l s, No.
I, Jan 45.
- 61 -
747t h Ta.:'lk Batt.filion (Nln+;h ArIIW ) . Th1 s 'J.'ittal1 cr. :--e-
ce1ved flame thro;.,:ers tte Uovember s!1ipment. these ,."ere 10-
stal led w1t h the sponson fn
0
1 units . The c r e"" s 9uper -
fic1 E' .1 t r 31nir. ' before- b-:-lng c oo:n1tted tc. al onD tr.e Ro'O' r
.Rive r 1n Dece:':'Jber . Two ta!'lks. !:Iount1 n,- thro .... ers . "ere
knoc ked out at l ong r E'nge. Both I n one
pa6 SCol thr01;,f.:!1 the t a n?: . i gnitinc t r.e HO' .. ":J\' er. no e::-
ploBi on oCC'.lrred ar.d the ho',' I;U:-!. ner escaped . The bAttalion COr.l-
mander retained his entr:usias!':l for th!! ne',', 6.."'Id. oelieve d th;! t
it would prove uMful . Du=-1n
s
the fi ght i ng oehle- " n t \o,e Roer <:. nd
t he R"1ine !1e devised. an p lan for the u s e o'!' flame
t hr ower & .ilthoUfh t r.ere is no r E'cord of 1t ove:- bee n exc-
cuted , tho> plan 1s be la .... as 8.:1 eTs:lple o'!' p os s ier'" t a c t ical
e :ap loYMent .
the 5itu2 tion 1s a sp ec! al 0:":."' : tle are attRcklng
the e!'l.emy upon a flat, ero?,d ,iv", s'Jch as ex-
iste between the ROER end R!!P!E rivers . The
defense c0nsiets of stron& pOi n t s o f e Ach
littl e vi lleGe .... rich tho!? p l a in each 1, 000 yp r ds
or s o . About 100- 300 Germn..ns Are defe!!c1,1nr eaet- \' 11-
l &c
o
tronches 8
Supp orting a nti-ta::. !o: e.:urlS :J r e 10cf' ted ,,ithi:1 vil-
l age and in !'l.ei ghoorinr vi ll ages or
overlovk:ing t:-Ie p l ain
.,.. ertilhr y oaTrae " on t!" .... Objoct!.ve 3.00:,
ne i gi.bo:1n,:r t o",'l'lS starts the attack. T!", "
.... ill fire HE ana. fo r the pu:-:"'ose s o f
t he v! si on o'!' enomy
C'e""5 . grvu.'1c. i s also s-:1o:-o:ed ou t.
the artlll e ry i s st ill oomtar=.i of" to .. !". , thret'
flame t hr o",", !" t a :'l !::s , followod 0:- t .... o oroinr. r:,.'
:"! Ove of: t o\"' r c. e !'l. eoy The
- 52 -
purpose of the tanks is to protect
the flame tanks from flank attacks "'i th a
bazooka. The flame tanks, upon neering the
trenches will open fire and attempt to
'flush out' the The awesome sight of
ttree flame throwers firing nt them should
cause SOMe of them to leave their trenches
As the tanks within
range, those l"ft would have the choice of
burning up or leavi ng. Tho se who
to leave could be snot by machine guns from
the tanks. (In this special case, the flame
gun is superior to the Machine gun in thE. t it
is able to reach down into trenches.) Pro-
tection f"rom enemy AlT; guns would be afforded
by the smoke and haze over the town and sur-
rounding towns. at our jumP-off p oint
would also cover the area. The infantry is
to follow the tanks 1n this attack with en-
gineer units out the night before to
clear paths in tho mine fields.
116
The battalion wa", wi thdr2.M1 from cOMbat early in January
and persop.nel, including the D2.ttalion cO":1f!lanc..er, attended en
exten si ve flame thrower sc hool conduc t ed by Nin th Tf1o:>re
1 s no record of furt he r flame thrower employment by the battalion.
709th Tank Batt"lion (Ninth Army). The first two un j ts
were in this battalion the latter part of
One officer and non-commissioned officer received mechanical
instruction,but the t anks ro.turned to c ombat befote the cre, ... s
could be tr8ined. The tanks \,o''?re opera tin: near the s'!1all to\om
116
?d Lt G. Roo s, Rep ort on Tour. 26 December to
30 December 1944, datF!d 31 Dec ' In o.'V,VG.
!1587:i80-51- U
- 63 -
of Vosnach. Germany, and the bow gunners told how to operate
the flame gun. A na turn1 V-shaped wedge. by outl1fle
of the forest, existed in enemy lines. The plan called for
clea,ring the west side of the wedge first and then attacking the
right wi th tanks. flame t?-n1.cs, and infantry. attack
went accordine: to ple,n, with infantry riding on the backs of the
tanks as they the right The tanks approached
1 n 1i ne, with the two flame tanks seperated by the afmor",d tanks.
flame throwers fired at the edge of the woods where the
were entrenched. As 800n as the fuel was exhausted. the .infantry
dismounted and attacked. Little resistance was offered the
mi ssion ""2, S quickly completed. No known enemy casual ti!'!s resul ted
117
from the flame. Thi s bat talton we s sufficien tly s2.ti sfied witl-J.
the flame thrower to have t ts c:uota of nine installed
durinL latter part of February. at time crews were sent
118
to the Army's school.
70lst Tank Battalion (lUI". th A.rml), Installation of nine
flame throwers in the tanks of this battalion was begun on 13 Janu-
sry 1945. Upon completion of this work, four days later, the crews
attended a four-day in the operation of weapon. Two
of the four days were devoted to tactical exercises. The battalion
117
Ibid.
118
Ltr, 2d Lt Edwin G. Roos to 0 Ninth Army, 19 Apr 45,
sub: Usage of E4-5 Flame Thrower. Against the Enemy
to Report, 4 Aor 45). In of Cilll Sect,
T-ln-A. Cml C Sch Library.
- 64 -
was in c omnat in the attack upon Brachelen.
Plans were laid to use the flame thrower! in conjunction with a
squadron of British Crocodiles. However, the Germans evacuated
119
the town and no tanks were Later the baU,a.lion reported
a successful mission against a wooded area. The Germans fled And
120
the infantry occupied the posi tion wi thout opposition.
743d Tank Battalion (Ninth Army). Nine flame throwers
we r e installed in this battalion duri!1g' the first week of Janu2.ry
1945 and t <>chnical training in their operation, g1 ven
ny Ninth Army. was most thorough.
The battalion reported three combat us e s of it.: flc.:ne
throwers. the drive from the Roer to the Rhine, one tank,
after firing several HE shells at a German AT gun pOSition,
\vi th it and threw flame in and around the gun. Scattered German
infantry remained in the vicinity of the poaition, but were routed
i nto a nearby woods by the si ght of the flame. A short time later
same tank si ghted German infantrymen lying in open ditches
beside a road. The bow machine gunner opened fire with his
flame f,Ull, but, having nef!lected to turn on the '.if!ni tion awi tch,
go t only a wet burst. l,'lhen last seen, the Q.ennane were frantically
119
701st Tk En. A/A Rnt. Jan 45. pp. 5, 6.
120
Rpt, Capt P. R. Johnson, C\iS, Com Z ETO to Oml o 12th
Army Gp, .w:- 45, sub: E4-5Rl Flame Thrower in 12th
Army Group. In C Sch Library, 319.1/208.
- 65 -
trying to rub the fuel off c lothes and bodtes. La ter, duri ng
the adva nce, tt.c tanks ..... e:-e l eadinr. infe.."ltry when they ca.me
up on a roed block. Smell elld m!'\.chine gun fire wa s coming
from thp. and lower fl oor of e house on t he left of the
road 'block.. This house wa6 6itueted on a sharp drop, 80 t hat
th2 tank couldf1re ita 75-mm. gun into the upper floors only .
The tank drew closer and fired its flame gun into the house.
121
Twenty- hlo Germans fled Ollt back door nnd wer e captured.
8th Armored Divisi on (Ninth Army) . Nine flame trrowers
each lnstalled In 18th and 80th Tank Batt3li ons during
the latte r part of March 1945. tanks were committ e& to com-
bat immediately a fter i nstal lat ion and there was no time in which
to train Or erators. A ref'.lali ng truck, operated. two en-
Ilsted men from the was at tached
to service the fl8.!:le throwers , and an officer from the IT.aintenance
company went along a8 as sist ant driver to give instruction and to
get first hand experience . Both the tank c rews and officers In
this battalion eager to fine targets for their we;mone,
but the flame ttn fir'!d. only once by t.he che-nical officer ,
who acted as assistant dr iver. I n this the t p.nl: w ..... s halted
near a house ,i n position to fire the 75-mrr:. ::..gainst thO! enemy who
121
Ltr, Cml 0 Ninth Army to Cal 0 12th Army Op , 30 }J)r 45,
sub: Mechanized Thrower Activities (Z4R2- 5F.l ) .
I n CML ... G.
- 66 -
weB deployed about 1000 to 2000 ya r ns t enk , with out -
po s t a at v6.ri ous positions in t he vicinity of t Rnk column .
During t he operation, two enemy sol di e rs, f rom the house near
the fla.me tt.rowe:- , chemical officer had the
ta.'lk commander turn h i stanK towfl r il the so t hat could
fl ush i t wi th fire . fla.'Ile gun functioned p':!rfectly - filling
the house wi th fl.:'l.me . Uo other enemy so l die rs c Po.me out
from the house , but the flame thrower hAd p r oved the house empty
and i ndi cated to the tank Cre'ol' 8 that i t c ould efficiently fl ush
ou t J.spi c ious areas coul d. not be hannl ed by the tank r s
other weapons . At no other t i me in fi ve l ater attacks , in a8
many days, o.ld an opportuni ty to "1 8 e t he flame gun arise . On
several occasions the p latoon l eader call ed for t he flame tl-.ro'N'er
to be ready for action , but i t WR S not used .
At time, c..urlnG a night attack on a'l enemy strong
poin t, a. fIR.tllC t hroper 'ould have been i deal for fl .... shing out
the t arget , bu t, s i nce tr,e l eA-di ng ta.nks in the colu..'"\O i n f root
of the stronc: p Oint had been knocked out imrQedl.atel y b.> bazooka.
f i re , flar.le tr.ro\ler I s onl y a.vailabl e 6rmroacheD t o t he targe t
"?lock;:>n. . Al so , t'":e fl am2 ta.nk coul e. not get c l ose eno'..l&h ,
from any e.irecti vn , to provic..e flanking fire.
'7he c!-.emical officer enco'.mtero;d severa l diffic-:...lti es in
- 5? -
the Operatioos of the GO t h Tank Battali on. When the
gun was removed the swiv el mount prior to the in-
stellati on of hot barrel and ba rrel
of : he gun a p:- obl em 1n an c r owded com-
gun "':::'S l rt stalled in t h'? s1Ji vel mount
and assistant gU:'! "Ier ".' <> s called upon to pass f r oLl
the racks 'bebind hi s he f ound himself by the
flame gun , fuel hoee. and electric condui t l eadi ng to the f l ame
gun .
The various valves on the fuel un i t suc Ject to
dental opening . as the operator crawled in and out of hatch,
and t t1 s CAused lo s!> of fue l and pressure . Dl r1ng thig p eriod
the 18th Tank Battalion had no oPT-o rt un1 ty to its :necr.-
snized flame throwers. Ac cordi ng to p latoon and CQuman j -
ers , the Ger mans would !'lg::t at 2000 t o 3000 yards , cut
1<2
sur r'?ndered wtJen tanks approached their po al tions .
736 th Tank Battali on. ':he Ar ':C' r eported t hat a
t ot a l of six flame throwers, equi-pped with syonsOn fu"! l ta.!'lIS
only, had been inst a lled in t his battali on by March , and
cre,,s l'-..ad been tra ined. The only record o f occurred
122
Lt r, Hq Kinth Ar oy 0 0.:>1 C to Cml 0 Nintl-t Ar:ny , 4 A,. -or
45, BU't : Tr a 1ni nr anr. \Jsaee of E4- 5 Flame 'r'<r o\o.'e!s
(22 Mar - 1 J.pr 45) . I n
- 68 -
while a ci.vanci ng from lialb!'rstadt to Gronlnt;en. Real8tance was
rather being for the cost fr om fanatical s torm
troop ers and Hi tler The r oad bloc:-c on the outskirts
of Groninee-n ..... easi ly reduced, but iroten. e small ar'!l" fire
was met from t he h,ouses in tbe tONn e A l oudsoeaker WflS br ought
up and the German s were t old flame thr owers woul d be used if
t h'!y c. i cin It aurr"!l'lder. No on'! did, r>.nd fl6.lle tanks from
A to f ire a f ew bur sts into one- house. The onl y ton-
gible effect wa's to dr ive t he se fanatics from one to
another .
123
8 . Critique. The few actions in which flAme was used
againDt the Germans in I taly d.id not establish a ollitnry r eqcl r e-
cent in the fo r a mechani z!'c. The
concensus. for but las: si x months 0: the war agai nst
Geroe.r.y. we. s t hat the raectlani zed flame t hro'''er could or should
not r.ave been used 1n t hst Tht Fil 07>1nion .... the r esult
oi observ3ti ons of prcovious operati ons . It \rr{as felt 1:=, the
time 8 tank c oul d man"!.lV"l' clos') enouc" to sui ta'\:'le !leme tar ge t.
eneny fir"! \,: oul d knocked i t out before i t could
124
fir e . Th", tensi o'" .... "3; 5 so high, hnc. the of t'rl", Alli es
so sl ow t ho t a r :nored uni ts th<>!l! selves could not be ecrp loy-ed in
!"t.:, , CT.l 0 Nin t il. hr:rJ;{ to (Tol C 12t l- Gp. 30 ADr
J.1echan i : '?d Flame Thr O'I,""r Activiti es I n
124
WF :Ed Rp t, MroUSA. T:Jo . Jnn 45, p. li .
- 69 -
accordance with established doctrine. Armor wo:; s US"l<1. i n smal l
units, el though ttis and ques t i onable re-
125
aul ts .
\.'hen t he D.lropea.'l 'Ihecter we.!> ir.forl!:eo tl'-.zt 1')0 au:r.i l1l!r y
type throwers woul d be shi?ped in Jun e 1944, it vas pl anned
to !:'mp1oy them in hedgero.\' country of llormandy. !t wa s be-
Heved that, with a flame gun with a greater rane e t han a baoz ooke. ,
enemy i nf antrymen coul d be cleared out wi thout too much danber
of tanks.
l 26
When new weapon cid not arTlve in time
for t his operation , en thusiasm lo!anecl to some !very ef-
fort was however , t o make avail able fo r br eachinG
t he Sie&fri ed Line . When the u.nit s did ar rive , the b itter nght-
i ng by the Ge r mans in t ), .. Ardennes Offensi ve found ow: troOps on
the defensive completel y occupied. This dtuation, coupl ed
with the cold winter did not favor the of
e new weapon . By the t ime the throwers had been i nst al l ed
ad the troop s had acqua!ntcd with t hem, the Si egfried
Line had been breached,and fast-moving acti on In did
not afford many oppo rtunities for their use .
The one insta nce where two of a flame tank crew
\tere ba dly burned when the tenk wes hi t \ddely rumOT<;! d
125
J.GF !(pt, Rpt , 21 Ap r 44 , p . 4.
126
Ltr, Dr G. Br ought on to OC C\.,.5, l G Sep 44. In Tech
L1 b, ACe.
- 70 -
127
That one created a great deal area.
of unfavorable criticism of the flame and established its
reputation as a hazard. However, in the
Ninth Army approximately twelve flame th..rower tank . had been
knocked out by enemy action, and not one person had a
casual t:r as the direc t r esul t of the presence of the flame
thro ... rer. Neverthe1<>ss, the psycholof!ical fear of fuel tan1.c
128
explosions an operational factor.
Th", ini tial installation and the continuing maintenance
of the E4-5's were acute problems in themselves. There were,
'1o\,.'9ver, eO'Ile aspects of both proble:ns which affected operations.
In the first p lac"!, many commanders would not install their CO!!l-
ulement 0:'" fleme thro\rers until they, or others, had had so:ne
combat experience with them, and this reluctance precluded
mass emoloyment of the wean ons. For example, the 77lst Tank
Bat t alion decided to install three fln.me and to
129
store the remaining fifteen.

128
129
Ltr, Co R 774th En to CO 774th tl'k En, 5 Jan 45. Cited
also in ltr, Co C 774th Tk Bn to CO 774th Tk Bn, 5 Jan
45, and in C"IIS SDere Parts Teal". in MTO and ETO, Final
P.eport, 19 Jun 45, p. 40. In OfL"tG.
Ltr, eml 0 Ninth Army to Cml 0 12th Army Gp, 30 Aur 45, sub:
Mechanized Flame Thrower Acti vi ties In o.11
1
,'G.
1st Ind, 5 Jan 45 and 2d Ind, 9 Jan 45 (by 771st Tk 3n and
84th Inf Div) on ltr, Hq 1st US Army S'ect to ee's
Tk :Ens, 3 Jan 45, sub: E4-5 Flame Throwers. In C!'L"vG.
- 71 -
Faulty maintenance was for of the feil-
nres from combat elTr"'loyment. Simple
mechanical blockage of the 19ni H on jet by external dirt, ;'Ihich
coule. have ")een rer.'ledied 'Jlith proper :TIaintensnce, caused igni t i on
130
failures on meny flame missions. Standard procedure in the
tank "battalions, when there was a repla.cement in the tAnk crew,
was to assign t he ne,.,. crew me:nber t o the job of bow gunner, who
was al so the flame operator. Inasmuch as the new man
Was usuelly not trained in the use of the flame thrower, this
was an additional drawback to any routine tactical planning for
131
com'bc.t employment.
shortage of tanks in Europe a major
ThE':r ,:ere on the cri tical i tem li st and had to}.! priori ty for
coobat purposes. Thi s fact undoubtedly was, in prJ.rt, rec;:;?on-
sible for the numerous 1:1-5 equipment turned in for storage,
and for the decision on the of many not to install
the flame guns at all. Tanks had to be taken out of combat to
have the flame throwers installed and then returned to combat
wi th diseati sHed tank crews, who did not wan t to carr;' the
weapon unless the t pctical situation justified its use.
130
131
Ltr. Dr G. Broughton to OC CWS, 20 Apr 45. No. 41.
In Tech LiJrary. ACC.
Ltr. CWS Coo Z ETO to 0 12th Arny Gp, 23 Mar 45,
sub: Flame Thrower s. In Cl-U.WG.
- 72 -
The First Army recognized the weapon was used
very little, and sent the following letter to all tank oattaliJn
commanders:
1. Inspection of Flame Thrower equipment and
analysis 0: combat experiences indicate consider-
able have been' encountered with ig-
nition, RnQ first echelon maintenance. Little
uso. has been mRde of the equipment tactically end
many objections have been raised by in-
dicating necess9ry confidence in the weapon
is lacking.
2. Further reseerch and tati ') n is now
being conducted by First Army c\iS Section to elimi-
nate the problems which have and to increase
the effectiv9!!ess of thi s weanon in bunt
up A solution to all the
which have raised cannot be provided at this
time. If you have a use for this equipment in its
tank role and intend to so use it, the equip-
ment cay be retained; If you hBve no intention of
using the Flame Thrower and desire to turn the equip-
ment in for storage, request you so by in-
dorsement hereon. This communication is
not authority for turning in the equipment.
13
;::
Pursuant to this letter, the 740th, 741tt, 745th, ?46th.
?71st, and the 7?4th Tank Eattalions requested permission to
store most of their flame thrower unita. Typical of these re-
quests was that of the 771st Tank Eattalion. which follows:
132
1. Flame Throwers issued this
are now being installed in medium tanks. In-
stallation has been completed on two tanks and
it is intended the crews be trained in its
use and then to action.
Ltr, Armd Sect First Army to CO's Tk Ens, 3 Jan 45,
sU'b:J4-5 Flame Thro'to.'ers. In Clv\L
1
'iG.
- 73 -
2. on 1:' e):pf' r iEnCf' r8S ri3.C
'1:jt,h t1:es., n .. "'hrc
l1
lers a p3.rt in the ori [irJ.11
ir. the 1.:nitec St a t es almost a ;:car aLo e
.il.t tha t. t ine thE F1c.ne 'I'hr .:JiJcr SEe:::ed t o have cefi nite
possi':JiEtj_es if tl1(> '1.f'r:tion could be ren-
eciec' ':':o.e fact t ha t it \:as ac:apteci cJ t h2 leo us
t.u believe these defe cts h-'1G been c orre cted.
3. Y01.: r letter raises crave doubt in our mine as
t o acvisability of continuint:: \.'i th ' thiti ins t a lla-
t ion . It is not !elt that thE f iel d of battle is t he
fClr ex per imenta t io!! ar.d correction of pure 1:,.-
r::e chanical (ii:fi cul t ies v; h=-ch exist in O'l r equi ;Jc:.ent.
Ol., r cOT'fic'er:ce in the Flame is further s h:lken
b; ' the fact t ha t the sees fit to inc b ee l eO;;
replacements with the ini t ial issue. Therefor e , we
intend t o install only t hree Flame Throwers (one (1)
per company), at ?resf: nt , ana if the;y ?r ove so.t i sfac-
tory, the be c orpleted at a later
date.
4. Heq'lest authority to turn i n f:.fteen (15)
Flame Throwers fGr Dt orabe.
OnJ,y the 743c and the 750th ,!,o. nk Battalions of t he First Army
.,;antec to keep their fla:1.e ec.uip::1ent until a tat:'tical si tuati or. gave
them an opportunity to test, it in combat.
rep0rts on the of t he flame thrcJVl er
in ETO are SiJrnevlhRt s>< etchy, anr. all eYhaustive effort t o cOr:l pile a ce-
tailed acc ount of oper3t i ::ms has not been m;toe. Hovn'f' T', or. tr:e
of fairly s a tisfactory da ta, three poi nts stanG out quite clearly.
Tlar:le thro;-;int; tank s Yiere ccn:-::i tted to action with absolut.e l;, r. o tac-
tical trair.inl V,-i. th c ::J::ntinec. ar::ls. Cr eVis, Vier e often re\.iui r ec.: t o op-
erate the ViapOn in cori:bat '"i tbout any previous experience in fjring
the '='Cluip:'lP.nt. The principa l value of the fla'7le t hr owp.r, as
was its t:'s: ' cho loE:=-cal eff ec t on the enemy , therE: no report fr:)I41
ETJ of enen:' personnel '-)eing burned to death.
- 74 -
CHAPTER I II
MAIN TYPE TANK FLAUE T:FIROW'ERS
A. Mariannas Operation
1. Procurement and Me.nufacture in the Theater. Late i.n January
1944, twenty Ronson F. U .L. 1H. IV (Canadian) vehioular flame throwers
were taken to the Central Pacific Area by the V Amphibious Corps. The
Ronson name thrower was designed and built by the British to be mounted
on any universal carrier, suoh as the Bren gun oarrier. The unit
weighed approximately 1,350 pounds filled. It had a fuel oapacity of
seventy-two gallons and was designed for thickened fuel. The driving
force or pressure for fuel ejeotion was derived from oarbon dioxide.
The fuel was ignited by an eleotrio spark on a jet of gasoline. The
unit had an effeotive range of seventy-five to eighty yards with thiok-
ened fuel, and up to 110 yards with the solidified fuel. These flame
throwers were acoompanied by an officer and two enlisted men of the
Royal Ce.nadian Army, who mounted one of the units in a weapon carrier
the other in an LVT (Figs. 3 & 4) for instructional purposes. On
3 February 1944, a demonstration of these unite was conduoted at Koko
Head, Oahu, (Fig. 5). Among the hi gh-ranking Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps offioers attending the demonstration the concensus was that the
LVT was vulnerable to small arms fire and not a suitable vehicle for
mounting the flame thrower.
At a oonferenoe held on 4 February, it was decided to utilize the
twenty units as follows= fourteen to remain crated and to be delivered
- 75 -
Figure :5.
Figure 4.
Figure 6.
by the C'i;;S to Ca.mp Catlin, together with necessary napalm and carbon
dioxide; four to be made available to the CWS for training instr1lctors
and operators; one to be shipped to Hawaii for training the2d
Livisi oD; and one to be installed in a medium tank bJ the cvrs at Scho....
fielo. Fror;] 5 to 12 t.he Canadian tea.'1l conducted an instruc-
tors' school for CI'tS, Marine, and tank officers. This was followed by
a second school conducted by the from 14 to 19 February to train
operators for the 27th Infantry avision, 4th Tank Group, 715th Amphib-
1
"tous Tank Battalion, and V Amphibious Corps.
[''-hile the t.rainine progran was in progress, the V Amphibious Corps
did a great deal of work at Pearl Harbor in an attempt to set up the
Ronson flame thrower to operate at higher pressures and SO obtain an in-
2
creased range. At t he end of this experiment, further work on the
project Ylas abandoned and, on 14 April, the V Amphibious Corps trans-
ferred the 'r'. onson flame thr ower equipnent on a "temporary loan basis"
to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Farces in Central Pacific for
f'lrther experimental work by the chemical warfare officer in that com-
mand.
J
1
2
Hq USAF, CPA, Tng Hemo, 7 Feb 44. In Hiat CWS Pac, Vol. III.
Ref. J.
Ltr, V Amphib Corps to Bu Ord, Washington, D.C., 14 Mar 4/+, sub: Bureau
of Ordnance Project RE 2d-80 Ronson F. U. L. IV, Flame Thrower,
Conversion of. In CWS Pac, Vol. III , Ref. 4.
3Ltr , CG V A:nphib Corps to CG ;,1arine Supply Base, 14 Apr 441 sub: Honson
Flame Thrower Eqt1ipment, Transfer of. In Hist Cl'iS Mid Pac, 1.'01. III,
Ref. 5.
- 76 -
wring the period that the :.rarine expertmen4tion 'Was going on, and
imnediately after the cOJ1.ierence held on 4 Febrllar;' , the 43d CJ-iemical
Laborat ory ':ompany was charged with the of mounting the
Ronson thro'r' er in a medium tank. However, since relatively few
medium tan:{s were available in the theater, authority '\Vas not given to
use one for this job. At this time, :,D light tanks were being replaced
by too then new U5 li ght tank, mak.ing a number of :.:3' s available.
Therefore. one of the ' oJ's was obta::'p.ed anci work was started to equipi t
wi th the Ronson. Plans were drawn up to permit tilaximum utilizati on of
the space within ,the tank . Fuel tanks f or the flame thrower were manu-
factured the t{onolulu Iron The Ronson was origi nally equipped
."i th a nunber of Bri tiflh t.ype fi ttinGs which had to be replaced by stand-
ard fittings . Considerable was made in tne opera-
t.ion of t he cont.rols in oreier t o make operation of the flame eun sir:lpler.
Some necessary parts 'were hand-tooled at the };orth Sector Oronance Shop.
The: 37-mm.. gun was from the turret and replaced by the ttonson
fla!:Je gun 'which was protected bya howitzer-like shroud. The four spec-
ially huilt fuel t anks had a capacity of 175 gallons. The flame. gun as
mounted in the turret had a traverse of 180
0
In addi tion-, to the fUime
throYler, t he li:;ht. tank mounted a ,JO-r. a liber machine gun and carried a
radi o. The flaTJe t hroYler was capable of approximately two minutes of
sus tained fire. ( See APpendix 1 for a detailed report of this installa-
tion. )
0 -51- 7
- 77 -
On 15 April 1944, when a delJlortstration of this tank was held for
interested officers, the ?!arines were quick to see its possibilities..
By this time, thp. V Amphibious Corps had brought in ten more units,
making a total of thirty units available in Hawaii, and requested that
all available units be installed jn the obsolescent light tank for use
in the cominf, operation.
4
This request was approved and work
was started immediately to equip H:3A1 light tanks with the
flame thrower. This work was carried out joint 1y by the Chemical War-
fare Service, CPA, the Bureau of Ships, 14th Naval District, the EDgin-
eer Office, V AmpWbious Corps, and Marine Corps personnel. 17
1944 the weapons had been mounted, test-fired, readjusted, waterproofed
and loaded aboard ships.5 The general characteristics of the wpapons
were as follows: f'J.el capacity - 170 gallons; operating pressure -
180-250 p.s.1.; effective range (thickened fuel) - 60-80 yards; duration
of fire - two miputes; traverse - 180
0
; elevation - 18; and depression -
15
0
It was recognized that the light tank mounted had several
advantages such as vulnerability to small caliber anti-tank weapons,
limi ted space for both driver and gunner, and limited mobility, but medium
tanks could not be made available in t.ime to meet the deadline for in-
sta11at.ion. (See Appendix 2 for a detailed report of these Flame Tanks.)
4Vemo , em1 o CPA to G-JrtJe. apd ciS CPA, 17 Apr 44, sub: Inetallation of
Ronson Flame Thro--'er Ui L1&ht" 'hill<:. In Hiat CiIS Mid Pac, 'Vol. In,
Ref. 6.
5Ltr , CG Marine Supply Serv, V A!nPhib Corps to Supply 0, Navy Yard, Pearl
Harbor, :3 May 44, sub: Installation of Ronson Flame Throwers in 1GA1
Light Tanks. In Hist CWS Mid Pac, Vol. lIlt Ref. 8.
- 78 -
2. TraininG. 'I'raininc '7as conducted as. the tanks came off the
procucti.on line. Fiv8 classes of f orty '"tours each, attended by a total
of 109 students, '7ere conducted by the CV,'S durinG the months of Febr1lary,
:.'arch, and iq)ril. St udents were frnm the tank 1.!nits of the 2d and 4th
1'
:. arlne 27th and 33th 4th Armored Group and
separate units, including CV:S.
6
The 27th Infantry Division was scheduled
for the ' Jarianas operation but did not express a desire f or the tanks
until it was too late.
7
3. Tactical F.mployment. Twelve of these flame throwers were issued
to hoth the 2d anc 4th ., ti visions and wpre landed on Saipan on D
plus 2 (17 June 1944). They were employed there continuously until 13
July, and on 24 July 1':ere taken to Tinian uy these c:ivisions, and em-
played ' \ith the assault wave.
For tac tical enplo:'r.1ent, twelve flarle tanks and three lieht tank:>
formed a company. Four flame tanks and one liCht lead tank formec a
platocn. !lonnally one of these platoons was attached to a company of
mecium tanks, which in turn vias attached to a r:larine LurinG
operations, the light tanks remainer. in the rear and were called forward
v,hen it becane necessar:l to neutralize a stronE; point. The rJediu::l tanks
uS'J.ally covered the flame tanks while they " ere moving into firing
6Hist CE3 : rid Pac, Vol. II, Annex le, p. 1.
7 Hist C'I iS Pac, Vol. I, Sec. 3, p. 25.
- 79 -
position.
8
Employment of.the flame tanks started late in the Saipan operation
beoauae of the complete unfamiliarity of commanding officers Ynth the
possibilities of these weapons and because of lack of experience among
operating personnel. The first day on Saipan the flame tanks were used
only for mopping up. On the second day they were employed in the
assault. After that, they remained in the front lines and, as the op-
eration progressed, were called upon more and more for support. These
tanks fired on dugouts, canefields, buildings and caves (Fig. 6.) When
a canefield was suspected of harboring snipers or machine gun positions,
it was fired by the armored flame throwers. On one occasion one of the
flame tanks attacked a building. A Japanese soldier with a light ma-
chine gun started firing at the tank and the flame gunner gave one un-
ignited burst which was aimed so acourately that it knocked the machine
gunner down. The next burst ignited, and the building went up in flames.
One operator claimed to have gotten more than 130 Japanese with his
flame thrower during the two operations.
A tank commander reported that he was called upon t o destroy an
enemy bunker located under a house from which considerable small arms
fire was being received. He approached the position under cover of fire
from medium tanks and his own .30-caliber machine gun The
8Rpt , eml 0 POA, 21 Aug 44, sub, Operation of Armored Flame Throwers by
4th Marine Division on Saipan and Tinian. In Hist CWS Mid Pac, Vol.
III, Annex 1Ic3, Ref. 1, p. 3.
- 8'J -
Figure 6.
).1l1n:{er t.en others Here found vJho were apparentl:' killed instantly, 55_nee
was Ctgainst a large cave ano 250 JaDCinese snrrenCerec.
solc' jerO:i ' .'C'<' c
n
'lgr,in[3 b:ld l:; Rnd our mecical officer repartee; Ct
fe'\\' of searec1 1uncs .10 One ci r :i ver reported t,ha t in an ar ea 150
yards square, JOO to 400 Japanese "'ere f1usherl h:y the large tank fJame
t:rrower.
hit t.he ')each \vas mediur.'! tanks, f01lowe c imr.lecJiately by flame tank8.
,j hen a point of t'c si stance Vias met, the tanks openeri fir e , f01-
iSter l an(' tnc , hurned bocies were f our:d 0 11 t 11<') 1;eac!1, l-,u tit
is possi ble t hat "ome of' t.hese Japanese had been burned fire borabs.
At, onE: poin ./-, '1 COlH;ret p held lip the CleVanCe f or a 6ay. A flame
thr ower t:J.nl, was L,rouG.ht ir: ; uni gniteo fnel Vias :irst firerl into the
positi on, there it. "las io: ited, causinG an intensel:
r
hot fire. No further
r esistancf> mpt frorr: the pillbox. At anot her point, t.he flame thrower
;J'X) Jap!3.ne3e out thpi r :-'0sitior:. emp. hundred
9CPA comba t J. nt
p
rVi E'1:s wit.h M,qr i.np Divisi on Per sonn el, 4 Sc>p 44.
l.n :1ist ' l i r j }' ac: , \' 01. IV, Annex !IcJ, Hef. J, p. 7.
1011.1i6 ., pp . 7-10.
Scanned by MilSpecManuals - 81 -
and fifty ,'! ere shot and fiftJ- surrendared. 11
4. Conll'nents." iJo casualties to per sonnel occurreel as
resul t of flame thr QVler operations. Such a s:na.ll number of nen hao bef'n
trainee: for the operati on, one operator and one driver f f)r each tank,
that b::1 ttle became a pr oblen. [ uring the fi ghtine around
Tapotc hau, a. school Ylas set up 500 ;r,qrds behi nd the fr ont lines t o tra.in
additi onal men. The int'O' r est anc confirlence of t. he men in the Yleapon is
indicated by the fact t hat the crews ".;rere recru:i_ ted from volunt eers and
there were more volunteers than were neeced.
l2
One flame tank on Tinian was out of on L plus 2 by a
sea mine which blew off the tread and injured the two occupants. Since
parts were not a. vailable, this tank was cannibalized f or sFare parts.
tank was deadlined the two operati ons hecause of malfuncti oning
of the fliirne thrower. :-!owever, several tanks were deadlined temporarily
JE' cause of mechanical brea1.cdowns .13
Supplies were carried on the basis of a thirty-day operati on with
an expected refueling of one load per day . It was f ound that the tank:;
refueled on the average of twice each day. After about twelve days,
11 n-d

12
I h
, .
--2.... ,
p. 11.
pp. 11-13.
13
RPt
, Operati on of ilr oore d Flar.Je
Saipan ane Tinian, 21 Aug 44.
Annex Ire], Ref . 1, p. 4.
Throwers by 4th Divisi on on
In Mist C-r:S Pac, IV,
- 82 -
thickened fuel ran out and "Bunker C" fuel from ships was used. This
fuel, mixed with Diesel oil to produce a low flash point, gave a range
of fHty to sixty yards. The in5_ tial supply of carbon dioxide Vias ex,....
hausted, but addi tional cylindp.rs were ohtained fr om Navy shi ps . Fuel
anc pressure bottles were hauled in half-tracks from the orieinal dump
to rallying and alternate rallying point s . A total of approximately
.36,000 gallons of fuel Was expenced in t he two operati ons by the 4th
Marine Division alone.
14
Since refueling v;as usually done at night,
the presence of lights inside the tank would ha ve been a great help.
Since ljght tanks were very vulnerable to light artillery and anti-
tank weapons, it was recommended that the flame thr ower be mount ed in
medium tanks f or future operati ons.
15
B. Peleliu Operation
1. tBvelopment of Navy I Flame Thrower and Pre para tion for
Employment. In order t o meet the need demonstrated at Tarawa (21 Nov
43), the Bureau of Ordnance initiated the developr.1ent of a rUGgedly
constructed flame thrower, with a range of more than 100 yards, to be
in an LeVP or similar assault landing craft. The intended
ployment of this weapon was to cover a beachhead th flame during the
14rbid., pp. 3-5.
15
cPA
, Conference on Flame 5 Sep 44. In Hist C\iS :.fid Pac,
Vol. IV, Annex Ire3, Ref. p. 11.
- 83 -
initial assault phAse. It was felt that by usinE; twent; of units,
at intervals of fift y yards, a beach 1,000 yards lonr, could be coverec
with flame to a depth of 100 yards. After neatralizing a beach, the
flame thrower V7a s to be returr: ed t o the shi p, and the LCVf was t o be em-
ployed in landjng troops and equipuent. On 2 March 1944, the first. ten
units were received by the ITavy repartment and tested. In April, twenty
units were shipped to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
16
On
29 April, the Cor.unanrling General , V A.'Ilphibious Corps, reported that l1in
view of the excessive weight of the Mark I flame thrower, its suitability
for e:nployment 5.D amphibious operati on s is doubt.'ul'l ami that five of the
units would be turned over to t he COr.Jr.iandint: Gener a l, Central Pacific
Area, for experimental purposes .17 E-srli in the five units were re-
ceived by the 4Jc. Chenical LaboratorY,A.t Oahu, where i t \;as soon l earrJea
that they could not be installed in mecium tanks.
18
charar-teristics
of this fh.me thrower were: net fuel - 200 Gall ons; rate of
ejection - 2. 5 gallons per second; sustained firinc time - 7L sec onos;
o:oerating pressure - 475 pounds per square inch; plectrical ;:,llition s:"s-
te:u air atomized [ r oss weiGht empty - 5,200
filled - The fuel was :rro?elled by air of which the ani t
16Ltr , C-in-C to C-in-C USPF, 19 Apr 4/ .. , sub: Throwers. In
f.list CWS :.!icl ?ac, Vol. III, Ref. 9.
17Ltr , CG V A:nphib Corps to C-in-C USPF, 29 Apr 44, sub; :.!ark I FLme
ThY'O"I'Iers. In T-!ist C\:S :.1id Pac, Vol. III, Ref . 10.
Cor.u:;pnt Vo . 2, C:nl 0 CPA to Tk 0 ano G-J [r5PAY, 6 L:aJ" sub:
I Flame Throwers. In P.ist . CtS :.!id Pac, Vol. III, Hel,
Ref. 11.
- B4 -
carried 10.5 cubic feet a 2,000 p.s.L, necetisitating the nse of 3
reducti nn valve.
19
On J June 194/+ a Flar.le Thrower Detachment, consi of one
0fficer anc three enlisted men v,i th thrp.e t:avy J ark ::: flame throwers
and accessories , joined the 1st i.farine :Civisj.on at Cuadalcanal. 'l'he:,.-
\'.' ere a ttached t o t he 1st :'arine Amphibian Tractor Battalion f or the
p-clrp8se of rilountiniS the fla!ne thr owers on LVT' s f er the Peleliu opera-
tion '", hich schedaled f or 15 September. The j ob involved securing
the fl-3rr,e t hrmvers in LVT' s, :noc1::i f:,ing the constructi on of the units to
fit t he vehicle , 08visine a sahsfactory char giIl g systf'ril, a ddi r, g to the
air compressor equipment t o provi de l ow pressur
p
(0-150 p. s. i.) air for
use when neeoed, devisine a fire extinguishing system, training opera-
tors, ()btaining s pCl re parts, tools, and supplies, and assi sting in the
operati ona l planninG' for wlplo;;n:lent of thE': un::. ts. The flarr.e thrower
h;:1 r1 been de s ignee to \ .' ithstanG the vibrations of an amphibious
tract0r o!,erat:i n:; on l ancl , .qnG numerous cifficu.l ties werp encountered.
shie l r:is securer' t o thF: flame Gun to pr otect the Lunner vihrateci
l oose ; insulati on (I n the spark plues crackeci off; t.he damp
climate cansed rust to form in the air bank Lsic. in ori ginal repory
hottles which in turn cl() sseci and broke the air st rainers allowing
to damage t he regulator va lves; the fuel pUr.lp was cie signed t o
19
H
t p 1 f' 1' .11 J t:'\...,. 19 ' f 44 b V ' r
T
.p ,. ;:nl , c . : } lams, r., U H, : .ay ,su: .5. iav:,);
Fh:ne Thrower !,!a rk I. In Hi st C",S Pac, Vol. III, ftef. 13.
- 85 -
operate by an electric motor, but the motor had to be replaced by a
!I jeep" enf, ine because elctrici ty was not available.
In addition to the ;.:arines who operatec the tractors and manned
the machine guns, ten others were assigned to the detachment; four to
IT1Ai.ntain anc s ervice the equipment; and six to operate the three units.
A shortaee of napalm prevented proper training of operators.
Shortly before embarl<'..ation, three additional flame throwers, manned
by an officer and three enlisted men, were acded to the detachment. An
air CO:!l::>res s or was Ob tained for them and six were given a quick
briefing on the equipment which t hey \'Jould operate in combat.
The pl:ws for employment called for each of the first three flame
thrower units t o be a s s igned t o one of the attacking regiments -
the 1st, 5th, and 7th. The radio of each tractor was set on the conunand
frequency of the regiment with which it was to operate. rlth the 1st
'.Jarines, t he flane thr ol'!er tro.ctor was t o l and just behind the initial
wave of LVT ' s and be avai lable f or use hy the tnfantry upon landing . In
t he 5th '. 'ar i nes , the flame tractor was to land with the first wave of
assault troops . The unit to the 7th t1arines was to stand off
snore 'Nith t'velve LVT(A) ' s near a small island on the left flank, ready
to f' Clll oVi the infantry to the beach. The other three flame thr ower unit::;
were l oade d on trans ports and were to be put into LVT(4) 's and br ought
ashore as soon as tractors available.
20
20
RPt
, Ac t.ivities of the Navy F'1 tt in Palaus Opn. In Hist CY'/S :Hd Pac,
',7 01. IV, Annex II c] , pp. 1-8.
- 86 -
2. Employment. In the landing, the operational plan of using the
flame throvlers broke down completely. The unit "lith the IstMarines
could not advance beyond the beach because the troops could not, and
stood by under fire for five hours awaiting orders from the regiment.
The unit with the 5th was ordered to stand off shore out of
danger. After landing, all three units stood by on the beaches for the
rest of the day. This situation may probably be to lack of
knowledge of the abihties of the weapon and how to employ it., The
units did not operate on the second day because air compressors were
not yet available to re-pressure the weapons. From the third day on,
units were assigned daily to regiments according to their needs. The
units t.her. reported t o the regiment or battalion cOlltlland post and re-
ceived instructions for each mission. Durine the latter part of the
operation, units were attached to regiments for longer periods.
The infantry used the flame throwers principally to neutralize
caves, pillhoxes, and dugouts, but they were also used to burn cover
21
from an area. The? wer e f ound effective in covering an area in whid
Japanese were hidden in broken ground. The enemy was often caught by
arching the rod of thickened fuel over a ridge and dropping it upon
them on the far slope. This type of firing usually controlled by
radio from an observation post.
22
21
For day t o day activities of the flame thr ower tractors, see Appen-
dix 3.
22
Rpt, Activities of the FT 'Cet in Palaus Opn. In Hist CWS
Pac, Vol. Annex IId, pp. 1-8.
- FJ7 -
In the Erst part of the operation the units almos t alwa;;s "Horked
ahead of the infantry, and even ahead of the tanks by as much as 200
yards. the attack reached the hills and slowed down, the units were
given more prot ecti on were often covered by tanks and infantry. In
onE case the "I'Ia:,' was paved by an a dvance mortar barrage. Often the way
was prepared by de:aol:Uion men or tanks whj ch had blasted open the aper-
t.ure to be fir ed into. The light, half-inch armor pl<it e , t he openne ss of
the tract or, and the , ra y the crew Vias exposed t o enemy fire, e s pecially
fr o:n high pos i tions on hills and cliffs, pr evented the us e of flar:le tanks
in many pl ace s where it could done damage.
23
Aft er ge tt i ng st arted , t he si x flame tract ors were employed al'11ost
cont i nuously curing the first thirty or forty days of operation, a nd
then s pas:::lodically until D plus s eventy-five. The f l ame t hrowers fir ed
int o a p:,r oximate l y 100 caves , t "went y-five pillboxe s, dUGout s ami hl or::k-
house s, and burned off over forty areas. over 300 Japane se were
killed as a result of the flame thrower a ctions while our losses were nine
wour,oed and t wo killed. Fifty loads of f ue l were expended.
The f ollovring a cc ount of the activitie s of the detachment on 26 Sep.-
tember (D plus 11) is typi cal of a busy day 's action: One tractor that
had br oken a final drivE" t he previous da:' wa s brou ght in for repair. A
second unit reported t o t he 2d Battali on , 7t h and Vias sent off
the roa d to the cliffs opposite the command post where it burned two
23
Ibi d
., p. 16.
- 88 -
pillboxes, a hillside, a food dump, and an ammunition dump. This unit
was protected by six infantrymen and s ~ o k e shells from a half-track.
The third and fourth units operated with the 32lst Infantry, 8lst Divi-
sion. \','hen one of these units returned with a broken track, the flame
thrower was transferred to another tractor. The fifth unit went 400
yards into the hills, just past Dead ;Jan I s Curve on the Fest Coast Road.
One cave was fired on the way in and two on the way out, killine five
Japanese. The remaining two units reported to the 5th :Jarines. One
stood by while the other ran the length of a large concrete pillbox,
lying opposite the causeway to Ngesebu, and fired into the apertures,
driving out and killing thirty-five Japanese.
On 7 October, four units operated with the 5th Marines. One bf these
units stood by at the command post, unable to go in on the target bpcause
of enemy machine gun and mortar fire and a disab"led half-track )'lhich
blocked the road. The second unit, ~ ~ t h the 3d Battalion, advanced with
tank support to fire into caves near the Five Sisters, and was successful
in eliminating machine gun and mortar fire. The third unit was directed
by a forward observer, using radio comrmmications, to a pocket in the
hills near the Five Brothers and covered the face of the hill, two draws,
and two caves with two loads of fuel" blowing up an arnr.ru.nition dump and
killing many Japanese on the far side of the ridges over which the crews
arched the rod of flame. The fourth unit, operatine with Company L, ad-
vanced into the mouth of a ravine to fire a cave at the base of a cliff.
The first tYfO shots were ineffectual and the tractor was backed up closer
to the cave to get a better shot. The flame thrower operator Was hit
- 89 -
twice by a sniper and wounded. The assistant operator took his
place at the flame gun and was killed instantly by machine eun fire. The
unit returned to the service poiht, refueled and stood b;.,' to furnish fur-
ther support to the company.
J. Comments. Continual tractor breakdovms crippled the usefulness
of the flame thrower throughout the operation. Except for a split high
pressure air line, Trhich put one flame thrower out of action, damage
suffered by other flame throwers Was of a minor nature, and coulc be
remedied in an hour or t wo or in a day at the most. The amphibious
tractors, however, could not vIi thstand the rough terrain and )lere con-
tinually going out of comrns sion wi th broken final drives . badly torn
tracks c1nd bogie v{heels, and engine trouble, so that in using six flame
throvrers for sixty-one or a total of 366 flame thr ower ciays , 113
flame thr ower days were consumed by tractor maintenance. The result was
that out of six flame thr owers, fewer than an average of four a were
available for duty, and usually some of them were in poor operating con-
dition, in spite of the fact that fla:ne throwers ,yere transf erred from
disabled tract ors into serviceable ones seventeen times the opera-
tion, and that nineteen different tractors were used t o carry the six
flame throwers at different times. It was strongly r ecommended that the
LVT be abandoned as a transporting ve hicle and tbat the flame thrower be
installed in a tank.
24
24
Ibid., pp. 12, 16.
- 90 -
gelatinized fuel (nine percent napalm) was used, its effect was
to burn and not sear whatever it touched. It did not kill a human in-
stantly as liquid fuel did. Japanese that were hit directly by the flame
in such a way that it flared up around them were observed to run and con-
tinup- t.o evade fire for several seconds before auccumbing. iVhen fired
into a cave, the fuel burned with a tremendous flowering of flame, eiving
off intense heat and a great deal of smoke. It would continue to burn
f or ten or fifteen minutes of its own accord and often set fire to wooden
structures, ammuni tion "or other inflamr.lable material which burned as long
as a day. A burst of several seconds was usually all that was fired on a
t.arget. For a large inclosure. a ten second burst was used, and in a few
cases a half or a whole load was fired into a cave which was extremely
farge or had lJlany leading from it.
25
The operation proved that the men were insufficiently trained in the
use , service and of the flame thrower. Some of the operators,
who .. iere not as accurate as they should have been, wasted fuel before
getting on t.he target. They also were not able to estimate the range .
accurately. Incomplete knowledge of the gun detracted from the sel(-
reliance of the men and their ability to take care of small malfunctions
in the field. The ',farine operators did an excellent job of runnine
their units in close t o the enemy in order to burn them out. Many times
they advanced, ahead of the infantrf. to places where they were flanked
25Ibi d " p. 15.
\1587380-51-8
- 91 -
by Japanese fire,or to positions commanded by the enemy from superior
heights.
The development and employment of the Navy's large flame weapon was
matched closely by the flame thrower group in Bawaii,and the lessons
learned proved useful in the developments that followed.
C. Le;;rte Operation
When the XXIV Corps was given the mission of capturing the Island
of Yap, a small isl,and of low coral formation in the western Carolines,
aerial reconnaissance indicated that there were many heavy beach defen-
ses which would in all probability be strongly manned. It was felt that
flame mounted on LVTAl's tanks) would be of value
against the beach defenses a nd the lol'{ lying marshy interior. Accord-
inp:ly, the 37-m."l. GUn was removed fr om the t.urret of an LVTAI and the
Ronson flame thrower installed. This weapon was de':lonstrated at Koko
Head, Oahu, on 5 August 1944. and the XXIV Corps deci ded to mount addi-
tional Ronsons on light tanks.
26
It was later dec i ded to mount nine of
these flame thrOlvers on the obsolescent \!3Al light tanks. This decisior.
was made after the experience with the light tank-mounted flame throwers
in the operation. It waS felt that the light tank would be
more maneuverable and suitable for use against the beach defenses on
Yap. Medium tanks were not available for conversion into flame tanks.
27
J.6
H
-l
st
C'\lTc. . ',r..;d P V -'I TIr R f 16 d "7
ac, o. . , e. an
27
Hist CY6 Hid Pac, Vol. II, Annex 2cl, p. 21.
- 92 -
The scheculed assau 1t on ' .' 3.p cancelled short-I:; after the XXIV
Corps harl put out t o sea aIle true was attached t o Sixth 1\r:;]y f or
the te landin: , 20 October 1944. The opera ti on tooK place durine
the rainy sp-ason and the mud almost the rlechanized weapons.
The bombardment. to lan0j,ng was so eff ec tive on the XXIV
C'Jrps landing Oeaches ' that res istance to the ini tidl landing ""as Eght.
Only one enemy bunker, which was made of coconut lOGS ancl covered y:it.h
s ane , v:as repart ee: t 'J have :)ffpr'?d resis tance . It 1"3.3 quickl:' put out
of action by the lone flamE' thrower equipped LVTA1.
28
The lieht tank
fla"le thrOYferS ,Fere e;-aployed s everal times t o burn off the heavy f01i-
Ao ge v.-h:i.ch concea lpd eneny positions, but the f ighting soon reached the
:nountainous terrain, maldrl G the employment of light tanks impracticable.
The 20th Armore0 Gr oup. to which the flame tanks were assigned, rerorted
t.hat c onsiderable mecLanical difficulty was experienced wit!'] the obso-'
l escent light tanks. Even vrith the sli ght use of the flame throwers,
it was re p'Jrted that leaks both in fuel and presS'J.re lines resulted
fr om mov1nc over r ough terrain.
D. Iwo Jirna
1. PrOC
1
1rement anc1 ?repara ti on. 1..'hile the development procr.q,:n
far IT'R:'n arMament flame thrower tanks, to be used by Tenth Army, was in
progress, the 'farine Cor ps sent representatives to the demonstratiohs
28Tech Intell Rpt Ho . 271, 5 Feb 45, p. 2.
- 93 -
conducted by the Chemical Vlarfare Service, Central Pacific Base Command,
and wa& soon requesting main armament flame thrower tanks to be used in
the Iwo Jima campaign, which had been projected as a marine operation.
The Fleet Harine Forces initiated action to have eight main armament
tlame thrower tanks built under highest priority. On 5 Noveober 1944,
the Cammander_in-Chief,. POA, directed the Commanding G e n e ~ a l , POA, to
prepare eight flame thrower tanks for the Fleet :-!arine Forces, Pacific.
The Marines had t wo M4A3 medium tanks available and six were furnished
from Army stocks, to be replaced from Marine stocks then on order . The
deadline date for completion of construction of the tanks was 30 Novem-
ber. The Chemical Warfare Service, POA, had carried out the development
work on M4 tanks, and certain modificati ons had to he made for installa-
tion in the M4A3. However, with complet e co-operat i on and a ssistance
from the Marines, the deadline was met. In vie\'! of the limi ted time for
production and the limited experience i n installing the flame thrower in
the M4A3 tank, it was feared that serious deficiencies night result.29
A report, dated 17 January 1945. stated that a number of def iciencies had
already been noted while operators were being trained in the 4th Tank
Battalion, 4th t!arine Division, to which four of the units had been
issued. These defidencies had ' been corrected and several modifications
had oeen made. For exa'1l ple, one tank had mounted .an extra .50-caliber
r.lachine gun on the turret t o the l eft of the flame gun and had poured
four inches of reinforced concrete along the outside of eachsponson for
29Hist CV5 Mid Pac, Vol. II, Annex 2cl, p. 45.
- 94 -
protection against magnetic mines. JO The other four units 'Were issued
to the 5th Tank Battalion, 5th Livision, and oJ)flrators Y[ere
trained during December and January.)l
These main armament t.ype flal!le thrower medium tanks through
the ?5-rnm. gun tubes of the M4A.3 tanks, and had a fuel capacity of nearly
)00 gallons. The maximum effective range was eighty to 100 yards and the
total firint; time about 150 seconds per fnel load. The flame tanks l'rere
designed and constructed by a composite group of Army, Navy, and
Corps personnel, under the of the Chemical Warfare Service,
Pacific Ocean Areas.)2
2. ThlP1oyment. On 19 February 1945
J
the V AraplJibious Corps landed
on the south coast of Iwo Jima, with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions in
t.he assault and the 3d in floating reserve. two possible landinb
beaches existed and the defenders h;:l.0 them both c overed with large num-
bers of yVeapons, ranging from hig coast defense and AA b'Uns to mortars
and machine guns. Not only were landings costly, but our losses were
hie;h in men and materiel throughout the thirty day s of the campaign.
In the :i nitia1 stages of the operatjon, our casnalties were caused
))
Ltr, Hq, FT Gp to eml 0 CPBC, 17 Jan 45, sub: Inspection of ' ..
F1aoe Thr o .... ;ers with the 4th 1,1arine Livision. In Hist !.!id Pac,
Vol. III, Annex II c1, Ref. 78, pp. 1-2.
FT Gp to Cm1 0 CPEG, 13 Jan 45, sub: Inspection of Flame Thrower
Units of 5th Marine Division. In Hist CWS Mid Pac, Vol. III,
Ref. 78.
J2Hist CH.3 }!id Pac. Vol. IV, Annex II c2, p. 1.
- 95 -
cM.efly by enemy mortar and artillery fire. Counter-battery fire by
artillery, naval guns, and plane-fired rockets was also effectjve during
this staee. However, in the l atter stages of the operation when resist-
ance was chiefly from a network of caves in very rugged terrain, front
lines were too close to enemy positions for the employment of artillery,
naval gunfire, air support, or even mortars for direct . S
1
1pport. I n this
phase, the principal supporting arms were flame tanks, armored dozer
tanks, and demolitions.
3
)
The eight fiame tanks were broueht ashore on D-Day. They were not
employed on the first and second aays, which was probably oue to lack of
training. By D plus 2 and D plus 3, however, the crews had become more
familiar with these weapons and began to play an important r ole, which
continued throughout the campaign. By D plus 6, the infantry had beco:ne
dependent upon support froCl flame tanks and requested that Sllpport ron-
stantly)4 The tactic s employed were generally as follcms: the i nLm-
try v,-ould attempt to advance, thereby drawing fire and di$closing enemy
positions; armored dozers, working ahead of the infantry and protected
by tank and infantry fire, were usually employed t o prepare a r oad for
the tanks from which fjre could be brought to bear on enemy positions;
flame-throwing tanks then moved forward and neutralized the enemy posi-
tions Viith flame and machine gun fjre, s o that the infantry could advance.
33Hist cr,'S !1id Pac, Vol. IV, Annex IIc), p. l.
.34Armored Force Bd, Hpt of Conference on recr,anized Flame i'hrowers,
E12-7Rl, 23 'far 45. In O!LI'ID.
- 96 -
E:ngineers followed closely with decolitions and destroyed the enemy caves
and pillboxes.
J5
'::'his was ('\ slow and laborious process, hllt any attempt
'Qyt!-"le infant.ry t o continue the advance hef ore by-passed enemy positions
had been result ed in heavy casualties, and no real gain could
be made as long as the ene!7lJT coule fire on our troops from the reall'. J6
The 5th Tank Battalion, 5th Marine Division, reported the general
situation as follows! the northern area of the island consisted of bad-
lanes which in trainine woule have been considered impassable to tanks.
'::'hese were :nade up of deep gulleys, saw-toothed ridges, .sheer cliffs, and
houlder-st.rev;n plateaus. The Japanese were holed-up in
this area for their last stand. The defense was predominately one of
small ar!:1S and r:r enaoe thr owinG' The former was deadly, being carried
on from well-concea led holes and caves. It was a type of resistance
coul d best be eradicated by lib'2ral use of flame throwers and dur-
:I.n:r the final t){O weeks of the operation the problem was always that of
eetting the flame within range of the targets. Tank dozers and
neer arr:lored dozers provided the answer. The progress depended on
hoy; fast roads could be cozed; the dozer nudged out a few yards of road-
way, and then got out of the way. The flame tanks would come up, some-
times two or three in rapid succession, and fire the area under attack,
while recu1ar tanks stood back to cover them or to shoot at targets of
35
Actn Rpt, 26th lhlrines, 5th l:{ar Div, Iwo Jima, Annex Queen. In AG
Rec Sec.
0'7
, .
opportunity. This process was repeated hundreds of times during the
latter stages of the operati on. There were days when the 5th Tank Bat-
talion used between 5,000 ann 10,000 gallons of flame thrower fuel in its
three or four flame tanks. The number of flame tanks an d tank ri ozers
alike was inadequate to meet the demands for their services.
3
?
Terrain in the northern part of the island was such that the infan-
try could not always protect the tanks from suicide attack.
the tactics were as f ollows-: the lead tank woul d do the fi Ghting, the
next tank would' cover to the right and the last tank to the left. In
this manner a platoon, consistins of three tanks. pr oved effective. rihen
resistance in a particular situation was overcome, the dozer tank would
come in and doze paths to all caves, pillboxes, or other
The dozer would withdraw and the flame tank would move in and burn the
area. The flame tank: was reported to have constantly overcome resistance
v,'hen all other ,"eaDons had failed. The four, with which the 5th Tank
Battali on landed, was an adequate number until the-northern end of the
is,land was reached. Since the resistance on this end of the islanc Was
so securely entrenched that only the flame tanks were effective, the de-
mand for them exceeded the supply. The fixed assignment of flame tanks
to tank companies was found t o be impracticable, and they T;ere all placed
in a battalion pool a!1c stationed at the refueling area. Thts procedure
enabled the tar k battali on to have available those flane tanks which
otherwise 'would have been immobilized, since the opportunity for their
37 Actn Hpt, 5th rfar Div, Iwo Jima, Annex Love, 19 Feb - 26 ;"!ar 45.
In AG Hist Rec Sec.
- 98 -
use c:id not exist in a particular sector. By ,this system it was possi-
ble to dis patch flame tantcs to those areas Ylhere the neee. was greatest.
Requests f or flame tanks YJere mace t o t he battalion by the tank compan-
ies or platoons, and by infantry unjts through liaison pp,rsonnel. As
soon as a f2me tank had exhausted its fuel, it retur ned to the refill-
ing station f or a nen l oad . I t i':as then reassigned in .accordance with
requests and circumstances. In spi te of these measures, advances were
frequently he l ei. up vrhi l e "IVa i ting f or flame tanKS whic h were engaged
elsewhere}8 A complete day by day log of the main armament flame
thrower medium tanks is given in .,Appendix 4.
3. Comments. The 3d Division entered the Iwo Jima opera-
tion without main a r mament flame thr ower tanks. r1owever, the division
obtained the use of a few Gurinc; the later stages of the operation.
At the cl ose of the battle t he Givision re port that the
organizati on of its tank hattalioD be by a c ompan;;' of main
armament fla'Tle thrower tanks. It was stated that this weapon proved
::1ost effective against e:.tplaceOlents and caves, and that the auxiliary
type flame throwers (E4R2 ... 5Rl) "'ere consi dered of little value because
of their short range and linited traverse.
39
The 9t h l.'arine Re giment, 3d Division, reported that the main
armament f1ai:le thrower tank was the most powerful weapon at their
38rbid
39
Actn Rpt, 3d llar Div, Reinforced, Iwo Jima, 31 Oct - 16 Mar. 45.
In Hist eVlS Mid Pac, Vol. IV, Annex IIc3, p. 25.
-99-
disposal. It was believed that the reason for its effectiveness "las
that the flame could enter small pillbox apertures and cave openings
and engulf all contours and folds. Positions Y;hich had wi thstooC con-
stant artillery, ' naval gunfire, and 75-mm. direct fire succumbed to the
flames. This reeiment reported use of the auxiliary type flame
to some extent, but it "'as often impossible to maneuver a tank to with-
in the fifty-yard range, and the lULi ted traverse offered a qmsider-
ahle handicap.40
The 3d Battalion (9th Marines) report assp-rted that the main arma-
ment flame thrower was used only once b:.' the battalion, which had made
use of the portable flame thrower, and that the greater vol-
ume of flame, range, and longer 'were Hpxactly Vlhat is needed to
effectively reach the enemy in his deep ano e l aborate cavE' ,,41
The 23d : (arine, 4th 1.[arine Division, reccrnnenoed t hat m.ore large
flame thrower tanks be -provided, but not at the expense of sacrificinG
any of the original gun power in the tank company, and also, that all
f
. t
tank platoons have one lame thrower tank as oT;anic
The 2d Battalion, 24th LIarines, 4th Iivision, report declared that
the Ronson flame thrower tanks were available on a ration and
40Actn Rpt, 9th Marines, 3d Div, Iwo Jiroa. In Hist cr;s !Iid Pac,
Vol. IV, Annex IIc3, pp. 25-27.
41Actn Hpt, 3d Bn, 9th 3d Div: Iwo Jiroa. In Hist O!S
Mid Pac, Vol. IV, Annex IIcJ, p. 27.
420pns Rpt, 230 HC'1', 3d 1,!ar fi v, lVio Jima. Hist :ud Pac,
Vol. IV, Annex IIc3, p. 23.
- 100 -
t,hat the r egiment Ylas unoble to obtai n more than two a t a t i me . The
usual number avaiLahle was one . i-hen that one tank had e)( j>ended its
flame , it had t o go t o the r ear ana refue l befor e f ini shine its mis-
s ion. Several times (iuring the oper ation, situations arose ,,,her e a
flexibl e extension hose on a r eel from tthe large f l ar.le t hr ol'/er ":oul d
ha\' E' be en valuabl e , hecaus e it T. oul d have a llowed the inf ant,r ;n::en t o
in c l ose to forti fica t ions .
43
The 24th 4t.h Division, r eportee'! that the flame thr oYi er
tank was an excellent li'eapon to reduce f ortified posi tions , bu t its
fuel capacity insufficient for proper empl oyment of the weapon
and the muzz l e of the 7 5-mm . was too large to be 9r oper l y controlleo
and the ranp,e t oo short . It was that a small er mu zzle
be used , t hat each flame throv;er t ank have an incr eased clipctci t :r' J and
carry 8 trailer load of ex tra fue l to a lleviate the necess ity of num-
erous trips 1..0 the rear fue l dumps 'When the tanks des!'lf'rately
needed i n the front lines.
n44
The 5th ',Iar i ne Tank 3;lttalion recommended that a tlflame tank sec_
of nine flame t anks . be made an or gani c par t of the
battalion . The four flame tanks assigned tn the battalion had pr oved
i nadequate to meet t hp dema nds . 45 All companies of 1. his hattalion were
4J
Opns
Rpt , 2cf Bn , 24th ReT, 4t,h Div, 1wo J i ma . In Hist CWS Mid
Vol. IV, Annex IIe3, p. 29 .
440pns Rpt , 25th RCT, 4th Usr Div, Iwo Jima , 15 Apr 45. In H1st
Pac, Vol. IV, Annex II c3 , pp. 29-30.
1.5
Actn
Rpt, 5th Tk 9n, 5th War Div , I wo Jima. In 'Hlst CWS Hid PRC,
VoL IV, Annex IIc3, p. 30.
- 101 -
in agreement with the recomnendation for more flame tanks, and made the
following comnents on the mechanical functioning of the fla;ne throwers:
the operato? was unable to see v/here he was firing, incicating the need
of a movable periscope for the purpose of observing the flame; a 360
0
traverse lVould have been useful in roueh country v:here the manel.lvera-
bility of the tank Was restricted; the flame gun needed an extension to
prevent dribbling on the rear of the tank if a 360
0
traverse were eo-
ployed; and a separate battery for the flame thrower ignition system
"as recommended.
46
The comments given above are typical of those received from infan-
try and tank units engaged at Iwo Jima. As usual, when comments are
received from units at the close of a campaign, there were ciscrepancies
and contradictions, hut an analysis indicates a requirement for more
flame tanks and r.Jechanical improvements on the ones employed.
The main armament flame thrower tanks did not establish a reputa-
tion of being death t.raps, as dio the auxiliary type flame thrower cur-
ing the Okinawa operation. One vehicle rec eived a mort ar hit soon after
[-Day. Fire extinb'J.ishers were used and the tank was back in action in
a couple of days. Several days later it received another hit and, as
the fire extinguishers were not functi oninE, the tank v:as destroyed.
It was carrying a full load of thickened fuel at the time it was hit,
but no explosion A second vehicle struck a yardship mine
46 t R t C B 5th '1"11. En Di T Ji In U";st '.lid
Ac n p, 0, J. "" Ll!d.r v,.J.. wo rna. _ ):
Pac, Vol. IV, Annex IIc3, p. 31.
- 102 -
under which was a load of TNT. The vehicle was immobilized. but again
no explosion resulted. no member of the crew was injured in either
case. Another tank ,'las hit on the ri ght sponson with a 'shaped charge,
but little damage resulted an d the vehicle 'Was back in action the fo1-
lowing day. The only injury suffered by the crew in this oase was a
small piece of shell fragment in the tank commander's knee.
4
?
There is a paucity of information available in regard to eervic-
ine, maintenance, and supply for the flame tanks during the operation.
Two "Seabee" technicians, who helped build them, a.ccolllPflied the. eight
flame throwers for the purpose of maintenence. Two reports were re-
ceived from one of these technicians, hut they do not reveal any ser-
10'.15 maintenance like those experienced with the Hark I
at Peleliu. One deficiency noted was that of poorly trained opera-
t ors. One flame tank returned froLl the front lines because the opera-
tor cid not know which valve to open to let pressure into the fuel
tan ks .
48
"11ile on boarn shj el1route to the 2,500 gallons
of f 1, Fl per f1ame t.hr m.pr were premixed, but. was lost on the
heach nuring operations and more han to be prepared. Approxi-
mately th:i.rty-five min'lt es were to refuel the flame throwers
47 Armored Force Bd, Rpt of Conferenoe on Mechanized Flame Throwers,
EU-7Rl, 23 45, pp. 6, 7. In CML'WG.
48Ltrs, lOth USN Const En
CY;C, CEe, USNR, 2 '!ar
Vol. III, Ref. 79.
(Joe Kissel, EM/2/c) to Mr. O'Neill
and 19 liar 45, no sub. In Hiat CY'-S Hid Pac,
- 103 -
at refuelinG points were established as far forward as possible.
49
E. Ryukyus Campaien
1. and Procurement. On 16 August the Chemical
' ''arfare Service conducted a demonstration in Oahu, f or officers of var-
ious branches of the Army and Tiavy, to demonstrate all mechanized flame
throwers thus far developed in the theater. n.epresentatives of the
Tenth Army, which was being formed in Hawaii, also were flresent.50
About this time, reports of the of main armament light tank
flame throvlers .. ,ere beinE: received from the ";arianas. The Tenth fl.IT.lY,
then encaged in planninG Hs i'irst operdt:cm which Cit th,qt time was
exX!cteo to he an assault on Formosa, became interested in securinc
this type flame tl1rovler for its projected operation. 8n 26 Aue:;ust 1')44
a conference "las hpld b:r members of Tenth V Amphibious Cor ps, and
the Chemical r:arfare Service, POA, to determine requirements f or main
armament tank fbme throwers 1'0r the Formosa o?ration. 7enth Ar::lY
planners estimatec that ap!,roximately 223 w0uld be required.
51
This
requirement far exceeded the number of medium tanks avai18,ble. :lowever,
in reply to a letter from the Commanding f'Jf
ll
::ral, l'acific . Oqean Area,
49Armored Force Be, Rpt of Conference on " echanizec Flame Throwers,
E12-7Rl, 2J 45. In C:.'l.':iG.
50Hist C'."S '!id Pac, \'01. II, Annex lIe, p. 9.
51
Conference held C;nl 0, POA, on Tank : !ounted Flame Thrmler hequire-
menta, 26 Aug 44. In Hist cr'"S Pac, Vol. III, Ref. 23.
- 104 -
the Tenth made firm its requirements for ane tank battalion of ,three
companie5, utilizing Ronson type flame throwers mounted on
medium tanka. The primary weapon of the vehicle was to be the flame gun
and the fuel cSp;icity was to be the maximum obtainable. 52
The Chemical Section, Central Pacific 3ase ,Command (Oahu) was
charged with the development and proauction of these flame tanks. Four
ot'ficp.rs, twelve enlisted men and thirty trained "Seabees
lt
were attached
to perform the work. 53 Two battalions of new medium -tanks were enroute
to Hawaii to replace the older M4 tank which would then become available
for modification. In accordance with War -Department _Circular No.4,
1944, which stated that alteration or modification which affect
the working parts of items or equipment will be made without prior
pl"oval of the chief of the appropriate technical Service," the base com-
mand requested permission from the Tiar Department to carry out the pre-
ject. This reqllest was granted on 14 October F
1
44.
54
In the meanti lJe , while staff work was in progress to authorize the
modification of the obsolescent tanks, Ylork was proceeding in the prep-
aration of development models to meet the deadline. On 11 October the
521st Ind, 12 Sep 44 on ltr, CG POA to CG Tenth Army, sub: Requirements
f or vehicular Hounted Flame Throwers. AG 470.71/3. In Hist CY'S
Uid Pac, Vol. III, Ref. 26.
53
Memo, G-3, Hq AFPOA, for CG CPBC, 12 Sep 44, sub: Tank Mounted Flame
Tlrrowers. In Hist cn.;; Mid Pac, Vol. III, Ref. 29.
54Hist Mid Pac, Vol. III, Annex Hcl, Ref. 31-34.
- 105 -
first r.loc.el W8.6 rea<4' for deJo1011stration. j, change had been made in the
Ronson flame gun to employ, in essence, the Ing1ehart gas closure sys-
tem, which ,,-, n s C::l n sidered a very desirable fe'!ture. The modified Ron-
flEJlle gun was teste:1 and gs.ve an excellent range and firing cheracter-
Lstic . ':'he flame gun W,', S l'ru tected by a ho":itzer-like shroud
the Tenth Army objected cn the basis that it d!d not hAve the sa.me
55
8Uhouette as stand2rd. 75-m.'D. . gun tnnk.
actlon was taken to design a new flame gun which would
fit inside the 75-mm. gun tube. Since it was to cut off the
breech of th-e gun, a tube was obtabed and the new flame
gun was demonstrated to the Tenth Army on 31 October 1944. Tenth
accepted this model on 2 No vm::'er 1944.
56
Ji. total of fourteen s8.1';&6::;
7&-1llIl. gun tubes WE.S loca:t ",c1. in the Uni tee. St&tea anc'!. s1"i"':ped 'Jy a1 to
Oahu and authority we.s received from the Wa r Department to expend suf-
ticlent new gun tubes to complete the project. The Navy Bure&u of
Ordnance &681 steel in pro-euring the necessary supplies by making available
57
surplus M2rk I -UIli ts and. parts.
It was necessary to incr cf.s") the size of pro,.ri s! onal Flame
Thrower Group ill order to carry out the conitruction ,.ork, ani por!'lo!ll"el
!=i5
S6
57
Ibid., Refs 39-41, also Vol. II, II cl, p. 30.
Ltr, CG Ten t '\; ArrJY to CG POA, 2 Nov 44, sub: 1,!oUI' ted
:Flame Thro\:er. I:1 Hist Cw':; Mlc ;Pac, Vo l. III, Re f 42.
H1.st CHS Min Pac, Vol. II, A.'1neJC 2 cl, p. 32.
- 106 -
was, of neoessity, gathered from a variety of sources. Since there was
no authorized table of organization for such a unit. the 251st Composite
Chemical Supply Detachment. Supply Team No.4, was designated as the ad-
ministrative element of the Flame Thrower Group. Civilians, Arny, Navy,
Marine. and naval construction personnel partiCipated at various times
as members of the group (Fig. 7.) The majority of technicians for this
work was obtained from the loth and 117th Naval Construotion Battalions.
Personnel were also loaned Army ordnance and engineer organi-
zations.
58
On 16 Deoember, ten armored Force officers and twenty Armored
Force enlisted men from the United States joined the Flame Thrower
Group.59
By a letter, dated 15 November 1944, the 27th Infantry Division re-
quested twelve light tanks, mounting Ronson flame throvrers, for use in
future operations. It was specified that these flame thrower tanks
should be similar to the ones employed by the 2d with
\vhich the 27th had operated on Saipen. On 21 November. Fleet
Force stated its total reqUirements as fifty-four flame tanks, on the
basis of nine for each of the six Marine Divisions. This request was
later increased to twelve per division. with high priority for those
divisions to be employed in the Okinawa operation. Since it was impos-
sible to produce the additional flame tanks on the date specified and
with the facilities available in Hawaii, both the 2'7th Infantry Division
58Hist CWS Pac, Vol. III, Refs. 45, 46, 47.
59
Ltr. CG ACtF to eG POA, 16 Nov 44, sub: Shipnent }l umber GE-1l4. In
Hist CTIS liid Pac, Vol. III, Refs. 48 and 49.

