FE D. QUITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS GR 124862; 22 December 1998 SC 2nd Division; Bellosillo, J.

FACTS: Fe Quita (FE) was married to Arturo Padlan (ARTURO) on 18 May 1941, but they were not blessed with children. Fe, then became an American citizen and later on divorced Arturo in San Francisco, California in 19 July 1950. The decree was granted on 23 July 1954. Subsequently she married Felix Tupaz that also ended up in divorce to marry another man. Apparently, Arturo married Blandina Dandan (BLANDINA), on April 1947, and had five children with her, and also had another child with someone else. In April 1972, Arturo died. During the intestate proceedings of Arturos estate, Blandina asserted that she was the surviving spouse of Arturo that was opposed by Fe arguing that under Philippine Laws, Arturo was still married to her despite the divorce decree she had secured from San Francisco and having to have married twice thereafter. The lower court decided in favor the heirship of the children of Arturo and Blandina, and to Fe as the surviving spouse of Arturo, saying that the divorce decree obtained by Fe cannot be recognized by Philippine, citing Tenchavez vs. Escano (No. L-19671, 29 November 1965). On Appeal, the decision was reversed. ISSUE: Whether Blandina is the surviving spouse of Arturo? HELD: Blandina is not the surviving spouse of Arturo. RATIO DECIDENDI: The court citing Van Dorn vs. Romillo (G.R. No. 68470, 8 October 1985), that in as much as Philippine Courts does not allow the Filipino spouse to remarry, the decree is recognized by the same, and it is on this very same vein that the law frees the said spouse from his/her marital obligations from the divorcing spouse and further it prevents the latter from invoking Philippine Laws with regard to their conjugal property in the country. Therefore, since this case pertains to the intestacy of Arturo, Fe cannot become his surviving spouse. Blandina can neither be Arturos surviving spouse, their marriage being bigamous.

PAULA LLORENTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS GR 124371; 23 November 2000 SC 1st Division; Pardo, J. FACTS: Lorenzo Llorente (LORENZO), a US Navy serviceman, married Paula on 22 February 1937. The Second World War broke and left the Philippines. While in the US, Lorenzo became a US citizen, and returned to the Philippines only after the said war ended. He discovered Paula with child and the father to the same is his own brother. Given this very das fate, Lorenzo refrained himself from filing any criminal case against Paula and his brother and instead entered into an agreement with Paula that he they be peacefully separate, suspended her benefits from the US Government, and that their property shall be settled later in a separate agreement. He returned to the US and divorced Paula; the latter being represented by an attorney-in-fact. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and married Alicia. Lorenzo and Alicia lived peacefully as husband and wife, and were blessed with three children. Then Lorenzo then made a last will and testament making Alicia and their children his testamentary heirs. He then had the same probated ante mortem and appointed Alicia as administratrix of his estate. The court denied the application of Alicia as administratrix as Lorenzo was still alive however allowed the probate of the will. Lorenzon then died before the termination of the proceedings. Paula then filed for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor, and an opposition to the heirship of Alicia and the latters children saying that their succession encroaches to her legitime; her being the surviving spouse of Lorenzo. Alicia filed for a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor in the probate proceedings. However, the court gave due course to Paulas arguments that the divorce decree issued by the US court is not recognized in the Philippines; hence, denying the formers petition. Thereafter, the court declared that the will is intrinsically invalid and declared Paula as the surviving spouse of Arturo and was appointed administratrix thereto. Alicia moved to reconsider and was denied. On appeal, the decision was modified making Alicia a co-owner of any property that was acquired during her cohabitation with Arturo. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether Alicia is entitled to inherit from Lorenzo? HELD: The petition is granted: The decision of the CA is set aside; The decision of the probate court is reversed; It recognizes the validity of the divorce decree granted by the US court; and The case is remanded to court a quo to determine the intrinsic validity of the will (which

includes the issue at bar). RATIO DECIDENDI: It must be stressed that under Philippine Laws on Succession, the courts shall apply lex nationalii and not Philippine Laws automatically. The divorce decree is valid. In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. the Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him. In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons. For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

RODOLFO NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY AM MTJ-96-1088; 19 July 1996 SC 2nd Division; Romero, J. FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by the Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo Navarro, against Hon. Judge Hernando Dumagtoy. In his complaint he avers that said judge had solemnized a marriage between a man and a woman despite him knowing that the groom is already married; and that the same judge solemnized a wedding outside the jurisdiction of his court. The said judge in his defense said that on the first incident, he merely relied that the grooms wife is was presumably dead, the same having not returned to their dwelling for more than seven years already; and on the second argues that one of the contracting parties thereto requested him in writing to solemnize their wedding in Dapa (outside of his jurisdiction). ISSUE: Whether the said judge is administratively liable? HELD: The said judge is found to have acted in gross ignorance of the law and is administratively liable; he is suspended for six months. RATIO DECIDENDI: The law is clear Article 41 (Family Code) does not automatically allow a person, whose wife has gone missing for four consecutive years, to just get married. He must first secure a declaration of presumptive death from the court; without which any subsequent marriage is void. The law is also clear under Arts. 7 & 8 (Family Code) that a member of the judiciary may solemnize a marriage, and the same must be done with their courts jurisdiction (respectively).

