The contrasting fates of China and Japan during the 19 th century Introduction In the 19th century Japan and

China faced a brand new challenge in the form of the expanding Western imperialist powers. This external pressure prompted these countries to question their traditions and respond to the new challenges. By the end of the epoch Japan emerged as the only non-traditional member of the European-led sovereign state system, whereas China became a stagnant semi-colony of the imperial powers. The different trajectories of these countries remained an important discourse in the past century and now as we have experienced the resurgence of the East Asian nations it is still pivotal to comprehend this important historical era, which may lead us to better understand the recent discourses in the region. Different interpretations have attempted to comprehend various crucial issues that determined the different fates of the countries. Intense disputes emerged about whether the Western imperialist forces had definitive influence on these countries or their inner characteristics determined their actions. Lockwood (1956: 42-43) argues that in an open and structurally pluralistic Japanese a new unprecedented unity was created, whereas the Confucian China with its atomized society lacked collective strength. Moulder (1977: 200) states that Chinas incorporation into the imperialist free trade system resulted in the weakening of the imperial state, whereas Japans relative autonomy permitted its transformation into a strong national state. Another debate has occurred concerning how the governments should have handled the situation in the era. Some scholars have interpreted this era as the searching for feasible answers to the Western challenge. Tsiang (1971: 136) argues that no country can really westernize its fighting without in some degree westernizing its economy and polity." Nevertheless, Hs (1997: 722) states that the non-Western nations should be examined to discern their respective indigenous conditions and decision-making patterns and the ways in which these factors determined the course of their modernization. As the East Asian examples of modernization emerged we should be careful with the notion of Westernization as now there is not only one model of modernization in existence. Wendt (1992: 423) assumes that the interactions between states can be explained to some extent by their interests and identities; therefore, in this essay my focus will be on the internal factors that determined the different fates of China and Japan. Even though imperialist encroachment meant a significant drain on Chinese resources; I assume that these effects were only limited. I intend to stress that there existed significant differences between the Japanese and Chinese interior, which determined their respective responses to the Western intrusion. These internal factors led to the revolutionary changes in Japan, whereas mandarin intellectuals failed to devise a comprehensive response. I assume that in order to find the causes behind the inertia of the Chinese government in the 19th century, we have to analyse the cultural and economic background as well as the intellectual atmosphere at the imperial court. At the same time an investigation is necessary into the social, economic and intellectual changes that took place in Japan during its isolation. After briefly explaining the direct consequences of the imperialist intrusion I intend to compare the modernization efforts in both countries to understand their development (or failure). In China, an adverse cultural and intellectual atmosphere precluded a comprehensive strategy to handle the internal and external pressures. On the other hand Japan managed to devise a complex perspective to the challenges and implemented revolutionary changes in the Meiji era. The last part elaborates the consequences of the different political approaches in China and Japan by examining the war between the two countries and the domestic outcome of their policies.

