Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 45, No.

5, 739767, September 2009

From Positive Neutrality to Partisanship: How and Why the Armenian Political Parties Took Sides in Lebanese Politics in the Post-Taif Period (1989Present)
OHANNES GEUKJIAN
This study examines and analyzes the policy of the Armenian political parties in Lebanese politics after the 1989 Taif agreement that was drafted in Saudi Arabia and supported by Syria and the United States. The accord ended the Lebanese civil war, advocating state-building, stability and peaceful relations among the 18 Lebanese religious communities. This research also provides an in-depth assessment of how and why the Armenian parties abandoned their traditional policy of positive neutrality that was adopted during the 197589 civil war and took sides with dierent political movements and coalitions in order to achieve their political goals. In the post-Taif period the Dashnak, Hunchag and Ramgavar parties failed to reach a compromise agreement over the political representation of the Armenian community in the Lebanese parliament as well as cabinet appointments mainly because the Hunchag and Ramgavar parties were eager to benet from the political change that the Taif ushered in with separate representation. Indeed, the Hunchags and Ramgavars rejected the former Dashnak monopoly to control Armenian deputies, ostensibly to maintain an Armenian bloc inside parliament that could defend Armenian communal concerns. From a Dashnak perspective, the Armenian bloc demonstrated political strength and ability to bargain with the various Lebanese groups during election campaigns as well as exerting signicant inuence on any government. To better understand all of these complexities, parliamentary elections from 1992 until 2005 are examined in light of the policies of the Armenian parties, before assessing the epochal political developments in 2005. Within this context, it is important to stress the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in light of the Security Council Resolution 1559 and its implications particularly over the Armenian community, the division of the majority of the Lebanese people between the March 8 and March 14 Forces and the impact of both camps on the policies of the Armenian parties. No less important were the positions Armenian parties held with respect to the Turkish peacekeeping troops deployed to southern Lebanon as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as a result of Security Council Resolution 1701 to monitor the ceasere after the JulyAugust 2006 war between Hizbullah and Israel. Another key issue that highlighted the weakness and inability
ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/09/050739-29 2009 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/00263200903135554

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to control the Armenian electorate was the 2007 Metn by-election when a split occurred within Dashnak ranks. A group of discontented Dashnaks, supported and nanced by Rac Hariris Future Movement, separated from the party and challenged the Dashnak stance by supporting the candidacy of former President Amin Gemayel. The splinter group established an organization called Free LebaneseArmenian Movement (FLAM), a development that was arguably crucial not only in Armenian circles but also in Lebanese internal politics because a new Armenian player, in addition to the three traditional parties, with considerable political signicance was ready to negotiate over Armenian concerns. Also addressed are the various roles played by Armenian parties, particularly the Dashnak party, in the May 2008 Doha agreement that ended the political stando between the ruling majority comprised of the March 14 Forces and the antigovernment opposition led by Hizbullah and the Amal Movement. This contribution concludes with several observations, including a complete reassessment of timetested positions that protected and promoted Armenian rights and privileges in Lebanon. It speculates that the policy of positive neutrality that was adopted in the civil war period may well be an alternative to current penchants that subjected and continue to compel Armenians to intense Lebanese internal rivalries. This research gathers its data from newspapers and periodicals published in Lebanon during the period under review, as well as personal observations and open-ended interviews conducted with prominent Armenian gures and politicians in Lebanon.

The foundation of Lebanons Armenian community grew as a result of two migration waves. The rst wave occurred at the end of the First World War, when approximately 40,000 Armenians settled in Beirut and the northern region of Mount Lebanon. The majority were from Cilicia, a medieval Armenian province in Anatolia. The refugees of this wave settled mainly in Beiruts Medawar and Quarantina areas but many were eventually assimilated into the native Christian population. The second wave reached Lebanon between 1937 and 1939, when approximately 15,000 Armenians arrived after the French Mandatory government ceded the Alexandretta Sanjak to Turkey. Some of these Armenians settled in Syria and others in the Bekaa valley, particularly in the city of Anjar, as well as Tyre in southern Lebanon.1 In addition to these two migratory waves, nearly 5,000 Armenians reached Lebanon from Palestine in the aftermath of the 1948 ArabIsraeli war.2 The French Mandatory government in Lebanon and Syria was responsible for the Armenian settlements. Towards that end, land was allocated for building refugee camps in both countries. In addition to French assistance, a number of orphanages were established by the American Near East Relief organizations to shelter the homeless Armenians. Most of these orphanages were later transformed into educational and/or vocational training institutions, like the Birds Nest in Jbail (Byblos) which had been run by the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia. According to the stipulation of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Mandatory government granted Lebanese citizenship to the Armenians on 31 August 1924.3 Immediately thereafter, the French and their allies reinforced and expanded the political spaces reserved for the Armenians in the new confessional system being established in Lebanon4 a policy that was criticized by Lebanese Muslims because the Armenians contributed