CHING vs CA [G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004]

FACTS: On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per annum. As added security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of P38,000,000.00. The loan was subsequently renewed on various dates, the last renewal having been made on December 4, 1980. Earlier, on December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount of P13,000,000.00 payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the previous loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note to evidence the loan maturing on June 29, 1981. This was renewed once for a period of one month. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August 21, 1981, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo Ching, Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI. ISSUE: (a) Whether or not the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines (b) Whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders. RULING: (a). Yes. In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said relief. (b). No. We find and so hold that the CA erred in setting aside and reversing the orders of the RTC. The private respondent, the petitioner in the CA, was burdened to prove that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal purpose to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the tribunal, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the tribunal acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment and is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It was incumbent upon the private respondent to adduce a sufficiently strong demonstration that the RTC acted whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to, and even decide of, the controversy before certiorari will lie. A special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of its jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. After a comprehensive review of the records of the RTC and of the CA, we find and so hold that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders.

In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same. The private respondents reliance on the rulings of this Court in Maramba v. Lozano and Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Banzon is misplaced. In the Maramba case, we held that where there is no showing as to when the property was acquired, the fact that the title is in the wifes name alone is determinative of the ownership of the property. The principle was reiterated in the Associated Insurance case where the uncontroverted evidence showed that the shares of stocks were acquired during the marriage of the petitioners.

GUIANG vs COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 125172. June 26, 1998] FACTS: Over the objection of private respondent and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband sold to Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of their conjugal property, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They were married on December 24, 1968 in Bacolod City, before a judge. Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with Gilda Corpuz as vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, and particularly known as Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a conditional deed of sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The consideration was payable in installment, with right of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee fail to pay three successive installments (Exh. 2, tsn. p. 6, February 14, 1990). On April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion of their Lot No. 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 to the spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The latter have since then occupied the one-half portion [and] built their house thereon (tsn. p. 4, May 22, 1992). They are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila in June 1989. She was trying to look for work abroad, in [the] Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale of the remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409. On March 1, 1990, he sold to defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document known as Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A) the remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house standing thereon for a total consideration of P30,000.00 of which P5,000.00 was to be paid in June , 1990. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property is void or voidable. RULING: This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the two lower courts: ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.(165a) (Italics supplied) Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the trial court adroitly explained the amendatory effect of the above provision in this wise. The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real

property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus, the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit: Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)

NAVARRO, vs. DOMAGTOY [A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996] FACTS: The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Judge Domagtoy holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. MonicaBurgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent Judge's residence in the Municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Judge Domagtoy is liable for solemnizing the marriage between Tagadan and Borga. 2. Whether or not Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario outside his jurisdiction. 3. Whether or not he exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. RULING: 1. Yes. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides: "A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41." The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda 2. Yes. The solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.) Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of

death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect." More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. 3. Yes. The Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a sixmonth suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

JADER-MANALO vs. CAMAISA [G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002] FACTS: Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came across an advertisement placed by Spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April, 1992 issue, for the sale of their ten-door apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal. She was interested in buying the two properties so she negotiated for the purchase through a real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized by the spouses. Thelma made a visual inspection of the said lots with the real estate broker and was shown the tax declarations, real property tax payment receipts, location plans, and vicinity maps relating to the properties. She met with the vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses and made a definite offer to buy the properties to Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, NormaCamaisa in the presence of the real estate broker. After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of P1,500,000.00 for the Taytay property andP2,100,000.00 for the Makati property to be paid on installment basis with down payments of P100,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively, on April 15, 1992. The balance thereof was to be paid as follows: Taytay Property Makati Property 6th month P200,000.00 P300,000.00 12th month 700,000.00 1,600,000.00 18th month 500,000.00 This agreement was handwritten by Thelma and signed by Edilberto. When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wifes conformity and consent to the sale. The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by petitioner. The following day, petitioner, the real estate broker and Edilberto met in the latters office for the formal signing of the typewritten Contracts to Sell. After Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two checks, namely, UCPB Check No. 62807 dated April 15, 1992 for P200,000.00 and UCPB Check No. 62808 also dated April 15, 1992 for P100,000.00 in the presence of the real estate broker and an employee in Edilbertos office. The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of his wifes signature ISSUE: Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wifes written consent. RULING: No. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.