- 107 -
Figure 7.
aHe the Fleet Fa- ce were i nfor med that the fifty_four flame
tanl<s, 1:Jeinc manufad,ured for the Tenth Anny, wou l d be employed t o
support 311 units during the Okinawa operation . 60
2. Empl oyment - 7l3th Tank Ba ttalion . Armored Flame _Thrower. Pr o-
visional. en 1 r,'ovember 1944, the 7l3th Tank Batta li on was designated
as the unit to be equipped Y/i th the f ifty- four main armament type med-
ium t ank flame throwers for the Hyukyus Certain personne l
fr om this battalion were f ur nished t he Flame Thrower Group to assist in
the construction of the f l ame tanks . In this 'tlay, maintenance person-
nel of the tank battalion became acquainteo with their tanks
from the moment flame thrower installation began and were soon very fa-
miliar 'with the weapons . As fla"e tanks r olled of! the assembl y line
they were run out t o the training area, test fired , adjusted, ,and used
in the schools for trai ning operating personne l. Ot her personnel of the
battali on were trained in the mixine of flame thrower fuel.
The stanoara tank battal ion organization WaS not suited t o hand le
all the problems of a f lace thrower tank battalion. Therefore, a ten-
tative table of or gani zation, largely within the framework of the stand-
arc organization, was drawn UP to per mit more flexible use of personne l
60
Evidence that the f l ame tanks actually did support both Army and
ines during the Okinawa Operation j s given in Appendix
61
Ltr, CG Tenth Army t o CO POA, 6 Oct 44, sub: Tank An -
Primary Armament , and 1st ind (H. d.) 470 . 71/3 (G- 3) .
Pac, Vol . III, Ref. 51.
_ 108 _
Fiane Thrower
In Hist C":S
d
. t 62
an equ1 prnpn The ano characteristics of the battalion,
:lS well as its mi ss ion are given in ;:)i r ective ro. 14, ueaC: _
liuarter s , Tent.h c' o.\ tec' 5 Fetr'.l Cl r:: 1945.
63
,:,r.is c:irective Was issued
primarily t o acquaint commanci ers v:ith t he new weapon that Was to
The battalior. l eft fearl at OI}OO, 4 1945, and arrived
of t he battalj on 0f 391 of ficers and enl i sted Men anti 136 ve-
hic1cs . The echelor. , of 133 off:cers Rna enlis t ee nen anc
\,as ).eft behinc at :.1ahu f or on a l a t er
echel on, Mlen shippinG be canE avail.qble. : iover."!er.t o f tte f OrYia r c: . (che 1 0 :1
'.';a s mac;c In ten f'xc e I' t f or 202 pers onnel , ho J'1 ove c. on eHl " PA be-
cause of oasseni:er s;;ace on thA s. for the operati on ,'" as 1
April 1945. but ba tt. a lion .... Ia s helc Ci t anchor in Ke rama l-tetto until
L plu3 six (7 April 1945) ,-hen it vas ::rJ.t a s hor e aL 2each or.
Okinawa Shima.
64
T'1e J a panese clefenoing eXPf'r=_encec the ter r if:ring
b'Jrst. of flame on 19 Aprj.l 194 5. On this ca y thirty-one flc1. ''1e tanks were
c0::,r.:ittec and 3, '"iOO Ga llon::; of fuel Vlere expcnC:ec : A supportec
62
Hist C1S :!io Pa c , Vol. Ref. 53 .
63
See Appencix
64AJ.. Rpt, 713th 3n , !\r ''1or u
1
;:larae :hr o
1
.e r, Fr ovi si0:1a :!., Phase T
!:ansej CI:ap IV, p. 1. (Se 6) .
- lC9 -
the 181th Infantry Rer:imflnt, 7th Division. In attacking th." Rocky Craf-' s,
the ?lIth Tank Battalion WO.8 in the 'lead, followed by Comrany A's flame
tanks which in turn \Yere followed by the infan try. OnE? tAnk waS hi t and
another threw a track. In tryinF, to ttose a was
killed by small arms fire and an officer the 3d Plat oon wa s
slightly wounded. One tank flamed a mac hine gun position, burned a house,
and ki1le d an estimated fifteen Japanese. In attempting to evacuate
some wounded infantrymen the tank became stuck and to be abandoned.
The 1st Platoon, Compeny B. moved out with Company C, 193d Tank Battalion,
to 8U!)port the l06th Infantry, 27th Division, in a drive south from
Kachino to Kuma. Three or four caves were flamed (Fig. 8) and
eight Japanese soldiers with gas masks on came running out and were
killed. One flame tank wns hit in the drive sprocket by an enemy 47-mm.
shell and put out of action. Flame t anks of thfl 2d Platoon.
Company :g, operated with Co mp any A, 193d Tank Battalion, in SU'!'-
rort of the l05th Infantry. 27th with the mission of cle8ring
Ka.kasu. The infantry gave no sunnort, 8.nd wh<>o the flame tanks s tarted
to fire they were ordered to ston, for f ear OT burning our own troops.
Four of the flame tanks were nut out of action, one by a. two by
enflmy anti-tank fire, and O:1e by a \'lhite phosphoru!'l shell. A sergeant
Was rep orted missing and five men were wounded in action.
The battle for the Crags and Hill 178 beyon d them begA.n on 19 Ar ril.
The flame tanks continued to sunport the i nfantry in t b.is action. (Fig. 9.)
The wa s bitterly by the enemy and cost our infantry
- 110 -
Figure 8.
Figure 9.
a total of 243 casualtif!s. ':'he flame tanks oj1(;ra in close suP!)ort,
f100ci ng the "iho-1e peak vIi th 1iquic; fire. On 21 j,pri1, the enell:':' sho.md
their hatrec! f or the urmoreG fla!'le throwers v!hen Japanese, carr;'T-
ing satchel charr,es, hurled themselves at the flame but ";8re cut
down before they c oule: reach ther.;. The Crags v'ere a:terncl tel:' pounded
by artillery, am; burner] flame, until .:xcupiec by our tr00',Js on 23
April.
On 20 April Jd Plat:Jon of Company A supportec thE 326 ::::nfantry,
7th T:ivl..sion, jn the attack on Ouki Hill. Flane tanks fjre on
c:1placements around the hill 'whi1e inf;mtry attackec towClrc the front
a deep gorge on the =n a fierc e hand t o han( j3ttle.
the h:l1 was taken and mopped up , ,.-i th fl:une an(3 cemoE hons.
On 21 h.pril the 1st Platoon, Conpany A, GUPT)orte( 17t:1
7th i;ivision, Company 3, 711th Tank Battalion, in a (lrive froI:! s ::JU+,h
of Yonabaru. 'J.'heir mi nsi on ,iat; to burn a rocky ridge. This Vias
plis:W(l .d.th clo.3E. :;uPi)ort hy infantr:.' an( tanks, b.lt t.he ir:fant.r:' "as
un1:1b1e to consolidate thp Awro:xima,hl:i sevent:,-livE: ( )J t. i l<-
E-nemy were killed by Clur flc'1r.:le t anks, and.!llJre, who triprl. to escape the
fl.'lme, were killH': by standa r d tall;{s. The 'lth Li .visiClll that
fla:!le thrower tanks Here active :lTlC of [ reat value. Infantr;"men cOo...
opo'rated well "lith the f18me t.:m\{ s, at about five Jards ;':'IlC
climbing ont o the tani{s to l-l0int out targets. :'lame tanks c :mtinl1ec
to support thit) acti ()n thi"QuSh 23 April. After the thirrl succ e:3 siVf;
- 111 -
;Josi t i (m::;.
; 'rO;Tl 22 to 2;. Af'ril tnf: 383d Infantr:,. :-.e,;ir.1Ent, 96 th IiviGion, v.as
engaged in Oln ,,!, a ::;1\arp ric.
5
e on th'? defense
line : 71'\e rjc1ge reachu: on 22 but any W:.l 3
stopped hy fortj ,fied caves alOll f:.; the ridGe line. l'he flar:l e tan": s
":ere called up to t 'urn off the hi ::"1. ::ext V ]" ", ttCick WdS re-
su:ned t. hp b'Jt t1(e enen;., had eV.'1.(,ll a te( their positi. ons.
""his action !"'\arJ.:ec the fjrst rd thcra\,/al 1"): the ener.lJ' from a stronGly
:J r..; ,:m:: zed defense s:,' stem. It ap)'le", rc:c that V"e v'::' t '\'los he-
cause of the deviJstatinc effect of the flar1e.
65
Sn 26 April, sixteen flamp taJJks we r e corru.,i tteo Cir.e xpeTl GecJ ""
t ot'll nf 2.,900 c allons of fue l i n :')un:i nE t )-)e t Ol';ns of aLe rai(a::Ja,
fl a:nLnt; a r:,cge nurth of i':ochi, ::mci Dn rJin
b
off areas tn thE: S6th I:ivi-
S::"011 Sector. 11m 'Jffic e rs ane an enlistee,; man "'e r e rlOun c' ecJ a 'oooby
trap explosion =mc.: anotpp.r enlist ee) I':)an, 1hile ::;tancijnl.,; up in his open
t?nk t urret, .. ,as ",oum}ed h:r a sniper. On 27 April all platoons of LOI:1-
pi-tfl:/ C ai.;, "1ir: s:.lpportE:: c the JdJd i r! a Lr llellj nt,; all 0'1;' 'rattle
on t:"P. hills north of Shure. Fnem:; opposi tion was fierc e nearly
2,400 [allons of fuel fired into caves and
After 1000 hours nnE was halted by intense mortar, machine
t:un, 3.nC sf'1l11l ar"')s fire fr om eni'>::-y posj t,i ons on j ts eYp0:::;ed ri t,; ht flank.
tS5 Actn Rpt, He1 J8Jc.: Inf H.eGt (96th Div), n.ci., s'lb: CCir:1pai gn.
- 112 -
During the remainder of the day, however, this battalion cleaned out large
numbers of the enemy with flame throwers and tanks. An adjacent battalion
advanced and consolidated lines on top of Hill 138, from which tanks were
able to deli ver direct fire on enemy posi tions in the town of Shuri. The
flame tanks definitely accounted for fifteen Japanese, and many more prob-
ably perished in emplacements. Four flame t.anks were dllrj ng the
day i.n this sector, one receivinr: tD.ree direct hits from an enemy 47-m'1l.
A.T gun. Of the others, one stalled, one turned over, and one threw a
track. All were rescued.
On 28 April the flame tanks had a busy day. Company A supportec
units of the 7th :::ivision, but had difficulty in operating because of mud
and almost impassable terrain. One section (three flame tanks) was un-
able to advance at all. The other section attempted to pass t hrough
Onaga village to attack a hillside and several caves on the s outhwest
edge of the to" ln. AGain the armor tried to push forward, only to be
forced back by mJ. G, heavy artillery , anc mortar fire. The JEl Plat oon
flamed caves and a ridge. Two tanKs were stuck in s oft Gr ound, and
h i O men wer e roundec while evacurltinc them. The compan:,r the
27th Ii.vision and bt:rned out a sr.Jall valley c ontaining ene:ny snipers
ann a mac hine sun posi tion The flar.le tan k reported, howevf: r,
that it was 0oubtf'.l1 if the flame VIas p.ffectiv as the rante Vias t oo
l ong. Three flame tanks, supported by tank s ano infantry, flamed pill-
boxes, cA.ves, and machine GUn positions in the .qrea southwest of
chinato airfield, where one flame tank struck a mine and was disahleo.
- 113 -
Company C the JdJd in the attack . The terrain
'Was muddy 'El]"lC one tank \,las mi r ed anc evacuated. 'i'he other three got
and (JOUred b'.l.rning napalm and :!lJch ine gun f i re into caves .
7hre"", mor e flame tanks , cl osel,}' by the infantry, fi.red t'JiO
l oaes of napalrt into caves a nd GuEou tS . Flarne tn this a rea was crecii-
t eo l'.'i th killine over 100 .Japanese , and Ci cvan ces up to JOC yards
were made in t,he face of heavy resi stance . A t l)tctl of twenty_six
flalle tanks WQS cor:rlit ted during t.he day ano J,500 gallons of ftlel v:ere
fir ed b:J the bat talion .
On 29 Apr i l the 1st' Platoon , Corooany 5 , poured flame on entrenched
E'ner.lY posi ti ons near i :aka"'!l8 in the 7th Divisi. on sector , expending 900
ga llons 1n a half hou r . Ten i'ler p. drivJ:=n out the flame and
\lie r e l<illed by infantrymen . The Jc Pl atoon burneo out snipers a n<-l ma-
chine t.1.1 n f)Ositions on thp southwest ti p of ai rfielD. COIr.j:)any
C al l i t s pl<itoons i.n support of th"! 96th [.ivision and the ?63d
Tank north of Shuri. Fl ame tanks , with stanc..:ar d t.anks , spear_
headed the i nfantry advan ce . was liberul :i..y on r iCiges and
reVf> r se s l opes . I n t"'I]"Ie flame tank a cannoneer disillou nted. anc a front
line infantr yman , ,',' ho !<IlP;; the t ook hts pl ace . Flanl<ec by reg-
ular tanks , t.he hi e flame thr owers poured napalm into a. large cave con-
t aining apPl'oxil"\a. tely 100 pnc'TlY soldiers . Then , f urther
t hroueh a cleared r.linefiel d 800 y arci5 aheaci of the infantry, the tanl(s
and flame t anks firp.d and. blasted other cave positions. :Jany Japanese
sol (!iers were spen, u('Ith j n ,a no out of caves , and we re flamed . cne
-1l1.-
thousan c. fivf'! hundred F!8llon s of fuel 'W' !'lre expended, and the infantry
credited the t enks a nd f lame tP-nks 'With 260 of the 290 enemy soldiers
kill ed. The day ' s total for the bAttalion was t welve tpnks commi tted
and 3.900 of fuel The bat t a li on commAnde r report ed
that the infantry liked the flamp. thr owers and advanced behind them.
when they hesi t ated to follow a standAr d tank . Thus , wi thin t en dAyS
after this Dey been introduced i nto co mbat, i nfan try command-
ers had welded it t hei r toams and individual Bol di er
had l earned of it s capabiliti e s.
Space does not per mit a deta iled day by day account of the activi -
66
ties of the 71 3th Armored Fl ame Thr ower Tank Bat tali on . During the month
of May, fi ghting t ook p l ace along the enemy dt-fensive po81tions l oca ted
on the hieh ground north of Shuri . (Fi g . 10 . ) The coral r ock on this high
ground wa s honeycombed wit h cave s, the defended it b i tterly.
Shur! was t he anci ent cap ita l of Oki nawa And General UshlJi ma ' s 32d Army
Head quarters was located In un dergr ound Caves beneath Shuri Castle. The
Tenth .Army attaclr;e d the Shuri defenses with the XXI V Corps on the l eft
(eas t) and the III AmphibiOUS COTOS on the right. In t he XXIV Cot'pe
sectcr , the 7th Divisi on advanced on the l eft the 77th Divi -
!'l i on , on th"l: right, mai'!.e a f r ontf'\.l toward Shurj. In the III lim-
phi Moue Corps sec tor. the 6th Ms,rine D1 vi si on advencea al ong the COAs tal
right flAnk and the l et Di vi o; i on '''ns !lssi e;nec the s ector on the
66
For the ba ttali on' s Acti on 6"'.e A"'!l endh : 6 .
- 115 -
Figure 10.
corp' 5 left flank., Each of the four line divisions ,vas supported by a
battalion of
Company A of the 71Jth 5attalion (Flr\me) supported the 7th Divi-
sion during the fi:t5t ten daJ>6 of May:in the , battle .for Kochi ' Ridge.
The 96th Division then replaced the '7th Division., Khich moved bad( to
Cor'ps reserve for a rest. Company A's ' flame
sl!Pportec the 96th Gi vision In the fighting f'jr the Hills
area.
Company 3 supporteo the 1st ;,'larine D.i vision during the first ten
days of the month in the bat ,I f: f o!' Hill 60 and Nan Eill. Thi.s fight
developed into a tank, flame, an d dem') li tions ba ttle'. Fr aIl! 11 to 20
May thE" flame tanks supported the Marines in the savage .rfght
to seize Shurt Heights.
The fllL7e tanks 01' Conpany C supported the 77th Divisi on from 1
to 6 :Ia:; in neutralizinG the netvDrk of caves on the reverse of
Yaeqa Escar pment. fr on 11 t o 21 ' :ay t hE f13 ne tan'.-: s liqui c fjn:
1t1to the unciergrour. d po s iti ons of Chocolate Drop [Ji ll and the Flatt op-
Dick Hil15 area.
:uri. n:-: the l a st. ten ( a,,' s of I' air.s t,'..: rr er. :' i'lP FJ ound
intI) a quaC1i l'e anc .... ere i rt:1obilized. =-"l rirlg t his per ioc, the
Japanese J2d Ar;ny succe eded i n evacua tinc the Shuri cefcnse liI: anC
tablishec itself on t he hibh r' n t:-:, e s o.:.the rn ti p of t he islarlc .
On 29 the 1st garine Division occupied :i huri, which had been a
- 116 -
symbol of strength for the during the bitter along the
Shuri r.efense line. wrinc t he month the fl ame t anks expencec 49,000
I ons of fil el. \';'hfl nthe rains s t.arted , twenty-eight of t:-'e
battali on ' s f i ft y-four t a nks we r e in ope ratin& condition.
,)p.s taken of t he i n t ank oprati ons tJ r epa i r eleven
flame tanks.
The 1st Platoon, Company 3, '\'fas at tache d t o ele:nE: nt s of the 6th
:.!arine Division f or 3n ar.1phibi ou s landi ng on Cr oku Pe nin sula I n 6 June,
with the ru.s s ion (If ca pt.uri ne r
1
aha air fi eld . For the fir s t two
the flame t an:<s we r e not used . On 8 June , however, two f 1arle
-,,'er e ser;t out v' ith Co;::)pany A, 6t h :!ar ine Tank Battali on , to burn vi1-
l a bes neA.!' the 3irfil c . Ten J apa ne s e >"e r e killed . On 10 June, f our
t an'cS bur ned Or oku ane Ja pane se were burned t o death.
'The next day, f our f 1a:ne t an'{s ournec the t en n of Tomicusuki anG t'7elve
(' nen:j sol c: i et s were annihi. l tlt
prl
, : he f i (; htH. g on. the peninsula soon
su'::J si oec :m c
l
on 15 June the Muines cap:tlr ec ACmira1 Ota 's heac1quarters
";"er e the;, - f ound h:i m ar, C
1
hi s staff 13:i c! out, hav:"n[ cons'UIllnated
d har i -kari pac t.
en 9 luna. t hA 7th bet an a concerted attack on a strong
r ocky l i r.e sou :.,l1 of Gus hich.J. n. The Ja p:1I'!e5e Vlere defenci ing a long
r idge which Vias cal l e c t he fuze-take Escarpnent , or just "The Escarp-
mE'nt ,It n .b escar pmer. t extended the . :bole 7 th !)i vision fr ont
and reached i nto the 96th Di vision's zone i n serie s of cliffs and
hills. Cn the r iGht, in t he '7t !i :civi s
i
on the escarpnent rose

- 117 -
in a sheet vertical cliff, 2SO to JOO feet high, to a rolling plateau.
On the left, or east, the escarpment was steep, but not sheer. Here
the cliff was topped by a jumbled pile of knobs, sllall hill's, coral
buttresses, and pinnacles, which were called Hill 95. To
the southeast of the escar pment lay r ugged cl11'1'5 bordering the sea ..
At least 500 of the enemy defended the right side of the' escarpment in
the 7th Division sector. lhey were deployed in depth, in lines and
groups of snipers and machine gunners at the base of the cliff ' ana in
groups on the hilly plateau over the cliff. Uany more were in positions
on Rill 95 and its approaches.
Before the escarpment lay a valley, covered with a patchwork of
cane and rice fields. North of the valley, on small ridges and in ra-
vines, the 7th Division dug in anc looked out. on the tough job ahead ...
the job of seizing the escarpnent in the face of murderous Japanese fire
from hi t; h ground. On the right, .or west side: the 17th Inf'antry Regiment
faced the sheer cliff; on the left, the 32d Infantry Regiment poised for
their attack on Hill 95.
On 9 June 7th forces struck from behind their advanced
patrols. They met withering fire and made little progress. On 10 June
they struck again. At 0730 hours naval gunfire, artillery, and tanks
pounded the . cliffs in front of the 32d Infantry. The i nfantry advanced
and probed the eastside of Hill 95, but jVere greeted by accurate
machine gun and snipep fire from the hiU approaches and from the hill
itself. they were unable to move, but five flame tanks
- 118 -
maneuvered 1nto position and burned off all appr oaches to Hill 95 and
its escarpments. The terrific heat eliminated most of the resistance
in that area. 3y 1700 hours troops had advanced t o the last high
grouno on the east approach to Hill 95. The 17t h Infantry, on the r ight
facing the sheer cliff, fir ed on positi ons on the escarr-ment with all
available weapons. Two .companies of infantry, approximately seventy-five
men "\'Iith no officers, had gained the top of the escarpment south of
Gushichan. Here they were promptly pinned down by Japanese fire from
further up the ridge. 'l'he Commandin'g Officer, Company C, 7l3th Armored
Flame Tank Dattalion, and his sergeant scaled the wall and pulled a fire
hose after them. The pinned dm'lT1 b:
r
a pillbox 100 yards up
the ridge , refused t o help vnth the hose or to go forward until the
enemy's first position had been sprayed with fire. Since the hose would
not reach that far, tank men took it down, moved the1rtank and climbed
the ridge again. It took them near1Y 'two hours to reach , the top, where
they ' were about thirty yards from the enemy position. From this point
they attacked 'Vii th the extension hose, burnine out the defenders. About
seventy Japanese were killed here, and the top of the rtdge was secured.
Then the five flame tanks were put in line ann machine guns fired over a
500-yard frontage of the escarpment.
67
On 11 June all attacks were resumed. A battalion of the 32d Infan-
try was alerted ' +'0 build ladders in order to scale the heights of the
67 (1) Combat Opns lipt, Hyukyus Campaign, Okinawa Shima, Hq 32,d Inf Regt
(7th Inf Div). (2) Ltr, emlO Tenth Army to Cm1 0 U1dPac, 28 Jul
45, .no sub.
- 119 -
escarpment. of the success of the day was attributed to the flame
throwertankmen, who had a field day burning' underbrush and defenders
from the entire area, (Fig. 11) in what was termed "Colonel j;{ickey Finns
Scorched Earth Policy" - the flame tankmen had won a permanent place in
the doughboy's hearts. Following the flame, the infantry assault took
off. One platoon of Company B, 32d Infantry, and men from the flame
thrower tank crew worked their way to a point just below the lip of the
top and under heavy fire from a minimum of seventy-five Japanese
sucoeeded in pulling a 400-foot flame hose with them. These seventy-
five defenders, armed with grenades, satchel charges, and bayonets, were
only a few feet from them. Reaching this precarious position under al-
most superhuman difficulties, the crew sprayed fuel onto the top of the
oliff and then ignited it. Quickly follOWing their advantage, men from
Company B leaped to the top and, with flame ,and fire from own
weapons, killed the fleeing Japanese and seized the commanding terrain
of the hill. Two platoons of Company A followed and took up
positions on the left of Company B.
68
Meantime, medium tanks were moving southwest along the bone of the
esoarpment le.ying direct fire into c.aves and crevioes and machine gunning
Japanese who had been blasted out of caves. Tanks were badly needed to
support the men on top of Hill 95, so reoonnaissance was_made to discover
a route in the of Hanagusuku. By actual count there were 135
68Combat Opns Rpt, Ryukyus Campaign, Okinawe. Shima, Hq 32d Inf Regt
(7th Inf Div). n.d.
- 120 -
Figure 11.
Ja?:lnese dead another 100 ",;ere csti;nateo killp,d by all weapons in-
cluc:iine flar.:e ttlY' over tanks.
f\ not her section of tan%s :ind fl3.me tanks . fla.ned t he er.tire front of
thE escar!l:-1.ent, criving , the Japanese from their positior:s and then cut-
t.ir. g the::! omn rrith ITI3.chine gun fire. fAIring the niGht the 17th Infan-
trJ cr ept i' :n' viarc' scalecJ tbe sheer escarpment without firinc a sincle
shot. The Ja:)anese ha c pulled back fr om forwar d ?0Sj ti ons to avoid niGht
haras sinb that since our hao not mace night
attacks previously not mak8 one nOl". At , dawn, as the Japan-
ese st arte 6 l.J ac
1
( t. Ol'lii l 'd thei r positi ons' , US infantrymen took ther:l by com-
f->lete sur pr ise and r:l :.:mec; thera c1o;n . I'l.}me tanks mo ppe d. up sO['Je by-passed
posit1cms in the esc3rpment and sllpported 1.lnits moving a round to the
rie; ht flar: '(.
The battle c onti nueri nn 12 ,hme. At dawn , in the 32d Infantry sec-
t.or, a l a r gp. em:ny i'l)rc p t rieo t o <.lis loc1ge Compan;y ;3 from its precarious
pos 5. t i.)n a:nonL t he c crs.l heacs (jno :)innac> s on Bill 95, dno was rapidly
anlli hilated. Shortly aftf-T s. two flanle t anks came up 2. nd an exten-
si on was h'3.'.lled u p the f j ft} -foot ps car pment rope . The fl@ll
Was thf.r, fireci over the opposite edge ane Was bl O1m into the caves by
the .-.inc . ,sl' p;Jortin:.:; killeG JdjlC:lne Se ane six more Vlere
ki lleG hy t hE- !l3.me. Several am ,1U)1ition ciumps were "D lmm up. The hose
"as t ilEn rift:;, arc attached to a nother fla.me thrower. Two
<pillboxes v.'ere t a ke!1 under fir e ane apr r oxi r1'J tely f ifty Japanese Here
killed . explosi ,:1fls occ'.lr r ed ::ina Japanese bodies were thrmm
- 121 -
hiGh into the air . The flame t.hroTJers bela"., the escar)l:llent moved into
posi tion to destroy thirt;: Japanese who v.r ere tryinG to escape thp flame
alont; t.he ridge. Three hundred gallons of napalm were expended. I n
the afternoon, five fla.r.le thr owers were lined up at the base of the
oliff to fire caves anc pillboxes. Thirt:,' Japanese ){ere killed and an
machine which V/.S firin,: on t he flame thro,;;ers, was destroyed
T:i th its erel'{ of three. Fifteen hundred gallons of napalm v:er e expended
in this a ct ion. 711e pushpd f orwar0 during the day and
hy 1600 hOl.u's qill 95 y;as i n t hf' hands of U.S. troops. ThP ;_nfantry n ow
the road leauinG fr0<:1 Pana[usul-:u t o the top of the
:.l ent. Flame tanks burneci the slopes which r ose fr om the s:des of the
road and y:ere ab le to reconnoiter and determine that t he r oad was suit-
able f or tanks and that it lpc< t o t he top of the ps car pment. Cl thAr f lame
tanks cont:nued flaminG Japane se who were hola ine out on t. he northeast
approaches to Hill 95.
7he 17th Infantry c onti nl t"[! se curing a nd flankint the eS('Cl rpr.;e n t
on 12 J'..lne. After the ni f; ht the bat tlf! l ias Lrv, e l;y .q s truggle
f :)r t hp pla teau over the escarpment. Flame tanks a c vanced ar.d expendcc1.
600 of eel1ed gasoline, a sma ll vi llag
p
i n front of one
bat+Jalion, ,me many J apane sE", f orcer1 int J . the Opll flClme, wer e \:illea
')y the i.nfant r;;. :'.: n the ",fternClM\, nine Lallons o,f f ue l -./e r e
j. n area c .:.ves on both f on :ard rtnc1 reverse
slopes.
- 122 -
At 0430 h0ur:; on iJ June the J'lpanose fur iousl y counterattacked
troops of the 32ri Infantry on Hill 95, driving them back fUty yaros
in one sect.or . Slo .. the drive wa s halt.ec , t,hen with 200
Japanese The 320 Infantry drove f on :ard unt il they again
.)verlool(1?0 the r oad . Inf.s.nt r yrnen r,ee<.iec tanks on Hi ll 95 and on .
part s ')f thp. f>3Car?t.lent.
I'b::l had been burnine the bi'\se of the scar jX!lent on 13
June, CIne they moved up, as on the precedinl; day , and flamed both
sides of t.he c1 r.<tv, 3f,d the t.op of thE escarmlent, clearine the area of
snipers . Tanks then moved up thr ough the craW. v:ithout close infantry
support , aN; joihed t hf> 2d 9G,tta l:lon, 326 Infantry, on top of Hill 95
f or the cri ve c1 0V:n t.he nther siee.
The L'th ::::nfantr y advanced ' :ith support from medium tanks. anc! flame
thrower tanks to Asato and hegan opf:rations ar,a1nst"heavy resistance.
Ry ni Ght thp vi lla!::e \'las taken aJ'l.d the 17th t ied In with ot the
32d I nfantr;! on t.he If'ft, south of Asato . Some .1lopping up to
be done , but t:.he battle f or the escar p!lent ar.d Hill 95 was over.
711e f or "1.11 95 VIas of the kind of tactics employed
to (;estroy tl1e tn t!leir fi ght-to- the- deflt.h defense on the sout.her n
tip 01 01.: inaY!a . Ollly f13.::-.e tanks fror.l C \':ere employed i n this
actton. '1eanwhile , CO"f' panies : ... anc B were supportinr. the 96th I nfant ry
rivisi c'n in their aevance in t-l("lQ(fy battle f ')r Kunis hi Hjdge .
- 123 -
From 13 to 17 June, Company C "again supported the 7th IJ.j vision in
the fierce battle f or Hills 153 115, pr oved to be a repeti-
tion of Hill 95. On 14 June the battalion commander wounded in this
action and the cOD1r.ander of the 3d Platoon, Company C, was killed when
thef1ame tank which they were a tt::l pting t o evacuate caue; ht fire . The
battalion executi ve officer assumed command . On this same cay the com-
pany worked continuously burning 01,lt caves, spraying hi11si ces, and
hurnine houses and pillboxes. Three" thousanc nine hundred gallons of
fuel were expended OBr "14 J1lDe. The company credited hy the infant.ry
i'ii.th kl11ing 131 Japanese and possibly twenty-four mor e . the
foW day's fighting for these hills, Company C poured nearly 1.3,000 gal-
lOris of f1amine oil into the defenses.
1"rom 18 to 23 June, Company C t he 7th l:ivision in the
attack on Hill 110 t As was true of the other Mlls, each crevice,
cave, ano coral outcroppin6, of vlhich the,rf! viere huncreds concealed hy
thorny underbrush, had its full quota of armec Japanese s ol di.e rs ceterm-
ined- to take a s many American lives as possi ble before they were killed.
On 19 June one flame tank commander fired two loads of f nel at caves and
brush where sni per fire was holding up the ;:;hen t he ::'nfantry
was again halted, he Atta ched 450 feet of hos e to his tank. "i dth t he
hel p of the 1,nfantry he dragEed it to the top of the escar!)fnent. The
infantry then said that they had no one t o handle the hose s o t he
commander (a sergeant ) handled it himself, leading the infantry through
a sni per-infested area. A1thoueh the hose leaked baoly and t he tanknan
was drenchec 'with oil, he continued unti 1 the fuel Was bone. He
Tile the ... _'l fir ed t r..i rtgen c lip s of cartridg es f rO$
hi !:> M-l riflg i n . .... ;.port. fla:n'" t er.k cOf.l:nancl,er
1
s perfo;' !::8nce !lre .
tigb prai se from bote the i nfantry a r.d the After from
the a bove acti on , t he tankman spott ed a Jep6.f,e ae 75- mrn . er..:..n as it knoc ked
Ou.. t a 711 th T811k Battalion veh icle . n<:' imDediately Jump ed Mo t her
711th tank, sprayed t he JEq)a"'l .. gun , and killea. the cre .... '. ,1r! other ISl!r-
geant fir gd. hIO loads of fuel and d.! d ilIU.Ch to Cl-'I, ositi :)n on the
hill . such t&ctics . the Japa'less could not continue their ra-
,1 st ance for l ong . :By dusk the hill we.s cleared end CUT' t r oops d',1 in
for niCht.
Flll 89 1I'as thl'! last roe,jor strong pOint on southern Cki na\,;a ws,
the 32d 7th Division. On 70 June the regi ment at tac keQ
t ::ls jaeg"' a. coral ... :-p:::ent , \off' S -..u:.c.ermlned 'by hundr eds of caves
a.o.d tunnel s. It wa 6 onl y 400 y a rds 10:"06 end 2"0 ;re_rd6 wide at it s ... 1.delt
place , ita top ended in a po in t t he coa6 t
of C:d.ll&' ... a . d t::e rose ZZG f eet scovo::: sea l'!vel, l'.nd loc.:tted
'eep .... i thi!l this f ortre s s were Lieutenant Ge ner.el Uahijime a nd hi .
Z2d Ar m:.i Head.quarters. Here the remnan t s of the 32d Ar tIlY iI'er e aae'embled
for t heir final .: t and. The al most unv e11 e\'e.bly r ou{ h .terra i r:: and the man)'
natur a l c aves, t unnel s . and c:,evl ces made it ex tr emely difficult to locate
69
enemy. The area had been 6ystema tically pOl.ln.ded. :for veekG by naval
69
Cpns Rpt . Campai !;n, Hq 32c. I nf Ret (7th I nf Div).
n. d.
- 125 -
gunfire and air strikes. using both HE and napalm filled bombs. rocket
assaults. and long-range artillery. By this time the thoroughly dis-
organized Japanese had very little fight left in them and the shortage
of weapons and ammunition was very apparent. lLany Japanese surrendered,
perauaded by our propa
6
anda leaflets and our front-line loudspeaker
appeals. However, a large number still elected to fight. and General
Ushijimafs "fight to the end" orders wore faithfully and fanatically
carried out.
Flame thrower and medium tanks preceded the infantry and, with the
usual scorched earth policy, burned off the remainder of the foliage on
Hill 89 and approaches thereto, leaving the escarpment's face an ugly
blackened mass of jagged coral. At 1430 hours on 20 June. infantrymen
charged up the rugged slope against light resistance, and by 1515 hours
had secured commanding positions on top of the hill.
During the night of 20 - 21 June. Japanese out of the crevices
and caves to harass our troops. morning the infantry proceeded to
clear the base of the hill. Hidden machine gun, rifle. and knee mortar
fire the attackers as they moved from one spot to another in neu-
tralizing each cave and crevice. Engineers quickly built a supply route
to take tanks to the top of Hill 89 and then along the
mente Flame-thrawing tanks in increasing numbers were brought uP. sys-
Jematically burned off all forms of vegetation, and then poured thousands
of gallons of the flaming liquid into caves and crevices (Fig. 12.) By
1800 hours the entire hill had been covered and remaining defenders no
Figure 12.
longer tired from the entranoes. Engineer demolition te&ne were
bulY the day sealing cave entrances. Support ed flame
thrower tanks, medium tanks, and artillery, the infantry pushed
rorward through difficult terrain to rout Japanese from
ooral heads and tall grass . Tank maohine gun fire and flame had to
rake the a.rea before intantrymen could move forward.
On 22 and 24 JUDe infantrymen, with the ai d of flame tanks and
demolition teams. continued mopping up the top of Hill 89. Flame
thrower tanka were able to reach the reef and work east to the
southern slopes of Hill 89 to olean out hostile Japanese. Loudspeaker
teams tried. with soma suooess. to encourage civilians and soldiers
to surrender. The flame tanks worked in conjunction wi t h loudspeaker
tanks .. in a team which killed over 100 Japanese and persuaded over
three times that number to surrender. Flame tanks on top of the cliff
fired fuel out over the sea so the wind could blow it back into oaves
which were too high to be reached from the beach. Five huge explo-
sions resulted as ammunition dumps blew up. Loads of fuel were fired
into a huge cavern in which over 1 .. 000 Japanese were believed to be
hiding (Fig. 13.) Near t he end of the day the bodi e s of Lieut enant
Generals Ushijima and Cho were found near the mouth of a cave where
they had oommitted suieide. Mopping up small groups and patroling
oleared areas continued, but the battle for Okinawa was over.
- 127 -
Figure is.
flame tanks c(mtinuf';c to support the infantry in mopping up
pockets of enemy troops. ) n 26 June, the actinG battalion c
n
l'!1r.lance-r,
while or>sE'rving the actior. 'Jf CO!'lpany C from a forwar ci ()btjerva't1.on
post, Has lfOunded by a snlper.
Dlring the car:lpaign, the battalion was enployec. a:b':J st continuouslr
for seventy days. It was officially cl'ec::i.tec ".1 th killing 4,738 Japan-
ese and capturing forty-nine. Lurir.[ the the hattalion lost
seven men \(illed in action and 112 men l'lounued, injureci , or tnissing.
No personr.el were )dllec inside flame thr:ower tanks as a rp.sult of enemy
act: on )" t(1tal of 630 flar:e tank "sortips" were made and 199,950 gal-
lons of t:1ickEmed fuel were fired. A total of forty-one tanks were
knoc\.ced out d1.Jri nt: the carn[)a,iLlJ), of which twenty-six were r .epal.J'ed and
returned to duty. fifteen were destroyed beyond repair.
70
Enemy r:efenses at Okinawa. The battalion's actions t09k place in
the southern third of the island. t:early eighty percent of this area
"as under cultivat.ion in small fields of sugar cane, sweet potatoes,
rice, and other crops. The rolling terrain was broken at frequent in-
tervals by rUf,ged hills, steep to vertical escarpnents, steep-sided and
rocky ravines, limestone pinnacles, and other rOUGh formations of coral
rock. The net result was a series of valleys arlo ridges in 1"lh:5.(;h neClrl;r
all clear terrain Has commanded by ground on one or more sides.
Heavy, t.horny hrush anc.t dense clur:l:'s of trees covered much of the area
70
1A
R + 71Jt'- 3n ' 1 1;'1 "' hI' 1' 1 "h '" 1
,\,1\ pv, : J '. K , . .Lame L, ower, rOV1S1.0na,. as", -
flansei Chot.:), 3C Jun 4'>. In CULl.ti.
- 128 -
..... ho on thp. se ;:3.cvan taces t o the ut::lost . Ca'/ e i n
nn(' t o cove r a ll 8Vf"TlUeS of a ppr oach interlock_
c1Jambers a.rnple o: t or cs of l : ... t l2l"" am."lun i-
tior. . '..lr,OCrt:r ounc installa t ions v:pre found l':! Jich, at least f or
br ief f'o:..l l ( a c.:co;rnori a t e ove r 1, 000 c.en. defet lc er:) 11150
""1 ) 1 \)f t hf. curious stone ho.lrial CUi: (!ee p into
ttl:: "in"; often connc. teci by tunnels. of the open u:r 6uno
of a ll incl uci.r. ;: bur iec aerial bO!:lbS, "-l 'C u see t.y t he
eneny t o an extent almost unec;.ua llec i n ;,be Pacifi c Frlemy artil-
ler:' anC;-: Mortars \ .. erp prRS tr.t i n h r ec nlinhers anc were used t o a (Lreater
extent I...han ever befol'e i n masst'! C ror both c l osp support anc'
th' ce:1erl11 OJ f thf' ,'Jerman c (lnc.:ept of defense t n r. ('pth _ a (; c ot h uf
r.lll t unll;,, . suppor tin;; :; trong pojnts c over inC all avenue s of apl.)roach
mim'c , and supported by ir,fantry counterattacks and infiltra-
hopelf:::;u l jl ant' cut-off ent>my pockpt s "'fhich hel d out t o the last
::lan , no!" in t.he i nrividual 3uiciQf? a ttacks, witt, satchel charces i:lIld
:;X,:{8 !1-1I 1__11
- 129 -
bales of high explosives, US tanks and personnel. Though nu-
merically inferior to the Am"'Ticans, thb Japan<>se had alllple troops 8lld
munitions with whic h to f ight. Thus, while the terrain on Okinawa
allowed relatively oore freedom for and tracked
vehicles than on 1wo Jima, the combination of d.eep mud. congested
traffic, fi=e, and minei restricted the u se of flame tanka en
masse to 1.nrlld up a Ifwall of fire" which, in SO!Il9 instances. might have
71
been effective.
The Japanese 47-mm. anti-tank gun caused. a large nu:nber of tank
casualties. These guns were found l ocated in prepared positions. such
as caves and burial vaults. tunnels served as passage ways
for movement of guns to a.1 ternate posi tiona. Posi tiona of
guIle on8 da:,- wer e often occ"J.pied during t he f or a.ction or.. the
following Most of the an t i-tank fire wa s close-range
flanking 'fire at ranf 9s of fl' om 300 to 800 yards. On some occaiHOCS
the enemy allowed one or two lead tanks to pass through their fiel d of
fire and then opened up on the rea.r Another practice ernploye4
by the enemy was -:' 0 let a tank turn a round exposing the rear eD!ne
compart::lent before firing. Ene!IlY anti-tank fire vas rapid and accu-
rate. :i::ven thoug:-_ the guns were l ocatc in caves, the terrain usuallj
tank movements into fields of fire. The guns were
71
Hi at CWS Mid Pac, Vol. IV" Ann'x II c3, p. 34.
- 130 -
hard to detect because the enemy wi thdrew U l,elil i r.- to the ceV 30i
!lad beeD. fired, and "'t>'!cau6e t hsj'" ,",'ere tired from poei tions well
to the rear of the mouth of inclosures. The Japanese s mokel ess>
wee also a factor con tribut ing to thp di fficulty of detecting
the guns. The largest a..c.ti-te.nk fir' ::-Qceived t"h", battalion
was ?&-mn:. On orle occas! "r, a rO\Uld of t:-.i e c.:.li ber pierceJ. the siae of a
tank beneath the apoD8on and entered a napalm fuel tank, but did not
72
igni te the fuel.
Narrow rOAds, shell holee, and mud cau8ed many tank to throw their
tracks . These tanka were abandoned and, at nieht. became targets for
73
the enemy .... ho destroyed them Io'i tb satc hel chElrges and. incendiaries.
In the Okinawa oner ation the armored flame t hrovers were generally
attached as a company of eighteen flame tanka to a tank battalion, which
in turn re-attached a platoon of six flame tanka to eac h tank: c0!!llallY.
The tank companies then usually attached a of three flame tanks
to each regular tank nlatoon . Normally a standard tank company 8upported
an infantry regiment, with its nlatoons In support of infantry battalion
Wi thin the tank-infantry team, flame t A1lke were employed in different waye.
72
Rq ?l3th Tk En. AlA Rpt, Armored FlAme Pr ovisional,
Cha!>_ VII, p. 1.
73
!.ill..
- 131 -
In some they attached to acted as an integral nart of the
tank nlatoon. In other instences they were attl'l,ched to a tank platoon
end remained in a forward assembly area for use when a sui te,ble target
was encountered. In such cases the flame tank cRlled up and sun-
lJorted by other tanks until it accomplished its mission. Under these
condi tiona, the tank platoon le8der con trolled the action of th<:l flame
tanks. '!his WFI, S the most COmmon type of On some
fleme tanks operated ..... ith the infantry and in close suoport of all tp-nks,
In a few t8,nks operated alone wi th the infantry. In the
greatest nercentap:e of cases, the tank-flame tan'c team operated out in
front of the infantry until the was sufficiently cleared for the
infantry to advance. The most desirab19 rnp1lner of "!1!Iployment was found
to be the tank-flame tank-infantry team, with the infantry
closely behind to support the flame tanks and to occuny the
74
ground taken.
Con'1l<:lnts and Reco"!'mendations. '!Ihe 'l'ank Armored
Thro'-'er (Provi sional), renorto.d the>. t the ]a rge of enemy
killed and the enemy equipment destroyeci clid not indicate th"! ttme value
of the main armam9n t flame The true va lue of the weaT)on wa s
proved by its abi li ty to dri out of hi S 'PreTIA-re el nosi tions
74
Ibid., Chap. VIII, -p. 2.
- 132 -
into the onen I" here he WP-. S 1d.1l9cl by the troOps . The follow-
ing liEt gives the most common misuses of the tanks:
1. Use of thro" er for their mRchine p;un
fire only, out in front of the i nfa.ntry ';o1ithout
an;' sur.rport.
2. Failure on the TlP.rt of the infantr:v ronl1. te.nk CO!!l-
m,anders to t ak"e the ad.vice of the flR.me thrower
commanders as to proper of th"! weapon.
3. supnort on the nart of the infantry end
tanks.
4. The use of flame thro\on'>.rs to burn l a re;e area tar-
gets '\o,here there 1 s no known resistance. AI thour-h
1s necesse.ry in some cases, it is well for the
infantry to bear in mind the.t the sunnly of flame
is limi ted and carmot be used to burn a ne.th for
their advAllce.
5. Failure on the part of the infantry to move un and
quic'ldy occuny the p.:rouno tak<m by the fle.me tank.
The 713th Battalion fel t that in stead of ha.vinp. senars.te armored
flame tr..rower battalions, it would be advisable either to replace the
light tp.nk company in each standard tank battalion with a flame thrower
or to add such a company to each battalion. This system would
simplify administ r ative p...nd supply matters, since a flame thrower tank
company WI:'.s normally attached to ste.ndard tank batte.1ions for operat1.one.
It a.lso reco11rnended that infantry cO'!1l'llan<'l.ers make every effort to
fa.miliRriM themselves with cenabllities and limi t ations of armored
flame and to learn how to co-ordina,te t!Jese weapons wi th other
75
weapons and with trooos. The lack of familiarity of supported unite
75
Ibid.
- 133 -
.ith the flame tanks be attributed to lack of combined training prior
to the operation.
The 7th Infantry Di vi sion reported tlvl t the flame tanks ..... ere "out-
standingly successful and of the f ree.tes t value." This division recom-
mended that one c0lllpp.ny of these tanks b
o
m!'! de an in terral part of e?.ch
76
tMk battalion attached to an infantry division. The 17th Infantry
Regiment, 7th Division, re-ported that the flame tanks tlwere i nvaluable
against enemy entrenched in cora l forme tions, h c. avy undergrowth and in
caves, driving them from these positions ..... hen all other means }w.d been
exhausted. It "In some CAses, flame tanks were the onl y wean ons which
could drive the from positions." This regimp.nt recommended
an increased number of flame tanks be made available and that the platoon
leaders' and Mction leaders' tanks he equipped wi th SCR 300 racUos so
77
that could be maintained with front line infantry troops.
The 32d Infantry Regiment, Division, renorted tha t without the use
of the flame tanks, for out the area on southern
OkinFl. ..... a, the fie tion would Mve t8\ren lonf:er a nd would have been much
more costly. It W8 S stated tha t the fleme should be mounted
on the new medium tank (M4A2) whic h w[!s equip1')ed wi th all around vision.
It was recommended th;'I. t more flftme tanks bp. ml'Jei e available to assault
76
7th Inf Div, Opns Rr> t, R.,;ukyus Campaif"n.
77
17th Inf Regt, Opns Rpt, R;yukyus Cs,"1pllirn.
- 134 -
regiments, since, in many the advp..nce W;:1 S slowed. down
78
ably a shortage of them. The l84th Inf/tntry 7th Division
recommended a minimum of one r>latoon (six tanks) of flame tanks as suo-
79
port for each assault battalion.
The 27th Infantry Division reTlort"ld thA. t the armored flame throwers
were to a limited extent for burning out and c nves end
for general mopping-up operations and ha d nerformed these mi ssions in an
80
excellent manner.
The 96th Infantry Division rerorted that during the mop-up phase
all caves were being blown and sealed and the enemy WA. S hiding in cane
fields, tall grass, and buildings; the fleme tanks were used extensively
for clearing out those Japanese who a t tempted to use this type of con-
cea1men t. It was recommended that in the future the company of flf'.lI\e
tanks be attached to the medium tank battalion sufficiently nrior to an
operati on topermi t detailed and co-ordina ted training of these two uni ts
81
and the supported infantry. The 382d Infantry, 96th Division, reported
that the flame tank was one of the most effective weapons used at Okinawa,
end that "when all weapons failed to the suicidal enemy from
78
32d Inf Regt, Combat Opns Rpt, Ryukyus Camoaign, Okinawa Shima.
79
80
81
184th Inf Regt, Opns Rpt, Ryukyus Catrrpaign . In Fist CWS Hid Pac,
Vol. IV, Annex II c3, 'P. 99.
21th Inf Div, Opns Rpt, Phase I, Nansei Shoto. In Hist CWS Hid
Pac, Vol. IV, Annex II c3, p. 99.
96th Inf Div, Action Rpt, Ryukyus Campaign.
- 135 -
his defensi ve the flame tbroYing t anKs, when they
c oul d reech the noe1t1on, would quickly Me. 82
The 763d Tank Rattalion, attached to the 96th Division,
t he demand fo r tanks always exceed9d the supply. It vas also re-
t ha t in ca ses infantry fAiled to occU'o), an area which
had been cleAned out by tanks And flame tRnks , thus necessitAting a
repetition of the 8Me work the following day, e nd pivinp the M
83
onnortunity to bolster his nnt.i - tank defenses in t hAt !,! osltlon.
The XXI" Coros reported thl'l t thf! of small infantry units
was, in {'t'eat meAsure, the 'Progress of closely knit inflUltry-h.nk assAult
teams , infBlltry-demol1t1on assault teams, and infMtry-fiAme thrower
assaul t teams . It ... recommended medium tanks b e made avail-
able to the extent of two thre'!-comyany battfl.l1on8 per corps of three
div1 8tons.
134
Tenth Army's Af ter Action Report substAnti a ted the reports of the
units ns F,lven fl.bove. It W8.S felt that the batta.l1on not the p r oper
for flame throwers beCAu se flame tank
were a lwp-ys attac hed to other units combat, the battalion
commander and hi s staff with few duti es An d rp.snonsibilities. It was
82
382d Inf Rept . Opns Rnt , Okinawa , 1 AT:lrll - 30 194 5 .
63
84
76:3d Tk Bn, Ryukyus Operation Rot . In Filet Pac, Vol.
IV, Annex II c3, n. 101.
XXI V Corns , Action Rn t, Ryuk::"Us CampR1en . In R1st CI.TS t-'id PA.C ,
Vol. IV, A"'!nex II c3, p . 102.
- 1 36 -
thRt a flame thrower : s nk: be ar.dec. as Rn or{'"anic
85
uni t to each tRnp: battalion. The 'l'nnk :Battalion's t '-'nv.s were
V4AI WqS i nferior 1n '!lobility to t he tanks , with
which three of the four Ar my t ank battal i ons i n t he oneration
throwers be moun ted in the M4A3, or A r'lode l equal in mobility fi n d nro-
tect1ve Rrmo'!' to the e(]uin,:!ont of units to be sunnorted.
On the matt.,r o f retention of the 75-mm. Fun in the fl ame t Rnk and
of mounting the co-axially with the cannon barrel, the Tenth
Army concurred with the 713th Armored Thrower Battalion only if
the fuel cClpacity were not r educed, a nd provided thf-'t the ca'PAbHi ty of
the fl a.me gun we.s not handicapped thereby. It is p ossi ble that the
Co mmanding General, XXIV Corps, WRS correct when he stated that the
average tanker was gun conscious because of hi s eRrly tnlining and mi ght
resort to the use of his PUn when he shoul d be on a mission.
The Tenth Arrrry recommended P. 360
0
traverse in stead of 260
0
All uni te
ren orted th8t the IDA-in flexible fuel line to the ,qun had a short 11 fe
and tha t runtures were frequent. In P.. normRI d8.y 'S o-perRtlon over FUgf': ed
terrAin, numerous leAks in fuel an d pre ssure lines, necessi ta-
e r7eat deRI of first e nd s econd echelon The nressure
reE"Ul at or valve re quirec 0. gree t of Rdjust ment throuf':hout the oper a.-
85
Tenth ArMY, Action Rpt, Ryukyus. In Hist CT:,'S "id Pac, vol.
IV, Annex II c3, LJ. 102.
- 137 -
tion. The solenoid And other valves on the flame thrower Operated elec-
trically, but it was believed that manual ooeration would be more satie-
86
fp-.ctory.
Fuel. After tests on napalm mixtures, r?nPinv from
'three '0 ercent to nine p ercent, and also on mixtures of }.Tavy "Bunker C"
fuel oil, a six nercent nepalm mixture wit h Fasoline wa s found to be
87
the most sa tisfactory f ue l for all 'Ou!"'()oses. A total of 183,000 ge.l-
of six 'Oercent nap alm fuel was mixed for the Tenth Army during
December, January, and early February. Less than thirty percent of this
fuel, when tested in the target areas, had a Gardner viscosity corres-
ponding to that of four nercent freshly mixed nanalm. Its viscosity WaS
11 ttle better than that of gasoline. It therefore became necessAry to
discard most of pre-mixed fuel and to nrepBre fuel in the field.
Mixing was done by the Army CWS Depot. chemical service
troops were available and quartermaster troops were assigned to assist
in the two fuel mixinF units. These mixing units had been
built at Oahu and each a capacity of gallons per eight hours. It
wes nscessr-e ry to operate the two uni ts continuously to fill the demands
of the 7l3th Armored Flame Thrower Rattalion, which expended nearly
88
200,000 gallons at an ever increasinr- rate durin{,: the O'Oer8.tion. }(pnalm
86
87
Ltr, CG Tent h Army to CG POA., 27 Eay 4;:) , sub: Reco:n.rnended Chanf' es
in eonstruction on POA CWS-Hl Hechanhed Fla!!le Thrower s. In
.. lG.
7l3th AFT, Prov, A/A Rot, Chap III.
88
Lt Col 'im. R. RTJt of Official IT'rRve1 to C C".' S, 28 Sep 45,
Sec t I II, p. 17. I n
- .138 -
was allocated by the Army through corps B.nd divisions. Division a11o-
cated fuel to t he flame thrower t?nk companies who ,.,ere a'bl e to draw
direc tly from Che mic?.l 'I,'erfa,re Service su'ODI y poin ts in ex?.ctly the
89
811me y.:e.y in which they drew other a'11llTUnition.
In order to 'Orevent the det"'rioration of ngpa.l!!l thic1cened ga soline.
the 43d Che':ltcal La'borfi.tory Corypany at OA.hu developed a method for sta-
'bilizinr- this fuel. This nrocess consisted of 1.6 percent
finely ground silica gel into the six percent napalm thickened g P.so-
90
line. The Marines had e: reat di fficul ty .. .,ri th unsta'ble thickened gaso-
line and were t he first to request st a'bilized fuel from
Ql
the C','lS Depot a t Sc ofield BPrrecks, Oahu.-
Extension Eose. After the Pelel1u on"ration it WrJ. S susgested
ths.t it Hould 'be of tremendous heIr i 7' the auxili .o,ry type flaMe thrower
tank s c ould 'be equipp ed with 200 feet o f hir-h 'O ressure hose for use in
flaming c aves and. 'Pill 'boxes in the terr ain where tanks were una 'ble to
apnroach wi thin firins di st a nce. 92 After the 1wo J1ml'!. opere.tion the
2d Bllttr:. li on. 24th r9'ported t hat on '!lImy occasions a reel of
flexi 'ble ho se extensi on on a large Ronson fla.me thrower tank ",ould have
'been !!lost valua'ble. This extension hose ,,,ou ld enable infantrymen to

713th AFT Bn, A/A RDt, Chan. IX.
90
See Ann en si:t:: 7 for 1\ detailed techn i cal ren ort.
91
92
Lt Co l ':.'illitlr:1 R. l.Il'mll, Rot of OfficiAl '1' r qvel, to C C
1
,.,'S,
28 Sen 45 . In CVLiG.
Ltr, Cml 0 POA to A(', fo r :F'ld Opns, 13 Jan 45.
- 139 -
"lark in close to fortificati ons which could not be i-ipproached with
safet y by a nan carrying a heavy portable f la:ne thrc,wer, or v:here
the terrai n prevented the use of flane tanks.
93
The Chemi c a l \'iar f are in Hawaii conducted experiments
with extensi c.n hose and, on 27 February 194 5, held a de:nonstrat ion
f or a grou p of interested of fi cers, using 400 feet of s tandard
i,t1ch rubber fire hOSE, i n standard fifty-foot a ttached to
the Ronson flame thr ower mounted in medium A flame range of
fift y to s i xty yards was obtained. AS a result of the demonstration,
the 'l' enth Arny got t hree sets of these extension hos e for the 71Jth
Ar:nored F13.r'l8 natt alion, "ihich later proved thej r value i n
s everal op<.: r a tions c urin?, the OkinaVi a Cartlpaicn. 94
I n one instance two men, from a tank crew of the AIT llat-
talion, rulling 400 feet of flame t; hr ov/er host' )';i th them, worked
tJ heir up to the top of a cliff. A :ninimum of seventy-five Japanese,
armed grenades , s atchel charges, and bayonets, were entrenched
on the summit. The tani{"1en r eached a position only a few feet away
from the e nemy, sprayeo fuel ov er the top of t he c liff, ane then
i gnit ed it. Infantrymen from Company R, 32d Tnfantry, qui ckly
93
4th
![arine Div, ltpt , Two Jirna (F: CT 24 Rpt, 2d :3n) . I n Hi st ;:! id
Pal' , 1' 0 1. IV, Annex I I cJ , p . 29 .
ADney 2 cl, p. 46.
- 140 -
followed and reached the top of the cliff in time to kill the fleeing
95
J apanese.
T!.ro cOITl!lFmies of infantry, consistinr of a.bout seventy-five en-
listed men, had gained the summit of an eecarpment south of Gushichan.
The foT'tll;rd face of the hill wp-s a peroendiculRr wall about seventy-
fi ve feet high. The ridp:e was about twen ty-fi ve ya.rds wide at the
top 2nd dropn ed shflrp ly to the sea on the south side. The surface of
the tOo of the cliff was rough and irregular, with many coral boulders.
The i nfEm try we. s -pinned clown immediR:tely by enemy fire from further
up the ridp: e. The officer, Comnany C, 713th AFT
and two of his men sca led the wall and nulled the extension hose after
them. They worked the hose forward until they were able to spray the
first enemy position, thus enabling our infantry to advance and occupy
it. They were then held down b:; 13 uillbox located behind a natural
bsrricade of roc',(s about 100 ;v?rds further Up the ridf"e. Since the
hose would not reach thfit fA.r, the officer and two enlisted men took
the hose down, moved the tank 2.nd the hill ae:ain. About two
hours \"ere required to reach the top. They c ame out in a depression
about thirty Y1'l.rds from the en'3my's position. The nillbox was quickly
burned out. One of the two enlisted men was wounded, but twenty-five
Japanese were killed. Next day these men dragged more hose onto the
95
Inf Regt, Combat Onns Rot, CAmnaign,
Shima.
- 141 -
ridge and carried it down the slope. From there they fired out
over the sea, allo.,.' ing the flames to be carried back by the wind into
96
the just above the water line.
F. Emnloyment in Luzon
1. The FJ7-7 (Q. Model) Flam"! Thrower. On 3 ADril 1945 an armored
force officer four enlisted m"!n, with four flame throwers
moun ted On lig ht tA.Ilks (M5Al) and a fl ame thrower service truc k (M8),
arrived in from the United states. The men and. equinment were
assi gned to Sixth Army end nlaced on duty with the Group
on 8 April 1945. There the equin ment WA.. S condi tioned p..nd tested p.nd
demonstrations were held at which interested officers could determine
97
the flame thrower's potentialities and the likely areas for their use.
The Standard Oil Development Company, under the direction of the
National Defense Research Council, had developed the F17-7 flame
for the Chemical Uarfare Service. This flame thrower consisted of the
E? fuel unit which WaS m? Qe un of six fuel tanks, lJiped in series, with
a tote.l capaci ty of 120 gallons. Compressed B.ir was used as the fuel
propell A. nt. The rate of fire was 2.5 gallons lJer second, giving a total
of fifty seconds of fire. It wq s equh:ned with the W7 NDRC Q, Model
gun. The fUn was installaed in a simulated howitzer turret shield,
96
Ltr, Crnl 0 Pac to C Info J3r OC C1rS, 10 Aug 45. In CMLWG.
97
USAFFE Bd Rpt No. 2%, 17 45, sub: Rp-lJort of Op eratio!1.s of
Flame Throwers E7-7 1n Light TankS, M5Al, and ES, Unit.
- 142 -
and replaced the 37-mm. gun. Thickened was i r nited
by means of ai r atomized and an electric snark. The co ni c", l
turret basket had reulaced by a cylindrical one of maximum capac ity.
The air and fuel fil l ed the basket, all owing the minimum r oom
practicable for turret Operation, equbment, and one occupant. A
A tr averse of 360
0
was obt ained by rotati ng the turret. An elevation
of minu$ 100 to plus 30
0
wa s possibl e. With 7. 2 uercent nApalm thick-
ened fuel, an effective r ange of 100 YArds was obtained.
98
Combat Tests. At t his ti me the fi ghting in LuzOn WAS reaching
it s final stage. :Battles wer e in progress a t l po Dem, Bfllete Pass , Villa
Verde Tre.il I?.nd B8f:Uio. All of these places wer e in mountainous hrrB.in
where it W"I.S difficult to mnneuver the li ght tanks . The Japanese Her e
using a greflt deal of artillery and mortar fire , incl uninR
aircraft which also l imited the emuloyment of
operational characteristics of f l ame tanks si mi l ar to those
oade in Hflwai i a year previousl y f or in the I slRnds ?..nd
their combat limitations were known .
A detach:nent was formed of one officer and twelve tp..nk crewmen
for t he four t anks, and. threl'! C',1S technicians for the truck.
On 13 April the Fl 8l!l'!'l Thrower Det nchrnent wa s a.ttached to I Corps f or
operations wit h the 25th Infantry Divisi on in the Balete Pass aren. On
14 Auri1 the flame tanks wer e demonstrated to officers of the 25th
98
(1 ) C"'I/S T of Dons Ltr 16, 12 Jul 44, p. 10 . un ':l .A. Woyes, Jr.,
Science i n \'lSI - Chemistry (Ne .... York, 1948) .
- 143 -
infantry Division and on next dey were to the 27th Infantry
Regiment which Was supported by a of M4Al medium tanks from the
775th Tank Battalion. All four tanks were moved up the mountain.
attempting to climb the steep slopes their hydromatic transmission slipped
99
and bulldozers were used to null them the r8st of the way.
On 16 April (8 plus 97), an attempt was made to engage an enemy
?osi tion on the reverse slope of A. ridge. The Japanese haM tually dug
p ositions on the reverse slopes of hills durinr, the fighting in the
Southwest Pacific. The positions were usually located in what the artil-
lery termed Itdead spaces. It It is true that they were suicidal positions,
but it is also true that they were usually difficult to neutralize and
often resulted in casualties to the infantr:.'. One of the flame tanks
moved alan;!': the narrow ridl'"e which furnished the only avenue of apnroach
and, When the enemy posit i on, down the slope in an
attempt to bring the thrower to bear on the tareet. The officer
in of the detachment operated flame gun on this mission and
he was unable to bring the flame blast down to the because the
maximum depreSSion of the (minus 10
0
) lacked about 15
0
of being
Bufficient. Because of the steepness of the slope, the light tank was
unable to Rdvance any further and, after two short bursts, withdrew.
unsuccessful mission revealed several weaknesses in the equipment.
Besides those a.lready mentioned, it was th,qt, in order to furnish
99
USAFF::!; Ed Rp t 1') 0. 296, 1 7 45.
- 144 -
close 3up:)()rt for t he inLmtrJ' the CO;TL'Tlunications setup hac to hE im-
;:;roved . Close cO::1 munication "las pti rticnlarly ilecessary in mountainous
terrain 'There visi on was limited anci the infantr;,{ hac to direct the
,flaP.1e tank to its objective. For this PUrrJos, a pOl'!er telephone,
which f ave t he turret oper 8. tor communicat i on with suppor t inc infantry,
was rj cged to the turret fror.l the back of the tank. The operator, hOlT-
Rver, ha d only cirect voice contact with the criver ;m el assistant criver
of the tank. He had to turn off the t urret traversing power when talking
either to the infantry over the power t e lephone, or to the driver and his
, t t b ". t . 100
aSSlS an y Clrec VOlce.
On 22 April, shell fragments from a Japanese 47-mm. shell tree burst
caused some damage to the service unit, v.hich was repaired by the 25th
I:ivision's orOr!ance shop. After the first missj,on, all four flame
tanks were kept on the alert. Duririg the next t",'elve days they were
brought up to the front lim's several t i1!s, but were r.ot used. On
27 Aor i l 1945, K, 27t h I nf antry , haci been held up for over
tl':e nt y-four hours on Elbow r i.ci i;; e Y:QL; ntain). Occasional tree
bursts of 47-l1tTl. she lls vlere beinc: received from a ridge to the right.
l,tore cistant ridges on the left were also held by the e nemy. Every
attempt to adva nce from Elbo .... ! BidGe t o Lone 'i ree Ridge ,"as met v.ith
mac hine gun fire an d ha. nd gr enades. ThE J a panese were entrenched
100(1) Ibid .. ( 2) Rpt of First Co:nbat Yission Fired by F:7-7 Flame Gun
on Light Tank, 16 Apr 45. In C}1L1';G.
!l587aS
- 145 -
on the reveree slape of Ridge and in the ravine between Elbow
Ridge and Lone Tree Ridge. The whole defensive VAS covered
with thick underbrush ."hich made our ?Ten1'l.d'!8 most ineffective. Shell
fire from ' tanks And also Ineffective because of the
defil aded positIon. What vas believed t o a pil l box could be s een
at the f oot of p. l arge tree across the ravine . This nosition actual ly
appeared 6S a dark discolorat i on at base of thp. tr-e.
In this si tuation, the comma."l.d,ing officer of the Tank Detach-
ment suggested the us e of flame tanks . An made on the after-
noon of 21 April, out the sT>p roach .... as exceediJl;ly difficult because of
t he heavy underbrush. A medium tank was used 1n an uneuccessful attempt
to break a path. On the mornIng of 28 Acri1 en armored bulldo%er was
brou& t I n to push a road through t o the firlnp position. At 0730 on
28 April, two f l ame tanks were at the assembly pOI nt 200 to 300 yards
from the tB.re'Jt. At 1230, one of these tanks moved dong bulldozed
trail which ended near the skirmish line just behind the to'o of"t: l bow
Ridge . Only one f l Ame tank coul d be used because of the nArr ow anuroach.
For the SMl9 renson, medium .tanks coul d not furnish sUDport. Two rifle
nlatoons f r om Company K furnished protecti on . One man WAl ked behind the
tank to i t Ae it moved the crest of the ridge. The bow mAchine
?,'Ullner, the officer commMding the d""tachment. sprAYed the susosc ted
areas with machine gun while the enemy resisted the of
the tank \dth hand prenA-de s. At this Tloint , which WAS about fifty
- 146 -
th9 target. the t Rnk r Rn onto A ] OF about ten to
i nc hes i n drivo.r maneuvored the t Rnk over tho. lop until
it just b!'! l enced fonrAro_. tted (lirect R.im on the target. The
first flame WPS directed at the suspected enemy nillbox. l?i,o.-ht Ja-p?..nese
were fl ushed and started to the front of the tank, but were
killed i llmediFttel y by sut:roortinp: infant r ymen. S1-' ort bursts '''ere fired
acro B8 the ta.r get .<1 rea from ri p:ht to left a t about ten- t o two.lve-yard
intervals. The entire area burned briskly for about five As
the smoke cleare\l, 8noth",r dugout becp.me visible to the right of the
first one, t he rema inder of t he flame was fired on it. The infan try
immediately edvanced and, by CO!Tl1JA.ny K bRQ its objective,
which wa s lone Tree Ridge, 200 YFlrds away . A total of fifty-three enemy
dead wrl S counted in the 200-y,?,rd area. Of the fifty-three, only six hA.d
been burned to death; the remainder had been killed by the infantry
when they were flushed from their positions. Our forces suffered no
casualties in this flaming oneration.
Eight nercent napal m wrs used on this mt.sion and the flame
functioned perfectly. The sector of fi r e covered a triangle, the apex
o
of which Wfl.S apT)Toximetely 105. Most of the fuel landed on the far
side of the ravine ap.ainst the hill beyond. Some of the
over Tree Ridf e which W?S nearly 200 YRrds away, but the effecti ve
heat wa s directly over the ta.r get, !:Then the flame ;'!A. S directed on the
target, a number of hand grenades were discharged in the
sit10n and it was that the heat from the flames mi f, ht have
- 147 -
caused this. It should be noted if the flame thrower had been
mounted on a medium tank the mission could have fired a day earlier,
since the medium te.nk, which had tried to break path on the previous
afternoon, had advanced to within fifty of the
On 6 the Flame Detachment was attached to XI Corps
to sunnort the 43d Infantry Division and of the 754th Tank
Battalion in the 11'0 De m PIea. :?ecause of hOAvy r ain s, terrAin con-
di tion s, e..nd road blocks covered by Arti J l"!ry fire, the flAJn e tlln"::s
were not emnloyed during the next few days. On 20 May the 38th 1n-
fantry Division replaced the 43d in this area. On 22 Me.;! , three
missions were fired. One flAme tank burned out e draw so thAt the
infantry could move in. A second supnorted the attack along a
ridge line, and a third tank fired over a ridge onto the reverse slone
of Landslide Hill to neutralize well dug-in positions.
At 1000 on 23 all four flame te.nks were assembled on Land-
slide Hill. The mission \"'8. S to sunnort Company C, 152d Infantry, 38th
Division, in occupying Bamboo Pill, which WAS a lohg narrow ridge with-
out. trees. Japanese mac hine GUnS were duf. in at the far end And could
fire the leneth of the entire ridge. The attack off at
1430 with the flame tanks leadinf the advance. Caves
dugouts were rep orted along the sides of the ridge , so flam"! was
dropped into them. USing their own Japanese suicide
101
(1) Hr, eml 0 2!5tl:. Inf Div to 0 I Corns, '! Ay 4 ,') , sub:
Report. on TJ se c: IC1A."1'? T!'J'ower. In CVLHG. (2)USAFFE"Ed Rpt
tTo. ?96, 17 VP..y 45.
- 148 -
as they s m .. ' the tanks e.nn. roA.ch. Th'l rid.p'"" Wf'. S occuni'9d.
The inf?.n trym:m ,!ho the SCR 3()O radio bo:!!!inCl_ the t .<' n1<:s, for
communic?tiO!l with the infantr.' , was in this action.
On 25 !f: ay the tanks ",ere given the mission of reducing an
enemy rOf .. d 'Dlock on Hill 51, which W.'Hl a lonE: r:i eg e g r ;::; dually falling
off into a steep drO!'. The Japanese had rsoulsed infantry attacks
Flf,s.inst this position. As Ullual, they were dug in just ov<:!r the cro:!st
of the ridge on the reverse slope. The e.ttack "" Cl. S in the SR.me
mp.nner as that on Bamboo Hill excent that only three tanks were us<>d.
'.Ii th the F..p"!,roach of the flrune tRnks, the JA.l"lP...nf"se fled from their '00-
sitions A.nd were killed by crossfire from the infa ntry's
weapons. A total of sixteen JapAnese wp.re b
J
' the infantry and
two were burned to death by the flAme throwers.
On 27 the tanks were again attAched to the 43d Division
R.t t-fp, rikinB, Rizal Province. Two tanks took up a position 2000 ynrds
south of l:lawaDam. The one-we.y rond to the dam was covered by
Japanese 20-mm. anti-aircraft guns which prevented the use of th'9 light
tanks. There were many positions alonf, tho:! road where a mechanized
flame thrower would. ha.ve been vf:\.l'uable f:l.nd where, if the flame throwe-:os
hud been mounted in medium tRnks, they could hAve been used to great
102
advan tco..ge.
These combat tests proved thA.t . li ght tanks were entirely unsatis-
factory for mounting flame throwers. 'To mechanical difficulties were
102
Ltr, 13th Ar md On to Sixth 31 MRY 45, sub: Testing
of Flar.le Throwers, 1J7-7 :'ounted in L1p.ht Tanlcs. In HRS, AGO.
- 149 -
encountered \o/i th the F:l-7 thrower minor fl.ir lea.ks B.t vnlves,
cocks, hi gh air In spite of heavy r ains,
no i gnition trouble wa s experienced. The compressor on the
unit functioned vell: ei ght minutes Were required to nump
air te.nks to 2000 p.s.!. Approximately four minutes were requi r ed to
mix a batch of ?i percent napalm fuel with the equipment in the
unit. About six minutes were required for the fuel (110 gallons)
103
into the fuel t anks. Both infantry end t enk units, with which the
main armament flame thrower opera ted, were enthusiastic about the effect-
ivenes8 of the l ar ge flame thrower.
G. Plans for t he &vushu Operation
1. Intelligence. On 1 July 1945 Sixth Army wa.s relieved of all
combat operations in the Philippines and directed to four corps,
consisting of twelve divisions, wit h an additiona.l two divisions as ar:ny
troop s, for an as saul t on southern Kyushu. The t A.I'get date waS set for
1 November lq45 a nd the mission wa s to secure the southern half of the
isl and of K;,;-,ushu pne. to establish air ba ses to sunport fl. three arm:;
operation a.O'ainst the "1ain island of Honshu ninety days later. A study
of availabl e informfl. tion indicated that the area we s well
suited for the typ e of underground defenses used so advantageously by
the JApAnese at Iwo Jima. and Okinawa. It was believed that the
103
USAFFE Bd Rpt No. 296, 17 Hay 45.
- l f)() -
initial stages of the operation the defended Caves would fit into a
logical pattern end be si tU1.".ted to cover approaches to strategic poin ts.
but tha t once this coherence Was lost enemy troapswould be found de-
fending caves 8.l:nost anywhere. re '!ardless of their effect on, the opera-
tion as a whole.
From past eXperience in the Pacific. it WHS exoected that most of
the cave fortifications would be so locat ed as to be protected
either direct or shell fire. Such usually be en c on-
structed with several hidden entrances to permit escape or
coun tera t tack. i f the main "lntrance were blocked. Caves were expected
to range in size from small holes. barely lar ge enoug-h for a sniper
or li ght machine

crew, to tremendous installations such as the one
captured by the 43d Infantry Divi sian in the mountains east of !t.anUa
which was built on four levels connected with an intricate stairway
104
8yS tern and housed some 1,500 men. It wa s therefore imp era t i ve that
l a rge capacity flame throwers be made available to combat troops.
From captured documents it was learned that the Japanese were aware
of the pos s ibility of extensive use of large flame throwers. One document
entitled ":Battle Lesson on Flume Throwing Tanks." issued on 14 Anrll 1945
by the Japp..nese Independent Battalion at Okinawa, read as follows:
104
When tpJlks dra"J close to our no s1 tions or
discover close qtle.rters attackers, they nlan to burn
them un wi th flames. One burst lasts about 80 s econds
ASF. Spec Tech Intell Rull lTO. 10, IICave 'war, II 24 Jun 45. In
CMLltTG.
- 151 -
they release flame suddenly from within smoke
screens. Range is about 120 meters. Our counter
measure is to keep strict security in the smoke, to
jump as far to the side as possible, and to 11e down
immediately.105
cp-ptured document, a.t Okinawa on 9 March 1945
the Am"lrican invasion) end cla.ssified "Top Secret, II read in part as follows:
The enemy' B flp.me throwers hp..ve developed ex-
ceedingly. Their range is 95 to 135 meters
and in the near future, it is surmised that they
will have a range of 200 meters. There is no other
method of attFl.ck 8{!Rinst this but artillery fire.
However, it is impossibl":! for t ank!'; to snout
flames more than six times due to fu":!l conditions.
Therefore, it is necessa.ry to hAve the an ti tflnk
observation parties count tr8 number of times the
flames have been expended. 6
The aboye forewarnings apparently d.id not result in many defensive
precauti ons against flame at 01dnB.wa, and it is doubtful whether
the Japanese soldier realized wh?t h"l WA.S up p..,gainst until he sa,,, the
flame tanks in action. In a few cases at caves were equiuped
",i th steel doors which had to be blown before the fll'lme could be used
effectively. It expected, however, tha t eng ineers would
have had time to install a dequate protection in the
homeland Enel!ly uri soners indicated the.t C8ve en trances had
been planned to mAke t he EInnropc h of Allied aT'i10r difficult
105
Ten ).r'ny Tr ."!nslP. ti on po. 111. In Pi st C'.1S Pac, Vol. IV,
Annex II c3, 35.
lOE
Ar my ':'r a nsl f1t io n no. 105 . In Fist C-..r S :!id P?_C, Vol. IV,
Annex II c3, p.
- IS,? -
or impossible. The wer"! often found h renty-fiv"l to fifty
fAet above level of the surrounding Fround and concealed in terrain
so rugged e s to bar the use of nrmor. Co-ordine.tion of fire from sup-
porting positions was H cardinal noint of JepA.nese doctrine. Hidden
anti-tank weanons, and "hume.n bombs" could be exp9cted on
flanks <'.-no. reA.r during an attp..ck on cave posl tions. Fle.me, neverthe-
less, Wp.. s one weepon that the Japenese fee.red. A. nd, I.:hen possible to
maneuver them into firinF: positi on, flame throW9rl wer"! usually more
107
successful than other weapons against underground defenses.
2. Plans. It wes planned to attach A. tank battA.lion to each
Bssp-ult division for the Kyushu operation. The 13th Armored Group,
Sixth Army, request"!d sufficient 1n2-7Rl main armrunent te.n'< flame
throwers to equin one COF-ronny (seventeen flame tanks) of each standard
b .nk 'bat talion. Th9 "O"!rsonnel, not furnished from th9 United states
with the tanks, were to be taken' from destroyer units assigned
108
to Sixth Army. Information avail A.b le in th"! theater at th"! time,
indicated 600 El2-7Rl units were mnnufactured in the United
States. However, only forty were expected to be available to Sixth
Army ih time for the Kyushu o-peration. It wns plenned, therefore, to
anportion the armored flame throwers in lots of five to each tank
107
108
ASF Snec Tech Bull !,TO. 10, "Cave ',iar," 84 Jan 45. In C!-ITNG.
Lt Col William R. Rot of Official Travel, to C CVlS,
28 Se!) 4f), Sect II I, p. 21. In CMLHG.
- 153 -
ba.ttalion as fast as they were received in the The 706th
and Tank Battalions ""ere mountinf': out from Hawaii and each was
109
being equipped wi th ten e.rmamen t flame tanks TTlP.nufactured lOCA.lly.
The tank bA.ttalion with each of the three divisions WA. S
wi th twelve POA model m8in armament t;rne medi urn flame throwers,
makin,cc a total of fift y-six flam"! tanks mp.nufactured in Hawaii R.nd forty
El2-7Rl flame tanks m8nufpctured in the United States to be mRde ava.il-
able to Sixth Army for the Kyushu opera.tion. It w!>. s also planned to
110
equip ea.ch fla.me tank detachment wi th extension hose.
Additional flame would shipped to Sixth Army as soon as
they available in the United States, thereby the con-
ternplated addition of a main armament flame thrower te.nk COffiDRnY to
each standard tank battalion. Each company was to 00. equi n-ped ""ith
fifteen medium flame tanks in the nlatoons and two medium flnme
tanks in COIUp MY headquarters sec t ion . ':'hree servicinf' uni ts, E8, we re
to be issued to each flame tank company. Personnel would be increased
to include the addition of flame thrower mechanics and technicians. ':'hi s
organization woul d have marle ArT'lOrp.o n?_mo. thro, ... er comrany p.n inte-
rral nart of the standard tank battalion and at th':"! Sa'll9 time ",ould have
109
I 'bi r,.
110
(l)Ibid. (2 ) Rist CiofS PRC, 'Tol. II, II cl,
p. 65.
- 154 -
provided a flexible organization to supportinp infantry units
III
or tank uni ts.
l:rapalm thickened fuel W83 to been 111ixed for t:mk battalions
by the che'7lica.l service nlatoon to division. These
ulatoons were to use the service unit assirned to each flame
Neitho.r flame tanks nor service units had arrived in the Philippines
when the war ended, and no fuel for units mounting out
from that area. In however, thQ Chemical Laboratory Comoany
had already mixed 150,000 {!,Allons of silic? gel stablli7.ed napalm
thickened FAsoline fuel for the V Amphibious Corps when the war ended.
The }!arines hA.d ordered 250,000 gallons of stabili zed fuel for the oper-
ation. In addition, the two Army tank battalions out of
112
Rawaii nlanned to stock stabilized fuel for the operation.
H. Euronean Therter
1. Employment Dy the British and. Canadiens. Although mechanized
flame thro .... ers, developed and e'lMloyed by American forces, may be cls.ssed
as ei ther auxiliary types or main armament types, the :Bri ti sh (or Canadian)
111
112
Pacific 't:arfare Bd Rpt No. 76, . Nov 45, sub: Future Organi-
zation and Employment of Main Armament Flame Thrower Tanks.
(1) 2d Ind 470.71/473. C:nl 0 to C CI'lS. In
Hand R. OC CmI O. (2) C',;'S Pac. Vol. II. Annex
II c. p. 37. (3) Ibid., Vol. IV, Annex II c8, p. 9.
- 155 -
"Wasps" and do not fall strictly into either classification.
The British Wasp (Mark II) was a main armament type, in tha t it rPT'llBced
the primnry of on which it was mounted. The Canadian
Wasp rrc) was more of an auxiliary tyne, since the Drlmary WeP..:Don
was retained by reducing the fuel c ppacity 2R percent, and the vehicle
was capable of o<>.ing used in its normal role without. re"1oving its flame
equiDment. That the Canadian wa s preferred and later adapted
as the Bri tish st<-ndard ca rrier-borne flame thrower indicated that, for
this type weaDon, armament other than a flame thrower was advantageous.
Because of its longer r anFe (80 to 100 ynrds) and fuel capacity
(100 imperial gallons for the '1ark II), the Wasn exhi bi ted character-
istics more like the American main armament weaDon than the auxiliary
type.
The British Crocodile (Figs. 14 and 15) cannot be classed
as a main armament flame thrower because the medium tank to which it was
attached retained the characteristics of the American main armament
type in fuel capacity (400 imperial gallons) and range (110 to 180 yards).
Because of the attached trailer, in which was carried, the Crocodile IS
maneuverabill ty VB. S reduced anit the elemo.nt of surpri se was sacri
Since the t actical value of both thesp. 'British weap ons profoundly influ-
enced the opinion s of Amer iean commancl.ers in 'lfurop e as to the requi remen t
for a main armament tyPe flame thrower, the organization, tactical doctrine,
- 156 -
Figure 14.
Figure 15.
113
and highlights of their employment is discussed below.
Organi za tion for Employment. Crocodiles. In 'l\fen ty-one Arrrw
Group (ETO) these weal'0ns were organized into special flame thrower uni ts.
A regiment consi sted of squadrons of fifteen Crocodiles each. Each
squadron contained three troops wi th four Churchill Crocodiles each and
one troop wi th three, making a total of fi fteen per squadron. Prior to
October 1944 a squadron of five troops of threE> tanks each for
a normal tank As a result of operational experience, this
organization was changed to enable the of half souadrons. One
regiment, the 141 Royal Armored Corps, W8. S ?ovaile.ole for the }Tormandy
landing. three regiments, the 141 Royal Armored Corps, the
1st Fife and Yorfar and the 7th Royal Tanks, were formed under
a brigade and attached for administration to the 79th Armored Division.
The arrival of Crococ.iles in Italy begl3nin Au{:Ust 1944, and the organi-
zation eventually became the 51st Royal Tanks, which was made un of two
squadrons, each with sixteen Crocodiles. In India and the Far plans
called for one Crocodile in each troop of three tanks in the fighting
squadrons, i.e., five flame tanks per squadron. and flame throwers were
to be a part of the normal organization.
These weapons were ini tially held in ,.Army pools to be
drawn as required. This system proved unsatisfactory because it did
113
For a comprehensive treatment of British flame throwers, see
Hiat (British), III, \{arfare. In CMLWG.
- 157 -
not ensure the availability of equinment at the needed, the
of maintenance was lower than when thA was held by
uni ts, and training difficu l ties 'Were proevAlen t. Twenty-one Army Group
p olicy to ' ,'erd the end of the war for six 't/asps (V8rk IIC) to be
l!lounted in ea ch infantry battalion ,lith twenty-five per-
114
cent reserve in corps and army
TF_ctical Doctrine. The essential of tActical em-
ployment were: (1) thoroUh reconnaisBA.nce; (?) Adeouate fire support;
(3) if:olate the objective; (4) use sufficient flrune - three or more
gun s; (5) follow immediately wi th supporting infan try; (6) -provide
cut-off fire on the flRnka; end (7) eet the fllLlle throwers up ana away
quic'dy. Wa !" used. effec ti vely A.{"" ainst the following of
targets, which are listed below in order of their suitability for
115
Attack mechrulized flame throwArs.
1. Dp.fense in the open - she1 ter pi t s, l'I.no.
trenches.
Natural cover - ditches, shrubbery, stand-
inp crops, :mrl ercges of woods.
3. Field fortifications - ni11boxAs. dugouts,
bunkers, and 18.r ger forts.
4. Forti fi [luil di '""I f" s - in towns
and vi 118.t'"e s.
Co-o-peration \\1. th the infe..n try 'Was stres$ed. The follOwing -POints
were considered essentiAl:
114
Ibid, pp. 20, 77, 91.
115
Lecture CP..p t Ar",? , Arsenp-.l, !'d.,
19 48. In
- 158 -
1. Contact bet"een i nfnntr y tank com-
manders shoul d be este. bli shed 8- t all
l evels. De t ails should out
toge ther.
2 . '!''.. n!-- t hr owers should be placed in
suyport of t he infA.ntry.
2. Intercommunica t ion of ?nd
unmi stakable
are e s sen t i al.
4. Co 'ltposi ti on of den end on the
nature of the terrain t he
of enemy defense s . If mAneuverabi l-
ity is restricted , t A.n1{s on erate 1n sun -
'l')or t of i nfAntry; in open country tenks
the attack. In al l cases , gun tanks
in sU'!,rport.
5. Use cover in th"l 8nnr o.'lch. axis
of advance may b.,. used infantry And
t ank s in order to take full advantage of
cover.
6. The i nf antr y must follow up i mmediately.
r refe: ably using troops from r e-
serve , bef ore the enemy has a chanc e to
rec over.
For !!L'ljor assault s on organized defense s, fl e ne t hr owers ""ere em-
p loyed in mas s to the initi al advp.nce where i t was pOSSible to
Eet t hem into a position wit hi n of the enemy f orward defense lines,
ei t her or before zero hour . This of support coul d normally be
carried out onl y where l i nes were as in a
canal or river cr ossing . In gener a l, flp-me t anks were s t sinet
organized positi on s after gap s had been 'TI8<"e in mine fi elds, And obstac les
prot ec ti nr th!?' "! 1th!'!r to assist 1n breFll(- in or i n sulJ se-
- 159 -
116
Quent mopping-up oper ations.
The smal l est unit of Crocodi l es to emn l oyed vas to be one- hRlf
a squadron, because only then coul d An ade quate number of weanons be
expected to a rrive at object ive. On occasions ,.,hen Ginp.-l e Croco-
dtles or even t TOopS of three woe re used , the operati on often f!liled.
The Crocodile wa s l imi ted to attacks becAuse the f l ame p,uns
tra versed frolJl eleven to two o ' clock only.
Th"! !!lountinp of an attnck wi t h the 'i/l'l. S'p fl ame
thrower s l ess extensive pl anning t han In the C8S9 of the Croco-
d11e; bol d end rapid action by c nr r l er s f requently achieved 8ucces8,
but the principl es were not neglected. These weapons were
nor mally nva11able for quick flame aupnort, whil e the Crocodi le was
reserved for use agai nst rougher i nvol vi ne detailed pl anni ng ,
117
the cle8r ence of fields , the of all ar ms .
Highlights of Emoloyment. Crocodi les . The 14l st Royal
Armored Corps R"!giment, equi oped '1-11 th forty-f! ve Cr ocodil es , fought
p. long t he whole front i n northwest Europe . Elements of this unit op-
erated a t one time or Rnother ",ith ever y British a nd Canadian divi !'; i on ,
116
117
Hi s t (Eri t1 sh ) III, :rh.me "erfar e , '0. 86. In
C!JJ. ' .... G. The follo .... i ne account of tish rmd CanAdi an
el!lnl oyrnent o f "s sns And Crocodiles in Italy pnd Ero 18
based on this British Thi s work i s a first
and is not used as an officia l
tioq of the Wer Office.
!J!!.!, . pp . 58- 80 .
- 1 60 -
and with several divisions. In the Normandy six unit.
(two troops of C Squadron) came a.shore at H plus 35, but, owinr. to the
rough seA.S and bel'ich obstacles, only two of these six IpJlded in condi-
tion for combat. These two, actinp: 8S gun tanks, assi!';tod the i'1fcmtry
through the first vil1!we anc" thereafter led \I'A)' t the day,
bearing as mAnY as forty infantrymen on their backs. On the
following morning they found to their that their nositi0n
was only a few hundred yards awf>,.y fr om a battery of German p:uns. ',n th
the scanty reSources available, an assp.ul t '.;as speedily planned and.
using .. o flail tanks for fire supTJort and artillery sie:n!il ner-
sonnel as infantry. the attack was launched. The Crocodil'9s fired
eight bursts of flflme and the German nosition immediately
became white with flags. One hundr'9d and fifty prisoners were tak'9n.
In the deys which followed there were few if any opportunities
for properly planned flame actions, for in the early weeks of the in-
Vasion general principles had to be abandoned in order to meet emer-
gencies. The few blasts of flame fired proved effective and the troops
were favorably impressed by the in1 tial performance of their special
weapon. However. since the te,nks were sometimes used as gun tanks,
their flame potantial was not fully realized. It was not long before
the whole regiment had landed, but the entire first month was spent in
learning the hR,rd way - a time spent in a !?eries of packet"
exo<!ri:nents. Powever, 'nany successful troon actions Here fOl.lfht in
that t1:ne. ',{here flame throwers fail",d it was largely the r",sult of
poor reconnaissance And improper tie-in th<!
- 161 -
During the mo nth of July, not only \r ere the squl'l.drons
1n sunn ort of forml' ti ons over A. wid"! pS"!P , b ut th!> troop s ... :ere snli t uTl
A..nd were con stantly p nroce ss of i n to,f! ration disintegra-
tion. One squadron W0S split over four brigades and three divis!onpl
fronts. The tacticfll an(t administrative dra\rbacks of this alloca tion
were proved in the action vlhich fol10\l.'o,d. On 8 July at La Bijude, t..,. o
troops remained inactive. A third troop ""ent into action, but,immedi-
ately after crossi ng the start-line, one tank wa s destroyed 0:-' bl't zooJr...a.
fire, one was penetrated by a. ?5-r:l!n. shell, ,,:hich dislocated the steer-
ing gear, and a third had to wi thdraw \-!hen its fuel pressure failed.
Furthermore, the infantry did not follow up the attack. The fourth
troop a:p-c eared, sfter bo.ing tardily released frol!! its bri e;ade, And,
without any knowledge of the ( round or the rushed into acti on.
The flaming was reported as "ma.{"nificent." High e:x:plosi ve a nd Resa
fire 81so were liberally u sed anc1. this ti me the infl'!.ntry went through
the enemy posi tion. ':'he obvious lesson le!'lrned WCl s thtOl.t, even to do a
one-troop job, two troops are r"!Quired to ensure the use of one. A
half squadron or squadron allotment would AAve been be t ter and a ll
could have been used on thi s particul A.r -po si ti on.
An exa!!Iple of successful fl aming was the two-troop action on 15
July at Le Bon Repos in support of the 8d Glascow Hi ghlanders. The
objectives were houses and wi th the use of Air nhoto-
graphs a nd f,round observation, t hor ough p l A.ns had Two
troops of the 10?th RAC were to precede the advance of the Crocodiles.
- 162 -
The Crocodiles, witl"l O"e troon on encl"> side of road, were to
fl nine positions in hedgerows en route to :Son Renos. A n l a t oon
of i nf an try was to 8,dntnce behind e;;.ch troor> of Crocodiles, ".ri th one
section il ed to folIo ... , i '1:r.lec.i "tel y behind. the fb.m'? tank. '!I he
obj'?ctive wr' s t o b"! tho rUvision 8rtill"ry urior to
H :o lus 20 , ','i th thE a ssist a!1c'? of smoke on b eyond tr."! objective.
A r eh"!f.\rsA.l too1.r n l<>ce wi th tho inf8.nt r y to cler:1 0nstr2te the I'l.b ili ty
of trooT' s to w8.1k throUf' h tr.e fl a:ne once it ""R S or.. th"! {! r ound. Al thoCl..'h
the demon strators' coots s c fferec in the nroce s s , thl:) rehearsa l W? S
CO'lsi c.ered worth ... ::Ule '.!hon the infe.ntr y entered. Le "Po!"!. Re1)oS 't,ithout
casual ties to the':1s "!lves or to the Croc odi l e s. A poli te "than:(" you,
'r:e a re OK now" fr om t h e p latoon cO:TInander and t he Crocodiles turned
about, leaving the i nfant ry to co!'.t inue on its WP,:7 . Unfortunately,
this oporation, the Crocodiles h eld too forwArd for sev-
eral dcl ys anrl. suffered casual ties from "!neroy mortars and a.ir
In the ep.rly pa rt of July, Crocodiles I,.;ere used to fl?JD8
woods, hedgerows, villa&, es, houses, Mc hine ["un -P OSiti on s, a ncl trenches
and were often c R.ll"!d UDon to p"!r form i mpo ssi ble tasks.
The fir s t Crocodi le action of squadron occurred on 17
Jul] 1944. In this action they sU:T)por ted f'th_ Bp.ttfl.lion , S"!afor.th
Righl enc1_ers, f).!1 1 n r oved to be most effecti ve in run
nests .<'1nd. burning t.h
o
out of deen holes . Th"! objective in this
action wn s a tri angl
o
ne e r A vita l :ooint on the loft
- 163 -
flank of the 8.ttack sO'_l tha.llst of Caen. Otha.r sqUJl.dron p.ctions alon/",
the fronts followed in quick succession. One wa s the attack
On Va y-Sur-Orne on 8 AU"l.lst. A previous attempt earli er in the day to
CErpture this to ... rn hPd "b e"n dAfeated with heavy Allied c', 8ualties. In
the Ffternoon a new attack, supported b;,: four troons of Crocodiles, wa S
launched. One - troOp WRS withdrawn because of trailer and gun trouble.
Forming-up positions were behind British-held Four comMand
tanks provided supporting fire and smoke from the area of the buildings,
and heavy artillery concentrations were fired to prevent the enemy from
escaping. Two companies of infllntry advanced along either side of the
and -pRssed the Crocodiles after the
Neither the infantry nor the Crocodiles sustained any casualties. The
enemy withdrew when the flame tanks went into action, nor did he counter-
attR.ck or send out the usual night patrols.
The of the infAntry was boosted by flame thrower support,
[-' nd officers believed that the weapon was an effective one and that it
had saved both 11 ves and t. Brigade headquarters A.nd the di vi-
sional co mander expressed their appr "' ciation to Crocodile squadrons
Rnd told them that over 100 prisoners had been tak-:m. "This attack, It
it Wa s reported, "bore out the contention that the effect of flame is
118
increased out of all proportion by using it en masse. II
118
(1) C',{S T of crons Ltr 21, 3 Jan 4!'5, Incl 4. (2) Hist
("Rri ti sh) II I, FIFlme ':Tarfare, p. 64. In