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to the sustenance of a Christian predominance in Lebanese society. Indeed, Lebanese Christians, particularly Maronites, supported and defended the Armenian presence in Lebanon because they considered the latter a signicant factor for the preservation of their dominant political power in the country.5 As time went by, the initial hostile attitude of the Muslims and the prejudices of the native population lessened as the Armenians eectively participated in the post-First World War reconstruction process and pursued a policy of least interference in Lebanese internal confessional politics. In fact, they openly adopted pro-government policies and supported the President. Given the complex nature of Lebanese society it would be unwise to side with one community against the others. However, after the independence of Lebanon in 1943 and particularly in the 1958 Lebanese civil war, the Dashnaks sided with the pro-Lebanese nationalist political forces in the country including the Phalange party and the pro-western President Camille Chamoun while the Hunchak actively supported Kamal Jumblatt and the anti-government political groupings. As for the Ramkavar party, it was cautious in its political choices and did not openly support any political group although it took an anti-government stance.6 Consequently, by supporting rival blocs, the Armenians in 1958 committed intra-communal violence and gained no political benets. The Armenians were not even represented in the cabinet. In religion, the majority of Armenians belonged to the Armenian Apostolic (Orthodox) community under the jurisdiction of the Catholicosate of Cilicia. The rest were distributed between the Catholic and Evangelical faiths. According to the confessional structure of Lebanese society, the Armenian Orthodox and Catholic churches were recognized as separate communities whereas the Armenian Evangelicals as part of the Lebanese Protestant/Evangelical community. In the rst half of the 1900s, the Armenians organized themselves and established their political institutions in Lebanon, including the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, ARF, or simply the Dashnak (1904), socialist in doctrine but which remained more of a nationalist party throughout its history; the Social Democratic Hunchakian party, or simply the Hunchak (1912), which considered itself Marxist but with a nationalist element; and the Democratic Liberal Ramgavar party (1921), that advocated the application of democratic principles in Armenian public life. All three gradually emerged with sophisticated cadres and leaders. Within this context, no independent Armenian groups emerged to challenge the leadership and play an active role in the community. As for Armenian communists, they did not establish a party but contributed, in 1925, to the establishment of the communist party of Lebanon.7 The three Armenian parties aimed to preserve Armenian national identity by maintaining Armenian culture and heritage ensuring that the Armenians remained loyal and dutiful citizens in Lebanon as well as the Armenian diaspora. The three parties were committed to the Armenian cause that is the liberation of all Armenian territories occupied by Turkey during the First World War and their annexation to Soviet Armenia, that became independent with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Evidently, all three parties believed that the Armenian cause could evaporate if diaspora communities became assimilated with the local populations in their respective host countries. Within this context, the nature of the Lebanese socio-political system that was based on a strictly communal structure contributed greatly to the preservation of Armenian national identity and oered