Valdes vs RTC 260 SCRA 221 FACTS: ... Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139 October 8, 1985 Fact of the Case: Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn. On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceeding before Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property. The lower cour... t denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines. Issue: (1)Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them. (2)Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties. Held: As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen as he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered married to private respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

santos vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112019; January 4, 1995 Art. 36(Civil Code)- PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY FACTS: Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 20, 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" in 1991.Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court. ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of Julia to return home or at the very least to communicate with her husband,for more than five (5) years constitute psychological incapacity. RULINGS: No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five (5) years does not constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage. Petition is denied.

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997 FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then

proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life. Ginas version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights. In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Chings mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husbands private parts nor did he see hers. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings examination was kept confidential up to this time. The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man Chings version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs. RATIO: The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have

cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

De Jesus vs Dizon G.R. No. 142877 Prayer of the Petitioner: Petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

Facts: The case involves two illegitimate children who having been born in a lawful wedlock; claim to be the illegitimate children of the decedent, Juan G. Dizon in order to enforce their respective shares in the latters estate under the rules on succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on August 23, 1964 and during this marriage, herein petitioners, Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus were born. However, in a notarized document dated June 07, 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Subsequently, on the following year, Juan G. Dizon died intestate leaving behind a considerable amount of assets. Thus, on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment, herein petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and accounting of the Dizon estate. On the other hand, herein respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case. They argued that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being thelegitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. But, the trial court denied their motion to dismiss as well as their motion for reconsideration, which prompted the respondents to elevate the issue before the Court of Appeals but still the latter upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered that case be remanded for further proceedings. Years later, respondents, notwithstanding with their submission of their answers and several motions, they filed an omnibus motion for the dismissal of the complaint. They contend that the action instituted was, in fact, made tocompel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able to establish their status as such heirs. They also asserted that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to ascertain the question of paternity and filiation because the same could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding. And at this instance, the trial court favored with the respondents and therefore dismissed the complaint of the petitioners for lack of cause of action and being improper.

Issue: Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent.

Ruling: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In

the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the childs acknowledgment. However, based on the records presented, they showed that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents.Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.

RELUCIO vs. LOPEZ GR No. 138497, January 16 2002 FACTS: Herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for "APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio, in the Regional Trial Court. In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private respondent, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976. A Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her. An Order was issued by herein respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: 1. Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against petitioner; 2. Whether petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a complete adjudication of the controversy. RULING: (1.) A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other. The elements of a cause of action are: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit: "If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property xxx" The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. The second cause of action is for an accounting by respondent husband. The accounting of

conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property coowned by him and petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto Lopez' share, if any there be, in property co-owned by him with petitioner. Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in respondent's favor, results in a breach of an obligation to respondent and gives rise to a cause of action. Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner. (2.) A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings. If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an action. Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez. Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in the above Special Proceedings. A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with respondent.

Tanada VS. tuvera FACTS: Tanada and company seeks a Writ of Mandamus compelling respondents public officials to cause the publication in the official Gazzette of various Presidential Decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations and administrative orders invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws, to be valid mush be published in the official Gazzette. Crime Committed: Violation on the right of the people to be informed. Contention of the Accused: Petitioners have no legal personality to seek for the Writ and the publication is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the law provides for their own effectivity dates. Contention of the State: Since the subject of the petition concerns a public and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not to show any specific interest for the petition to be given due course and that the right sight in is a public right. Held: The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official Gazzette all unpublished presidential decrees, issuances which are of general applications, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

PEOPLE vs MOSENDE 371 SCRA 446 G.R. No. 137001, December 5, 2001 Page 14- Alternative Circumstance (Intoxication)

FACTS: On the evening of March 22, 1998, Leticia Zabala Sapupo was alone with her two sleeping children at her residence in Wawa III, Rosario, Cavite. Her husband, a barangay tanod, had left the house to conduct a night patrol in the neighborhood. She would, now and then, look through the window opening to see if he was already back. At about 10:00 p.m., peeping out, she saw Cayetano TanoMosende, leaning on the fence, just arms away from where she stood. He was wearing the same clothes when she saw him drinking at the store earlier that afternoon. The vicinity was sufficiently illuminated from neighboring houses and a nearby construction site. Mosende was unaware of being watched because she by then had the lights in the house turned off. "Tano was known in the neighborhood of closely-knit urban dwellers as being a habitual drunkard and troublemaker when inebriated. Leticia saw Mosende walk towards the mango tree where Enrique Sefriuto, popularly called by neighbors as Andrew, was lying face up on a nearby bench. Moments later, Andrew stood up and walked some distance away to urinate. Mosende also rose, entered the yard and positioned himself behind Andrew while the latter was relieving himself. When Andrew faced Tano, the latter, without warning, stabbed the unsuspecting victim twice at the left portion of the abdomen. The wounded Andrew yelled, Inay, may tama ako, sinaksak ako ni `Tano!'