China before the Opium Wars 1

Several scholars have incriminated the traditional Chinese Confucian thinking as the main cause of the countrys failure in the 19 th century. In this chapter I intend to present the determining patterns in the Chinese culture, politics and economics of the early 19 th century. Lockwood (1956: 40) argues that China alone among the Asian peoples brought to the modern world a tradition of egalitarianism, of personal freedom and social mobility, free private property, and humane political ideals sanctioned by rebellion. At the same time the Chinese state traditions had been very enduring. In the previous two thousand years dynasties had rotated in a cyclical system, which was characterized by decay, chaos, refurbishment of the system, and then decay again (Levy, 1962: 172). Fairbank and Reischauer (1989: 258) argue that by the time the Western powers appeared in the early 19th century, the Ching empire was in the downward phase of a dynastic cycle. Since they had experienced no formidable opponent, the Chinese viewed themselves as the centre of Asian civilization. Hs (1971: 155) states that the traditionalist worldview was expressed in the emperors filial piety towards his ancestors: Filial piety demanded that he preserve the institutions set up by his forefathers, and that he place his duty to the family above all else (Hs, 1971: 155). The examination system through which the new members of the imperial bureaucracy were chosen failed to broaden the horizon of the Chinese leaders. Although it was open to everybody, it monopolized the education; entering the Chinese bureaucracy required hierarchical loyalty. The history of the Ching empire was by no means monolithic before the European powers penetrated the region. The emergence of the new agricultural technology resulted in the industrious revolution (Akira, cited in Sugihara, 2006: 82), which enabled the Chinese population to increase from the mid 18th to the mid 19th century from 143 million to 450 million (Harrison, 1967: 30). Sugihara (2006: 82) assumes that the East Asian peoples managed to escape the Malthusian checks and successfully responded to (...) the scarcity of land, by developing a set of technological and institutional devices for full absorption of family labour. By the mid-19 th century however, this agricultural development reached its boundaries. In absence of further technological development Fairbank and Reischauer (1989: 263) assume that production was almost totally absorbed by consumption. The Ching statesmen relied on the traditional economy of agriculture, the resources of which were further drained by the tax-farming allowing the officials to tax the local population. Only part of the revenue reached Peking. Moreover, the tax-farmers colluded with the big landowners making the tax system regressive where the poor paid more (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989: 264266). Whereas the model of sovereignty and system of nations developed gradually as the defining concept of international relations in Europe, the East Asian interpretation of foreign politics was the tributary system. In this system the relations between the different nations were expanded according to the role of individuals in the Confucian family model with the Chinese Middle Kingdom in the centre. The junior members of the model offered tribute to the head of the family, the Chinese Empire (Hs, 1971: 79).1 All the other peoples with whom the Chinese interacted in the course of history were regarded as barbarians: they were but uncivilized and outlandish peoples awaiting assimilation into the Chinese orbit through a cultural transformation (Hs, 1971: 82). Thus, China only entered into negotiations with another party if they accepted the vassal status. This dogma was interlocked with Chinese tenets of national security (Tsiang, 1971: 130). Wang (cited in Hs, 1971: 154) also states that no foreign resident ministers were ever received in the Chinese capital and no foreign ministers were ever sent abroad. The isolated Japan
1

This family of nations consisted of several East Asian entities, among them Korea, Annam (Vietnam), Siam (Thailand), Burma, Japan, and the Ryukyu Islands

Lockwood (1956: 41) argues that Japan only borrowed the Confucian philosophy from China without internalising to the same extent, which meant that the Japanese were eager to absorb new elements into their culture. Hall (1970: 86) thinks that the Japanese intellectuals abandoned their strict reliance on Chu Hsi neo-Confucianism when it came to writing about problems specific to Japan. Lockwood (1956: 42-43) also states that Japan was more pluralistic in structure. He borrows Lasswells notion of creative tension to describe a pattern of political organization less uniform, less centralized, and yet less atomized than the Chinese (Lockwood, 1956: 43). The Japanese, living as they did on an island, were always intrigued by the outside world. Even during the years of isolation the Yoshimune shogun permitted the import of foreign books in 1716. The Japanese translated mostly books on medicine and military science (Storry, 1982: 83). Their openness to new ideas was driven by the fear of their exposure to the foreign navies. The shogunate, since the first shogun Ieyasu, promoted education in Japan. In the 18 th century dozens of schools and academies were built, offering secular and practical education (MacFarlane, 1997: 787). As the Confucian philosophy was overshadowed by the inflowing Western knowledge and the reinterpretation of traditional Japanese thoughts, the fundamental basis of the Tokugawa shogunate was impaired. Concerning the Japanese economy before 1854, Macfarlane (1997: 768-769) suggests that the country had experienced an autonomous growth unusual in Asia at that time before the Western ships opened its ports. The levels of agricultural productivity and literacy were well above the Asian figures. The most notable change in the era, besides the rapid population growth, was the emergence of commercial agriculture. Rozman (cited in Macfarlane, 1997: 768) assumes that it was an unusual pre-modern society in the midst of the internally generated, rapid change. Sugihara (2006: 89) assessed that after a significant increase the Japanese population was unchanged between 1721 and 1846 a little over 30 million. Bolitho (cited in: Macfarlane, 1997: 769) argues that by the 18th century the Japanese economy was based on a commercial agriculture. Western intrusion Until the mid 19th century the East Asian monarchies had only limited contact with the Western states. However, by this time the European states (predominantly Great Britain) had developed formidable navies and well-organized armies. The British economy was drastically transformed by the industrial revolution, which significantly expanded her external trade. To fulfil the needs of the domestic market and to find foreign markets for their products the British attempted to promote or impose the notion of free trade on every country outside Europe. The British employed their navy to open the relatively closed entities of the tribute system in East Asia, and soon other Western powers followed their footsteps. The methods were in essence similar in every country. The European navies exerted pressure on the Asian governments, crushed and retaliated against resistance where it occurred, and imposed unequal trade treaties on these countries. The newcomer Europeans repudiated the tribute system, and the Ching Empire had to realize that the British and other European nations felt authorized to use arms in order to prove their right to free trade and equal treatment. The Opium Wars served British trade interests since the sale of opium could offset the European purchases of silk and tea. The Chinese attempts to check the opium trade led to two Opium Wars, in which the British forced their will on the Ching empire (Brook and Wakabayashi, 2000: 6-7). The two treaties that concluded these wars imposed the formerly mentioned unequal treaty system on China. The Treaty of Nanking (1840) and Treaty of Tientsin (1860) opened several Chinese ports to foreign trade, granting extraterritoriality to the citizens of the treaty nations (Moulder, 1977: 106108). Therefore, China lost its right of jurisdiction over foreign individuals. The empire also lost its commercial monopolies and tariff autonomies in these ports. Fixed, low level tariffs were established 3