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socio-economic, cultural and political advantages to the Armenian community. Indeed, in addition to the political parties, the Armenians established their schools, churches and sport clubs to sustain their Armenianness and national identity. Furthermore, the Lebanese political system that was based on confessional power sharing fully recognized the rights of the various communities in Lebanon. The provisions of the Lebanese constitution indeed guaranteed broad freedoms to organize educational institutions, clubs and social activities. The Armenian community, like other communities, were granted legitimate access to political institutions, and played critical roles in domestic aairs. Hence, the Armenian parties served as the major structures and channels for political participation while nurturing socio-economic ventures. Participation in the political sphere started in 1929 when Abdallah Ishaq, an Armenian Catholic, became the rst elected member of parliament. This was the result of Maronite-Armenian collaboration that granted the seat reserved for the representative of minorities to Ishaq.8 In the 1934 parliamentary elections, when a seat was allocated to the Armenian Apostolic community, the French-backed and a pro-Ramgavar candidate, Vahram Leilekian, was elected.9 In the 1943 parliamentary elections one Dashnak and one Ramgavar candidate were elected. During this period the Dashnaks and the Hunchaks formed a united front and supported nationalist leaders Abdallah Ya and Saeb Salam, in spite of French attempts to win Armenian votes for their proteges, Sami Al-Solh.10 It is out of the scope of this study to present a detailed analysis of the role of the Armenians in the consecutive Lebanese elections. Given their valuable roles the Armenian quota was adjusted in 1972, when the Apostolic community was granted the right to elect four representatives, while the Armenian Catholics were assigned a single seat. Remarkably, all the parliamentary seats reserved for the Armenian community were won by candidates supported by the Dashnak party between 1953 and 1972. The party had been eager to form an Armenian bloc inside parliament to better articulate Armenian interests. We can consider the Armenian bloc an institutional group to express the interest of the community and to have direct access to policymakers. A fragmented representation inside parliament would not serve eectively Armenian communal interests. It was also crucial to note the Armenian electoral power in Lebanon. The Armenian political parties compared to other Lebanese parties were very ecient in political mobilization of their electorate. Once their support had been won by other parties they reliably delivered the Armenian votes to the polling stations. In the post-Taif period, as will be discussed below, the Armenian parties sustained their eciency by mobilizing and organizing their electorate but failed to maintain an eective and united parliamentary bloc. Still, the Armenians determination for the preservation of the Lebanese consociational democracy, that manifested itself in power-sharing arrangements in dierent state institutions, was best illustrated with a sustained participation in various governments. From 1969 until the beginning of the second civil war in 1975, the Armenians maintained a regular presence in successive cabinets. The most eloquent and notable among the Armenian ministers was Khatchig Babikian who for the rst time represented the Armenians in the cabinet in 1961. Babikian, a highly respected lawyer, believed that working for general social improvements in Lebanon best served the interests of the Armenians and that the Armenian

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics

743

community could be badly hurt by prolonged civil disorders.11 Babikians statements highlighted that Armenians were eager to support consensus and reconciliation. Most Armenians believed that their contributions enhanced the countrys socio-economic development and kept peace among all groups. With the beginning of the Lebanese civil war in April 1975, the political leadership of the three Armenian parties adopted a policy of positive neutrality. Senior decision makers wished to steer clear of partisanship with any of the warring Lebanese parties as well as avoid potential intra-Armenian communal violence. The three parties managed to cooperate and take a united stance because they were not too far on policy issues. Parliamentarians Babikian and Melkon Eblighatian took on the task of explaining the motive behind this policy to various leaders of the Lebanese communities so as to avoid potential conict with any of them.12 Both parliamentarians carried on their task on behalf of the Armenian bloc that represented all the segments of the Armenian community. Apparently, Armenian communists were not party to the policy, although Baruyr Aghbashian, the former editor of the Ramgavar newspaper, Zartonk, claimed Armenian communists supported the policy of positive neutrality and they were worried about the safety of the Armenian communities in the diaspora. However, their name was not mentioned in the Armenian ocial press and media as a participant in making this policy.13 The adoption of positive neutrality did not mean that the Armenians did not have a position or a political opinion concerning all Lebanese communal issues. As far as they were concerned, the community was part and parcel of the Lebanese confessional political structure and they considered it unwise to remain aloof from key decisions concerning the socio-economic, cultural and political rights of all groups. Yet to remain neutral and not participate in the war was a denite stance.14 Politically, the Armenian leadership strongly supported Lebanons sovereignty and territorial integrity and Babikian argued that it was unacceptable to remain aloof and watch the countrys destruction.15 Armenian parliamentarians met with various parties to mediate a ceasere, and pleaded for reason, cautioning that the war would cause immense damage. They sought unity to resolve disputes through peaceful means and claried that contested national issues, like the constitution, the structure of government, the institutions, and the political system could be negotiated peacefully so as to reach consensus among all Lebanese.16 Moreover, Armenian politicians condemned violence, stressed that national solidarity should be developed among all Lebanese and appealed to warring parties to adopt reconciliation.17 Though proponents of positive neutrality, Armenian deputies, particularly Babikian, played signicant roles in the negotiations of the Tripartite Committee that was created by the League of Arab States (LAS) at its 23 May 1989 Casablanca Summit. Babikian was a prominent associate of the six member committee created by Patriarch Sfeir of the Maronite church in Lebanon, later identied as the Bekerki Committee,18 to negotiate with the Tripartite Committee to stop the war. This Committee that included King Fahed Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, King Hasan II of Morocco, and president Al-Shadhili Bin Jdid of Algeria aimed to reach a ceasere by 29 August 1989, to be followed by a meeting of the Lebanese deputies somewhere outside Lebanon.19 In September 1989, after a ceasere was reached between the warring parties 63 out of 99 members of the 1972 parliament gathered in