ISSUE: Whether or not Alternative Circumstance of Intoxication can be appreciated.

HELD: No. The court a quo, in considering the aggravating circumstance of intoxication, gave much weight to the testimony that appellant was so identified as a habitual drunkard. While Leticia Sapupo testified to having seen Mosende drinking an alcoholic beverage at a store earlier the afternoon of the incident, nothing would show that he was in any state of intoxication or in drunken condition when the dastardly deed was being committed. Treachery qualified the killing to murder but, there being no other aggravating circumstance shown, the penalty that can only be imposed is reclusion perpetua. Geronimo vs. CA and Antonio Esman Nature: Petition for Review on CA Decision (Affirming the decision of RTC declaring the marriage of Graciana and Antonio is valid) Facts: Petitioner contends that the marriage between Graciana Geronimo (his

s i s t e r ) a n d oppositor Antonio A. Esman was null and void since there was no marriage license issued to the parties at the time the marriage was celebrated. In fact, petitioner contends that a c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s s u e d b y t h e L o c a l C i v i l R e g i s t r a r o f P a t e r o s s h o w s t h a t t h e marriage license number was not stated in the marriage contract and that the marriage contract itself d o e s n o w s h o w t h e n u m b e r o f t h e m a r r i a g e l i c e n s e i s s u e d . M o r e o v e r , m a r r i a g e l i c e n s e number 5038770 which was issued to the deceased and the oppositor by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal was not really issued to Pateros before the marriage was celebrated but to Pasig in October 1959.O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , o p p o s i t o r c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t s r a i s e d b y p e t i t i o n e r a r e m e r e concoctions; that a close scrutiny of the aforementioned documents would show that except fo rt h e p h r a s e s " n o t s t a t e d " a n d " n o t r e c o r d e d " t h e t w o c e r t i f i e d c o p i e s o f t h e m a r r i a g e contract issued by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and the P a r i s h C h u r c h o f S a n R o q u e w e r e t h e s a m e a s t h e c e r t i f i e d c o p y o f t h e m a r r i a g e contract which was attached to the original petition which named the oppositor as the husband of the deceased; that petitioner simply asked that these phrases be incorporated to suit his ulterior motive; that even the omission of the marriage license number on the Registry of M a r r i a g e s i n t h e L o c a l C i v i l R e g i s t r a r i s n o t f a t a l i n i t s e l f a n d i s n o t c o n c l u s i v e p r o o f t h a t n o marriage license was actually signed on January 7, 1955 to Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A.Esman; and that the marriage license form issued to the Municipality of Pateros are printed by t h e B u r e a u o f P r i n t i n g w i t h s e r i a l i z e d n u m b e r s a n d d i s t r i b u t e d t o v a r i o u s p r o v i n c e s o r municipalities thru proper requisitions which serial numbers even if already used in the printing of the marriage license forms in the past years are used again in the printing of the same forms in the succeeding years.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage was valid?

Ruling: It may be conceded that the evidences presented of the petitioner-appellant do not b e a r t h e number of the marriage license relative to the marriage of G r a c i a n a Geronimo and the herein oppositor-appellee. B u t a t b e s t , s u c h n o n - i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e number could only serve to prove that the number was not recorded. It could not be accepted as convincing proof of non-issuance of the required marriage license. On the other hand, the marriage license number does appear in the certified archives c o p y o f the marriage contract. The non-indication of the license number in the c e r t i f i e d copies presented by the petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-a-vis the issue of t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e m a r r i a g e i n q u e s t i o n b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o t h i n g in the law which requires that the marriage license number would be indicated in the marriage contract itself. In conclusion there was a valid marriage license issued, error i n the recording of the serial number of the license does not tantamount to an invalid marriage

PFR CASE DIGEST Liyao Jr. vs. Liyao GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002 FACTS: William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the deceased were legally married but living separately for more than 10 years and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased. On the other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the deceased. HELD: Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law. Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