- 164 -
During August 1944 the 141st RAC was continuously employed flamin,"
hedgerows, orchards, and villages. At th'? end of August the advance
alonE the whol
o
front WP. S at a pp.ce which was i ::roossib le for
the Crocodiles to maintain. They could not proceed fast to reach
a strong pOint before thRt point bed been reduced by normal arms. In
September, however, the battles for channel ber-an and the
Crocodiles again played their part. The first ni Fht employment of
Crocodiles occurred on 10 Sentember during the attack on the
defenses of Le Havre. In thi s section a squa dron of Cro codiles was
employed in at t ac'<ing such strone noints AS fP.Tr!1 "buildings, \veenon
si tes in \-lOods, p.nd lA.rge reinforced Li ttle resistRnce
was encoun tered and 300 pri soners 'v!ere tFlken. 1,TO enemy dead were :' ound
and there were no casualties a mong Crocodile crews. The next d8Y the
Crocodiles were a gain in action, building s, weanon sites,And
comIDU..Tlic fl ti 0;'1 trenches which were surrounded hedgerows and mine
fields. The was OTJen anr_ fairly level. The CrocoCl.iles isolated
the posi tions .... i th smoke from their 0"!!1 wea;rons, e.ni went into the
attack preceded by flail tanks and 8upported by infantry. The enemy
u8U8lly to the flanks And surrendered to the infantry. However, in
one case a platoon of enemy infantrymen were in the a nd
burned to death.
There 'Wa s a period of for tho. flame throwers
the long s'Weep throu.e;h France t o the Low Countries. In October, a ftgr
the crossing of the Save.jaards Pleat, one squadron of the 141st RAC
- 165 -
operated in support of the 9th Canedi p.. n :?rigade in its advance into the
Lo\<, Countries.
The second Crocodile regiment, the lstFife a nd Forfar Yeomanry,
arrived on t he Continent in Octooer 1944 and went into action on 20
October in sunnort of t he 4th Armoured Division, which was
operating to the eAst of the Sout h Isthmus towards :Bergen Op
Zoom. In the latter pRrt of October the l41st RAC fought a number of
squadron action s in the dri'1<>' easbre.rds tOVJ?r cl s S' Rprto", enbosc h. Of
these actions, the one at Nuland six miles northeast of
'5'Hertogenboscb, was an exa!lTple of excellent co-ordination wit h the
infantry and resulted in t p. kinr sixty prisoners while sustaining casu-
alties of only one killed and wounded. Both regiments partici-
pnted in a number of massed flame actions ac"!'oss cF...nals, in s1.l,'I')port
of infantry in the area around the Lower Rhine. In 1945 the
141st RAC engaged in numerous actions in the area between the Roer and
Maas Rivers. In February and Mhrch, the two flame regiments
played a big part in cleAring up t he west bank of the Rhine and gave
invaluable assi stance in the can ture of Fre,ssel t, Cleve, Gennep, Hassim,
and Goch. In the woods fighting, in t.he R'?ichswa.l ct country, where
ordinary p1mor the r rep. ter seArching effect of the Crocodile
Was of considerable
E;v the end of a third Crocodile regi ment was ava.ilable,
when the 7th Royal Tanks were with Crocodiles. Aft er the
- 166 -
cr ossing the H.hine all thr ee regiments vlere employed v:her ever s tiff
resistance ,\,las encountered by the Canadian Army , the 2d Sri tish Army ,
and occasi ona lly l/ith United States f orce s. The l ast Cr ocodile acti on
occurred at 3r ener uor de on 2 'fay 1945 , ',Iher e t, . o r egir:lEnt <3 supported
"u he Hi ghland L'ivision.
In 175 recorded Crocodile ac ti ons, a t otal of 90) flame tanks were
used T,i th an over-all casualty rate of 6 . 6 percent, '(l hich was signif-
i cantly less than for tank operations. Casualti e s in the Croco-
oile units were caused chiefly by mine s ano anti-tank guns which a c-
counted for about one-third of the t otal of s ome ninet:,r killed and 160
"rounded. 'l' he average expenditure of fuel per action Was about seventy
percent of the t railer contents. For eac h l oad of fuel about six enemy
soldiers were killed or wounded and about t wenty-ei ght captured. The
75-mm. gun was used in about one-third of the recorded actj.ons, mainly
against tanks and self-propelled guns. In addition to the recorded
flame actions, the Crocodiles were used solely as gun tanks on seventy-
two occasi ons.
ll9
In Italy, the of Crocodiles increased steadily after August
1944. The mountainous count r y confronting the British Eighth Ar my in
t he au t u.rnn of 1944, t o a certai n extent precluded ->:, he use of flame
t hr owers on tracked vehicle s, but once the plains were reached there
--------
119Hi st '!onograph (Br i tish) III. T< lame pp. 58-f)9 . In CMLVJG.
- 167 -
'\" ,' as a della nri f or Per haps the ]';l ost successful use of mecha nized
flame t hr ovlers i n mass wa s in suppor t of t he as s ault a cr oss the Seni o
River at 1930 hours on 19 Aprj 1 1945. The 'was made by 5
Cor ps, 3r iti s h Ei Ght h Ar:ny, nit h the 3th Indian ano 2d Zealand
L'iv isi ons i n t he a ssau lt and the 78t h I.i vi s i on i n r es erve .
The Serlio River was bor ri er ed by steep-si de d flood banks whic h were
t en to twent y feet hi gh. The "ddth of the rjver varied from ten to
tYlenty Y3rds, the v:i c th betwe en the t ops of t he flood banks bei ng fifty
to seventy-five yar ds. The ener.lY held s tronE posi t ions du g int o t he
flood banks on hi s side of the r i ver. A total of twenty-eight Cr oco-
di l es and sixt y-fi ve ',"<[as ps 'f/as br o
1
lg!1t up a10nf, a 16, 000 yard fr ont and
flame d t he op'Josit e ban'r< f or one minute pr e ceding H-hour. The i nfantry
assaulted irn.mediate1y after the flame attack ceased and were across or
cross ing bef ore any resi stance VIa s enc ountered. Casualti.es i n t he
assau ltint; di vjsi ons were f or ty-fi ve killed ana 279 \':ounded . Several
hundred pri soner s "'Ier e taken and a number of the enemy were burned to
death.
120
The :.fasp . This rece ived its greatest use by t. he Canadians
who became very profi cient in i ts u se. The Canaci i ans made about 2 , 000
f lame att acks in northwest Europe. I n a ll of these attacks
their casualties amounted t o only fifteen men killed and fort y-five
125 Cor ps (3r), FlaITle Attack on RivE'r Senio , 9 Apr 45. In CMLWG.
- 168 -
wounded out of approximately 540.
121
iiasps were not employee in the early phases of the Normandy Cam-
paign because enemy mortars and anti-tank guns were extremely active
and, under these circumstances, the Crocodiles were more effective.
The first reported use of the Wasps Vias in the 53d Division area at
dusk on 29 July 1944. The objective Was a concentration of slit
trenches and bunkers enclosE-d by hedges ano trees. One section of two
Wasps supported each of two forward platoons of Company 1), 2d Battal-
ion, Ree:lment, the third section, of two Wasps, Was ,dth
reserve platoon. Supporting fire was laid down from H minus 2 to
R plus 40. 'i.'he f1a::1e tanks and the infantry moved from the point of
departur e simultaneously, the \vasps flaming the hedgerows at a range
of seventy-five to eighty yards. The Germans immediately began to
surrender, except those in one strong point 'which was burned out by the
reserve 7tasps. Seventeen prisoners, including one officer, were taken
very early in the fi ght. The remaining twelve or thirteen would not
surrender and were 1<illed by further bursts of flame. After expending
all their fup- l, the l;asps returned to the rear as 'speedily ' as possi ble.
Three vehicles were ditched, but there were no casualties among the
crews. In t.akinr; this strong, point the infantry sustained casualties
of only one killed and fifteen wounded.
121Lecture by Capt Henry Sorenson, Canadian Army, at Cml C School, 19
Aug 45. In CHLWG.
The first emplo;,ed thetiasp 1.-\ark HC in August 1944.
Forces advancine; southy;ar ds t OYfCl.r ri. F'ala::'se encountered strong enemy
resistance along the Laison River. D.lring the mopping-up operations
by the 2d Canadian Armoured Brigade and the 9th Canadian Infantry
Brigade on 15 August, Company B, of the Stor mont, Dmdas, and Glen-
garry Highlanders, reached its obj ective jn the vicinity of Il ontboint,
but was unahle t o consolidate its posi tj on be cause of Anemy fire. A
tank on the right and he avy machine fire from the left ;';lace
it imposs ible to conduct a flanking operation. The enemy was vell (iug
in along the hedgerows and in the orchards. Since there were well
covered appr oaches for the carriers, it was decided to put in a sec-
tion of three -;ras ps, with maximum fire support fr om B Company. No
supporting fire, exce pt small arms, was feasible because of the nature
of the terrain. After a reconnaissance the Wa sps moved forward t o the
starting line. The lead tank on the right flank drew first fire from
a German machine gun at about seventy yards. Having good cover, how-
ever, the tank moved f orwar d and flamed fr om a range of thi rt:' rards.
Burnine and screa'Tling, the enemy ran from the position. The next tar-
get was a machine gun which was from 120 yards, and neutral-
ized. Another l::asp engaged a: t hi rd machine gun at fift y yards and
silenced it immediately, Vlhile a fourth machine gun rlthdr ew. ln the
meantime, the carrier fired on the slit trenches in t he center
of the position. HavinG expended t heir fuel, the \{8. SpS returlled t o
the rear and the Hi ghlanders consolida ted the positi on unopposed. In
this section flame four or five of the enemy and wounded an
- 170 -
un1moYiTl number. The Hi ? hlanders sustained ei Ght casualties. A German
prisoner later stated that they had seventeen machine gun emplacements,
in add tion t o those vihich were flamed.
t he }!ark II an(; ; lark IIC were used on a number of occasi ons
durbt;; the month of Aueust. 'rhe tactics employed ' ''ere similar to those
used in the two instances cescribed above. In September, the ; ;asps
",ere used in the battles f or the channel ports, part.icularly at Boul-
0 6'118, wherE on one occasion prisoners were taken with no
Canacian casualties. In another action in the city itself. two of the
enemy were killed and sixty pr isoners taken Ylith no Canacian casual-
ties. One other incident at Boulogne involved the attack of a ship-
like f ortificat i or. at t he end of a pier near the harbo), entrance.
Alth ou[ h the first burst of flame was short, flags a ppeared im-
nedi ately, not only in the position being attacked but from another
enemy position on an arl jacent pier. Fifty were taken.
After the operati ons the channel ports, the scene of action
shifted to the canal and dyke country in the area of the Sheldt, the
Maas, and the Lower Rhine. The Wasp was used effectively, hoth in
crossings and in actions after crossings. The Wasp's range was long
enoueh to alloy{ it tCJ> fire across canals from under cover of the dykes.
In cr ossing the Leopold Canal, nineteen "liasps were assembled for the
attack . The flane throwers were spaced at about sixty-yard intervals
behind the dyke banks, covering the front of two assault ccmpanies.
The flame covered the opposite bank anc the infantqr launched their
- 171 -
assault boats ilTl!Tle diately . The enemy e i d n ot ret urn fire for ten mn-
utes after the flamin g c e ased and the bridgehead Vias established vii th-
out casualti es . Ei eht to twelve of the e nemy were r epor t ed killed by
the flame.
The Was p, IIe , s uperceded the Hark II i n the T-t'I' en ty-f i rst
Army Gr oup by the beeinni ng of 1945 and Was issued on the basi s of six
per batta li on . Beca1ise of t heir maneuverabili ty they pr ove d ext r e r:; e l y
successful i n stree t fi Ehting and pl ayed an important r ole in the cap.-
t ure of Ke ppel, Udem, and Xant en . They lI'ere also success-
f ully to brtfak up counterattac ks.
I n Ital y , \ias ps di e no t become a vaj lable unti l January 1945, and
Tlere never used extensively ther e t o r educe indivi dual str ong poi nts .
They were , however, '.l s ecl in mass t o su pport the r i ver crossir. [s at t he
Seni o , Santer na , Silla r o , Gaiano , and I c i cc . The Seni o cr ossi ng was
on a cor ps frontage a nd the Ga iano wa s on a two br i gade fr ont . In the
other instance s they were employed c n bat t a l ion fr ontages.
122
Cri tique. The successful p.r.l ployment of flame the Canaci ians,
compared .,/i th the more or l e ss abortive attempts by American f orces in
Eur ope, indi cates a l ack of vi sion on the part of our cOl!l!Ilancers both
i n the He l d am' i n the service f orces. Early in the 'rial' the CanadLms
:,\on oGr aph (Sr i tish) III! Flame pp . 82- 85 . I n C:HJIG.
- Y;2 -
were ahle to e stablish a requi r enent for a faa t, large capacity mechan-
ized flame thr ower that woul ri be s uitable for oper a tions in EUr ope .
History has pr oved t he wisdem of thei r choice. Throughout the war com-
pJai nts r eceived from the field on the tactical of the US port-
able flame t.hrower "I/(! re usually a beut its l eT: capacit y , short range ,
and i lll!,tObility. Ye t a requ irement f or liGht vehicul ar weapons f or use
by the infantr y ";as never e stablished hy US f orces . Lack of nevelop..
ment of such new \';eapons during peaceti me may be rati onali7.8d on the
basis of the pacifistic inclinations of eur peopl e, and the resulti ng
small a ppr opriations f or research and s t udy of ney,' wea pons . That such
lack of vision mus t be carried over into .... ar time dt!veloJ:ment appears
incr edible .
In nerth"{est Europe t.he Crocodile was s o cffecttv(! that supported
units "'anted more of them. The \i-asp was a more versatile weapon af t er
i:l plasti.c a r mor was devel oped and fastened, a s addit i onal protection,
to the f r ont of mec hanized carri e rs in .. hich they "ere mounted .
123
There was a sharp contrast between the employment of flame lien mas se"
'tlith othe r t :l pe uses of t he n'apons . Wasps h"l d heavy t anks
against heclberows; and the (.:rococilEl btlcarue mor e or less a str ategic
weapon beinG moved f r om point t o point along the fr ont as dic tated by
bigher command.
12k
123fAA Rpt" London rio . 2935-44 , 22 r.ec 44 . In AGIo' , C- 2 , DD.
124Ltr , Dr' . G. Br oughton to OC CVlS, 7 Jan 4 5, No . 26A. In Tech Ub,
ACC.
Scanned by Mi lSpecManuals - 1?3 -
Before the end of the War with Germany the British High Command
had accepted flat1 as a standard weapon. Field Earshall Alexander had
endorsed flame throwers fr om the start, but not until the vleapon had
been proveo in eombat did he eOrnr:1it hi!11 seU t o it, anc t hen his c on-
elusion was that in every tank a machine EUn should be replaced by a
f1
"'hr 125
a::tc u ower.
It V[as understood beyond question that the use of flame materi-
ally reduced our casualties and increased those of the enemy. It
shortened t.he time required to overcome enemy resistance and, in a
nUMber of cases, proved t o be a dAcisive factor in c ombat.
2. by British r.ttached to U.S. Troops. 3rest.
Sq,laciron B, 14131.. Royal Armored Corps, reported t o VIII Cor ps on 8
September 1944. The squadron consistec of a headquarters troop ( three
S5-mm. f,Un tanks), and four flaL'le thrower troops, each troop
three fla:-: le throwing tank,:;.
For a tir:le no sui table ohjecti ves f or the squadron were found.
On 10 September reconnaissance was made and plans dravm for an attack
by the sq'.ladron, in conjunct ion vii th 121st Infantry, 8th Infantry
Livisi on , a gainst the north and ""est positions of t.he inner "all v,hich
surrounded Brest. The attack Via s scheduled f or the
125
Ltr
, Dr. G. Br uughton to (Ie Cy,: s, 7 Jan 45, 37(a). In Te eh
Lib, ACC.
- Y/4 -
The mission of +.he flaoe t hr oi"ers Was to flame the e t'!1 brasures i n thfO!
wall and t o a tteJlpt t o Get s ome fLne over the wall. The attack was
cancelled because , c' ll rj DG the niEht , our artillery had been unable
to breach thf' wall as had helm planned . I t \'Ia s c onsi cered inadvisable
to lal,lnch an attack which v:as certain t o be stopped at the wall.
On 11 Sept ember the squadr'on wa s attached to the 29th Infantry
r ivi si on which operatjng the defenses of Brest.
The plan of the Commanoin1': C;ene r a l, 29 th Infantr:; Di vision, \':as t o use
t he squac.r on as a sur prise wea pon '. ti th the ma in emphasis on the final
assault. The mili n e f fort l {'3. S t o b made -3.l.'1lost cJ l1P. ea st alone the
east-"\"est rj age runninG. through Fort r.10ntbarey. In pre para tion fnr
the operation , key company :)f fi c FTs ar,o enlisted men fr om the 115th
ana 116th Infantry h eEiment s wer e as s eobled in the division rea r area
v-here, on 12 and 13 SeptembeJ1, t hey rehearsed attac%s with the flarre
126
thr ol':ers . "'he r erf ormance of t l":e flar. e t hr owe r at t hese rehearsals
mace a eeep i mpre s si on on comba t-har dened officers ar,d enlistee men .
The ;: l an Gid not "': or k out "f:1 ecause , or de r to open sufficient
i=:::l. pS i n t.he nine fiek a ncj t o cross the tank rii t ch im.'7led j.at. el: west of
Fort "ontba rey , .it was to first reduce the resistance in the
vi cinity of t he fort. -In t hE"' ni gh ts of 13 anc; 14 Se pt p. mber, a parti-
511 ccessfu 1 a tt e"lpt Was made t o open gaps for one fla:ne t hrower
126 rl f' h 0
See Appen\.:i x . or t . e pns : ..:e"o i s sued t he 29th ::: nf Di. v
!l!\!!7:IR 0 ........ ;;1 --14
- 175 -
group to the east of the village of Kervalin. On the afternoon of 14
September one group attacked from the vicinity of Kervalin, their ob-
jective, pillboxes near Fort Two of the tanks were knocked
out by mines before reaching the objective. The third flame thrower
reduced the two pillboxes by flaming and sent back about sixty prison-
ers. It wns thought t hat the flame contributed materially to
127
softening the unusually stubborn resistance E:.round Fort Kontbaroy.
From 14 to 16 September the squadron was employed in support of
1st Battalion, 116th Infantry, 29th Division, against Fort Uontbarey
which defended the we stern approach to Brest, France. Training exer-
cises in infantry-flame tank co-ordination '?"8re conducted before the
operhtion. ltontbarey was an old French caser...e.ted fort of the Vauban-
type, with earth-filled masonry walls about forty feet thick and sur-
rounded by a dry moat approximately forty feet and fifteen feet
deep. (See Fig. 16.) The outlying defenses of 20-l"lm. guns and rifle
pOSitions along a sunken road, 100 to 200 meters to the northwest, pro-
tected a mine field ''fhich lay north and west of the road and contained
300-pound naval torpedo shells equipped with pressure igniters. The
1st Battalion, 116th Infantry, had succeeded in infiltrating as far as
the sunken road and around the western side of the fort, hut the
enemy 6arrison, estir.lB.ted at 200 to 250, resisted stubbornly.
127
Arr.1ored Sec, Hq Ninth Army, Report on Employment of Churchill
"Crocodile" at brest, 30 Sep 44. In
- 176 -
,...---. FORT MONTBAREY
\ ')
11,,-,,"""",J.1>--
>"

Fi Gure 16 .
On 14 September, the 1st Battalion, 116th Infantry ( less Co:-::pany
A), supported by one platoon of the 12lst Fngineers, one plat oon of 4.2-
inch chemical mortars, three 75-:nm. tank destroyers, and the
14lst RAC Tank Squadr on Yfa3 orcerec' t o recl.'.c e the f ort. T he engineE:r
pla toon, under cover of 4.2 morta r s moke , swe pt ane taped a tan'{ lane
the minefield. Company C, 116th I nfantry, he l d pos j tions along
the sunken road t o t hp. "!'lest of the fort. At 1645 hours on lL.
the initial TIas launched f r om a tank area 800 meters
northwe s t of the f ort. Compan;y C r eoainec. in line around the f ort
whi le Company B acc ompanied three flame tanks mov in i n column fr om the
tank asse'11bly area. E::n [; ineer platoon was in r e serve . }'our Gun
tanks the command t.ank) , anei three 75- mrn . tank dest r oyers
(SP) u_IO fired in support. Since visibility was excellent, the mortar
by maint aininG a smoke s creen fron east of the fort, f ore-
stalled enel'1Y artillery acti on. fift y-pound dell oli tj on char8es 1iere
carrieo b:' about six infantrymen.
-r:hen thp f i r st f l a r,e tank reached the sunY-en r 'Ja d , it succ e sGfully
flamec the fort nntil i t s fuel YJas exhaus t e c . TIJ en, :J u pport i nt: thR
j jt attacked the f ort 1':) . t h 75- m.:::. and r.1achine fire. Al-
though the ':la""e t ank was hit with a 20-1nm. 3hel l, :. t contin'.lRC 2- n
action unti l it S1.: cr oppe c' int o a c or: crete
emplaceClent ter: feet decp. The tank was di sabled bu t there Viere no
casualties. The secone
1
flame tank struck a mine v:hich bleil o1'f the
- 177 -
right track, killed the driver, and injured the remaining four crew
t!le r.lber s. The third fla;ne tank, which by-passed t he second after the
engineers had cleared a lane, reached the fort at about 1800 hours,
but could not get into flaming position. A. 75-011\ . gun tan'r<: struck a
mine and had its turret blown off. Two of tbe crew were killed and
three were slightly wounded.
The engineer platoon was initially committed as an infantry re-
serve, but when Company E was made available by the regimental corrmander
to assist in holding a cordon about the fort f or the night, the engin-
eers were wi thdravm.. Two gun tanks were emplo;{ed in c lose support and
three additional flame tanks were held i n reserve. The attack was sus-
pended f or the night. The commander of the tank battalion reported that
the tanks had knocked out two 20-lll::J . guns and reduced two inf;mtry
strong points outsi de the main fort. On 15 September, while the engin-
eers were i mproving the tank lane, they a lso prep,ared demolition charges
totalling 2,000 pounds t o fill the moat and breach the fort.
On 16 September, the attack was renewed with two rifle companies in
assault and one in r eserve. At 1030, three f13l1le tanks fired bursts
into the moat and over the fort wall until the fuel was exhausted . At
1300, while three flame tanks were attacking with a support tank firing
high explosives a t the fort gate, three Germans ca!!l out . At 1500 the
three flame tanks covered the filling of the moat and the breaching of
the fort wall by engineers. Heantime, a 105-mrn. howitzer of the cannon
company fired about 200 rounds from a range of about 200 yards and
- 178 -
created a breach in the main gate. Tanks flar'led until they exhausted
their fuel. One went into the moat to the sides of the fort.
Smoke from the operations provided an excellent screen for the engineers
and infantry. After exhausting their fuel the tanks remained in posi-
tion, their crews throY/ing white phosphorus hand grenades to c over the
assault through the breaches by engineers and infantry. The fort
capitulatp0 1700 See Fig. 17.
An inspection of the fort on 17 September showed that the l'rall:;
had been extensively seared on three sides, and that flames had pene-
trated anc burned out one casemate within the fort. Trees around
strong points outsi de the moat were burned. The noat had been filled
and the fort wall breached by engineer demolitions. There were several
bomb craters, about fifteen feet in diameter and ten feet deep in the
center of the fort and outside the moat. In one case a bomb, or shell,
had penetrated a case!'1ate. Prisoner of war interrogCiti ons indicated
that flame-throning tanks materially reduced the garrison's will to
hold out. Eighty prisoners were taken in the fort.
l2S
The Commanding General, Ninth Army, was SO pleased with the Croco-
diles that on :31 October, he urged General Bradley to make one squadron
available to the Ninth Army for its impending operations against the
12Bapt, 29th In! Div FA Combat Observer, Employment of Crocoaile (Flame
Throwing) Churchill Tanks in Attack on :ft. ?Jontbarey near Brest,
France, 14 - 15 September 1944. In Cml C School Library, 470.71/
57 (3).
- 179 -
THE OPERATION
15 SEPTEMBER 1944
Figure 17.
Siegfriec Line.
129
Insteao of making the British units, v:hich by this
time v:ere in E.; reat c.e::1anc b:>, fy,enty-first Army Gr oL...p , avaiLhl e ,
Sher'nan-Cr ocodi le fla Ge thr oY' ers Y;hi ch had ':: een ffianufC:l. c tured by the
British, werE i s sued t o r inth Army .
OpArati ons 1'ri th 2d Armored D:i v\si on . Since AJ1erican troops l ackp. d
E'xnerience in the t acti cal employment of fl o.:ne tanks, co- operati on with
the infantry v:as nut ah,a;)- s good , nor ,',ere oper a tions succe ssful.
From 20 t o 22 Nov8:::ber 1944 , a squadron of' 1st Fife CJ.rl C Forfar ye omanry
was attached to the 2d Ar::' lored Division f or t hree attack operati ons.
The results reflect the i nexperience of component element s.
Greenswf' iller Attack. ':'ank Force X WC1f; t o assault the village fr om
the left flank wi t h two troops of Crocodiles l eac.: ing, fo lloweci b:,' Ci
battalion of infantry. The artillery was to fire c oncentrati ons i'1'0!Tl :;
minus 5to \.1 pbs 10. The attack was succe ssful. The arti llerJ fire
kept the enemy pinned dOtm as t he assault waver; a pproachnc; . ;{hen the
artillery lifted , the Cr oc odiles began flaming t he outskirts of the
town, whi.le all sup:cortinr.; 'wea pons were firir. g. '.:he infantry closec in
the moment the f1amine ceased. The Crocodiles then withdrew. The
success of thE' a ct t on yra s attributed t o the fact that the infantry
followed closely behind the Cr ocouiles and ohtained the full benefit of
t.he s hock of t he flame throwers. Casualties were very li t,;ht.
129
Ltr
, CG tlinth Army to CG Tl'I'elith Army Gp, .31 Oct 44, sub: Special
F4ui pnent (F1a;nE' Throwing Tar.ks). I n 12th Army Gp recor ci s,
470.71, Apparatus.
- 180 -
Friealejenhoven Attack. The plan of a tt"ck ' :a s the scb1 . as above,
hut tht=: ti:ninC of the attack Vias thrOt'm off hy rninefielc 5 whic h prev"Onteo.
close co- nr c:i n:J.ti uf! betwe en infantry ami arrwr. The Lr oco(; iles H. 0VanCec
after knr. ;1n had apparentl:, heen clearec, but r an into un-
locCltpc minefie l os \htch knoc keC: ou t thre e Croc oci lE)s. The f ou rth Cr oco-
eile succpeded in f13:' '1:ing t he H:;:; e of thF. t,OI'1Tl, but I'.'as later ui tched.
Verzenhau s en Attack . Three Cr ocodiles wer p t o the assault
infantry com.panies. acd engineer units were to t:uard the flanKS,
while an arti11er:l s:noke coric e rltr a t ion Wa s t o be pLced on the vi l18ge
3.l! C () n t he flan'v: s fr :)ID H !:linus 15 t o :i pl u s JO. The line of Cf. :xlrture
: or the infantry-Crocouile assault was 300 :yards s outhv:est of t he ob-
jective. The infantry wa s to ,j oin t he CrocoGiles or. the line of ce;;a r-
t'J.re at !! minus JO. tjhen the assault r;as launchec, only a part of the
infantry had joined the Croc odiles and t :'e prot ecti vE) s:noke screen had
dissipater:: . The Crococ iles v,ere s o heavily eng agee by aIlti-tCill ": fi re
a s they approac hed the tm.n that all -' ,ere cestr oyed.
l30
VI Corptl Operdtions. On 10 DecEY:1 ber 1944, the Comruancinr Senera.1,
VI Corps, reql1estec the Comnanc inc Ceneral, Seventh Army, to make Clvail-
al;lp. t Yie lv Ohurchill-Crocodile tanks, c omplete VJith crews, for llSP. in
hr eaching the Maginot and Siegfried Lines. The request a
lJOETOUSA, Immed:i.ate Rpt t-.: o. 14, 16 Dec 44. In C:'L1;G.
- 181 -
strong desire for such a weapon to auement the standard weapons.
131
These flame tanks were eventually made available to XIX Corps.
78th Infantry Division. A squacl ron fro::! the lst fife and Forfar
feomanry oppratec.i with this divisi on in January 1945 dur ing the fi ght-
ing in the Siegfried Line in the Hoer River sector.
1
)2
3. Bri tish Flame Throwers F:nployed by Tr OODS
Procurement f ro::! the Rritish. Crococi iles. The requirement f or a
mechanized fla:'1e thrower for use by US forces in the invasion of the
Continent Vias Given serious consideration thr ouehout the plannine phase
of the operCition. Since such weapons were not available fr om the
United States, the possibility of procuring and adapting British f lane
throvrer s t o the Sherman (medium) tanks was studied. On 6 ,March 1943 ,
the prototype Crocodile flame thr oi ler, mounted on the L:hurchill tank,
was demonstrated f or the first time t o representaties of the US Army.
A second demonstration for observers, including representatives of the
Assistant Chief of ;:,taff, G-3, ETO, and G-5, 'Was held in April 1943.
As a result of these demonstrations, the Chief Chemical Officer of the
theater suggested, on 27 to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,
that an investigation be conducted to det er mine t he requirement for
mechanical flame throwers. Based on a study made by representatives
13\tr, CG VI Corps to CG Seventh Army, 10 Dec 44, sub: Supplies and
Equipment. 400.34. In 7th Army Cml Sec Records, 470.71 - FT
Fuels, Jan 43 - Feb 45, ORB.
132Eist : 'onoq:raph (3ritish) III. Flame Warfare, p. 67. In c.,U.Y;Q.
- 182 -
of G-5 and the Chief Chemical Officer, it was recommended that 100 Sher-
man tanks be fitted wit h attachments, plus a reserve of twenty-
five adQi tional trailers. On 6 July 1943 this recomr'1enddti on Vias for-
warded to the Acting Chief of Staff, G-3, who concurred with the recom-
nencati on, and reque s ted t he aporoval of the Chief of Staff. , On 16 July
1943, the the iit er commander appr ovec the recommendati on and it Vias f or-
warded ':,0 t he Chief of Services, Headquarters, 50S, ETO, for necessary
acti on. On 24 July 1943 the Chief of Services f orwaroe ci t he corres pon-
dence to the Chief Chemical Officer for necessary action.
The US requirement was subr.ri.tted to the British flar Office on 11
August 1943, requesting that 100 f18rne tnrower units complete with
trailers, and twenty-five additional trailers, be furnished. This re-
quirement was held by the Far Office until final approval of a produc-
tion model .7as received. However, acting on this requirement, the
British Petroleum 'Narfare Departoent proceed ed with the construction of
a wooden mock-up on a Sherman tank. This model was completed and in-
spectec on 1 October 1943. The War Office was advised on 5 October 1943
that the mock-up installation was suitable and that work was to be con-
tinued to produce a prototype of the flame thrower. The prototype was
completed in January 1944 a nd Was Eiven its first field trials on January
28. Subsequent trials ..,rere held on 3 February 1944, at y{hich representa-
tives fr om Suprerne Headquarters, First US Army Group (later Twelfth Army
Group), First US Army, 2d and 3d Armored llvision, XIX CCorps, Or dnance,
and Chemical Service wer E- present. The performance of the
- 183 -
prototype Vias satisfactory, but the construction was not of a production
type. Meanwhile, the design of a production mode l f or the ::14 tank was
on hand. The first model, fabricated in mild steel, was available dur-
ing the latter part of \{arch 1944.
133
The problem of mounting Crocodiles on Sherman tanks involved the
use of parts that hacJ not been standardized for l!'lou:lting on tbe Church-
ill tank. It was planned to pool com.':lon iteQs, while s pecial conponents
were to be furnished from the Unit-eel States. An order for six S!1er:nc'1n-
Crpcodiles was placed in England. Specifications and drawings for the
s['ecial parts '!'fere sent to the Chief, Chemical V:arfare Service, on 30
who stated that deli very of ten sets could be made in thirt:' CRYS,
and that the order of 100 sets could be completed in sixty da;ls.134
Army Groc;.nd Fer ces made no objection to this procurement program al-
thouf, h the Armored Force in the United states had repeatedly stated that
no trailer tJ' pe flame thrower would be acceptable.
135
3y ,Tuly the de:.lonstrations in England of the E4-5 flame thrower had
convinced Supreme Headquarters that this weapon was unsatisfactory.
Hence, on 15 July the 3eadquarters reaffirmed its original order for 100
of the "Crocodile," 4 :far In ETO Records, 470.71 - Flame
Thr ower s, ORB.
134
iliemo, C Tech Div to AC for 8 Jun 44, sub: Flame Thrower
for :.lherman (M4) Tank - Crococile. In
135( 1) 10:,1, C Tech Div to C 'Theaters Br OC CWS thru: AC CWS for Hateriel,
14 Jun 44. (2) 10M, AC crlS for Fld Opns to (,; Theaters Br, 20 Jun
44. In CMDI"G.
- 184 -
Crocodile-Shermans with tVJent,y-five, additional trailers, and urgec that
the or der be expedi tf>(;,l36 But, s i nce the Crocodiles were a ney; 'Wea pon
\','hi ch did not show up well ouring the f i rst month of European l'i ghting,
the enthusiasm for it died doy,'!', . On 13 st General Eisenhower ad-
vised t.he qri Ush ,ll noer-Secret3ry of S:'ate, rirector of Special Yieapons
anc VehiclEs, that lIS ForcEs ciesirec t o cancel their requirement for
th
<' h r , " , 137
e .:.l en:lan-,;r ocoul ... P. S. thi s ti"!lE the &.-5 aux:i liary had
been demonstraU:d to the armies anc: hac be pn acce pted because j twas
believed to be available in quantity. The E4':"'5 also appealed t o tonk-
ers because, \\'ithcut the vul lle rable trailed , it offered greater maneu-
verahility .138
'='he 3d ti.sh cOlTJ pletec f oul' J he::-'::w.n-Crocodile units 1'Ihich were
issued to Pinth ArT.Y curint: the latter part of rovember where they were
used to equip a platoon in -;-,he 739th Tank Batt.alion (Spec ial) .139
Since the orig:'!:" l contr3. n , d ,th tl'lP Br::.t.ish c::, lled for six Sher:nan
136
(1) DeI'S ltr, C Cml 0 KT=-:USA t o .i. e (1 S for 1- l ei Opns, 20 Jul 1+4.
(2 ) Crn l AdvitlE:r G- J Sec to C ('1/5, ::29 Jul 44 . In CMLlIG.
137
Ltr
, CG SHAFF to ';ohE: :Jncier-5ec ' y of State (til' of ,s -,;ecial l ea r=,ons and
Vehicles ), 13 Aug 44, suh: Crocooile Flal'le Throwers. 470.71-2
GCT-AG\l. In ;'1"e lfth Arm'J' Gp recorcs , 470.71 - A) paratus.
13
8
'!e:1o , c:nl A. dviser G-J SHAEl f or Cml O's in E1'0, 16 Sep 44. In Cml C
Sch Li b, 319.1/179.
139 ( 1) Ltr, CG !'; inth to eG 12th Gp, 31 Oct 4/., sub : Special
!::quit=ment (Flame Throvlini-: Tanks). In 'j'Y.eli'th up records,
470.71 - Appara.tus. (2 ) He.;. Ni nth I ll:'.! , G-3 t o CofS, 14 tlov
44. In Cml C Sch files, ninth Arm;/ , 1-1DA. (J) Hq Ninth
Comment ri o. 1, 10 Jan 45, Flame Thr ower. In Cml C Sch
files, Ui nth Arm: ' , FT's (: 1isc).
- 185 -
tanks equipped with Crocodile flame .throvrers, the COmManding General,
that two additional un:i ts be f urnished .140 This
request coulc not be met because procurement by the British \',ar Office
of additional Crocodi le unUs for use with- Sherman tanks would, it was
saie, s erious l y hanper production of Churchill-Crococile units urgently
141
required by the Twent:.,-first Amy Group.
The Con:nanding General, Ninth Army, persisted in his requests for
this weapon. On 13 Jar :uary 1945, he proposed that sufficient Sherman-
Crocodiles to equip one hattalion plus a reserve stock, involv:l.ng ap.-
proximatel;y sixty fla"TIe tanks, be made available, and that sufficient
officer and enlisted personnel be assignee to the AI'r!l y t o activd.te the
battalion in the field . It was planned t o use the plat uon of Sherman-
Crocodiles in the 729th Tank Battalion as a training cadre. It was
believed that the battalion could be ready for combat in approximately
six weeks after receipt of personnel and equipment.
142
This request,
however, was not favorably considered at Twelfth Army
Group, hecause it was nut believed that the flame thr owers v/Ould be
14Outgoinc ur from 12th Army Gp to ETOUSA, Ref. No. QX 24139, 18 Nov
44. In 12th Army Gp recor ds , 470.71, Apparatus.
141Pad, ETOUSA to 'I\ Jelfth Army Gp, 29 [c 1.4, sub: Croc odiles. In
Twelfth Arr:J.Y Gp records, 470.71, .:.pparatus.
1421st Ind, 28 Jan 1 .. 5, on ltr, CG Twelfth Arny Gp to CG Ninth Army,
13 Jan 45, sub! "'echanized Flame Thrower. In eml C Sch Lib,
Ninth Army, T-18 FT, ;\Usc.
- 186 -
available in the near future.
14J
1!Tasps and Ronsons. After it Ylas decided that the Crocodile did not
meet the needs of US forces fi ghting in Normandy, steps were taken to
investigate the possibility of r:lounting Wasps, not only on the Sherman
tank but also upon such vehicles as the M-2 Jlalf-track, M-J carriage for
d If
lIf4
the 75-mm. gun, an the M-4 ha -track.
When reports filtered back that the Wasps mounted on Bren carriers
had been highly' successfnl in burning out scatterec resistance in or-
chards, cultivated fields, and hedgerows, a \\a3p was mounted on a hali-
track and, on 26 Oct ober 1944, the weapon was demonstrated t o personnel
of Third Army Headquarters. This flame thrower carried 120 gallons of
fuel and fired up to a distance of 120 yards. General Patton, however,
'Was not pleased, with its performances, his main objection being that
the flame was not hot enough. He stated that he had many times recom-
merded t he developnent of f uel 'ifhich "I'lould produce a hotter flame and
wanted to know why thermi te could not emplbyed .145 The (,Tenera1'!
criticism l'iaS, of course , a le[;i timate , one, because when napalm was
used to thicken gasoline for the purpose of increasing range, i't. also
for Becord, G-Jand G-4, Ar;ny Ci p, 3 Feb 45, sub: Mech-
anized Flame Throwers. In Twelfth Amy Gp records, 134 Tanks and
Armored Cars.
l41.\!f>ffiO, Cm1 Adviser G-J to C Cml 0 BTOUSA, 11 Aug 44, sub:
Vehicle Flame Thrower. In CMLYID.
145(1) 'Pers ltr, CCll O, 3d Army toe C1'1!S, 4 Nov 44. In CmX;(}. (2) A/A
Rpt, Third Army, 1 .Aug 44 - 9 May 45, Vol. II, Part II, crt, p. 5.
!'edu.ced the burnine teoperature.
At this time the Canadian Headquarters informed Sunre'!le Eeacquart-
ers that ther e were appr oxir.1C1.tely 700 obsolete Ronson flame throwers in
the Uni ted Kingdom for l';hjch no nee d existed . The li ar I:epartment re-
quested t hat befor e these wt::!re scrapped , US Force:;; in Eur ope be asked
v:hether they l'lanted the weapons.l
46
On 25 'l'vlelfth 'Ar:ny Group
s t .:jted that the E4-5 f l ame t hrOl':ers 'Here adequCf 'te for their needs and
that no requiret:lent existed f or t he i'i.onsons .
l47
:JeanVihile, on 7 :":ove'.:nher at Bernea u, Be1t.: iulI1, a cemonstr ation of
the carrier- bor ne \ 'laS held for officers of the Seventh and r inth
tl.r::lies . As a result , the weapon was rejected . The chief
objections ( l) unsuitabi lity of Mae half- track carrier , which
be hi ghly vulner3;ble t o aut.omatic weapons and artill ery fire;
(2) hck of s pare part3 supply and the cii fficult y of resuppl y of fuel;
and (3) difficulty of obtaining personnel t l'ained in the operation and
maintenance of the equiunent in time t,o m'il{e its use profitahle .
l1
..
S
The Seventh Army Engineer, ho\,:ever , r equ ested f our \'[asps t o be used by
146
Rad, SHAEF to 12th and. 6t h Army Gps , 18 Oct 44. In Twelf th Army Gp
records, 470 . 71,
147
Rad
, Twe lfth Army Gp to SHAJ.:F', 25 Nov 1.1. , sub: :n.amEJ Thr o'l':ers. In
!'.;,elfth Army Gp records , 470 . 71, iipparatus .
148 ( 1) Hq Ninth Ar,:!l,i4, Minn t es of Sp'('ial 30ard,
lOOOlll! ov CW. In Cml C ..,ch Ll.b , 1- 18 . (2 ) H3.. st l.pt, Cml Sec ,
Hq Seventh Nov 1. /
1
, Pio). 1- 2 . In C:.!L1i!G . (3) Ninth .V!:'!.y, HI?,t,
0- 3 t,o CofS, 1/. ;';OV 44. In enl C Sch Li b , T- l b.
_ 188 _
mine clearance units t.o provice additional pr otection against s n i p e r ~
and by-passed pillhoxes. A radio request t o higher headquarters re-
vealed that only the demonstrator model was then available. The dem-
onstrator was delivered to an Drdnance company for mounting. In the
absence of detailed plans and drawings, difficulty was experienced in
installing it. No rec ord is available as to whether it was ever em-
ployed by the engineers.
149
Employment of Sherman-Crocodiles. The four Sherman-Crocodile
flame throwers de livered t o the Nint h Army in November were issued to
the 739th Tank Battalion, Special (Mine Exploder), where they 'I'lere or-
ganized into a pl atoon and crews trained . This plat oon moved from
Gulpen, Holland, to Aldenhoven, Ger Qany, on 9 February 1945. From 9
to 23 February. The pl a t oon trained 1';i th the 29th Infantry Division
vihich haC. used Crocodiles at Brest. 1'1hen the flame thrower platoon
crossed the hoer River on 24 Februar y 1945, the unit received orders
to move up to the Citace l at Julieh, Germany. Li ght sillall arms and ma-
chine gun fir e emanating from there had bet: n a nuisance f or two days.
A moat averaging about eir:hty-five feet in width and about twentyfeet
dee p surrounded the Ci t adel. The walls of the fort, which were very
thi ck, hac beE"n hit in several places, but it was still a formidable
obs tac le. The plan called for flaming the south wall as well as firing
75-mr.;. shells to force the door. The four flame tanks started into
149Hq Sevent.h Army, Cm1 Sec Hist Hpt, }l OV 44, p. 12. In CHLV!I1.
- 189 -
position. Two tanks which trouble before reaching the Citadel
had to be withdravm. The other two proceeded as planned.
Flaming started when the Crocodiles were about seventy-five yards
from the wall. The flame went over the wall. forcing the Germans to re-
treat underground. The gates were blown open by twenty r ounds of '75-mm.
shells fired by the tanKs. The flame tanks then moved to the gate where
they flamed the opening. The infantry then waded across t he water-filled
moat into the Citadel as last four Germans left alive fled through
the tunnels and scampered out across the nearby hillside. The famed
Citadel which fell at 1500 on 24 'February t o burn f or t wo
days.150 After crossing the Rhine, the 739th Tank Battalion, Special
(Mine Exploder), supported the 2d Armored Division, but the
offered little for use of the flame t hrowers.
151
4. Requirement Es,tablished for Main Armament Type Flame Throwers
Because of certain combat defiCiencies, such as lack of maneuverabilit
J
and vulnerability of the trailer, which had been observed with t he
Crocodile flame, throwers, technical oU'icers in the Europea'n Theater
watched closely the development of a main armament flame thrower in the
United States during the summer and autumn of 1944.15
2
The development
150 (1) Ltr, CO 739th Tk Bn (Special) (Mi1lt:
Army, 22 Mar 45, sub: Flame Throwers.
(2) A/A Rpt, 29th Inf Div, Feb 45, p.
Sp (M.E.) Hist, 1 Mar 43 - 21 Nov 45.
to Cml 0 Ninth
In Cml C Sch Lib,
6 . (3) 739th \{ed Tk Bn,
l51r39th Med Tk Bn, Sp (M.E.) Hist, 1 Mar 43 - 21 rJ ov 45.
l52Pers ltr, Cml Adviser to G-3 SHAEF to AC CWS f or Fld Opns, 22 Jul 1.4,.
In CMLVIG.
- 190 -
carried on by the Ua tional Defense hesearch Council ""as of special in-
tere s t. The results of this development were reported to the t heater
in Augu st 1944.153 Th e main objection at ETOUSA was the inadvisability
of sacrificing tanks for the installation of such flame throwers when
there !'las already a shortaEe of tanks. At this time, however, field
commander s hoped that the auxiliary type ( E4-5) then being f urnished,
v:ould meet t heir needs for a mechanized flame weapon,154 In I:cember,
limited procurement of !:la in armament units, de signated E12-7Rl,
had been initiated. At this time it was thought by Army Ground Forces
that t his unit would be needed, even though thea t er indications had
been to the contrary. It was expected that t.wenty units 1'lould he
available 15 January,155 In January 1945 , t he t heater chemical
officer was advis ed that none of the E12-7Rl models w01,ld be authorized
for experimental be cause of the demand f or them in the Pacific.
156
It was also announcF- d that the flame tanks should be on their way to
the t. heaters by the middle of February.157
l 53Ltr , OC (:1'S to Cml 0 ETOUSA, 9 Aug 44, sub: :Flarne 'T' hr ower Tank I:-
velopment by NDHC. In CMLWG.
[-Iq ETOUSA Ct'"S T, O C CWS, 28 Aug 44, sub: Flame Thrower Tank De.-
ve lopment. Gno 470. 71/303 . In C!,u,WG.
155
Pers ltr, I 'eput y C CWS to Cml Adviser G-3 SHAEF, 29 Dec 44. In o.U,V!G.
15
6
1st Inci , 26 Jan 45 , on ltr, C Cml 0 ETOUSA to C CTIS, 7 Dec 44, sub:
Flame 'ilir ower, \iechanized, E-7. In CMLWG.
157
Pers ltr, AC f or F1d OFtlS OC CYIS to C Cm1 0 ETOUSA, 12 Jan 45. In
CiII.XlD.
- 191 -
On 14 ,Jarruary 1945, the Commanding General, Twelfth Arr!lY Group sub-
lIitted a request for twelve of the first twent y El2-7 main armament
flame throwers for operational tests, and reque s ted information as to
date of availability.l58 The Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, how-
Aver., reported that, oo'l ing t o t he shortage of tanks and personnel, the
value of such a weapon Was more than offset by "tying upl! the required
number of tanks, the t raining of necessary crews, and the added burden
to service unit.s. He also stated that the armored f orces UnCleI' his
command defi nitely ,'lOul d not give up any of t hei.r tanks t o provi de main
armaGlent flame throwers.
l59
On 22 Febrllary the thea t el' r eceived information from the Y,.ar Ie-
partmcnt that ten units complete ,,:ith f our E-8 serv:icing units coul d be
:nade available by 1 May . This informati on was f ollowed by a thea t er
request that shipment be made by t he first c onvoy in May.160
On 13 Januar y, the Comrnanci ing General, TYl"e li'th Ar my Gr oup, asked
his a r my cO!'llr.1anders f or t heir r equirements f or the main arr:ta."Tl ent flame
throwe rs. The Third Ar r.1:' oid not r equest t he weapons because of their
15
8
Ltr
, CG Twelfth Army Gp t o CG ETO, 14 Jan 45, sub! p.rchanized Fl ame
Thr owers. 470.71. In 12th Army Gp recor ds, 470.71 - Apparatus .
l59
1st
Ind, 1 Feb 45, on Itr, C
Army Gp, 3 Jan 45, no sub .
FT Fuels , Jan 43 - Feb 45 .
ern l 0 ETOUSA t o Gml Adviser, C- 3 6th
In 7th Ar my ern1 Sec r ecor ds , 470 . 71,
In ORB.
l60rnCO!TIi ng Rad, !1q Com Z E70USA to 12th Army Gp, 22 Feb 45, sub: Fl ar:le
Throwers, t:echanized, E12-7R1. In 12th hrmy Gp records, 470 . 71 -
llppara tus.
- 192 -
short range, the tine required to refuel., and ,limited opEra tiol'Ia1 time. 161
The rinth Army proposed an eventual requ irement of one se parate fla;ne
t hrower battalion per ar"1Y, as 'l'lell as one flane thrower company to be
made organic with each armored di vision. It Vias recon:mended that the
special flame throwing tanks have the following characteristics: ( 1)
range approxioately 100 yards; ( 2) fuel capacity at least 150 gallons;
(3) rate of discharge at l east three gallons per second; (4) tank to
re tain its j)resent princi pal ano suhsi diary ar?lar'l ent; (5) the ent i re
flame t hrower to be contained in the tank; and (6) only a minimum of
present stoy/age t o be displacec .
162
In April the installation of F12-7IU flame throwers was ciscontin-
ued because of the shortagp. of t anks . lo'hen the \ Cir asked the
theater to decide if sixt. y-five tan'rc s could be diverted fr om April allO-
cations for the installation of main arma.men t flame t hrm;ers, the
theater a [ reed that t he;.- could.
16J
Opini ons at l evel were d
regarding the neecl for such a '\':eapon, b'.lt the the'J. t er cOIllffiander was
Y:illing to sacrifice SO:1e tanks in order to obtain a large flame tank.
These flame tanks hac been l oaced on ships the. t were I'eac
J
' t o sail \ hen
the GovErnment surrendered at H.heir:1S on 7 !fay 1945.
161
1st
Ind , 22 Jan 45, on ltr, CG 12th Arm31 Gp 'third Ar rn;;r , 13 ,Jan 45,
sub: \:echanized Flame Throwers. In 12th Army Gp records, 470.?1
Apparatus.
162
1st Ind, 13 Jan 45, on HI', CG 12th Army Gp to CO t:i nth Arm:;', 13
Jan 45, sub: zed Flame 'l'hrovlers. In Crd C Sch Lib,
file 1'-18.
16J
Rad
, c a .... CXJ ':'-64434 , 4 Apr 45. ( 2) ha d, C;,1-IH-6615, 7 A PI' 1.5.
- 1.93 -
CHAl' TZR I V
Dnploymen t of Meehan! zed Fl ame Thro .... ers by the Enem,y
Al tho"o.l.br. boU: tr.e I tnl1a:1 a:td. &:":,,! es .... E", D ... 1 th
mocneJ1i zed flame t hr ower s , the!" ? is no r ecord of t hei r emplo;'lnen t
against St a t es troop s .
Sir.ce Ger mp_1s .!e re t he f irs t to de\' eloTl fl t.:-.e i n
',iorld ',1:3 "1' I , i t 1 s sC.irne .... hat surprisinE; t hat they did not u se them to
a f,:r:'!a ter ex tent in ',/orl d ;{ Fl.!" 11 . The p erfor ma.nce of" t ::e lr :ll:Ulle
... 1,'co s l nler : o!' t o ::.urs a:d t l".ere I':ere :ot'1. T"Ol !!icel
reasons for Accor din& n 8e:t10r off icial,
rog::. t ed af t e r tl:e .... a r, Iii t :!. -: "" i, reat f ait h in t he fl awe t or ower a s
a'.", r- ... i nnl nt; 'deepon .:!nd, a::: es. rll b.S 194<:>, r eco:nrnendec.. t o t!": e
St aff tte development of Po fla'll e t:-.r o .... e r i,itr. a range
of 200 yar ds , but this was opposed the Panzer gener a l , Guderian. Hence ,
li ttl e work was ac t 'tal ly <ione O"l. Der project . Ho,,'ever . aft er
t he (Jer,;\S!lC '.; ere &ttac1ced with fl81!le on D Day and af t e r , Hitl er ordered
ell s ... er t priority i naue;urate d on
lont; - r a.'!.;e flc_-:'l e This r esult ed i l". sor:e novel i deas , but the
Ger!:'! a.. .. s approactec. oJ..r achi eve:nen ts i n tl-..is f iel d .
en iie, Germans wer e stearat e ,
- 194 -
too, the synthetic base of their gasoline caused rapid deteriora-
tion of fuels after mixing. The standare. Serm3.ll flam'? thrower fuels
were bawed on mixtures of tar oil anel gasoline. The object of their
research was to obtain the best possible performance from lv'" q'l",:::'i ty
1
materials. Stocks of a volatile base fuel, t'hickened wi t:1 syn thetic
resin, were captured by t he Twent y-first Army Group, but the perce n:age
of thickener was only enough to bring t hi s f uel up to t hs vi sec si t y o f
their standr. rd type. Thi s fuel, wlc'3n nssa. i e our weapon s, gave
imately the same range as our liqui d t yp es; but a much shor t er range
t han our tr..ickened f uel. Moreover, t::e :'rJ.cendl :-- ry val ue of Gerr.lan
fuels die. not compare v,it:1 t':.s.t cf our thickened fuel.
G
A German training manual of 1940 use o f
flame thrower tank battalions. or companies, in a flame atta c k i ;'_
co-operation ,.;1 th other tanks and ""i th infantry. Neverthe l es s, Geroan
flame tank encount,e rea. fr offi were ex ecuted '.'litt one or t,vc
tanks. In Italy th" terrain eli" n ot f r.i'o r mas s tank <::.ttacks c.n. d. in
northwest Europe the use of fleJ:18 by the Germans was in tCl.'1l:
ha1f-tryck fla.me t hro'.'ers agains t the Ai p vi si on at A,rr:heI:l .
3
Reports of this action indicate t hat, during t::
c
course o f ' .... orld War II,
1
z
:3
See &:,pendlx 9 'f'or Q-?t ailed re-poyt 01". (fer Dan fla::1E' ti'ro'."or
f u els.
His t ,.ronogrs.ph (Briti s'h, ), III, F12Jr.-:: .farfare, p p . 105-06 .
In CillMG.
. pp. 108-09.
- 195 -
developed anc used several different flame thrower models for mounting
4
in tracked vehicles. The German mechanized flame throwers usually
encountered Allied troops in I t aly were those mounted in Panzer
5
lvlark III and IV tanks. German use of flame in I taly VIas 11mi ted to
small 8I'.g8f;emen ta, of one flamo, tp..nk supported by two or thr '36
gut: tanks. Single flame tanks were used in: (1) street figh ting, (:;)
in s tati c defense of entrances into narrow str ee ts well
a6ainst anti-t.s.nk ""eapons, and ('7) in. .,1Tl"tlOrt i nf1tl'1
t
.ry attacks on
contained
T1c<:: ;irst use of German tank-mounted fl ame guns US troops
Wns at the bf.:. ttl,:, of th8 Salerno Beachhead on 9 Septemb9r 1 943.
'rIa!: decidec.ly unsuccessful, wi th five of th? six (}erman flame tanks
7
destroyed by our troops. T': " fl S!:1A tank '3 scE.ped and later in
the day was used effecti.vel v c.gains t a company of 8th Royal Fnsil -
iers, which was l ying in an di tcll. As tr:.e comnpny IS si:'l':-p ound
c annons r.a c'. been krl oc ked out, t te ir onl;)' anti-tank consisted.
of bazookas (British typ e , P.I.,A.T.). A!J :o a.rently bro enemy
4
Rr;t , Lo" .. : c: n, No . R592-5, 27 Dec 44. In Intell Br, OC Cr:1 1 O.
5
(1) Hq AGF, Obs erver I s Rp t on Ita lian Calupnien (Sd"!rno to Venafro),
3 Jan 44. ( 8) C',;S Int ell Bull No. 30 , 1 AYJ r <:4 . 1:1 Cl;lI;G.
6
Hist i;fonoe;:raph (British) III, Fl 3.>":!o Y/o.rfare, p. 1') 9 . In CML ... G.
7
AG:P' Observer' s on Italian (S:, l"!rno to Ven llfro;,
;:; J ?n I!'1 :rLP..S, AGO.
- 196 -
ta:nks, out of of the bazookas, support ec. on':' flame thro\r1.ng
ta'1k to the edge 0 f a platoor.. posl tl o!1, v' l:1 i ch was flamed at clo se
range. Th9 baz ooka gunner, before he burned, got off a round
witr.o'-.:t a"pparent result. Casualties ' ''ere heavy, twent,y or more
being attributed to the flame, and the effect on morale was cor-
respondinr,ly gr ?at, si'1ce this ws s the ba t tali on's f irst encounter
8
with either tanks or flame. A prisoner of war stated that the
flame t hrower was the same as that used in Stalingrad and else-
\-,here on the Eastern Front, where they were especially effective in
street-fighti ng. The flame gun looked like an ordinary and
coul d be ]Loun ted in any tank. The fuo.l used wa s a t hin, black,
9
oil. The tank ca rried an armamen t of twc machine guns, arret
the flame gun replaced the main t ank gun. In so me of these
10
the re were s ets of smoke p rojectors on each side of the t u rret
.La te in Nov9'l11)e r 1943, aft er the Bri ti S!1 Eighth Army cros sed
the Sanl"70 and w;::: s at.tacki ng- no rth\!ard .. , there \Vere a fe'.'! inst ance s of
t he use of flame by the Germans. The 5 t h Gur'.q, .. ?. s, who hac .. c a:pt'J.Ted
the village of Mozze.g, r op la du rin[ the ni gh t, were
8
Hi st t-1onogrr...ph (Br i ti sh) III, Flam9 Jnr f e..r e , p . 109 .
9
AGF O'bserver' s Report on I (Sa l'=!,J"lo to Venafro),
3 J F-.n 44. I n HRS . AGO.
10
JU'EQ., Tech Intell SUI'lTYla.ry };o . 14 , 85 (.:n - 43. I T" H...'RS. AGO.
- 197 -
after dt:. .... on by four Me r k III fla:ne tenks . 3"'cause e 1n the
r oa1 pr even t ed the of su;'portlnp. :- rms, the Gur l"hall v:e re
t he ir !tor:.'!l'" Wf'S seri ou sl y effected . RO\-J '!v .'Ol T, 1>.+"ter Gur khas
.... er e tol d tl' l'I t it \\'fl 5 II Just r"nother k1nd of t a nlr , 11 they rellier''' end
r .qeeined their c onfidence. There nO c nsualt:!.. e s fro!!!.
the flrune , Hhlch had bM!1. i'irected I'l.t B cl osely shuttered buil di ng .
On the h,q nd, o n'" of the t hr o14e r s W.?I': 'Tocked out b ' a
ba?; oo ka (P. I.A.'!'. ) firt"r an \lTlp or "Iindol,' . S1lcr. su ccess as
t he Ge!'l':'l<".ns attained .... !lS attrlbutec. s ol el y t o the e l er.len t of RU1-pri se
en d '.ms U S1.lalJ : , telTl?o!"ary . Ir> t !1l s ce. s e th? village .... .... s r"!ta!.cen bo.t er
in <In:; aft e r a artille r y bOlT' b," rd!':l "'nt .
ll
At c.!"tone. the Ge rmMs used on!' fla."i'Ie thro.:er to
12
bur n e. hayst ac!.c f r om r..ad !!let r eRlstance. Usually any
succe ss achi eved by t he use of wa s
thp.n cBsud ty-pr oducin; . T\'I.p.: t ""' foS true when the 21at He.1 Zealand
:aat.tal1 cn .... (1 $ attC1 c r;ed at ni ght t.y 't .... ,.., ... .'inG t Dnks, I=rot ecte d
0:" t hre(" J.1P.. r k I V t a nks , .,Thicr. attempted t o di. sl ot'lCe t l'te :ilE"w
era houses sli t trenches . of f lam'" At ni ght was
11
Hi s t I.tonogr aph (:Br i tish) , III, Fl em'" ', ia rfare , p"O . 109-10 .
11'\ CJ.'V,/G ,
12
): A !)::ot , Cniro, 1'0 . 3824-44, 11 !';"l r 44 , ! n 3r, OC
ColO.
- 198 -
called lIa terrifying spectacle L;ihich hail]'. c_istinct 2.nti -morde
effect on dismounted troops. II '!'here were, hO,lever, no
13
resultine- from the a t tack. Anoth"!!' rCT'ort, wh:cr. received "Tide
ei reule. ti on. cle scri bed a si n':l e occa si on wh"'n !1. fla1':1e tar.. " a c t ually
14
reached the edge of a "O lat oon position. 9' r .'ly ed +:,,"0 p ith fire.
A flame attack which produced prisoners W'l. S con sicer"!d t::tct ical
success, as in one case ,,,her'?!, in the area near Pan toni , Italy, on
23 February 1944, the flame against a 3ritish unit and
15
forced five or six British soldiers in a slit trench to surrender.
Most of the CO!n:llunications r",cardinf Germen flame thrOiJin t:. acti vi ty
16
ag ainst Allied troo'Js did not CB.!nalties
.As previously noted, the on.ly recorded use of' fla..m'? ar"l:iinst
the Twenty-first Army Group in hence or Germqny """8. 8 at Arnhem.
Certainly helf-track fh.::!'" thro"!erR, as well A.S flame throwinc te.nks
.. !ere used Rnd possi bly J'TIan:9ack throwers i!ere O"OE'ratsc fr om ten1.-:s.
Fl3ll19 WGS used on houses and on , . .,r oods, 2nd a?:ainst in
t.renches or in the o-;:;on. '!'he nUT:lber of c2suel ties proba bly .:as not
17
great, but the morRle was consi de rahle.
13
RDt, Italy, loro. 13667, 30 thty 44. In Intell !=lr, OC CMl O.
14
Ci'iS Intell ?ull }To. :<0, 1 Apr 44, T1T1. 7-8. In (;"V'iG.
15
16
17
Extracts from "Hates from i:,he Alliee ]r:.o{" olt 'ad If
44, A.nnex 'S. In
Thus r:.. detdlf'c1_ re"Oort of enemy u se o f t. "o ' cs
against US in!.sn tc-y, 5 ?eb 44, c.i". " Ci t men tion re 2.
1
.l1ts ::;:
t'hp attacJ<: . In Int"ll1igence \ TO. 4 .<I,T'r 44.
In HRS, AC-O.
Hist !.1onograph (;:ritis'b), II!, :12'J1
0
' .. p. 111. In C'T.1S.
- 199 -
""'1") few of the 'lr:tploym"!nt of flame by the C-erman Amy
in Fr nnc
o
sketcr.y. ?rOl!; France, trt? Sev91"\th Ar:rI..v
the> canture of six tanks, nt Cros
Four were destl"0:,o::1; t,.;o still operational, b'.lt n0 note is
includ9d as to thoy rRd been used in nction.
tells of an c0mne.ny, in tho vicinity of Kesfeld, taking
t.,o \,'itl1 the sU'!Jpcrt of fIp.me> thro ... rers monnted on hPl:"-
t
1 18
rac';:s.
There were Bp,!,erently three T)T'incipe,l '>lr.y the Germans
little of thr0were after Salerno: (1) the
German tactical 3i tuation was, on the \\T!-ole, defensive and, by doc-
trine, the flame thrower is strictly a weapon for and special
use in the offense; (2) the German Army never developed a type of
thickened fuel which would give their flame weapons, a range cooparable
to united State& napa:w, or the British F.R.A.S. (In Janu?ry 1945,
El ':"lllIp, cE>ptnred in Brugsels yield.ed 12,000 gallons of thickened fuel,
19
1n which rubber was used as the thickening agent, but it was then
too late for the fuel to be of much use;)(3) the of the
Uni ted States artillery and anti-tank fire ... !hich l1Iil.i ted German tank
operations.
18
19
Hq V Corps, :Ust Record, Oct 44, G-2 Sect, Fart I - Enemy
Si tiDn . p. 1.
Ltr, Dr G. Bro1.:.6h ton. ? Jan 45, 'TO. 26a. I n T'2 c:-; li brary, ACC.
- 200 -
C!W'T:wi V
SU'!lIMIY and tvaluatlon
A. SU.''':'I1'I&.l",
1. Proc".n'ement and S..lppl y . The need fo r a mechanized flame
fer use B6a.i n s t Jap aneso: de f en ses .. as r ea lized i n 1943 after
t :te battles of G"..ludalcp.nFl l And Buns. .i.t t his early date 1t 'lias the
opini on of field commanders that Japanese bunker and cave defenses
c ould. not neutralized with t he cO"lventional artillery. mort ar.
ncval gunfir e . A great many a ttemp t s were mads i n t he fi eld
t o modifi ed portable fl ame thr owers on tanks. Tbe Qe experi-
ment s met ",ith littl e succe S6, p r imarUy b ec8'ue the limited
f acili ti e s available in the field, the unsatisfactory ignition
sy stem on t he flame gun . a nd the limited fue l capacity of the
mociifl ed. portabl e flame thr ower f uel uni t
.&.OQut mi dc.l e of 1944 , tr.e Mari ne Corps obt ai ned a few
::; /"-5 a '.lxlli a r y tp.nk f r om t he Unite d Stat e s and
empl oy ed t hem i n t he 0pE>rat:!. on . I n 81 tuat10ns ..... here t ank s
c oul d 'be u s eoi , proved f ar 8Uneri or t o the portabl e
t : .ro\l e r . AS a r esult of s ':i th mechani z. ed fl a.'!l e t hro .... ers .
the demand for auxiliar y fl rune t ':"", ro"'!ers i::c T'?El sed. War
_ 201 _
producti on Qi i no t t he needs of the theater during next
year, 18-l flame tr.r owers were "buil t in FJl.waii. In 1 :'-') of
t hes e unit s , t h'? fuel 9.nd p
r
essu:- '3 units were manufact '.lr ed. l oc ?lly
and. i n t he r ema i ning thirt y-four, f uel l.nd pr e ssure u...'1 i t S wpr e 00-
tained from t he Uni ted St at e s. Tn e flame guns ...... ere manufe.ct'.lrec_ in
Hawaii fr ow c: desi t;n obtained fr om t he Armored ] orc e at Fort Knox,
Kentucky. Sufficient units fr om t !"ie Unit ed State s did nei; become
available in the un t il Jun e 1<] ";'5 , ' .'''.i ch time t he use of
the auxiliary tyPe flame t hro'.', ers he d be:,!: :::'.1 by the main arma-
went
After the costly battle of Tara ...... a. 21 November 1943, the Navy
Bureau of OrcL'1ance ini tiated ac t i on to procure large capaci ty flame
for use in landing operations. Two mOn the later, the firsi
hen ty large capaci ty flame tr.ro'rer s (Ron son s) arri ved in Hawaii for
the V bi ous Corp s. The :rtonson flame throwers bad been purc}1-8.sed
from and were not entirel y suited for amphibious operation&.
I n April t he Ron son s we!' 9 turned. over t he the Chemical Officer, Pacific
Ocean Area, for t he p'l rp ose of developing a main armament type flame
thrower for u s e i n tanks. Twenty-four modified Ronsons were mounted
in light tanks and employed by t he Marines dur i ng t he Marianas op era-
tion, June-July 1944. 'Ihe lig!1 t tank was f ound t o be un sui ted for
mounting large capacity flame throwers. Howe ver, nt the request of
XXIV Corps, nine more light tank flame throwers we r e for the
- 202 -
Yap operatIon. The decision to light '&Ilk. VElS baaed on a study
of the conditions on the Island .of Yap, but, since the XllV COrpl
was diverted to Leyte, the light flame tanks receiveJ. little use
because of the unaui table terrain. Eight mediULl tank flrut.::
'. ' 3re ,7i3nufactured in Hawaii for use by the Marines in Iwo Jima in
February 1945. Fifty-four tanks were also manufactured in Hawaii
for t :,e Tenth A;rmy to ule in Okinawa. Four main arliiament flame
thrower tanks from the United States arrived in Luzon, Fhilippine
Islands, in April 1945. These flame thrower units were mounted on
light tanks. During the lastflfteen mon the of the war, a total
1,59 raa.1n armament flame thro .... ers were manufactured in H.a\.r aii. Of
these, light flame tanks and sixty-two medium flame tanks
werp used in combat.
For the Peleliu operat:on, September 1944. ,he Navy furnished
(3 flame thrower detac!;men t consi sting of six Ronson flame throwers
mount ed on umphibious tractors. The large flame
of considerable value, but the tractor wa s definitely not
sui ted fo r land operations.
2. Tactical Doctrine and Employment. Tanks equipped vi th auxil-
,
le.ry flame thro ',o/ ere (twe nty-fi va and f1 fty gallon capaci were nor-
mall; as tanks unill a situati un arose 'w'hich required. the
use of a flame thrower. At f1 re t, th"! flam", thrower was lc9p t filled
and " eady for action. This procedure was satisfactory until
- 203 -
anti - tank artill ery and I f:.nd r::.lnea encount'! r"d in b .rg'! num'bera .
I n & few instances , when tank s truck a l and or was hit by
enemy artillery , name exploded end burned the c rews to
death . a flame were f ill ed onl y when on a f lami nc
mi ssion . In f a ct , SOille tank removd. th"'! au.rll1ary t ype fl ame
thro'.'or f rom the tanks All d reque s ted only main arma.cent type flame
tanks, Only e. few auxili ary typE' flWile throwers we re available dur -
ine the Philippi ne opera t i on since we re not subject ed to
extensive antl- tA.nk artl llery end lnh J.rmo ned Group .... 89
with t he i r p erformance. AS 8 result, i t wa s p l anned to
equip t al'lks in each t a nk platoon for tr. e Kyushu ope r a tion. The
weaknesse 8 of t his type of flame tr.:ower were recognized &"'l Q hbQ
main t;,,? e flame thro.,.,'ers be e;'! avail a ble . the re-
quircl4ent. for t he auxiliary .... ould have b eon red'.l ced.
M.ain arr::lBment t yp e flame '..:ere firs t eaployed in t he
i>feriana& operati on. 'n: e t a ctical E":::plo:rnent of tanks in t hil
WaG ouch the same && t hat fo r t he of t he war.
T .... el'lc light flame t anks wer e a ssi gned to e. tank ba t t alion an d were
fo rmed i nto a company of three platoons. Four li ht f lame tanka And
ODe l ight l ead tank a pla toon was nor mally a t tached to
a medium tank to support an infantry regi men t . The se f l ame
t anka .... er e easployeJ. aucce siofully dur ing the oper ati on ..... here t he ir
were not restricted by ant i-tank artillery and on
- 204 -
t er r ai n tr...a t c o-... ld be traversed oy li ght t a..'lko. On 1',(0 Ji ma four
medium fla.t!te tanks were a t tached t o the tank battalionb in "' ach of
the 4th and Mar ine Di vi sions . Owing t o the shortage of
t anks, they ''i ere usually as si:n ed to support and t a nk u." its
&s r equired. Also . beca u se of t!le rugged terrain . they \f'orked ..... ith
armored bulldoz ers much of the Ume. For the Okinli ..... a op er a t i on , the
713 t h Tank Battalion 'ooItL S e qui pped .... i th fifty- four main ar mament flame
t hrowers ane. a company of was b.ttached to a
t tandar d ba t t a li on . Th"l tank bat tnli o:1 s then re- attached a pla-
toon of si x flame tanks to each tank co:;,pany . I n the tank c O!l\) Alli e s ,
a s ecti on of three tanke; .... as norrnsl l:r attached t o me dium
tr.. n'w:: p latoon. These fifty- four tal"lks were offici ally c r e d.1 ted
wi t h ki lling 4 , 788 J e:pan e::;e Me. cap turi ng forty-ni n e ,::::l!'inC; seventy
day s of a.ction . Ho ... ever . i t '!lias rer-c rted tha t thei r !'eal value wa s
t hat ot flushing t he enemy. The succe s sful emp l oyment of : l am.: tank:.
on the inf a ntry- tank- flame tank In ths Ma r i anas . Iwo
J l ma . and Oki ne.I-!8 . .... as a lag in '.. i:.e employmen t of the flame
tanka during the early pert of t he operations . p rl /ll\ rUy because of both
.tU l nfa.ntry and tank command.ers
l
-xlfa'Tlil i arity ...... lt h t!1E' ne .... '!II eapon .
Tr- ere '''' 'is cuch a ehort time bet we en ti::e du.te of manufac t ur e ::. nd the
date t!leir -..I. &e I n combat, tha t .... a ti ne'fer tl.=ne to c onduc t
cOIL Dl n ed p r ior to Op'!'!r a tiOIli:>. f-acti c s ... er e o: ten develOp ed
on the ba.tt lefi e ld.-
- >'05 -
lor the XYUahu operation it planned to each tank
with a company of main armament flame thrower
However, there were not enoUgh flame throwers and instead
a flame tank detachment "'DS acided toeac," stand.ard tank battalion.
It ... as estimated that forty El2-':'L:,}. flame throwers from the United
States and fifty-six POA main armament flame throwers were to have
available to Sixth irmy for the operation.
3. Maintenance and Servici ng. In the Central Pacific Area,
and servicing of tanks was accomplished by organic
or attached personnel who had been trai n8d in achools and 1n flame
t=.rover shops in Oahu. For example, two :'Tavy '.5eabe98, II who helped
build t Je tanks, tnem to Iwo J1ma supervised main-
tenance and servicing. At O;dnawa, personnel of the 71:3th Armored
Thro\.,.er Battalion, provisional, performed those duties. The ..
mechanics and technlcl ans hacl actually helped to manufacture and in-
stall the weapons and thoroughly understood them. The mixing of
fuel for the flame tanks at Okinawa was by CWS &nd
the fuel was issued 1n the same way as In the South-
vest Paci fie, ',\,here a chemical platoon vas . attached to each
diVision, OW'S men not only mixed fuel for the flame tanks, but were
employed to assist in service and mair:tenance. For Kyushu
t1on, a chemical service platoon was assigned to each divi-
8ion end thelr duties included mixing fuel and maintaining
flame thrower s.
- 206-
lntroduction of mechanized flame thro'.:err i n the l'cclf1c
caused much favorable from first 1n the Marianas
until the end of the war. Mount ine. flat:!o t ... .rowers 1n tanks wa e t he
answer to ::1'..1(' 1" of the a.i'"erso cri tid s:n portable flatle thrower.
I.e i ts short its li mited fuel capacity. and its excessive
wei ght as a manpack weapon. mechanized fl8l!le t r r o\'! er coulr.
approach a po s1 tiOD wi thout fear of the murderous sniper fir"l !\'hich
habi tually covered enemy posi t i ons. When the war ended. the
range and i nc reased fuel capaci ty of the main t flame t hr o\rer
had almo st certainly doomed the auxiliary flame thrower to
The pOpularity of mechanized flame throwers with both infantry
and tank unit s was attested by the numer ous fo r flame
tunks. By the end 'of the "'a.:', r!'qt:.e s"ts for large capacity fl ame
were many times g reater than. the supply. Although there
."ere many unfavorable r epo rts on the perfor rr: a.nce of t he a'J.x1l1ary
fla:ne tl'.rower s, there .... as never an report on ef f!'ct ive-
0:- large thrower&. Many battalion and regimental
menders incl uded statements i n their Action to tte
t hr t the advance hed often been up cecause flame tanks
had not been ava1lable.
- 207-
I nitiall;; , AtT.:c red Force a. for
mechanized fl ame t hr owers that c ouJ d b9 i nstal l ed 1n t a nks
out app reciably reducing t he armament. This l ed to t he
d.evelOp ment o f aw:1Hary typo flaoe thr ower s , effect iveness
and ce:pab1l1 ties of .... hich were eclipsed by the :l 1'I. 1n nrmBJllen t type.
I nfantrymen , inc luding c orps and dIvlsi on recorni zed
the superior 1 t y of a primary- p 'Jrpoee .... eapon over that of a dual
purpose .... eapon. However , a t the end of t r. e war t here were still
a number of c fflcers 1n the Armored Force ,.,.ho felt that the flame
[,Un shoul d be mounted co- axially with t he 75-cm. or 90- mm. on the
ta.'1k A.nd t hat for ty rou."I. c.s of 75-tl::l. . o r :wen t y r ounds of
90- rt.:1 . 8!l1.'"l;u.'1 i t1 on shoulc. be r et ai ned for ute wi t h the fl8l:l to! tbro.,.eT.
Suc h an arr30gement na turally reduced effi c i ency o f t he large
cs:pecl t:. :!1. a.::le t r.ro ..... en: rnd tended t o i ncorporate the .... eakne s s of
auxiliary typ e, or ducl purno se ... eanor The mount i ng of" bo tb.
a cannon and a flame thro .. !er I n a me d1UJ1l fl ame tank dI d n')t a,pear
J u stifi ed 1n view of the f act t !:e t fl 8!l'l!O .... ere added. to
the st a ndard t ank bat t 2. l1 ons a nd th .... t tactica l do ctrine we s be- sed
on the
- 208 _
APPGJ!1[X 1
Technical Repor t No. 23, Project No . 35
43rd Chemical Laborat ory Company
A. P. O. 957
c/o Post mas t er, San Francisco, Calif .
20 Apr il 1944
FLA.!!. E THROt'ER . AR!.iOHED, SELF- PROPw.Ell
n iSTALLATION - nAIKTENANCE - OPERATI ON
- 209 -
COOTElITS
Abstract
211
I nt roduction 211
Hist orical 211
'l'heoretical
211
Ex;Jeri.r\ental -
Instructions , oper ations and
of the : l a'!\e Thrower, Armored, Self-Propel l ed 220
Discussion 226
Concl usions 2J3
APpendices
Appendi x A (\iithdrawn)
9 (Photographs )
APpendix C
- 210 -
ABSTRACT
I . Int!:oductlon
After the demonstration at Koko Head Beach on 3 February l S44 of the
II Alligator " mounted Canadian Ronson Flame Thrower, i t "'as decided to
mount this unit in an American tank f or the f ollowing reasons:
a. To gi ve the operat or sufficient prot ection to approach close
enough to his obj ective to assure its neut ralization .
b. To obtain a flame thrower of great fjre capacity.
The installation of this unit assigned t o the 4Jrd Chemical Lab-
Company by the CPA, Chemical Office, A. P. O. 958.
The object of this report is t o present the work accomplished to
date.
II . Historical
8 . The Ronson thrower unit is used by the Brjtish Army mounted
i n a Bren Universal Carri er.
b. sever al experiments have been made by U. S. For ces i n the field to
:idapt the [tl'!\er ican fla:te thrower for use in a light tank.
c. -;- "oY' k is bei ng c;lrried on the St andard Oi l Deve lopnent Company
to install the Uodel Q flar.lA gun in a modified tur ret and basket of t he
Li ght Tank , /.t5Al in pl ace of the 37 !!lIi.1 gun. This installation has a fuel
capaci ty of 125 gallons, sufficient f or a 50 second burning time .
III . Theoret i cal
It is felt that the ideal weapon of t his t;:,.' pe should have the fol l ow_
ing
a. It should be a supporting weapon desiened solely as a "FlaT.e
Thr ower, Armored, Self Propelled!! .
b. Sufficient armor to small arms fire .
c .
d. Small ar ms fire power .
e. fuel capacity utilizing the space available .
f. The flane thrower unit should be 9 0 installed that it can be
easily and refueled .
g . rue t o the inflammability of the unit safety feat.ures should be
included wherever possibl e .
_ 211 -
IV. Experimental
Three types of tanks were available in this area: the YJA5 Medium
Tank, the 'fedium Tank, and the (Guiberson) Light Tank.
The first t,vo tanks were primarily rejected because if a flame
thr ower Yd. th the Ronson's characteristics were installed in either of
these tanks the resulting weapon would have no tactical value as a tank
or as an armorecl flame thrower, due to a great depletion of laree cali-
ber fire power and a low flar.1e fuel capacity.
By installing the unit in the Tank, Light, \13 which is at present an
obsolescent -weapon available in this area, this vehicle would be primar-
jly a flar;ne thrower with a large fuel capacity to be used f or a s pecific
mission as needed.
Thus the unit was installed in the Tank, Light, -with 4 fuel tanks
in the hull, the control box in t he space formerly occupied by the
assistant driver's seat, t he CO
2
pressure cylinder in a horizontal posi-
tion in the left sponson anc the gun in the turret in place of the
37 mm gun. One co-axially mounted . 30 cal. ;.\C- provides arr.1S fire
power.
Characteristics and Data
, .It . of vehicle 26,000 lbs.
of unit, empty 2,150 lbs.
Fuel capacity 175 gals.
Fuel system operating pressure 180 - 250 psi.
Effective ranee for rendering covered
positions (pi llboxes, etc.) untenable 60 - 65 yards
Effective range for temporary ne'.ltralizRt i on 75 - 100 yards
Effective range for attacking open positions
such as trenches, f ox holes, etc. 100 - 125 yards
Fuel consumption - 2 gals/sec.
Dlration of fire at 200 psi. 2 min.
Fire cont rol
Depression 260 mils 15 deg.
Elevation 320 11\i 15 18 deg.
Traverse 35b r.1ils 20 deg.
Traverse in turret 2, 850 mils 160 de e .
- 212 -
Ir.str uctions are f or installing, firing, refuelinG, and main-
tai ninc this wea pon .
V. !:1.scussion
The acvantages of this flame thrower, ar!10red, self propelled over
portable unjt
a . Protection against smal l arms fire ana shrapnel .
b. Protective fire power ( . 30 cal. MG).
c . Longer ranee .
d. Thr ep. as much fuel discharge pp.r second .
e. Twelve times as r,reat fi r inr; time.
The weapon requires two nen, the tank driver and the flame aunner .
Any sui table liquid fuel available in the field and used in the
portable flame thrower or thickened f uels usi ng up to ) . 75% Na pal:n (by
wei ght ) in gasoline can he fired by this weapon .
VI. Conclusions
The designed pr oj ect has been and eiven sat isfactory f i eld
t ests .
Furthr work , if desir ed , will be carried on under the di rection of
the CPA Chemical Of fice.
- 213 -
I. Introduction
The i nstallation of the Ronson F.U.L. MK IV Flame Thrower Unit in an
American tank, was assigned to the 43rd Chemical Laboratory Company by the
CPA, Chemical Office, A.P.O. 958. Capt. Conrad E. Caspar, 193rc Tank
Battalion, A.P.O. 91)7, was the consultant fro!:l the Armored Force.
After the demonstration, 3 February at .Koko Head Beach, of the
"Alligator" mounted Canadian Ronson Flame Thr cwer (see 43rd Chemical Lab-
oratory Report, T.R. No.3, 4 February 1944) it was decided to mount the
Ronson Flame Thrower in an tank, for the reasons:
a. To give the operator sufficient protection to approach close
enough t o his obj ective to as sure its neutralizati on.
b. To obtain a flam.e thrower of great fire capacity.
The obj ect of this report. js to present the work accomplished to date.
II. Historical
a. The Ronson Flame is described in detail in a Canadian
report "RmrSON F.U.L. MK IV PNIT, (Canadian)- - Instruction Book and Parts
List - 1942" for "The Department of National Ifence, Canada"; issued by
The stewart - Warner - Alemite Corporation of Canada Ltd., Belleville,
Ontario. This unit is used by the British Ar my mounted on a Bren Universal

b. CFS Theater of Operations Letter No . 8, 27 November 1943 lists a
report by the Chemical Officer of the 37th Di vision of an impr ovised tank
mounted portable fla::le t hrower whi ch was used by the 3rd ' {arine Divi sion.
In this instance t wo sets of fuel tanks were used, and the flame thr ower
was mounted by renoving the bo.; machine gun.
c. A portable Fla:le Thrower improvisec! t o be operated from an
E3Al light tank is reported by the Chemical Officer of the XIV Corps in
Theater of Operations Letter No . 6, g Oct obpr 1943 .
d. "lor k is beint', none on Flar1e Thr oY: ers, E4-5 ancl E5-5 as
reoorted in C'1
r
,C; Theat er of Oper ations Letter tvo . 11, da ted 9 March 1944.
e. Standard Oil Developnent Com.pany reported on a "Demonstration of
Yodel Q - November 19, 1943. The Lit',ht Tank s turret and turret
basket were modified to permit the i nstallation of the Q gun all
auxiliary fuel and propellant gas wi t hiL the basket. At pr esent
tests are being. continued on this type of t.ank m.ounted flame thrower. The
fueL capacit:>, is 125 r; alloris, S'J.ffici ent for a 50 second burning time and
ranges varying from 85 to 150 yards 'J.sing a thic kened fuel c8nsisting of
3% Na pab in gasoline. The 37 :nr:l gun had to be removed.
f. F'J.rther refereI'ce is made to flame throwers mounted on tanks used
by f oriegn nati o!1s . Field Lab. 2-3-3); Tactical &: Technical
Trends No . 39, 2 1943, pp. 9 to 11 describes the German Flamp.
Throwing Tank, ?ZKW 2 (F).
- 214 -
g. Uemorandum to Lt. General R. C. Richardson of 21 February 1944 ,
II11se of Fla::lf' Throwers for Attack of Jap,mese I:'efenses" refers to the
large, lone range flame thrower F ... 1 or Q flame thrower developed
by Standard Oil Co.