on the trading commodities. The most favoured nation clause expanded the privileges granted to any country to every treaty country (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989: 328). The Convention of Peking virtually granted the Christian missionaries free access to the interior of China. Furthermore, the large sums of indemnities further constrained the resources available for the Chinese government (Moulder, 1977: 105). Whereas China had restricted trade relations with the Western powers even before the Opium Wars, the Tokugawa shogunate completely isolated Japan in 1639. The seclusion of the island ended in 1854 when an American Commodore, Perry, pressured the Japanese to open a few of their ports. Several other delegates from different countries followed Perrys expedition and Japan had to accept the unequal treaties and Townsend Harris, the American diplomatic representative, was received by the shogun in Yedo (Storry, 1982: 93) in 1857. Moulder states that the foreign penetration paralysed China, whereas Japan developed autonomously in the 19th century. I acknowledge that the Western influence in China was more extensive than in Japan, and the foreign pressure was growing on China throughout the century. Moreover, Fairbank and Reischauer (1989: 386) mention that the imperialist powers co-operated with the Ching empire to uphold the regime, so that they could enjoy their privileges deriving from the unequal treaties. At the same time, Fairbank and Reischauer (1989: 386-390) also mention that Western powers could not transform the self-sufficient Chinese economy, and the interior areas remained beyond foreign contact. If we consider Lippits (1978: 279) findings about the Western drain on the Chinese income we discover that the capital outflow accounted only for an extremely small share of the revenues, therefore, Lippit (1978: 279) denies that terminating the foreign drain on Chinas resources could in itself have provided a major thrust for modernization. Chinese inertia After the first Anglo-Chinese War, western intrusion created a completely new situation in the Chinese history, as China had to deal with equal powers. Furthermore, a new wave of rebellions exacerbated its position. Tsiang (1971: 136) considers the years between the first and second Opium War as the lost twenty years due to the lack of Chinese modernization efforts in the era. However, Cohen (1970: 32) states that Chinese tried to respond not only to the Western threat, but also to the complex situation that emerged in the epoch. If we compare the magnitude of the first Opium War and the Taiping rebellion (the number of casualties of the rebellion was approximately 20-30 million people), one could understand why the latter was considered more important by the Ching. However, as the years passed the Western presence in the country became more prevalent, and by the 1880s the discourse about the foreign threat was at the centre of the Chinese politics. However, the Chinese leaders avoided drastic reforms. Fairbank and Reischauer (1989: 258) state that the main fact influencing Chinas modern transformation was that Chinas center of gravity lay deep within. The economic self-sufficiency and the sense of intellectual superiority hindered the acceptance of Western ideas and technologies. Wright (cited in Cohen, 1970: 41) assessed these circumstances thus: the restoration failed because the modernization ran counter to the requirements of Confucian stability. Hs (1971: 162) also assumes that the modernization was opposed by the Chinese intellectuals whose interests clashed with any change. Therefore, they created a powerful anti-reform environment at the imperial court, which was reinforced by the impractical examination system. The victor over the Taiping rebellion, Tseng Kuo-fan, represents the effort to defend traditional Confucian society against the West by superficial material means (Teng cited in Swisher, 1958: 31). Swisher (1958: 34) suggests that the outstanding failure of this system was that it could not respond on the philosophical or ideological level in effect the Ching intellectuals failed to create a viable perspective in terms of governance. Thus, Hs (1971: 156-157) assumes that emperor Hsien-fengs most significant mistake was that he had no general strategy to handle the barbarians. 4