PFR CASE DIGEST Manzano vs. Sanchez AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001

FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels. ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code. HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Tuason v.Court of Appeals G.R No.116607 April 10,1996 Facts: In 1989,private respondent Maria Victoria L.Tuason file with the Regional Trial Court,branch 149 of Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage to petitioner Emilio Tuason.In her complaint Maria alleged that she and Emilio were married on June 3,1972 and as a result begot two children at the time of the marriage Emilio Tuason was already Psychologically incapacitated to comly with his essential obligation which became manifest aftreward and resulted in violnet fights between them.Maria also alleged that Emilio is a drug user and a womanizer that in 1984 he left the conjugal home and cohabited withthree women in succession.After he left the conjugal dwelling he gave minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the tutiion of his children complelling Maria to accept donations and dole-outs from her family and friends.Emilio likewise becme spendrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership. Issues: 1.WON Marias cliam that Emilio was already incapicitated at the time of the marriage and becames manifest only after their marriage is a valid ground for the nullity of the marriage. 2.WON Emilio Tuasons claim that he was deprived of due process is correct. Held: 1.Yes,Emilio Tuason failed to present witnesses that would prove his innocense that led to the courts decision to declare their marriage void under article 36 of the Family code based on the evidence presented by Maria Tuason. 2.No because his failure to inform or to notify the court about his confinement and medical treatment therefrom is negligence which is not excusable that led the court to deny his petition

MARCOS VS MARCOS [G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000] Facts: Brenda Marcos (appellee/petitioner) and Wilson Marcos (respondent) were married twice (on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig, and on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila.) They have five children. Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. After the downfall of President Marcos, Wilson left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, Brenda always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house. On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions. The appellee presented the following evidences: a. In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them. b. She submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation while the appellant on the other hand, did not. The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children. Issue: (1) Whether or not Wilson Marcos psychological incapacity is considered as a ground for nullity of their marriage. Ruling:

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus: "WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent. Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise: "Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision. "In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x xx unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable. Brenda Marcos filed for a petition. Preliminary Issue: (1) Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation. Ruling: The court agrees with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.

In Republic v. CA and Molina, the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code were laid down by this Court as follows: "1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state. x xx xxx xxx 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x xx xxx xxx (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensorvinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Main Issue: (2) Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated. Ruling: The court rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious

psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.[12]At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation inMolina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina. Decision: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs. Notes: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA Nationality Principle Internal and Conflict Rule FACTS: Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs.

HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter. 1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californians outside the California, and 2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in California. The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed. Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

Modequillo vs. Breva GR 86355 May 31, 1990 Facts: A judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Davao del Sur. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Davao del Sur registered inthe name of defendant and a parcel of agricultural land located at Malalag, Davao del Sur. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequilloalleging therein that the residential land located at PoblacionMalalag is where the family home is built since1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachmentunder Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and thatthe judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumeratedunder Article 155 of the Family Code. An ISSUE: Whether or not the family home of petitioner is exempt from execution of the money judgment? HELD: No, the exemptions for execution provided for by the Family Code are inapplicable because the residential house and lot of petitioner Jose Modeuillo was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case

Benitez-Badua vs. CA GR 105625 January 24, 1994 FACTS: Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989. Private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) filed a complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of the nephew. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua,alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate.The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She was raised and cared for by the deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth; (2) Baptismal Certificate; (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter; and (4) School Records where the spouses name were reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age,categorically declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy? HELD: The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the sole heirs of the deceased because she died without descendants and ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared thathe was the petitioners father.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995 LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent. Facts: Lupo Atienza lived together with Yolanda de Castro with whom he has two children. He purchased a house in Bel-Air, Makati where his family stayed. He stays there too whenever hes in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his bed. Their house boy informed him that Brillantes had been cohabiting with Yolanda de Castro. Later on, Brillantes prevented him from visiting his children. He claims that Brillantes is married to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children. Atienza filed a complaint for Gross Immorality & Appearance of Impropriety against Brillantes. Brillantes claims that his marriage to Ongkiko is not valid because of lack of marriage license. According to him, Ongkiko abandoned him 17 years ago leaving their children with him. He claims that he believed that he was single when he married de Castro because his first marriage was void. Issue: Whether or not Brillantes can contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration that his previous marriage is void? Held: No. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, judicial declaration of nullity of previous marriage is needed before one can enter into a second marriage. Rule has retroactive effect thus applicable to Brillantes even if he got married under the Civil Code. Brillantes acted in bad faith when he married Zenaida Ongkiko. They undergo two ceremonies however he never got a license. Then, he immorally and illegally cohabited with de Castro. Not fit for the judiciary.