IV.
Although each of the above referred units has great advantages over
any portable flar;',e thrower in regards to range, protection, and capacity
it is felt that the ideal weapon of this type should have the following
characteristics:
a. It should be a supporting weapon designed solely as a itSelf Pro-
pelled ArT1']o!"ed Fla:-:i.e Thr ower
lt

b. S,.tfficient arrr: or to wi thstand small arms fire.
c. "(aneuverability.
C. Smal l ar MS fire power.
e. fuel capacit:
r
utilizing the space available.
f. The flame thrower unit should be so installed that it can be
efficiently maintained and refueled.
[> we to the infla::unabili of t.he unit safety features should be
included wherever possible.
This report will be concerned only with the adapt.ation of the Ronson
Flame Thrower Unit to the U.S. Tank !If3, Light.
Experimental ( See Photos and Drawings)
Three types of tan'-<s were available i n this area: the :nA5 11redium
Tan'-<, the 1.14 Tank, and the 10 (Guiberscn) Li ght Tank.
The prelimlnary considerations of the three types of tanks available
follow:
A. A flar:e thrower cou ld be mounted in a \'edium 'I'ank1. to occupy
the following space:
Right side of hull between tunnel and the riCht side, with sun
placed in the bow gun opening.
Ri E;h t sponson, 'with gun placed in the bow gun opening.
In the turret, with the gun in the place of t he 75 nm gun.
The following modifications would be necessary to install the flame
thrower in a "J4 Tank:
- 215 -
1. Ri Cht stde of
a. Thirty ( 30) round 7 5 ammunt t ion rack
b. A t ool and r ation box r emoved .
c . The escape hat ch blocked off.
d. ':odifying t he ball bOli mount to f it gun .
e . The of the as sistant criver's seat .
Remarks :
s. A r.laxil!ll.l:n of twenty (20) r ounds of ?5 mm could be re:nounted
i n the turret.
h. A much smaller t ool and r a tion bnx would have t o be installed
on the l eft s ide of t he tunnel between the battery box and
bulk head .
c . No r err. edy for t he covering of t he e scape ha t ch .
d . The bal l mount be I1l3.de u se less f or the further use of
the . 30 Cal . machine
e . Ass ist ant dri '/ er or oper ator of fl<;.:ne thr ower ha'lp. t o
s i t on par t 0f the inst allation.
a . Seventeen (17 ) round 75
b. One ( 1) spare parts box r e:noved .
c . '!i'ifteen (15) r ormd 75 !:UTI Br:t."Uuni tion r a ck re:noved .
d . Ball bow mount :nodi f ied .
e . Remcuntinp, of assis t ant dr iver1s seat .

a . Spare par ts box cC'.lld be t o another l ocation .
b. 3all mount "ould be made useless f or [ , rther use of . JO ca l.
:!'!achine eun .
c . Assi sta nt dr iver or oper ator of fla.r:e thr o'l>:er would have to
sit on part of the instal lation. (See 2e) .
3 . TUrret :
a . 75 gun and accessor i es r enoved.
- 216 -
b. Stabilizer r.\l?chanism r enoved.
Re::J.arks :
7he thrower would requi r e the complete use of the t t: rre t.
!t would make the 75 mm gun and aecessories useless .
B. A thr ower could be mounted in a r
f
JA5 :!edi um Tank in the
follov;ing two (2)
In t he ri p, ht side of hull gun in place of 75 gun.
T'Jr r et wi th g'J.n in place of 37 rnr.I tun.
The tlo:'o"'...f ic=3.ti0ns wou l d have t o be :naee:
1. Turret ;
a. and accessories removed.
h . St3 bi. li zer r er.0ved .
The fla:!. throwe r installfl t, ion V'Ol lld require the entir e use of
the turret .
2. the r ight sice of hull:
a . 75 mm
b. Stabilizer removed .
c . 75 rrt.r:1. ammunition rack re:novF'c .
d . of the 75 :'IITl in gun shield .
Remarks ;
If the 75 ::tiJ g,J n Via s removed there liould be nO need for the
rac ks or ar.:r of the 7 .S ::1m eqt:. i?ffient .
C. A fla'"e thrower could be mounted i n a Libht Tank in the f 01-
place .
Hull of the veh:'cle , the co:nplete right sice and f r om dr i vEr 's
seat t , bulk head on left side , wit.h the gun placed i n the 37 ::"1m
position.
The [ollowinr; r:Jodi fications be requir ed :
1. !{ e!'1oving 37 mIll gun and accessor::' es .
_ 217 -
2. Removinp, assistant driver's seat.
Remarks:
If the 37 mm gUn was removed there would be no need of the racks
or any equipment connected to the gun.
D. Sumlnary.
The installation of a flame thrower in a H4 Medium Tank would
cut down the fire power by leaving only the coaxial machine gun. The
problem of refilling or servicing the flame thrower would take the tank
out of action more often. The largest possible fuel tank that could be
installed for the flame thrower would last apprOXimately thirty (30) to
forty (40) seconds.
The .'installation of the flame thrower in a \OA5 Medium Tank would:
Cut down the fire power of the 75 mm or 37 mm guns leaving all the
machine guns for personnel. The maximum fuel tank for the flame thr ower
that could be installed would last appr oxima tely thirty (30) to forty
(40) seconds. Thus the problem of refilli ng and servi6ng the flane
thrower is just as great.
If a flame thrower 'nth the Ronson's were installed
in either of these two tanks the resulting weapon would have no tactical
value as a tank or as an armored thrower.
9:
r
installing a flame thrower in the Tank, Light, 'n , this vehicle
would be primA.r i ly a flame thrower to be used for a specific mission as
neederl. The removal of the 37 mID gun permits the installation of large
fuel tankA s'lfficient f or appr oxima tely t wo (2) mi nutes firing thus re-
ri'..lcing t he pr nhlem of refueling or servi cing t he fla:ne thrower. This
weapon will be equi pped with a radio and a .30 Cal. machine gun.
E. Thus the HJ Guiber son Light Tan k whic h at present is an obsoles-
cent weapon available i n t his ar Ea wa s selected . This tank i s
normally manned by a 4 man crew, its is 14 tons, the nor mal arma-
ment cons) sts cf a 37 gun and a co-axial .30 Cal. machine gun mounted
in the turret, a . 30 Cal. bow machine gun (Asst. Driver) and a .50 Cal.
A.A. gun on the outs i de of the turret.
After installinG the flame gun system only two will be used
f or the operation of this weapon, namely ; one ririver and one gunner. As
a result of Many field t ests t he f ollowing plan of installation was
chosen: (See Photos and Drawings).
1. Fuel Tanks: f our tanks, connected in series with a t otal capaci ty
of 175 gallons are located in the hull of t he vehi cle .
2. Pressur e Cvlindpr ( C02) i.s l oc3 ted i n a hor i zontal pos i ti on in the
lef t s ponson. A 9; i nch diameter hole was cut in the fr ont s ponson
plate t o allow the of the cylinder.
- 2lS -
J. The Control Box is located on the floor of the vehicle in the
place occupied by the ass i stant driver's seat.
All operating lines from the control box are brought to a panel
directly underneath the turret. This panel and the VIn are con-
nected by flexible tubing.
4. Ignition System: A small tank of gasoline is mounted on the
right wall of the vehicle just above the control box . A spark gap
located in the flame gun is energized by a hi gh tension coil and 6 V.
fr om the tank's st orage battery.
5. The Fla':le Gun is mounted in the turret in place of the 37 mrn gun.
6 . A Heat Exchanger using hot transmission oil and installed between
the upper tanks pre-heats the CO
2
to prevent freezine.
7. Safety Features not found in the original Ronson F. U .L. t1K IV
Uni t:
a. A con centric copper rinG inside the end of the flame gun
shroud connecterl to the hi gh pressure CO
2
By pushing
a button on gun grip, a blast of CO
2
is expelled through
holes i n the copper ring, thus extinguishing any flame that
mi ght have resulted from oil dribbles.
b. A bleeder va1ve accessible to the gun operator by which the
pressure system can be vented to the outside through a pipe
extending through t he floor of the tank in case of a "run-
away" gun.
c. All electrical connecti ons to the gun can be broken instantly
by pulling out a plug in the panel board.
d. All e l ectrical wiring is surr ounded by a flexible metal
sheath.
e. The fuel tanks have been tested to a pr essure of 525 psi. while
the noraal pressure is in the range of 130 - 250 psi.
- 219 -
and Characteristics of the Flame Thrower Armored Self-
fl. . Preparation of Tank for lo,!ounting of Honson Flame Thrower Unit:
1. the 37 mm eun and mount.
2. Take off the turret.
3. Hemove all accessories connected with the 37 m.m gun.
4. Rer.lOve the a ssistant driver's seat.
5. Change the pos ition of nain battery s'.ntch.
6. Chanv, position of decompression handle.
7. Change the position of fuel control valves.
8. Drill or cut ( depending upon structure of tank hull ) holes
f or U- bolts t o recei ve mOlmting accFlssories of fuel tanks and control
box (?ef. Blueprint, Tracj_ng No. 21805, 21-64, 28 February 1944, Arrange-
ment of Flame Thrower TRnks, Honolulu Iron Works Co., Honolulu, T .H.).
9. Drill or cut holes in transmission shaft housing (Ref. Blue-
print 21-64 above).
10. Cut hatch in l eft spons on and install mount for reception of
CO
2
cylinder (Ref. D-27).
11. Install heat. exchan["er (Ref. Dt-40).
12. Clean and rolicFl t he i nsi de of t he tank thoroughly and give
it a or otective coatinG of paint. Note: All vehicles of this type usually
contain oil, gasoline, rags, muniti on , etc
B. Preparation and Yodificat; on of R.onson Flame Thrower Unit.
1. Flaoe Gun;
a. the flexible mount, (Ref. Ronson F.U.L. Instruction
Book p. 25. Remove: Anti flop device and flexible j01nt.)
h. After removing the "Ronson" shroud the safety C02 line
(ffi-36 and DR-40) is installed.
c. Shim and modify Ronson shroud to fit into protective arnor
shroud.
2. Control Box:
a. Install and prepare four mounting bolts.
- 220 -
h. Install solenoid switch (Ref. ID-JJ).
3. I gnition
Pre pare and install !?asoline r eservoi r. Thi s js an ad dit i on
t o the or isiral Ronson F. U.L. [nit becau se the dr iving fuel of the Tank,
Light , to is diesel oi l (Ref. rR-37 ).
C. InstallAtion of Fl ar:1e Thr ovrinp; Un:i t in Tank , Light
J
. ;n .
1. Procedure:
a . Check operation of r e l ocated fuel valves , main batt ery
swi t ch and decompression switch by oper ati.ng the tank engine .
b. Install fuel t anks made avai l abl e according t o Blueprint
No . and 21-65, Tracing r-io . 21805 and 21806, 23 February 1944 . De-
tail of Fl a;;o.e Thrower ":'anks, Honolulu Iron \Yorks Co. , Honolulu, T.H.
( see Photos No . 5, 5a and 5::' of construction of a unit of fuel tanks.
Als o see ffi- 25 ). Thi s installat,i on refer s to Tank, Lieht. , :.0 only.
c. Insta 11 mount and connec t t he :nociifiec1 Remson f l aT.e thrower
unit . For thi s purpose r eference is ma de to '::i ll t he dr awings and photo-
graphs accoT.panyinf; t his F/eport.
D. Te st inG and Operati on:
1. Cl os e main battery switch .
2 . Open valve on gasoline supply tank.
3. C lose valve on tr.e compression line int o fuel t anks .
4 . Cl ose the valve on the bl ow-down line.
5. Open main CO
2
valve .
6. Adjust the Grove pressure regulator valve unti l the pressure
gauge indicates the desired pressure for type fue l being used. The
Grove rebru lator valve is adjuster. by opening the body needle va lve openir.g
wit h the loading turn . Insert key in dome needle valve and open
slowly, watching the o'cltlet pressure gauge . !'ihen desired pressure is sholfTl
on close down needlE-' valve; then body neecle va lve. If outlet
pr es3Ure is hiEh, crack outlEt stop valve , and open needle valve only
until outlet pressur e settles to oe3i r ec value.
7. ChE!ck operation of the solenoid and i gnition system by pressing
gun operating button. Press button several times (from 6 to 8 times) until
a good i gnition is obtained.
8 . Close ret r actor tube l oc king nut on the gun anc open the valve
on the pressure line of fuel t anks.
9587:180- 51-17
- 221 -
9 . Press oper ating once to check operation of main
fuel valve.
10. Open the retractor tube l ocking nut.
11. The gun 1 s now ready for fi r ing . The fire will continue as
long as t,hf! b>..ltton is held down .
12 . If the operating pressure Crops durine fjrine , the Crave
valve should be readjusted.
IJ. Af ter fire is di scontinued !
a. Cl ose the retractor locking nut .
b. Close valve on pre ssure line to fuel tanks.
c . Cl ose valve on CO
2
cylinder .
E. of Fuel Tanks .
1. Open the valve on pressur e olow_down line .
2. Open the valve on the pressure l ine to fuel tanks , thus
al lowing all pressure to drain the tanks, -- then reclose both valvea.
J . Remove the 2 inch filling pl ug and the inch vent plugs from
all t he tanks .
4. The refilline line is screwed in the 2 inch refilling hole and
fuel is in. As each tank fills up replace the vent pl ug and tighten.
_ 222 _
The CO cylinder from the previous run is used for refuelinrr pressure.
5. The in which the t anks refill differs f or liquid and
thickened fuels. (Ref. I:H-?5) The tanks fill in the follO\':inG order:
a. Liquid Fuels:
l. Upper Hight
3. Lower Right
b. Thickened f uels:
l. lJpper Right
3. Lower Left
2. Lower Left
4. Upper Left
2 Left
4. Lmver Right
6. ReMove the refue l i ng line, replace and tighten ref i lling plug.
F. Change of CO
2
C:rlinder:
1. Change cylinder every time r efueling takes place.
2. sponson cover plate.
3. Unscr ew t he pressure line from the cylinder .
4. Loosen cylinder support clasp.
5. Remove cylinder and replace with full one, reverse
procedure, 4, 3, and 2.
6 . Check gasoline t ank. If it i s les s than half full, remove it
and refill.
G. Imnediate Ac-+:.ion for Failures to Fire.
In case the weapon does not function the following causes ought to
be considered and if possible repaired:
1. Solenoid switch does not operate:
* a. Check jack plug on panel board t o make sure it is seated
tightly.
b. Check 60 Amp. fuze in tank fuze box.
c. Make sure that the main battery switch is ON.
d. Check all wirinr, and connections.
* l;OTE: on Tank, Li ght, YJ, .30 Cal. IJachine Gun, and
Radio 536 or Int ercoCl'11unica tion 528, see proper Flfs.
- 223 -
2. Solenoic does not open main gas
Readjust linkaGe on solenoid until valve functions properly,
then ti ehten loc\{ nut.
3. No spark on Firing:
a. Check fuze on i enition system of the fla:ne t hrOlver Imit.
b. Check spE.rk cap anc arljust to 1/8 inch.
c. Check igniti on switch linkage with main gas valve.
d. Check all wiring and connections.
4. If gasoline is ejected - or - if gasoline fails to ignite.
a. Check and clean gasoline jets.
h. Check alir,nment from secondary gasoline jet to spark gap.
c. Check filter and float chamber for dirt plugging it.
d. Check all easoline lines for obstructions, by loosening
one end and blowing through the lines.
5. If main fuel valve is not operat ing properly.
a. "!a',<;e sure operating pressure is above 125 psi.
b. "{ain f ue l valve does not shut off properly, readjust
linkage with control box.
6. Insufficjent or poor characteristics:
a. Hake sure operating pressure is correct and corresponding
to fuel used. (180 to 250 psi.)
b. Disassernble @tn and clean retract or tube anc nozzle.
7. IIRun-Awayll Gun:
This condition exists when the gun does not cease t o fire upon
releasing the firinG button. If this situHtion occurs, im!'lediately swing
the gun and turret s o the fla"1e coes not obscure the driver's vision.
a. If t he vehicle and operators are not endangered by the
fla"1e, the flane can be C'.lt off by closint; the retract or tube lockine nut .
b. If they are endangered, open the pressure
blolf-do'\'m valve. Then cut off the C02 supply at the pressure cylinder and
determine the cause of the malfunctioning.
- 2.24 -
c. This condition is usually due to the main valve failing
to close ann is corrected by adjusting the linkage between this valve and
the control box.
d. The presenc e of forei gn matter or rust in the gun and
retrac:'or tube can pn?vent this unit froll shutting otf the fuel anci thus
contribute to a !trun_away!t if at the sa::le time the 1'T1ain fuel valve
has not complet ely closed.
H. [.aily Haintenance.
1. After firing, refuel, change CO cylinder, check' Gasoline
.
2. Disasser:1 bly eun, clean retnlCtor t 1lbe, gasoline jets,
nozzle and spark gap.
J. Pour gasoline through gun barrel until it is thoro'.lchly
free of thickened fuel and dirt. use vlater).
4. Clean out dr ip pan and reasse:n ble [).In.
5. Make sure that all connection3 are tj.ght and that there
are no leaks.
6. Check all copper tubing for vibrational strains and maKe
sure that they are anchored securely.
7. l'!ipe up all spi lled fuel anci in and .qround the
tank.
3. Check thp batt ery at least once a week.
J. Fuel Mixt llres:
Under the climatic conditions of the Central and South Pacific
Area the followinG fuel mixtures can be used:
1. Any liquid fuel, preferably I:iesel No .2, 70% Bunker C.
2. Thic kened fuels are limited to J. 75% }Tapal.rn, or less, pref-
prably J. 5?> r1apalm (ll} Ibs. in 50 sallons of gasoline).
K. Characteristics and Data:
\'It . of ve hicle --------------------------------.----
of unit, _______________________________ _
}'ll el capacity ---------------------------- ---------
f\.\cl sy st e::J opPr2t=-nF; ;;ressure ----------- ---------
Effective ranGe f or covered po s =-:' i ons
(pi llboxes , etc .) untenable ------.---------------
Effective range f or t.e!TIporary neutralizati on -----
- 225 -
2(' , 000 lb:.>.
2 ,150 lbs.
175 Ga ls.
50 psi.
60-65 yds.
75-100 yc!s.
V. f'iscussion
Sffective ran,:; e fat' attacking open positions
such as trenches, fox holes, etc . --------------

Fuel consumption ----------------------------------
wration of Fire at 20 psi. ----------------------
Fi r e Control
100-125 yds .
3/8 in.
gals. / s
2 min.
Depression --------------------- 260 15 deg.
Elevation ---------------------- 320 mils: 18 deg.
----------------------- 350 mils: 20 deg.
in Turret ------------- 2,850 mils: 160 deg.
CO
2
capacity a complete charge of 175 gals. is expelled
by cylinder of CO
2
(Spec: 220 ,ft. (50
Ibs.) pressure CO
2
cylinder.)
Previous reports on this subject have shown that a mechanized flame
thrower should offer adequate protection to its operating crew, be man-
and have necessary range and flame volume.
A. This weapon developerl by the 43rd Chemical Laboratory Company and
callec t he Flame Thr ower, Ar mored, Self-Propelled ( IISat an
ll
) offers the
necessRry protection against s::'.a ll ar ms [-ire and shrapnel. The .30 Cal.
co-axially r.lounted li ght , ei 'les t he "'eapon protective fir e pov!er while
appr oaching and leaving the target.
3. :!,ts aovantaEe s over any portabl e flame t hr ower are (in addi t ion to
Par agr aph A;.
2. Thr ee as much fuel di schar ge per sec ond.
3 . Tot al burnin[ time twelve times as great.
4. Fue l ca;:;acity 35 times as grea t.
5. L1..!e to the incr eased capacity and fire power this weapon can
be '.lseo t o nE'utralize pill boxes, d"J.gout s, etc. which wou l d otherwise re-
c:.'Jir e sE:veral portable f l 3.:7'.e t.hr mrers . It is also of ne
1
1tralizing
such before
c. The 43rd (;he:nical Labor ator y COTllpany was faced "lith t 'l"O possibili-
ties in attacking this ;>r oj ect.
1. To h1,;.i l d a flar.1 e t hr ol"Er into a tank t o be used as a supple-
mentary weapon . The t actical use of the tank would remain the same at the
cost of ar::l arnent and th'lEi di!'linisning i ts Affectiveness.
2. To build a flame thrower, armored, s elf-propelled using an
obsolescent tank ( Tank, Light, M3) and making Us mission solely that of
flame throvTing.
- 226 -
D. 'The flane thrower - vehicle team consists of ? I"\An, the driver
and the f,unn.6r. 'T'he dr i ver handles the tan:< under the ei re cti.::m I)f the
gunner and in adr:li t i on per f"rns the necessilr y s ervi.cing and
operati ()T]s on thfO' t:=ln'-<.
flane operator acts as commander of the tank, designating
course and targets to the driver and performs all for firing
the flame fUn and the . 30 Cal. 'We The flai:1e gunner all 'Nark
and nai nt pnance concernec1 with the flar.1e thrower. Eit.her onp can use the
radio.
E. Supply.
1. :\1el: Any Hquid f ue l suitahle for the portablp fl?::1e
thr ower can be llsed in t.his iT,'..l n. These fuels readily avaiL,ble in
the field or can be mixed under field (see a lso 43rd Chemjcal
Laboratory Company Feport ?:'.R . No. 19, 15 March 1944 on "Subs t itut e Flame
Thrower f'.t els
lt
) Thir '..:: eneo Fueld of 3.5 or 3.75% Napalm in r: asol ine (by
,,"ei Ght.) are t he most s atisfactor :,' . If fue l s vri.th more ttan
are IlEJed, desirabl e flar1e characteristics are sacrificed . Any kind of
can be llsed as i gnjt inn fuel .
2 . C02 : OnE' c Oi1ner ci a l CO
2
c:rl-i.ncer is neCPssary t o pr !")Vice
pressure chal' r,:e . The use of t. he CO
2
is the l10St r Citi onal, e c on-
omical and effici ent pressure source, because CO
2
at 200 psi. will
place 245 gallons whi Ie ni troe;en and/or c0:71 pr essed air at the
pressure displace on ly 100 callons.
For this reason it is necessary to set up a source of CO
cyUnoers in the field.
AlthouGh the present c onst.r' lc t in]; 3.nd perfomal'}ce given hy the
Fla:ne ':'hr m,er, Armored, Self -Pr opelleo ( "'Satan'!) is sati s fact ory, several
pointE; ()f iJ'llprove::lent are proposed f or further study.
1. Studies should be made of the adaptability of other flame.
to the Fhne Thr ower, .\rt:lored, Self-Propelled which elirninate the c ontrol
box.
2 . Studies shoulc be made t o cl eter:nine the pr acticabilj of
;], i: ear t:' pe pU'11P with a transmis:.; i on power t a ke- off to supply the
pressur e and r epla ce the cyEnder contained pr ope llant.
J . }:t has been proven that rr.etal cannot effectively
stand the vihrati ons of a tank. Therefor e , it is proposed to further
simplify the systeM t o eliminate these lines.
4 . For reasons of S'l pply it is proposed to u se only ne
powered Ught. ta:-lks i n any further insta.llations in order to e linina te the
neces51 ty of supplying c'iesel oj 1 as fuel.
- 227 -
5 . Tf'sts should be conduc t ed t o make the vehi cle water tieht f or
amphibious oper3tions .
\'1 . Cone l usions :
ThE" designed pr 01ect has been compl e ted and eivf!n satisfactory field
tests .
Further work, if de sired J ?i. l l be carr iec on under the dir ection of
the CPA Chemical f1 fficer J A. p. O. 958.
- ?28 -
done by!
lsI John P. EolanoViski
J ohn ? Bolanowski , 1st !..t . ,
Section
!/4 !1eau;nont W. 1"'hi taker
Repor t By ,
Lt . . .john P. Bolanowski
T/srt. qans Friedenfeld
T/'" Louis Rear:!
r/4 qeaumont 1". r 'hitaker
Photography:
T/3 Fred C.
Pvt. Robert
Irafting:
TiS Stanley F.
Pfe . Russell R . .. Johnson
5 copies made )
)
Typed illP )
r:istribution:
Project No . J5
T. R. No . 23
Approval reco:n.':l.cnoeo :
lsi John 0,
J ohn O. Clements, Capt . , C1'.S .
4)rd Cheilicn.l Laborator:' Company
Executive Officer
AT'provec! ;
lsi Robert T.
Robprt T. Hart , Capt . , C'S .
I.J r c Chemical Compan;y
CQ!'!1!'nanding:
Copies 1 to 3:
4'
<.
, .
Ch"'..,ical Officer 1 P.q . t: SAFICP,'" !\ ?O 953 .
Technical ('(;- C\'.'S ( ALtn: I', ajar Stewart) .
Retained 4Jrc Chemical Cb:npany .
- 229 -
- 2290-
-1. & 2.
Exterior Views of nSatan
lf
,
Figure 18.
Exterior View of Turret showing Flame Gun
I
'7IA' (
,.
4. Interior View of Turret
Figure 19.
5. One Unit of Fuel Tanks (Construction
5a. One Unit of Fuel Tanks (Construction)
Figure 20.
50. One Unit of Fuel Tanks (Construction;
'Figure 21.
6. Operation of ItSatan'
6a Operation of "Satantt. Closeup of Flame on Object.
"Figure 22.
'J. Operation, of It Satan"
. 7a. Operation of "Satan". Closeup of Target
Figure 2 , ~
8. Operation of "Satan"
Shooting for Range or ,Completion of Operation.
9. Operation of "Satan". Initial Burst
9a. Operation of "Satan"
Shooting for Range. -1 Second Later. Initial Burst
9b. Operation of "Satan"
Shooting for Range. 2-3 Seconds Later
Figure 25.
APPENDIX 2
Te chni cal Report No . 35, Pr oject no . 100
43rd Chel'lical Laboratory COt:l :)any
A.P. D. 957
c/o San Francisco, Ca lif.
30 ,Tune 191.4
"EXPERIENCE GAIflED Af1V ON THE
THROWER, AR\!0R>:D, SELF-PROPELLED.
- 233 -
INI"l:X
t . introduction
II. History
: :U . :!odificat ions
1. Fuel S:'sten
2 . Pre ssure SysteTl
J . GasoEne System
4. tion
5. risco Su p, le::1ents
6 ;
'!eili cle Hoc'iif i ca ti ons
TV . ':orl{ done ! A.
!3 . "Tr('.u!)le
C. Pref i r ing: Che c'.c Lis t,
v. Pecc":'J"':!enci<ltions
VI . Conclusions
Sicno.ture Sheet
A!>r>P.ndi ces : thdr;n.Tl)
- ?J9 -

240
240
.,:t, l
241
242
242
24)
21.1.
2!.6
247
251
2Sl
255
260
261
"!rperlenceOe.lned and Recommendations on the nao9 Throw9r, Armored, Self
PrOpelled. If
1. Introduction:
On the oasis of the results obtained by 43rd Chemical
Company in developing the "Satan" Fla!!1e Thrower, the V Amphibious Corps,
throue;h CPA, Office requested tha t this or gantzp. tion
turn1 sh technical advice and sunervi sory assi s t <'l. nce in installing twenty-
four Ronson Flame Throwers in Li ght Tanks, M3Al which were to be used in
combat ouerations.
Reference is made to the 43rd Chemical Labora tory Company T.R. No. 23,
Project 'To. 35. 20 April 1944. Thrower Armored, Self Propelled (Satan).
The present reuort contains additional information, made
and recommendation s for future work.
II. Hi story:
On 18 Anril 1944, 1st Lt. John P. Bolanowski and T/4 Be numont W.
Whitaker of the 43rd Chemlcal Comuany reported to Col. A. V.
Wilson. CE, at Pearl Harbor. with all blue prints and drawings necessary
for the co nstruction of the "Satan" Flame Thrower, Armored, Self Propelled.
This group made the estimates of materiel and men necessary to complete
the job and also made several changes in the design to improve the flame
thrower and expedite
These changes will be listed by each specific system involved.
namely:
1. Fuel System
2. Pressure System
3. Gasoline System
4. Igni tl on System
5. Mi scellaneous
6. Vehicle modifications.
Scanned by MilSpecManuals _ 240 _
III. Modifications:
throughout:
a. IIher"l nossi'Ole and nrectical, all threaded connections
were either wel ded or ror;lace c. 1.:Jy thus minimizing possibility of
leaks inherent in threRded
b. All non-ferrous tuning over a foot l ong was secured
every 12 to 18 inches to minimize vibr at i onal strain and prevent eventual
colla}) se.
c. Where pos sible Ronson Fi tti ne s (Bri tish thread) were changed
to Amer ican.
The modifications in vari ous described in the
followi ng pf1rAgr ap hs:
1. Fuel System:
a) Fuel Tanks: Due to the la.c k oft ime and f ac t thAt So
st artminf die for t2n'rs inche s o.d. WR S not aV8 ila 'Jle. tho fuel tank
dimensi on s har! to b
o
reduced to '),0 .5 o. n. which in turn reduced the
fuel canacity by p-pproxi ma toly 4fo thus diminishing tho. ftrinr- time.
b) All vents, refueling, and. insnection plup:s wore made of
brass and designed for a gasket because tests nreviou sly proved
that t he ordina ry nip", ca st iron nl ll p:s , although easily obt ainable,
cea sed to be tif"ht continuous on",n i'1t:; and tifhtening f or
refueli ng . All brass plugs had to be machined. (See Photo 4)
c) In the original model the vent for the bottom right a nd
left hand fuel t anks run out at the t onmost level of tahks and
plugged, thus making it necessa ry for refueling men inside to take
his posit i on on Qri ver' s 8nd filJing, carwl out
trlr ou.,-L thl? driver's d:;or p.nG. tH-ck th"l turret to the
- 241 -
refueling of the top tanks. To obviate this, an elbow was added to the
lover vent lines and a short piece of pressure pipe brought up to the
level of the top tanks. P.S sh01,In in nl:.otos No.1 and No.2. T:cus the
refu"!l1ng c a n observed and regula.ted from one nosi tion. The ;,>ipe il
plugged by a brass cap.
z- Pressure System:
a) CO
2
cylinder: The mounting base for the CO
2
cylinder in
the left SDonson was c0$n?ed to hold the c ylinder at a 10 slone with the
head down. This chRnee wa s m?re to utilize a greater nortion of the con-
tents of the c ylinder and to g ive a wider of p r opelling gas avail-
able against theoretical needs.
b) Rea t Exchanf,; er: Al though the heat exchan o:er was moun ted in
th'3 same r:1a.nner as in the "Satan II model, the :ne tal flexi bl'3 tubing lee.ding
from the heat exchan.f"er to oil cooler ""' :". S of regul a r oil r'3sistnnt
rubber tubing . fittings f or this tubing \r er e r:raz'3d to th e hoa t
uchanger inl e ts a nd outl ets . This ch2n,ooe the cleu onde nce on
tubing and fi tti ng e used !l ri marily by t he Ar mored force, thus p rovid. i ng a
more g ener ::>, l sou rce of for ImA.re p a rts or renl pce'11ents.
c) 7he oner 8 ting nre s sure gn.uge lo cntod fo rwnr cl 0[, a nd in
b'3tween, the fu"l t ,rm'.o:: s equ i !med wi th a. sturdy "" otal ,c;uard. See photo
:To. ?
to c01'1for!'l1 t o .t OT) rifht tpn'\(- thus movi'1 p- it out o f \-,'8Y l1'tking
e) R131ief Valve: A y>ro,ssur", v.".l ve WA.S monnt'3 d as s[-,own
in p 1'10 t o :' 0 . 2 .
3. Gasoli ne
S d b M
'j ,ll.) .Tank: j Due t o
canne Y I s
t '! of the fl a t t;,"')e of tank
-24.2 -
used in the "Satan" model a small tank of one gallon c?p?.ci ty ""as m-"!de by
""elding ends to 6 inch diPJTl"lter pine 10 inches lone. (See photo 1.) The
refilling plug ""as ma c.e l arge enough (c!:iuned and vented 11- inch niT")1')le) so
th2t by using 9. 3 gallon decontaT!linating aT' paratu8 as a filling device, unite
can be serviced the removal of the gasoline tank. Rolder
we r e welded to the side of the vehicle and th __ gasoline tank can removed
if necessE',ry.
b) The flexible gasoline line from the control box
to the gun WPS mqde by Ronson from the Ronson gasoline line
and. att 2ching: them by cl an:m s to 5G l. nches of 011 and gasoline resistant
synthetic rubber tubin{,: (t inch Ld.). This not only \'lorked satisfactorily
but also enabled the shipment of spare lines. See uhoto no. 3.
c) To p rovide positive delivery gasoline to t he jets and to
give positive the ball-spring valve Just behind the gasoline
nozzle and jet ""a s reMoved. This eliminates the leaking of gasoline around
the joints by diminishing the pressure required to force gasoline to and
through the nozzle and the atomizing jet.
4. Igni tion or Electrical System:
Experience has shown that it is advantageous, tactically. to
be able to fire severel bursts of fuel on the target. and then
ignite it. firinF t echnique obViously ene.b19s th'3 gunner to get more
fl.l9l on the target and iFnite it on his Judgment of the situation. This
fe ?ture \vas a.dded to the 24 Tank moun ted Ronson units by introducing a
switch in the six volt circuit and installing it on the gun handl9 a.ssembly.
See nhoto 3. For this 6 volt system a positive on and off switch was
intended thus r ivinf tho ou erator selection of fuel or fir'3; Rlso free-
- -243 -
tng hi s left for of th"'! 51 nc'9 th1 s of
.",i tch \It'P. S 1l...''1p.vaila"h le i,., t r. i s a clUsh button st f' rtin;:; swi tch hnd
to be used. Although this arranFement funct i ons satisfactorily, it. entails
the o.i sadvan of havinr- to both buttons sinr.1l in order
to fire a stream of flame. The 6 volt circuit is shown in circuit diagram.
The physical of the Jack plug s and p ush b uttons are shown in
photos 1 & 3.
All electrical wiring vas installed caalo. and the jpck
plug receptacles in the control box were shielded with insulating paper.
5. t<liscellaneous
a) Control Box: The con trol box vas raised 18 inches above its
locf'.tion in the origine.l "Sata n" model. Thl s si:1J1)lified installation
and mp.de the control box more E!,cceesi ble for mAl n tenance. It a1 so put the
main fuel valve in a nosition it could be and
end where t he ml'lin fuel valve linkaP.'e' could ':lor"! r"!A.dl1y adjusted. It
provided visual of the o'"'erption of control and ml'l.in
1\1el valve; it shortened the di sch'O'rp" e nine from 60 to 15 inches and elim-
inated three turns, t!'.us inc r e8.sing TJressure ef'ficienc y ; it r.12.de possibl13
the use of the side of the control for a and eliminated
the flexible in the origina] 3nd it sho rtened all
lines leRding to co n trol by 12 to 18 and eliminated one
conner gasoline line.
Raisine the cO"1trol -oox it i mo s s ibl .. to crowd an assist a nt
driv'3 r in this c o:np ::: rtrn nnt. It b e"' :l previously decider:" that an assistant
driver would not be u'-= d, a lt houfh the control box wr: s on the flo or, because
his escan "l wa s irrroossible in c a se of fire.
A CO'l trol lever we s instfllled in the uni t to enAble th"! flame
- -2..., -
operator to actuate the eystem in ca.e or failure of the See
photo No.1.
b) Flame Gun: 'I'he drip ' lifts provided .wi th th Ronson un1 t 1s
no t adequate leaked badly. Therefore, -part of the gun handle rod was cut
off and a stainless steel or walled tube waR threaded into the
gun tube as shown 1n 58.
c) Gun Shield: The gun shieln ma!e QY dishing 1 inch armor
n
1
ate to a inch de"dth using inch stamping die. Time and materials
at hand did not allow the construction of a shield more fitting to the tur-
ret armament blister. (See Drawing, and Photo Nos. 5, 6, & 8) The shield
cut and trimmed for traverse, depres sion, and elevation on the t est
f1 eld.
d) Retractor tube and spring: The sleeve on the rear of
retractor tube was stiver brazed in place. This sleeve comes 80ft solder",d
on and will pull loose after continued firing, causing a "run away" gun.
ThP, retractor tube springs arrived in bad condition; their
canablli ty of fully seating the retractor tube was decreased du'" to the
fact that rust had partially destroyed the spring's elasticity. Because
spare parts were not available the following correct1ve measures were taken:
Each gpring was thoroughly cleaned of rust, stretched and
replaced into the gun nnd the unit fired. From rapid firing it was easily
determined ho .... effectively the "stretch" was working. From this test the
lenf, t h of a n lug to be inserted behind the spring was Qetermined. After
insta,lling the plug the unit W8. S given a rapid fire test to insure positive
shutting off action of the retractor tube. The plugs inserted behind the
spring were made of t to }- inch length of metal rod. This nrocedure -pro-
duced rapid firi nr- of the gun and effective closure of the noz?le
the tube
Scannea Dy
--U5 -
e) Gun Shroud: Ths gun ehroucl 's .s. r mor of the "Satan" mo0.el
was i mp roved usi ng 8 p i pe of 6-5/8 inches o. d ., 5-5/8 inches i.d.
Alt ho\lh 2. r ::1 0r i s f t'.ciliti es avr il p':le d i el not r olling
a. tuoe o f t hi s A I f\ngth of thi s r i p e vli:S fi r e d up on at severa l
ranges n sin!! J .s.pe.:1e se . 25 c " li ber rifl e pne. a r mo r pi e rci nF ammunition a nd
proved s c tisfa ct o r y . (See an d Photos }TO S 5. C, &: 8)
f) Gun Extingui sher System: Instea d of ta-rplng the 11'1.r g o. CO
2
cyli nd er extingui s'r.i nf, t h'? " t t h e nuzzl e fl n d drin trouf h, the
run is sUTJ p lied e. standr' r d 4 l b . CO
2
fire extinr-uishe r mounted inside
left front of t h e turret A. S sr.own i n Pr oto This sys tem serves to
extinf::ui sr . the f l ame t he mu z zle of t 'he fl e me f un in c e s ':' of :l "run lIWay"
gun. and ennol e s the oTle r "'.tor to e:r:tinp:uish the fir e in the drip trough f:.nd
f,"UIl muz7.l e \';'1 e n P. s t reru:, of uni c n it s t . f u el is clesired.
6.
a) The i n s tall a tiol" of the flrm
o
unit necesGit a t es the comp lete
removal of the turret '" asv: et a n d. 'tj o\'!er trave r s i nr.: :Tlp..ki r. g
opera tion of the turret 1m:o ossible. However, e nough manual t r a versi ne
mechani ems were f oun d a t t an"" ord'1anc e shou s Rnd were moun tee a s s hown in
Photo No.3. Again, in this Case a better more e fficient tra ver s ing
mechanism could have oeen designed out time did no t permlt. As a result
o 0
turret t.raverse WRS reduced t o 90 li mi t ed fro m 10 ri ght to
o
90 left. This wa s a tha t could not b e avoided because of
circumstances involved.
b) The turret blister which nofnally received the 37 mm gun
shield we.s alt ered as shown in slretch ;ro,. 1 t o e i ve e dded 10c21 fr e e
trAverse, elevRtion , ?nd A c a n be ot tained by
photo No.3 in tris ronort Fl.nd TJhoto l'
T
o. 4 i n the ori ginal reTJo rt.
- -2- -
c) All fixtures within the not to the flame
uni t v'ere cut away t t hus lOA.ving the turret \,ells !"is smooth as possible to
preven t injury to the gun'1er crmsed hi s bein,"" t hro\!11. aroUl'ld wi thin the
vehicle on cross-cou ntry
d) The peri scop e was rerroved froM th'? hft side 0: the
turret and placed on the center line of the gun. See nhoto No.3.
e) The left $DOnson desien wa s modified to allow a
better locki ng anc. closine device. See Drawing No. 50.
f) The c ylinder of CO (used in case of fire in the engine
2
men t ) W'" s removed from the ree.r left corner and i nstelled behind and to
left of the ciriver's seat thus ml"Jdng it eAsily avpil ro ble in M emer{!enI.;Y.
See photo 2.
g) A niece . of 1" nlets WAS welded over the bow machine gun
'norte
h) A SP."t for tho fl H1"'e PlMer WAS eda.nted from a turret in
the t 2nk. s T?':1ovabl e se"'t rests the two upp er fuel tan1t:s ancl
the fleme gun and neriecope. See nhoto 7 and Drawing-
'no. 54.
IV. 'ifor',: Done:
A. The redesi{!ried units 'tere cO'1.str ucter' p..t Pearl Harbor Navy Yard
by civili an Althou{' h severpl shons were involved in the work,
the of the c o,., str1.lction and asse:T': bly W:". S done at shop 56
and. Cop"J ersmi ths). An assembly line vie s set up at thi s sh op 8nd tJ1e uncer-
si hned and T/4 ';fhi taker g:we th9 necesspry e.dvice and sunervisory
assi s tance. 'Jork st erted on 20 Anril 1 944 an d first unit wp..s corrroleted
on 2 ;11ay 1944 . Uni ts th", n CO:>1.fleted F.l.t the rate of on
o
or two a day
Rn d t he fin a l (24th) uni t we.s (11311 vere.d to the ne; Rr'?p on 17 nay 1944.
- .24.1 -
A. testin, area was set UT) at the V A"'mh. Corre Centor.
Immediately construction of first unit, it wes moved to tris
for chec}d"l g , p...nd. test firi!".g. crew tl-Jis work con-
dsted of the unde rsi pned , three !!len from Crnl. Lab. Co. p-nd three
welders and three machinists from the 117th Co nstruction Batt a lion.
Gas and arc h \.,re1ding and all tools ..'.ry for the job were fur-
nished by the 117th Navp-1 Construction llb . . Subsequent units were sent to
the test a rea i mme diately upon completinf, th":! assembly And after testing
were turned over to the USVC.
The unit s were assembled hasti1? by emnloyees who were c omp letely
unfamiliar ' with the'-1. Al so I the uni ts were to b .. in combat by per-
sonne1 who did not hEve a norrn.p.1 onportuni ty to become f n.mlliar wi th the
weanon; therefor'?, in chec'ri nr: 8n(1. adjustinp' t!1em evory urec Aution W'" S
to insure th9t th'?y were in n .. rfect order.
An individu,.-o l record WA. S 1{ep t for eHch fll".me thrower . This has
been c on solidated (see chp-rt 1 ) <>.nd helns c18rify the u ri mary pumose of
thi s ren'ort, namely. to sho ... , th::. t a simpler and more nractic"l flame
thrower should be dev"lonect utili?:ing tho )1:no'v,ledp'e gained in the flame
thrOwer to d8te.
The fo llowing is a detailed discussion of thq in whi ch the
work wC'.s b:! the testing pe rsonnel, ke",ninr in "1 i l1 (' 1 th'? noints above,
and. assuming that as a vehicle arrived <>. t th"! testi ng F,Tound, everything
concerning th"! flame throwing unit WAS nnd out of adjustm"nt.
was for g r an ted.
1. Uoon arrival of t 2.nk moun ted fl ame thr ower un1 t at the
grounds, it was checked for Ronson Roll, Fir st Aid
Kit, Grove Valve Tool Sac k , p",riscope left snonson cover plate,
extingUisher. f11TI muzzle fire extinruisher, all
-..24.8 -
lines and and solenoid All deficiencies were
ent"lred i "1'l1ediat"lly on the ve'h icle' s ?. nf nrocured fro ":1
t he s'h OTl.
2. Gun: Tha. gun WAS removed fr om shroud,
and,
a. barrel seating nut was remo ved And for soating .
It wp-s found thAt severe.l of the guns were no t nropo.rl y checked before
shi pment from the manufac turer. Where the barrel nut WRS not
prop erly seated, tho. gun on firing sprayed Iarre quantities of fuel back
. in to the flame gunner's compArtment. If thi s nut with its beveled seat
were not machined properly it meant a complete eychange of gun or return
to the machine shop. This machining a problem because of the
British Thread.
b. The ball spring valve was removed and the ga soline line
reassembled ann tested for obstructions.
c. The connection between the spark and high tension
wire leading to it consists of a spr1nr. partia1ly housed in a fibre casing.
From and test firing it was found that this tyoe of contact
Was a source of spark trouble. Therefore, positive connectiQn was made
by soldering , eliminating the "ossibl1i ty of no spark, should the
contact be drawn away during cross country operation.
d. The spark plug and plug housing were removed and the
plug checked for breaks, if and spark
gap was set at 3/32 inch in preference to lis inch by the
Ronson Manual. The alignment of this unit with the gasoline WAS
checked and adjusted.
- .2-W -
e. The retractor tube '9nd snrin , found were
noli shed wi th crocus cloth, oiled, re;:> leced in a cleRned and oiled barrel
and checked for alif':'1mc.nt. (If tub'! a ligns n roper1y it c pn be ep..sily
revolved in its b " 2ri",:- s by hand. A dirty, rusty anc.lo r bent tube I-:'ill bind .
If this conditi on exists tr-e tube will eventue lly into a nosition
where it will bind, sef>.t irmrop"'rly in the n077le and th"l f01n ",.,in no t
C<>'P. se firinr "!J ron"lrly or will not fir" at all.)
f. The retrActor tube found rusty,
elM.ned and oiled.
f. Th .. gun hJlndlo, rod W:'''S cut off 5/e inch pnd R 10 to 12 inch
'Diece of silver brp_!:ed or thrQaded into th .. r:un, See 'irn.wi'1p "'jo.
58. Thi s WE'S found neces sR.ry becpuse th"! Ronson drin a rrrmpement WI'tS not
cI'J.Nibly of h pncUi "lP: effec ti vely tho, slAc"" flow of fuel At the rear of the
run. To this drip tube was attached 5 to 5 feet of fl!'!x1b1e E:p so1in
Q
and
011 resistant tubing and the disch2.rf-'e end n1aced thl'oup:h a hole in the
floor underneath the . control box.
h. The flexible fuel hose connection to the gun WAS ch<>cked and
in all cases tiGhtened by 2 to 5 turne.
i. With all narts cleaned, oiled , And a ll
threeded connections tightened, the gun WP8 re-nount.ed 2nd. Th ..
pun hEJnd.le reu1a ced, ?nd fl .. xib1e lines (electricnl, fne1, fP.soline,
nozzle CO
2
, ".nd drin line) were secured.
J. Nhlle thl'! f1ln WAS overhpul",d th"l wp.lder in to
trim thp shield, th
Q
lever ?nd Rnd'Derform
any weldinI'" on"lrl'1.ti on necp.ss"ry in And llnon th'" before the tpnks
werl'! filled with flPcme throv.'inp fuel. All MPnuRl levers were lnP.ne,
- 250 -
mounted cmd adjusted in th'3 wps in
field on nroduction to
P.S t o raa :.dmum elev2.ti on, d<:'!nresrion, tl.nc travorse.
k. The Rnd connections WAre checked for
looseness nnd. bra ced a{" 8inst vibr" tion. system ,,'a s c ?: ecked individ1..lAlly
frora sour r. e to even tual ou tlet.
1. The vehicle wps with Diesel No. 2, gasoline
and. 'o r ovided with a 50# CO
2
c;: linder. Ne ... {:,n sv:ets were But on all o rass
vent
m. 'ditrl the gun rn A.de s p.. fe by t u rning tho ':; ;u-r'?l locki n[ nut fully
forwar d , t he CO
2
pres sure \"rp.s turn"ld on and the p ressu re lines
chec \r:ed for leaks. rinor lea'-'::s were fixed i !1 t he field. To remedy r1 e. jor
the unit had to De returned to t h ", s hop. (See chec'-': list.)
n. The Grove va lv"l \l-' 8S set at ?()0 DSi. Up to t his n oint all
checking , adjusting and coul d 8 9 done without firing the weapon.
To .perfor:n tests, checks and ndjust ments On the uni t fr om t h i s n oint on,
firin.: ,ra s neces3ry. Because of the deta.il with which all this work was
done a nd because twenty-four un its nlus the Sptan
presented new problems in adjustments a nd t esting the work from this point
on was standardized. it can be ext r a cted from this report and
used as a standcrd procedure for "troub le shooting" in a tank mounted Ronson
Flame Uni t.
B. "Trouble Shootin.G" in the Modified Ronson Unit.
The nurpose of this is to list nrimary sources of trouble
and failur es to fire in t he :,:odified Ronsor, Unit And to give methods for their
detection and correcti on.

- 251 -
Any mtlfunctionhg of tho. Fun CB.n uS
1
.le..lly ':10. discoverad in the
p:'9-firi".G cr.eck of t \: o. u".i t. PU!l C3.n often bo. onerated b:; "n"lnuRl
met hods i n c a se of fqi l u ro. of soma nnrt of the a nd the
11st g ives the p re-f i ri ng checks wit h t he immedia.te action8 for firing and
the corrective no.cess8.ry.
C. Pr c-firi ng Check List:
IS
1. CLOS3 ALL V ALVES ON FLAME 7HB.0dER U:;l IT AND / AKE SlJTJ E GUN
0" u . va l ves will not keep the Q'1it from but
any leaks should be ren Ec ired [-is soon as possible and. def ective valves
repaired or repl a ced.
2. TURN ON iUIN UTTERY SWITCH: A..YlY failure in this switch
will ke ep the tank from operating and falls under t Ank maintenance.
3. CHECK FLAME THRO'.:rn GASOLHfE SUPFLY Al"JD GASOLINJ<.;
TAliK VALVE.
4. CHECK OPMATION OF SOLENOID AND SPARK :3Y DZPR::SSFG BOTH
BUTTONS ON GUN HANDLE: In CA.!e of failure of solenoid the gun can be actu ...
ated by manual control handle. If no sp a rk occurs check the six vol t
fuse, swi tches Md connec tion s. In lmmedia te ac ti on "shor t ar ound" 8-1"'tY
defecti ve swi tcho.s or wiring. Tho. necessRry main tenance consi sts of 10-
eating Rnd or replaci ng the defective part.
5. OPEN VALVE ON CO
2
CYLI 1'fDER AND RESET GROV;;: VALVE IF
NECESSARY: If the Grove va lve will not give enough pressure, i mmediate
action for firing the gli.'l consists of re;-,ul&ting the !:lMually by
means of tho, jump er valve. When the Grove valve passes . too much gas the
c a n be mnnually controlled by the COz cylinder valve. Any mal-
func tioning of the Grove valve is corrected by di sas E,o,mbling and clel3..l1ing
the valve and replacing any defective parts. The instructi on sheet in the
full details for this
- 252 -
6. CImCI MAIN GAS VALVE Alrn BY
BOTH BUTTot:S ON GUU H.!NDtE: Thla activa t e s t he CO!1. trol box and gives a
s t r eam of i gnition flame at the gun. The gun will still oDe rato if the
mein gas valve but this condition should be corrected by removi ng
main ga s valve, disassembling the valve head at the i ntake side and
cl ean i ng or repairing the valve seat. If the valve wo r ks but.does not allow
t he r ocker arm to r eturn properly, the gun cpn be shut off wi th the barrel
l ocking nut. Correction of t hi s conditi on r equires removal of the main gas
valve and cleaning or repairi ng the exhaust valve sea t. If the box
actufl t es nroperly bu t no easoli ne i s dischar ged a t the gun , nri me the float
chamber and check all li ne s for st onna ,-e . If gasoli ne is dl schB,rged but doe.
not i gnl te I check spar }c ti mi ng li nk on mai n gas valve and clean secondary
gasoline J et i n
7. OPEN PRESSURE VALV"'i, TO FU3L TANKS.
8. CRECK BY DEPRESSr:TG BOTH FJ TTONS ON GUN
BE SURE GUN SAFETY IS SHUT: This gives a str eam of i gni t i on flame at gun
and t he flexibl e f uel line stiffens due to pr e ssur e of the fuel.
9 . CHECK OF NOZZLE FI RE EXTI NGUI SHER : Thi s extingui shea
any fire than may remain in t he no zzle or driD Da!'!. after st ep 8.
10. OPEN BARRZL LOCKING NUT (SAFETY) A.ND fIRE A SHORT BURST OJ FUEL
BY DEPRESSI NG STREAM F0TTON: If a s"tisf actor y fuel s t ream is obtained
the gun is ready t o fire. If the fuel doea not shut off sharply, the
gun is oDerate d by shutti ng off with the Barr el Locki ng Nut. Failures to shut
off ar e divi de d i nto two classes; tho s" caused b;' i !TTp r oper seAting of the
r et ractor t ube , and those caused by impr op er cl osing of t he ma1h f uel valve.
Whe n the t ube i s not wor ki ng pron erly the f uel stream dies down
gradually i nstecod of shut t i ng of f sharply . Tr.is i s co rr ected by removing
and cleani ng the t ube and a scer tai ni ng the r etr Rctor tube
- 253 -
slides s:Yloothly in its be['ril"{,:s and he s "- l)ositi v"! seat in the gun nozzle. J.
bent t ube \.ill not sli de in th"! beari ngs and r:1ust be r ep laced. A
positive seat is obtained by grinding with valve grindinf, compound.
If the fuel stream co ntinues to after the f iring button is relea sed, t 1:.e
main valve is not closing. the link between the fuel valve
and the rocker arm to ma.ke cert nin it is tight. If the link i s tirht it in-
dicri tes a defective main fuel valve and must be rena1reo. or replaced. Any
leeks around the retractor tube locking nut can be stonpeo. by tightening the
nut.
The only part not covered so far is the pressure relief valve.
Trash in the sea t will cause it to leak can he corrected cleaning. The
velve is set by sc r ewing the valve core UP or down nnd is tested '0;;- buildinC
un thp. pressure in the system with the jumper valve. valve i s normally
set to open at 350 psi.
When the uni ts were onerating in a sati efactory manner, the re-
mainder of the fuel .... as shot out an d the fuel tanks blown wi th C02'
After the units were checked and tested, and known to be opera-
ting correctly, the responsibility of the testing crew ceased. The units
.... ere then delivered to the
During the course of this .... ork the following materials were
used.
1. 4000 gallons Diesel No.2 Fuel Oil
2. 50 cylinders or 20.000 cubic feet CO
2
3. 300 gallons napalm thick9ned gasoline
4. 500 gallons of 50-50 mixture of Diesel No.2 and SF
300 Fuel Oil
5. 50 gallons ga soline.
- 254 .,;
On the basis of one load per day, the above materials represent
the requirements of one flame unit f or a thirty day operation.
The experience gained On this job out the weak f)oints in
the Ronson Unit and makes possible recol:mendations and pr oposals
f or their improvement.
V. Recommendations:
A. The following recommendations were ba sed upon experience gai r. ed
while wor klnE on t.he Honson Flame gun mounted in Light Tanks.
No work to the best knowledge of the writer as to the proposed
i m9r ovenent s has 8een done up to this date.
The following is )\Ti tten to present the primary fact that the
present tank mounted flame thrower can be chanGed, redesigned, and modified
to give a bett8r, more efficient fla;ne unit. These modifications are based
upon the follol':ing prere4uisites of any military equipnent.
1. Maximum fire power and range.
2. Logistically practical.
3. Sattlefield sturdiness.
4. Complete adaptability of design for ease in mass-producti.on
anrl installati on .
5. Simplicity of principle and operatlon.
6 . of maint enance and servicinG.
7. Utilization of parts, equipment , and materials already
oresent in and naval SNL's.
3. It is t hat experimental research be authorized to
build a tank mounted flame using a gear pump instead of compressed
gas as the fuel propelling medium. This unit could be used with the Ronson
- 255 -
Gun but C8n to almost any stAndard flp-me gun. If the
Ro n son gun is used it shoul d built with standard fittings
t Lr ouehout. I t is kn own thP. t v<>ry viscous cannot be used
in !i pu;rro of this t Y1') e becausE' pump would bree\{ un the gel. Li quid fu .. ls
.... ould work se ti sfac torily in 'a -pU.'lTD inmell ed un 1 t. Pr el1:nina ry r e search con-
ducted by thi s oreani za ti on has shown t h::l. t 3 .5':t na.palm gasoline
gels a re not destroyed by a rotary t yPe nump.
All fl ame-t hro,-,rer sy stems kno .... rn to b", Rvaill3.'ble, and used by the
U.S. Forces at the pre s e nt of t he p r essure typ e ; that is, a cylinder or
cylinders of c orrrpr e s s od gas (a ir, n itrol'en , and/ or CO
2
) i s u sed to prope l
the fl am"! fuel tl-'.r ough t he system to the nozzl ", and on to the '::''tis
means that the compl e t e system, incl uding li nes and tan\{s. must be designs4
luff1ciently enough to .... not the oper at ing pre ssure
(180 psi on Ronson, 35() p si on port abl "! , 425 psi on th'9 _Q.tl gun ) but ,at
least two OT t hree tim"!s t he operating to p r ovide s ome factor of
lafety, Summa ri ze d, the whol .. system should be strong enough to hol d , at
lea st temn orarily, .... pressure i s c ontained in the compressed gas cyl-
inder just in case r egul C1t ing valves fAil, o r the valve f e ils to 0"9-
erate. The whole sy stem t her 8fore i s heavy, an d
Th e use of bottl ed pressure a l so entails logistics with major
eij!nif i canc e. For exa"1!DlA.: (in thp- "Satan" model) for every load of f uel
fired, one c yli nder of gas is re quired. t hie fact on the onera-
tion of 30 tAnk-mounted throw'3rs f or a ne riod of 30 dp.y!\ , firi ng only
once a dAY, would rAquire 31") cylinders per; d.qy or 90n p ar r.1 onth.
the c yli nders can be used again, requires snecial thul
to th- problem. ActUAl has thRt gns
- 256 -
in such Rmounts hard to obtain.
A flame thrower unit thA.t utilizes rl ge
p
-::, numn to furnish
pressure to tho f1ln would eUminl'lte the gas cylinders, the teavy walled
used to carry fuel, and All the complexities of the
urereduction system. Power for this pump would c ome from thA vehicle
engine. The pump would be inst a lled bet."e"'n the fuel an'" the gun; thus
the fuel would not have to b e pressure vessels.
C. As per tentative schematic sketch (Drawing No. 55 and 56) a rotary
gear fuel PU!llp should be procured or designed. The pump head characteri stics
must be such that enough pressure will be develOped to operate ' the gun.
at apprl')ximately 200ffpsi. ..l.pump of these general
present in M4 Medium Tanks with bull-dozer blades.
D. The flame thrower fuel tanks can be built in any shape to conform
to any space available, strong enoueh only to hold the fuel. By conforming
to the sPace available and eliminating heavy walled cylindrical pressure
velsels the fuel capacity would be increRsed greAtly. In the light tank
used in the "Satan" model the fuel ty can b e increased from 170 to
fallon s.
E. The pressure system would be to the short distance between
the nozzle of the gun and the nump.
F. Non ferrous pressure tubine would be largely eliminated with the
of the short length to carry gasoline from the small gasoline
tank to gun noz :; le, 8.nd tubing for the tf;UIl fire extinf,Ui sher.
G. Qperation and lenition: Altrough the Ronson control box 1s a very
well constru cted piece of anparatus; it is too complicated. temneramental
- 267 -
Rnd vuln'3rnbl'3 in 2. rOclr- h ridi :l{" v9hic19. Its op eration is acco;nnlisr.ed
coxpletely by p rossure timed delivery, sD8rk end of
tt. 8 fuel vc_lve. Th9 co ntrol boy 1n a geAr :!Ju.'np syste:-:1 v.'Oulcl r. ave to
be rep l a ced. In nIece of the control box 8 fUAI Valve would be in-
stall Ad .... would b e onened by foot !".nd clo9d by s"9 rin[ s. The
rasoline \,'ould consist of a on'" gallon tank in wr.ich n ressur9 is
buil t un by a {I_c nd priminf nu.rrrn. nluE A line leadintf! t"h..roUf"h FJ valve in th"l
run tanene to the g1l.U n07.71e. Tl'.e igni tion snark \<Ioul d CO:;1" fror:! one or
more standard vehiel"'. S!"[!.r' plugs actuated by Po coil builtin to the
g-un Darrel. The 19ni tion snark: cnd .. 'ould De ti:ned B.t cun r.2.ndle.
H. The actURl Ronson Dame Gun is Deli evod to Do. of go 0 <'l. us p. in
fut u re developments. Sinc9 the question of r p..nCe hRS C 8 ':"0 UT) in 2.11
previous flam'? thro\Oler work Rnd the r an[ '3 dt;!1""nds on th9 c on v nrsion of
press1..: re t o veloci t:; in the flame gun nO? zle, r"sep..rch shoul d : Ie done on
nozzle design for the various fuels used. Any previous wor !( on nonle de-
sign done '0: ' other investiGation agencies should b .::; mrtce to t :-. is
organization. It is that severel nozzles CQul d De for
vaious tactical uses. The n0 7,zle in the Ronson Gun is ea.sily p. nd
it should. De planned to furnish a set of at least two for each unit. One
noz7le ,,'ould g1 ve maximu.'!l rp.nre wi th fuel. the other ma.ximum
heat 0 :1 the target wi th les s The pun shroud should be ca!'!'l oufle.[ ;ed
to e ive t he of the wep..pon it if' rep18cinr. The !l"-'riscop e
De mechanicrtlly counled to tho. The c pn be further i un r oved to
lea.kinc " round the retrrtctor tUDe lo c kin.' nut.
It is furtr-.er reco-m"ncied thr: t research be l1.uthoriz.ed to d.e t er ::1ine
tho of large flame throw"'rs. Tho.
"'ear on 1 tself woul d be usod t o burn;:>. vesicFl.!'lt free path in
- 258 -
gr oun d or snecial truc k:- mounted uni t " ould be con struc t "!d usi n[ sto.nrnr d
oil drums fer t he fuel sU"' l y V:n'{s .
K. Refu'?1ine;: In all nrobl"! ms c O!1cerning flq:JlO t'crow"!rs c;ue,-.ti on
of refueling in respect t o time i nvo l veel r:n" the ease \"i th which it C1! n be
done has always been u roninent. The pro!1o sed unit coul d be "lPs ily refueled
using the "illlP. Referring t o the sche:1atic flow diagram it CEi n be seen t he t
by a simp l e of the throwor be taken out of t he
barrels end into the fue l tan1<s \\'itr. a "linLnUr.! of effort. in-
vol vc.Ci. "ould depend on the cannei ty of the pump e nd the effi ei ency of n.e
op er p..ti nr personnel.
The s ioplicity is an-p[! rent. The v ent is run to the out-
eic.e of the vehicle. '1"::11e one mRn i s :'.p'\ri nf t he outsic." n ron .'HRtions, n.e
driver, lepvinr the vohicle, bo to thr oe
(3 ) valves keep moto r running . i s as f ollows: drum
to ou tside n lug , t.hrou".'}; nU .TD , throu{"h bY-"Jas s valve
in to fuel t 2 nk.
narts , 2nd fue l woul d be reducec, to ;: mini"1u'71 . unit to be t o
t he field for a ssembly in 0(1 0 n iece, t,:e nu:!'T) flnd ac.fl'r.t ers, the aso lin e
system and neces sc.r y spare -pa rt s . Blueprints for the fuel t nnks would
be supplied and the t nnl.:s c ould 0
0
:::c. ci e and in the fio.ld usinE;
availilole ,mp:ineer equ i nment, su")n lies, R.nd. '"er so"'nel. Tr.e S!'> nce
consuned by pres sure cylinders an,: cor::pressors coul (:;. :"e for '3xtre fue l
or add. it iona l units a.dding t o the fi r eno ,,: e r witr.out i'1 Cr "'Rsi ng
problems.
The unit should be 80 designed that it ean r eadi ly mAnufaetured
and eesily i nstalled in the f ield by existing Its simplicity
of end opera ti on wil l make it tend t o stand up longer under
eombat U ons. T1':e only p!'\rt used in construct! on is not B.
.tande. rd item of supply would be th"l morli fied flame gun itself.
VI. Conclusions:
The assienment of r, i vi np. and superv isor y PssistAnce
1n construc ting twenty- four (24) modif ied fl ame throver s ar mo r od . self
prop elled was compl e t ed to the sRtiefactlon of every one co ncerned on 17
J'{ay 1944.
However , a t ank mounted thro .... er of t he t ype outl ined In the
ebove woul d meet mI lI t ary requIrements mo re s? tlsfectorl1y
than any .. ea:pon studied. by tris orr, enizp.U on to rle.t'!l.
- 260 -
itork done "b y:
T/'! Vi::cent '!' . Kar ol owic8.
LP.bOTp.to ry
T/'! Kenne th C. Jone s ,
43r d Leborator y Comnany
't/4 Beaumont TiL ',,rhitAke r,
48rd l2bor ator y
Six men of the l l?th N. C. B.
,
\
P. Bol anowakl
JOHN P. :OOLANO'\ I I.
Engl neerinK Secti on
Autho r
Co- author
' /3 Fred C. Photography
TI s StAnl ey r. Drafting
Ptc. Rus8el R. OrBfting.
ProJect No. 100.
TR Woo
ADprovp. l
s J ohn O. Cl ement.
t J OHN O. CL"MEtlTS. C.pt . CWS.
4:.zrd Ch!!mlc.d Labor a t or y Cor.meny
Executive Officer