Consequently the scope of changes was limited during the first major reform endeavour called the self-strengthening from the 1860s. The goal was to suppress the Taiping rebellion and control the imperialist powers. The reforms were based on Wei Yans premise (cited in: Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989: 285): learning their superior technology in order to control them. The changes intended to develop the army and the navy. Cohen (1970: 39-40) argues that the nature of the reforms was restorative rather than innovative, since modernization was not intended to change the traditional society. Modern arsenals and shipyards were established but the government opposed the establishment of telegraphs and railroads to inhibit the Western intrusion of mainland China. The officials of the Ching empire opened the Tsungli Yamen, the new Office for the General Management, when the Chinese reformers realised that the Westerners relied on the treaties, possessed better weapons, but they were willing to sell these armaments as well (Tsiang, 1971: 136137). The scope of the new office was to deal with foreign relations in Peking. At the same time the Tsungli Yamen became the centre of modernization efforts in the 1860s. Nevertheless, the founding prince Kung viewed these institutions as temporary establishments (Kung, cited in Cohen (1970: 40): as soon as the military campaigns are concluded and the affairs of the various countries are simplified, the new office will be abolished. Besides the imperial incapacity most of the intellectuals were also reluctant to take postings in overseas Chinese offices, and only the Japanese expedition to Formosa in 1874 convinced the mandarins to establish diplomatic representations abroad (Hs, 1971: 161). Hs (1971: 162-163) states these anti-foreign elements successfully created the impression that foreign affairs was a dangerous subject and to associate with it was to betray ones decency. The role of an envoy rather seemed to be the role of an outcast. On the other hand Chen (cited in Hs, 1971: 154) states that main goal of the Western imperialism was not only to achieve equal treatment but to strengthen their position in Peking and obtain control over China. The imperialist aim to penetrate into China is unquestionable. However, the lack of diplomatic strategy severely aggravated the Chinese position as it could not represent its interests on the international stage. The new imperial protective measures against the rebels constrained the Ching authority. The government supported the establishment of local militia to protect the hinterland from the rebels. This militia was not dissolved after the defeat of the rebellion, which strengthened the local leaders (Lippit 1978: 318). The overburdened central government was unable to exert control the provinces any more as the local leaders became the government. They seized administrative and fiscal controls over the provinces (Harrington, 1967: 43). The disintegration of the central authority continued throughout the century hindering any reform effort. To alleviate the fiscal hardship a new tax on merchants was introduced. This was called the likin and it became an important source of revenue. Another important basis of income became the maritime customs. Whereas the income from traditional land tax remained roughly the same amount throughout the century its share in the total revenue fell from 75 percent in 1850 to 30 percent in 1900 approximately (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989: 316-317). Cohen (1970: 43) believes that the Chinese reform thought (yung) gradually broadened from ships and guns to science and mathematics, then to industrialization and finally to modern schooling. Western knowledge gathered ground, new industrial enterprises were established, and the first telegraph line was opened in 1881 (Cohen, 1970: 46). At the same time as Levy (1962: 192) assumes that Chinese government lacked the ability to centrally organize industrialization. Tsing (1971: 138) thinks that the lack of co-operation between the provinces severely affected modernization efforts. The Japanese response After Perrys mission, the Tokugawa shogunate, hindered by its own tradition, was also unable to enact fundamental reforms (Craig and Reischauer, 1978: 125). The shogunate was a feudal 5