Republic of the Philippines (Petitioner) vs. Erlinda matias Dagdag (Respondent) #22 September 7, 1976 Facts:

P.F.R

On September 7, 1976, Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag got married and had two children. In 1990 Erlinda filed a petition for nullity of marriage for the reason of psychological incapacity. She alleged that Avelino often disappear for months indulge drinking sprees with friends and inflict physical injuries on her if she refused to have sexual intercourse by forced. She also learned that Avelino was imprisoned but escaped from jail for that reason she was force to

elevate and look for a job to support herself and the children. Virginia Dagdag (Erlinda Sister-inlaw) Testified about Erlindas allegations. RTC-olongapo declared the marriage null and void, which was affirmed by the court of Appeals. For the reason of; Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Defendants constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continuously destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEES MARRIAGE TO AVELINO DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST Issue: Whether or not Avelino Dagdag suffers from psychological incapacity, emotionally immature and irresponsible, and habitual alcoholic terming to family obligation. RULING: NO! The Supreme Court ruled that Erlinda failed to comply with evidentiary requirements under the guidelines set in the two cases of Santos and Molina, as she failed to present a Psychiatrist or medical doctor to testify; the allegation that Avelino is fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven and the investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present converting evidences. Contend: that the alleged P.I to Avelino is not of the nature contemplated by Art. 36 of the Family Code, the CA made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of P.I and application thereof to the facts. that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase psychological incapacity and an incorrect application thereof to the facts. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGANCES, petitioner VS ARGOS and PINEDA, respondents [G.R. No. 130362. September 10, 2001] FACTS: Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of International Flavors and Fragrances Inc. (IFFI). Hernan H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing director. Consequently the managers reported directly to Costa. Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim on December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a Personnel Announcement which described respondents as persona non grata and urged employees not to have further dealings with them. On July 1, 1994 respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel against Costa. On March 31, 1995, respondents filed a civil case for damages against Costa and IFFI, in its subsidiary capacity as employer. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents can sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioners employee? DECISION: No, the respondents cannot sue the petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action. Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence. Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties.Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature In the case at bar, respondents did not base their civil action on petitioner IFFIs primary liability under Art. 33 but claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as employer of Costa.

LEE VS COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 118387. October 11, 2001] FACTS: This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, KehShiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan. Unknown to KehShiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners mother was KehShiok Cheng. A petition against all the petitioners was filed. The petition sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of KehShiok Cheng as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name Tiu Chuan, who is allegedly the petitioners true birth mother. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have no cause of action to impugn the legitimacy of the petitioners as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children only after his death. HELD: No. The respondents have cause of action to impugn the legitimacy of the petitioners even if their father is still alive. Petitioners contention is without merit. In the case of Babiera vs. Catotal, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the birth certificate of one TeofistaGuinto as null and void ab initio, and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the same from the Registry of Live Births. We ruled therein that private respondent PresentacionCatotal, child of spouses Eugenio Babiera and HermogenaCariosa, had the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of TeofistaBabiera, another alleged child of the same spouses because she is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The Supreme Court likewise held therein that: x xx Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of the provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latters child at all. x xx.

Similarly, The Supreme Court

ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals that:

Petitioners insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. x xx. x xx xxx xxx.

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz: Petitioners recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner VioletaCabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedents child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. Petition is denied.

PESCA VS. PESCA (April 17, 2001) FACTS: Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca, a college student, and respondent ZosimoPesca, a seaman, were married on 03 March 1975. Six months later they established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their house in Caloocan City. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together, during Zosimos vacation. The couple begot four children. Petitioner said that in 1988, respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence. On 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. A case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment. Petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Petitioner sued respondent for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendentelite. CONTENTIONS: a. DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN SANTOS VS. COURT OF (1995), AS WELL AS THE GUIDELINES SET OUT IN REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA, (1997), SHOULD HAVE NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION AND, THE MOLINA RULING COULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. PETITIONER ARGUES, THE APPLICATION OF THE SANTOS AND MOLINA DICTA SHOULD WARRANT ONLY A REMAND OF THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS AND NOT ITS DISMISSAL. b. ZOSIMO PESCA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED AS WOULD CAUSE HIM TO BE TRULY INCOGNITIVE OF THE BASIC MARITAL COVENANT. HELD: a. The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legisinterpretadolegis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lexprospicit, non respicit. It is in Santos

when the Court has given life to the term psychologically incapacitated and in Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. MOLINA HAS STRENGTHENED, NOT OVERTURNED, SANTOS. b. The term psychological incapacityhas been explained by the Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina: the use of the phrase `psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlate, `psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