/./
/ t/
- 261 -
Rober t T. Hart
T. KART, Cap t., CWS.
43rd LAboratory Comnany
CO!imandl ng
APPENDIX 3
DAlLY OPERATI ONS or l1AVY MARX I FI.AM! T!IIlOlIlI:R
ON PELELI1J
- 252 -
DAI LY OPERATION S 0 F NAVY '.1 A P. i{ I FLA' rE THROl','ER ON PEL'TJU*
15 September 1944 -- I:-Day.
(a) Three ' fark I Flame Throwers mounted on LVT (4) 's (amphibious
tractors) and two service tractors, one an (2) carrying three extra
loads of fuel and fueling equipnent, the other an L'1T (1) carryinG an
air compressor and tools, an 1ST at ' 07JO for the 1and-
ing on Pe1eliu. The three flame thrower units took their assigned po-
sitions in the ass ault waves and proceeded to shore. The service trac-
tors stood by off shore until it was deemed possible to bring them in
without damage.
(b) One flame thrower unit landed on the middle of '.I.'hite Beach at 0830
jllst Qehind the armored LVT's and just ahead of the first wave of a3-
sault troops. No targets were observed when approaching the beach.
Forward progress was limited to twenty yards inland because the front
lines were pinned down fifty yards inland. It did no firing due to no
instructions frOM infantry commanders ."ho were in charge of its opera-
tion, no visible targets, 3nd inability to determine accurately where
the fr ont lines were. At 1000, three men were wounded by snipers and
shrapnel and were evacuated. At 1200, one man was hit by a sniper and
evacuated. At 1400, the three remaining men moved the unit to Orange
Beach to avoid enemy fire. The unit moved up to the edge of the air-
port at 1800 and uRed t he machine gun all night.
*History of the Chemical l'rarfare Service in the Middle Pacific, Vol. IV,
Annex IIcJ, pp. 18-40.
-263 -
(c) Thp flame thrower unit landed on Oranee One wi th the
fir st wave of assault. t r oops but ,",'as ordered off t o safety be:,'onci t he
reef . Tr.o more t o land were with the instruction
because of enem!' fire and lack of targets in that vi cinity. The unit
beached at 1200 and advanced t o the edee of the ai rfield at 1600 to
use i ts machine guns all nieht.
(d) The thir d thrower unit stooe off shore an armored col-
on the right flar.k of Orange 3each Three. It r eported t o the beach
at 1000 . At 1600, t.he L11T stuck in a shell hole on the beach and the
crew dug in f or the ni eht .
(e) The service tractor carrying the air compressor started to ship
water shor tly after leav1ng the ship and sank in eeep wat er off the reef
three hours after
( f ) The servi ce tractor carrying the flame thrower fueling equipment
to aid the sinking tractor to t he reef . Faili ng in that , it
tried to cCJr.l e in on the coral but encountered heavy fire and stood by at
sea the rest. of the day and night.
(g) Three additional flamp. thr ower s and one air compressor spent the
day on an AKA unable t o get ashor e.
16 Septmber 1944 -- D plus One.
(a) One man from the crew of the flame thrower unit on Orange Beach
was fatally wounded at 0300 qy a machine gun bu llet and was
At 1100 , that unit extricated -itself from the hole that it had run into
the previous afternoon. Because or air leaks , all three units spent the
day on the beach and in the water awaiting an air compressor to recharge
them. The air aboar d the AKA ashore on a t ractor, but
- 261. -
too late in the day to set units into operation. All units and the serv-
ice equipment set up in an area near a fuel dump 100 yards inland from
the left flank of Orange 3each One.
(b) The three flame throwers aboard the AKA were brought to the reef by
an LeT, but were to get ashore due to the inability to get LVT's
to mount them in, and a crane to lift them from the LeT into the LVT's.
17 September 1944 D plus Two.
(a) One unit reported to the First Battalion of the Fifth 2!arines at
0900. As it started to move in behind three tanks its track was blown
conpletely off by an HE shell. It labored back across the airport,
under mortar fire, on one , track, and was hauled from the edge of the
field to the area by the service tractor.
(b) One unit reported to the First 3attalion of the First "arines and
fired on two pillboxes and tvro ledges 200 yards ahead of the lines.
The flame thrower malfunctioned and set the tractor afire. 8eing under
enemy fire with exploding, the crew temporarily abandoned
the tractor and returned to our lines. Two men were wounded and evacu-
ated at the time. One man brought the tractor back to the area later
that day. Both tract.or and flame thrower needed repair.
(c) A third flame thrower unit reported to the First Regiment at 0700.
Together with several tanks, it started for a blockhouse but broke down
with motor trouble and later that day was hauled back to the area.
(d) A disgusted LeT captain loaded the three orphan throwers
back aboard the AKA since no one had acopted them.
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18 September 1944 -- D plus Three.
(a) The flame thrower in the burnt up tractor was removed. The tractor
with motor trouble was repaired.
(b) All three flame throwers aboard the AKA were set .in tractors and
brought ashore for operations.
(c) units reported to the Second Battalion, Seventh Regiment. One
stood by while the other started in but was ordered back due to intense
mortar fire. This tractor then broke a final drive while near the front
lines.
19 September 1944 -- D plus Four.
(a) The flame thrower out of the burned tractor was set in another one.
T.ork was begun on broken dovlD tractor.
(b) One unit stood by with the Second Battalion, Seventh Regiment.
(c) Three units rpported to the First Regiment. One tractor broke
down on its way up. One arrived at noon after standing by in the morn-
ing with the Fifth At 1300 this unit emptied its entire
charee on a hillside and a shack. The gun drooled a bit and started a
fire which was easily extinguished. The third unit reported to the
Secnnd Battalion and at 1600 fired into caves and pillboxes on cliffs.
There was a sli ght dribble from the gun at the end of the firine.
20 September 1944 -- D plus Five.
(a) Two units were under repair.
(b) Fonr units went to the First Regiment. One spent the afternoon
being shunt ed around the different battalion CP's. One stood by with
the Third Sattalion. A third reported to the Second Battalion. In
- 266 -
the morning it worked over a sector of ridge 100 yards ahead of the lines,
while tanks covered its right flank and withdrawal. In the afternoon it
stood by in the same area. The fourth unit reported to the Second Bat-
talion at 1430 and immediately went in and hit caves, pillboxes, and
shacks on a cliff. On the 'Way out an AP projectile and a HE
hit and disabled the tractor, and removed the drivers' right foot. The
tractor was left seventy-five yards ahead of the line.
21 September 1944 -- D plus Six.
(a) The tractor which had been knocked out the day before was towed
back to the area. "l'rork was done on two tractors.
(b) Repairs Vlere finished on one of the above two and it stood by with
the Seventh Regiment in the afternoon.
(c) Three units stood by with different battalions of the First Hegiment.
22 September -- D olus Seven.
(a) Disabled tractor still out of commission. One unit remained in camp
area.
(b) One unit stayed with the Army 321st Regiment all day and night be-
cause tanks blocked the road that evening. One unit stood by with the
First Battalion of the Seventh Regiment and two units stood by with the
Fir st Regiment.
23 September 1944 -- D plus Eight.
(a) One tractor still out of commission. It and two other units spent
the day in the area.
(b) Two units stood by with the Army 321st Regiment and one unit stood
by with the Second Battalion, Fifth Regiment.
- 267 -
24 SeptembP.r -- D plus Nine.
(a) The flame thrower in the disabled tractor was transferred into the
repatred tractor which had been burnt on D plus Two. It reported to the
Seventh and burned mlt three caves which had harbored snipers in the
ridges just north of Division Headquarters. One man was wounded by a
sniper and evacuated. The tractor broke a final drive on its way back.
(b) One unit stood by with the Third Battalion, First Regiment.
(c) Four units reported to the 321st Amy Regtment in the morning.
Two patrols were formed
J
each consisting of three tanks, two flame
thrower units and five LVT (A)'s in a file. At 1100, accompanied by
demolition men, the two patrols started up the west coast to the radio
station about 1,200 yards away. One patrol advanced about halfway up
the beach killing a few snipers, knocking out one Japanese seventY-Bp.ven
millimeter eun and shelling the radio station before being called back.
Neither flame thrower fired. The other patrol went about 300 yards up
the road knocking out about twelve pillboxes and dugouts and killing
thirty or forty Koreans before being called back. The two flame thrower
units burned out three of these dugouts.
(d) In thp- afternoon all four units advanced via the road to the radio
station with the First Battalion, Fifth Regiment, but did not fire.
25 september 1944 -- D plus Ten.
(a) One tractor out of commission.
(b) Two units reported to the 32lst Regiment. One stood b3
r
The other
fired into six caves setting off a lot of enemy ammunition. This unit.
remained overnight with a broken track.
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(c) Three units reported to the Fifth Regiment. One stood by. At 1400
a second advanced as far as the causeway to Ngesebus with tanks) but did
not fire. The creVl eot four snipers with small arms. The third unit
started in for some caves on a cliff, for the Second .Battalion, but was
held out by heavy Japanese fire.
26 September 1944 -- D plus Eleven .
(a) Tractor with final drive brought in.
(b) One unit reported to the Second Battalion, Seventh went
off the road to the cliffs opposite the CP and burned two pillboxes, a
hillside, a food dump and an ammunition dump.
and smoke shells from a half-track.
somewhat and the wind cut down its range.
It was covered by six
The gun dribbled
(c) Two units with the j2lst Regiment. One which had been with them
for the previous day and night returned with a broken track and the
flame t hrower was transferred to another tractor. The other turned
400 yards into the hi lls just past Man's Curve on the West Coast
Road and shot into one cave on the way in and into two caves on the
way out; getting five Japanese. There was sniper fire and some land
mines.
(d) Two units reported to the Fifth Regiment. One stood by. The
other ran the length of a large concrete pillbox lying opposite the
causeway to Nf,esebu, and fired into the success ive apertures, driving
out and killing thirty-five Japanese.
- 269 -
27 September 1944 -- D plus 1welve.
(8) All units operated with the Fifth Regiment.
(b) One opArating With the First Battalion couldn't get into the tar-
get due to terrain. A second one with the CO of the Second Battalion
went into the fire on a tareet 200 yards ahead of the lines, but heavy
brush prevented the advance of the' tractor and t..:ut down the range of
the gun to such an extent that it also did not fire. It received no
enemy fire. , A colonel or a lieutenant colonel commandeered this tlni t
after dark, loaded it up with ammunition, food and water and ordered
it up to "GIt Company. It soon ran into, and became stuck in, a shell
hole. The crew spent the night there under enemy fire.
Cc) The four other units fired. One burned over a hillside and the
foot of a tree. Another with "Fit Company of the Second Battalion
cleaned out four caves, one pillhox and sprayed an area in which there
soon followed a heavy explosion. This unit accounted for forty Japan-
esp. The third one crossed to Ngesebus and followed by infantry, ad-
vanced and fired at a long trench, but with little effect. The fourth
flame thrower was transferred from a disabled marine tractor into an
army tractor. Supported by a tank and infantrymen around the unit and
around the target, this unit fired three quarters of a load onto a
hill, forward and to the right of the Fifth's CP, neutralizing a cave,
and receiving in return machine gun fire and a couple of mortar shells.
Reloaderl, it worked over a hillside and several caves again with tank
and :nfantry support.
- 270 -
28 September 1944 D Thirteen.
(a) One unit returned t.o the army maintenance area for track repairs.
The unit which Was stuck in a shell hole refused to move for either a
bulldozer or two tractors pulling together, finally pulled out
by a tank retriever only to evidence a broken final drive. One of the
tractors which tried to tow the unit out was destroyed by hitting a
buried 100 pound aerial bomb.
(b) Four units operated with the Fifth Regiment. One unit stood by
with "G" Company, but terrain prevented operation. One attacked two
caves, one large pillbox, one small blockhouse, and got twenty Japan-
ese by firing over a hill. Starting back up with a second load, it
broke down with a final drive out. A third unit, after two tries,
shot a load into one large cave on a hill bar.k from the causeway, re-
ceiving knee mortar, rifle and machine gun fire from the enemy. It
had two tan\(8 as support, 150 yards to the rear. The fourth unit
fired into a cave on Ngesebus. As the crew tried to'repair a track
that had broken away from the sprocket, a "Bolt seventy-seven
opened up. After the seventy-seven was eliminated, they repaired the
track and returned.
29 September 1944 -- D plus Fourteen.
(a) One tractor out of commission. One stayed in area.
(b) One unit stood by with the Seventh Regiment all day and was
joined by another at 1300.
(c) Three units reported to the Fifth Regiment, one of which stood by
until 1300, and then reported to the Seventh Regiment. A second
Scanned by MilSpecManuals - 271-
tractor, which had just had a flame thrower transferred to it from a dis-
abled tractor, reported to "K" Company, but found the terrain too rough
to reach the target. The third unit worked with "G" Company, and, su.p-
ported by t wo tan1{s, worked over a long bunker and the area above it. A
sniper ftom a hi gh positi on fired dOl\n :into the tractor f orcing the crew
mlt into the shell holes. After having one and evecuated
they were able to get thenselves and the equipnent out.
30 September 1944 -- D plus Fifteen.
(a) One tractor still disabled. first and reverse gears broke down
in another. One went into maintenance for repairs on the tracks and
bogie wheels. One stayed in thp. area .
. (b) Two operated with the Fifth One of these with the First
Battalion got v."ithin fifty feet of the objective caves and the flame
thrower failed to work. On the way back the final drive broke down.
'nle other unit sUpfl orted by infantry and three tanks went up a road be-
t"een the two hills to the ri Ght and beyond the radio to"f'!er and fired
into one l arge cave and t hree small ones. It received machine gun fire.
Later it returned to t he area with motor trouble.
1 October 1944 -- D plus Sixteen
(a) Same t ractor still disabled. After having a thrower trans-
ferred to it from another tractor one stayed in the area. Two tractors
had repair work on the t,racks and bogie wheels.
(b) One had repairs finished on it and stood by with the Fifth
Regiment.
(c) One tractor had a unit transferred to it and stood by the First
- 272 -
Battalion, Seventh
2 October 191.4 -- C plus Seventeen.
( a) Same t r actor out of comnission . One tract or stayed in the area .
One was uncer repai r.
(b) Thr ee units stood the Seventh Regiment . One of them broke
a track upon returning.
:3 Oct ober 1944 -- D rlus Eighteen.
(a) Same tractor disabled pl us another broken cown in the One
tractor under re pair
(b) One reported to the Third Battaliun
J
Heei ment, bu t
enemy fire prevented adt'ance.
(c) TWo units stood by with the Second Bat t al ion, Seventh ReGiment . A
tried to run one through a mor te r bRrrage t o get it to more t r oops
ann caves . That unit ceased operati on due t o a fifty_seven millimeter
under the engine . One man was wounded by shrapnel.
!. Octoher 191f4 -- D plus Nineteen.
(a) Three units !I over the hill. II One under repair.
(b) One reported to "K" Company, Third Battalion,F1fth Ree1ment . It
advanced into a draw over rough t errain, barbed wire, and hi lls to burn
over t wo caves , one ravine, the sides of the and the side of a
hill . A shot i nt o a cave on top of t he hill l'(ent completely through
and out t he ot her killing and runninG out 125 to 130 Japanese.
The uni t r eceived sniper and :nachine eun fire .
- 273 -
5 October 1'j4/ .. -- :::: plus Twent:jT.
(a) Transferred flame thrower from onp- disabled tractor into a service-
able one. Ot her t wo uni t s rerna:i nec ou t of cOITI:,.is si on . A f ourth t r a ctor
Was under repair.
( b) One unit stood wit h the Fifth and one uni t stood by
..... ith thp Second Sa tte. l:0n, Seventh Kegi11ent .
6 October -- r plus Twenty-onp.
(a) One tract or still a hold out in the hills. Two tractors '.wrler repair .
One unit stood by with the Second Battalion, Fifth Regiment. One
stood by with both a battalion of the seventh one of t he Fifth as the
1E.t.t
p
r t.ook over the other's positjnn on the
7 1944 -- :c plus Twe r.t;,'-two .
(a) Onp tn.ctor disabl ed . One uncer repCl.ir.
(b) Four units opprated r.ith t he Fifth Regiment . One of these stood
b
J
' at the CP unCible to ;:0 in on the t ar get due t o ene!'1Y 11achine gun fire
anc mortar fire ano a di :'l 8hl ed half track ir: t.he r oad . A secone un:i t
V'ri th the Third Ba ttalion advanced with tank support t o fire into two
CRV"'S near the Five Sisters and eliminated rnacnine gun 9.nC: PlOrtar fire.
The third wasc.irected by a forwar d obser ver via radio in firing into a
pocket in the hi lls near the Fi\'p. and covered t :'8 f 3.ce 'J f the
hill, t wo draws tyro caves with t wo l oacs of fla.:'1e 'olov.i nt'" 1) p ar:
ar:'u'";l'-l!:::. t ::' 0n ,-1'.np and ki llinG nan:' Japarese on the far sic!e of tht.' ri cJGes
over which they ar ched the r od of flame. The fourth unit OpEr:::i ted l:i th
"L" Company an r1 advanced t o ravine -nout h t o fire i nto a cave at the base
of the cliff. Two s hot s over t he s ide were ineffec tive c:'J.e to poor
- ').74 -
fuel. Thp tractor was then hac\.:ed up t o the cave to provide a !Jetter
shot. Illring this onp fla:7le thr ower gunner was h:" t 3.no seri-
ou sl:! wounded twice b:' d sniper. The other eunner cli:nbeci up to shoot
and was killed iITlI!lediately b'J rl.:J.chine Grtm fire. l":nit returned, re-
fillp.d and stood by aEain with the outfH.
8 October 1944 -- D plus Twenty-three.
(a) One tractor disabled. One in maintenance. One in area.
(b) Three units operated with the Fifth Pegi:7lent. All three were
c03ched frOM an observation post by radio. Gnp. fired into a cave and
then arched the rest over the hi ll. After r e l oadinB, it fired again
over the sa.'!1e hill. 30th loads were effective against Ja;J3nese in a ra-
vine on the other side. After a short mortar barraee, another unit ran
into a basin f:"ring first di rectly into a ravine and then over a hill.
The third unit advanc ed over r ough terrain into a ravine and hurned over
a hillsi de . Sn returninc) this unit sheared its bolts, re-
paired then and then Ylent to maint.enance area for track repairs.
9 '::l et ober 1l) 44 -- I:' plus Twenty-four.
(a) One tractor disabled. Tl/o under repair. ane in the camp area.
(b) operated with the Fifth Regiment. One sent its fire over a
hill according to radioed directions. The other advanced down the road
from the Second 9a ttahon and fired its ent ire load into a cave. The
hillsi de off and Japanese were killed.
10 October 1944 -- :s plus ':'wenty-five.
(a) One t r ac t or di.sabled i n the hills. Two in the area .
(b) Three operated vrith the Second Battalion, Fifth Reglment. One of
- 275 -
these had maintenance work cl one on it i n the morn::.ng anc stood by in the
af t ernoon. A secone st ood by unt:'l TD:. rJ --3ft er noon Cine then bur nen out
its t r yinc to eet up a ste ep slope t o f i re. The thi r d unit went
'lP the same slope and sprayed the si de of Hill #120, se tti nG off an
ammun i tion dump.
II October 1944 _-- D.-Ellls Twenty-six.
(a) One t.ractor dlsabled i n the hills. One ander repair.
(b) Two went up to the south side of Lead I s Cave on t he 1:est Coast
Road to investigate possibilities of working over the face of the 'cliff
with the flame thrower. Neit her fired.
(c) Two operated with the Second Battalion, Fifth Regiment, one of
which stood by . The other advanced over r ough t errain into the north
end of a pocket Bill #140, ana fired over a r i dge i nto another
as directed by radio. Later it took demolition men up to in-
spect a target and brought them up still aeain coverinG them .nth
machine guns as cleared the road.
I? October 1944 -- D plus Twenty-seven.
(a) One tractor disabled in the hills. One under repair and one in
area.
(b) One unit worked from the same pocket near Hill #140 that it had
worked from the day before with the Second 13attaUon, Fifth Regiment.
Got one sniper and set off an dump. The tractors trans-
mission broke down on the way out.
(c) Two units moved in near the cliff on the Coast Road over
certain sections of brush, rocke and trees that the enemy used for cover.
- '716 -
13 October 1944 -- D plus Twenty-eight.
(a) "Two tractors di sabled in the hills. T"ti O tractors under repair.
(b) Two units stood by at the cliff on the l.'{est Coast Road. One
barely made it back due to a bad track.
14 October 1944 -- D plus Twenty-nine.
(a) Same one disabled in the hills. Four under repair. Switched
thrower from tractor with poor tracks into a serviceable one.
15 October 1944 -- D plus Thirty.
(a) One disabled in the hills. One p.llled down out of t he hills
where repair work Was begun to the regular maintenance area. Three
under repair.
(b) One reported to the First Battalion, Seventh Regiment by the Five
Sisters, and advanced over awful terrain, firing at the pitted rocky
ground and three caves, receiving sniper fire in return. The tracks
were badly damaged.
16 October 1944 -- D plus Thirty-one.
(a) A caterpillar tractor was finally able to get in and haul the dis-
abled tractor out of the hills. Japanese had shot and smashed at the
tractor, but did not harm the flame thrower to a great extent. Three
tractors under repair,
(b) Two units operated with the Third Battalion, J2lst Army Regiment.
One was sent in to the wrong target, didn't fire, and broke the final
drive on the way out. The other fired into two caves and reeeiyed
some light mortar and fire.
- 277 -
17 October 1944 - D plus Thirty-ty'o.
(a) Hauled broken dmm tractor in fro;'!l the hi Ils. Thr ee tractnrs under
repair. The tractor that had been bauled out of the h:' Es t.he cay 'r>e-
fore was surve:red, and the fla'"Je thr ower Vias transferr ed to another
tractor. Dar:lage to the flane thrower was repaired.
(b) One unit went up to the Second 3attalion J21st Regiment, but
could.n't eet up the h i ~ l and returned .
18 October 1944 '-- r plus Th irty-three.
(a) Two tractors under repair. One flC'l r.1e thrower was transferred from
the last tractor hauled in to a serviceable tractor.
(b) Three units reported to the 321st Regiment. The one wi th the First
Battalion in the northwest end of thevalle
J
r
bet l': een the Five Brothers
and "alt' s Ridge moved up to the top of a ridge and backed into position
to fire on the target. The flarne gun failed to fire cue t o a faulty re-
pair job and the unit returned. 'fl'ro units worked with the Second 13at-
talion near the same location. The first one went up a steep incline to
a rid.r,e, across a small valley, and fired one burst which failed to reach
the objec t ive hillside. A bulldozer then built a ramp up to a second
ridge. The unit then backed up this r a ~ p and advanced into a small poc-
ket firing into a cave, a ravine, and a hillside, receiving sniper fire
in return. A large amount of damage was done tl) the tracks by the ter-
"('ain. The second unit in turn advanced to the same firing platform and
burned brush off the hillside, burned out a small cave and shot the last
half of its load over a ridge into a small ravine , but failed to reach
the ,Japanese on the opposite slope.
- 278 -
19 October 1944 -- D plus Thirty-four.
(a) Two tractors under repair. One out of commission. 11'1 0 sta;yed in
the area.
(h) One unit stood by with the Second Battalion, J21st Regiment.
20 October 1944 -- D plus Thirty-five.
(a) Two tractors under repair. One Three units stayed in
area.
21 October 1944 -- D plus Thirty-six.
(a) All tractors stayed in the area. The flane thrower transferred
t hree tract ors, one of which was the damaged one, into three army
tract ors all of which were in better condition.
22 Jctober 1944 -- D plus Thirty-seven.
(a) 1'1'10 units stayed in the area.
(b) Four units operated with the J21st Regiment in the valley between
",'alt's Ridge and the !"ive Brothers. One went into the valley at noon
er.Jptyine its load into a ravi ne and eliminat.ing sniper fire. One stood
by at the he:td of the valley but dien't fire. ' A third spent the :norn-
ing i n the valley and fired inter!Tlittently into different caves, one of
whi ch was a hos pital cave and dr ove out six Japanese. Shrapnel wounded
one l'1an. The f ourth unit fire d hRoil a l oad into a cave in ' '[alt' s Ridge
t o cover demolition men anc
1
moved dorm to the foot of the valley. After
st:mdine b:' there for awhile they tried to come out and hit a s::J.all mine
"\'Ihich st opped the tractor, started a leak in the fla::le thr')Yfer I s high
':'1ress'J r e air-line, but hurt no one. The crew renderec the weapons in-
operative and left the unit there.
- ;n9 -
23 October 1944 - D plus Thirty-eight.
(' )
,8 One tractor stuck ~ n the valley. Two flame throvrers were trans-
ferred into other tractors and t hose and another unit stayed in the
area.
(b) Two uni ts worked in the valley with the J21st Regiment. One of
these followed the other in but didn't fire. Its final drive broke as
it returned to the area. The other went dOl'lTl the valley fror.l the north
end firine about half a load into four caves, one of which was a hos-
pital cave on Walt's Ridge about one quarter of the. way down the val-
ley. It advanced further but did no more firing. Its final drive also
broke when it reached t he main road back. The tractG'l' was to"!ed to the
area.
24 October 1944 -- D plus Thirty-nine.
(a) One tract or in valley. ~ r o under repair. Two units stayed in the
area.
(b) One burned out a sniper and set off some Japanese ammunition on
the east side of rJalt' s Ridge in hitting five caves. All under the
8Lspices of the J 21st Regimep. t. The range was fair so some more shoot-
ing was done for the benefit of a navy photographer.
25 October 1944 -- D plus Forty.
(a) One tractor in valley. Two under repair. Three units in area.
26 October 1944 -- D plus Forty-one.
(a) One tractor in valley. One under repair. Four in area.
- 280 -
Z7-?9 October 1944 -- D plus Forty-t.o to Forty-tour .
( a ) One tractor :i. n valley . :ive units in ar ea .
30 October 1944 - - plus Forty- five.
(a) Tractor in !!loved to its !!Ia1ntenance area and repair begun.
r'i ve units i n area .
31 Octol.:ler 191.1. - - D plus :,orty-six.
(a) One tractor under repair . Five in area .
1 Nover:tber 1944 - D pl us Forty_seven.
{a ) area to Scarlet Beach v.i.th the First Amphibian Tractor nat-
tal1 0n . Three units macie it successfully. Two broke final dr!. ves a8
s oon as they had started . One unit under repair .
2- 3 November 1944 -- D plus Forty-el.ght - Forty_nine .
(a) Three units under r epair . Thr ee in area .
4 Novenber 1944 - D plus Fifty.
(a) T.'I'o units under re pai r . Three in area.
(b) One unit r eported at 1200 to t.he Third :mttalion, J2lst Regiment
in the valley between the Fi ve and V.'aU ' 5 Ridge, firee into
two caves at the foot of t he Five Brothers, and then tried. t o fire into
a pocket half_way up the sa:::e cliff at two caves and one dugout. It
reached one cave, hut the steepness of t he cliff, ran r,e of the target,
and a prevented it the other two . gy shootine over
the top of the cliff it caught thr ee Japanese. The third quarter of
the fuel was poor caus1 ne leakage and fire .
- 281 -
5-8 )love:nber 1944 - 1:: plus Fifty-one to Fift;;r-four.
(a) Two units uneer repair. Four in area.
9 Nove:nber 1944 -- S pll.1s Fifty-five.
(a) The da'Yla ged fl.$l. ::le thrower (by land mine) Vias transferred int a a
tractor t o be ready to go aboard ship, and another flame thrower
was transferred fr om- a tract or under repair to a serviceable tractor.
!i'inal result: One unit secured; one under repair; four in the area.
10 November 1944 -- D plus Fifty-six.
( a) One secur erl . One under repair. Three in area.
(b) One unit reported to the Second Battalion, 323d Rep,i:nent and fired
into t he tVIO entrances to a C-3. ve at the f oot of Ol d Baldy. Killed
ei ght een Japanese, one of ,'{hom stag::;ered out on fire and "/as shot dov .. n.
'rhe r r ound yras searched f or mi. nE's and barbed ni r e Vias r er:l.ove d bef ore
:novinS in . The fu e l v.ra s Door causinG leakage ano f j, re.
11-12 1941. -- n plus .F ifty-seven and F' ifty-eight.
(a) One unit secured. Five in ar ea.
13 l! ove:nber 1944 - D plus Fifty-nine.
(a) One secured . Four in area.
(b) One unit repor ted to the Second Battalion, 323d Regiment at 0600 .
At 1000 after thr ee tanks ha d s pent three hml rs giving the walls the
works, the lmit waddled down into the bowl between the Five Brothers
and the Chinese I:all. Runn i ng the length of the valley, it fired into
about twenty Clwes. A Japanese soldier who tri ed to char ge the tractor
with, a box of explosives Vias split with a fifty cali ber machine gun.
- 282 -
For a while the crew was pinned down by sniper fire and ricochets frol'l
the army's counter-barrage of scall arms fire. The i Gnition system on
the fla!.'le thrower failed cue to a bullet cutting the ignition gas line.
A lot of drool causeC1 !lrC in the tractor.
(c) The '-wit Cili:l e out, wa s refueled 3.nd repaired, and re-entered the
vall e: ' again at 1230 , firin c:; int o a bout ten caves and three brush piles
bef or e pinned dmm <1iZain b:' a s niper a nd forced to Vii thCraw with
a quar t. er of a load left. Dr ove a lone eneI:\Y soldier Ollt of a cave on
f2re and shot him down.
1.4 1944 -- "[ plns Sixty.
(a) One unit secured . F:.ve in area.
15 November 1944 -- D plus
(a) Secured a ll units but one turning this one together with service
equi pment over to the Ar:n:
r

25 ;' ove'TIoe r 194/, -- D nlu s Seventy- one.
(a) Loaded all uni ts anc: eq
1
li IX:l8nt a board shi p that loaned
t o the Ar:ny.
28 jIT overr.r-er 1944 -- ;; 'Olus Sevent y-five.
( a) Loaded e'-luir:r.nen t l oaned t o ahoard s hip.
Tile unit s v'ere secured in prepara ti on for i m"ledi ate l oading
3.l]o<-i rd shi p ar: d de parture from Peleliu , but one unit and service equip.-
::;ent ,,'hich was turned over to the !\ r.:1y's 32Jd Regi ment in accordance
v'i t h an order fror:l the I slanO Command . fi n crew Was taut;ht to op.-
er a te, sRrvice, and repair the equ ip:r. ent. This crew :nade ahout twelve
0 -51-- 21
- 2.33 -
more up into the bowl between the Five Brothers and the Chinese
and another valley just to the west, shooting into caves and poc_
ket s directly and by radio guidance until the island Was secured on D
plus seventy-three .
NUMB!R OF A!.IPHIBIAN TRACTORS USED,
IM!BER OF TIllES FLA'IE THROr,rn WAS TRANS-
19 LVT(4) 's, 1 LVT( 2) and
1 LVT( l).
FERRED FRO!1 OIIE TRACTOR INTO ANOTHER: 17
NUMBER OF DA!S THAT TRACTORS
THROWFRS IN THEM SPENT IN MAINTENANCE, 113
NUl.!BEll OF TIMES THAT A TRACTOR BROKE
roV!N JUST AS A FLI!.\E THROIYEll UmT ViAS
1EAlJY TO MOVE IN ON A TARGET: 4
NU'.IBER OF LOADS FIRED BY THE FLAJ.\E THROl'ffilS: 50
APPROXB!ATE NUMBER OF CAVFS SHOT INTO: 100
NU!l9ER OF PIIJ...BOXES, DJGOOTS,
AND BLOCKHOUSES FIRED INTO, 25
APPROXIlIATE NU1!BER OF APEAS 9URliED OVER: 40
APPROXI!.IATE NUMBER OF AoW.!UNITI0N IIJI.!PS
=LODED: 8
APPROXIMATE NUl.IBER OF JArS KI LLED OR RUN
OUT INTO THE OP!'!>! : WELL OVER 300
NUMBER OF !!EN r/JUNDED AND EVACUATED: 9
NUMBER OF !!EN KILLED, 2
APP:;:)lDIX
DAY BY DAY LOG OF FLAME TANK OPERATI ONS
ON IWO JIMA
- 265 -
4
DAY BY DAY LOG OF ILAl-i:'J TA'\TK OP:<:hATI ONS
I JH1A
following acc ount b ee n 'Oieced fro" renortg of the
:td, 4th, And 5t':1 ::;":.rine DiviE;ions for the Two Jima oneration. st ory
reflects lnl tial lAc"" in thp of t Anks due to
'dth the new weanon on T' ."rt of bo th QT)erators ;:;.no sUT',TJorted infMtry,
laclc of snitable tp..!'p'et!'l, h,, <> u-y :'lnti-tA.n1r fir"" <mit of formulp, ted
t pctical doctrine for the use of tho flpme It reflects
c on tinually mountin{:: of, and enthusi e s::l for, t he fl p- me
rerl chine a climRx on th", final assl'tul ts on fl'Jna tically defended
arl'!fJ.S on the no'rth enCl. of Iwo ,.;her"! the Ipr,.,.'" scal" us", of o if" flame
throNers WA.S an of n", nrl y "vory action. And l"stly,
the story SrQ1..Ts of of cp:rp".<d gn, tho i n finite
of tho t actics were used, over and over aFain -
p .' the!!J", ""i tt nu:n'h<>rless s"12l1 vAri11.tions; R.!lc1 the do,.C"{"ed nersistence
c our 2" e of the thr t ',ron - ani<. of the !!J on thp..t lost, too.
F,s c L 1,!Ar i ne dlvi s i :J n inc orpo r s,ted f:!. t p. nk bA. tta l1on WAS g i'!fl n
pn corresponding t n number of the divisi on
( '2 .1'"., Btl: TFln": 5tl-. l'J"'rine Division). For con-
venience in reference, tal'll-: c o:;:;) P..nies ,He referred t') ':'J;V t he of
Te.nk Battalion 1"_110_ t he letter of the Cormany (e.e'., 115-Alt ref ers to
Coc.n any "A", 5t h Tenlr Ba tta lion, 5t}-. i;F rin'! Divisi on).
D-Day (l S Feb 1945). At H p lus ".5 , 5-A l And ed. 1,.,i th hro fl p..me t8!1ks
p t Fed :i3ee.ch. It Wl'i s planned to h::we them follo l.' 50 yp.rds behind reFUI Dr
of oY1Dortunity. On" f18me tr.nk (YT) w:c s knocked
ou t t: mo rtp..r fire, the 0 ther f ollowed th"l te.nrs t o Airfield #1, but d. id
not fire t hnt ciay. La te in the afternoon 5-C got p.shore with two fl ame
tanks, but di d no firinl'" . Tho beach wps under h ",avy artillery Rna morte.r
fire, but ",ost of the J ep:mss e emnlacements in the i"1medi a te vicInity of
th", oeA.chhep(\ h",d been knoclred out by f';un fire, and the fl'lllle
throwe-s could not more distant
At least \to of the 4th Mp..rine Di vi si on fl"me t p. nV::s fO t asho;" P.t
Yellow 'Pe r cr: [' no their ' ,ey to the #1 Airfield "" here severpl D i1l-
boxes were fl e m"d e nd out.
of the C';;' S in the !'iddle Fe-.cifie, TTol. IV, AnneY- llc3,
np. 5 -30.
- 286 ..
D ,",lus 1. A f1prne 5-A usqd for MG firq tut no
.. c.ue to lac"':" of sui tB-n1"! terro.ts p-nrr f, o.nerql i nex-
5-A' s nut out of
pcti ,)n' on D-1),<>;' , I"r' s pnd SF'nt m:, to tho. 1i1".
o
. } TO :l"me
pcti on \0[<"'5 r.,no'!"t"!d fr ol1 o thor unitR.
D TIlus 2 . A big FT fro.m 5-C I'-I" S sent out, "t hrou,t"hout
the very "!ffectiv9 use l1Pde of tho flam"! t ank a t the ba se
of Suribachi." Anot r. eT :'S -C t"'n
1r
fb::1 "' cl n illboxe s by th o n Air-
f iel d. 5-A's flAme bivouac.
D n lus 3. rAin on tho. cinder terrain t an
1r
On.,ra-
t ions di f ficult to iMnossi'hle. 5-C sent 2 flll!!!" tp. n": to burn out a
stubbo rn bo::ind n . ., lines, Jut the trn1r bOP' f ed dOIm.
Ar: ot'-',or f l l>:11
o
t , nl<: \" P'S : orcod C;V hl1.nr:i
n
;, r,-,in to senc9. ;-> vo lunt.,er
ont sir. e under rJ' Avy n r'" to t "n
1r
s ",,'": 11<:> the:,r bA.cV:od out of
defllpded u OC1re t at the of Surlbr chi. 5-A sent two fleme
tof-? s"ctor, where they were 150 to the r ep r of
'Jther :; ne usod on];' for firo SU'1"o rt.
TI 4. I'l c,""o f r o"'1 5-C othor tpn,<-s in ",onr,ing
1"1 the bes'" of th" prep; . !'i-A t"n"s in bivouac.
D "'lu\'. r-,
(' 01u'1'1n of '-, 'l Id.rstrir, .i,;?,
C'n '-'no infr>n try, h'lt
I"l i n",s ,">ne one:'1Y AT f i. re, !" 1"r1
R-A s "'n t tho. of p
}'ut no ',' J.'''::. '..ls on. <;-r; c,ltrnortec.
lost s ov",n t"'n '.rc: in "'FI f pn hour to
fore on to th.drAv.
T) ..., 1'1': ? .S- C s "n t t,, !) fl ,c . ..,,, t"n
1
,: :"nn t on tpn
h
, to
fir e on th
n
inf"ntry. In fF'nt ry
t :' r pots, r,1.ll'-'r t"nv-s C!)"Or" c t.!:"") \"ith 75mM fire, pnn
fl <'>".1" t " n''''" in "'!'}r1. hurn"'c1. 0
1
1 t tho Tin"lly t;"n
1
,.s drew
s o 'me": firn th;:, t t h oy "''''r
o
vi tr,c'\ rp"T!1 ::->t ro('uest o f the
inf": ntr;,!. !'i - ll-' t"n
1
,..c, rn"""ino(l i:1 '\-,ivouf1c .
'Ry th", "nel ') f \.'o.n '''' of tl-, o fl ? "!1
o
t"'nlr On" r,,-
t or s F' '\..It .'1,)-::' 0 ,', c"usto'!''''c. to t '. oir 11 "" ' "' eanons, and
the i r:.fantr: - \-.. :- , .. : : .... coul ct. do .
'. ,=c :,r.i qu'" :or t ". :; f l ".'l," tC:'.':S ir' c O:-,,,; :l.l1C ti on \.'i tl: ot:cc r
.. cL.rif:.' i :i, i ', t:.'" L <-l t of t.:-:
o
C'T''' cial t qrr [; in c:11.,raC-
t "' l'is Lics i'.n e t::':) ti;c "nn.:n:;'
ta:1. !<'s . .J t:-:
c
li ""':':; s . ::-:" on tt n line ": it!;
:, ';c. fl [-".:: ,,,:ri '. ill ,J oxes t'c "Y'l tl;y fo r
- 287
5-0' s t tlO flp:?1 "! tanks " ore p tt?c::
O
(:" to 5-]3 :or en att r c k on
h.irfipl d #'.'. I n tho s \' ::Jrcls , "Oo .. B
out 2 emf'] 3.:. A'l' f"l.l:L "' - ic;-. e l so
'burn od. r;' l t. ',:", cr css"ri it" Ai r-;or t ': it". v," r y 1i oY' ', oeiti on . As
\ ,'12 t: ot s i ::'e " ' S b ef' an to t ot ", P" "' t deal of mo r t ' r fi r e ,
e l so t":n i-::2nt ry :-J'." V;' resi s t !',r: c" It! ", ':urned SOY =; CBv es C-.'1:::'
shrt'.c"nery out . II
D '" l us 10 . (1 l'licrc; : 1 :::-45) . c - A ef">:1t 0--...;.'0 t',' G t:->'1.': s , '1
n
U
1
1or
of tti ct fi r e d . On e W2S by int o a s hell nnd
to be out by r (079r.
5-C' ::, r: c t ior: r '?'; or'v 1'0:: th" S' 0';/ S S0 ')9 of t he d iff i c ulties
of the ficht-inf, . At a uout 0 84') t ''ln t ,) O FTs :no ved
Ollt in of Lt 2- '')3 ("" G. :a, ' t l: r.Ii on Lrnding 22 t ',. l:;;r i ne
He:::', ilil 9nta l C')r:1Ja t :ee",-;-), .:"nc. took UTl [ . "osi ti on fr o!-, w}',ich they I') l a ced
fire 0;: tl:e cliffs 2n d. Li{"h g r ou..l1d to :'1-: " :,0": t. On four occ['si cJns i n
t t e rni n{: ve r y e f f e c t i v e use ' ,' 2 S rr:[ 0 o :i the ::-1 tEU1'<: S. '1:';:,"n : ,E'rl
\: er e to sU"'Q ort t r oo:', c c-ossi "'If' : f12t ,': r ouncl to ih:, T',' of FiJI
;'62. l C:'.J.J the infa ntry occ'..ln i ocG. :h", c li ff ;", nc. g r o'C-'ld to tr.e
fron t 2.nu ve re d. i ggin[; i n . 'l'here re:nained t he ::-: o,)"o i nf: up of a r 'J.c;e; ecl
eTec i n the ri t;ht sect or h':--, i ch h nd o e<>fl o.-" rlier. f I nme
t ank s s:ood. sl i g h tl i t o the r e ., r of r ec'-";u l.s.r th? Eri n," .
Then o n
a
tri ed to Je tt e r i te osit i on , boefe d to the bnl 1y
i ::, soft c ov er:' n." :. e.--:19 1 oce".1 "' n t . The i "l me <U ,, t,:, [-' r ca
c Q;itni !1ec. <"n esti::1e t eo. Z-''J to .<:; ) J c:?iwe se, so-ne i!1 R c :- ve not 10 f ee t
t he tank. bOi .g e e. 'lot fi r e i n t o :.ho c<v e ,
no r o t', or tnn ::s ',',' i Li', f l F t ec toY':" "9",'ons . 'Jr.," J 2:pe.ne s-? s\,: FC' n ?c'.
t:--, e c 2. ve , fe,ounted t h " V,n', out t:;e :) eri sG:Y'I e, Cl nd. n. t te::r.--'ted
9 sa ;" cr,el cr- c r'-- s . : d. :1
'r
s S '3:1 t in . '.Ii tt t!:.p :f ir t,t
f ir e !\o f or cover in s t el l toles, f l nrne
{:un::e r spi d , "t r.ere i s .,.;1--er " t"l;e:J' :lo,t t he i r d oo'Tl wi t h our flsm"!'."
Ir..fan try refu sed to th'J 7 ', ne o f nction , so Ft t ::cn' -
wi t:c n, mer.. fr om o t h '? r t r n
1
-::s eli S.'!loun t <:>d . s Ii t tIe grQU;; fOll(': l". t
'Ni t::. s"lall a r ms themselves d.i rec ted n ro tocted thp. fI ;;mo,
whil e it ;; 01lred fl e,In '? on st rongDoi n ts. Th";,' we r o, j oi n ed sr' ortly by
i'1fan t. r y, t\ nd t Ile F' re:.l. ':I n.s 'Tlo;)n eu. u:
n

4th l-1"".r-ine Divi sion t",n',:s end f1<:).2e t?,r. '<:s lvd. 'i ee"1 little used
t hu s fI".r in tho, c e.r:'!''J1:liC; n U"\.le t o terr e.in. HO """
TO
r,
on t>li S C,ClY, t pnks and. fli:'::1'? t ,<--n'<: s fi re c.l 800 gallons of fuel and Over
600 7 5,1'1 s!:."' ll s at ? !i"' rtic'.ll p. rlj" t0115h 1 0Ceted on tOD o f
q cliff. then the resis t a nce wa s n ot des troyo, d.
D -0 1 1.15 11. f) -A t .<>n> s r i n b i vonae . F1 A.:Tlr:; \-,'i th
- 288 -
although we tried to rep,ch them. Evidently the air got too hot for
the Nips so several left their dugouts to meet HG fire from three
tanks. If For the most :oart firing to the front WP.s conducted on c aves
a nd p robable enemy posi tions from a stationary p osi tion. Fla.ming
usually followed blasting of 'Ni th the 755 on the regular tanks.
The blockhouse and cliff in front of the 4t h MArine Division
sector continued to give trouble. In extremely fi ghti ng the
day we s spent in reducing caves a nd pillboxes in f ace of the cliff.
4-A flame tanks fired over 1000 gallons of bla.zing fuel in to the cliff-
top blockhouse. This blockhou se appeared to be uninhabited directly
after the atta ck. but w[' s apparently connec t ed to a subterranean pas sage ,
as it was reoccupied some"lhat later by the enemy. Flame tanks attached
to 4-B fired 500 gA.llons of fuel on fortific a tions in their area.
D plus 12. Nine regular tanks and h l o flame tank s from 5-A moved
out at 0735, the flame tanks forming a rear mobile reserve to be on
call whenever needed. The infantry hDd become so accustomed t o flame
support that they c alled frequently for the big flame throwers. The
first call wa s to burn out a by-passed 'Pocket, which we; ", done with the
two flal'Tle tanks fi ring si mul t a n<>ously. FTs returned for refill s a nd. re-
joined 5-A. F.ach flame tank fired a second fuel load in to a second
maze of i nterlocki ns cave s and n illboxes On high ground, refuelled, and
returned. At dusk enemy infiltrators drifted through the front lines
toward a central loca tion, p os s ibly mountinf" f or a counterattack, and
firing on the r ear of troops. Both flame tanks closed in end
sprayed the area wi th re, de stroying all resi stAnce 'and killing the
entire enemy g roup.
A 5-0 flame tank attached to 5-B wa.s used to fire a n e rtillery
po si tion previously bla!?ted \On th 75s, and then moved "a lo ng the sides
of the road leRding to Ki t a to burn out caves a nd pillboxes. The
Japanese frequently broke fro:n hiding and ran, some tib es in fl Hmes fro:n
the flame tank. II Flame was al so used to support cap ture of a cli ff
and high ground by the infantry .
4th Marine Division assaults on thB rugged cliff a nd hi gh rock
positions took place under constant mortar, MG, a nd rifl e f ire. "Tanks
and , fl ame thro\.rer tanks coul d be r otten in to p ositions onl y with the
greatest difficulty and could fir e e ffectively only on a few emp lace-
ments. II A dozer tank made a road along which flame tanks a,dva nced to
fire the .,alne cliff-top block.'1ouse tha.t had defied previ ous efforts to
knock it out with and HE. 500 gallons of napalm were fired into
the fortifice. tion. 4-C
t
s fl.'?me tanks were u s ed to adVAntage in close
support missions around Turkey Knob .
D plus 13. Flame tanks from 5-A were a s si gned to 5-B. Cliffs,
caves, M (l ravines protecting snipers were burned, wi th some d_oubt as
to effectiveness of the fire.
- 289 -
5-B t s nks und flame repeated the performAnce of D nlus 12.
Th'9 infAntry b d f a ll en back from r.i gh to low ground. and the a rmored
mis s ion w,"'.s to of the high ground. ':lith two platoons
of t ,q nks, ea ch v: i th a fl ame tanlr, a p Ointblank 75mm wa s laid
on t he obj ecti ve. Then the flame t anks !lloved up and each F1' sp<9nt t \'JO
complete loe.cis of flame fuel to burn out the Japanese who remained.
Then the infA. ntry moved in and tried to secure themselves against count"lr-
attack. as th"l Y bF.d done the day before.
5-C t hrowAr t a nks mopP<9d up pockets behind the lines wi th
fl p..me. Then t Anks, clos ely follo ... red by flame tanks and infantry. spe!'l r-
hea ded art assAult Ftcross 300 ya.rds of O'gen g r ound, t e n
1
(" s firing as they
1t.'ent. Reaching hi ,,,,h gr ound , the t anks a n 0. flame tpnks swept the front
And flanks Itri th fl pJIle. MG, an n 75m!!) fire, destroying mortar emplacements
2. l a rge number of enemy in the a.rea who ann eared to ha ve been pre-
pari nG for a coun terA. ttack.
In the 4th 14prine Di vi sion sector, t "lnks a nd flame were used
in a drive 1)F! r p, ll"ll to a series of rocky corridors. Flmne t hr o
1
,'er tanks
an
r
' demoli tion s here proved of v"l lue th"n I?-.ny 0 ther 8f:a.in st
tunnel fortifications.
D "Olus 14. 5-A t anks and t i') O fl ame tanks moved out ... !1 th infantry
guides f a mili a r It ,i th the terrain. Th"l flame t anks werC\ ab1"3 to advpnce
and blast fuel p.. t close r p, nt'! e into and rocky emplacements in
enemy p ersonnel "rere visi ble. FTs r e turn"!d for refuelling an d an enemy
AT gun o1')ened un . conmlet<lly destroying the regular tank and several
trucks. This gun prevented further flame tank at the front.
On the way to bivouac a tank WA S seriously dPmar.ed by a tape-
mea sure mine l a id over: h ro 5 or 6 inch shell s, and had to be aband.oned.
One man in the tank was burned.
tanks and flame t a nks advanced into thP sector of the pre-
vious day to fi nd thAt duri ng the ni r;ht the hAd again been
forc ed to abandon t he ground. The da.y \o{[>, s "almost an exact dupli-
c a te of the pr eceding day . The same tanks . the same units, the s ame
situation, the s ame objective and the s PJIle results." Flame t anks r e-
turned to 5-C, :noved in to Ni shi and mOpped U""l an a r ea in the repr of our
fron t lines.
Four tanks and t wo flame tanks fro,., 4-A the da y \vorki ng
over a by-passed pocket,destroying caves And nillboxes And exoending
over ,1500 gallons of napal m fuel. A l ar ge nUlnber of snip e rs were
clee red out ,lith fl ame . 4-C flame tan ks continued t o sutJ'Dort as sault
uni ts around Turlrey Knob.
D nlus 15 (6 I-1a r 1945)
up .s nd. fl runed in the gen"lr a l
flgoo d r e sults" but no action
bivOUFtc.
The undFmAged tank from 5-A moved
area of the previous day , \-,1 th reported
5-C fl ame remained in
.. .290.-
4th Div tC'.nks co'\tirm"!d to ::lo-n up tho, pocket on
previous blasting C:::.Vo,5 und pillboxes. One flallo, U ,.n1l:, .q
tAnk, and a dozer ten', wo,re knocl-:ed out mines.
D ulus 16. 5-A its only ou o,rationRl flAme tRnk to 5-B, and
it was "used with good effect on cliffs that
Gunfire p..nd flNlle t horo'J.r.rl;1' 'o l p.stcd the &r o, " , 1"n')c ki nt' ou t a stub'born
of enemy l>lGs, and. the i " f !1 ntr;y ''l oved in a ft " r t hem.
Four rebUlar t p. nl(s from 5-C i n to a d.rr-; ,: p revi:)Usly
by Ma.rines, ,,!hero. they ene!'1y 11o sitions on the f ar siete .hn
enemy coastal gun hi f' h in thp- cli ff in tU s area s do,stroyed [cnd. ene'7lY
personnel of Gun were observed evp.cuatinr ty an exi t nearl;y150
Y2rds back of the bun a nd at tho ba se of t ho clif!. From tho.
an infantry ce.ll for flame t a nks, Rnd h ro of th"lse lu.TJ1bered up f'.nd
fl ame 2.long the face of the cliff. NUl!!erous enel':ly po,rsonnel c P .. me out
and were destroY"ld by the t a nks. mDjority of resi sta r:ce in this
locality was knocked out, though ""E S still 8;:)T) Arent when
tanks flame tenks pulled out. Eno,my in the areI' . .... ere l e ft. in ' i so-
l A ted 7) ockets end infnn try were t1.ble tl) :: c..v"::ce U7) to 10') y ;::rds beyond
the hef'.vy cO<1stnl gun.
In the 4th n"" r Di v S<;'ctor fl l'l.!l1!' t ""l ks .... ' erq u s ?<l i!1 r:1oy)"1 i nr C" VO E
[' r.d concrete errmlaceT!1ents 8!'ld in slo1.)ly cl rivinp' ,) nc
l
., tho '}n","w on t ho
ri p.' ht fl pnk. One fl lC.r.1t> tan1( WA S knoc'ced out ty a nin<>.
D nlus 17. 5-A re1J e.ired. one fl e:ne tank . 5-C ou t 11 tanks
and two fl Rr.1 e tanks, but t heBe slowl y a 9 t h", clp'r-
inr: rOone. of were u nc ",r h epvy sni T) "lr fi ro. Lr t<> r i."l t he :1<"...,'.
8 fl ame mo"eo. un to thf' front, fir ed h", lf e 10.c;.cL 0:" n:1.1J <>1.., , and
struc k a min'" in a sUT)T) osedly c le,"; "ed areA, ,:)Utti n
c
i t out o f act.i on
for three days.
4th Divi sion cO"ltinued to out t ho of
the urevious dRY , a nd a l Eo f1emec t :- rret s fOT' '''r r . . -., -1' ' noh . A
'?t ti !:o "! ",1- 1
o
t::1: f ill<.> d. \" i th ::."-c:a l "1 t "'pou,,, h
directl:; c etdnd a te.nk. Fl a mi :1;' n8'laL:! '."<' <; e. ll over t he
tank, setting it on fire. '!'he crew eVe. c.le.tec. , i:J.ove vs r,
E: nd p ut out the fire with a ::orta hl"l C02 exti nF,ui shqr. ;' 0 c:.' 8'.18. 1 ti es
or sisnifican t da!llp. " c to tte t 2.nk occurred.
D ulus 18. 5-A.' s op er8.ti on;::1 flB"l e :=1- :'3 in
clAE:ri n[ a of resists.nee in tr. e Ji r.e s . A :i l "'n t o 2. t t
o
ek in
two with flp.me t ank s, an a. irf2. ntr y \";, 5 d9 f 8r:.tec. b:: d-if-
ficult t erra in to the front and oc eu'i1 i c,,1
p dr e.u , \<lnich, thickly wooded, v.'e.s no' . .' c ': oke d '.:i t r. a of
foliaGe 2nd s tu:-np s 10-15 feet hi eh . Thi 5 cau s ec: l.' '-lr s t!? o f
sh!=!lls fir ec. !3 t t he far si de Gf t he c.r P. \." "rich fo r -: eo. t:-,,,. .l,?[,.rt of
the defensi ve The d07er t hrew n tra e k to
- ::an-
throueh a te.nk rOAd, end tAnks snd flame tanks could only push ahead
50 yprds to blast and. flame targets. A Je:panese satchel charge dis-
abled tank.
One 5-0 flame tank moved up 'tTi th regular tanks I but an action
renort is not 8vailable.
4th Mc.rine Di vi sion fleme tanks were used in the sp..me area as
on the previous day.
D 'plus 19. Severp.l 5-A t ;:;. nks and a flame tank moved forward, but
few into action at the front. One WPB destroyed by a
s1.,-tchel charGe, two more tanks were d2mag ed by mines, Bnd 0 thers were
unable to attack "'hen the dozer bec8:!l e bellied do .. m in the only path
of The tank destroyed by a satchel chp.rge was set on fire
Rnd burned out by the flame tan
1
,: , but not un til the tA.nk commander
h e d stuc',: l)y the g'uns to fire every remaining round of aEl!lluni tion at
the enemy.
5-B tenks tried to comnlete 5-A's mission by a ne ... , route. A flame
te.nk was able to ad.vance and destroy some of the closer pOints of re-
si st.s. nce.
5-0 tanks and a flame tank were placed in support of infantry,
more for mOrf,.le purposes than anything else, since the terrain pro-
hi ti ted a d. vance and sui table targets were lacking.
D "Olus 20. (11 March 1945). ' 5-A- loaned its repaired flaI!1e tank
to 5-] to help out a Docket of resist.ance. Inftmtry guides did
not knOlt, ",hereto guide tanks but tank liaison personnel were provided,
and ilmr-king 11 ::eral USe of the tank on all areas capable of ha.r-
boring resistance and \,Tithin its range, the tanks advanced the infantry
some 80 yp.rds in to nocket, destroying pillboxes, empla.cements, and
One blockhouse. It The FT commander renorted, "Several eno.my tried to
atte.ck F-l (the fl?me tank) with charges and threw several grenades at
tank, hov;ever wi th tho. nrotection of other tanks and our own flame,
enemy did not succeed in dOing ha rm to us. Heavy casualties were in-
flicted on enemy by flame in thl s area. It Flame tpnks then moved 50
yards North of RJ 322 and fired onto the reverse slope of Hill 357,
enablinr the infantry to advance to that point. One tank was damaged
by a mine composed of picric acid blocks over a yardstick mine which
in turn layover a buried 100-1'0 aerial bomb.
D plus 21. 5-A Cl.F:fl.in loan"ld its flam"l tank to 5-B. This tank
W[1.S used "wi th very good effec t on enemy per sonnel. Heavy casual ties
were inflicted on the enemy by flarne p..nd mac'nine gun fire." The t!?nk
turned around and shortly caught on fire, though it did not to
ha.ve oeen hi t. All occunants were eVllcuated safely but the tank was
destroyed.
- 292 ..
A..'10ther p latoon of froM 5-B, .. . 1. th two tElnks a tt A. ch"'d
from 5-C, sUp::J orted a drive in the a reA in w'>1.ich t 2.:1. !: \,.'p s
and destroyed on D p lus 19. This ti m
o
c. dozer s t c.rted a road directly
in front of the dise bled t 2nv.:. tiThe method of attack, much reneated,
wa s ' to doze a short dist pnce, ;nove the fl ,qr:l9 t prl l{ in, burn out all the
resist .snce it c ould r"' <' ch, 3r.d n '..11 1 it out arp in so th", dozer could
r esurll"" its road buil di ng . This W8S interrupte d when the Jap anese threw
a shaDed c harge at t he dozer, disaolirv it for t,,!O hours or so .... 'fl'hen
the dozer WA S returned to action, P W2 S started toward the sea,
and the at t a ck re sumed . The tank dozer a nd the flame tank were the
principals in this action, the other tanks sitting back to cover them,
8nd to fire on t argets of oTlportunity. The advance wps very slow,
pr oxi ;nity of our troo!,s limiting us"" of our tank guns, 'but the infantry
in movinc forv'prd. Vost resist Ance WP.S it'! CE. Ves ?_nd sp ider
hole s. II
5-C sen t out tRnks which were jOined 'by a tanv::, but
r e.in soft kent the'1 roadbound ..... ith little action. Some
were 'burned 01i t, 'but most tocr gets were 'beyond reach of th!:'!
fl pm",
4th Div f L?m"! t pnks in to dr pws 2nd. cliffs "Torth of
Beach Roe.d in 113 4 'I and 185 P. Fl ame W8S e ffective but not 1" 11 tprg: ets
could 'b8 re[' ched by ei or 75mm shell s. T,,'o fl DIne thrower
tanks were loaned t o the 5th !!ar Di v's 5th Tank :Bn, A, S r:1 0 st of th!:'!
4th Div s""ctor consisted of t'O'rrain impassable to t Anks. (It mC'.y
be not8d , however, the 4th Mpr Div made very extensi ve of
fl ame tr.r owe::- s 1n the assaul t and un of thi s

D plus 22. 5-A tank s operated in the same area of stu'bborn 09"')0-
6i t ion as th8 p revious day. On tho. ri /,,:ht "frontal adVAnce WC'.S limi ted,
but bood firin", p ositions were o'bt a ined and results ,'.'ere s et i sfac tory."
On left, "t r-,,?- doze r w:? s u sed to good advRntag e (l nd. g pO-ined
40 YB.r ds . It W8 D withdrF_"m Hnd a flame tank WA S COr.l"'itted. As it
entered e. J 3.TJ threw a sA, tchel cha r (':f> under tho? of th'l t Anlr [;,n<:1 i t
expl oded .lith gree.t fo rce, dl1"'1ar-inr the snp- ine. The fl all e tent com-
pleted its mis s ion, p,nd withdre\<.' under its o ... m p Ol"er." Afto.r going
",,'bout 50 YRrds the cauE;ht f ire. TMk was abandoned a nd rescued
later in the d.s.;J 8nd. a new enf ine w,?s ins talled. flame t 8nk
fire on t hi s r:1 is sion wo e dir ected b:, infent ry ;:;ui des, \.;":11e inf[',n try
trooDs ::SD t 1.IO small ar!:',s fire. Troop s were ['.ole to gain 75 YRrds in
sect or.
5-R t a nks and a flame t ank continued to attRck the a reR of the
previ ous day . Led by a tMV:: dozer they ettacked e.t 073() . lilt ,,' 8 S
nossi'ble to sp ot the t-!G e..nd mo rtar nositions holclinf" i nf2ntry .
:EJ' 'blowinf UD all such Dositions , and 'burning out every aCC e ss
- 293 ..
end no ssible e'llDresure or p18.c'?, t8nb::s lQr,>ne ""ed to n"!utrpl1ze
resistc>1!c"! 2nd p"rr.1it inft'.ntry to 2.dv!'nce . ',ih"ln trcis ', ;I: S
cold by a 25-foot dron-off to 2. "') lat'?!O.u ben,?-pth, a rORd \':'IS
dozed Over the cliff." An d flAme advpnced down rORe.
and the infantry ha d moved onto the p late0u when tanks were rel<>3sed
at 1630.
5-C tanks, a dozer, and a. name tank "forked over a rid,'Ce that
hed held up the infantry for four da.ys. Co:nbined acUon resulted in
a 300 yard advance And seizure of the
work:
i ty.
The
4t :. ga r Di v used t!my:s and a fl a.me b .n 1<: \" i t'l an ass:=ml t teAm "to
over a c nve entrance Where GeOr?A noted some enemy ectiv-
T.,o enemy soldters r?n out of th". r,.nd ri fle r:1 en shot t he"1.
cave we S \; 1"11 ;,'orked over 'by the kmks and flame thro""erf\."
out
was
made
fro;"'
t hi s
from
In 2.Ilothsr 4tL Mar D1 v area ItA flame thrower tank wpc to us"d
the d.ay to sU'Dp ort the attack of BLT-2-25, fir1nr; up the drn",s it
able to re2 ch from the beech roed .. " ".'hen the flame thrower t0nk
its final run of the dey and :1 red un one of the d.raws inl a. nd
the 'ceo>ch road., i t a l " rge nu.-rn"c'8r of ene.my in the Onen. Of
f:r o'ln of '?nerny at le" st 75 'oy the fl ? rnA 2nd n"- fire
the 8.n d hy : ire of B1T-l-?5 , th":'y r E: n ou t of the dra\-l."
D Ul ' l S ?:Z . 5-A's flp..:ne \l1f'S h':!ld in cut not used
p..1l day. di d. n0t g et a ch.ance to fire, due to neces sity of dozin,::
t wo roads off a cliff to t he front, of e. rn inefi"ll d , e n d. he:::ory
enemy AT a nd small ar".,s fire. In the a rea of L'" 1-?-7 a colur.J.n of tnnl>;:s
and the sAcond fl eme led by dozer f orwRrd. One t 2nk was
lost to a buried fl,eripI 00"11::. "Tl1n'-cs 'Dushed across a sme.ll riGr e line,
into a denression, which seeT1'led to be a JaD CP or area .
Ce.ves, S")ider tr ;:>7)s, and spotted tr. f' a re;:> . . The thro
"
ler
t El nl,: WPS broUP'ht UYJ, bur ned out t his arep.., r"fueled a nd returned af?in .
At lep.st six lo r.-d s flpme '-"ere used "Ii LT 1-27 thi s day. Our tanlr
dozer an arm A.no hn d to "'i thdr p.. w for renA-irs. The f! [' ve t he
infantry overhead fire su-::")or t \,hile tho d07.er "'''.8 out. Atternnts to
find e.venues of adv e.nee ,o!hich did. not re nuire dozi"'f' ,,'ere fru:1 tIes s "
5-C tanks a nd e. fla!TI8 t.ank su...,:; ort ,? d l ,T' s 1-28 c, ncl 2-28. The
FT "h8.n n shErped cherp- e 'DIP-ced o,-,i t. between the turret p.nd ril"ht
snonson, '''hi ch blew p ho I", throur- h ths d. ec" of the t2.nk." s cpused
three c 2. sual ti es, rmd th", t o> n": "f Pc " te!"T':orarily out 0 f 2.cti on.
The los t a throurh Rn enemy
4t h :it=\r Div continued to use fl pm" tpnks throuO"hout the dAY
in burning frOM t he r ORd.
Div borroloJed [> c ou." le of fl pme t a. n',:s fr om 5th Div for
mODDing un p nocket of resist pnce.
D Dlus 24 . 5-A's fl -"m" t"n
1r
, "r' S "use d ,d th ver-y -"'"ood effect on
_ _
e!!Tplaced '!'lnemy in. cliffe." ann out efter
a thorough poundinl' from the 755 0 f the
"SeverRl "Dockets of JffOS were burned out with tank (from
and considerable fire sunport WAS goi yen th", infAntry. LR ter the flame
was to mOpping up gr ound taken by LT 1-27 tho. preceding
day. Working closely with engineers. this job was done .... "
flame tank moved to the front but the FT rep ort ed.
".Acti vi ty Waa rather light. Used only one half loa.d of II
The 4th MrH Div began secUTinp: to lo.ave the island. Tv,ro flame
tanks were left wi th the 5t':l Tank Bn . Two others still supn or t ed re-
maining 4th Mar Div acti on.
3rd Mar Div again borrowed a flams tank for mopping-up
and "used it to excellent advantage."
D plus 25. (1 6 Mar 45). 5-A's flame tank was held in readiness
but no t used.
5-]1 s flame t a...l'lk cooper a ted 1; li th H tank dozer in ma:dng and clear-
ing out a ro a d over very rough terrain. JBn anese threw a number of gre-
nades at the dozer. but no damage dona. The dozer would make 2.0
yards of road, and the flame tank would come up and fhune the area. then
the dozer would continue the road for another short space. con-
tinued acro s s the draw till the dozer blade Was blown . off by a buried
aerial bomb. The flame tank: moved t o the left flank and was flaming
a ridge when it was hi t in the final drive by a shell from aU. S. t ank
abandoned by our troops two day s "befo Te . A. r egular tank covering the
flame tank knocked out the in the tank.
The 4tt Mar Div continue.d except f or the.
and a few reguh.r tanks. The tanks rema i ned at the fro '1 t, sup-
porting LT :;';';24 and ROT 25. After organized enemy resistance hAd ceased
at 1500. however, IIi t WI1 S nece ssnry to call back one flame thrower and
one medium tank to neutra lize one cave in zone of ]LT 3-25. This
cave had previousl;r been tA.ken, but when engineers att errm ted to blow it
closed. they were t aken under fire. The cave wes finally blown shut
at 1800 after a road had been "bulldozed to wit hin 50 yards of the cave
and the tank had. fired nap a lm into the mouth of the cave. II
The 3rd Ma r Div launched attack at 0840, An d
by 1000 the flank hpd 2dvanced. 100 y&rds under i ntense sniper fire
and in d. ividual suicide attacks. Japanese ran i:1to groups of U.S. In-
fantry and tanks with demoliti on cha r ges Rnd grenades. and flame
tanks, borrowed from the 4th a nd 5th M2T Divs. offere<l excellent sup'J ort.
aft er which the right flank wa s abl e to advance 200 ya rds against li ght
opLi osi tion. Shortly after noon the rir;ht assaul t company re" ched the
coa.t at TA 251 I. The island Vas declared secured this day. but the
mopping up of fairly good sized pockets of well resistRnce
etill presented a task to the Marines.
D plus 26. 5-A reported that one flam0 tanK "':!orked overtime today.
Oonnd..erable casualties were inflicted on enemy by flame. II
The commander of 5-B's flame tank wrote. "We moved out to the North
elope of Hill 165 burned out an area of caves. Had tank cover-
ing me. which I didn't like. II (When possible at least two tanks vere
used to provide covering fire.) "The dozer had made a road to the base
of a ravine that had been holding up the infantry. We burned out the
ravine and the infantr;y moved on up and covered the area. vie wi thdrew
and were not called back tha t day. 4'
5-C tanks stood by.
4th Mar Div turned over one flame tank to the 3rd Mar Div.
D plus 27. 5-A's flame tank was used "continuously" but further
action details are not
5-B's flame tank worked on the left of Hill 105. The tank
records the action: "Jvioved out. .. about 200 y:'l. rds to the )Torth of where
we burned out an a rea on D plus 26. The flame tank dumped one load of
glop in th0 up1) er end of the c.raw to our left front. Refueled ;::nd re-
turned and stood by. A.t about 1100 cP.ll C8:ne to go back: and burn a draw
with Caves to our rear. I took: the flame tank to the
place and. was met by two infantry guides. I got out of the tank and w0nt
with them and they showed me the area to be burned. Then went to the
tank and Got in position so I could fire directly into the caves. Then
could not get permiSSion to fire. II About 1500 the tank withdrew. At
1700 another flame tank advanced and burned out the caves from the same
posi tion.
5-0 flame tank stood by but did not fire.
The 4th Mar Div finished embarking. l eaving the two flame tanks on
loan to the 5th Tank Bn with that outfit, and giving tank
to the 3rd Mar Div. This left the 5th Mar Div with five operational flame
tanks, and the 3rd l>1 o,r Div wi th one good and one. d8.maged flame tank.
D plus 28. By this date, organized rel5iste.nce on 1wo Jima had
been confined to a fair sized irregular pocket on the NOrthern end of
the island , which had stubbornly resisted. U.S. troo"l')s for some days.
P'lame tanks were, and h2d been for the 1:' st few days. operating from
a pool, and were at.tached where ;nost needed. Nearly all flame tanks
were more or les s continuously. Such action revort. 88
are available fOllow:
- 29'6 -
One flame supporting 5-A reported, "Dozer dozed a road
to floor of draw ve had burfted the mouth of on D plus 27. During the
day I dumped f1 ve loads of flame fuel on thi s valley floor and cli fie
on its sides. Saw several Nips and the infantry moved down to the floor
of the valley at the upper end. Secured at approximately 1700 .
was very goo d country to operate in because we had good freedom
to fire where we knew the Nips to "be. Also during the day we fired into
cement op eni ng that had been opened by the dozer. Believe it to have
been a tunnel connecting either pillbox8! or blockhouses on cliff below
us faci ng the flat toward the ocean.
N
Another flame tank covered a dozer which wa s a road. The
flame could not be used wi thout endrul p"e,ring infantry working up to the
target.
A third flame tank fired one zone, rearmed, and was then committed
at the extreme right of the LT 1-26 sector to work over a strong pOint
a.long wi th tanks. A t ank commander reported. "An armored dozer
preceded our advaftce 3t this pOint. and worked the tanks about 30 yards
into the pocket. At this pOint, tanks were withdrawn and a flame throwe]
moved in to spray a ridge along the right flank. This WRS successfully
done by Sgt B----'s tank which w? s then subjected to an attack by an
individual Jap who threw a satchel charge immobilizing the turret of the
flame thrower and causing other damage to the vehicle. It vas possible
to drive this tank back to the bivouac area."
D plus 29. Detailed ae tion reports are availp.,ble only from 5-B.
which reported: "'B' Co t his day sent th.e 4t h platoon to support LT 3 -
27, and the let platoon to support LT 1-26, both driving on the pocket
in which all resistance had concentrated for a last stand. LT 1-
26 wa s moving in from tip of thi s pocket at the southeast, and LT
3-27 was on its left. The immediate objective and key to the situation
wa s a hogback ridfe facing both these units and commanding all ground
around it for 200-300 yards. The 4th platoon' with LT 3-27 wa s dozed up
to this ridge into which it poured 75mm fire and load aft er load of flame
fuel. About l500 the infantry moved up and t ook most of thi s ridge in
a give and take grenade battle. The 'A' Co tank dozer hit a mine in
that action and its blade vas completely demoliehed. On the ri ght, with
L! 1-26. the 1st platoon. unable to safelyf1re i tsguI1s. relied on
the flame throwers and inched behind an armored engineer dozer. burning
out any positions that could hide Japs."
D plus 30 (21 Mar 45). Host flame tanks stood by on call while
infantry continued attacks on the pocket. No action reports available.
D plus 31. A 5th Mar Di v flame tank renorts that it "Moved out
in supuort of Co 'A' to same draw as on D plus 28. Dumped about three
- 297 -
loads on sides of cliffs flamed over the end of the draw
and area toward the sea. Couldn't reach the flat below us."
tank struck a mine close to the target. No cA.sualtles resulted
but a and were smashed. The flame tank fired. its full
fuel load and wa s then towed to safety. A t hird flame t hro\.;er tank
1D00p ed 1.tO a small pocket behinc'. the lines of LT 2-28.
Nt excellent account of how fl e.me tp,nks were used along wi th
other and weapons submitted by t he 3rd Div for this
date, as follows: IIFr om the :previo'ls t wo d.a.y s action the defense sys-
tem in the p ocket was defini t ely establi shed and, on t he 22d of IJ. arch,
I Co, with a platoon of tanks plus one flame thrower tank attached,
was ordered to attack and seize the enemy position from the west and
louth covered. by fire from the hi eh on the western of the
draw. The small Japanese force occupied a trench system runni ng along
the base of the 'sugarloaf' hill from the southern end of the hill north-
west to the head of the dra'"" with a couple of lviG bunker's (still in
operation) built into the trench p 8ra., et at key pOints. Caves ran
(this was assumed and established l a ter to be a fact) from the bottom
of the trench into a l ar ge c ave under the hill, which enabled thf
Japanese to vacat e the trench return to it at will. Due to the
fact th2t the tanks were lat e in arriving and because a pass-
age through masking ground had to be bulldozed for the tanks to reach a
"Oosi tion from which the main targets could be engp..ged and close enongh
for the use of the flame thrower tank, the aBsaul t by I Co di d no t Jump
off until about 1300.
"At about 1220 the tanks (without the flame thrower tank)
into position within 50 yards of target and steadily with
APC and HE for 20 minutes, the fire being directed Over SCR 300 by
the I Co comllander and by s }Iarine, who kr1ew the targets, placed in-
side of the platoon le?der'!'\ tank. The entire trench system WAS
thoroughly and heavily worked over, all visi l le cl:\ves in the hillside
!1ro.d .in to, And the l a st remaining MG bunkers completely de.troyed.
The flame thrower tank va s moved into position about 40 YArds from
the trench system end S"Orayed its cherg!'! back and forth along the
trench until its fuel was exhausted. Five or six Japanese were shot
down attempting to escape from the trench ae the flame diminished,
others were seen to blow themselves up wi th grenades. As the fleme
thrower tFtnk ceased firine the two as sault platoons closed with the
objectiTe (the line of departure was just 75 yprds from it) and, using
their own flame throwers On t argets the tank had missed. almost
ately occupied it. '.ii th the nlatoon which had enveloped and come up
along the spur from the south covering the main length of trench, the
platoon from the west moved into the trench and systematically closed
each of the IIcommu!lica tion" cavea \-:hieh ran in to the l 8. rge clo..amber under
the tdll vit h demolition cherges. Two main entrances t o the large caves
were found. one leading from the south end of the trench and one in the
south aide of the hi.ll i tse:l.f. Fragmentation and smoke flame
- 298 -
and large TNT charges were thrown into these, a great amount of activ-
ity and commotion in the cave resulting. Engineers were brought in
complete the job of sealing 8,11 the caves, a,nd, where they were too
large to completely sesl wi t h charges, they "Tere bulldozed ahut. Two
mortars and a good supp ly of ammunition were removed from a section
of the trench.
"One platoon was sent to the top of the sugarloaf hill and by
working from the top down on thf'! reverse si de wi th flame th.rower and
demoli tions, destroyed *hat proveo, to be the last two emplacements of
the center of resistance. 11 (This, however, was only p a rt of the last
la.rg'e pocket of 9rganlzed resi sta.nce. )
D plus 32. The 5th TankBn reported the general action of the day
as follows: IIWtth the help of an armored dozer, the tanks followed by
the troops were able to advance 200-300 Y!'?rds. Three flame tanks were
used to good advantage this day in conjunction with two platoons of
tanks. in burni ng off succes.si ve ridges and re,vines containing a number
of caves and enemy personnel. The enemy does not like our flame tanks."
One of these flame tank commanders re:oorted: It',iere called to burn
out a pocket 1n rear of lines of 228. The .. e were 50 Japanese done away
wi th at this paint."
5-13 sent t\,;O platoons wi th flame tanks to support I,.T 3-26 and 3-
28 on the front and right of the l $,st bi P' pocket. On the right a tank
dozer worked on a road which was to allow flame tanks to join the i!l-
fantry at the lower end of the pocket, which. subsequently, it did. A
satchel charge got one tank, but the road was completed. "This per-
mitted tanks to cover and support the movement of our infantry down the
iraw, using a flame tank as well as regular tank /I In the
frontal as saul t by LT 3-26, a tank platoon "fired in to caves and on tar-
gets design8.ted by the infantry, thoroughly burning out two ceves with
the flame tank. Thi s vehicle we,s damaged by a satchel charge before it
could get into position to fire its third load of fleme fuel. The tanks
and infantry e.dvanced to the ne\fly dozed Doad across the pocket."
D pIllS 33. A flame tank sup-oorting 5-A'renorted, "We went to a
-pocket of resi st;:?nce in 3-28 and started to work at once. 'Burned off
cliffs on South Side of Lt B---'s knocked out tank. Refueled and dumped
load into ravines and a rea tOl>!8.ro the sea. Hade three trips i n this
area. Was reported Nips were jump i nr off cliffs into the sea . Very
good day./I
A 5-C name tanker reT) or teo, liThe t l: ird 'Y) l a t oon an,l three flame tanlrs
1n support of 2-28. The area they 'tIere operating in hac1. been thor cughly
gone over on the three previous consecuti VI? d8YI. The Japenes"" were
moving from the main pocket of resista.nce around the divisi on left flpnk
into this area. 4200 gallons of flame fuel were dumped in this area today
-The resul ts of the four days of on era tion in thi s pocket gave Dne the
1m'Gression the t 1 t must have r a. ined roasted Japanese, a s they very
thickly strew over the entire a,rea.. No tanks lost, no casual ties."
9l'i 8738 0-61-22
- 299-
D plus 34. (25 ?-ip,r 45). This was the last day of LT 2-'28
and LT 3-28 faced each other on o"01'1osi te sides of th'3 'smRll area of steep
ridg'3s [end a rocky ravine fl,;>nked by a cli ff overlooking sea. The
end was near. The 2nd platoon of 5-E sunp ortinr- 3-28 used its lo?d of
fuel, and could advance no further. was better for thp flpme t 2nks
with the 1st "l)latoon sU'D!)orting 2-28. '!:'he flame tpn": s , cra 't,ling to Rn
on the cliff, pou red lOAd aft er load of fuel int o
last stuDDorn gull y un til fi \'e lOr'.ds ""p-r"! gone. An, a":1rnuni tion c.umn 8Y-
u J oded. From sides Nprine eniners off the enemy as they
rushed f r om c n res and roc',(s in e.nd of the seHrching flame.
It was to o f or the Tho moved in, Rnd by
noon the
COll"1 ents on Flame fanks. The story of th' flame tanl{s snep.'.rs for
itself, a nd m8.'(es li sting of comments s1tn erfluous, those
avail able here included for the record.
Fle.me tanks nlone would ha.ve been un.<l.ble to onerate efficiently in
Most situa tions on hw Jl'11l1. All th!'ouP.: h t ho c l'l,::1Dl1ign the job wps ac com-
r>A..'1ied by acti ve a nd close teamwor
1
t of t a nks, dozer tank s p.nd armored d07.o.r s ,
flane can'-l::s, inf antry, a nd. enr: in7lers. t he close cO"1bat story
does nn t s ay much a':' out them, full crgdit mu s t p;o to arti;lery, no.vl'll
gunfire, air su-:: p ort, .s.nd the vl\rioup. servi c e U"l i ts. The close CO "'lbp, t
arr::lS were intef:rated i!1to lend t e.sk f orces a s tr oon s g:3,ined 9xnerience in
the c o:rrplex job of as saulting , cleaninf'; up , p,nd s ea ling off tr ,:,
dug outs, T' ll1boxes, and other empl c,cements thnt honeycombed t he vp,ry
difficult
- 300 -
Almu llc3
lHBLIOGRAPRY
1. Action 5th Har Div, 1wo Jima: .1nnex (26th HaI'ines
Rep ort).
2. Actio!", Report. 5th Har Div, 1wo Jima: Annex toTe (5th- Tk En Report).
3. Action 3rd Mer Div. Iwo Jima.
4. Action Re-oort, 3rd Mar Div, Iwo JimA (9th IrA-Tines Ren ort).
5. Acti on Renort. 3rd Div, Iwo Jima (9th ?d En).
6. Action Re-rort, 3rd Mar DiT. Iwo_ Jima (9th Renort, 0d Bn).
7. Action Renort. 0Td Mer Div. 1wo Jima (?lst Renort).
8. Action Renort, 3rd Mar 1)iv, 1wo Jima Tank:Bn 'Report).
9. Actio'1- Renort. 3rd Div, 1wo JimR (21st Report, 3d En).
10. Ooeretions Renort, 4th niv. Iwo JimA (Reftl CO!l1bat ':'ee.m 23 Report).
11. Ooer8tions Renort, 4th Div, 1wo Jima (Re?: tl Conbet 23 Re-p ort,
1st En).
12. Ooerl'l tions Renort, 4th Div, Iwo Jima (Regtl Combat Team 23 Report,
8 to Annex Fox).
13. erations Renort, 4th Mar Div, lwo Jima (Regtl Combat TOa!ll 24 Renort.
Annex George
14. One"'ations Renol't, 4th Mar Di v. Iwo JimA. (Regtl CombA. t Tea'll 24 Renort,
Annex Charlie).
15. Ooerations Ren ort. 4th Ha l' DiT, Iwo Jima (Regtl Co mbat 24 Renort.
8d En).
16. Onel' ? tions Ren ort, 4th niv, Iwo (Regotl Combat Tee.m 24 Report,
3d En).
17. Qperations Rep {)rt, 4th t/;ar niv. Iwo Jtma (Regtl Combat Team 25 Reoort).
18. R-mort. 4th Har Div, Iwo Jima -(4th TAnk ]n R!"T,ort).
19. Acti on Re-oort, 5th PRr 'Div. 1wo Jima(Co A, 5th 1'n).
20. Action Renort, 5th MRr Div. Iwo Jima (Co B, 5th mank
21. Action ReTort. 5th Div, Iwo Jima (Co C, 5th Tanir Bn).
22. Acti on Re11 -rt, 5t h Mar Div, 1..,,0 Jima (Ref-: tl CO!'1bEl t TeA.M 26 . Annex
Q,leen)

- 301 -
DIR2CTIVE NUl1 EER 14
Readounrters Tent h .Army
5 Februnry 1945
- 302 -
APPENDIX 5
TEJlTTH ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
APO 357
OPERA'l:'IONAL DI5ECTIVE)
)
14 )
BA":1TALION
ARMORED
5 February 1945
I. The Armor ed Thrower Battalion is a special
nUrDose unit orga.nized e qui1(1)ed fl S e tactically and administra tively
self-contained uni t of three cO!"TDanies anyone o f which can be attached
to Corns or Divisions. thrower companies should be with
tMks, with infa ntry or with a combina tion of the t .... o. ',Ihen o-perpting
wi th a tenk batt a lion, the flame throwers will be disnersed among the
t a nks s nd advA.nce '.d th them. ':then a n target hP.s been nrO;)-
e.rly eng2,gen , fl ame throwers must Advgnce e,nc destro;( the target, with
the t anks A.S en of the unit or under its protective fire.
o-pera ting wi th i nff,n try, flame throwers p: en'?rally remp- in ber ind the
advancing infantry, until the t8.r get r..as bep,n develo-ped, then by 11ean a
of surprise p ... l'1.d r.1obll ity, neutrE.1 lize or destroy the t!'!rget. Only in un-
uSUE.l s ituations will the flame be considered as a force to
form pp..r t of a tank-infa ntry team, even thoufh the infAntr;,' commanders
may consider them as tanks. Protection must be fur nished the flame
throwers at all times, E'nd since they have n o offenai ve WeBDon wi th which
to c ombat hi gh veloc1 ty fire, special nrotection must be furnished against
enemy anti-tank weap ons.
II. Cfu:...RAC'IZRlSTICS: Chief cha racteristics of the armorec-. fla'TIe t lo.ro wers
are: Ions ran,':e of flcune, protection fo r the cre .. , s oms sup"Jorting mechine
gun fire, f reat t y , and action when absolutely necess8. ry. It
is sen si ti ve to minefields, obstacl"ls, unfavorable terrA-in, c1 arkness,
weather, a nd 2nti-tank wean ons; I'll so the flame o1)ertitor he,s limi ted vi si-
Dility . The gr e n test difficulty tha t must be OverCOMe i n a comnany
of flame throwers in action is the sunnl;! of th,,: fuel mixture, .... h ich will
be t re men :.ous i n o"' er Clt ion where tho.re a re m.? ny n r crner tp.. r ?ets. :Secf\.use
of t hi s nroblsm, t'1e nr "'1 ored flRme should never be used
a:e; air:st tar[ o.ts whch ean be ov"rcome by other me?ns, t e.king into con-
si deration a ll of the factors involved. Flame thrower operators should not
use the flame indiscrimina tely, but should fire it only upon targets that
re Quire flame. The c8.li ber .30 mA.chine gun can handle mf:ny target e and
should be used wherever nossible.
III. HISSIc'rs : Arrnore c1.. flame trrower uni ts wi th nrOner n rotection can
perform or as s ist in the nerform?nce of the followin?
1. Attack of cities.
?. Attack of nillboxes other strongly fortified n ositions.
- 303.-
3. Destroy intrenched infantry automa tic wean ons.
4. Demor a li 7. e t he enemy at time , in c ou nter-
attacks.
5. Offensive acti on a f 'a i n s t i nf an t r y by us i ng {'"un fi :' 9.
IV. Ju'TD USE:
1. Read guBr ter s end Hep.douFl rt ers ters an d h9[H"l -
quart e rs company consists of:
s. A battalion f or Rnd t a c ti ca l
employment of the battalion.
b. A tank s <' ction of three t a nks, one eac h f or t he bat talion
commander, S-3 Bnd the artill ery observer; u se i s for commpn d under
fire.
c. A company organi z ed t o perform p ron er
ad.!ninis t rati on, BUPDI ;: a nd. maintenance.
d . A reconnais se nc e pla toon of i-ton trucks , ortanized
into a :p lat oon headqua rter s a nd three scuut s ncti ons of b 10 squad s each.
platoon will be 8.ble to perf or m close bElt tle r e co nna i sS<Jnce , lj ... a. i son
missions and to wor k wi t h the a ssault platoon , hen i t fires a s P.. fi eld
B.rtil l=:ry bat t ".r y .
e. An assault ,D1.l. '1 p latoon cOmDOSE<d of a p lat oon hea c.qu prtors
and six gun sections of one gun each; t hes e gun s a r e t he onl y long
offensive weap on s in the ba tt a li on. This n Jat oon will be at l e t o fur nish
e.rtillery on t he f r on t of a ny unit cf t h " battalion; it C2.n be
controlled t hrough the battalion r ad io n et s o a s t o f urni sh t he mpxi'1um
fire for the supnorted unit. six guns '!lay be orf E.ni zed into
of two guns to sunp ort a fl ame t hro'..r er li.'1i t wi tb direct fire when a ssaul t
guns a re e.t t ached. Thi s a tt a chment is valu,' b1 9 'tThen a r:!1o red
flame throwers a re working wi t h i n fan t r y bec ause oJ the tr'O' men,l.ou s fi::-e
power, and because o f the mor::t l e e f fect up on the infantry_
2 . An lOr ed Flame Thrower COmDany:
a . The ar'l1ored fl a'l1e thrower CO'TOany is !!lA.de- up of:
(1) A cormany heAd qu p..rters for a dministr a.t ion,
s1.mnly a nd !!lai n tenanc e . The t ank for the CO"1:'1'l AACer
is ::t normal medium tank ./ith a SCR-508 radio an d
shoul d be u sed as a vehi c le only, exc en t
when ::t Il f orces a r e needed to cOlTf1'J l e te t he
the me y be used as a sup-
p orti ng WeaD on .
(2 ) ':"hr ee fl8me t hro'l'! er n l a toons, ea ch consis t i n of
six ar mo:' ed fl ame t hrowers and a s'!'all l i a ison a nd
sect i on.
- 304 -
(a) The flame throwers should never be used
in smaller than sections of three.
for they should be able to engage targets
from more thp-n one direction and have the
mutual supnort of eBc h other's machine fUn
fire; hOI-fever, only on8 flame thrO\:ler should
fire unless the others are n eeded. The com-.
m8,nder of whatever size uni tis used should
have absol u te control over the firing of the
flame gun. This is not a .... eanon of opportunity.
but one for a special Durpose.
(b) liaison and reconnaissance section .... ill
not be n eeded .... hen a unit is attached to a
tank unit because the radio set-up in this
battalion is si 1'_ilar t o that used in tank
batta-lions, but the p "? rsor.. nel .... ill function
as machine gun loaders and as assi stan ts for
the flame gun. This soction will prove very
i mpo rtant when ;.;orking with infantry, es-
necially when oper 5.ting from the he8. dqu8.rters
of th ... infantry unit. AS it ca.n transmit orders
from the j nfan try cOlM'lander to the fl-sme tp.ro .... er
commanc1.er. These orders can be trans'C' itted by
the liaison sect i on1s SCR-
509, which is in the flame thrower net. Each
flame thrower section commander can receive
instructions from either the li a ison and re-
connaissRnce section or f rom the nlatoon
commanner ann then can issue his orders to the
t hrowe rs of his section t hr ough his SCR-
508 . dismounted, the members of this
section will choose routes of advance, p l a ces
of conce 81men t. P.nc. target s for the flame
t hrowers.
b. When the and maintena nce a re made
from service comp any. the flame thrower company will be able t o function
as a separa te c ompany.
3. Service Co::;p any. The service company is organized so as to
perform its own administ r ation, sUDp ly and maintenance; to 9unnly the other
comp anies of the battalion; to perform bat t alion a dministration; and to fur-
nish a hi gher echelon of maintena nce. The COffi'"9BnY is me,de of:
a. A c 0:Tt9 any her, dquarters for CO:J:D any command, administ r a-
tion and maintenance.
b. A sunp ly and transpor tation Dlatoon formed into a platoon
headquarters 2.n d four supnly s ections for attachment to companies of the
ba tt a lion. The sec ti on com!Ilp. nder will be the sunply officer for the comnany
to which the section is attached.
- 305 -
c. A be.ttal1on maintena nce nb,toon, a lso divid.ed into a
n latoon headquar t er s Bnd four s ec tions whi ch will ner fo r m second echelon
m?. i ntennnce for to "" !1ich attacr_ed.
d. A battv.lion e-c .. :n1nistra t i ve Rnd s ection si milar
to of f:! zt?. ndard t ank battalion , 'Io,lt:-, e quiva lent dut i es.
v. SUPPLY:
1. :Eac h fl Mle t hro .... er has can acl ty fo r E\.l')l') r oxi mf!. tely three
hundred f,all on s of fuel mixture, whi c h c a n be f ired in 86
s econds of cont inuous oper ation ',:it h a '!laxi mum Tf\O c e of 100 ys rds and
a -'aJ:imu,'ll effective f anre of eo yar ds . ,:, r.e fuel t o fill all the flame
throv er tanks i n the bette.li on i s consi de red one unit of fire. The
ba tta l i on 1s so organi?ed it s trcn suor tation will provide One r e-
f ue linr or r..n add:'ti onal unit of fi re .. One .. - ton truck CAn hAul enot .. e;h
of th"O' mixtu re CP,rbon dioy.i de bo ttle s wit h atb.ch'f!ents to r efuel
two fl ame t hr owers. ';;his , p l us the f uel i n the fl F'JRI!! throlrre r
t <".nks , is t wo U!'lits of fire, tota li nf" 3'? , 400 /Sp .. lloos of F;."sol1 ne ,
13,441 pounds of napalm, 3.24 bot tl es of cF-.r bon dioxide: l' nd ...,i11 fill
the wei ;ht CflpAC ity of the 27 trucks -;:rovi de d fo r this U\lr!)Ose .
2. ReadJ. f u el wi 11 be dr('l. \o'o fl am", thrower s un 1 t from
c hemic?l sections e t corps o r ASPs .
OFI'l CIAL: lsi
I tl
r. . D. POST
Bri padi er Gener &! GSC
of Stp-.ff
J.. S. GAI?Fn::r.r
J. , . GAlITIl:LD
Co lonel AnD
Adju ':an t :1<:ln -:ral
- 306 -
APPtalDIX 6
m:PORT APrER ACTION
HEADQUARTERS 7l3TH TANK BATTALION
- 307 -
TABLE 0," CONTENTS
Chapter
Page
I Purpose and lli ssion.