system, which meant that it lacked effective central authority. The scope of the reforms was similarly narrow when compared to the Chinese self-strengthening. Nevertheless, the Japanese found a unique resolution to their problems. The Meiji Restoration in 1868 incorporated the traditional Japanese ideology with the emperor in the centre and created a new country that could adapt to new challenges. Even though the coalition that toppled the bakufu was heterogeneous, the new found Japanese unity resulted in a broad consensus, and the Meiji emperor personalized the Japanese unity. Therefore, on this basis a unified Japanese national state, with a strong central authority, was established. I have to mention here that the Ching empire differed from Japan in terms of its sheer size and excessively heterogeneous population. Iriye (1993: 9) states that Chinese leaders tended to regard China as a culture or civilization. Nationalism emerged only in the late 19 th century replacing culturalism as the main driver for reforms in China (Cohen, 1970: 44) The new Japanese elite were more heterogeneous than the secluded Chinese intellectuals. Craig and Reischauer (1978: 134) assume that the roles of the daimyo were largely symbolic and the real leadership was in the hands of the engineers of the revolution, a young group of samurai. To this group were added the elements of the court nobility, rural gentry, city merchants, and intellectuals (Lockwood, 1958: 45). Janssen (1970: 101) suggests that their individual commitment resulted in the revolutionary changes. The Japanese were dismayed by the penetration of the Western barbarians and the emperor ordered the shogun to expel the foreigners. However, the bakufu lacked the power to confront them, which weakened its prestige. After the successful Meiji Restoration; however, the expel the barbarians catchword changed as the new leaders in power announced the new strategy: Western knowledge became essential in order to strengthen Japan (Storry, 1982: 103). Several foreign experts were invited and Japanese were sent abroad to study Western methods. The whole change in attitude was symbolized by an audience with the emperor arranged in March 1868 in Kyoto for the representatives of the foreign powers (Craig and Reischauer, 1978: 136). Janssen (1970: 101) states that the events of the Restoration produced a clean break in Japans political continuity and offered the opportunity for equally striking institutional innovations. The emperor issued the Five Articles Oath which abolished the feudal class restrictions, and fukokukyohei (to prosper the state and strengthen its armed forces, cited in: Hall, 1979: 266) became new slogan of the Restoration. The structure of the new government evolved through a process of trial and error. The whole reform period was characterized by applying Western methods in different sectors of the state (e.g. education), and if the applied process did not work they restructured it according to another pattern. Eventually in 1871 emulating the Western institutions the Council of State was divided into three divisions dealing with legislative, administrative and judicial functions (Craig and Reischauer, 1978: 138). The Japanese state did not become more democratic, but it did become more effective. To achieve control over the mainland the country was divided into prefectures and their governors were appointed by the central authority (Storry, 1982: 107-108). The land of the daimyo was partitioned among the peasants. In exchange the government required large sacrifice from them as the new land tax was introduced that imposed heavy burden on the farmers. However, the national unity created the requisite consensus among the groups of power, while the peasant population remained incredibly disciplined and loyal to the emperor during the years of the transformation. There were sporadic peasant rebellions during the 1870s but only the insurgence of the impoverished samurai led by Saigo Takamori created any serious danger for the government. His army was defeated by the new conscripted imperial peasant army in 1877. The imperial government confiscated the military industries and mines established during the Tokugawa era; therefore, it asserted control over the strategic industries (Borton, 1970: 90). However, Iriye (1992: 20-23) argues that the Japanese industrialization started only after the SinoJapanese war. The lack of capital hindered the initial Japanese industrialization as the Meiji 6