DOMINGO VS.COURT OF APPEALS GR 104818; 17 September 1993 3rd Division; Romero, J. FACTS: Delia Soledad Avera (DELIA) and Roberto Domingo (ROBERTO) were married on 29 November 1976. Thereafter in 23 January 1979, she went to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to work that enabled her to purchase real and personal property, amounting to Php 350, 000.00, and support Roberto, who since 1983 was unemployed. Since Delia only gets to go home for a one-month vacation, once a year; she left Roberto in-charge to administer the said property. Sometime in 1983, the spouses were sued for bigamy by Emerlinadela Paz (EMERLINA); apparently, Roberto was still married to her when he subsequently contracted marriage with Delia. On her vacation on June 1989, Delia discovered that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and has even disposed some of her property without her consent nor knowledge. She confronted Roberto and thereafter appointed her brother MoisesAvera (MOISES), as her attorney-in-fact, in recovering the said property from Roberto. Roberto failed and refused to deliver said property. Delia (via Moises) filed to the court a petition to declare their marriage void. In the same, she prays that she be declared the exclusive owner of all the property that were acquired since 1979 to the present. Roberto moves to dismiss the action, arguing that admittedly their marriage is bigamous and therefore there is no need for a declaration of nullity, citing the case of People vs. Aragon (100 Phil. 1033) and People vs. Mendoza (95 Phil. 845), since the purpose of the action is not for Delia to remarry but only to recover her alleged property. Further he argues that the property subject of the litigation is not in his possession. The lower court denied said motion saying that there is still a need for a judicial decree of nullity, citing the case of Consuegra vs. CA. Roberto now files this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. ISSUE: Whether a decree of nullity is necessary for the recovry of the property of Roberto and Delia? HELD: A decree of nullity is necessary.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The jurisprudence cited by both Roberto and the lower court does not apply in the case at bar, the facts of both cases are that which involves the succession of the surviving spouses, different from the case at bar. The Supreme Court decided in this wise: the Family Code, under Art. 40 is clear that a judicial declaration of nullity is necessary to capacitate the spouse/s in void marriage to remarry; but the same is not only limited thereto. The same can also be resorted to in order to liquidate, partition, distribute, and separate the property of the erstwhile spouses. It may also be invoked in order to resolve custody issues and support of the children. In fact, the Court continues, that a separate action need not be filed for all of these issues are resolved in relation to the said grant or denial of the decree sought for before the court.

Cojuangco v. CA Facts: Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to September18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms totaling more than 1 million pesos. Danding sent demand letters to the PCSO and Fernando Carrascoso for the collection of the prizes due him. And PCSCO and Carrascoso consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the PCGG. Danding filed a collection suit before the RTC of Manila But before receipt of the summons, the PCGG advised PCSO and Carrascoso that " it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings" Immediately, this was communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza by Carrascoso. Atty. Mendoza refused to accept the money since a case was also filed against them. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of Danding and ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay the amount claimed plus interest, damages and attorneys fees. The trial court ruled that PCSO and its then c h a i r m a n , F e r n a n d o O . C a r r a s c o s o J r . , h a d n o a u t h o r i t y t o w i t h h o l d t h e s u b j e c t r a c e h o r s e winnings, since no writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by the PCGG. It held that it was Carrascoso's unwarranted personal initiative not to release the prizes. Having been a previous longtime associate of Danding in his horse racing and breeding activities, he had supposedly been aware that Danding's winning horses were not ill-gotten. The trial court held that, by not p a y i n g t h e w i n n i n g s , Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and harassment of Cojuangco and his family. CA reversed. It ruled that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of Danding. It noted that, at the time, the scope of the sequestration of the properties of former President F e r d i n a n d E . M a r c o s a n d h i s c r o n i e s w a s n o t w e l l - d e f i n e d . I t a l s o n o t e d t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g actuations of Carrascoso negated bad faith: (1) he promptly replied to petitioner's demand for the release of his prizes, citing PCGG's instruction to withhold payment thereof; (2) upon PCGG's subsequent advice to release petitioner's winnings, he immediately informed petitioner thereof; and (3) he interposed no objection to the partial execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: W h e t h e r t h e a w a r d f o r d a m a g e s a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t C a r r a s c o s o , J r . i s w a r r a n t e d b y evidence and the law. Held: No. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Carrascoso h a v e n o t a c t e d i n b a d f a i t h i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . T h e f a c t s w o u l d s h o w t h a t h e w a s a c t u a l l y uncertain whether the racehorse winnings should be included in the sequestration orders as this is shown in Carrascosos letters to PCGG Chairman Salonga. Moreover, the finding of bad faith a g a i n s t Carrascoso is overshadowed by the evidences showing his good faith. He w a s j u s t recently appointed chairman of the PCSO when he received the first demand for the collection of the prize which he promptly answered saying he was under instructions by the PCGG to withhold such payment. But the moment he received the go signal from the PCGG that the prize winnings of plaintiff Cojuangco could already be released, he immediately informed the latter thereof, interposed no objection to the execution pending