II Pre liminary Pl&.nning

I II Training, Phase and Rehearsnls .

I V Loadi ng and Embarkat i on.

V to a.nd Arrival at the Objective

VI Assault Phase

VII Enemy Tactics .

VIII Est i mat ed Resu lts of Operations .

IX Cotmnents and Recommendations

- 308 -
APPENDIX 6
HEADQUARTERS 7l3TH TANK BATTALION
Armored Flame Thrower Provisional
APO 902
REPORT AFTER ACT! ON
PRASE I - SHOTO
CHAPTER I
Purnose and Mission
The purpose of this report is to present in narrative form the
action of battalion in prepe.rA.t1on for and part1cipe.t1on in
I, Iceberg Operation.
The wa s assigned the mission of equippi ng . and
tra ini ng only Armor e d Flnmethrower BattE,l1on in tbe Army Ilnd p re-
the battalion for nod carrying in into combat.
On 10 Nov 1944, ttis bat t alion wp- s moved to Oahu, T.R. from the
outlyi .:ig Hawaii 2n Isle.!1 :1 s. At thi s time wor d was recei ved t hat the
batt a lion \,as to be converted from a standp- rd tank battalion to an
e.rmored flamethrower b a tta lion. The propcsed wep,;pon wa s to be a modi-
fied Ron son type in the tube of the 75mm gun,
to op er Hte under high pressure wi th a three hundred gallon fuel cap aci ty
and an effective range of eighty to one b.unc.r ed ypsds. Fifty-four tanks
moun ting tti s gun were to repl ace the fi fty-four t&1l k B a s the
ma in armar. ent of tte ba ttali cn. At the time thi s information was recelved,
On e an exp eri men t a l model, been built.
The battdion comm.snder Wa directed to drHW up a table of organ! Z3.-
tion and equipment for a provi sion::.1 fl Amet:b..r o'r:er ba tt2.1 i0o, following as
neo ,,1y 8 S p o ssible t he Tic end E of a standa rd tenk batta lion. The
number of perf'onnel, tteir grades and ratings, were to rema in the same as
those in a t a nk battalion. Changes in the organi zation of the
bRtt 8.lion and eqUipment neceesi by the conversion was made. The
great e st ma.de wa s the deactl vC'. tion of the lir ht t ank cOIIr';>RD.y and
t he mortar platoon. This chanf' e W8S necesse.ry to increase H.e size of the
Service Co in order to handle the gr eatly increased supp ly problem.
The proposed T/o a nd E for the p ro\' islonA.l flaJ!lethr ower battalion was
submi tted to Gener c.l, USAi'POA for a-pprovn1 on 28 Dec 1944 and
information that it had been approved was rece ived on 6 Jan 1945. During
tMs time work wa s begun and continued on the reorganization of the
battalion, so trEt when word of was received, t he conversion was
prActically complete.
- 309 -
Construction of the tanks for the battalion was begun around
1 Dec 1944. c. W. S., OPBC was in charge of con struction wi th
personnel from a Naval Construction Bn supervising the inst8lla-
t1on. Because of a shortage of personnel for the construction and
in order to train our own personnel, the battalion
supplied three officers and sixty enlisted men to assist in the in-
stallation. Thi s proved to 'be very soti sfactory.
Standard medium tanks drawn from Ordnance were to
provide flamethrower tanks. A shop was set up at Schofield Barracks,
Oahu, T.R. where the inste.llation was made. The first five tanks were
received by the battalion on 25 Dec 1944 and the lAst tank on 25 Jan
1945. Movement orders for the Iceberg Operation were received on
22 Ja.n 1945.
In the course of construction of the flamethrower tanks, modifica-
tions and additions which were found necessary were made. A need for a
method of measuring the amount of fuel expended became evident. After
quite a bit of research and experimentation, Lt. J. L. Jonkouski of the
battE'.lion devised a method of using B clock for this purpose which has
proved very SFttisfFtctory. The problem of stowage of the te.nks wall
worked out by the battalion officers.
The personne l in the instellation of the were
returned to duty with the battF..lion in the secor.d week of Ja.n 1945.
A training progre.m desip;ned to urepare bptt!:1.lion for combat wi th
the. new weapon st a rted in Nov and continued concurrently with the
other work un til embarkation of the uni t.
- 310 -
CHAPTER II
Preliminary
Prior to the Iceberg Operation the armored flamethrower was a
new and untried weapon. ThAre was no tactical doctrine written to
govern its use. Informc>t1on as to the most sui table orgp.ni7.?tion,
metho d of sup1Jly and meint"'!nance, an d administrative procedure of
t he battAlion wns not available on the mixing, store.ge, prorer
t hickness an d of fuel for the new gun.
Confronted with these problems, the battalion commander his
staff and comnany commanders made exhaustive studies to find the
solution. In most t he answers to these qUf!stions had to be
found before the propo sed T/o and E could be submi tted. A paper on
the organizetion anu expected tactical was drawn up and
submitted with the Tic and E for This paper was later
published in the form of Op erationfl.l Dir"!ctive No. 14, Hq Tenth Army,
APO 357. The pa.ner was di stributed to Inf Divs, Tank B!ls, and other
interested troops in Tenth Army in order that they might become
familiar with the principle of organiza t ion and employment which were
i nc luded. The principles of organizA.tion and tecticAI emTlloyC",ent in-
in the AAve been followed on thi S opera.tion and found to
be generally correct.
Experiments were conduct ed to determine the proper methods for
mixing and storage of vRrious types of fuel. In conjunc tion wi th
these tests conducted to determine the most satisfpc tory types
of fuel for weatr..er conditions and different type tp..rgets.
The most fuel found by these tests and by experience in
combat is a NapAlm mixture.
Plans for a satisfactory method of supply were made. From these
plans the En Service Co was orgflnized. A specie.1 spare parts ki t for
each gun was developed so that each gun could be maintained.
The stowage of the Napalm supp ly trucks was desi gned so that they could
readily refuel the flamethrower and also make first echelon repairs on
the guns in the field.
Since it was evid.en t tha t the Bn Hqs would not maintain tactical
control over the flamethrower corrroe.ni es in the field and since it was
eIPected that the comp anies would be widely separated in combat, plans
were made to properly support the administratively.
Upon receipt of movement for the Iceberg plnns
were for the embarkation of personnel and vehicles. Due to the
limited shipping space available to batt?-lion, not aU personnel
vehicles could be taken. A rear was oreanized which re-
mained on Oahu to be brought forward at a later date when shipping be-
came available.
- 311 -
The battalion was required to carryall fifty-four armored
In order t o carry t hese veh1cles and all of t he
pertonnel and vehicles to enable t he ba ttali on to oper a te
properly, t he ship s had t o be londed far mor e hep.vily than i8 consi-
dered sarP. f or combat loading or for beaching in the 6 nAult ....
Al l ten LSM's tranepor ted i n an APA and JOined the En on t he
t arget.
In view of t he fact that t he batta lion ini tinlly as si gned t o
Tent h Army and not further assigned t o a subordinnt e unit and no
mis sion wos assi gn ed the be ttal10n 1n t he Order , l oad1ng
pl3r.8 we r e mnde to meet , a s neArly a s possibl e. the situations whi ch
it .... as felt, might p os8Ibly ar i se. Each of t he t hree Co ' s wer e
acsi gned three LRM' s . The basic unit l oaded aboard each ship .... 88 the
with its supply and maintenance vehIcl es . One LSM was utilized
for the Bn Hqs, Hqs Co and Sv Co Hqs. The most Import nn t items of
supply ammuni ti on, fuel , rations and were divi ded equal ly among
al l ten ships. This wes done 80 that in case a p h .toon or company .... as
celled in to be unlOAded Bep8_re.tely and used before t he remainder of
t he battalion W88 unloAded, the unit could opera te pronerl y.
- 31?' -
I! I
Tr 81!?ing Pftp..se Rebe?rs8.1s
In order to train personnel in the operetion, emnloyment and
' of the new prlrr:A.ry wep.p on, an int",nsive training progrl'1m
was instituted to reach the desired stHte of efficiency in a minimun
of time. A school on the oners. tion of the gun was conduc ted by CV1S
personnel for selected officer'and NCO the
The school of f orty-eight hours of cl assroom anrl pr Hc t icR. l
work ann qu.::.lified those attencling to instruct the rem8. ining
in tre b8.ttalion. THO cl 8. ssp.s hel o. R.nd a tot9l of officers
and. NCOa from the ba tt R. 1ion a ttended. PrinCipa l t o-r;ics of i nstruction

a. Hechanica l functioning of the gun and its fuel, pressure
and ignition systems.
b. Assembly and disas sembly of the gun.
c. Operation of the gun.
d. Mixing of various type fuels.
e. Maintenance and atonpage s.
f. Firing of gun from sta ti onary and moving t c nks.
A school for personnel only was conduc ted in addition to
the school for onerat ions. This school included instruction in and
third echelon mnintenance and repairs.
With the trained instruc10rs provided by the schools, the rema.ining
personnel were tra ined in the various characteristics of the gun, its
Uses and supply system. Flamethrower company personnel instructed
primarily in the functioning, operation, firing and first end second
echelon mFtintene.nce of the wep.pon. ,';i th the exception of the in struction
in second echelon mB.intenance of the gun, all of the nersonnel in the
conmanies were inftructed in 8.11 subjec ts without rege.rd to t hei r T/O
position. This d.o ne to insure sufficient trtdned r "'Tl lacel"Jen ts.
Service comrany personnel were trained ir! the mixing of fuel, hp,ndlinf;
and storage of fuel and the functioning of the supnly system. Addi tion8.1
driver tra.ining wa.s conducted to t ake care of the additional trucks in
the battalion.
Concurrently with trRining, wer e to determine the
nrOner tynes of fuel to be used. Hixtures of NR.nalm re.nging from 3<1, to
were tried. Die s el fuel a nd. f,Tavy "Punker C" fuel 011 \"ere tried a s
\.ell as mixtures of these wi th gas oline and kerosene. In this manner
the 6% Napalm WaS foune to be the most satisfactory fuel for all pur-
noses. 'IShakedown
lT
tests wer" c onduc ted on the t a nks to revea l the
weak points in the r,un find metho ds of correction. Numerous de-
fects were discovered and remedied. The ignition and pressure system
were found to be the most defective, and although many were
and are still being made , these systems continue to give the most trou ble.
- 313 -
Because of the limited tr.<l. lnlng f ac1l1t1"'is Rnd tLT.e availa.ble
only a smal l porti on of fiel d training for the
could b"e conducted. Ho .... ever, this di d not training
proficiency since the batte_H on had previously beM thoroughly
trained in tank oper Rtion end tActics. 'tleapone traini r:g had high
pri ori ty becAuse of a l s.r ge chan(' e of personnel in the Bn and re-
qualifica tion in smAll arms .... nece ssary. An intensive swimmi ng
program was on to qualify all personnel in the battRlion i n
the re quired swimming tests. This bettali on did not partieinete in
any reheAr sals prior to the oper p. t1on. Apnroximately f orty-five
days of training ti me available to prepare for the
- 314 -
CHAPTER IV
Loading and Embarkation
The battalion moved to the objective on ten L5M's with the exception of two
hundred and two officers and who moved aboard APA 201. This personnel
Joined battalion on the objective. Assignment of shipping wns as follows:
L5M #279 - Bn Hq & Hq Co and Sv Co Hqs LSM #275 - 2nd Plat. Co B wlCo Hqs
L5M 1172 - 1st Plat. Co A L5M * 56 -
3rd Plat, Co B
LSM #208 - 2nd Plat. Co A and Co Hqs LSM #244 - 1st Plat, Co C
# 82 - \3rd Plat, Co A LSM #173 - 2nd Plat, Co C
LSM *221 - 1st Plat. Co B L5M
"" 62 -
3rd Pl at. Co C w ICo Hqs
A total of three hundred niMty one officers and :EM pnd one hundred thirty
six vehicles were transported aboard the ten LSM's. One hundred and thirty
three officers and EM. and seventy-five vehicles were left on Oahu as a
rear echelon because of the limited shipping space.
Loading took at I!lquois POint. Oahu, T. H. between 23 Feb 45 and 1
45. The first four ships were loaded 22 and 23 Feb. the next four on 26 and
27 Feb and. the remaining two on 1 Mar. Personnel embarked on 3 Ma. r and the convoy
left Pearl Harbor, T. H. on 4 Mar 45. A Tq.1 appointed for each ship supervi Md
the loading of individual ships. The loading plans were made by the En S-3 and
the En Tq.1 and these two officers exercised control of all loe.din{; operations.
The loading plans were made under the supervision of 3d POA Team. A
great deal of helpful advice and dAta was obtained from this team.
Prior to the time the ships were scheduled to be loaded, the cargo for each
ship was broken down, hatued to the loading point and stacked on the beach in
front of the ship's loading poi nt. This system invaluable for the fol-
lowing reason s:
a. A check of all material to be loaded on each ship could be made prior
to the loading and mistakes corrected.
b. Confusion in the actual loading was grea tly reduced.
c. The loading time was decreased becRuse of the availability of
cargo.
d. A more compact and seawortlv cargo stowage was gained because equal
size containers could be loaded together.
Cranes for lifting and handling the cargo were furnished by the Navy. Navy
trucks were used to move the cargo from the beach to the ships and some trucks
from the Bn were also used for this purpose. The to be loaded were
moved to the pier after the ca rgo had been loaded and lashed down by our own
personnel. Excellent cooperation on the part of Navy increased the efficiency
of the loading oVeratlon.
The Bn Was reqUired to submit final loading plans before actual loading of
the ships had begun. This is not advisable because even after loading has started
it is necessary to make some changes. These changes do not appear on the loading
plan.
D--MiISpecManuals
- 315 -
ClUPT. V
to and Arrival at the Objective
The movement from Oahu to the t arget took thir t y days. The convoy l eft
Pear l at 0900 , 4 Mar 1945 and arrived I n t he Kerama Ratto
area a t 1100 2 Apr 1945. A constan t check was maintained on the vehicles and
their 1 because the were on the open deck and al so
the roll of the ship was quite a probl em. rol l of the ship sometimes
reached as much 8S 30 which causes a great strain on the l a shings. The
vehicles Yar e started onc e a week and run for a perl od of app roxi mately
fIfteen minutes. This was found to be satlsfpctor,y. Some diffi culty wa s
experi enced from water forming in the carburator for ton truCk3.
Two stop s wer e made en r oute , one at Eclwet ck and t he other at Saipan.
Personnel wer e a l lowed to go ashore at Sai pan and mail was received t here.
Training enr oute consi sted of spec i a li zed subjec ts on Japanese t ac tics,
equ1pment, r ecogn1ti on of enemy eqUipment , etc. Marksmanship training was
conduc ted by firing a t towed targets fr om t he stern of t he ship. Ant1-air-
craft fi r ing was conducted in conjunction Y1th Naval per sonnel. Aft er leaving
Saipan all troOps wer e instruc t ed in orientat ion of target area, pl ans for
operati on and the expect ed part this battali on would play.
The convoy vaited at anchor i n t he Kerama Ratto fr om 2 !or until 7 Apr
45, when unloading over the llauabl beaches wa. begun.
- 316 -
CHAPTER VI
ASSAULT PlIASE
7 April 1945
L. No. of tanks disabled: a. Due to mechanical di f' ficulty 1
No. of tanks operative at present time
No. of tnnks in bivouac but not operative
3.. Killed in action; None
b. Wounded in action: 2
i. Narrative:
53
o
Battalion landed over Hagushi beaches Orange #1 and Purple #1 & #2. All
Ihips except LSM #208 unloaded vehicles this date. 1';0 cargo was unloaded. One
;ank of the 2nd Plat, Co. C, wa.s lost in the surf due to its falling in a hole
.n the reef. One truck of Sv Co. and one Medical Det peep were wrecked
m the reef but pulled out and sent to ordnance.
The entire day was taken up with landing and moving vohioles to a bivouac
at IWGUK (TA 8388-S). Eo was atta.ched for ta.ctical purposes to 20th
Group in XXIV Army Corps. En remains directly Under Army control for
strat ion.
1st Plat. Co C, was moved to the control tower at KADENA AIRFIELD for purpose
If defense of the airfield. The remainder of the En was placed in Group reserve for
lurpose of protection of XXIV Corps unloading and supply sector. The primary
;hreats to this sector is from airborne attack.
was performed on the vehicles and all waterproofing was removed
nd placed in a salvage dump in the Bn area.
I. Remarks: On the trip over two men on APA 201 were wounded as a result of a
apanese strafing attack on the ship. This could have been avoided if the men had
'allowed orders and remained be low.
There was definitely some of Napalm fuel vmich was mixed in Oahu
nd moved over here ready mixed. Fuel that was previously had the character-
sties of about a 4% fuel. This was no doubt due to the poor mixing and the
ength of time the fuel was stored.
8 April 1945
No. of tanks operative at present time 53
No. of tanks in bivouac but not operative 0
Narrative: Battalion remained in initial location and oontinued maintenanee
f vehicles. An attempt was made to salvage the Co C tank that was lost in the
urf but the crew vms unable to do so.
Co C was atchd to the 763rd Tk En for operation with the 96th Inf. Div. Co
was atchd to the 711 Tk En for operation with the 7th Inf Div.
- 317 -
All tanks W6re test fired in the bivouac aroa and only one tank was
defective. This was e. Co A tank which had a leak in the storage tanks.
LSI/.. #208 was unloaded completing; the unloadil".g of 8.11 vehicles in the
Bn. Unloading of cargo vras beGun. 10 EM from each ship were left aboard
to help put the cargo in LVT's and DUKW's for movement to the beach. Out
crews handled the carbo only once durirlg the unloading. This vras when it
was unloaded into the LVT's and DUKW's. All cargo went to beach dumps with
tr!e exception of orgenizatione. l equipment.
9 April 1945
1. No. of tanks operRtive at present time 53
2. No. of tanks in bivouac but not oper Rtive 0
3. Narratives
a. 1st and 3d Plats, Co A moved south and joined the 711th Tk Bn. They
moved into bivouac at 'TA 8579-X. 2nd Plat, Co A, remained with the Bn in
order to complete r emoval of water proofing and maintenance.
b. 1st Flat, Co 0, relieved 1st Plat, Co G at Kadena Airfield.
c. Co C moved south and joined 763d Tk Bn. They established a bivouac
area at TA 838 3-R.
1945
1. No. of tany: s committed 6
2. No. of tanks disabled: a. Due to mechanical difficulty 1
----
3. No. of tanks operative at pre sent time 52
4. No. of tanks in bivouac but not operRtivo 0
5. Na.rrati ve s
a. Co A - 1st Pls.t atchd to Co B, 711th Tk Bn, was committed at 0830.
Previous-:ro-this the Inf had advanced until they met resistance, then with-
drew to permit the tanks to come up. The objective was TA 8474-1. The
flame throwers supported the standard tanks with YG fire as they a.dvanced..
Two Pillboxes destroyed by 75mm fire, and our tanks destroyed an
ammo dump with Cal 30 tracer. All tanks were under continuous artillery and
mortar f ire from 0830 until 1500. In movinb back, t he reserve tanks were
called upon to tow the others due to bad hills.
b. Co B t C - cornrni tted no t anks.
6. Remarks. The lnr-Tank cooperation was excellent, although the advance
was slow.
11 April 1945
1. No. of tanks operative at present tiJ'le 52
- 318 -
2. No. of tanks in Bivouac but not operative: Hone
3. Harrative: Eo tanks were used at all this date dUG to the
situation and very rainy weather.
12 Ap_z:.ll-...!..945
1. No. of tan1:::s operative at present time 52
2. No. of tanks in bivouac but not oper :3.tive: i; one
3. Narrative,
a. rJo tanlcs were used this date due to the tactical situation and
extremely rainy weather.
b. At approx 0400. Japanese planes dropped two 500 lb boobs on '(edena. Air-
field. One bO!Jb landed within 75 yards of a tank of the 1st Plat. Co. but
no danage was done.
1. No. of tanks at present time 53
2. of tanks in bivouac but not operntive; None
3. Narrative: No tanks were corxnitted durinb t his peri::>d.
1. No. of tanlc s comnited 31
2. No. of tanks loads of fuel used 12
3. No. of t an;-::s disabled: A. Due to mechanice.l dU'ficul"':::y 3
----_.-
B. Due to eneL'1Y fire 4
c. Due to enemy land mines 1
4. No. of tanks operative at present time 48
---.-
5. No. of tanks in bivouac but not operat i vc 1
------
6. Personnel: a. i: illed in action 2
b. Wounded in action 8
c. Outstanding performance of individuals or units. S; t.
Sogan Co. B. repeatedly dismounted under intense mortar. artillery and SA fire
to attach cables to his tank in an evacuate it and to put out a fire.
Lt. Novak was complimented by Capt of the 193d
Tk Bn for his performance in a decidedly unfavorable position.
- 319 -
7. Karrfl.ti ve:
a. The En he.d two cOtrp8..Ilies (A & B) in operation this da.te. Co C
was on call tut Was not used.
b. Co. A - The 1st Plat went out with 1st En 184th Inf, but not
corrnnitted. The 3d Flat operated with Co C 7l1th Tk En and 184tl: Inf. Their
m.i ssion was to follov; the standard tanks end fire ",:hen called on. The Inf
followed the flame throwers. In avoiding a.rti llery fire, 1 tank Vo'9.S struck
and one threw e. track. In trying to evacuate the se tanks, Sgt J.: oore was
killed by SA fire, end Lt. Jone s was slightly wounded. During this time ,
Sgt. Ciaffrci was a sked to evacuate some 1Hounded. He was given no support
on this action and when his tank vras struck it was necessary to abandon it,
which vras done successfully. Before getting struck, the tank knocked out a
IlG, burned a house and killed!lIl estima ted 1.:: Japanese. The day's action
took place r of Hill 178.
c. Co B - 1st Plat moved out with Co C, 193d Tk En in support of
l06th lnf with the mission of attacking S from I/ACHI NOTO TO GUSUKU},iA.
They could not move south of J.::ACHINATO due .to roadblocks. 3 or 4 caves
were burned Hnd 7 or 8 Japaneso killed v.no came running out with gas masks.
One tank knocked out by 47mm hit on sprocket. 2d Plat with Co A, 193d Tk
En in diroct support of 195th lnf "'as gi von mission of burning KAKAZU and
then takinG positions beyond t he tovm to support the Inf. The lnf gave no
support, !.'.nd when the flame throwers started to operate in KAZAZU, they
were ordered to stop beoause our Iut Y.'as in t he village. This we.s probably
not truo and an esse nti c lly sound mission was not carried out. 4 of our
tanks were destroyed, 1 by mine, 2 by AT gun and 1 by shell. 1 man, Sgt
Ear sh - lIT lA, 5 men WIA.
8. The tanks must receive support by Inf on a mission of this type.
20 AEril 1945
1. No. of tanks cOP.".mitted 12
2. No . of tanks loads of fue l used 4
3. No. of tanks operative at r .. r e sent time 49
-----
4.
a. Co B & C - were not committed. Lt Brandno's tank was hit by a
shell in an assemble area.
b. Co A - 3d Plat moved out to sup!Jort Co G, 32d lnf with 5 tanks
from 711th Tk En. At 1300, 2 tanks were sent 600 yds in front of the lnf
to burn fl. ridge. SOT.'.e Japanese were killed by I'G fire. Later the same
mission was ordered because the Japanese moved in again e.s soon as the
flame throwers withdrew. This time the lnf moved up and consolidated the
ground immedie.t ely, which should have been done in the first place.
5. Remarks:
The failure of the lnr to consolidate the area after the first burning
permitted the Japanese to register their guns on the area and lay heavy
fire on the t a.nks a s they moved up the second time.
- 320 -
1. No. of tanks cor:uni tGd 6
2. No. of tanks loads of fuel used 5
3. No. of tank s ope rative at present time
4:. }:arrative:
a. Co B & C were not commited.
b. Co A---=--Tsr"P-lat was-a--fdldto Co B 17th lnf and Co E, 7llth Tk Bu.
Their mission VIas to burn a rocky ridge. This ,illS accomplished with close
support by lnf and tan.'i( s, but the lni' was um:. ble to consoli:iate the position.
75 Japanese were killed by our flame throwers and more by the
standard tanks as they ran over the ridge to e scape the flame. 3d Plat atch
to Co. B, 184th lnf and Co C, 711th Tk Bn, burned so:n.e caves and wooded knoll
N of HILL 178. The same mission was ' fired I nter in the day with excellent
results. An estimate d 20 Japanese were killed.
5. Remar k s: Co. B, 17th lnf worked very well with the tanks, followinG at
about 5 yards and climbing on t he te.nks to point out
22 Ap ril 1245
1. No. of tanks COmrlited 9
2. No. of loads of fuel used 7
--
3. No. of tanks disabled: a. Due t o ene::1Y fire 3
-----
4. No. of tanks operative at present time 4S
5. No. of t anks in bivouac but not operative 3
6. Personnel: a. Killed in action: None
b. i'iounded in action: 1
c. Outstanding perforrn-a- n-ce--oJ..""'$ individuals or units:
Tee 4 Wiemer, Co A, backed his t ank out 300 yards after being wounded to
avoid enemy artillery. Capt Ratcliff recommended thnt he be Given t he
Bronz Star.
7. Narrative: a. Co E & C were not commited.
'0 . Co A - 1st Pl at t wice pe rfor7:J.e d the same mission as the
day before. A.:; ain the lnf "".' as une.bl e to hold the position because of h e3.VY
artille ry and grenade fire . 2d Flat a lso f ired mi ssion a s the ctay
before. The tU!1ks killed about 8 Japanese who tri e d to reach the m with
sat che l
8. Rema r ks:
Co A tOday encountered some Japanese lying; on t he ground covere d with U.S.
shelter halves . These Japanese had satchel char. s es and it is be lieved t hat t hey
were waiting fo r the tanles. All of these Japane se Vio r e Z:illed.
- 321 -
23 A'Oril 1945
t
1. No. of tank s corenitted 17
2. 1J o. of tank loads of fuel used 18
3. No. of te.nks disabled: a. Due to mechenic8.l diff iculty 2
---
4. No. of tanks ope r ative at pr e sent time 46
5. 1; o. of tanks in bivouac but not ope r ati vo 2
6. l; arrati ve I
a. Co B - Saw no action today
b. - 1st Plat, atched to Co C, 17th Inr, performed the same mission
as on thetWo p recedinG day s. This tiC': e, after the fired their mission
the Ini' was able to move in and hold the ridge. This took two hours on the 3d
day of assault. This was in TA 8375-B. 3d Plat moved out at 0715 wi th Co B,
711th Gu . The 1st mission was firing a ridge. After refueling they moved
up to :' ire S07:10 wood and anothe r ridge. During this action, one tan1-: ViaS
mired i n a rice po.ddy . P.n att emut to r etrieve this t ank was unsucce ssful, due
to l: eavy mortar and a rtillery f ire.
c. Co C - 2d and 3d Plats Vlere atchc1 to Co 5, 763d Tk TIn and 383 In' .
Ho t!?_r s ets Fere er:.:;c.:; ec1. 3d Plat with Co C, 763c1 Tk En fired 3 load s
napalm at c ave s and cliffs. r o obse rve d r esults.
2f. Auri I 1945
!.
1. Ho. 01' tanlc s committed 3
')
o. of tr .. l or.ds of' fuel used 2
"' .
3. No. of opo r A.t i ve at present t Lr,e 47
-----
"'" .
o. of t anl;: s in bivouac 'out n ot operntive 1
---
5. :'! arrr_t i ve :
a. Co B t. C were not corr.mitted.
b.
..... d PI nt moved out Co L , 711th Tk En and joined 2d im Co Ii.
-
--
32d Inf . 71-.8 : ir st lili ssion \,as t o fire 8. c ave in which SOT;le enemy movement
"(:. 5 obs e rved . Then the tan\s moved aga i nst t he ridge , and t he Inf c onsolidated
pos iti on . At 1330 the went ove r on t he r everse slope t he ri dge
with t he r emainder of t he ir flame and l!:G f ire. The Ini' moved in to mop up
and s e cure the a rea.
c . Ii.err.:?,r l: s: Al l of ti'le mis s ion s were sucC'8 ssful and the f l aF.le t !1 rov.fe rs
received excellent support.
- 322 -
1945
1. 1\0. of tanks committed 16
2. No. of tanks loads of fuel 10
3. No. of tanks operative at present time 43
4. r.o. of tanks in bivouac but not operative 3
5. Personnel: a. Killed in action: 1: one
6. li'arrative:
a. Co A - 1st Plat burned out a hill just H of KOCEl. using 2 loads
of Hapalm:--This mission vms accomplished so easily t hat Lt. Frall believe d
there VIas nothi:n:s on the hill and that the Inf could have moved in without
the flar.J.e throv.'er support. In the af'ternoon. the 1st Flat ,vas given the
mission of burninG the t 01m of The Fle.t noved d01m a narrow road
into the tovm, hurning as they proceeded. At this point nortar drove the
1nf back. The tanks covered the evacuation of the Inf dead and wounded,
and they be.cl:ed out of the town.
b. Co B - 1st Plat with Co B. 193d Tk En in support of the 105th Inf
hp-d the iiiiSsior. of burning NAKA;:A. The tov,'!l wo..s burned with one lOfld of
ltapalm, and while no eneny vrere obs e rved to be killed, the flar:le throViOrs
materially aided the Inf in clearin,s the vi lb
6
e of S and snipers.
c. Co C - 1st P1nt advanced with Co A, 763d Tl<: Bn and 381st Inf, but
engaged 2d Plat supportine the 383d Inf and Co B, 763d Tk
En, fired Hapalr: e.t ridges e.nd brush and drove a nu:-tber of Jap?nese
gun positions. 3d Plp..t. atchd to Go C, 763d Tk Bn and the 383d Inf, fired
at ridges and slopes. Capt l:iemeyer. Lt. Faulkner and Cpl :;alone we re
wounded by a booby trap explosion. Sgt Spencer was yrounded by a sni per
while in his tank turret.
7. Remarks:
a. Co A reports excellent cooperation on the of the l7th'Inf
Regt in supporting tanks a.nd te.king advice e.s to te.nks' r:roper use.
b. Co B report.s considerable trouble with failure of l'lllin fuel line.
4 hoses have ruptured in the past week.
c. Co C reports radio receivers being shorte d out by water leaking
down through mast base into receiver.
27 April 1945
1. l!o. of tanks committed 16
2. No. of tank loads of fuel used 14
3. No. of tank s disabled: a. Due to nechanical difficulty 2
----
b.' Due to enemy fire 2
-",----
(Repaired in field) ------
d. Stuck
2
- 323 -
4.
No. of tanks at present time 36
5. No. of tanks in bivouac but not operative 4
6. Na.rrative,
a. Co A - 1st Plat the 2d Bn, 17th Inf, moved out to
assault the town of ONAGA. They were stopped by an .antitank ditcn on
the N side of the town and forced to withdraw under heavy arty and mortar
fire.
b. Co B - No tanks were committed, but as the 2d Plat started back
from an a:"SSembly area, one tank had a track blown by an AT mine. This
was repaired in the field.
c. Co C - 1st, 2d and 3d Plats, operating with Co's A, B & C of the
763d Tk Bn, respectively, were in action from 0800 to 1700. Approx 2400
gals of napalm were expended in caves and hillsides in TA 8074 in
the zone of the 383d Inf. 15 Japane se VJere seen to be killed by our tanks.
1 tank received 3 47mm hits, 1 tank was overturned, 1 threw a track and 1
had engine failure. It is believed that all four will be recovered.
28 April 1945
10 No. of tanks committed 26
2. No. of tank loads of fuel used 12
----
3. No. of tanks disabled: a. Due to mechanical difficulty 3
b. Due to enemy fire 3
d. Due to mud and terrain
--7--
----
4. No. of tanks operative at pre sent time 34
--
5. No. of t anks in bivouac but not operative 8
6. Pers cnne ll a. !. illed in action 3
---
c. Outst andi ng perforT'":an ce of indivi duals or tmits:
Tee 5 Fry, Co C, with compl ete disregard for his 0>"!l1 safty, ran, about
600 yd s dovm a r oad under i ntense arty fire to bricg an'ambulance for
three wounded men.
7. Narrative:
a. Co A - 3d Pl at atchd to 2d . Bn, 17th I nf burned cave s and a ridge
in TA 82 73-i,; . Durin; this action, 2 tanks were stuck and in evacuating
these under J':lort er and arty fire, Lt. O'Connell and Tec 4 Cress were
wounded. One t ank W8 S dr,r.'8.ged by she ll fire but managed to pullout. 1st
Sec, 1st Plat . e.t chd to 17tr. :':nf v:a s unable to perform assi gned mission
because of terra i r- di f ficulti Gs . 2d Sec , 1st Pl at atchd to 2d Ru, 17th Inf ,
tried to move t he tOI'/D. of ONAGA to reach a hillside and caves on
t he SW edge. One t :mk \':-as stud. and had to be evacuated, and the Plat
withdrew because of the terrain. In spite of this, t hey
- 324 -
ordered on the S5.'l1e mi ssion in the and a gain ware forced to
wi thdra,,! unde r he evy mortar p,nd 8.rty fire.
b. Co B - 1st Plat committed one te.nk with Co B, lS3d Tk En to burn
out a snipers and 1 KG. Smoke was use d for
concealment. It is doubtful' if the fle.me'l'ras effective as the range 'was
too great. 2d Flat atchd 3 flame throwers to Co 1, 165th lnf. Oue tank
was lost due t o a mine. The ot h'.O! r 2 flame throwers with tank and Inf
support engage d caves, pillboxes and VG's in the area SW of idechinato Airfield.
c. Co C - 1st Plat committ ed 4 tanks in TA 8075. 1 t fmk vras evacuated
when it mired in enemy territory. The ot her 3 fired Hapalm and llG's
at caves. 1 tank, previou sly lost, was recovered nnd s ent 'back for repairs.
2d Plat had 6 casualties duril'!.r; the nigtt wr.en a shell landed. in a foxhole
where the IT.en were sleeping. Sgt Bondel, Sgt Lotti & P:'c FrugeI' were killed;
Cpl Kogut &; Tec 5 Ganble Vlere serious]y wounded and Pvt Hornbe ck WaS sli Ghtly
wounded. 3d Pl at corr.mitted 3 flame throwers which fire d 6 loads of lJ apalm into
caves over 100 Japanese. This vras in TA 8-J75.
1. 1\0 of tanks C01l'Jlutted 12
2. No of tank of fuel used 13
3. Ko of tanks operative at present time 37
4. No of tanks in bivouac but not operative __ _
5. Narra.tive:
a. Co A committed no tanks.
b. co-B - 1st Plat atchd to 105th Inf to burn out entrenched positions
near NAK1iJ:i1i:7 900 gals napalm were fired in -} hour. 10 Japanese driven
out by the flames, were killed by the Inf. 3d Plat operating with 3d Bn,
165 Inf and tanks of the 193d Tk En, burned out snipers 2. nd a possible 1:G
on the SiV tip of the 1::ACn: INATO An:nELD.
c. Co C - 1st Plat Co C, 763d Tk En and the 383d Inf committed
2 tanks 't"O'f'ire napa.lm and HG's at slopes and ridges in TA 8075. No
results were obse rved. 2n Plat, operating with Co B, 763d Tk En and 381st
Inf. Flame throwers and standard tanks led the advance, firing on ridges
and reverse slopes. 3d Plat "d th Co C, 763 Tk fu and 383d Inf, committed
3 flame throwers in the morning. Some caves and ridges were burned. The
oanoneer was dismounted in one tank a doughboy took his place to designate
known targets. Approx 100 Japanese were in one cave which was burned. In the
afternoon the flame thrower and Standard tanks .,rent through a cleared mine-
field about 800 yds in front of the Inf. Numerous Japanese were seen, both
in and out of caves. The Inf credited tanks with 90% of the 290
killed. 1500 gals of napalm were fired.
6. Remarks:
The Inf is very fond of the flame throwers and will advance behind one
where they will hesitate to follow a standard tank.
- 325 -
30 April 1945
1. No of tan's cor.mi tted 8
2. No of tank loeds of fuel use d I
3. No of tanks disabled: a.. Due to enemy fire I
---
11 0 of tanks at time 36 operati vc present
---
5. No of tenl: s in bivouac but not ope r at ive 1
6. Narrative I
a. Co A - No tanks Vlere committed
b. Gob - No t anks were comrni tted
c. co-c - 1st and 2d Pl at were not conunitte d. 3d Plat vrith Co
763d Tk fired one load of n apAlm at caves in a. Gmall vall'3y. .After
the t an k to withdraw, but vms hit on the sprocket by
a 47rnm. Enemy f ire we.s so intense that it 'Ha s in:p ossi ble to tow out the
flame throwe r and the crew evac1..18ted to a. f rom the 763d. S/S,r:;t
Pardy's flar.1 e wh ich was standing by, was attecked ,by a Jape.nese
with a satche l che. r be. The commander of 763d tank just behind h i m opened
his turret and killed the Japa.nc se wit h SI:G fire.
1 1945
1. No of tanks committed 11
2. 1: 0 of t nnk loads of 1'uel used 8
--.--
3. No of t anks operative at pr esent
ti;;,e
35
4. No of tanks in bivouac but n ot ODEC r D.tive 1
5. Personnel: a . Killed in acti on: Kane
b. Wounded i n act ion 1
----
6. n arrative:
1,>, . Co A - 1st Plat ope r ated with Co B. 711th Tk Bn in support of
the 3d En;-t7th Inr. Thei r missi on wa s t o burn t he r everse slope of a
hill to enabl e the I nf t o move up. It Was necessary to bulldoze a
road through before the f lame thrOwer c ould move up. Two loads of
l-J apall'l1 were expended, but t he I nf was still unable to te, \ e the position.
Th is "'!9. S just S of the t o":n of KIeHl.
b. Co C - Attached to 706th Tk Bn and 77th Div u.pon r e li ef of 96th
Div and 763d Tk En. One flame thrower of t r.e 2d Plat: Sgt. Tyler, fired
2 loads of lfapalm into cave s and cove red a hill v:ith i' ire. 3d Plat c ommitted
2 flame throwers in support of C B. 706th Tk Bn. Numerous Japa.nese who
ran from cave s to escape the fl ane were shot dawn by Inf. One
flame thrower drew 47rnm AT fire but suffered no hits.
- 32 G -
c. Co B - Attached to 1st Mar Tk En and 1st IJar Div upon relief
of 27th lJI'Vand 19:3d Tk 30. The 1st Ple,t burned the town of 1..fYAGUStJt\:U
supported by the 1st Regt.
7. Remar1:.:s:
a. Caot Ratcliff reported that Co B, ?lIth Tk En, proved to be
very cooperative.
-b. Co C reports Japanese operating radio on channel '1;3.
c. Co. C observed 2 nude Japanese at 1408 about 100 from the
bivouac area rummaging through a pile of clothes near a cave. After
attempting to flush them with gunfire. smoke and grenades, Lt. Drandino
poured gasoline into the cave, intending to burn them out. At this
point an explOSion within the cave ignited the gasoline and Lt. Brandino
recei ved 2d debree burns of the head nnd the hands.
2 May 1945
1. No of tanks c orrani ttect 6
2. No of tank loads of fuel used 4
. No of tanks operative at present time 34
4. No of te.nks in bivouao but not operative 5
6. Narrative,
a. Co A - 1st Plnt committed 1 flame thrower on same mission as
day previous in support of the 3d En, 17th Inf. The Inf was still unable
to move over the hill. The Co moved to a location at TA 8474-G.
b. Co B - No tanks were The Co moved to a new location
et TA 7878=f, H of l.1achinato Airfie ld.
c. Co C - 3 flame throwers from the 3d Plat rep orted to Co B, 706th
Tk E'n roid307th Inf. One tank VIas cOTnmi tted, firing on a rocky ridge, No
results were observed. 2 tanks from the 1st Plat operated with the 306th
Inf. They burned a ridge, starting large fires, and fired into some caves.
All action took place in TA 8075.
7. Remarks:
Co A reports the 3d En, 17th Inf is very cooperative and will accept
t t e advice of tank officers as to proper employment of tanks.
:3 May 1945
2. No of tank loads of fuel ' used 3
- 327 -
3. 10 of tanks operative at present time 33
4. No of tanks in bivouac but not operative 6
5. Personnel: a.
b.
Killed in action:
Wounded in action
None
1
c. Outstanding perfor-ffi-a-n-c-e--of individuals or units,
S/Sgt Curtis. Co A, dismounted from his tank and attempted to lead it
to a pillbox which was firing at him, in order to accomplish his mission.
He was wounded in this action.
6. Narrative c
a. Co A - 1st Plat atohd to Co B, 7l1th Tk En in support of the
3d Bn, 17th Inf, operated in the vic inity of LOCHl. Their target was
the reve rse slope of a hill which had caves and aplllbox on it. Lt.
Lyles moved his tank through a cut and burned the reverse slope Ynth
one standard tank supporting. About 50 Japanese killed as they ran
from the flame s. The mission was euocessful, but the Inf was still unable
to ta. ke the- posi tion. 2d Plat operated with .co B, 711th Tk En and the
1st En, 17th Inf in the vicinity of ONAGA. At 1200 Lt. Jones moved
through the town 'with good tank and Inf support and fired a pillbox and
caves on the S edge. Later, S/Sgt Curtis and Sgt were brought
up on the same mission. Sgt Curtis was wounded in the action. The mission
wa..s successful and approx 75 Japanese were killed.
b. Co B - :5d Pl at was atch to Co B. 1st :!tlar Tk Bn and the 5th
They were committed in TA 7976-G to burn out pillboxes, but
were unable to reach the target due to terrain. One tank was bogged
down and was towed out under cover of smoke.
c. Co C - committed no tanks.
4

1945
1. No of tanks oommitted 7
2. No of tanks loads of fuel used :3
,3.
No of tanks operative at present time 34
4. Uo of tanks in bivouac but not opera t i ve 5
5. Personnels a. Killed in action: None
6. Narrative:
a. Co A - The Co is now looated at TA 8475-M. 1st Plat operated
with Co B. 7l1th Tk En in support of 3d En. 17th Inf in vicinity of
KOCHI. Lt Lyles moved up at 0700 to burn a reverse slope. While going
into position he was attacked by Japanese with satchel Charges, but no
damage was done. He completed his mission successfully killing a number
- -
ot Japanese. 2d Plat operated ?oith 1st Plat Co B 711th Tk En and 2c
En, 17th Inf. A Japanese oounterattaok developed on the HE side or
ONAGA and the flame throwers and standard tanka were called up to assist
the Inf. Atter two hours of firing the attack was repulsed.
b. Co B - 3d Plat atohd to Co B, 1at Mar Tk En & 5th Uarines, was
Galled up to rorn out caves and Ml nest. in TA 7976-<1. Although firing
at extreme range, both tanks expended their loads. No definite results
were observed. On their way baok, the flame thrO"ff'ers evacuated dead and
wounded.
o. Co C - No -tanks were committed.
d. Hq. Hq Co & Sv Co moved to TA 8579-H.
5 M a ~ 1945
1. No of tanks oommitted 2
3. No of tanks disabled, a. Due to meohanical diffioulty 2
4. No of tanks operative at present time 31
5. No of tanks in bivouac but not operative :5
6. Narrative:
a. Co A & Co C - No tanks were oommitted.
b. Co B-2 tanks of the 2d Plat expended 2 loads of fuel in burning
cave and tunnels in TA 7975-P, supported by Co C, 1st Mar Tk En and 1st En,
5th Marines. No enemy were seen to be killed. but Japanese MG's which
were firing were silenced. The Inf movea up to take the area.
6
Mal
1945
3. No of tanks disabled: a. Due to meohanical diffioulty ~
6. Narrative,
a. Co A - 1st Plat, operating with Co B, 711th Tk En and 1st En, 17th
Inf. One flame thrower was movea up with standard tanks in support and
firea caves ana hillsides HE of ONAGA.
b. Co B - ~ d Plat. operating with the 7th Marines, moved out at
1500 and b u ~ e a 5 caves with 2 loads of Napalm. They were closely
aupported by Marine tanks and Int. An estimated 15 Japanese were killed.
- 329 -
3d Plat atchd to Co B, 1st Mar Tk En and the 3d an, 5th Marines. attaoked
reverse slope in TA 7875-G with excellent support b.1 tanks and Inf.
About 200 Japanese were driven out, of 50 were killed by flame
thrower and standard tanks.
o. Co C - 1st Plat moved out with 307th Inf ahd Co B. 706th Tk En.
S.Sgt Hayes and Sgt Knapp fired on a reverse slope. driving out numerous
Japanese. Approximately 15 Japanese were killed.
7. Remarks: Co C reports lack of cooperation from 706th Tk En.
7 May 1945
1. No of tanks committed
No of tank loads of fuel used 20
3. No of tanks disabled, a. Due to mechanical difficulty 2
b. Stuck
6. Narrative,
a. Co A - 1st Plat with Co A, 711th Tk En were in support of 3d En,
17th Inf. At 1100, 2 flame throwers moveQ out to fire a cut. supported
by 2 stanaard tanks. This was the 5th day of firing on this cut. Yet
the Inf was still unable to take the position. 2d Plat operated with
1st Plat, Co A. 71lth Tk Bn ana 1st En 17th Inf. Lt. Jones with an
officer from the Inf and one from the 71lth went up on foot to make a
personal reconnaissance of the terrain. Then Lt. Jones'f1ame thrower
supported 2 standard tanks which moved up to fire 75mm. They witharew
under heavy mortar LtJones' tank took 2 hits without damage.
Af't:;er this Lt. Jones ana Sgt Albera moved up in succession to fire
their flame guns at the target. 3d Plat attempted to burn the town
of KAYBAR! in support of tee 184th Inf, but both routes of approach
were heavily mined.
b. Co B - 1st Sec, 1st Plat supported Co A. 1st Har Tk En and. M
&:I.. 1st Marines. Operating in TA 7775-J, thtly up the target
with 75mm, then moved out ana burned caves uncoverea by 75mm fire. 8
Japanese were killt:ld by our MG fire, ana GO - 30 were to be in the
burned caves. 2d Sec, 1st Plat supported. 1 Plat, Co 'A, 1st ll.e.r Tk En and 1st
En. 1st Marines. They fired 1200 gls of Napalm. at caves B.nd area targets
in TA 7774-1, withdrawing once to refuel. Gd. Plat with Co B, 1st Mar Tk
En and 1st En. 5th Marines. burned caves and ridges in TA 7075-P, from which
Japanese MG fire was received. One flame thrower was evacuated after falling
into a hole. An attempt to retrieve it by the tank recovery vehicle
was unsucoessful due to Mar Tk En and 3d En. 5th Merines. operating in a
TA 7875-Gm. They burned caves with the close support of standard tanka
- 330 -
and Inf. 6 Japanese were seen to be killed by our as they ran from
the caves, and the smoke obscurod others. 5 Japanese killea as they
atter:pted to throw hend grenaaes at the ta11ks. Later one flame thrower
burned a few houses, a liG nest and several snipers.
c. Co e - 2d Plat, Sgt Tyler, operating with Co B, 706th Tk Bn ana
307th Inf, fired loco of Napalm into caves filled with Japanese
equipment. A large explosion resulted and 1 Japanese truck was burned.
During this action he was subjected to intense mortar firtl. Numerou8
Japanese were flushea anO killed by supporting Inr. Lt. Hoffa firea ontl load
into a cave 1400 yd B N of SEURI. A huge firtl and several explOSions resulted.
8 lla.y 1945
1. No of tanks operative at the present time 29
3. Narrative: No tanks were committed today because of adverse weather
and terrain conditions.
9 &y 1945
1. No of tanks corranitted :3
2. No of tank loaos of fuel usea 3
5. Narrative:
a. Co A and Co C were not cor.unitted .
b. Co B - atchd to Co A, 1st Tk En and 1st lEarines, operated
in TA 7775 after t he area :-:ad been covered by 75mm anO EG fire. The flame
throwers moved in to burn 2 exposed caves. A large number of Japanostl were
forced out of another opening on the reverse slope and killed by Marine
tanks and Inf. 4 Japanese were killed at our end of the tunnel. This
section enabled the Inf to advance 600-800 yards. A small village of
6-8 houses were also burned by 1 flame thrower.
10 Mal 1945
1. No of tanks committ ed 7
2. Ho of tank loads of fuel used 5
3. No of tanks di sa bled: a . Due to mech8nical difficulty 1
b. Due to terrain 1
!/1\87380-1I1- :.!4
- 331 -
4. Wo ot tanks operative at pre.ent ti_
6. Personnel:
7. Narrative:
a.
b.
Killed in aotion,
Wounded in aotion
None
1
----
a. Co A - No tanks were committed.
b. Co B - 1st Plat, atchd to Co A, 1at Mar Tk En and 1st En, 1st
attacked in TA 7774-BCDGHI at 1000. The objective was reached
at 1200 and all but 1 thrower retired. Sgt Zannelli's flame gun
failed to operate so he stayed up to support the Inf with MG fire.
While doing this Japanese MG fire' knocked off his periscope and radio
antenna, and he was slightly wounded b,y bullet splash. 2 Japanese were
seen to be killed by our guns and 1 LMG was knocked out. 2d Plat with
Co C, 1st Mar Tk En and 2d En, 5th Marines, attacked in TA 7975-R at
0830. 2 caves were burned, killing 4 Japanese and 1 LMG knocked out.
Large exploSions were heard from the caves. A cliff then burned and
a number of Japanese ran out were killed by the tanks.
c. Co C - Sgt Schrum's tank, atchd to Co B, 706th Tk En was committed,
but while moving into firing position it was overturned.
11 :,,:ay 1945
No of tanks disabled, a. Due to mechanical difficulty 2
b. D ue to enemy fire 2
b. Wounded in action 2 orfs - 9 EU
7. Narrative,
a. Co A - No tanks were committed.
b. Co B - 1st Plat atchd to Co A, 1st Mar Tk En and 1st Marines,
attacked caves and dugouts W of DAKESHI at 1000 with all 6 flame throwers.
About 100 Japanese were flushed from the caves, an ammo dump and a 47mn AT gun
were destroyed in this action. Sgt Stagliano'S tank took 2 hits from a 75mm
gun in the engine and was evacuated. After the men had left the tank, a
150mm (est) shell hit in the vicinity and wounded 4 of the crew. S/Sgt
Lintner attempted to tow out the disabled tank and took a hit from the same
gun which struck his Napalm tank and flooded the crew compartment. It did
- 33G -
not ignite. 80 he backed out and sent his tank to the rear. Sgt Zane11i.
though temporarily stuck, engaged the AT gun with his MG's and covered the
evacuation of the other tanks. The remaining tanks continued to operate
in the area. burning caves and houses until the close of the period. Dur-
ing a later attempt to evacuate Sgt Stagliano's tank with the Tk Rec Veh,
1 Off and 4 EM vrere wounded by a 32 CM sp1gOb mortar shell which hit nearby.
2d and 3d Plats were not committed. Lt Novak was wounded by a short round
from a friendly 75nnn gun while he was at an OF.
c. Co C - 1st Plat operating with Co B. 706th Tk Bn. burned caves and
riages in the zone of the 305th lnf. 4-706th tanks lost in this action,
but the flame throwers suffered no damage. A number of Vlounded lnf and
tankers were evacuated by Sgt Haygood. 2d Plat burned oaves and hillsides with
Co C 706th Tk En and 306th Inf. A number of Japanese who were driven out of
the caves were killed. Sgt Foleyts tank took a hit from one AT gun.
12 May 1945
3. No of tanks disabled: a. Due to meohanioal difficulty 4
c. Due to terrain 1

No tanks operative at pre sent time 28
e. Personnels a. Killed in action: None
b. Wounded in aotion 3
7. Narrative:
a. Co A - 2d Plat, operating in support of Co C, 763d Tk En and Inr,
fired one load of Napalm in the valley E of ZEBRA HILL. 3d Plat operated with
Co B, 763 Tk En and 383d Inf. The 75mm tanks covered the target area of GAJA
and a ridge just to the S with 75mm gun and MG fire. The. flame throwers moved
through the standard tanks to burn the town and ridge. Before the flame had
died out, the Inf moved in to oonsolidate the position.
b. Co B,- 1st Plat, atchd to 6th Mar Tk En and 1st Bn. 22d Marines,
oommitted 1 flame thrower at 0830 to burn a sugar mill (TA 7574-D). At the
same time 2 flame throwers burned. a small village at TA 7573-R. They reloaded
and all three were sent in to burn areas in TA 7573-S. 22d credit the
flame throwers with killing Japanese in this acti on in addition to
the f ollowing equipment: 2 grenade dischargers, 1:S 11:G's, 2-2Omm guns,
1-47mm, 1-75mm Howitzer, 9 cases of plastic mines and an ammo dump.
Plat, G flame throwers plus atchd from Plat, operatea with Co C,
l/?t Lear Tt: En and 7th 7 loads of Napalm were firect at caves ana
tombs in TA 7874-N with no observea r e sults. However t he lnf was able to
occupy the position at l:sOO. 3d Plat atchd to Co A, 1st Uar Tk En and 1st
Mar Regt, burnea small village s and a few caves in TA 7773-HI, using
only 1 flame thrower. Japanese are to be killed by our guns and
1 L1.!G probably destroyed.
c. Co C - 3d Plat ope rating with Co C, 706th Tk En, burned caves ana
During this action, Sgt Tyler received an artillery hit which
broke his track. While waiting in an assembly area, Capt Neimeyer and Teo
4 Crawford were wounaea by Jap mortar fire. Sgt Holmes was also wounaea
during the day's action. Lt. Horfa's tank was creaited with 75-100

8. Remarks: The action participatea in by the :Sd Plat, Co A, was a
splendid examp le of flame thrower-tank-lnf coordination.
1;5

1945
1. No of tanks cormni ttea 9
5. Narrative,
a. Co A - 2d Plat operating with Co C, Tk Bn and :Sd En,
Inf, oommitted only 1 flame thrower. Lt Jones burned a cut on the N edge
of ZEBRA HILL, killing about 50 Japane se.
b. Co B - 2a Plat, working with Co C, 1st Tk En ana 7th Mar
Regt, usea 6 loadS of Napalm in burni ng ana 1 pillbox in TA 7874-
LMNO. About 50 Japanese !'lushea ana burnea in this action. G flamt!
throwtlrswerecommittea to burn caves in TA 7874-S. Although they coulet
not reach the ta.rget, 15 J apanese ran out and were killed by tank l!G
fire. :5<1 Plat, atchet to Co C, 1st Tk En, committed 1 flame thrower
to burn small villages in TA 7773-D.
c. Co C - One section of 1st Plat was atcha to Co D, 706th Tk En.
They fired loads of Napalm at caves nna holes in TA 807:5-PQ. Large
explOSions resultea. The tanks Ini' gave exoellent support.
- -
6. Rtlma.rks: Co A report s thtl 96th Inr Di v works very we 11 with thtl
flame throwers, movins ri ght in behina thtl to oocupy thtl positions.
'fhe 766d Tk Bn has 6i ven tht:l flamtl throwers exce lltlnt covering fi re.
14 1945
1. No of tanks committea 12
G. No of tank load. s of fuel used. 10
3 . No of tanks d.isableds a. Due to mechanica l difficulty 1
c. Due to being 8tuck 1
4. No of tanks operative at prtlstlnt timtl ;:: 8
5. 1. 0 of tank!> in bivouac but not operati Vtl 17
6. Narrative:
a. Co A - At 0800, Gd Plat, operating with Co B, Tk Bn ana
rni' fired an tln",InY ::Itrong point on a high riage ju:;t to the ri gh'C 01'
CONICAL HILL, neutralizinc the position ana enabling the rnf to moVt! in
ana consolioate same. At about 1500. S/Sgt Land movea out with 1 Plat
A Co, Tk Bn to neutraliztI t:lntlmy in vicinity ot' TA 8170-E. The
stanaara tank::! coverea the ar",a with 75mm and MG fire ana Sgt Land. fired a
small village. The mission was accomplisheu ana th", Int' movea in anu
consoiiae>.t",u t ht:l posi 'Cion.
b. Co B - 1st Plat operating with 6th Ear Tk Bn oorn",a CllVt!d ana
in TA 757v-RSWS. 4 Japantlse wertl killt:ld ana gals of Napalm
expenaea. Plat operating with Co C, 18t Tk En in TA 7874-L eoula not
rtlach t h",ir targets. va Plat operating with Co A, 1st Tk En burnea small
caves at TA 7773*H ana 7774-X, and a smail portion of the town of WANA.
gals 01' Napalm were expenaea. The Co no personnel or
vehioular oasualtie::l.
c . Co C - 1st Plat, atcha to Ga Plat, Co D, 706th Tk En, firt:lu
and ridges in TA 807;:,-UV. Orientation and Inf-tank
support was exoellent. No definite re sults observea. One tank, operating
wi th Co D, 706tn Tk Bn, rireu a riuge in TA The Co l:iUsta1n.,a no
personnel or vehicular
15 May 1945
1. No of tanks coL'IlIlittea 1
2. No of tank load. s of fuel 1
- -
3. No of tanks op6rative at present time 28
5. Narratives
a. Co A ana Co B committeo no tanks.
b. Co C - GU Plat, atchu to Co A, 786thTk En, committea 1
flame thrOWtlr. S/SE;t Tully fil"t!U one loao or Napalm at cave::! ana
in TA 7974-V, receiving gooa from tanks anu Inl.
Bi8 Cal killeo 5 Japanest!.
16 May 1945
1. No of tanks connnittt:!u 8
G. No 01' tanks 10aos 01" f'uel uSt:Jo 8
3. No of tanks disab1eas a. Due to mechanical uU"ficulty 1
b. Due to terrain
4. No of tanks operative at prt:JStmt time
5. No of tanks in bivouac but not op",re:ti Vtl 8
6. Narrative:
a. Co A - 1st Plat, atcha to Co A, 76M Tk Bn anu Gd En. Ini
was given of Jap on hili at TA
At 1400 tht:! t;tanc1ara tanks workt!o oVt:lr tht! position with 75mm. Lt
f.Lame thro .. t:lupportl:la by Inr, movt!u up anu firt!u thl:lir
killing about G5 Japant:!8t:! anu tlxplooing st!vt:lral ammo oumpse Japanese
attemptea to reach the flame throwers with satchel charges anawtJre killea.
Sgt thl:ln fired tht! same killing approx GO Japant!st!.
While withura .. ing from mission, Sgt Kostelny's tank thrt:lw a track,
and the cro .. "al:i tlvacul:lt",u by tan!C:s.
b. Co B - 1st Plat wor!Cing "ith tht! 6th Mar Tk En, burneu cave8
in TA 767G-B. G Japant:Jst:! "tire kilLl:lu by our tan!C MG firl:le Sgt Webb's
engine !' ailtlu in Jap territory anu haa to be evacuatea. \)a Plat, atcha
to C A, 1st Mar Tk Bn ana 7th Mar Regt, burnt!G tht! town of WANA. No
definite results were observed.
c. Co C - Ga Plat, atchci to Co C. 706th Tk Bn,was conuni ttea to
support thtJ aaVI:ll1Co 01' 106mn tank ana burn rt:1v"rc", /Slop", at TA 7974-V.
Tari;;tlt ar"a \'Ia::s wi r"acn 01' n,amt:1 gun anu oauo"u roar or tank to
btl tlxposou to AT fir",. Aft"r su;:staining ont! hit (AT) on thtl righT; roar
sponbon, tht: rlam., thro .. t::Ir .. i t:huro ...
7. ReInlirlCo' The mitS/Siun or Co C's flamtl WatS in accoraanotJ with
proper uStJ 0f f!amtl thro"tlrlS.
- -
17 i.ia.y 1945
1. No of tanks COmnU'ttea IG
G. No 01' tank loaa:; of fu",l. Ul:>ea 1;::
No of tankl:> ail:>abh1U: a. Due to terrain
;::
4. No or t anks op",rl.l'tivt:l a't n ro;:,oni;. tl'T',t;
5. No 01' t nnIz:; in oi vouac but no't Opt; ratl Vo 7
6. Personne l: a . Ki IltJa in action: NontJ
b. 'Wounot:la in ac tion 1
---
7. Narrative:
a. Co A - 1st Plat, ope rating with Co A6 76;)(1 Tk Bn, in support 0 1'
1st En, Ini', wa.s given tht1 mi::;sion '01' f iring a sinall village . Lt.
Lyles' tank th" mi ;:s;:,iun anu roInl.lino::lu in thu I.lrol.l to U l;iO hi::;
CAl "V HG 's. Approx;)O Japaneso wo r", ki l.l.ea by the f lame ana LG's. Sgt
BenISon's tank .. as g;ivo::In mi:;olun of burning 8. cut 1'rom which tho I n.!. Wtu:!
r"c"iving MG and sniper fire. This was done and a number of Japanese
ran out to be killed by supporti ng Inf and t anks. Sgt Benson's tank killed
abou t 15.
b . Co B - 1st Pl c.t , ope rating with the 6th Ea.r T:.;: Bn6 burned caves
and area targets in TA 7672-AP. . 2 Japanese known to be kil led . 2d Plat ,
operating vfith Co C, 1st Tk Bn and the. 5th Lar Regt, committed 2 flame
throwers at TA 7873-CD11IIJ. Tombs and caves VTere burned. One flame
hud to be abandoned because of a broken tract . Radios vrere r emoved
and suns disar med . 3d Plat was atchd to Co C, 1st Tk Bn and supported
by Co's 1 B.nd K of the 5th ReGt . 4 flame thr ovrsrs Vlere cOlTlJ":li tted at
1945 ":ith tank support e.nd burned 5 tombs , 12 caVElS e.nd 3 houses in
TA 7879-EIJ. 7 Japanese who ran into a tOr:lb vrere k illed, 8.S vrere 2 "l"rho
atteiilpted to t hrow gr enades at t he t anks .
c. Co C - 3d Flat was atchd to Co C, 706th Tk Bn. Sgt Parady's
tank was at to burn a culvert, ridge and several caves. Approx
50 Japanese were flushed to be killed by supporting Inf . On its return t he
flame thrower's electrical system broke dovm and it was towed back to the
bivouac a r ee. . Sgt Schrum went into action at 1200 to burn caves and the
brush around a roa.d block. About 25 J apanese who ran out were killed by
supp ort ing s.
18

1945
1. No of t anks com::nitted 9
3. No of tanks disabl ed: a. Due to mechani ca l difficulty 2
b. Due to enemy l e.nd mines 1
- 337 -
4. No of tanks operative at r,:resent ti:ne 28
5. no of tanks in bivouac but not operative 7
6. Narrative:
a. Co A - 1st Sec, 1st Plat, with Co A, 763d Tk En and 1st Bn,
383d Inf. Sgt Benson's tank fired a hillside and ditch at TA 8170-J. He
then remained in the area to use his i,IG's on the surrounding hills. Lt.
Lyles, with standard tank support, was given mission of firing a reverse
slope. They were unable to reach the slope because of AT fire which
penetrated one 763d tank. 2d Sec, 1st Plat, operated with Co A. 763d Tk
Bn and 2d Bn, 383d Inf. Sgt Knotts was given mission of firing over a
bluff that the 75's could not reach. Be rolled his flame dawn the re-
verse side of the bluff and also fired some caves. He killed approxi-
mately 15 Japanese. This action took place in TA 827l-P. 2d Plat was
given a mission with Co C, 763a Tk Bn. In order to reach t he target
they had to pass through a cut where minas had previously been en-
countered. Be.ngalore torpedoes which were exploded to detonate any re-
maining mines succeeded. in caving in t he cut to such an extent t hat the
tanks were unable to get through.
b. Co B - 2d Plat, atchd to Co C, 1st liar Tk En and 7th 1.lar
Regt, conunitted 3 flame throwers which fired 5 loads of Napalm at cc. ves
and tombs from which Japanese I!iG fire was reported (TA 7879-HIJ). No
positive results observed.
c. Co C - 3d Plat, atchd to Co C. 706th Tk Bn and 305th Inf,
fired 4 loads of Napalm in TA 7873-). Caves, culverts, houses ana a roaa
block were engaged, resulting in numerous Japanese being driven out to be
killed by supporting M-8 fire. One tank was lost due to AT mine which
blew off a track.
3. No of tanks disabled: a. Due to enemy land mines 1
b. Due to terra.in 1
----
6. Narrative:
a. Co A - 2d Plat operated 2 flame throwers with Co C, Tk
Bn in support of 2d En, 382d Inf. At Sst Achenbach fired cave s
ana entrenchments in vicinity of Table Top (TA 8172-K) with Good
support from tanks and Inf. In burning a l ar bc cave the flames went
throubh the cave and out of another opening. A number of Japanese
- 338 -
were and the flame killed 50. At 1300 Sgt Albera
burned caves in the same area and killed an estimated 35 Japanese.
His track was broken on the way out ana the 763a tanks broubht out
the crew.
b. Co B - 2d Plat operated with Co C, 1st lJar Tk Bn and 5th
i.: ar Regt. 2 flame throwers were com..m.tted to burn caves ana tombs. As
they withdrew, Lt Sutherland's tank hit 2 mines sinrultaneously and blew
both tracks. This action "[as in TA 787:5-HI. 1 mortj f lame thrower was
in the same area at lGOO ana burnee several caves.
c. Co C - No tanks wer e committed.
20

1945
1. No of tanks comIni ttea 10
3. No of tanks disabled, a. Due to enemy fire 1
4. No of tanks operative at present ti;ne 25
5. No of tanks in bivouac not operati va 8
6. Narrative:
a. Co A - 1 tank from Gd Plat atchd to Co C, 763d Tk Bn in support
of 382d Inf, burned a ridgeline in TA 8172-L. No results were observed.
'J. Co B - 1st Plat, atohd to 6th :':ar Tk Bn, attacked caves in
TA 7672-1. 6 Japanese ""ere seen to be killed by our guns. 2d Plat, atchd
to Co A, 1st l!ar Tk ' En and 2d Bn, let llarines, corami tted :5 flame throwers
at 0830 Ene burned caves and tombs in TA 7873-HIJU. 2 MGts were reported
in this area, but after the flame throwers fired, the In1' moved in with-
out araftin
b
fire. Two tanks were committea in afternoon to burn
small town on the N edge of SHURI(TA 7873-S). One tank broke down on the
way to the target, but Lt Krall continuea ana comp1etea mission. On
hiti rtlturn ht! towea the aisabled tank until it again. 4
wert! killea in action.
c. Co C - 2d Plat, atoha to Co C, 706th Tk Bncommitted Sgt
Tyler's tank at 1100 in TA to burn caves and ridges. He received
no tank and very little lnf support. Lt Brandino's tank was committed in
the same area ana was knocked out by 47mm fire from Japanese tank. S/Sgt
Tully at assaulted a riugt! in TA 7B73-CD supported by tanks.
The hose flaIlltj unit was supportea by G-75mm t8.nks. The hose flame unit
w'ls employed, but the lnf operator was wounaed by small arms fir",. Sgt.
Richardsou firea one load of Napalm at caves ana in TA
supportea 1 standard tank. lnr support was lacing in this
dutj to small arms
- -
d. At approx 1500 in the afternoon, Lt. Brandlno was engaged in
burning the reverse siae or ariuge in TA 787t>-Owhen his tank was hit
by the 47mm fire from a Japanese tank. Lt Brandinots tank was destroyea
by the fire after receiving the hit. Maj Littlepage, Capt Crowley and
the C. 0., Co t, 706th Tk En were able to observe this action from an
OF in the vicinity of TA 787:5-B and Maj Littlepage located the Jap tank.
The Japanese tank withdrew and then pulled up into another position to be
able to bring fire on the 706th tanks which were near where Lt Brandino
had been knocked out. After spotting the enemy tank in ita
Maj Littlepage got into a tank belonging to the C. 0., 706th Tk Bn Co C,
ana with the help of the C. 0., firea on ana destroyed the tank.
7. Remarku
1.
2.
a. Japanese Killed Today
b.
No
No
Co A
Co B
Co C
TOTALS
Co A
Co B
Co C
TOTALS
Tks Com- Tks Dis-
mitted ab1ed by
no
Enemy Act i on
4
108 9
145 9
363 22
o
10
o
10
Tks Dis-
ableC1 for
other rea.sons
14
15
21
50
21 May 1945
of tanks committed 9
of tank loads of' fuel used 11
To date
445
37:-5
470
1288
Gals Na-
pals ex-
penaed
18,600
30,000
27,450
76,050
;:s. No of tanks disabloal a. Due to meohanioal diffioulty 1
4. No of tanklS operative at present time '1.7
6. No of tanklS in bivouao but not operative 5
6. Narratives
a. Co A - No tanks were committed
b. Co B - 1st Plat, atchd to 6th Mer Di v, burned a few houses
on the N edge of which were harboring some snipers. 2d Plat
With , flame throwers from the Plat, wertJ atchd to CO A, 1st Mar
Tk Bn and the 1st Marines in an advance to the N edge of SHURI. 2
flame were committea at 0800. 2 in SHURr with 6 - 75mm tanklS
anti 1 on a ridge 75 yds N 01' SHURI with tanks. All tanks wore
supportea by Mar1ntl fireteams. All loa.ds wer" firea beror", 093U.
Numerous Japaneso wtJre seon and about some by out
guns. l flame throwers were committed in the same area at 1030, one
- 340 -
ot' which out caves. Plat, atchd to Co B, 1st Mar Tk Bn,
supported the 5th Marines advance along a draw NW of SHURI. 2
loads were firea on a reverse slope ana 1 known to be killed.
One thrower was c ornmi ttea on the same area at 1300 to burn
caves ana tombs and to silence a Japanese MG. One more loaa waS
at 7 burial vaults, 15 J ap anese.
c. Co C - Plat committea flame with th6 1st Plat,
Co C, 706th Tk En. One fl ame thr ower threw a track at 0900 ana was
evacuated. Sgt Armstrong moved up to t he same target at and
firea one load at machine guns ext, snipers ana some houses.
7. Remarks.
e. . Japanese Killed:
b.
Co A
Co B
Co C
TOTALS
Tks Com-
mitted
110
115
147
Co A
Co B
Co C
TOTALS
Tks Dis-
abled by
Enemy Action
4
9
9
Today
o
46
o
46
Tks Dis-
abled other
reasons
14
15