government was reluctant to borrow Western capital to conserve the remaining sovereignty of the state. Nonetheless, the Japanese development successfully surpassed the Chinese. They built a far larger railroad and telegraph network. The spread of the textile industry in Japan became a momentous success as it utilized the cheap labour and was less capital intensive (Levy, 1967: 192). The Japanese textile products were competitive with the English goods and after 1895 Japan entered the Chinese and Korean markets (Borton, 1970: 308-309). The most important source of income of export though derived from the production of raw silk. As Ma (2004: 369-370) points out the Japanese successfully mechanized the production, combining the traditional methods with modern science. Ma (2004: 370) also stresses that important physical and social infrastructure was built up in Japan, whereas Chinese bureaucrats ignored the development of the economy. In 1870 the Chinese export was three times as large as the Japanese, yet by 1905 Japanese silk exports surpassed the Chinese. The Sino-Japanese war and the contrasting fates of the two countries For centuries, the Chinese had influenced the international politics in East Asia through the tribute system and cultural impacts. As the Ching empire failed to maintain this system after the first Opium War the Western countries established colonies on the territories of former members of the tribute countries.2 It became clear for the emerging Japan that China must be defeated if the Meiji state wanted to emulate European imperialism and expand its sphere of influence in the region. Consequently, a serious terrestrial conflict exploded between the two countries in 1894 over the control of Korea. The better organized Japanese army and navy, led by professional leaders, defeated the Chinese military, led by Chinese bureaucrats who lacked a military training. China had to cede Formosa to Japan and Japan expanded its sphere of influence to Korea. Additionally, Iriye (1992: 19) stresses that the Chinese indemnities provided funds for the first modern Japanese iron works. Arrighi (et. al, 2006: 298) suggest that both countries had similar economic results by 1894. However the driving force behind Chinese industrial development was the activity of local authorities, whereas in Japan the central government controlled the industrialization. Chinas defeat weakened national unity and consolidated the power of the warlords. The Ching emperor initiated another reform movement in 1898, which led to the first massive assault on Chinas outmoded institutional structure (Cohen, 1970: 46). The orders concerned the examination system, education, military reform, bureaucracy and economic development. However, the Ching emperor failed to obtain the support of the country for his reforms. Either the officials did not understand the measures or they resisted applying them (Cohen, 1970: 46-47). Therefore, the last effort in the 19 th century to create a stable system achieved only minor results, and the Ching empire stumbled towards collapse. On the other hand Japan became part of the sovereign states system. Iriye (1992: 18) argues that the foreign acceptance of Japan was due of the essential prerequisites for membership: armaments, successful military campaigns, and colonies. In other words Japan became an imperialist power. However, sheer military power was not enough. To renounce the unequal treaties and regain its full sovereignty the Meiji government had to meet the measure of conformity to what the West considered adequate guarantees for regularity of administration (Janssen, 1970: 71). Partly to defer to foreign will, a Prussian inspired constitution was introduced in 1889. As foreign governments argued that the Japanese legal system threatened their citizens, the Meiji government implemented a new criminal code and a new civil code in the 1890s. Public opinion was hostile towards the new laws; however, this resulted in the elimination of the unequal clauses in the treaties with the United Kingdom in 1894, before the war commenced in Korea (Storry, 1982:
2

Great Britain colonised Burma, France expanded its sphere of influence to Annam and Russia penetrated Manchuria

125). Japan paid an enormous price to become the member of the nation system. At the same time significantly consolidated its position by the end of the century partly at the expense of China. Conclusion In this study my objective was to present the internal factors that determined the fate of Japan and China in the 19 th century. I intended to present two contrasting trajectories: a centralized, national Japan that succeeded in coping with the external and internal pressures that occurred. At the same time my aim was to explain the stumbling effort to modernize China. The failure of this effort resulted in the revolution of 1911 and the fall of the Ching empire. As we have seen, modernization efforts constantly conflicted with the Confucian tradition in China. Moreover, the framework of this tradition did not allow the creation of a comprehensive strategy. Chinese leaders lacked the vision of the organized military, new economy or modern education, their response was non-responsiveness. At the same time the Japanese starting from a more pluralistic, open base, and a more commercialized economy managed to develop the consequential responses to the pressures exerted from outside during the century, while transforming their country. Concerning foreign policy, the Chinese tradition and the countrys intellectual isolation hindered the formation of an effective foreign policy. The Japanese drew different conclusions from the forceful intentions of the Western countries. The Meiji government developed a diplomatic structure along Western standards. When evaluating the different developments in China and Japan I have to stress that Chinese modernization achievements were modest only in comparison to the results attained by Japan. At the same time, if we attempt to put the events into a broader perspective we have to remark that China achieved several notable developments; the Ching empire not only avoided direct colonisation, but was considerably more productive than other countries (Korea, Burma etc.) that tried to adapt to the requirements of the changing world. On the other hand, we have to notice the long-term oriented Chinese thinking may interpret the transformation of China in differently. The scope of this study was the first and rather unsuccessful phase in this large period of time. Recent events have illuminated the fact that the development of China might be discerned as a natural evolution that commenced in the early 19 th century and it is still in the motion in the early 21 st century now producing more visible accomplishments. If we consider the enormous size and cultural heterogeneity of the country we may recognize why things have changed by a fairly different pace than they did in Japan. Word count: 4994

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