appeal relative thereto, in fact, actually paid off all the winnings due to Danding. The rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a c l e a r s h o w i n g o f b a d faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney's fees and expenses o f litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefore under the Civil Code However, Carrascoso may still be held liable under Art. 32 of the Civil Code for violating Dandings right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Under this provision it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough t h a t t h e r e w a s a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext o f justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties. While Carrascoso may have r e l i e d u p o n t h e P C G G ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s , h e c o u l d h a v e f u r t h e r s o u g h t the specific legal basis therefore. A little exercise of prudence would h a v e d i s c l o s e d t h a t t h e r e w a s n o w r i t i s s u e d specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of Danding. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order r e q u i r e s t h e s h o w i n g o f a prima facie c a s e a n d d u e r e g a r d f o r t h e requirements of due p r o c e s s . T h e w i t h h o l d i n g o f t h e p r i z e w i n n i n g s o f D a n d i n g w i t h o u t a p r o p e r l y i s s u e d sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law. Hence, he is liable for nominal damages.

ORTIGAS & CO. LTD., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ISMAEL G. MATHAY III, Facts: On August 25, 1976, Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land with an area of 1,508 square meters, located in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 0737. The contract of sale provided that the lot: 1. (1) be used exclusivelyfor residential purposes only, and not more than one single-family residential building will be constructed thereon,6. The BUYER shall not erectany sign or billboard on the rooffor advertising purposes11. No single-family residential building shall be erecteduntil the building plans, specificationhave been approved by the SELLER14....restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until December 31, 2025 when they shall cease and terminate. These and the other conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia. In 1981, Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, ( Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region) which reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located. On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. On January 18, 1995, ORTIGAS & CO. LTD filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso, the complaint sought the demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Complainant prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit petitioner from constructing the commercial building and/or engaging in commercial activity on the lot. The complaint was later amended to implead Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp., which has a ten percent (10%) interest in the lot. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to apply MMC Ordinance No.81-01 to Civil Case No. 64931. Contention of Petitioner: Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in limiting its decision to the cited zoning ordinance. It avers that a contractual right is not automatically discarded once a claim is made that it conflicts with police power. Petitioner submits that the restrictive clauses in the questioned contract is not in conflict with the zoning ordinance. For one, according to him, the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 did not prohibit the construction of residential buildings. He argues that even with the zoning ordinance, the seller and buyer of the re-classified lot can voluntarily agree to an exclusive residential use thereof. Hence, petitioner concludes that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the condition imposing exclusive residential use was effectively nullified by the zoning ordinance. Held: The trial courts reliance on the Co vs. IAC, is misplaced. In Co, the disputed area was agricultural and Ordinance No. 81-01 did not specifically provide that it shall have retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands located within the zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in nature, and stated with respect to agricultural areas covered that the zoning ordinance should be given prospective operation only. The area in this case involves not agricultural but urban residential land. Ordinance No. 81-01 retroactively affected the operation of the zoning ordinance in Greenhills by reclassifying certain locations therein as commercial Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the

ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on the disputed lot to single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced. While our legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed null and void. Respondent court correctly found that the trial court committed in this case a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to treat Ordinance No. 81-01 as applicable to Civil Case No. 64931. In resolving matters in litigation, judges are not only duty-bound to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws, they are also bound by their oath of office to apply the applicable law. Tested by the foregoing definition, private respondent in this case is clearly a real party in interest. It is not disputed that he is in possession of the lot pursuant to a valid lease. He is a possessor in the concept of a holder of the thing under Article 525 of the Civil Code.iHe was impleaded as a defendant in the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 64931. Further, what petitioner seeks to enjoin is the building by respondent of a commercial structure on the lot. Clearly, it is private respondents acts which are in issue, and his interest in said issue cannot be a mere incidental interest. In its amended complaint, petitioner prayed for, among others, judgment ordering the demolition of all improvements illegally built on the lot in question. These show that it is petitioner Mathay III, doing business as Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., and not only the Hermosos, who will be adversely affected by the courts decree. DENIED.