51
May 1945
To Date
445
419
470
1:534
Gals Na-
palm ex-
pended
18,600
3:5,000
"1. 7,750
79,350
:5. No of tanks disabled' a. Due to mechanical difficulty 1
5. No of tankl:S in bivouac but not operatiV8 6
6. N arrati VI::t J
a. Co A - No tankl:S were committed
b. Co C - 1st Plat, atchd to 6th Mar Div, oommittea 2
flame throwerb e.nJ Ubea one loaa of Napalm in burning eaV6b near TA 767G-R.
c. Co C - No tanks were committed.
7. Rem.e.rksl
- -
a. Japanese Killed:
An error in
b. Tks Com-
mittea
Co A HG
Co E li5
Co C 147
TOTALS :5711
Co A
Co B
Co C
TOTALS
ye steraay's rt1port
Tks Dil:l-
ablea by
Ent:1my action
4
9
G
15
TOd!?_y
t!howtta A Co's total
Tks Dis-
ablea othttl'
reasons
14
15
GG
51
G;j - G9 Uay 1945
1. No 0 1' tankt! operat:ive a.t prt1sent tim", :5;:'
c. No of t anks in bivouac but not oper ative G
at
To Date
5:50
419
470
1419
4115.
Na-
palm ex-
pended
18,600
;5;;,;:'OU
G7,7 50
79, 65U
:5. Narrative: Th", per-ioa G:5-G9 May was spent on ma.intenanott and rest
as the weatht1r and terrain prohibitt1d the use 01' tanks. At z9l1uO, Co
B rttoeivtlu a low level. attack by 6-8 f'rienuly airorart. Th", bivouae
area wns hit by two 500 Ib bombs, Cal 50 MG anti rockets. There were no
casualtit1s.
4.. Remarlet!: One tan1-: of Co B, S/Sgt Lintner's, returnt1U 1'rom Oranance
with extra armor. It now wei ghs about 4" tons, but th", arivt1r rt:1portt1u
it easy to operate ana able to muddy roads in 4th gea.r. I t
r ''") ];).'.l i :1 Cl t o be seen if this wei ght is praotical for the Continental
9ngin'" unaer combat conaitiontl.
:50 llal - 9 June 1945
1. No of tanks conunitted 2
2. Ho of tanks louds of fue 1 used 4
3. No of tanks oper ative at present time 39
4. No of t anks i1. vouac but not operative 4
5. Harrati ve I
a. During the periOd :30 May - 9 June, the battalion Saw no aotion
with the exoeption of 1st Plat, Co B.
- MG -
b. 1st Plat Co B_ was atchd . to the 6th Mar Div for the amphibou8
landings on the OROKU Peninsula, with the mission of taking t he NA.'iA
AIRFIELD. On 4 June they loaded 4 f lavne throwers on an LeT at Point
Loomis, but were forced to unload the same day due to a typhoon warning.
On 5 June the vehic l es and men re loaded ant embarked. The Plat landed
at 0630, 6 June and for 2 days were on call without being committed.
On 8 June, 2 flame throwers were sent out with Co f.- 6th Mar Tk Bn to
burn villages at TA 7469-KP, 7369-AFp 10 Japanese were seen to be
killed. No flame throvrers were committed on 9 June as they stood by
near the NAHA AIRFIELD.
10 June 1945
,.
No of tanks loads of rue 1 used 16
3.
No
of tanks disabled: a. Due to mechanical difficulty 1
5. Ho of tanks in bivouac but not operative 6
6. Narrative:
a. Co A- 1 flame thrower of the 1st Plat, operating with Co A,
763d Tk Bn and 2d Bn, 383d Inf, was committed to burn a hillside which
was holding up the advance in the vicinity of JUNAGUSUKU. Although
no Japanese were see to be killed, the Inf was able to advance after
the burning.
b. Co B - The 1st Plat, operating with the 6th Mar Tk Bn, cO!llr.litted
4 flame throwers to burn OROKU (TA 7376) and CHIWA (TA 7367), 26 Japanese
were killed. 3d Plat committed 2 flame throwers with Co A, 1st Mar Tk
Bn and the 5th Mar Regt. The town of YUZA was partially burned. One
vehicle broke a sprockPt and W'AS sent to TOMOSU for repairs.
c. Co C - The 3d Plat, atchd to the 32d Inf# committed 5 flame
throwers during the day. After firing 2 loads at the esoarpment, the
hose attachement was fitted and carr i ed to the top of the ridge by
Capt Niemeyer and Sgt Schrum. 70 Japanese were killed here a..."ld the
ridge secllred. Then the 5 fla.me throwers were put in line and MG's
worked o v ~ r a 500 yd frontage of the excarpement in TA 8160.
11 June 1945
1. No oft auks 0 ommi tted 18
3.
No of tanks disabled: a. 1ue
to enemy land mines 1
- 3 4 ~ -
6. No of tanks in bi vouae rut not operatiTe 6
6. Personnol,
7. Narrative:
a.
b.
Killed in action:
Wounded in action
None
:5
----
a. Co A - 1st Plat and G flame throwers from Plat operatea
with Co A, 76:5d Tk Bn fn support of the En, :58M Inf. The 4 flaIlltt
throwers moved up one at a time ana burnea in the town of YUJA ana
surrounding approaches to the Very satisfactory results
were obtained. About 15 Japanese were killea by our flame. The
Plat, operating with Co B, Tk an and the 38lst lnr burned in the
town of TOMOl and caves to the south of the town.
b. Co B - The 1st Plat, working with the 6th Mar Div on the OROKU
Peninsula:-OOmmitted 4 flame throwers in burning the town of
(TA 7468). 12 Japanese were killed. The 3d Plat committed 3 flame
throwers at various times during thtl dar in support of the 1st Mar Rgt
in the vicinity OZATO (TA7662-P)(7562-Y). Sgt Swenson was WLA while
helping to repair a marine tank. His flame thrower was piaked by
another oommander and. returned to the front lines. One flame thrower
which had been standing by near OZATO hit a large mine as it prepared
t o return to bivouac area. right track was blown off and. as
the artillery fire was heavy, it was necessary to abandon the vehicle
500 yds behind our It was destroyed. at night by Japanese. One
flame thrower burned caves in TA 7562-Y and killed 6 Japanese who were
thrOWing grenades at the supporting marine fire team.
c. Co C - The 3d Plat operated with Co C, 71lth Tk Bn ana the
32d Inf. lJn'6 flame thrower burned pillboxes and ammo dumps with tank
Mapport. - The hose attachment was fitted and carried 50 Ft up the escarp-
ment. After burning the reverse slope and killing 35 Japanese, the ridge
was secured by the Inf. Three flame throwers were committea at 1130 on
the right of regimental zon6 to fire on the escarpment. During the day
S/Sgt Tully was 1rIA and Lt Hoff KIA.
12 June 1945
1. No of tanks oornmitted 12
2. No of tanks loads of' fuel usea 14
3. No of tanks disabled, a.. Due to mechanical difficulty 4
b. Due to enemy land mines 1
5. 10 of tanks in bivouac but not operative 10
- M4 -
6. Personnel. a. Killed in action 1
b. Wounded in action None
7. Narrati ve:
a. Co A - 1st Plat with 3 tanks from the 2d Plat operated with
the 2d lnf and Co A, 763d Tk Bn. 1 flame thrower was given
the mission of burning strong point in the tOlt'tl. of YUZA. The Int'
was then able to move on. The 3d Plat operating with the 38lst lnf
and Co B, 763d Tk Bn, comndtted 1 flame thrower to fire the face of
the escarpment in their zone. On returning from this mission,
flame thrower struck a mine and was disabled. The company was given
oredit for 19 Japanese.
b. Co B - No flame throwers committea.
c. co-c - 2d Plat operated with Co B, 7l1th Tk En, committed
flame throwers in the morning to burn a village in TA 8060-PQ. 600
gals of Napalm were expended. In the afternoon they moved to a ridge
at TA 7960-J. gals of Napalm were expended in burning area targets
and caves on both fonlard end reverse slopes. 20 Japanese were killed
by flame fire. The 3d Plat left the area at 0630 with 2 flame
to operate in TA 8l59-AB, with Co C, 711th Tk Bn ana
the Inf. The hose extension to the flame gun was employed and
hoisted by rope up a 50 ft escarpment.
The flame was then fired over the opposite edge and was blown
into caves by the wina. Supporting Inf killed Japanese and 6 more
were killed with the flame. Several ammo dumps were blown up. The
hose attachment was then moved over 50 yae and attached to another
flame thrower. Two pillboxes were taken under fire and approximately
50 Japanese were killed, some killing themselves. Numerous throwers
below the escarpment moved into position to destroy Japanese who were
trying to escape the flame along the ridge. 300 gals of Napalm were ex-
pended. In the afternoon 5 flame throwers were lined up at the base of
the cliff to fire at caves and pillboxes. 30 Japanese were killed ana a
Japanese MG whioh was firing on the flame was destroyed with its
crsw of who rolled down the escarpment. 1500 gals of Napalm were ex-
pended in this action. We lost one EM - Teo 4 Louis N. Wohlgamuth, Jr
KIA.
8. 1t8marks J
a. Japanese Iilled,
Co A
Co B
Co C
Totala
Period 8-12 June --To Date
- M5-
15
G9
139
223
545
488
609
1642
1.
'G.
3.
4.
5.
b. Our KIA
c.
rI o
No
No
No
No
of
Co A
Co B
Co C
Totals
Tks Com-
mitteu
118
128
147
09S"
7 later satche l
.* 1 "
3 "
tanks
"
II
Hq
A. 1
B
C 4
SV
TOTALS 5
Tks Dil::l-
ablt:1a by
Emnny Action
11
4
15
1
1
Tks Dis-
abltla other
rtHl.::sons
8 '"
7
13
che.rgt:lu, or
28
aamagou
" "
" "
"
n
"
"
1:j June 194b
11
of tank loaas of fuel 11
01' tanks disabltlu: a. Due to terrain 1
01' tanks at prl:ll:l",nt time
or tanks in bivouac but not optlrat1 VI:1 9
6. NarratiV6:
I or WIA
2
15
'1.7
18
2
64
Gals Na-
palm ex-
penoeu
19, 800
37,GOIJ
31,350
88,350
by
" n
" "
a. Co A - 1st Plat . operatea with Co A, 76M Tk En ana the In!'.
At 1300 one-flamtl throwt:lr wat> oEmt out to burn a part 01' the
just E or YUZA, supporteu by a platoon or dtanaaru tanko. Upon
t10n or thil5 m1lSdion, the platoon withart1n ana another rlame thro"or
and tank platoon nt:lr", up. After burning tho targ",t, tho InI' .. !:I.&
enableu t o mov'Q up ana tal'.:e tht' p0tsltion. At IbUO, 1. 1'1aI1lt1 thrOnvr ntl.o
to burn e. 1'1:1" hut" NE of OZATO. i'ful1e moving up, tho tstanae.ru.
tank l<l:r6.ai:::l r:; him e. min",. Th'Q crtlw t'vacuattlu t o th:l flame tb-oo:wor,
in t urn haa failurt1. Anotht1r flame throwtlr tOWtlU it out.
b. Co B - Gc1 Plat, operating with Co B, 1st Bar Tk Bn ana the 7th
!Jar Regt, cormnittea 2 f' larTl'=' thro.-;tlrts to burn ca.vet!, trtlnche ::l and ridge d
N of' KUNISHI. No .. tire Obl:l"'rvou..
c. Co C - 0ptlratlng nith Co A, 711tn Tk Bn anu thtl "GO I nr, G
thro.-;vro :;r.; In TA muvou 40u yus up a r oau in
- ';''*0 -
this area. using the flarne guns as they adva.nced and the road was
secured by the Inf. 5 Japanese were killed by the flame throwers. 3
flame throwers were committed in TA 7960-RS. 8060-QV. burning caves.
ridges and a vi llage. One flame thrower was lost due to terrain
difficulties but the orew evacuated safely. 2 flame throwers. firing
on a ridge in this area, blew up an ammo dump and destroyed a HMG and
3 Japanes e With flame. A total of 1950 gals of fuel were expended
durinG the day.
7. Remarks:
a. Japanese Killed, Today To Date
Co A
Co B 488
Co C 742
Totals 8 1775
b. Our casualties; no ohange
o.
Tks Di8- Tks Dis- Gals Na-
Tks Com- abled by abled other palm ex-
mitted enemy aotion reasons pended
Co A 118 8

20.400
Co B 128 11 7
**
37,800
Co C 165 4 14
"'.*
37.500
TOTALS 411 15 29 95.700
*
7 later satohel charged or otherwise damaged by Japanese

1
"
If, It It! It! . "
"
",
."'.
4
" "
"
If
"' " " "
14 June 1945
1. No of tanks corroni tted 19
3. No of tanks disabled: a.
b.
Due to mechanioal difficulty 1
Due to terrain
6. Personnel: a. Killed in aotion 1
b. Wounded in actioU-4
7 Narrative I
a. Co A - 1st Plat operated in 'fA 776l-Q with Co A 763d Tk Bn and
the 383d Int. 2 flame throwe rs were to burn a series of oaves
9687380-111-26
- \54.7 -
ana tombs. A number 01' civilians ana Japanest:1 801aier "'t:1re uriV'tJD
to eurr",natlr in this action ana 15 Japanese "t:1re ki!lea.Ga Plat,
with Co D, Tk En ana the ana Ens, 381st Inf,
committed. flamt:1 thro"I:1r;; to burn ::IO!lll:1 hOUB6ti from which the Inr
was receiving MG ana snip6r l'irt:1. The mission was accomplishl:1u
satisn",ctOrl,l.y ana 15 JapantHII:1 "t:1rtl cuuntt:lu Ul:1ttu. The';a Plat
conu:littt:lu 1 1'iame ,,1t;h Co B, 76;5d Tk: En ana ;:>a En, 381st In!'.
Sgt DiCarlo, given the misl:>ion 01' firing a rocky area on the top 01'
the escnrpment, moved through the tank!:> ttna caught Japant:ltltl by sur-
prise. His first burst of' flame scatttJreu Japanest:1 in ",very direction
ana h6 nab creaitea ",ith killing 50.
b. Co B - 20 Plat, atoha to Co C, 1st Mar Tk Bn, caVe& and
tombs in theviclnity ot' TA 7460-BCD with rl:1::1uit.:.. 6a Plat
operatea with Co C, 1st Mar Tk En. 2 flame throwors burnt:1u cane 1'itl1a8
in TA 7;J60-ST ana aroVt:1 out a numb",r 01' Japant:1th., ;, 01' whicn "ore
killeu by out MGt s. On returnlng, they t:1vacuatt:1U Marint:1 Int' casualtit:1s.
Anotnt:1r flame from tnis platoon attt:11Dpteu to i'ire a oane f1ela,
but this ignition failea. He shot unignitea fueL which "as Bet off with
ViP gr6naa6s.
c. Co C - 1st Plat, atchd to Co B, 71lth Tk Bn in support 01' the
17th Inf, burnt:1d hills ana C8.Vt:18 in TA 7959-VWX. Excellent wore
obtaineu. An Inr patrol "as ovacuatt:lu by this platoon. Ga ana
Plats atcha to Co A, 711tn Tk Bn in support 01' thtl Inf, workea
continuously througnout; tno aay burning hilla1uob, and
in TA 8069. Tht:1 Co lrao creuit;eu by the lnr with the i'ollow1ng
enemy One LMG
knoClrea out.
The Bn Comdr was wounaea at lGUU,14 June, on the lnr front,
while h6 ana the other nembcrs evacuating the tank in which th6y
.wro riaing. tank hau caught firoe In 6&.mt:1 aotion Lt.
Branaino, Plat Ldr, Plat, Co C Em (Tec 4 anaCpl
Wara) from Co C Wtlre wounaea, ana the En Exec Of'fict:1r wao sii:ghtly wounaou.
Tht1 tank J.e n in tht1 !'ront lin",s. Tht:1 Co firtlu galS 01' Napalm
dur1ng the periou.
8. Remarbu
a. kili6ac
Co A
Co B
Co C
Toaa;r
50
131
181
To Date
595
488
.
1956
b. Our casualtiebC 1 Officer KIA, 2 Officers WIA, 2 EM W1A
Totals to Date KIA MIA K or WIA
Hq &: Hq Co 4
A. Co 1 15
B Co 1 27
C Co 5 20
Sv Co 2
TOTALS 6 1 68
- 348 -
c. Tks Dls- Tits Dia- Gale Na-
Tks Com- abled by abled other palm Elc-
mitted e n e ~ action reasons 12ended
Co A 126 8- 22.200
Co :B 131 11 7 38.400
Co C 173 4 15" 41.400
TOTALS 430 15 30 102.000
7 later ae.tchel charges or otherwise damaged by Japane se
1
II
" "
II II II II II
4
..
" "
11
"
II II
"
15 June 1945
l. No of tanks committee. 24
3. No of tanka disabled: a. due to mechAnical difficulty 3
4. No of t ~ n k 8 operative at presen t time 23
5. No of tanka in biTouac but not onerative 14
7. Narrative:
a. Co A - 1st Plat Operated with Co A. 763d Tk Bn in support of the
2d Bn, 382d Inf. NUmerous caves and rocky areas were taken under fire
b flame and MG's as the flame throwers advanced with the tanks. The 2d
Plat operated with Co D 763d Tk Bn and the let Bn and 2d Bn 38lst Inf. Working
in a well coordinated attack, the tank-infantry-flame thrower team destroyed
three e n e ~ strong pOints, and the armored vehicles le4 the infantry to its
ObJective. The 3d Plat worked with Co B. 763d Tk Bn and the 3d Bn 38lst Inf.
3 flame throwers moved with the standard tanks, and 1n another excellent
example of teamwork. the tanks and the flame th.cow9rs r'9duced Japanese
pOSitions and the Inf moved into consolidate the ground.
b. Co B - 2d Plat, operating with the 1st Mar Tk En committed 4 flame
throwers to burn caves and tombs in the vicinity of KONISHI ridge and MEZADO.
During the action 1 flame thrower had a track blown off by a 47mm AT gun. It
was repaired in the field and continued with itemission. The 3d Plat,
operating with the 1st Marines, used 4 flame throwers burning cave fields in
the Vicinity of Hill 69. Results were undetermined as the cave fields were
very green. but sniper fire from the fields was stopped. A total of 73
Japanese were killed by the Co.
- 349 -
c. Co C - 5 flame throwers from the 1st Plat worked with the
32d Inf and 7l1th Tk Bn. 4 loads of fuel were fired at a village in
TA 7959 and one load was fired at snipers in high grass. 2 pillboxes
were neutralized in TA 8l59-P. The 2d Plat committed 3 flame throwers
wi th the 17th Inf. Several Jal)anese MGs and a mortl:'.r posi tion were
burned and caves taken- under fire in TA 7959-CD. 50 Japanese were killed
1n thi s ac tion.
16 June 1945
l. No of ta.nks committed 16
3. No of tanks dl sabled: a. Due to mecha_nical difficulty :3
6. Narra t1 ve:
a. Co A - 1st Plat operated with Co C
t
763d Tk Bn in support of
2d and 3d Bns, 382d Inf. At 1100, Sgt Benson was sent to burn caves
E of OZATA with 2 assault guns in support. He accomplished his mis-
sion and after refueling was sent to the same area with one assault
gun. His support was very poor, as the assault gun was too busy
firing on targets of opportunity and failed to cover the flame
thrower. Lt. Lyle's flame thrower, while waiting in an assembly area,
wa.s attacked by 2 Japanese with a satchel chr; rge. It fortunately
did not go off,and the Japanese were killed. S/Sgt Gleason accomnanied
the Inf on t'!>'o mi ssions. In each case hi s fhl.m. enabl.ed the Inf
to reach their objective. The 2d the advance with
MG fire until such times when it was necessary to pass through and
use the flame gun. Very satisfactory results were obtained, although
one flame thrower had to ignite the Napalm with tracers when his ignition
system failed.
b. Co E - The 2d Plat committed 2 flame throwers to burn out
caves and tombs in TA 7460-GR which were with snipers.
A number of Mar Inf casualties were 2 flame throwers
from the 3d Plat, working with the 1st Mar Tk Bn, burned the base of
KUNISRI Ridge at TA 7560-GH wi th no observed resul ts.
C. Co C - The 1st Plat, working with the 17th Inf, fired
8 loads of Napalm 1n TA 7860-11X, 7959-AB, includine Hill 153. A
Japanese with a sa tchel charge attempted to reach Sgt Davison's vehicle,
but he was killed with a burst of fl ame. 2d Pl8t, operating with the
32d Inf, fired 1800 gals of Napalm at pillboxes, caves and the escarpment
in TA 7958-D, 7959-Y.
17 June 1945
1. No of tanks 12
3. No of t a nks disabled: e. Due to mechenlc&l difficulty __
4. No of tanka Operative at present time 23
6. Peraonnel: a. Killed in action: None
c. Outstanding performance of individuals or units!
Capt Niemeyer and Sgt, Davison crAvled across 50 yds of exposed ground
to drag a wounded infantryman to cover after Inf 1n the area failed
to answer his cell for help. When they reached their they carried
h1m back, using the tank for a shield.
7. Narretive:
a . Co A - let Sec, 1st Pl at operatl'!d with Co C, 763d T'!-.:: Bn and
2d and 3d Bns. 382d Inf against targets 1n TA 7761-PH. 2d Sec. 1st Plat
operated with 3d Bn. 383d in TA 7?6D-R. Very satisfactory results
were obtained against caves, pillboxes and rocky 10 JanAn8Se
were killed, 30 more estimated and ,Ii number of others driven
out to be killed by the Inf. There no personnel or vehiculAr
casualties. 900 gals of Nfl"Oalm wer e exp",nded. Pfc Watkins was
at 1800 in the c0tl1!>any area. He wss hit in the leg by a Japanf!se sniper.
b. Co B - 1st Plat. operating with 6th Mar Bn. vorked over
KUNISHI Ridge and KUNISHI Valley. 2d Plat with the 1st Mar Tk Bn, burned
targets on MEZADO Ridge. 11 JepA.nese werP. counted dead. 1 :Df. Pfc Ct\k.
IIA. One flame thrower vas disabled by engine failure. 1400 gR.la of
Napalm were expended.
c. Co C - 3 flame throwers of the 1st Plat supported the lat and
2d Bns of the 11th Inf. 2!. loads of fuel vere expended firing at ridges,
caves and rock masses on BILL 153 (TA 7859), aiding the Inf to advance
about 800 yards. 5 flame throwers were atchd to the 32d Inf. working in
fA 1959-B. 6t loads of fuel were expended on brush, caves and the
escarpment. Sgt Davison killed one Japanese with an Japanese
rifle while Capt Niemeyer commanded tank On a minion. Sgt Boughan
killed one Japanese who was trying to place a satchel charge on a tank.
Capt Niemeyer and Sgt Davison crawled acrose 50 yde of exposed ground to
bring back a wounded infantryman after the Inf in the arPo8 had refused to
answer hie call for help. One EM. Pfc Strobbe. was WIA. 2650 gals of
Napalm were expended. 4 Japanese (Light) and 1 mortar were destroyed.
31 Japanese were counted dead.
8. Remarks I
a. Japanese killed:
CoA
Co B
Co C
Total s
- 351 -
Today To De. te
10 647
11 572
-;3"'1 ____
52 2283
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
b. Our to
c.
Co A
Co B
Co C
Ro, t Rq Co
ACo
Co
C Co
S. Co
TOTAlS
Com-
m! tted
152
146
196
TOTALS 494
*
7 lAter
H
1
,
"
fH
4
, ,
No. of t 1'l nlt e committed
No. of t enks load s of
. of t Anks o'oer a t1ve
lTo.of t Rn}rs 1n bivouac
ative
Narrfl tl ve :
Dot. KIA
1
5
6
':Ilt:.s Dia-
abled by
-rensl!I,l Action
1
4
5
MIA I
4
16
1 27
22
2
1 71
Tk. Dls-
abled other
R'!e 80ns
8 *
12 -#
18 i/H
38
GAls
N'Rnslm

30 , 000
44,000
51,'00
125,790
chl>rf!'ed or ... 18e dP. m:1 ,f"ed by S:!!lAn",,,e
"
, , ,
"
,
, ,
"
,
"
,
n
fuel used
.<!
at nreaent .time 24
but not cmer-
II
A. - 1st Sec, 1st Plat with Co C, 760d Bn
end 2d ]n, Inf 1n TA ?6SC-JI. 2d Bee, 1st PlAt, onerated with
Co C, 76;1d T'I<: Pn In . mttTlort of Rn, In! 1n TA ??SO-B. The 'ad
Ph.t, wit h Co D. 763d T'ic !In, sWl'Oorted let ,o:tnd 2d :Hns of the 3Bl st
lnf in TA 7759-:9CGR. The 2d Sec, 3d Fl at sur-ported the 3d 'Rn, 381at
In! Y1 th Co :R. 763d T\:- In all Cp..BeB, the fl ame throwers supported
the i nf -tanlr edvElne .. with until the fb.mPi V A S needed, then
moved througr e nd burned the t arget. Results were VAry sAtisfa ctory .
b. Co 'R - 1st PlPt , onere.tin...; ,.-tth t h!'! 6th Tlt 1In, bu!'ned
the town 27 JApr.nese vere The Zd And 3d Plats
o'ner ating ..,i th the 1 st 'M'" burned trenches end
eave s on f.:EZADO Ridp;e. Pfc p ..... tmotted 8 J p.T)1;1.nese artillery
movtnr. into -::> os1ti on. It by our MC. and after
the ere .... "'I e lOlled or c. 1S!>e!' sed, the pun destroyed by
tank fire. One flM'le t hroer burned KONISHI R1dp.;e Or r! th no ob-
served results. There were no or vehiculAr casualties.
- -
c. Co C - 4 flC'IIe t r.rowors ..... -era stchd t o Inf. Th'!lY
fired 4 l'O'P'dS ceves, s}o'"les, r ;tvtl'\"!s end r1 tV'e t Oll S. A
s :t tctel wps t hr o,"m I'!: t Ynl'i"''' I S end SFt s
tp.n'-:: ...... " $ subjected tn 10 rds of 1f,0"!'" p. rtillery firl'!. No d!J!I'IP.ge
WllS re""ort -ed . 4 J!,T)anp,se ... erE! seen t o '!-I -e killed :;. nd I UJ. G destr oyed .
'!'h./? !-ct t on took n I ece i n ':'A ?Q58- JlC . 4 fh . .''':l e throwers were etchd
to l 84th I n!'. fired l Oads at. Ci".veB, br'l s;' nnd
c.estroy1nr A:: AI'!l:nO dUI:l') in TA ?e58- BC.
6.
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Re:'l<".rks :
n. J El.pAneSe Killed: TOdaz To Det.
Co A 86 733
Co B 32 604
Co C
4 1069
TOTALS 122 2405
b. Our Ce.8UR.lties:
Chanr
e
e. Tks D18- T,ks Oi s- ,Gals
.Tks Coo- by aoled other "J'p;pal!!l
mitt'!!d ene!nl 2.ction r eacon s

Co A
160 No chang e Po cbanf:;e 33. 600
Co B 151
,
"
, ,
45 , 950
CO C 204
,
"
,
"
53,350
TOTALS 515 132,900
19 Jun. 1945
No. of t811ka committed

No. of tank 10ad8 of fuel uSAd
i!!
no. of tanks disabled;
a. Du. to r,echan1ce.l difficul ty...A
No. " of t Anks Ooeratlve a t nresent
t ime
No. of tanks 1n bivouac but not operat ive g
Personnel:

Killed in action: None
b. Wounded in action: 1
c. Outstanding of ind1viduals or
units: Sgt Boughan, Co C, will be recommended for decoration.
See Par ?e.
7. Narra tive:
a. Co A - The 2d Sec, 1st Plat, wi th the 2d !n, 3B2d
Inf and ;r;o had one flame thrower wi th the 34 Bn. 383d lnf And one
vi th the 24 !n. 3Q5th In!. Their action t ook -p lace in TA ??60-m'!..
The 24 Plat .upported the 2d En. 38let lnf in TA 7?6o-UV. Rocky
- -
cliffs, caves, cuts and Y)1llboxes with very
results. 110 Jppanes<> ',yere known to h:'tve t; gen
bO !.-,ors estimpted. Th'C:re were no friendly personnAl
or vehi cular C3 sual ti e s.
b. - 1st Pl"l.t atched to the 6th !,l ::: r Div. Sgt
Zanelli, with the 22d Regt, mo'Oped up in TA ?359-U1. He
first atte!!Ipted to use the but when it only
fired 10 ft, he drove the tank Up and used the flame
50 Japanese were killed. in tr..'i s action <".nd 30 F'.is taken.
The flc_ue thro.:er WE:.S credited ;.1.th 4:). Lt Bennett t ook
2 throwers to burn caves and houses in TA ?258-0 p.nd
?55?-KPL, 22 Ja:'Janese were killed .. r1 th fla'11e nnd The 2d
Flat c'ommi tted 1 flame t!lrovler. Lt sum: ortinf
the l,ler Inf aciv,lnce by burning c<!Ves '1nd tom'bs in TA ?657-P.
20 Japanese were killed in this The 3d Plat cO'11mitted
Sgt 1J,attson's tank, but being une.ble to k:eery u!' wi th the
other t8.Ilks he returned and burned ce.ves and rubble in
TA 7559-G. He WAS credited ",lith 50 Ja:oanese. After refuelin",,
he burned c,:.:>ves end tombs in TA 7559-P. 10 Jr:pMese and
civilians were driven out to cut down by the tanks.
c. Co C - 2d & 3d plats were atchd to 2?d Inf and fired
8 loads of nApalm in TA ?958-LR 8059-PQ, p.t 1rush, caves,
pillboxes a nd cliffs. Bourhan fired ? at cp.ves
brush fro'll which sni..,er fire !'.oldinf: un the 8clvpnce.
',,'hen the 11'lf W?S a f<a in halted, S,,;t Boughan atchd 450 ft of
hose to his tank. ','ath the help of the Inf he it to
the top of the esc8.I!Jment. As the Inf se.id they had no one
to handle the ho se, Se:t handled it himself, leedine
In! throUf.h a sniper infested area. Althouph the hose
leaked bAdly, & Sgt Boughan was drenched 1,1i. tr. nfl-:')al:n, he
continued until the fuel was Ee saw only 2 Japanese
burned, but the In! said ma..'1Y more were killed. The rifle-
man nearest Sst Boughan 1;<; s from hi s Y.-l in
sUIlPort. Se:t Boughan's :;Jerform8nce drew hi e h prai se from
both 'the Inf 8: Aft<>r retiring froT;l the ebo"7e c.c-
tlon, Sgt Boughan spotted a Japanese ?5P.l.11 gu.n as it knocked out
a . 711th Bn He im7nediately ju.'irped into another
711th tent & the gun on the Jnuanese The - tank then
killed the Japanese crew with Sgt Armstrong fired 3 loads &
destroyed the above mentioned gun & 5 more Jananese. Sgt
fired 2 loaas to neutralize e.11 on a hill from
which sniper and mortar fire were holding up the advance.
The 3d Plat 0:9 era ted wi th the 184th Inf in TA ??59-\f.X e.nd
?858-GH. Sgt Hay.:;ood was VilA when a tank ran over a dud at
the refueling :9oin t. He waS replaced. by S{:t Richardson who
fired 1 load at a series of pillboxes. 4 surrendered
and one was ldlled. Lt Jonkousk:i and Tee 5 Dei!i tt fired 2
loeds ench a.t enaolinf: t he Inf to advance wi thout
Opl) 081tion. They killed 45 Japan.o:!se find c. estroyed 2 UiGls .
8 . Remarks :
a. Japanese Killed:
. ToCay DA' 0_
Co A 110 e43
Co B 132 7M
Co C H 2O
TOTALS 294 2099
l<IA I or
,il A
b . Our to da te __ ____
c.
Eq Hq Cc
A eo 1
_ eo
C Co
Sv Co
5
TOTALS 6
Tka Com- Di s-
mi tted "bled by
1
1
en!my nctl on
Co
A
161 chrulge
Co R
151
,
"
Co C
202
"
,
TOTALS 514
20 June 1945
1. No . of tanks cO"!t.., l tted
No. of tAnk loads of fue l u sed 34
4
16
27
23
2
72
T'ta Di 8 -
ab1 ed 0 ther
r ea soha
}:o chanc e
, ,
"
"
Gals
. :rp;r alm
exo ended
38 ,100
47 .750
57,250
1 43,11)0
3. Po. of tanks a. Du.e to mechanlcRl difficulty ..l
b. Due to t errain
4. of t t'A'<S At nresent ti r:l '3....
5. of tanks 10 'bivoucc but not
6 . Feraonnel:a . Killed in ac t ton-l-
b . 1;lounded II I' ..1...
7. Narrati va:
a. Co A - 1st Pl a t Co C, Bn I n
of 2d In!, 2 fl ame throvera sunported the Inf adva nc e
l!G fire . and on 5 occasione moved u,; to burn s tronl'" 'Oo i nts vhlch
were hol ding Un the advance. 'lne refuel1 n& poi nt WI\8 ke-pt ';1'1 thin
500 yds of the front liM, which very eatisfactorj'.
-
supply system was used with the flame thrower operating with the
3d Bn, 381st Inf. This vehicle also supported the Inf advance
with flane and 'MG, and, as in the first case, the Inf was able
to move in and hold each center of resistance after it had been
burned. This action was in TA 7759. 2d Plat committed 3 flame
throwers 'With Co C, 38lst Inf. A road running through a cut N
of ARAGACHI and th reverse slope of the escarpment in that
vicinity were flamed. The last mission was to neutralize a
ridge from which the Inf received heavy AW fire. Another
2d Plat flame thrower assisted the 2d Bn, J05th Inf in eliminat-
ing a pocket in TA 776l-u. The 3d Plat operated with the 1st
Bn, 38lst Inf. In an advance toward MEDEERA, the flame throwers
supported with MG fire and twice moved up to flame areas from
which the Inf was halted by MG fire. Before being released the
flane throwers worked over a cut which was to be used in the next
day's assault on MEDEERA . At 0300 some Japanese atte;npted to set
up a LMG in the bivouac area. Although they were stopped and 2
killed, 3 of our men were WIA by grenades.
b. Co B - The 1st Plat operated 2 flame throwers with the
6th IAar Div in the KIYAMU-GUSUKU hill mass. The 2d Plat with the
1st Mar Div committed 3 flame throwers in TA 7559-FL. Caves and
tombs were burned and they assisted in the assault of Hill 79.
50 Japanese were killed. 2 flame throwers from the 3d Plat were in
the same assault, killing 26 Japanese.
c. Co C - 5 flame throwers were atchd to 32d Inf in TA 7859-NO
and 7957-UV. Targets engaged were brush, escarpments, pillboxes,
thick grass and ridges. 11 loads of Napalm were fired killing a
large number or Japanese and enabling supporting and Inr to
kill many more. 4 flame throwers were atchd to 1st Bn, 184th In! in
TA 7858-qR. 3 loads of napalm were fired at pillboxes,
gun positions and caves. One vehicle while test firing his flame
gun at the forward refueling point, accidently flushed 12 Japanese
who were promptly destroyed. At 1430, Tec 5 DeWitt was killed by
JaIBnese MG fire when he dismounted to receive instructions from the
Inf. At 0530, in the bivouac area, Cpl Burkheimer investigated a
noise in a cane field about 200 yds from the perimeter. He nearly
stepped on 2 Japanese, then killed them. At 0830 a Japanese was
wounded at a cave mouth near the bivouac. 3 EM investigated the cave
5 Japanese surrendered. During the day's action, 193 Japanese
killed, 5 captured and the following equipment 1
arty ammo dump, 2 - l05-mm. guns, 1 HMO and an estimated 25 lMGs.
d. Hq & Sv Forward CP - At 0900, Tec 4 Morris and Tec 5 Sarver
encountered and killed 8 Japanese soldiers about 800 yards E of the
Bn forward CP.
8. Remarks:
a. Japanese Killed: Toda;y: To rete
Hq & Sv 8 8
A 100 943
B 736
C
l2J 1
1
.213
Totals 301 3,000
.356 -
b. Our casualtip-s to date
KIA
IlIA I or WIA
Hq & Hq Co
4
A Co 1 16
B Co 1 27
C Co 6 23
SV Co 2
TOTAIS
7 1 72
c. Tks Com- Tks Disabled Tks Disabled Gals Napalm
mitted by enemy action other reasons
8 *
Co A 170 1
42,300
Co B 151 12"* 47,750
Co C 211
4
19
***
Totals 532
5 39
151,500
*
7 later satchel charged or otherwise d_ged by Japanese
**
1
"
,
"
" "
"
"
***
4
"
"
, , ,
" "
21 June
1945
l. No of tanks committed 29
2. No of tank load::! of fuel used
43
3. No of tanks disabled: &. ilie to mechanical difficul ty
3
4.
No of tanks operative at present time
24
5.
No of tanks in biVOUac but not operative 1)
6. Personnel: &. Ki l led in action: None
b. Wounded in action
-L
7 .
a. Co A - 1st Sec, 3d Plat, operated with Co B, ?63d Tk Tn 1n
support of 1st and 3d Bns, 3Blst In! on the N approach to MEDEERA.
They moved out at 0800 but _ere held up for 1,. hra by sol diers and
civilians :rurrendering. The flame throwers then burned a cut
thr ough which the tanks and Inf passed to gain commanding terrain.
After passing through, it was found that the reverse slope was so
well defended that f l ame was again necessary at this point. After
evacuating some casualties, the flar.le throwers were released. The
remainder of the 3d Plat operated E of MEDEERA with the J05th In!.
The Inf moved down a ridge and as they advanced the flame throwers
and standard tanks supported lfi th tire and flame from both sides.
80 Japanese were killed by flame throwers durinG the day.
-357 -
"
"
b. Co B - 1st at chd t o the 6th Tk 9n, burned
caves a."d tunnel s in TA 7456-J, ?556-F. 4 HUGs and
9 knee mort3.rs were destroyed . 4J Japanese "er e killed of which
2 were shot from tank t urret by set Webb and Sgt The
2d Plat l'faq atchd t o the 7th :,1ar Regt, b'.Jrning C1:l. ves and
pillboxes in TA 7559- 000IlI.NO. 19 Japanese were killed and 25
captured. An am!:l.o dump and 2 MOs were destr oyed. The 3d
Plat wor ked 4 f lane throwers with the 5th Mar Regt, burning
caves and t renches in TA ?658-AB, 7559-0 in support of an
attack on HILL 81 (TA 7559- Y) and HILL 85 (TA 7658-H). One
tank br oke a track and had t o be abandoned under sniper and
MG rirp., after being disarmed . One 'Was disabled by
011 leak. The Co f i red 5400 gals of Napalm and killed 141
Japanese.
c. Co C _ 7 flame throwers operated with the 32d I nr in
TA ?956-A, 7856-E. 17 loads of fuel were fired at the escarp-
ment, caves and tall grass. A large number of Japanese were killed
b-J the flame and many more flushed to be cut down by the Inf.
several 'Ws and one 20-!!IlTI. gun were silenced or destroyed.
3 flame throwers operated with the 1st Bn, 184th In! in TA
7757- 0 . Several pi llboxes and mortar positi ons were engaged
satisfactory results . During the ni ght the bivouac ar ea
attacked by 6 Japanese with small arms and grenades . 2 were
killed. The Co counted 185 dead Japanese during the period.
8.
a. Japanese ki lled, Toctal To
Hq Hq Co 8
A Co 75 1, 018
H Co 141 877
C Co 183

Totals
399 3, 399
b. Our to Date: KIA MIA I or 'Pi'It,
Hq & Hq Co
4
A Co 1 17
B Co 1 27
C Co 6
23
Sv Co 2
Totals 7 1
73
c. Tks Co:n- Tko t isab1ed Tko lisa bled Gals Napalm
mitted
by
enemy action other rea sons expended .
Co A
17'." 1
8 *
44, 700
Co B 162 14 ...
53,150
Co C 221
4 19
"**
66 , 5.50
Totals 562 5 41 164,400
*
7 later satchel charged or otheMfise damaged by Japanese
....
1
" "
" " "

" "
***
4
"
"
" "
" "

"
- 358 -
22 June 1945
1. No of tanks ___
2. of tank loads of fuel used 42
3. No of tanks disabled: a.
[ue to :nechanical difficulty

b. llie to enemy fire (satchel charge)
.-1.._
4.
No of tanks operative at present time 29
5.
No of tanks in bivouac but not operative 10
6. s. Killed in None
b. Wounded in action _ 3_
? Narrative:
a. Co A _ The 8 operative flame thrcwers in the company were
all atchd to ro C 76Jd Tk Bn and the J05th Inr with the mission of
taking Hi l l 85. flame throwers and standard tanks were split
up in two one t o support the Inr on each side. The group
on the left was able to place fire and flaffie ahead of the In! with
good results, but those' on the right (north) side ran into t.rouble.
Without close In! suppor t they ,\'ere unable to defend themsel ves
when they encountered a number of Japanese in shell holes anci caves.
2 flame throwers were satchel charged, one of ",hieh was p.lt out of
action. This group then withdrew and joined the other. The hi l l
was taken and the tanks released at 1600. The company killed
15 Japanese dur ing the day.
b. Co B _ 1st Plat c,ommi tted .3 fla:Tle throwers to support
the 6th ',1ar Div in mopping up TA 7255- BOH, 7456-QONI. 1 ammo dump
and 1 oil dump 'Were fired. 2d Plat supported 7th ftegt in
moppine up TA 756k, 766.1. Cane caves , brush and ruhble
were burned in area. The 3d Plat mopped up in TA 7559- TV\\,NS,
7659-'! . Bn.lsh and. Caves were burned . The company had :2 Fl!- !IA.
Set Hayes and Tee I. 'Reard r.ere 'o'Iounced by a splash frOr:l a sni per's
bul let hit the turret of the tank on which they wer e riding.
The corn.pany burned 6,000 ea1s of Napalm, killed 47 Japanese and
t ook 2 fi'ls.
c . Co C - 4 throwers atchd to the )2d lnf to burn
caves and t.roops pockets in the regtmental zone. 2 of the caves
are said to have opened into the Japanese Army Hqs . Set Schrum, using
the hos fired 10 caves. He was ac companied by an
interpreter with <l loud speaker "ho tried to get the Japanese to leave
the caves. Only 2 wer e taken this way. i'he hose exploded twice
during the operation . Sgt Armstrong fired load at caves along the
beach and repor ted many suicides. Sgt Holmes firec two loads in a
hi l l in which an 31 Comdr reported 50C Japmese holed up. Hi th the
llelp of Sr.t Boughan and Cpl Lopez, the hill was completely
reduced. 4 flatle throwers were atchd to the 1st Bn, 184th
In! and copped up in TA ??.5?-PQ. Numerous caves were fired
with many Japanese casualties. One load was fired into a large
crater near the company area. 9 Japanese were killed they
charged the dismounted men from Co Hq section who were support-
j ng the flame t hrower. An officer cha.rged S/Sgt OUnghouse with
his sword. 8 other Japanese, including one Captain were captured.
Cpl Snow was WIA by a Japanese grenade near the bivouac area. The
Co expended 4, 200 gals of napalm. 868 Japanese were killed.
d . Hq &. S!...!saoward CP _ 1 Japanese was killed and .5 captured
in the bivouac area.
7.
a.
Japanese Tocla:l
To IQte
Hq & Sv Co
i 9
A Co
15
lq33
8 Co
47 92.
C Co
868 <3<*
Totals

b. Our casualties to Date: KIA MIA I or WIA
Hq & Hq Co
"'
A Co
1 17
B Co
1 <9
C Co 6 <5
Sv Co
"
TOTALS
7 1
76
c. Tks Com- Tko !.'d.sabled Tko Disabled Gals Napalm
mi tted by enemy action other reasons expended.
Co A
187 No Change
Co B 173
Co C 220
TOTALS 589
23 June 1945
1.
No of tanks committed
_2.L
No of tanks oper3t ive at present time 13
,5 . Narrative:
a. - 2 flame throwers were atchd to
Itopping up operations in t he vicinity of OUTO.
fired with cane fields as the main target . The
- 360-
No Change 48,600
59,150

178,500
the 1st Bn, 382d Inf for
6 loads of .fuel were
name proved very
effective in flushing the Japanese as the Inf stood by to kill or
capture them. Late in the day one of these flame throwers moved
over to the escarpment East of OZATO and used the hose attach-
ments on caves With good results. 4 flame throwers operated
the 38lst In!, mopping up strong enemy resistance in MEImlU. In
one case the I n! blasted a hol e i n a courtyard wall, then a flame
thrower pulled up and burned 57 Japanese who were hiding there.
b. Co B _ 1st Plat operated 'f/ith the 6th Div. S/Sgt
Lintner with J flame throwers mopped up in TA 7456, exploding
an ammo dump and killing 30 Jaranese. Lt Sutherland's 2d Plat,
3 flame throwers operated with the 1st Div in TA. 76f:IJ-
?560, 7661. 16 Japanese were killed. Sgt Schmidt from the 3d
Plat fired one load in TA 7559-Q.
c. Co C _ 5 !lame throwers were atchd to the J2d In! and
2 flame throwers to the 1st En, 184th Inf. Sgt Schrum fired
into 4 caves, killing 23 Japanese . He also killed one with his
pistol at the refueling point. Sgt Holmes reported to the Inf
En Comdr and was told that 1000 Japanese were rounded up in a huge
cavern . The approaches to this cavern had been mined, so the
infantry removed them to penni t the flame throwers to approach .
When interpreters fai led to get more than a handful out by
loudspeakers, Sgt Holmes fired one load into the main entrance.
There was no estimate as to the number of killed. One
patrol entered this caVA and never came out. A second
patrol entered, received casualties and wit hdrew. Sgt Arm-
strongts tank tired one load over a bluff on the shore and
the wind blew the flame back into the caves underneath.
5 huge explosions resulted. Pic Sheets anc Pfc Kauffman, Sv Co,
killed one Japanese each at the .retueling point with SMGs.
d. Hg & Sv Forward CP - 1 Japanese killed 1n the bivouac
area in the early morning. 5 were killed and one captured at
by a eecurity patrol. 1!m, Tee 4 Millette,
6. Remarksf a. Japanese Killeds Today To IB.te
Hq & Sv 6
15
A 102 1,135
B 46 970
C
-1Q
TOTALS 184 4,514
b. Our Casualties to rate,
KIA MIA I or WI6
Hq
4
A
1 17
B 1 29
C 6 25
Sv
J
Total s 7 1 78
- 361 -
c.
1. No of
2. No of
3. No of
4. lJo of
Co A
Co E
Co C
Totals
tanks
Tks
mlttec
193
180
235
668
'!'ks Disabled
by enemy action
No Change
24 June
1945
committed
-L
tank l oads of fuel used
13
tank"
oper ative at present
30
Tks Disabled
other reasons
No Change
t anks in bivouac but not oper ative
Gab Napalm
expended.
53, 100
63, 400
73,150
189 , 650
5. Per sonne It 8. Out standing performance of individuals or units:
Co C, received a verbal from the 32d Inf f or
"EXcel l ent lII or k in accompUshing a most difficult mi ssior. . II
6 . Narrative :
a. Co A - 2 flame t hrowers were atchd to the 381st Inf, mopping up
in the vicinity of ' tEDEERA. As t he Inf hit pocket s of res istance, t he
flame t hrowers moved in to burn . The results _ere ver y satisfactory;
1?5 Japanese were ki ilec by the flane throwers .
b. Co B - 1st Plat c ommitted 2 flame t hr owers to burn ridges and
caves for the 6th Uar Div in TA 7458-0. No r esults were observed .
1 flamet hror.er from the 3d Plat w rned cane .fiel ds f'or t he ?th lAar
Regt a t HANJA where sniper fire was received . 3 J apanese were run out
and captured .
c. Co C - 2 throwers were vnt h the 3d An, 5th
Mar ine t o mop up in that Regt 's zone . No Japane se 'I\'e r e seen to be
killed. 2 flame thr owers atchd to the 3d Bn , l84t h Inf . Sgt Schrum
flus hed many from caves , 10 of which wer e ki l led by his tank,
the remainder by the i nfantr y. Cpl Lopez ' tank flushed and killed
15 Japanese . Sgt Schrum received a commendation f r om the I n! Rn COOldr
y.i.th "hom he vras T(Qrking for his "excellent work in the succes sf ul
fulfillment o.f a most di f f icult m.i5sion. "
d . Hq & Sv Forward CP - 2 ,Japanese were killed i n the bivouac
area dur ing the ni ght. 1 more was ki l l e d by A Hq Co patr ol at
Several caves were blasted in the a r ea.
7. Re!llar ks : a. Japanese Killed: To Date
Hq & Sv
3
18
A 175 1,390
B 970
c
2. {,12
Totals 203 4,707
- 362 -
c .
T(.s [ i s ablec Tk s ii sable(i
5, j .!:.t c: othEr
Co i.
l OS 11 0 !: o Chal. f,
Co
0
1:)3
Co c
..lJC'
'!\)TA : ,,S
ln
25 Junf' ).0<. 5
1 . : '0 of taO\;;9 c0'T!11tted u
2 . 1:0 of tan" 10a(\5 of fuel usee
3 . t'o of tanks at tine ) 4
4. t:o of tan ks in biVouac but not oPf' r a t.iv' __ 5_
5. I'!2.r ra t i ve :
3. Co A - fic fl a"1' thr0Wl:'rs were c OT!t'll itte c .
GClls :: apal.'Il
ex t)nc:c .
54, }CD
64, )00
74 . 950
11;13 , 550
b . Co::: - 2 f la.-:f' fr om 1st Plat bu r nee CLl v es in
t he v:'cinit y 0;' sU;C!Jortio[ 1s t i n t hei r
:r.op up. ;; l'. ere and 2 3::lr.'l O du:nps cestr' oj "ec .
c . Co C - ;; fla:nE" :. hr c ... er s were at cr.c :' 0 t hE' 32c :nf in :r.o p.-
ri nt: u p op'r3. tion::; alonG t he bea ch . In',er pret er s wor l.:ed .... i th t he
t ank- infant ry t ean in an a t ':.!:1 pt. to I h" to
\' hen th:" s failed , the fl &'Ue tlu' ,/I"Ii2-r S f i r ed sh0r t. int o '.he
CFi V f"S as f ll r ther j nducment . ;.. nurr.Of T were ca ;:> t ur ec and 21
l't e r e killed b:: I n: .
C. Sv FOP',a r d CD - 2 .f e, panes e 'Ti e- rE ca rtnr ed durinG the
pe, 'joc: , onf' of y, ho'n .... o l kE- c i n ';..o t.hE' bi v oua c a r ea t o bi ve hi n\ :)clf
L p. L. WtT: ,:: : led '0;; ane: .3 .,,: omen :'r. sol di e r t z U!;:' f cr ::,
acco;;,,?an:;i:-:(, U-,e::; wel' E' a l so r:i llec . 6 ci vili::.J ' S "<if;: r e interr.ec .
6. !'ten<>. r.;s :
a . ,J a panpse "': i lled ; 70
22
c .
Co A
Co p
Co C
Total::!
Hq Sv
A
3
C
,:,otals
1 , ) 00
:2 972
___ h4.:Q
2.7 :., '/ jt.
Tks C0::; - tisablec 7ks L'i sabl ed r,als ';a pal :n
j;l i t by P n <:':;, 'i a (' :, j 0 s" __
195 1; 0 Char.r;e i!o Chan Ee 51. , 300
185 64,900
241 _ _ ________
621- - - ------ ----- 195 , 050
Scanned by MltSp1'!tMlmua'ls
- - 353 -
1. No of tanks committ ed 5
3. No of tanks operative at present time
J5
4. No of tanks in bivouac rut not operative _4_
5. Personnel!

Killed in action: None
--
6 . Narrative:
a. Co A - 1 flame thrower was corrmi tted to burn cane fields
around the 96th Div Cpo 900 gals of Napalm were expended.
b. Co B - No flame throwers were committed.
c. Co C - 4 flame thrower s were atchd to the 32d In! in
m.oppi ng up caves and rocky areas al ong the beach. 27 Japanese
were burned and grenade expl osions within the caves in-
dicated that others were suicide.
d. Hq & Sv Forward OP _ The Bn Comdr, Maj Litt lepage was
lilA by a sniper while observing the action with Co C. UaJ Wood
assumed command of the Bn. At 1500 a woman and 6 Japanese, in_
cluding one sailor were captured in the vicinity of the bivouac
area.
7. Remarks:
a. Japanese Y. llledt ,T"od=a .. y __
Hq l< SV 22
A 2 1,300
B
C _ _ _
Totals 29 4,761
b. Our Casual ties to IBte:
KIA _
IlIA I or WI A
c.
Co A
Co B
Co C
Tot.la
Hq
A 1
B
C 6
Sv
Totals
7
Tks Com- Tks Disabled
action
195 No Change
185
245
625
- - 364 -
1
1
5
17
29
26
)
79
Tks D1 sabled
other reasons
No Change
Gals Napalm
expended.
54,300
64,900
78. 251;>
27 June
1945
1. No of tanks comr:rl.tted
5
2. No of tank loads of fuel used-
7
J. No of tanks operative at present time
J5
4.
No of tanks 1n bivouac but not operative
4
6. Narrative:
8. Co A - No flame committed. 2 Japanese were killed
by h1 vouae guards.
b. Co B-3 flame throwers burned cane fields in the vicinity
of HANJA with no observed results.
c. Co C _ 2 flame throwers were atchd to the 32d In! to burn caves
along the beach. 4 loads of Napalm were fired, including one with the
hose attachment. 24 Japanese were killed. the day the tank coro-
were fired upon by Japanese snipers but friendly In! alongside the
tanks were not bothered. At 2)00 one EM, Cpl Maccarone, was wounded by
fire when 2 Japanese infiltrators were discovered.
? REIlI8.rksf
a. Japanese Killed: ,T"o"ds,y""-__ -'T"o_IlB=;ct"".
Hq&5v 22
A 1,300
B 972
C ____
Totals . 20 4,781
b. Our Casualtiesf
1 !]I _ lilA.
c. Tks COr:I.- Tks Disabled Tks Disabled Gals Napilm
mitted by enemy action other reasons

Co A 195
No Change No' Change
54,300
Co B 188 65,800
Co C

Totals 6:xJ 199,550
28 June 1945
1. No of tanks operative at present time
35
2. No of tanks in bivouac but not operative
4
J.
Narrative: There was no action for the battalion today.
- 385-
29 June 1ill
1 . No of tanks operative at present time J7
2. No of tanka i n bivouao but not operative 2
3. Narrative:
a. Co A - 7 Japanese were killed in the vicinity of the bivouac
uea.
b. Co B and C - Saw no acti on and r eported no Japanese contacts.
c. Rq & Sv Forward CP - 8 Japanese were ki lled in the vicinity of
the CP qy our patrols during the period.
4.
Remarks,:
a. Japg,nese Killed: Today: To Date
Hq & Sv 8
JJ
A 7 1,3O?
B 972
C 2 . /t,f!7
Totals
15 4,786
b. Our No Change.
c. Operational Statistics: No Change.
30 June 1945
1. No of tanks operative at present time )7
3. Narratives
a. Co A - Effective 301000, Co A released from t o 96th In!
Div and reverts to Bn control. The company moved i nto the Sn rehabilj ta-
tion area, vicinity of MINATOGA.
b. Co B and C - No action.
c. Hq & Sv Forward CP _ 2 Japanese were killed about 2200 by
bivouac guards.
4. Remarks:
a. Japanese Killedf
Hq & Sv
A
B
C
Totals
.. T"od"a .. ,,- ' __ To tQte
2 ')2
2
- 366 .-
1,307
972
_-..;2", . ill..
4,788
CHAPTER VII
:ENEY.Y TAOTICS
ThE'! resista.nce met by our forces duril'l(: this 'Oeriod of was
well Rnd stubbornly executed. The enemy selected excellent.
terrain wi th commanc. ing and s1.lpl')ortin,'" fields ot" fire i.n 'Oosi tion where he
endeavored to make a. determined stand. The enemy units encountered con-
sisted mostly of lndenendent infantry and !!lortar battalions in sU'p'Oort of
anti-tank comnanles. Artillery, 8unnortlng the assaulting troons,
,e:rrployed counter-battery fire on a scale than has eTer been exner-
ienced on any other previous oneration 1n the Ppcific The!'lt .. r. The 'anti-
wea"')oils used by the enemy, the 47!!lm gun .... ith its increased
muzzle velocity, tend to bear out the fact that the Jf!'Oaneee have given
much thought and the to the develo'(',;nent and improvement of a gun that will,
8S has been proven, effectively penetrate the arIr.or of a medium tp.nk. The
47 mm gun a large nUMber of tank CAsualties. These guns were
located in -pre:oared positions, caves and burial vaults. Connecting tunnels
served as .... ays for t of to a1 ternate firinf- 'Oosi tions.
Positions void of guns one were found occunied during the night by the
enemy ready for action the following dAJ'. :,{ost of the anti-tank fire
recei ved b;y the tanks Was close range flanking , fire of rane-es from 300 to
800 yds. On some occasions the enemy gUnners have allo"'ed one or two tRnk.
to pass thrOUgh their field of fire before openinf- up on the rear tanks.
Another practice emnloyed Was to let a tank turn around exposing the rear
engine before firing. accurH.cy and the rapidity of the
firinf. has been quite noticeable. the guns were located in
Caves the terrain channelized tank movement into antiCipated fields of fire.
The were hHrd to detect due to the nractice of the enemy withdrawillF
the into the cave after firing or because of the method of firing the
gun a well in rear of the mouth of the enclosures. The
use of smokeless shells was 8. factor contributiIC to the difficulty
of the to-uIlS. The largest caliber anti-tRnk fire received by our
tanks Wp.s one round of supuosed1y 75mm, 'Oierced the side of the tank
beneath the S'Oonson came on through to enter P., nA1)alm tank wi thout
irniting the fuel.
The tanks were often subjected to artillery and mortar fire when in
close proximity to the These intense barra?es !!lade control of
the difficult and tended to obscure the
in narrow corridors where sufficient ground for maneuver was limited,
often fell victim to shell holes by eith'ar throwi:ng the tracks or, as
ha'O'Oened in one or two cnses, causin!! th"! to 'turn over comnletely.
One tank was to have been set on fire by a "IP shell, forcing the
crew to aba.ndon the vehicle. As a resul t of the Rrtill .. ry fire, 13,ntennae
were sheared off, susnension systems d.amaged and turret rings fouled..
Tanks were prone to draw artillery fire. In such situations our infantry
were forced to tq.ke cover, makino:: it impossible to oovance in sU']Jllort of
the tanks. Artillery fire was often received in the bivouac areas, but
due to the fact that it was unobserved fire, it nroved ineffective.
- 367 -
The enemy endeavored at All times to isolate attacldng
from the either by artillery and
mortar fire or by intense SA fire so as to allow especially
trained anti-tank personnel with satchel charges
concealed in and fox hole8 to apuroach our tanks with
these demolitions designed to severely damage the tank suspen-
sion systems. This type of anti-tank may well be referred
to as "Human Charges". The bearers of these charges set the fuse.s
and with the explosive wrapped around their bodies charge the
tanks. These apneared to weigh approximately 15 los.
The concealed positions occupied by these satchel charge men ,,.ere
termed as "spider holes" by our forces, and according to the Japanese
they were known as "Bottle Shaped" fox holes. They were well cam-
ouflaged and pla.ced in narrow defiles along expec ted avenues of
approach.
One tank platoon leader ran into a team of satchel charge
men concealed in "spider holes" located at a sharp turn in the
road. One fox hole was actually in the middle of the roa.d at
this turn. A ruse by the enemy was for the personnel
equipped with satchel charges to cover themselves in U. S.
shelter halves and remain covered in this position until the
tanks ran over them or un til such time as the tanks came wi thin
close enough range.
Anti-tank ditche8 were not encountered on any large scale.
Those thnt were encountered were readily eliminated by the aid
of tank dozers. One anti-tank ditch noted Was constructed by
the enemy without destroying the obvious bypasses. Evidently
these by-passes were left intentionally, for as the situation
developed it was found that anti-tank guns were laid-in on these
ao-proaches. In almost every case these di tchee were ple,ced
between natural defiles and rice paddies.
Hines e!!lployed by the enemy and encountered by our forces
included the anti-boat, both and double horn type, ceramic
or pottery mines. tape mines, aerial bombs. As far as it can
be determined these mines were never placed in any definite pattern.
Terrain free of mines the da.y before were often found to contain
mines the following day. One favorite trick employed by the
Japanese was to place mines in cabbage patches, lifting the plants
up and replanting them over the mine. Abandoned tanks
were found in some instance. booby trapped And mines placed in front
and rear of the tank, apparently with the idea of disabling the
recovery vehicle that came up to evacuate the tank. Any time a
tanker, while well forward in the zone, opened his hatch
in an effort to communicate with the infantry tArgets
- 366 -
he va.a almost sure to receive eni-per fire.
Recovery unite to evacuate tanka invariably met
wi th haraning sniper fire. the enemy
the infantry to -pass throu,v.h Yi thout firing. in the hO'Pe
of fire to bef!.I' on tank crew member. once expoeed
outsi de the tank. In B few instance s enemy were
known to occupy the of destroyed tpJlks. The
tanks as their primary target s, a ssBulti ng them
wit h all veapons at their command. From informatIon obtained
from centured documents a.nti p risoners it vas evident the t
destruction of tanka by any and every means possible had
'Pr:Iori ty over other targets. As an eX8l!r.')le of the streas
placed on t ank destruction by the the following
extract from the Japanese 32d Army Battle Doctrine, No. 13,
inter-preted by III Amph Corns. reads as follows: liThe roar
of enemy tanks 1s much fainter than our own And their apnroach
cannot be detected by unless tanks are Yi thin 1
on roads or 80 meters in dry fields. This nece ssitates the
stAtioning of antitank security l ook- outs .
w
It can be said that !!lore tanks .... ere lost because or
adverse terrain conditions than .... ere l ost di rect ly t o enemy
action. Narrow roads. shell holes and mud accoun ted for
many stuck tanks , whic h usually resul t ed in tracks bei ng
thrown. Tanks abandoned due to these condi tiona .... ere targets
at ni ght for the that slipped through end 8?plied
eatchel chargee and incendi aries .... hich. in al most all cssea,
destroyed the tanka beyond repair.
- 369 -
CHAPT:::li. VIII
Results of Ooerations
1. Enemy Casualt i es
8 . Killed
b . Captured
2. Our Lo s eee:
a. Personnel :
b .
(1) KIA
(2) '; or Ill>
(3) Mi Goi ng
EquiT'lment :
(1 ) l.ost:
( a )
AT !'1 re
(b) V!..nes
(c) Qrlere tional
(d) OoO;!Tattonal
wi t h I n.ter
by enemy
(. ) Tot n] Tanks
hlocked out
Lo sses
Lo sses
darr.age
4 , ?ea
49
7
111
1
B
B
25
10
10
(f) Re turned t o "Duty 26
- 370 -
CF..oIPTER IX
Comnenta and
1. 5-1
Ooeratlon of the adntnietratlve in the
field 18 much from operAtion in Through
eyperience eained in the Okinawa operation the following
recommendAtions are made in order to expedite &Cd imor ov8 the
handling of the additi onsl det ai ls neces8itated
by combat:
R. Personnel and other administrative matters should
remain under a centralized headquarters. ' It 18 ilTl!'Josdble for
a company to handle its own administration pronerly. There I.
no one enough experience to supervise the work of the
company clerk. It Is Imprp. ctlcal to attach the company clerk
to the personnel section of another unit. The other unit. will
not accept t he responelbl11 ty or eYeD attempt to Bupervise the
york: of the cOJIl!)an..v clerk. Operation of the Personnel Section
ae a unit even though the companios themselves ere
detached is the moat efficient method.
b. Definite should be gi.en to both the
unit and the hieher headquarters 8S to the proper channels of
Administrp.t1v".! Rnd Tactical re"ports. At Umes A conflict ariBes
between tyO h!:,.dqU2.rters as to ."hom the uni t bf! longs . Each hea.d-
quart@l!rs should lrno." just how f p-r i te control t.:0es over a un i t.
c. of 811 and Field orders affecting the
stntus of any orgA_nh:ation in the ba ttalion should be sent to
the headquarter s. These .... ri tten orders are necesss.ry for the
battalion history and reo orts .
d. Orders on the trAnsfer of hosoitallzed personnel are
too slo" .. 1n coming throlJl!;h or elee are not received at all.
This causes An additional burden on the unit which must try
nod locate theee orders. A .... hereby the unit would.
the orders , direct from the would con-
siderably.
e. \\'hen r epl acement s ere sent to a unit, the
Records Md ForI!! 20' B should M:n. \fuen tbe 8t'rvice
records and form 20 's are not r ecei ved causes much trouble
in handling of the reports .
f. There i& entirely too much red t ap e in the processing
of recommendations for the award of the Purple Heart. It 1.
- 371 -
Dot always possible to obtain a medical officer's certificAte
and even if they are available it takes hOUTS of work to
plete them. A process whereby the company commander
could certify that the wound or injury was as a re-
sult of enemy action and that by a medical officer
WRS required should be sufficient proof.
2. 5-2, 5-3
The armored flame thrower baa been tried in combat and
found to be a very effective weapon. Inf Diva and other tank
battalions with whom the flame throwers have worked have been
Tery emphatic in their expression of this weaponls worth and its
important role in the BIlCC8SS of the crperation. In the
flame throwers have attached in the fol lowing manner:
a. A company attached to a standard tank battalion in
sup:port of an infantry division.
b. J. "latoon of flame throwers attached to each medium
tank compA1lY.
c. A section of flame throwers su:o-porting a medium tp.nk
plA-toon.
The stand.erd tank compe.ny 11."'1.5 nomally been attached to an
infantry with its platoons in support of infantry battalion.
The flame throwers have generally been employed in fol-
lOwing manner within the tank-infantry team:
a. Attached to and acting as an integral of the tank
platoon.
b. Attached to a tank plA.toon and remaining in a forward
assembly area on call. ..th9n a for
the flame thrower 1 t "'8.$ called up and 9Upnorted by
other tanks until it accomplished its mi8sion. In
theBe cases the tank leader control8 the
action of the flame throwers. Th1s i8 the moet common
type of emr1oymgnt.
c. Operating 88 1n (b) aoove with the infantry in cl08e
of the tanks and flame throwers.
d. Operating with infantry alone.
I n the greatest percentB?e of cases the tank-flame
team has operated out in front of the infantry until the Was
IJUffici enUy for the i nfan try to adv8!:lce.
The most desirable manner of eMployment is the tank-fIAme-
thrower-infantry team with the infRntry following closely behind the
tanks to supnort and &0 occumy immediately the ground taken.
Dt1e to the 11'":litat1one of terrain, flame. throwers fire has
not mes.ed to build a "vell of flame." although this manner
- 372 -
of would have been very effec ti ve in some i nstances.
The most common misuse of t an):s M S been:
8 . Use of f 18Me t ank, for machine ,.un fir e
only, out in tron t of the i nfl".n try, wi thou t any aunuor t .
b. Failure on t he pnr t of the i nf antry and t ank: COM-
manders to t ake the advice of thp. flame thrower
commAnders aa to proper employment of the
c. ImprOp er 8upport on the :op.rt of the i nfnntry a.nd
tAJlk s .
d. The use of flame throye r e to burn l Ar ge t ar get.
where there ia no known r esistanc e . Alt hough thia
is nece68ary in case s it i. bet ter for the
infant ry to bear in mind t hat the eu:opl y of f lame
i .e 11mi ted and CA.nnot used to burn a "path fo r
t heir advance.
e. Failure on the par t of the infant r y t o !!lOve Utl and
quickl y occupy the by the f l ame throwers.
The supply system functioned e. s W/U ori gi na lly "pIMned.
One *ton truck vlII a used to cl'\rry r efuel for two fla!!le throwers.
The,e truck. vere moved to 8ssembly area8 each day 80 that
flame throwers could retael with a minimum of delay.
Caves vere the nrincioal for f l a!'!le throvers on this
Other target8 vere tombs, house 8 and vi llage s, ridges,
slapes a nd vooded area s.
The mos t outstpnding deficiency in out
during the otlerati on VAS the of tank-infantry training . The
two arms fail to understand the capabilities And limi t ations of
each other , cBusi np. con!u81on, lack of cooueratton, n<"Jedless 1088e'
and delay. This condit i on is and viII continue until
poe1 tive acti on is t aken. by bo th erms to correct it.
Commun1cation tank., t anks and f l ame
di d not present any major However , the communicati on
between the i nfantry and tanKs, espec1ally, the i nfA.1ltryman in
the front li ne s has l eft much to be desired. The use of the
s eri es 300 radi O, AN/VRC-3, mounted i n tank been used
for communic"lt1on wi th the lnf811 t ry. This has helped to solve the
probl em, but usually the channels caU8es of
radio nets and del ayed The use of t he SCR 509
-
rAdio b7 a tank liaison on the infftntry battalion OP baa
provided a direct channel of communication between the infantry
battalion commander and the tank commander end is definite
imorovement. The sound power telephonp. W2S not available to
be mounted on the tanks of this battalion urior to the
consequently this type of communication was not tried.
Thi s battalion killed a large nu.'Tlber of the enemy on the
operation and destroyed a great deal of his equipment. However,
the true value of the weanon cannot be indicated by these figures.
Its value lies in its ability to drive the J8:panese out of his
prepared positions into the open to be by supportine
troops. Exoerience has proven that the of
hie fanatical intentions to hold his ground and die for the EMperor,
will remain in his hole when flame is brought to bear on
him, but he wi:' make every effort to get out and away from the
flame.
Experience gained from the use of the armored flame thrower
in combat has indicated the need for some changes in the organiza-
tion of the battalion and the employment of the wean on. The fol-
l owing are submitted with the thought 1n mind
that if they are accepted the value of the weapon will be materi-
ally increased.
a. The standard tank battalion should include one flame
thrower company, either in place of the light tank company' or as
an addition to the battalion.
b. The standard tank battalion should be assigned to the
infantry division and become an integral part of the division.
c. If the table of organization as submitted by this
battalion 24 June 45 is anuroved, that there be a minimum of one
flame thrower ner Corus.
d. The sound power telephone should be mounted on the
rear of each tp.nk for tank-infantry communications.
e. '.o1hen flAme throwers are employed as they have been on
this Operation, the fleme thrower commander should control the
tllllks in support of him rRther than have the tanks
control his movement and .
f. That whenever p08sible in the employment of tanks the
of be used.
g. Tha t the armored c ormnander be given an opportuni ty to
command the tank-infantry team. This is not being done, and yet,
there is no reason to believe thP-t the commander cannot
handle the infantry as well as the infantry cOl!lJllander can handle
the tanks,.
h. That the infantry commanders make every effort to fa:nlliarize
themselves with the capabilities and limitations of thp, tank and
armored flame thrower and how to coordinate both with his troops.
i. That, if the i8 mRintained, the
combina tion flame gun and 75mrn be in Rll fleme
thrower tanks.
j. ':Ihat new t anks wi th add! tional spoDeon ar'llor reo lace
the pre8ent type. This woul d enable our tMlts to more
ively fir.ht the i mproved J apanes
o
anti- t ank
't. Tl'.at 1'1.11 t Anks be of the H4A.3 in order to hRV8
an with sufficient t o traveree all types of terrain.
3. 5-4
Thia Batt A.l ion received it s movement order a on 22 January
1945, n date 15 February 1945. Normally, thi.
period of t i me would be sufficient for A. unit to proceu ita
sunpl1es. On recei'Pt of movement order, t'hir t een (13) flame
throwers wp. re atill under construction. The tanks converted to
fl ame were used t ? other orpanizattons prior to being
turned over t o War fare Servi ce. vehicles were
iS8ued to our orRanization, fi ve (5) on 11 1944,
thirteen (13) on 8 J anuary 1945; twenty-three (23 ) on
22 J anuA.ry 1945 ; thi rteen (13) on 24 1945. To 'Place
the se vehicles in serviceable condition , required a
maximum of maintenance work. During the showdown inaoec tiona
it was nece ssary for lmttal i on and all COllll)aniea
to use every tool. As a result of heavy maintenance
requirement s, quanti t ies of tools which were serviceable
at the i nspecti ons vere l ater unservi ceabl e. The maintene.nce
probl em r equi r ed t he of el l ner aonnel And ot
key persons .... ere avail able for showdown i n80'3ctions .
Supp li es required were wi th the f ollowing
exc entiona :
a. S.C.R. radio::., h 'enty-four (24) volt could not be
obtained from Signal. It wee to conV'3rt
t .... elve (12) volt S.C.R. rAdios by procurinc two eac h
dynamotor, D. M.-36, end one e.,,""c h dynamo tor D.M.-37.
Dynamotors were di fficul t to obtAin due to cri tical
were not until aoproxi mat ely
thre
os
(3) dRYS nrior to
b. Solonoids, thirty caliber mount s, coul d not be
obt ai ned through were f i nally
from tanks. to
t hese was not f iven unt il the las t week.
MO'/'3m'3n t
of. clothing.
ordera soecified a thir ty (30) day maintenance
Chemical Warf are and smrnltea to
- 375 -
be carried by unit.. It was nece.a&r7 to prepare propert7
ie.ue Blips for euch items. Medical and Chemical Warfare
supplies were issued in a block. bOxed and prepared for
overseas shipment. quartermaster euppl1es were inued
individuallT. had to be stored. boxe. made and prepared for
overseas It would have been much better if block.
Yere prepared bT Quartermastar and _hipped to the un! t com-
plete. This would have avoided unaec.sBarT d.l.,.
Special for pistole and all round v1sion
cupolas were submitted. These item. wwre Dot made available .
Later experience in combat proved they are invaluable to
thil unit. All round cupolas are of prime importance for
fi81lle throvers becBUse of their clole-in operation.
receipt of movement orders, this unit requested
an Ordnance Technical Inspection for wheel vehicl.s. Thl.
inspection was Dot thorough and our maintenance did not con-
sider it an oversea s inspection. This inspection was only a
spot and firat echelon check. Wheels not removed.
engines and 4rlving train of vehicles not
for lubrication. As a result of this inspection
one ;-ton 4 % 4 WaB listed as .erviceable. Thia vehicle was
turned in to Ordnance for necessary re'paira A.Dd was condemned:
aa unserviceable. The average on wbeel yehicles
vas 30,000 miles. This unit W8 S the third to use the.e .ame
Vehicles.
Waterproofing materials for wheel vebicle. were not
available for issue. It was nece8aary for Ordnance to
improvise from any ma terial available. The final water-
proofing was excellent.
This Battalion had anticipated to aperate ita supply in
the normal manner. The 8upply Section would receive all alloca-
t10ns for napalm and ammunition. All iasue. and replacement
would be processed by the Supply Sect1on.
On arrival at destination, all equipment including thirty (30)
day maintenance supplies, deck stored, were unloaded by Corps teams.
Theae supp11earegardlee. of marking Were shipped to dump. end were
no t made available to our unit. We were unable at a later date to
obtain many of theae iteDs through normal sunply channel
During the operation. the fi8IDf! thrower companies were attachea.
to the Divi Sion on the 11ne and then to the assigned Tank !attalion
of the Division. The flame thrower compania. vere to receive their
supplie. hoe the uni ta th!l7 were attached to. Tb"! Battalion
- 376 -
Section va. to supply the rear detachment only. ReadqQartera
and Headquarter. Company and Service Company. The above
arrangement was satisfactory in most eases, though 1 twas
necessary many times for the atta1ion to obtain supplies
for our flame thrower companies. Theae were not
issued by the unit the companies vere attached to, though
the items were available. During the change of attachment
of flame thrower companies, their supply channel was broken.
Units being relieved were not able to supply the companies
and it time for the new units to coordinate the
s'1lppl1es. During that period of usually one week's time,
it was necessary for the companies to relT upon the
Battalion Sypply for their equipment.
The issue of supplies during the operation was excellent.
Immediate issue was made on all articles except cri tical short-
ages. We were unable to obtain small size H.B.T. uniform.,
shelter halves, shirt wool knit, tank tools and accessories
and T-17 micronhone8.
Napalm was allocated to flame thrower companies by Tenth
Army, through Corps and Division. This arrangement was very
satisfactory. The Division gave each company their allocation
and the companies were able to draw direct from Chemical War-
fare Service dumps.
The Medical Detachment estabUshed a :Battalion Aid
. Station in the rear area. and two (2) medical
aid men were attached to each comoany. During the operation,
the Medical Dets,chment did 'not handle baHle casual ties. Anti-
disease control measures were administered by the Medical
Detachment. All necessary mAterials were available in sufficient
quanti tiel and excellent results vere obtained.
The greatest part of flame thrower companies vehicula.r
maintenance was performed in company bivouac areas. Battalion
Maintenance Platoon was organized into sections attached to
each company. These sections were to perform all
necessary second echelon work. All evacuation to higher
echelon was by the Battalion Maintenance Officer.
The rear area detachment consisted of a welder and necessary
eupply men. Parts were i s.ued and replaced through the rear
detachment. This arrane:ement va. verysatiefactory.
- '&71 -
APP!:.mrx ?
TW, THEORY OF FLAME THRO\'PR :n;EtS 1.
43rd Chemical Laboratory Comnany
APO 1957
c/o Postmaster, San Frp. nc leco, Ce lif.
10 July 1945.
- 378 -
Table of Contents
Abstract
Intr oduction
I. ! .. echanisms involved when incorporating: a solid or solie
dehydrating agp.nt into the napalm-gasoline
Conclusions arrived at
II . of solid adsor bents in the napalm-gasoline
s;,ystem
Conclusions arrived at
)81
382
387
)88
392
III . Critical gelation phenomena in the 394
The compos!. tion of napalm
The solution of napal:n in gasoline
The Gelation of napalm solution
Signature Sheet

- J?9 -
394
394
396
403
ABSTRACT
This 1s the first report of a series of reports concerned With the
theory of flame t hrower tuels. Silica 1s used in this area to stabil-
ise napalm thickened fuel although it is recogni zed that other, and
perhaps better methode of stabilization can be developed. However, for
the l ocal situation where time and distance does not permit any delays
this type of dehydrating agent is an immediate and effective answer to
the problem of stable fuel manufacture. Discussed in this report are:
1) Mechanism involved when incorporating a solid or solid dehydrating
agent in the napalm-gasoline system. 2) Sediment ation of solid absorb-
ent in the system. 3) critical gelation phenomena in
the system.
Conclusions reached in this report are: 1) An homogenization step
1s desirable When incorporating silica flour into the mix. 2) An es-
timate of the particle size specification is presented. 3) Evidence to
show t hat t echnical grade napalm is in a region of critical gelati on is
presented. Transition in this regi on is from a solution of individual
molecules of to one single structure of infinite mo-
lecular weight.
- J!!O-
Dm!QIUCTIOli
1&8 ettec\1Yen&e8 of water and other polar agents in reducing the
relative consistency ot gela made the solution of napalm in gasoline
hi well known tact. No other factor bas been as important 1n arect-
tog negatively the reliability of performance at our present flame
guns. Consequently a study ot the phenomenon has been instituted by
this laboratory in an effor t to develop a proper theoretical understand-
ing of the problem. The need for stable flame thrower fuels, capable
ot reliable performance atter several months storage has prompted
the authorisation tor this work by the Commanding Officer, Hq ., Cit'S,
CPBC, APO #956. J. part of the work done under that directive is de_
scribed herein and the practical conclusions derived there_
from are herewith presented.
In order to supplJ< a stable fuel lllY!llIATELY FtlR CURRENT
this laboratory has recommended the use of activated silica flour an
agent which will induce gelation in the system and further assist in
stabilizing the fuel. It is recogni zed that other, and perhaps better,
methods ot stabilization can be developed, but tor the local situation
where procurement is extremely difficult and where fuel must b9 prepared
a number ot months in advance of an operation, this method serves as an
immediate and effect! va answer.
This report 1s the tirst of a series dealing With the general theory
and practice of silica stabiUzed napalm fuels. It is intended as a
plement to and as an elaboration of a recent letter t o the Chemical Orrl_
car, POA, lPO 11958 (7 Uay 1945) outlining a "nell theory and tactic of
flame wartare" based on stabilized fueh. Because large scale produc-
t10n of the silica fuels is underway at Oahll, these data are considered
t1m
e
ll'.
Scanned tiy Mi lSpecManuals
I. llechanisms involved ".hen incorpor ating a solid or solid dehydr at ing agent
into the napalm- casol ine system.
At the instant v.'hen napalm and gasoline are mixed the system contains some
concentration of napalm particl es suspended in the gasoline by means of agita-
ticn . Each of these particles on being brought into contact l,1.th the gasoline,
begins to absorb the solvent and in tur n begins to swel l - expanding steadily
into the medium.
If we consider i n detail the situation at various time interval s during the
swel ling process, the following situation represented schematically below is
obser ved. For purpos es of simplicity a number of individual kernels, lying in
a freeiy suspended straight line in a trough of gasoline will be considered.
Thus the fol lowing situati on prevails initially.
NAPAlM GRANULE
;/
Or--lQf---
Fl atting the unit weight of napalm in any planar section through these particles
and at a 90 angle to the line would give at zero (To) the shown
bel ow,

z

o

..
r
r
To
f1
"
DI ' h nee ,.
- 382 -
Thus, initially we have a heterogenous system. Illl!lediatel y follOwing, however,
gasoline will begin to diffuse through the peripheral surfaces of the particles
into their interiors . The outer edges of the particles in tt:rn will begin to
s'::ell into the gasoline creating: a situation v;here the individual particle will
have a diffuse periphery. Thus at a time Tl the follol'iing situation might pre-
vai l :

T,

z

0

Di stance ....
The inter-niffusion process until at the stir (T )J the
diffuse peripheries of the particles are in physical contact and a
pl ot of napalm concentration will be as follows:

-

z
Ts
0

Di stance
_ 1B1 _
/JOll the system v.i.ll not settle on standing and can thus be transferred to a
storage tank and be allowed to age. About 12 to 24 hours later the variation
in concentration incicated above will have disappeared for the most
part because the inter-diffusion will have continued until a homegenous mix
finally results. Thus:
..

o

..
_L-----------------------------------
Distance
It is thus apparent that the solution of napalm 1n a mixture of hydrocar-
bons is a process of transition from a heterogenolls system to a homogenous one,
but unlike simple solution the varying degrees of diffusion of the napalm aggre-
gates prior to Ts introduce certain complications when incorporating an insol-
uble solid agent into the
At any time prior to T24
J
it will be found the viscosity of the system
(in a micro section) along any line will vary qualitatively with the napalm
Yleight plot. Highest viscosities will be observed in the region of highest
napalm concentration and vice versa. At To this variation will be greatest
J
decreasing steadily as the system proceeds to complete uniformity. If an in-
soluble solid agent (i.e. silica flour
J
bentonite
J
anhydrous CUS0
4
) is incorpor-
ated into the mixing at some time prior to TSJ a non-uniform distribution occurs.
This is due to the fact that ordinary mixing cannot impart sufficient mQJlentum
to the individual grains of the solid to permit them to penetrate into the
napalm kernel. they remain confined in the gasoline phase onlf.
As the napalm swells
J
the free volume in which these grains can move becom88
less and less until at T. they are crowded to the periphery of the napalJa
- 384-
Magnification: 1.5 x
UNHOMOGENlZED
aOMOGENlZED
Thin sections of napalm gels
with activated silica flour incorporated
Figure 26.
particles and are imprisoned between the contacting surfaces of the napalm par-
ticles. A representation of the frequency distribution of these particl es
superinposed on the napalm curve at Ts would indic.;.te this l ocalization.
<
o

.. <
.;: '"
.
.
;:; .
u

u ._
:;0

l: 0

,-,
Distance ;a.
... -"
,
, '
I ' , ,
, ,
... ,- ...
, '
, '
, ,
, ,
,
,
,
,
I
I
,
,
,
,
, J,-\
,
,
,
,
After the napalm has attained a distribution a number of hours l ater
this localization of the insoluble matter would persist and in fact become
a feature of the gel. Thus the incorporation of a solid directly with the na-
palm results in a distribution which ',men viewed presents the appearance of a
three-dimensional lacel'l'ork of threads outlining the position of the contact sur_
faces at the stir
To demonstrate this effect a thin section of such a gel was prepared qy
pourir.g a mix at T s onto a glass plate. Anot her glass plate was used as a cover.
1 photograph of the assembly was taken 'iith transmitted light and is presented
in the upper section of the accompanying plate. The lace like distribution of the
silica is immediately apparent. It gives to the gel a pseudo-granular quality.
Such gels as these tend to give ,erratic results when their viscosity is measured
in a Gardner mobilometer. The most common difficulty is the lack of repr oduci-
hility of results. For a given load on the plunger one may observe variations
- 385 -
in the rate of fall of the plunger by as much as a 100% from run to run. An-
other difficulty frequently encountered is a non-uniformity in the rate of fall
over the 10 cm. interval.
From a purely theoretical inspection of the problem, an explanation for this
phenomenon may be deduced. As will be shown 13ter the presence of an agent like
silica gel increases the degree of gelation enormously. TIlth the silica locatea
at the original interstices of the swelled particles it 1s reasonable" t o expect
that in the region of the silica the quantities of polar agents avail-
able for terminating the polymeric chain is much l ess t han that in the interior
of the napalm blob.
Thus while the over-all gelation has been increased a non-uniformity exists
through any micro segment of the gel. The sit uati on, which it is supposed pre_
vails, is represented schematically below. It is supposed that as we follow the
e
o
-.
'u
.-
.- -
.; .

o.
u
u-
e -
t) ;;

0

>
Silica distribution through a planar section .
Distance along dotted line in (a).
Dl,tance along dotted line in (a).
- 386 -
( . )
(b)
( 0)
dotted line in (a) away from the region of high silica the viscosity
gradually falls to limiting value and then rises again in the vicinity of
another region of silica concentration. The concentration of-polar agents in the
napalm gasoline systems would bear a rough inverse relation to the viscosity. As
the zone of the silica particles is left, the concentration of polar agents rises
rapidly to a limtting value which is governed by t he rate of diffusion of the
polar agents to the silica, and the sphere of activity of the individual particles
and to a lesser degree by the activity of the absorbent itself. To eliminate
these inhomogenities and thus t o achieve flow properties at all practical levels
identical with those of straight napalm of identical viscosity it becomes neces_
sary to achieve a or nearly completely random distribution. this
random distribution is achieved with sufficient concentrations of the adsorbing
agent there is enough overlapping of the unit sphere of influence of each particle
so that any inhomogenity is reduced to an insignificant level. To approach this
condition it therefore becomes necessary to introduce some homogenizing step.
This may be best accomplished b,y grinding the napalm-gasoline-adsorbent mix
eufficiently, so that all napalm kernels are reduced in size or by subjecting the
partly swelled softened kernels to the cutting action of screens or sheer surfaces.
The practical details of such an operation are omitted here, but will be discussed
in detail later. However, when this is done a random distribution is achieved and
in the lower section of the photographic plate a view of a section of a
homogenized gel is presented.
I!!F CONCLUSIONS FROM TIlE ABOVE ANALYSIS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A. Napalm suspended in gasoline proceeds with time from a two_phase to a
single phase system.
B. A solid adsorbing agent mixed into the above system prior t o stir time
concentrates in the low viscosity phase and then on gelation of the system
- 387 -
there.
C. The non-uniform distribution of the adsorbent produces non-uniformity
in the concentration of polar agents in the napalm-gasoline system and this is
reflected in an inhomogeneity of the viscosity of the system - considered at
the mir-ro level.
D. The desired condition for practical oper.ation as well as theoretical
study is a random distribution of the absorbent particles.
E. The above consideration (D) controls all the additional experimental
work described below.
II. Sedimentation of solid adsorbents in the napalm-gasoline system.
The introduction of a solid adsorbent into this system raises
questions relating to sedimentation and sedimentation rates. In this section
two aspects of the will be considered . These are: A) sedimentation
velocities in the system at various ti.!nes follov,ing To and, B) the !!laSS trans-
fer of the adsorbent from the prepared and cured gel; that is sedimentation
during storage.
Both of these aspects will be treated, for simplicity, with a conservative
outlook since satisfactory conch:.sions here will require TIO further detailed
analysis . The mathematical complexity necessary f or exact of this
system does not justify more elRh.orate methods at this time , since it is only
intended to estimate the conditions which must be met in order t o achieve
atively non-sediment1ng systp-ms on storage.
In considering the problem of sedimentation rates in the system
the start of mixing several stages are apparent. Addition of the
flour in a.-nounts up to one to two percent even with four to five percent of
napalm results in an unhindered sedimentation defined by the
Stokes relation.
- 388 -
As the napalm particles swell this sedimentation is hindered only slightly b.Y
napalm aggregates. At stir a situation is achieved where the napalm kernels
do not settle anymore but if agitation stops at that point the silica will settle,
although at a diminished rate, down the low viscosity channels formed at the
contact surfaces of the aggregates. Hence, transfer to storage drums without
either further agitation or hOMogenization will result in the settling of an
'appreciable fraction from the body of the mix. The large particles will settle
more rapidly than the smaller ones and therefore these may be expected to accum-
ulate most rapidly at the bottom. For this reason merely agitating the mixture
up to the stir time is not sufficient for this operation. The addition of a
homogenizing step is therefore essential because in such a process the swelled'
particles of napalm are sheared into much smaller ones with the result that the
s,ystem becomes much more viscous.
A further advantage in homogenization is that the silica is no longer con-
centra ted in the region of the contact surfaces and therefore there is less like-
Ifhood of large silica aggregates forming with resulting increase in the sedimen-
tation rate. with random distribution of the particles achieved, a simple esti-
mate of sedimentation rates can new be made. The assumption involved here is
that the Stokes relation prevails in a gelated system.
This assumption is believed valid for the following reasons:
A. The particles considered are large in compartson to the size of the in-
dividual linkages in the polymeric net works of the system. Thus since any par-
ticles of reasonable size, i.e., L10r larger, "t;ill break many millions of link-
ages there is little possibility for erratic fall. It may be readily shown
by elementary calculations that a 5f spherical particle falling one1 (10-
6
- 389 -
meters) in a 100% gelated fOUr percent napalm mix will break 6.9 x 10
8
linkageB.
Thus uniformity of fall is aSBured.
B. Although spherical particles are assumed, deviations from this shape
will hinder the fall because the surface area per unit weight is increased. Thus
any estimate will be a maximal rate of fall.
A plot of the estimated rate of fall for spherical sillca particles in a gel
of Gardner 300 is presented in Fig. I. It reveals that for a partlcie size of
251 the rate of fall is about 0.4 inches per month and for a 441 particle corres-
ponding to the maximum sphere which could pass a 325 mesh screen a value of 1.2
inches per month. Thus the particle size range in which one must operate is
clearly indicated.
In plant practice it 1s easily possible to meet these requirements. Grinding
or unactivated silica gel in either a ball type attrition mill or in a
will accomplish the above. As an illustration, a particle size distribution plot
was made for s ome test batches of the flour which were ground in a small (2' x
It') laboratory ball mill. About 25 lbs" of commercial silica gel was introduced
and ground with '3/4" steel balls 200 Ibs. for forty-five minutes. '!be flour 80
obtained was 'sifted progressively through 100, 200 and 325 mesh U.S. sieves. The
distribution wass
lit. %
2
2
6
Mesh Size
retained on 100
" "200
" n 325
Thus ninety percent by we1ght had' a size smaller than 325 mesh. This
ial was then subjected to a particle size count using standard microscopic
count techniques with the following additional results accurate to 2 peroents
- 390 -
15
-~
~
c
0
10

-

~
u
c
-
w
0-
c

z
0
0-
c
0-
K
W
"
5
0
w
~
o 25
Figure I
Sedluntation Rate va. Particle Size
in a Mapal. Gel (Gardner :::: 300)
50 75 100
PARTICLE SIZE 1M ~ ~
325 230 200 140
C U.S. SIEVE SERIES
- 391 -
125 l!1O
100
Size range in
%
Frequency
Jr
2
i
Weight
%
Adjusted to 22%
2_9
82.5 5. 84 8. 9 B.O
%
8-16 10.7 12.70 U.8 10.6
16_24
4.5 20.40 20.8 lB.7
24-44 2.3 35.5
:1
8
.:1
100.0 90.0
%
A cumulative plot of all the above data 1s presented in Fig. n. This reveals
how adequately the necessary conditions for particle size may be met in actual
practi ce.
From the above the folloydng additional conclusions may now be summarized.
1. ben incorporating a solid flour into the napalm-gasoline system, ho-
mogenizati on of the mix ehould be incorporated into the process 1n order to
avoids
a. Rapid sedimentation in low viscosity channels.
b. Prevention of aggregate formati on.
2. A less desirable alternative is that of prolonging the stirring opera_
ticn until the gel has nearly set up.
3. Sedimentation rates when using silica flour (95 percent 200
mesh) in a gelled system (Gardner 100-JOO) is of a very low of tn3gni tude
and is not a fact or when fuel is to be stored for periods of three months or
less.
4. For longer perioc3 of storage, a program of 180 r ot at ion of the drums
after three months and then every six months thereafter is a desirable modus
operandi for depot installations.
- 392 -
W
..,
w
I
Figure II
Parti cl e Si ze Di stribution i n Si l i ca Fl our - CUlllula t l ve Wei ght Pe r cen ta ge vs. part i cl e Siz e .
100
80
~
~
~
....
K
~
U
K
60 ~
L
....
~
w
~
..
~
>
40
....
~
~
~
"
~
~
20
10
o
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
PUTICLE SI ZE 1M #J.
III. Critical gelation phenomena in the !yat,,_
It is the principal p.lrpose in this section to the degree of gela-
tion in the above system as a function ot the water content. Fro. thia anal1s1s
it will be shown that the syste. as it normally occurs is in , & region of critical
gelation. A reasonable and consistent treatment of the rheoloiieal properties at
the system results therefrom.
The Conposition of Napalm, Napalm as it is currentl supplied is a mixture
of the aluminum soaps of oleic, napthenic and the coconut oil fatty acids in the
weight ratios of lsl,2 The principal cOMponepta of the soap have
the structure Al(OH)RR'* and J.l(OH)2R J.l RR'Rft i. also a possibility,hIlt duo
to the tact that the soaps are precipitated in an aqueous medium this soap cannot
occur in any significant amount. In actual practice the distribution of the
principal species is as followa:
Al(OH) RR'
Al(OH)2 R
= 9'7.5 - 87.5%
= 2.5 - 12.5%
The distribution of the fatty acids may be assumed to be random in character and
governed only b.Y their molar percentages in the From the above data and
from the acid numbers of the various fatty acid specifications" one may estimate
a rough average molecular weight for the napalm molecule of about 500. This then
is the basic unit i8 introduced into ,the gasoline.
The Solution of Napalm in Gasoline: If such variables as temperature and sur
face area per unit weight of napalm are held constant, then the easiest and most
rapid solution of napalm in the gasoline would be achieved if the napalm went into
solution as individual molecules. In practice this does not occur unless there i8
a little more than one mole of a polar agent per mole of napalm. The reason for
* R is a general symbol representing any One of the avid radicals.
** OSRD Report 1/20)6 - Broughton., J. and Byfield, A. _ The Manufacture,
Properties and Testing of Napalm Soaps.
- 394-
this is as
TIle" trivalent aluminum i s hi ghly polarizing and tend. to form lon-d1.pole
interactions ot consi derable strength. A typdcal example of this property can be
seen in the co-ordination of acet ylacetone which forms the complex acetylacetonate.
(a)
J
In the case of the napalm. molecule this" co-ordination probably cannot be achieved
internally because the bond angles would be too small - hence co-ordination 1s
achieved among the indivi dual napalm molecules and there fore we have
n( napalm)
_-:>" (napalm)n
that this polymer1zati on does actually occur has been demonst rated qy the osmotic
pressure s tudies of the Stanfor d group.* However, when water is present in the
napalm the water molecule is co-orlnated preferentially, thuss
( b)
and further co-ordinatloD' among such molecular systems is virtually impossible.
It i s therefore easily undexstood why the so-called "peptized
ft
fuels show the
shortest stir tiDes _ simply because the s olution process merely involves the low
.eight aggregates listed under (b). Diffusion of these low molecular weight aggre-
gates is extremel1 in comparison t o molecules with of hundreds of
thousands. On the other hand if there no polar agents at all in t he napalm
then the solution process would involve molecules whose weights would be" determined
Oalsr 1057, 12/15/1;). - 1/ 15/44 Progress Report.
- 395-
11)' the size of the individual napalm kernels and such a process would be extrec.el,y
slow. In actual practice a compromise beh'een these two extrenes is adoptee as the
operandi. Let us now consider the nature of this in some detail.
The Gelation of Napal.'ll Solutions: The principal molecular species in tech_
nical napalm (i.e. , Al(OH)RR') is assumed to be tri-functional in its co-orein_
ability.
Thus in each of the two carboxy groups and the aluminum atom
represent points at lihich union tlith other molecules may occur. The as sumtltion
of trl-functionality involves the concept of only one co-ordinate linkage with
the aluminum atom although in the chelate co_ordination three linkages occur. It
is believed in this instance that steric considerations would hinder conplete co-
ordination. In any case the qualitative aspects of the agreement are not altered
by the above minimal assumption. Only a tri-functional molecule can for'll three-
dimensional whereas bi- functional units can attach themselves only in
linear chains.
For a tri-functional molecule one may express a probability, P, that it will
lead successively to the continuation of a pol ymeric structure. This probability
can be expressed in tpxms of the fraction of the total numbers of groups which have
reacted. The probability of chain termination then woul d be ( l-P). It is obvious
that if P < " an infinite net 'Work cannot be achieved since the two free groups
have less than an even chance of reacting once and thus continuing the structure.
Therefore P=i represents a minimum condition v;hich l::ust be met in order to initiav
eelation. For a system of higher functionality the critical probability Pc would
be P 1 where f represents the number of functional groups. As P is in-
c (f-1)
creased steadily from zero to one (1) the proportion of the larger molecules will
grow until the critical condition p=i is reached. The large molecules which form
- 396 -
however, in this interval will only be small multiples of the basic molecule be-
cause the necessary condition for critical gelation has not been met. However,
when P i, infinite netl/orks will first make their appearance. These networks
will co-exist in the system with the multiple molecular aegregates. As P in-
creases, the weicht fraction of the networks will. increase v/hile that of the
multiple molecular aggregates decreases. l"hen P S. 1, gelation lnll be
and t he weight fraction of the l ow weight aggregates will approach zero.
One may next ask nhat would be the weight fraction of' each of the various
multiple aggregates (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 the basic unit weight)
at any degree of probability of continuing the structure? For a cetailed study
of this problem we have the '"fOrk of Flory* who derived quantitative expressions
tor such weight fractions from statistical theory. Instead of using a simple
probability term he substituted an expression termed " the cross linking index",
y' and defined it as the number of individual cross links betYleen molecular
aggregates in the entire mixture divided by the total Il u:nbcr of chains. He
found that the weight fraction (W) of molecules composed of Z chajns (where Z is
I finite number) is given by
Flory, P. J. J.A. C.S. 2.2, 3091 (1943); 2.2, 3096; J. Phys. Chem. &, 132 (1942)
- 397 -
Hi. plot of Wz versus t, 1s given:
.50 ________ ________________________
40
.40
.20
.30
.10
.20
1.0
. 2.5
The most significant fact which is obtained from a study of this work is that
for all values ofY 1 the liZ is equal to unity and indicates that
relatively low molecular weights are predominant but when), >1 this sum becomes
less than unity. In other words a new phase appears i.e. the gel. A plot of the
weight fraction of the gel i.e. Woo infinite molecular weight fraction, is also
given. It reveals again that the appearance of the gel phase occurs abruptly as
a transition from the solution state. For more complicated systems such as the
napalm case the non-uniformity of the various molecular chains as well as a
higher degree of co-ordination would lower the critical value of )I.
The bearing of all of the analsis on the napalm problem is as follows: A
polar agent by virtue of its ability to preferentially co-ordinate with the central
aluminum atom is a chain terminating agent. Its concentration in the system deter-
mines the probability of any individual molecule continuing the chain. the
mole ratio of polar agent to napalm is one, it is obvious that the probability of
polymerization between the napalm molecules is zero. However, as the water (the
most common polar agent) is progressively removed a gradual accumulation of the
- 398 ..
higher weight aggregates occurs. At a certain critical concentration the torma-
tion of infinite networks appears. Continued removal of the water results in an
abrupt and progressive shift of the sol ~ gel equilibrium. This condition is
clearly reflected in the viscosity data ~ h i c h is obtained as the effective water
content of the system is altered.
To demonstrate this transition more precisely the following experiment il
presented. Imperial napalm was dissolved in regular leaded gasoline to a concen-
tration of four percent. Other samples were prepared in identical fashion except
that various known quantities of water or activated silica flour were added in
addition. The samples were prepared by mixing the various constituents in fruit
jars. I:::o.ediately upon addition of t.he napalm. which usually was done last, the
jars were closed tightly and subjected to vigorous and prolonged agitation for 45
minutes in a laboratory reciprocating shaker. They were ~ h e n allowed to age tor
twenty-four hours after ~ h i c h viscosities were measured in a Gardner mobilometer.
The results of those viscosity tests are presented immediately below and are
plotted in Figure III.
Plus & Minus "ater O1ta
All mixes 15 gms. (4%) Imperial 979A in 500cc QM Leaded Ga.oline.
Silica Gel heat of wetting 23.7 cal./gm - Effective mol. wt. factor = 64.6
(include. total water - 7%)
Calc. mol. wt. Napalm = 508
).{oles Napalm V."t. Silica Gel Moles Siltc Gel Uole Ratio Gardner
.0295 4.92
gIn'.
.076 2.58 205

3.90 .060 2.05 200

2.06 .032 1. 08 100

1.46 .023 .71 140
.65
.010 .34 00
.36 .0056 .19 53
"
41
- 399 -
Moles Napalm
.0295
"
"
"
"
"
"
. 018
.036
.072
.144
.180
.360
Mole Ratio
.001 .034
.002 .068
.004 .136
.008 .271
. 010 . 339
.020 . 6?8
Gardner
41
36
30
24
14
9
5
Since the exact water content of the napalm cannot be precisely known* the
condition of the napalm "as received" was arbitrarily selected as a reference
point. Additions of water are plotted in mole of water to napalm. Addi-
tion of sil ica are simi l srly treated but since the silica is in effect removing
water the napalm it is plotted as minus water on the coordinate paper.
There is another feature in this plot which must be understood. That is,
that one mole of silica is not binding one :nole of 'Y>ater. Actually it is a far
sl"l8ller quantity. In this plot the scale chosen is such that four moles of silica
correspond to one of water. I n reality the ability of the silica to bind water
diminishes as it to remove the tightly bound water from the napalm.
Hence the curve shoulc actually be compres sed procressively as one moves away
from the reference position . This problem will be elaborated in more detai l
later. Since it is not t oo important to the present argument, it s development may
be here.
* It had previously been shol'm Progress Report , She l l Developnent Co.
OElIsr 916 :!ay 25, 1943 , also OSRD P.eport #2036 9r oughtQn & Byfield) that the water
content by analysis is a function of the method used. This is due to the
fact that water is held by the napalm in a number of di fferent ways, i.e., adsorp-
tion of types and di fferent types of hycrate formation .
- IIJO -
l3
>-'
I
200
180
160
140

120
w
z
0

100
80
EO
40
20
2. 8 2.4 2. 0 1.6 1.2
8
MOLE UTiO
REMOVAL OF WATER
SILICA GEL
.APAUI

o
Effect of Acti vated Silica Gel
and Water on Gardner
and 269-276
. 1 .2 . 3 . 4 .5 .6
ADDEO WATER
"2
MOLE RATIO
NAPALM
? .8
:-
I1"at is shown by this fieure, however, is t.hat in conforoity with the above
theoretical considerations a fairly sudden and abrupt transition from one visco5-
ity level to another is achieved as the effective water concentration is altered.
This is interpreted as a transition from a solution of individual napalm molecules
to a completely eelated containing a molecule of infinite size. Thus it is
.!Ieen why
_____ -' __ GHATIOM
-..,------
Ref.
SOLUTUOM OF IMDIVIDUAL
NAPALM MOLECULES
the napaln system is so extremely sensitive to water, that is, because it is 1n
reality in the transition interval between the two states. A stabilized and rel-
atively insensit1vp. condition is achieved at either the high or the low viscosity
level. But in the intermediate and critical region a slight alteration of the
polar agent concentration and thus the probability of chain termination has a
triking effect on the degree of gelation and thus on the viscosity.
- 4P2 -
Work:
T/Sgt H. B. swede, Flame Thrower Section
n,. Theory at n-
fuel.!. - Project lu.o,
Priority B, T.R. 181
Approval recOmmended.
T/4 H.B. Weisblatt, Flame Thrower Section lsI Ham II, Ibnaldaon
HARRy II. IXJNALlBON, Capt., C1IS,
prc. B. llalberg, Flame ntrolfer Section 43d Chemical Laboratory CcapaDJ
Chemical Section
Asshted by:
Pre. Margin Collins
Pre . Mario Greco
Pre. Jesse J. McNeely
* Author
Typed. RWI
Photography by.
Fred C. Piepmeler, Int. Section.
Graphs by.
pre . E. C. Bredeson, Eng. Section.
Pistrl00.tion:
See Distribution Sheet.
- 40)-
APproved,
lsI Robert T. Hart
ROBERT T. HART, lIaj., C'iIS,
43d Chemical Laboratory
Commanding
OPERATIONS !.!E1!ORANIm! NU\.IBl!R 18
Headquarters 29th Infantry Division
14 September 1944
- 404 -
APprmIX 8
HEAIqrARTmtS 29TH INFANTRY DIVISION
14 September 1944
MEMORANIlJM
_m ............ 18
INFA}TTRY-FLA.ETHROwrn TANK CO-ORDINATION
General. The use of the flame-thrower tank with infantry in an attack against
defending in hedgerows follows the general principle set forth in memorandum,
. s headquarters, 25 June 1944, "Infantry-Tank Coordination." The detailed proce-
outlined below was developed as a result of training and operations of the 116th
try with the 14lst British Royal Armored Corps Squadron (BUFFS).
Organization. This Tank Squadron consisted of five troops of three flame-
tanks each and a headquarters troops of four support tanks and a command
b. Characteristics. The flame-throwing tank is a ChurChill, armed with a 75-mm.
2-inch smoke discharger and three machine guns in addition to the flame-thrower.
tank tOW8 a two wheeled trailer carrying 400 gallons of fuel, which will furnish
tely 120 shots for the flame, which has a maximum range of approximately a:>
The support tanks are similar in armament but lack flame-throwing equipnent.
tank is equipped with a hedgecutter to facilitate movement through hedgerows and
ble of a maximum rate of movement of about 10 miles per hour.
Tactical Employment.
In these exercises one troop of tanks was designated to support each infantry
platoon, thus adhering to the principle of "one squad, one tank, one field.-
an assignment permits the squadron to support a battalion using either a four-
ve-platoon front for the attack, or a regiment attacking with two battalions
at with each battalion in column of companies, each assault company using two
oons in assault and one in support.
b. The accompanying sketches represent the tank troop (3 tanks) supporting an
try platoon attacking with two squads in assault and one in support, assaulting
in adjacent fields.
This description starts with the assault squads stopped along
by enemy fire. Two infantry squads are deployed along the leading hedgerOl ..
a platoon leader between the squads. As shown, the support squad is one hedge-
' in rear, and with it is the tank troop cormnander' s tank. The tank troop commander
bserving the infantry platoon commander for signals. The two remaining tanks of
, troop are concealed y;ith support distance.
Phase II. The infantry platoon commander signals the tank troop commander
by raising his carbine over his head, butt up. The tank is moved forward and
slightly to the flank to afford the infantry commander protection. The two
commanders then plan their action over a telephone located on the side of the tank.
The two tanks are moved straight forward, one in each field, and
through the hedge occupied by the infantry. The tanks begin to direct flames into
the hedges on either side of the field and to the front after they have passed
the infantry. Meanwhile, the troop commander's tank supports the attack by fire frc
his 75-mm. gun and machine guns. As Boon as the hedges are "'-ell covered with flame:
the two assault squads advance rapidly behind the tanks, maintaining their deployed
tornation. The men must be cautioned not to bunch up behind the tanks or near the
hedgerows .
e. Phase III. When the tanks have covered the hedges thoroughly With flame, tt
tank displays a flag from the turret and ceases spraying. Immediately on seeing thl
flag, the infantry rushes forward with fixed bayonets to close with the enemy re:naiJ
ing in the far hedge. In the meantime the support squad had advanced to the hedge
.acated by the assault squads.
f. This completes the cycle. If enemy resistance continues, the process is
peated, rut only as long as necessary. 'fltten fire is not being received from the
hedgerow in front of the infantry, t hey precede the tanks as in the first formation
described.
g. All other infantry supporting weapons are used in this procedure in the non
manner.
4. The tank flame_thrower has many uses other than that described above. For exam,
it can be used for placing flame in the aperatures of pillboxes or in covering a wa)
with flame or tiring at the apertures in the wall to enable the infantry to reach al
acale it.
5. Discussion. The following points must be borne in mind in using this procedure:
8. This i s a solutionj use it only as long as you cannot replace it _ith a
better one.
b. The procedure .was developed, based upon a fixed set of condi tions existing
at the time. Changes in anyone of these conditions will necessitate a change or
complete revamping of the procedure.
c. Training under conditions of
present, must precede the use of this procedure.
should closing with the flame.
use, with all participating
For example, the assaulting
G IRflARt'r .
Maj. Gen.
)FFICUL,
"lTTE
0-3,
DISTRIBUTION
- -'J)h-
agenc1
infant
AIT!X!lIX 9
- 4CfI -
9
GERllAN FLAMETHROWERS AND FUJ.lETHROWER FUEJ};--!.I
I. FLAIlETllRCWERS,
A. Introduction:
The Gerll1!l.ns realhed early in the war the velue of fleJOO-
throwers as supplementeryweapon5 aDd devoloped B number of
models to be primarily on the attack with supporting
nre. but ocoasionally on the defense. '!be following sullJTlary
desoribes the models enol11ntert3d during the European campaign.
B. Portable Flamethrowers:
The most COl!J1lon of the earlier model flamethrowers in use
we.s the mediulll wei,!;ht fla.methrow9?" (Mi ttleror FlB.mmenwerr",;o ) . a
heavier model of the obsolete "35" portable fle.methrower. Jt
oonsisted of a 10 gallon steel cylinder containing 7.5 gallons of
ruel and ni trogen in the remaining volume. 8. one quart steel
cylinder of hydrogen, a oonnecting hose and a flame projector,
all lIlOunted on a dolly fi tted wi th two pneulllElti 0 tiros and towing
herne S6 for two men. It hed a continuous fl9.I:le jet of 25 seconds
and a range or about 25-35 yards. Its total weicht was about
225 pounds. This model had limited distribution and was not used
to any extent.
The portable flemethrowers in generd usage were the
model 41 (Flammenwerfer 41) and the model 41 wi th cartridge
igni tion (Flallll'lenwerfer 41 mi t Patronen Strahlrohr). The
latter model hAs often been inoorrectly called the Model 42
flamethrower. Both models had the Same !Uel pack b.J.t differed
in the construction of the flAme projeotors; The fue 1 peck
consisted of two steel cylinders. one containiD& 7.4 quarts
fuel oil and the other nitro&en. attached . to a oarrier f'or
wearing on the beck of the soldier. A metal braided hose and
neeessa.ry fittings completed the assembly. In the original
model 41 flamethrower. the pro.1e ctor incorporated batteries and
a . cylinder of hydrogen for ignition of the fuel jet. while in tho
improved 41. the fuel W88 ignited by means of a flash from
an ignition cartridge fixed in the projector. The range of these
fltrnethrowers WAS a bout 25-35 yards and their weights fi !led with
fuel, approxime. to ly 40-42 pounds .
The latest development in portable flamethrowers was the
single burst f18m1tthrower 46 (Einstossflamnenwerfer 46) a l1r;ht
Chemica.l Warte re. World War II." September 1945,
Intol 11g. onco DiviSion, CIlS, Hq Theater Sorvico Forces, Em
- 40S -
weight (6.3 pounds loaded) model as a weapon
for engineer assault troops or paratroopers. The was
to be discarded .fter firing, collected later, cleaned and filled
for re-use. It oonsisted or a cylindrioal shee t-metal fuel container,
the baok end of which waS sealed by a welded cap. 111e forward end
had two tubular projections which formed the and the
f'uel ignition tube. A trigger gri p we s welded to t he underside of
the f'uel c ontainer the forward end. The top side of the !\leI
was fitted with two loops for a carrying strap. It had a
range of about 30 and a duration burst of 1-2 seconds.
In add! tion to the above flamethrowers a number of obsolete
models are known but these were not in use i n the fiel d .
For the servicing of the portable flamethrowers there was
also provided a oonsiderable amount of shipping oontainers, repair
benohes, recharg'i n e; vehicles and trailers, oarrying carts, etc.
c. Emplaced Flemethrower:
The ell'\placod flamethrower, "Abwehr Flammenwerfer 42", was
copied frotl a Russian desiOl 11m was used by the GerIDllna to some
extent for defensive purposes. It waS generally installed in
fixed installations suoh a8 gun bunkers and road blocks, on beaches ,
etc., from whio h it could be tired upon advanoing troops. It was
a single burst weapon, containing about 5.5 ga l lons of fuel and had
a range of 50 to 60 yards . The fl&lJlethrower consisted of .. oylind-
rical ruel tank . a propellant ohllllll.ber o"ntaining a propelling powder
and Iln electrio igniter, and a projeotor tube.
D. Fluvtthrow-er 'rank81
The" German8 developed a number of flamethrowers for tanks.
One type in6tall a ti on found in a .xw.n (F) flamethrower tank
oonsisted of two fl amethr owers mounted in two small turrets, with
180 degroes traverses , each provided with 35 gallons of :ruel oil
stored in fUel tanks on the outside of the tank. Duration of the
jet oorats wero 3-4 minutes of oontinuous stream., find the ignition
waS by means of an aoetylene fl&me.
Another type of tank, wa..s e quipped with a
flavethrower in the turret disguised as e. 5 cm Kw.K.39 cannon. It
had an effeotive rllnge of 40 yards . I ;nition medium wu a fbe
spray of fuel 011 e1eotrice.lly ignited. Total ruel cape.city
(stored internally) of the tank was 225 gallons and WaS sufficient
for a continuous jet of 3-4 minutes.
A third type of fle.methrO', .. er for insertion onto a Pz.Jg.38
tank had A project or which operated 8imilarly to the cartridge
ignition projector of the illproved model 41 portable flamathrCM'er.
The tank oarried 154 gallons of fUe l 011.
- 409 -
E. Flamethrower Vehio lee:
Aii""'8rmored half-traot whioh (Ni ttlere 'F1-.pazu:erwa&en-
251/ 16) mrunting two large flamethrower_ (14 tI:ID jet) and
OQe _.11 portable f1.etilro"er was oaptured by Allied troops.
Th8 two large fle.methrov",rs were mounted one on either dde ot
the vehicle and one small rlamethrOllt'er. at the rear. The
lerge flamethrower had a range ot 40 yards and a oontinuous jet
of 88 seconds duratj on. There were two 95 gallon ruel tanka .
".., large f la1rBthrowers' jete were eleotrioally ignited but the
_mall portable jet W811 ignited by meane of an
ign1 tion oartri dge.
Although tha Germane a high oapaoity mobile
flamethrower to be used with tankt! and armored ,",hiole', only a
few were e ver manufaotured. rt was mounted on ' 8 two wheeled.
rubber tired trailer and proteoted by armor plate. A fuel tank:
of 40 gallons oapacity was built into the trailer. whioh produced
a oontinuous,1l:tt of 24 seoonds at a range of 35-40 yard
IUition of the ,jet wat! by means of a gaeoline spray. eleotrioally
ignited.
II. FLAilETlIRa'1ER FUi.LS,
A. General:
1. Requirements for a 8uitable fuel.
i. CaP6ble of being ignited at temperatures down to 3S
o
C.
il. High density to overoooe air resistanoe.
11 1. High vhood ty - so that the ;)ltt remains compaot .
iT. Steady and constant burnine properties over the
temp&rature range - 3S
o
to 40
0
C
"'. Good snoke producer - to support the physic&!
and moral proper tie s . .
",i. Good storage properties - no decomposition or
deposi ti on.
vil. No injurious effects on health.
viil. MUst be produced from tnon-oritical
'
raw materials.
ix. Raw .. torials must be ineXPDn8ive.
x. not oO,rrode the equiflMnt in whioh it is used.
2. Teohnical Seoifioation of Standard Flame FUel 19 1s an
exam.ple
L Physioal properties.
a. Any material separating or deposited must be
r .. ,dlly dissolved or rediatrl b.1ted by Itirring.
b. There must be no suspmd,ed particles larger
than 3 mm. and total suspended .atter must not
exceed 0.1".
- -410 --
i1. Speoifio gravity - 1.03 t o 1.08 at
iii. V1scoeity. - In the standard road tar viscosimster
with out let jet sat at 4 mm diameter, maximum time
of flow 8 seo.
i "V. Fluh point - MuiDwm 5c.
v. storage and transport: a. 10-20,000 kg (10-20 tons)
tankers.
b. 200 kg. steel barrels.
3. Standard tests (1942 ).
i. !)etermi nation of viscosity at 20
0
, 0 and - 30
o
C.
11. Detennination of flash point in an open cruoible.
111. Determination of vapor pressure at 20
0
, 0
0
_ 30
o
C.
iv. Determination of soUditying point.
v. AnalYSis by quantitative f raotional distillation;
fraotions being taken every 20
0

B. Properties.
L lEnition.
Light oi ls a re generally easy to ignite. HeAvier o11s
give inoreased smoke produotion and, because of greater density and
visoosity, improved jet range. At the same time they are less
easily ignited .
Ease of ign! tion can, howe"r, be improved by addition
of fractions of low boi ling point, usually is suffioient.
But in spite of' this addition, igni tion remains uncertain due to
the tendenoy of the lighter fraotions to separate out and evaporate.
Alternatively addition of ohemicals be used to
improve ignition. These however frequently do not dissolve
completely. aDd the resulting deposition decreased the effeot to a
considerable extent.
ign! tion.
i gni tabl e
Deorease of teaperature also r educes the ease of
The sernce requirement that th6 flame f\lel should be
dnwn to - 35
0
can be met in either one of two ways -
i. by two fuels - one a viscous swmn.er
fuel, the other ti. thin winter rue!. This
soluti on was chosen by the Gerl':'Bns in 1914-18
and still used the The disadvantage
of thh method i8 one of aupply.
- 411 -
11. for the supply re.8on the Germans U8e one standard
!'l8l'le fuel addlll1 1 ~ benzol for teaperatures between
0
0
and - 20
0
c and 25% OOn%01 for teaperatures below
that.
2. Density.
lfith .. firearm projectile a large weight per unit area at
?roSi section. by improwd performance against air resistanoe ,
increases the range. 'I'be 88JQ& 1s true, in a liquid jet, of the
tue 1 densi ty.
This increased density may ~ e aohieved by using the
higher homologues of the paraffin series or mixed oi 18 oonteinint
suitable fraotions of higber boiling point.
The distillates of brawn ooa1 tar and oil shale oannot
be used in winter a8 they are not oold resiating. Mineral 011s,
oontaining arol:l8tio oompounds are however sui table and the higher
boiling arolll8ti c fraotions from ooal tar 011. are the ones chosen.
If the dond ty is inoreased above 1.20 the f'lame fuel
will not ignite even at SUDDer ._p.ra'taNa.
3. vt.sooeitz.
Early attempts to inc rease the jet ra.nge were baaed
largely on making the oil heavy (i.e.increasing its density). It
is now known that viscosity playa an e ven greater part.
A viscous oil forma .. amooth and compact jet owing to
its internal oohesion and great surface tension.
The more visooys the 011, the more difficult will be
ita pe.ssage through the nozzle, but the les8 will be the break up
in the air end hence the greater its range. F\lrthar, the greater
the vis oosity of the oil the greeter the pressure needed to propel
the jet at a steedy, rapid rate.
In the usual ooal tar flame fUels visoosity is obtained
from anthraoene residues or pitoh. these also giving the required
thi ck smoke.
With flame fuel s of other oompod tions vhooslty oan be
aoquired by .dmixture of ohemioa.ls. By this method even the liquid
hydrooarbons of low boilin point (Pentane,hexane,heptane,toluene
and. thei r Ilixturee) oan aha be made vi800us and used as fl$lDe
!\Ieh:. The s e improve the i gnition, jet renge and storage life
under oold oonditione .
The advantagea and dieadvant.e.ges of the 1Jro types of
f'le.me tuels may be II\l1JW8.rhed:
- 412-
i. Viaooua 011 ,;i wa ,004 dow t.lrniDf;, with oopioua
amoke and ,ODd jet rant;e.
Under oold oonditiona it ia not readily ignited
and tends to
11. Ifon-rlaoou.a oil p ... a a hot, rut buJ"ninc 1'1 __
with little IIIlOke and ahorter j.t reap. UDder
hot oon4itiona it .xud at paokings .to., and
evaporates readily.
4 . Eklrn1ng properties.
",. fl ... jet
leave no residues unburnt .
r .... ins.
should oonsume lts.lf compl.tely .nd
In standard flame fuel 19 about 10%
Thr.e condition. IIlUst be satisfied to fill the require-
Dmt s for the large temperature range - 35
0
to +40
0
1-
1. The oompoaition ot the fuel .... st be suitable.
H. Aa the compound tla. fuel tenda to separate out
the containers must be r olled, shaken or stirred.
iii. The ignition must set 11,ht to the jet ot
fuel all round and not from one side only. Thi.
becomes partioularl y important when riring in ,
crosswind.. OUe ot low boilinr; point are Jlk)at
re adily IVlited. They burn with, wry hot tl ...
of ahort duration. only a ahort jet range 18
achie..ed and little or no afte r-burnll1(; at the
target.
'nle RuSSians apecify a. very hot fl.- to increaee the
physical erfect. of the weapon and a brightly burning fla.e to gift
increued moral .ff ect.
5. Baoke production.
Production ot , wry thiok blaok sacke can be aohie ... d
by uaing oU. rich in oarbon, poor in hydror;en aDd, i1' pouible,
c onta1nin, no oxygen. Example. are antilraaen. aU. and napthalene.
The.e are the a_ ooapound s inorea tbe Ti.ooalty of fl
fuels. The quantity or the .. _t.rlal. added, ha-ewr, .. st not be
ao great that thor. is .epar.t1on .t low temperatures or "the :tl_
tuel will not igni t.. UDder JUah ooDdit1ona.
A thiok blaok smoke not only aoral but alao physical
.tfect. A tl ... with .. ch 8aoke cau -are due.ge to huaans or
animal s than a amokel.ss on., it the latter ia hotter. Thi. i.!
t'Urther incre d. by the a.phyxhtinr; etr.ot at tb. aoot particles.
...... 0-01_
Scanned by MII:;pecManuals
- 413-
6. Stora.ge.
It is necessary that fl.me fuel remains liquid even
atter several :years storage at any temperature between - 35
0
end
+ 40.
The fuel MUst not deposit any doughy or s olid
pttrticles. At low temperatures, particularly, those f'ractionB
which are important for viscod ty or smoke producti on tend t o
s8oparate. While anthracene fonns doughy lumps, pitoh end other
of high carbon content tend t o f bke out anc some o11s
e"n depod t orystals.
Deposi tion
fractionated basic oils,
addition of stabili%ers.
suitable for large scal e
expen8i" raw materials.
be I%"evented hy the use of
of less dense fraations by
The s e processes Are, however, not
use as the ohemicals are maGe from t oo
Tho best solution ia founG In making flamethrowing
equipnent as r o oost as possible so that flame fuels of poor
qua.lity may be used in them.
7. r njurl ous effects.
E-ven when not rurning, 1'1&100 fuel, inc ludinG
standard flame !\leI 19, ma y cause casualties .
i.Skin. Spl&shi ng and. drenohi may cause
phye1oe.1 damage partioular ly to the ruC('lUS
membrane and oonjunctiva.
ii.Internal. Internal organs may be damaged by
bre l,thing vapor from non-viscou s oils.
iii.Explosion. The vapor from non-vis c('lus !\lele
Can form an explosive mixture wi th air.
C. Composition.
1. General.
Tests ha.e shown that f or a flame fuel a mixture of
more or Ie 86. readily ignitable oils with specifi c gravity a little
over 1 is the moat suitable.
The composition must be such thflt the specifications
(.ee 1580 A,para. 1) already enumerated are met . Thl s inc ludes the
- 414 -
demand for a fuel which can be used equally ",'ell i n.sunner or wint-e:',
in o rder to Simplify production end supply. Army flemethrower& hf>vc
ooEn iuued since 1940 lWith st6Dda.rd flal!\8 f\!el HI . which can be used
down to - 30 through addition of The Ilonthly produc tion for
the SUlMIl'r l S42 Wp.s 600 t ons; c oul d es s il y be i nC'refised by
In addition flame fue l Rh !l( See C pera 5 .11) he.! been issued
of late.
I t i s of greet impo rtance that the flamt. fuel be prc<l-u ced
frem idi eenous non - e ritice.1 1Il6terifl l s hn'; iflb n se. t hfact ory s upply
pas iti o n.
2 . Coal tar
i . Genera 1 .
Fen:."l gives e. ho t. very smoky flame. Tar 011s he.w the
d i SAd vantage thet at low temr:ereture s pitch an d CArbon-rich substar.ces
separ&te . '!'heir s o lidifying points ere t herefore t oo hi [, h .
11.(' J4Jnum mixtures (1914 - 1918 )
Four types of rh-.me o il we re used by the I'; ermlms in t he
19H- 1918 wer:
a.Blue oil ( Summer 011) '118000s. flurnt well with a very
s mok y fle.me. Too t hick in cold weather ar.d e8s11y
choked the valves of the flamethrawer .
b .Tallow oil (Wint e r 011) Non-visoous. Burnt quickly
with &hot fle.lI8 but Ii t tle smoke. I.e&lre ci e e sil y
through peekings etc and under warm cond itions
evaporated eaally.
o . Green oil By mixing blue and yellow oils in the
proportion 1 I 3.
d.Red oil. This was a trAining fuel. It W8E very
viscous and gave ewn more smoke. t hough less heet
than b lue oi l.
iii.Frenoh fl ame fuel (1915 - 1918)
85% coal tar oil
15% heavy 011
iv.U.S. flame fuel
70% weter gas tar S . G.l. 044
30f0 gaso line S.G.0.756
S . G.of mixture 1.02-
This ruel was interesting in that only about 70( of
it burnt, tho remaining 30% dri pping out unconsumed.
v.Standard flame fuel 19
"n11a 11 claimed to be the beast flam fuel derived
f r om ooal distIllates , to date_ It wu developed 1936-38 by the
- 415 -
a.,.nlchaft fur Teer .... rwertuD, in Du!ewr,;-Yeidenich. ThI _in
oomponents are light and h.aT'! tar oil. and h.aTY benr.ol.
J
hea...y benr.ol (benzol hydrocarbons b.p.50o - 22S
0
C)
27% liquid briquet-pitch (coal tar p1tch)
27% anthracene oil (aroRltic hydrocarbons b.p.greater
than 225
0
II.Dd otMr cycHo oompounds)
2% addi t1. ons (Hi ghes hODlologues of phenol)
No alkali; No IIlineral acids t
comlRl1 ti on II
, ! bea'VY benlol
35% liquid briquet pitoh
20,( anthracene oil
6" additions
[)enlity }.09 - 1.10
Excellent to good
pointed and hot.
ignition in BUmPer or winter. The is
Ji\lel loues abou t 10,(. Smoke production exoellent.
on long storage cryatall of anthraoene are oocaaional17
formed.
Cost per 100 kg 1a abrut 12 HM. '11le raw material 11 tu.tion
wae at that tu. (1942/43)uncertain in the case of heavy beDzol.
Standard fl&lll.e ru&l ie oonsidered to be .. practically
.epoa1tless oil of good quality. equally suitable for eummer or
winter use.
A separate winter oil 115 not reqw.red sinoe standard
flame tu"" l 19 after admixtu:re of benzol remains liquid and 1a
readily ignited in cold conditions.
Rates of benzol addition are:
15% for temperatures between 0 and - 20
0
25% for tempe ratures below - 20
0
OUa than benzol (e.g. paraf'fin. wast. or SUJII.P
011. petrol. lubrioating oil etc.) atl!lt not be added dnoe thBy
do not mix with the flane fuel and may eftn oause deoOllpod tiOD .
Some 6% of Flame fuel 19 la tnsoluble 1n banzol.
- 416 -
3. Brown cOal distillates.
The Riebeck: .nd Jdont.n experimenta been dhoontinued
reliable itnitioD oould not be achieved. The Estonian ahale oil.
by the sue conaern he", howe",r been found aui table.
4 . )(1D8ral 011 dhtUle,tea.
i.r,eneral.
paraffin - TM. gives 8. wry hot flame or .hort
ranr;e 8.Ild Tery 11 ttie smoke.
Gasoline - The heat dew loped by burning petrol
endangers the crew and there is fl danger of the rlalle fhflhlng baak
'into the equip!Bot. The RUssians use a non-return val", a8 a
.arety II1I!Hl.8ure in their portable flamethrower, which burns ge.eoline
mixiAlre8 as well as diesel oil.
Tar oil is decomposed by gasoline and doughy lumps
or asphalt are tanned.
The Russians use no coal tar diatillates, but only
distilh,tes of "mineral oils. or which they haw plentif\ll s upplies.
In Germany development of theae ruel. WaS pursued
by Rhenania-08ssg. Though a. hot tlUl8 and reliable ignition was
achieved the rllllge was 8mall 8l1d the smoke thin.
ii.Polish mixture 1939
67 - 7 raW"
33 - 25% gasoline
iii.Russian mixtures (lY4l-42).
a.Summer fuels:
7if,! naphtha
g oline{or paraffin 5% ga.oline)
b.Winter fuela.
or
S()%: naphtha
25j1 paraffin
28% gasoline
65% naphtha
paraffin
1O}t gaaol1ne
or
50)/ naphtha
60,( petrol
- 417 -
c F\J.e 1 fo r the portable fle.mtlth r ower f(OKS 41:
45% naphtha
35"lc psraffi n
20,?'; gasoline
d . F\lol for fougasse flamethrower :
60% n&phthe.
petr ol
This g ives fau ltless ignition dowr. to - 30
0
Ac C'ordi ne; to Russian p/ W. (sfo.id to be fla_me fuel
speci ali sts) tr.e following cC'lmposi ti ons ... :e re used in 11:141 fCl T
visoous mixtures:
OC(X )-1 501.
naphU.e.
paraffin
22 - 2411 e;csoline
3- napthinic acid soaps
oc( xl?
56
-
naphtha
peraffin
gasoline
2 -
1% aluminulT'.
nc(T)1
So;.; naphtha
20)( paraffin
18
-1""

2 - 11. ne.phthinic acid soaps
OC( T ) 2 67 naphtha
30%, gasoli ne
3 - 1% al uminum stearate
5. petrol distillates.
l.neoera 1.
Rheinpreussen were 8sk8d i n the au t umn of 1940 to
start developme nt of a new fllll'!"e fue l of increa s ed vi s cosi t.y
from the synthetic gasoline by-pr oducts which they he. d available.
Thi s gE>soline conhins liquid l o\,. boilin[ hydro -
carbens includin[. pentane . hexane. heptane , toluene and thei r
mixtures.
11 Flame fue l Rh 5 .
Comf'lred with s tandar d flame fuol 11:1 , this f uel
( am the very sil':111ar 6) is much cleaner to use . It is
- hJS -
colorless and not unpleasant in odor.
however a re its low vi s co si t y end poor
The disadvantages
smoke development.
The incre&sed viscosity required for l nnge r jet
r ange can be obtained by a ddi tion of Rheal II (S8C D para 3,iv).
6 .Die se 1 fuel oil.
i.General.
This oil has a speoifi c gravity of 0 . 65 and there f ore
bel onr;e t o the lig ht oils. Non- vi scous, it gives little smoke
and a s hor t jet range . The flame i s , however , very hot. Be1'or e
f r eezing this fuel thickens to a paste at - 30 .
While the army uses standard tlflrn.e fuel 19 , the navy
uses diesttl oil fo r its shi pnounted flamethrower. whe r u the
above menti ontld disadv8ntf\ges Ar<:t .:>utweighed by the advantage
of simplified suppl y. si nce ditlsel o i l is used es f uel for the
ships engine s .
Tho RussiAnS a l s o use dies91 oil 1n thei r portabl e
equ ipmunt ROKS - 2.
11 . Di e s el oil plu s standard fl6l!\e fuel 19 .
the s e tv.'o in the pro porti nns 4 : 6 or 3 : 7
was e. fei lure (IS the stt.nda r d flame fuel sepp.rated , particularly
i n cold wttathe r. 'I'h6 then c l or.ges the flnrrethr ovmr
val ve s .
7 . Ethyl al cohol.
Thi s Givol') an almost inv:isible fltJme , which is consldor-
ably a f fected by the wind, and no sr.<oke.
a.Carbon d i sulphide.
i . Gone ral.
This liqui d hus a flash poi n t of - 25
0
and a very
sll18.1 1 he at of' comru s tion.
ii . Mixture with standard f l ame fuel 19 .
Thi s fai led comr Ie te ly, s a t is rectory i g n1ti on of the
jet not be ing e chievetl .
9 .Ethyl ether.
This hes e flas h point of - 35
0
A mixture with s tandar d
flame fuel 19 in pr oportion of 14 86 gave e;ood results , rut
such mixtures c &.nnot be used as lIuf ficient supplies nf ethyl
ethe r are not available .
- 419 -
10.Petroleum ether.
IJl admixture of 7 - 15% petroleum other bring' the
ignition temper .. ture of aome tlame fuels down to - 30.
Petrol ether does not, however, mix with flame
tuel 19 . but remaina as a separate layer on top.
D. Thickening Agents
1. General.
The oompaotness of tho fuel stream ( .. nd thereby jet
r ~ e ) is influenoed oonsiderably by the '1'isooa1ty 01' the flame
fuol (8ee Sec B para 3).
It therefore became neoessary to nnd 8. sui table
material by whieh a non-visoous, though otherwise suitable flame
f\lel, could be thickened.
2 . Fiedler ' S ('.al Qils.
Fie dler rOlllised this in 1917 and produced two flame
fueh G and P. '!'hese were gelatinous am lumpy but were still
spraysble . Unfortunately details of the formula have been los t
(by the Germans), but the followi ng data oonoerning these experim-
ents is extant.
The standard nozzle was slightly enlarged. During
tests ranges f r om 55 to 70 yards (compared wi th the nonal 18 -
25 yards) were aohieved with the portable flamethrower at pressures
of 23 to 15 atmospheros.
1.G ",.1
This burnt only at the top of the jet steam and
at the tllrget, as many i ndi vidual flames about 20 ins.high over
an are8 of 10 - 15 ft . i n dl e.meter . These flames cont lnued tor
about 2 mins .
At night the smokeles s flame appeared whiti.h in
color.
11 .p FUel
Thi 8 rurnt at the target with a thin whi te smoke.
Physiological properties suggested that it contained phosphorua.
These tests were abandoned awing to the very
unoerta i n ignition of the fuel.
- 420 -
3. Rhea!.
i .C'reneral
Development work undertaken by Rheinpreussen in
the autumn of UI40 had ted in a flame rue 1 made from the
by-products of tt. synthetic petrol industries. oalled flame
tuel Rh. S. '.15 this was non-viscoue it is neces8ary to U5ft a
thickening a Gent to increase the viscosity.
a. Sodium slats of acids . TheSe r.ompounds
are among those tested by the U.S. Chemical Warfare Service in
1917 - 18. Rheinpreu8sen decided against them becaus e of their
tendency to separate out.
these are
supply.
b. }.luminwn stearate, collulose ether. etc.
su:! table they cannot be utilized as they are in
Al thoogh
short
c. Aluminum alcoholate. This proved to bo the best
thickening agent .
ii. PrOperties of Aluminum alooholate.
Tbi sis f r om alumina and an aloohol
(oontaining at least 6 oarbon atoms per molecule) In the presence
ot carbon dioxide and a 11 ttle water.
It causes the non-viscous olear hydrocarbons to
oongeal to a transparent jellylike mass.
fuel treated in this manner hes the followi.
pro per tie s :
a. Great vi s cosity and high surf&.c8 tension.
These cause the jet to be compact and increase the range by e.bout
30{..
b. Resistance to heat or cold. The s ettil1f, point
11 til bout - 90
0
previous value.
o. Sarety in handling es the vapor pressure is
reduoed to hal f the previous value.
d. Good ignition as the flashpoint is - 40.
e. Long duration or rlame as the thickened fuel
1a tlntire1y combustible .
f. Unfortunately poor smoke devel opnent. A white
smoke. which has no moral e freot but may ser'1'8 ror oamouflage. oan
be oreated by addition of alumina or magnesium oxide . Good
di sperSion and suspension of these powders throughout the ruel
oan be ensured by additi on or aluminum resinate. ino re sinate or
naphtha.
_ 1,21 _
In addition t o fla:TIe fuel HhS any fuel . othe r
than ' those d(jrivttd f r om ter o ils, may he thick'enEld by addition of
Rheal.
iii . Rhea l I.
This is a white crys talline powdtJr, also known as
C,ARHUTAL.
Rhea1 I should be Aoded t o the rl6l!le fuel to the
of about &,t. byv:eight ( 300 l,m poVi de r fOI' 7 lit ers of fuel).
The necessary SJTl811 quantity of v.ater (0 . 1-0.2%)18
obtained from the atmospheric moisturth It is there f ore neces58ry
thet the thickening ae;ent be stirred into the fuel in open vessels.
Stirring must be for about 30 minutes.
iv . Rheal JI .
This is 8. non- hydro lyseble li quid and 1s added in
the proportion of 6% by w6ight.
'!'he adve.ntago of this abent o-w cr Rhoa l I i s that
the mixture needs to be shaken or sti rred for 8 few minutes only.
4 . Russian thickening agent .
As with Rheal I this is e powder, known e,s 1" P-2,
issued in 2 kg, packets . OP- 2 consists o! tho aluminum salt of
naph thinl0 - or fatty - ecids and is use d in the proportion of
2 - 6% by weir;ht.
The powdor must be g r ound, stirred into 5 - 8
liters of petrol and this solution added t o the fuel with
constant sti rring . The whol e process takes 15 - 30 minute s .
T1I6 fuel then remains viscous f or the following
tim6s:
light oil: summer 6 hr.
winter 2 days
oil : suur.tor 2 Clays
winte r

- 8
days
- 422 -
Storage of the thickened fuel must be in airtight
containers and under cool condi ti ons , when the maximum storage
life wi 11 be:
lS ummer
winter
2 months
4 monthlS
The viscosity is by additi on of 10 - 15%
and inc re ased by use of mOTe powder .
E. Spontaneous
1. General.
If a .jet of fuel is ignited at the nozzle, up to 80%
ia consumed on its way to the target. Triis fact MS prompted
rtlseaTch for an incendiary material to be mixed with the flame
fuel, and to be lSelt - igniting. so that the flalM fuel is ignited
a cer tain while a f ter it leaveiS the no zzle.
Thi s can he done with substance IS which are spontaneously
inflammable bJt these are f re quently dane;e r ou8 if they ignite by
accidental exposure t o the ai T.
2 . White phos pharos.
Vlhi Ie thi s is sui tabl e it cannot be used a t present owi ng
to limitations of supply . FUrthermore it has been found upsafe to
handle in flameth r owers.
As a selt - igniting mixture, devel o ping a go od smoke, the
followi nt 15 reported to have been developed abroad:
401. whi te phosphorus
10% carbon disulphide
25;'10 saltpeter
25% naphthalene
Phosphorus i s particularly effecti ve against living
targets and the morale effect usually exceeds the phYSical.
Russ ian application (Summer 1942)
In the summer of l!;l42. the Russie.ns made a number of low
flying attliOks on GerIMn airfields in which many phosphorus balls
8 ins in diameter) were d r opped in 8. short while . giving the
impreSSion of a flame at tack. '!1lese b8.11 s ignited before reaching
the grouDd and scattered on hreeking up. The fires started
- 423 _
on the parts of airoraft caused only little d ... ,.
they oould be extinguished ldth sand, but the thiok grey ok.
produoed, whioh lasted about 10 minutes, made attack on the low
flying airoraft d1l'ficul t .
3.
This .ynthetic I.G. Farhen produot oan be USed eub-
etitute for white phosphorus.
i. Chemical.
This is alumdnum methyl chloride - believed to have
the r ormula AIel Al( CH )3.
3 3
The melting. point of the oommeroial product varies,
normally it is about but this oan be lowered to OOC by
addition or tho ethyl compound without materially effecting the
ignition properties. The boiling point is about 148
0

Nethyletoff is transported in steel bottlee or in
sealed gla8s tubes and stored in steel oontainers under nitrogen.
Glass and iron are not corroded by it but light alloys, euch a8
elelctron, are .
11. Properties.
In contact with a small amount of air, as when
pourlQg from one vessel to another, a 8mall rImae 18
In mdxtures rioh in air (as in fine jets and sprays) however,
.,.tolent decomposition takes place.
The decamped ti on" is e.lmost explcsi ve when the
material i s 1n eontaot liquids containing oxygen (e.g., water,
alcohol) or even moist soil.
Oxygen free liquids oan be used to reduce this
effect. In admixture with 10J' benzol the liquid ignited hlttlD&
the grouM; with a mixture containing equal volumes of the two
liquids, ignition does not take plaoe.
11 1. Safety mixtures.
The danger of spontaneous igniti on or premature
8elf 19ni tion can be redu ced by addition of:
(1) granulated diatomaceous earth
( 11) Kio se 19uhr
(iii) Paraffin _x
(iv) Xieselguhr and paraffin wax
- 424 -
or whioh Kieselguhr appears to be the most useful. The mixture
with paraffin wax is visoous.
Iv. General experiments.
a. If oarbon tetrachloride is added to
Methylatoff a spontaneously Inflamnab1e mixture is formed.
b. Liquid pitoh cannot be ignited by
o. Fll tered anthracene residue s are not igni ted
by small &mounts of the compound. Addition of larger quantities
result. in ignition, fo llowed by slow combustion and
of blaok smoke.
v. EXperiments uSing the small
Short jet ranges only were achieved.
a. Pure Methylstoff a little white smoke.
b . 7it liters Methylstoff -#-0.12 liters oarbon
tetraohloride . Spontaneoos ignition 50 (20 ins) from the noule.
Great lateral heat .
o. B liters M6thylstoff + 0 .8 liters
tet raohloride . Spontaneous ignition at the no%1e.
he at . MJch boown and white snoke.
oarbon
Great la teTal
d. 2 parts Me thylatoff ... 1 part oil. Fair jet
range and good smoke dewl opment
EXp!lrimants were also oarried out in which
of Methyl s t off and various mixtures with it were cata-
pulted on t o the target .
vi. Further requirements.
Tests with Methylsto!f were abandoned in 1936 a.
the compound was considered not to be safe for normal handling.
The se te sts were however to be continued when the following
requi r eIMnts oou ld be mat:
a. Either solid up to 50
0
or liquid down
o
t o - 10
b. Safe for handling and storage.
c. Gives black instead of whi te smoke -
possibly after addition of fIltored
anthraoene r esidu
- 425 -
SI GNI FICANT DATES IN SUPA AND ADJACENT AREAS
'_,eneral Headquarters Uni ted States Army Forces , Paeific
10 June 1945
- 426 -
APPE'1DIX 10
GENr;){AL HEA!XlUARTrnS
UNI TED STA.TES FORCES, PACIFIC
Latest r.evision Significant
and Adjacent Areas
Compiled by:
G-J Historical Divisi on
El'1E'.IT Offensive
Japanese carrier force struck Pearl Harbor
Thailand surrendered
Japanese Cl ark Field, Lu zon
Malaya invaded
Japanese landed Vigan and n.parri, Luzon
Guam capt'lred
Lal1C1ing at !)lvao, Voi ndanao
Wake I sland surrendered
Hong Kong surrendered
uan1la declared open city (bombed follo ...... i nC day)
"anila occupied
Battle of '!. acassar Strai ts
Rabaul seized
Balikpapan (Borneo) occupied
Gasmata (Ney; Britain) occupied
Singapore surrendered
Heavy Japanese air raid on Carwin
Timor i nvaded
Battle of Java Sea
Japanese invaded Java
- 427 -
10 Jun 4;
7
[ec
41
8 [ec
41
8
[)ec
41
9 Cec 41
10 [)ec 41
10 Cec 41
20 Cec .1
23 Cec 1,1
25 Dec 41
26 [)ec
41
2 Jan
42
Jan 42
23 Jan 42
2/,
Jan 42
10 Feb
42
15
Feb 42
19 Feb 42-
20 Feb '42
28 Feb
42
1 '.{ar 1.;2
Japanese air raid on Broome caught refugees from Java
Lae-Salamaua captured
British evacuated Rangoon
Ruin (Southern Bougainville) occupied
Surrender on Bataan
Japanese landed at Capiz and Iloilo (Pansy)
Tu1agi occupied
Hollandia occupied
Corregidor surrendered
Battle of the Coral Sea
General Sharp, CO USAFFE Vi sayan- Mindanao
Command, surrendered
Battle of Midway
Japanese landed Buna-Gona area
Kai, Aroe, Tanimbar Islands seized
Ja}:anese landed Milne Bay
Madang and Wewak occupied
Japanese repulsed at Wau
General Chronology
2 Mar 42
8 liar 42
8 llar 42
7 AIX' 42
9 Apr 42
16 Apr 42
2 May 42
6 Yay 42
6 May 42
7-8 Nay 42
9 May 42
3-6 Jun 42
21_22 Jul 42
Jl Jul 42
25-26 Aug 42
18-19 Dec 42
30 Jan 43
Task Foree - South Pacific constituted at sea 12 Dec 41
First us Expeditionary Forces landed Australia (Brisbane),
Foree _ South Pacific USFIA upon debar-
kation. -- 22-23 Dec 41
USFIA became USAFIA 5 Jan 42
General MacArthur arrived Darwin, Australia 17 Mar 42
Initial date of OH" Sm'A 18 Apr 42
Battle of the Coral Sea turned back Japanese attempt to
capture Port 7-8 May 42
Midget submarines attacked Sydney Harbor
Jl May - 1 Jun 42
- 428 -
GHQ closed Yelbourn!", opened Br1lbane
OSAFIA discontinued, USASOS created to assume ita functions
Japanese landed at 0008
'apum Campaign
Forces engaged Kokoda Trail; 7th. lustn Div.
(-18th Sdo), 16th and 30th Au.tn Bde.
Forces engaged Milne Bay: 7th and lath Austn Pdes
Forces engaged Buna-Gona area:
Austn - 7th D1 v, 16th Bele, 30th Bda, 14th Bde
US - I Corp9, 32d Int OI.y, 163d Int (41st Int OI.y)
Japanese captured Kokada a/me
20 ""1 ~
20 Jul ~
21-22 Jul ~
23 Jul 42
23 Jan 4J
26-29 ""142
TJS Yarines landed Ouadalcanal - Tulagi area
Guadalcanal campaign
Forces engaged: 1st !:far Di ... , elements 2d Mar
Americal Div, 25th Inf Div
7 Aug 42
7 4ug 42 - 21 Fob 4J
DiY,
Naval Battle of Savo Island
Na'Y31 Sa ttlp. of F.astern SolaaOD.a
Japanese repulsed at Milne Bay b,y 7th and 18th Austn
8-9 Aug 42
23-25 Aug 42
Sde. 26 Aug - 7 Sop 42
Fifth Air Force established
Farthest penetration of Japanese toward Port Moresby
(20 air line miles - Japanese reached lmita Range)
25th AU9tn 8do (7th Diy) began offensive to drivo
Japanese back across Owen Stanleys
Maval Battle of Cape Esperance
'irst elements 32d Di ... m.oved by air to N coast
New Guinea, landing at lOlnigela
Landing and operations Goodenough Island
(one Austn Bn)
Naval Battle of Santa CrulS
Kokods a/me occupied b7 25th Au.tn ado (7th 01. ... )
Raval Battle of Quadalcanal
Naval Battle of Tassalaronga
958738 0 - 51- 3J
- 429--
3 sop 42
17 sop 42
26 Sop 42
11 Oct 42
14 Oct 42
22-26 Oct 42
26-27 Oct 42
2 Nov 42
U ... 15 NOT 42
30 NO'( 42
Gena captured by 21st Auotn 9de (7th Div) 9 Dec 102
Buna Village captured by U7th In! (J2d Inr Div)
14
Dec
42
Bun. Government Station captured by 12?th In! 2 Jan 43
SonaIIanda captured b7 l Bth Austn 8do (7th Div) 18 Jan
4J
Last organized Japanese resistance Buns-Gona area ended 22 Jan
43
New Guinea campaign
Japanese repulsed at V/au by 17th Austn ade
Sixth Army established in SWPA
Russell Islands landing (elements 43d In! Div)
Northern Solomons Campaign
USAFFE reconstituted
Sea Battle (destruction of 1&e c onvoy by
Fifth Air Force and RAAF)
Southweet Pacific Force redesignate Seventh Fleet
Attu invaded by 7th Int Div
Woodlark and Kirtwina I slands occupied
Advance echelon landed Woodlark
Advance echelon landed Kiriwina
landings
Forces involved 112th Cay ReT (" .'oodlark)
and l5Bth ReT (Kir1wi na)
This was 1st opn directed by Sixth Army,
operating as Alamo Force
Nassau Ray landing (Mackechnie Force, composed
of elements 162d Int 41st l nr Div)
Nelf Georgia GrOup landings
Kula Gulf Naval Battle
Naval off Vella !avella
Mubo captured by 17th Austn Sde operating
Under command 3d Austn Div
- 4JG -
24 Jan 43-
31 Dec 44
JG Jan 43
16 Feb 43
21 l'eb 43
22 Feb 4J-
21 Nov 44
26 Feb 4J
;(:-4 Mar 43
15 Mar 43
11 May 43
22 Jun - 5 Aug 43
n - 23 Jun 43
23 - 24 Jun 43
JG Jun 43
29-JG Jun 4J
JG Jun 43
5-6 Jul 43
1) Jul 43
14 Jul 4J
Y.unda a/me, New Georgia, captured
43d, 37th, and 25th In! Divs engaged
Naval engagement off Vella Lavella
Vella Lave 14 landing
Forces engaged Vella Lavella operation were
35th ReT of 25th In! Div and elements 3d
New Zea1&nd DiT.
Heavy Fifth Air Force raids on we_ak
More than "200 Japanese a/c destroyed
Kiska occupied by US and Canadian forces .
Amphibious landing Lae area (9th Austn Div)
Hadzab parachute landing (503d Prcht In! Regt)
Transport a/c began to fly elements 7th Austn
Div to Nadzab
Salamaua captured
Forces engaged in Salamaua operations _ere
17th and 15th Austn Bdes. 162d In! (41st In! Div)
Operati ons under 3d Austn Div to 26 Aug, thereafter
under 5th Austn Div
Lae captured by 25th A.ustn ade (7th Div)
Kaiapit captured by elements 7th Allstn Div
Finschhafen landing (29th Austn Dbe, later
reinforced by remainder of 9th Div
Finschhafen captured by 20th Austn Sde
rAlmpu occupied by 21st Austn Bde (7th Div)
NaTal battle off Vella Lavella
Over 300 SWPA. a/c struck Rabau l
All enemy resistance in He_ Georgia Groups having
ceased, C ~ 3d FIt terminated the operation
Treasury Island landing (elements 3d New Zealand
ADphihious landing Choiseul Island (2d MarParcht
- 431 -
Div)
Bn)
5 Aug 43
6-7 Aug 43
15 Aug 43
17-18 Aug 43
4 Sap 43
5 Sop 43
6 Sep 43
11 Sep 43
16 Sop 43
20 Sep 43
22 Sop 43
2 Oct 43
5 Oct 43
6-7 Oct 43
12 Oct
43
15 Oct
43
27 Oct 43
28 Oct 43
Bougalnrllle landing, }l}D.prege ':"ugul!lta Bay 1 Noy 43
3d Div landed initial17, 37th In! Div commenced
landing 7 days later. Operations to 15 Dec under
1st Mar Phib Corps, thereafter under XIV Corps.
Americal Dlv reUeved 3d Div beginning 2.7
Naval Batt le ot Empress Augusta 9ay 1- 2 Nov 43
l{eavy SWPA air strike on Rabaul 2. Nov 43
Marine parachute bn withdrellf from Choiseul 3-4 Nov 43
3d Fleet carrier strikes on Japanese naval forces Rabaul 5 &. 11 Nov 43
Oilbert Islands landings by 2d Yar Div and
165th RCT of 27th Inf Div
Naval battle orf
Satelberg captured by 26th Austn Bd. (9th Div)
Ara.' landing (l12th Cav ReT)
Elements 15Bth In! Regt later reinforced 112th ReT
40th In! Div relieved 112th RCT early Jun 44
B1 smarc ks Campaign
Cape Gloucester Landingg ( let War DiY)
40th lnf Div relieved 1st Mar Di.., Apr - Yay 44
Cape Gloucel!lter air strips captured by 1st Mar Div
Saidor landing ( 126th ReT initially, later reinforced by
remainder of 32d Inf Di v )
510 on Huon Peninsula captured by ele!:lents 9th Austn Di..,
Shaggy Ridge in Finisterre Range N of Dumpu cleared by
18th Austn ado (7th Div)
4th !tar Div landed on Roi and Namur, 7th Inf
Div an Kwajalein Island, in Kwajalein
Atoll, Marshall Islande
Juncture of elements )2d In! Div and 8th Austn
ade (5th Div) at Yagomi, E of Saidor
Patrols lst Mar Di.., and 112th RCT establish
contact on New Britain
20 Nov 43
25 Nov 43
25 Nov 43
15 !:ec 43
15 Dec 43-
27 Nov 44
26 Dec 43
30 Dec 43
2 Jan 44
16 Jan 44
23 Jan 44
1 Feb 44
lD rob 44
lD Feb 44
CG Sixth Dexterity Operation
(Western New Britain and Saidor)
Green Island landing (elements 3d New Zealand" Div)
Naval task force struck Truk
Eniwetok landing (22d Yar Regt and 106th In!
of 27th Inf Div)
Naval task force struck Marianas
Los Negros, Admiralty Islands, landing
(2d Sqn, 5th Cav Regt, reinforced by remainder
1st Cay Div beginning 2 Mar)
Landing at Mindiri, W of Saidor, by elements
)2d Inf Div
Landing on Willaumex Peninsula vicinity of
Tal.sea by elements 1st !lar Div
Japanese assault on Empress Augusta Bay perimeter
repulsed by 37th Inf and Americal Divs
captured by elements 1st Div
Manus Island landing (W of Lorengau) by 2d Brig,
1st Cav Div
Lorengau air strip captured by 2d Cay Brig
Lorengau captured by 2d Cav Brig
Emirau landing (4th Mar Regt)
Naval task force struck Palau, Yap, l'{oleai
Hollandia air strips heavily bombed, approx 288
Japanese alc destroyed
RagadJim occupied without opposition by elements
15th Austn Bde operating under command of
11th Austn Di. v
Hollandia and Aitape landings
I Corps directed operations at Hollandia 41st
Inf Div (_163d RCT) landing HUmboldt Bay and 24th
Inf Diy (-34 RCT) landing at Tanahmerah Bay.
34th RCT was I Corps reseTTe. 163d RCT landed at
Aitape.
- -4)3 -
10 Feb 44
15 Feb 44
16-17 Feb 44
17 Feb 44
23 Feb 44
29 Feb 44
6 liar 44
8-28 Mar 44
9 Mar 44
15 liar 44
17 liar 44
18 liar 44
20 liar 44
JO Mar - 1 Apr 44
JO Mar - 3 Apr 44
13 4pr 44
22 Apr 44
by elements 15th Austn 3de ( 11th Div)
and 8th Austn 9de ( 5th !iv)
Alexishafen occupied by 3th Austn Bde (5th ttV)
Hollandia, Cyclops, and Sentani a/mes captured by
elements 24th and 41st In! Divs.
Naval Task Force raided Truk
Cape Hoskins a/me (New Britain) occupied by
elements 40th In! Div
Landing at Arara on mainland opposite Wakde
"sland by 1630 ReT (41st Inf Div). Later
engaged in operations Wakde_Sarmi area were
24 Apr 44
26 Apr 44
26 Apr 44
30 Apr - 1 May 44
7 May 44
17 May 44
l5Bth, RCT, 6th !nr Div, 31st In! r)jv (-12/lth RCT),
and 123d ReT (J3d Inf Div)
southeast Asia Command ann SWPA hp.avy
bomber strike on
Wakde Island landing (elements 163d RCT)
C3 Sixth Army terminated Adru.ralty Islands Campai (;, TI
Wakde a/me secured by el ement s 16)d ReT
81ak Island l andtr.g (vicinity of Bosnek) by 41st Inf
Liv (-l63c Task force was reinforced in
June by 163d ReT ano 34th Inf un 24tt. Inf Div
I Corps dirp.cted ojJerat ions 15-29 Jun.
co Sixth Army terminated Hollandia operation
PJokmer a/me, Biak, captured by 41st In! Div
XIV Corps (US Army forces Elnirau, Green Island,
'Aougainville, Treasury I sland, NeTt' Georgia
Group) came under direc t control SiJ'PA
Saipan invaded (2d and 4th Uar Divz, 2?th lnf Div)
Hansa Bay occupied by elements 5th Div
Far fAstern Ai r Force established
Naval Battle Eastern Phili ppines
Borokoe and Sorido a/Des, "Biak, captured by
34th Inf (24th Inf Div)
17 May 44
18 l.!ay 44
18 llay 44
19 !lay 44
n May 44
6 Jun 44
6 Jun 44
15 Jun 44
15 Jun 44
15 Jun 44
15 Jun 44
Jun 44
20 Tun 44
Noeruoor Islanc landing
l58th RCT initially, reinforced bep,inning
3 Jul hy 503d ?rcht Inf kCT
Japanese xvrIl Army attacked US iriniumor River line
E of Ait&pe, after breakthrough suffered
se vere defeat. XI Corps directed operations.
127th and 128th kegts (320 Div), l12th CaY Regt ,
124th Inf Regt (JIst Di v) , and Ib9th
.In! (43d Div) were engaged in the battle .
Guam invaded Od Har L/iv, 1st Mar Prov Br ie, 77th Inf Div}
Tinian invaded (2d and 4th Mar
Landings at Cape Opnar ai, Ams t e-rclac and Middlebur g
Islands (6th Inf Div, less 20th ReT which rejoined
N.v at Sansapor in Aug)
Shore to shore landing, Cape Opnarai t o Sans[Jpar, by
elements 6th I n! tiv
First air attack on Philippines sinCE 1942
(Sassa naval a/me neaT Davao)
CO Sixt. h Army ter:ninated Biak operat.ion
CO Sixth Army terminated Aitape oper ation
CG Sixth AnlY terr.1inated Noemfoor operation
CO Sixth Arrr.;, terr:l.inated Sansapor
CG Sixth Artily terminuted Wakce_Sarmi operation
Eighth Army estahlished
3d l" l eet struck a/mes and shipping in Mind:inao
and Visayan ar ea
'.{orotai Island landing (31st In! Div ano 126th
RCT of 32d In! Div under co:nmand XI Corps)
Landing on Peleliu Island ( Palau Group) by
1st \lar Div
Landinc on Anguar Island (Palau Group) by
Slst Inf Viv (-323d RCT)
3c str uck Luzon and Vi sayan
- 435 -
2 Jul 44
10- 11 Jul -
8 Aug 44
21 Jul 44
24 Jul 44
30 Jul 44
31 Jul 44
6-7 Aue 44
20 Aug
44
25 Aug
44
31 Aug 44
31 Aug
44
2 Sep
44
7 Sep 44
9- 14 Sep 44
15 Sep 44
15 Sep 44
17 Sep 44
21- 24 Sep 44
Unoppooed landin,s Ullthi Atoll by 323d ftCT
of B18t In! DI..,
First heavy raid on Ballkpapan, Borneo
eG Sixth Army terminated Operation
3d Fleet struck Hansel Shoto, Formosa, Luzon,
and the Vlsayan
6th Ranger Bn landed Dinagat, Saluan, and Homonhon
Islands in entrance to Leyte Gulf
SiXth Army invaded Leyte
X Corps (1st Cav Div and 24th Inr Div) landed
San Ricardo - Palo area
XlIV Corps (96th and 7th In! Dl.vs) landed
IUl:ag area
Tacloban a/me seized by 1st Cav Div
Naval Battle of Leyte Gulf
Elements of 1st Cay Div landed on Samar
Carigara captured by 24th Inf and 1st Cay Oivs
?th Int Div reached Baybay on W coast
of Leyte
Vapia Islands cleared of Japanese by elements 31st
In! Div (1st OJ>l directed by Eighth ArmY)
Asia IRlands occupied by elements J1st In! Diy
Limon captured by 32d In! riv
First B-29 raid on Japan from Saipan
First landing of Japanese airborne troops E coast of
Leyte (San Pablo - Illlag area)
Second enemy airborne attack on Leyte
tBuri, San Pablo, Bayug a/mes plus diver-
sionary drops in Tacloban _ Dulag area)
77th In! Div landed S of Ormoc in vicinity of Ipll
Ormoc captured by 77th Inf D1. v
3d Fleet strikes on Luzon
- 436 -
23 Sep 44
JO Sep 44
4 Oct 44
10-21 Oct 44
17-18 Oct 44
20 Oct 44
20 Oct 44
2.3-".6 Oct 44
24 Oct 44
2 Nov 44
2 Nov 44
15-18 Nov 44
19-70 Nov 44
24 Nov 44
24 Nov 44
26-)7 Nov 44
6-7 Dec 44
7 l:e<: 44
10 Dec 44
14_16 Dec 44
lIindoro landing (S03d Preht ReT and 19th RCT
of 24th In! DiT)
Hlghlfay 2 cleared from Umon to Ormoc as 1st Cav D1v
and 32d In! Div overc8l'I\e final Japanese resistance
in Lonoy - Canangs area
CG Sixth Anny terminated Leyte campaign
Y.arinduque Island landing by elements 21st In!
(24th In! DiT)
3d Fleet Strikes on Hansel Shoto, Formosa, and Luzon
Sixth Army invaded Luzon
I Corps (43d and 6th Inf DiYs) and XIV Corp.
(37th and 40th In! tiYs) landed Lingayen Gulf
3d Fleet struck Indo-China and China coasts,
Formosa, and Nansei Shoto
Camotes Islands cleared by elements 7th In! Div
Tarlac captured by 40th In! Div
landing in San Narcisco area of Zambales Province
by XI Corps (Jath Inf tiY and 34th RCT of 24th
Inf DiY)
Nasugbu, Satangas PrOvince, landing by
11th AlB Div (_511th Preht In!)
Mindoro operation terminated
511th Preht Inf (11th AlB Div) seized TagaytQ
Ridge, Batang88 by parachute drop
1st Cay Div entered Grace Park, Manila
Landing at" Karlveles, Bataan by 151st
RCT Oath Inf Diy)
In airborne operation 50Jd Prcht In! Regt landed
Topside, Correg1dor, while elements of 34th
RCT (24th Inf DiY) made amph1biou. assault
5th Fleet struck Tokyo and Nagoya-Kobe areas
I"o Jima land inc (4th and 5th J.!ar Divo with
3d Yar Div in reserve)
- 4J7 -
15 ~ c 44
22 ~ c 44
25 ~ c 44
3 Jan 45
3-9 Jan 45 .
9 Jan 45
12-22 Jan 45
15-31 Jan 45
21 Jan 45
29 Jan 45
31 Jan 45
31 Jan 45
3 Feb 45
3 Feb 45
15 Feb 45
16 Feb 45
16-17 Feb 45
19 Feb 45
Landings on NW tip of Samar, Capll and Biri Islands
in San Bernardino Strait by elemetlts Americal
Div and 1st Philjppine Inf Regt .
Last organized enemy resistance in Manila overcome,
37th Inf tQV, 1st Cav Div, 11th AlB Div par-
ticipated in battle for Manila
landing, in vicinity of Puert o Princessa, by
186th RCT (41st Inf Liv)
41st Inf Iiv (-lB6th RCT) landed near Zanboanga,
Mindanao
Basilan I sland (Sulu Archipelago) landing by
elements 41st Inf Di v.
Panay landing, 13 miles I'f of Iloilo, by 40th I nf Div
(-lOBth RCT)
Cebu landing, 5 miles 1'1 of Cehu City, by Americal Iiv
C-164th ReT)
77th Div landed Y.erana Rett o
Negros landing (W coast near Palu Pandan) by
40th Inf tiv (-108th RC:')
l58th RC';' lanced at Legaspi, SE Luzon
Tenth Army l anded on Okina"'a
3d Phib Corps (1st and 6th Mar N.vs)
XXIV Corps (7th and 96th Inf Iivs)
Elements 41st Inf Div landed Sanga Sanga Is l and,
Tal'ri Tam. Group
Est'ablishment of GHQ AFPAC
Elements 41st In! [iv landed Jolo I sland,
Sulu Archipelago
El ements Americal Ii. v landed on Bohol C VisayCis ;
77th Inf Liv landed on Ie Shima
X Corps landed Malabang - Cotabato area Mincanao.
24th Inf Div made initial landing, followed
22d Apr by 31st Inf 1iv.
Eaguio captured by 129th Inr (37th In! Div)
- 438 -
1'1-20 Feb 45
25 Feb 45
28 Feb 45
lO Mar 45
15 Mar 45
18 45
26 Mar L.5
26 Mar 45
29 ar 45
1 Apr 45
1 Apr 45
2 Apr
45
6 Apr
45
9 Apr 45
11 Apr 45
16
45
17 Apr
45
26 Apr 45
26th Austn ade (9th landed Tarakan I sland off
NE Borneo
Davao captured by 24th Inf Div
Macajalar Bay (N Mindanao) landing by l08th ReT
(40th Inf Div)
Wewak captured by 6th Austn
Balete Pass sec.,;,red by 25th Inf Di v
Ipo tam captured by 43d Inf Div
155th Inf (31st Inf Div) and l08th Inf
(40th Inf Div) established contact in the
Impalutao area, Miqdanao, clearing Sayre
HighT/ay.
Wa't.'a tam captured by 38th Inr Civ
Brunei Sa:r, Borneo landinGs by 9th Austn Ci v.
( -26th 3de)
* Landing at Ralikpapan by Australian forces
* Dropping of first atomic on Hir oshima
* Entry of Russia into war Japan
.. Dropping of second atomic bom, on r:<teasaki
* Japanese Government sued for peace
'lH'r Acceptance of Allied peace ter::lS by Japan J ending fighting
** Signinf, of surrender t.erms by Japan aboard
Battleship Missouri
1 May 45
<-4 lIay 45
10 May 45
11 May 45
13 May 45
17 !lay 45
23 May 45
29 May
45
10 Jun
45
1 Jul
45
6 Aug 45
8 Aug
45
9
Aug
45
10 Aug
45
14 Aug 45
2 Sep 45
* From Biennial HPoport of The Chief of Staff of the United States
Army, ,Jul y 1, 194.3 to June .30, 1945, to the Secretary of 'iiar,
pp. 83, 86 .
** From the Army-Navy Journal, Dec ?, 191.4 - Dec ?, 1945, pp. 10, 192'.
- 439 -
SU!.]ECT: on aceursc:y of fact. IUld adequae:y of treatment,
in Cbemicl'I.l COrpl Hi.torieal Study No.5 on "MechAnized
Flame Operations in World War II."
TO Chief. Historical Office, Building 165,
Army Chemical Center. YAryland.
Slgned, _____________ _
Rank and poel ti on
during World War 11 ____________________ _
present address ________________________ __
SOBJECT: Commenh on accurACY of fact, and ad-aquae)" of treatment,
in Chemical Corps R1atorical StudT No.5 on -Mechanized
rlame Thrower Operations in World War II.w
Chief, Historical Office, Building +65,
Arrtr/ Chemical Center, Maryland.
Signod ______________ _
Bank and ~ o . l t i o n
during \/orld Var 11 _________ _
Pretent addree8, __________________________ _
st.: BJEC'I , on. Fl.c cu r c.C;',' of f ree t , al"ld ad0c:.uacy of
Coq:: s F.1 sto, :'cd St ud.,).' }'!'o . 5 or: tlMeci"..an i2.ed
Oper et i uns in .... orld 'tlar II. It
TO C!:. i e f, Histori cal Of fi e- e. Buil di ng #5,
Az-:n:,. Cen t!! r .
Si.med' _______________ _
Rp.nk and
dur in;; ',','orld lfR.r II. ______ _____ _
add ree s, _____________ ___

Chemical Corps Historical Studies Number 5-Mechanized Flame Thrower Operations in World War II

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