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the city of Taif in Saudi Arabia. Three Armenian deputies, namely Babikian, Eblighatian (Armenian Apostolic) and Antranik Manougian (Armenian Evangelical) attended. The Armenian delegation was jointly supported by the Armenian political parties. Souren Khanamirian and Ara Yerevanian, the other two Armenian parliamentarians, could not be there for personal reasons. The deliberations in the Taif meeting aimed to reform the political system, to abolish political confessionalism on a phased basis as well as to establish a new representation system that would grant numeric parity for both Christians and Muslims. Importantly, it was critical to note that a small group of 16 deputies, including Babikian, out of the 63 attending deputies shaped deliberations to avoid gridlock.20 In October 1989, an agreement was reached as a rst step to reconstruct post-war Lebanon. The Armenian deputies signed the agreement, contributed to its ratication and supported it politically. In part, some of the success attributed to Armenian contributions, were the result of the tested policy of positive neutrality. The Taif agreement not only re-established the consociational power-sharing political system but also institutionalized and solidied sectarian and confessional aliations. A confessional balance between the Christians and Muslims was established in parliament with a revamped executive authority vested in the cabinet at the expense of the Maronite President of the Republic. The Taif did not alter the confessional aliations of the Prime Minister (Sunni) and the Speaker of the Chamber (Shiia). Likewise within the readjusted confessional balance, the Armenians did not lose any privileges. Hagop Pakradounian, the Armenian Dashnak MP elected in 2005 from the Metn constituency, argued that Taif recognized the Armenian community as one of the seven main communities of the country rather than the seventh one.21 In the pre-Taif period, the Armenians participated in Lebanese politics but were not recognized by the system as a main community equal to the six predominant ones (Maronites, Sunnis, Shiias, Druzes, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics). Hence, Pakradounian stressed that in the post-Taif period after being recognized as a predominant community, the Armenians must further defend all their communal rights with no concessions.22 The Taif agreement also regulated the confessional composition of the Cabinet and distributed ministerial seats equally among Christians and Muslims. Within this context, Armenians were assigned one ministerial post in any Cabinet formed by at least 14 members, and at least two portfolios in Cabinets comprised of 28 members or more.23 With respect to parliamentary seats, electoral law No. 154, supported by Syria after its 1976 deployment as part of the Arab Deterrent Forces to stop the civil war, granted a further advantage to the Armenians. Signed by President Elias Hraoui, the law awarded Armenians a sixth seat (ve Apostolic and one Catholic), while Armenian Evangelicals heretofore considered part of the Protestant/ Evangelical community could also contest the Protestant seat in Beirut.24 In other words, in the post-Taif period it was possible for Armenians to win a total of seven seats, which was unprecedented. These political arrangements apparently enhanced Armenian representations through various state structures as the parties enhanced their contribution to domestic politics. Nevertheless, the three Armenian parties thought about choices and continued to nominate candidates along partisan lines, which caused inevitable problems. What happened in the 1992 elections was a perfect illustration of intra-communal tensions and divisions.

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745

Indeed, on 14 August 1992, a joint DashnakHunchag communique announced that the two parties agreed to submit joint candidates for MP seats in both Beirut and Metn constituencies. As a result, and in addition to Babikian, Khanamirian, Hagop Tchukhadarian and Dr. Nourijean Demirjian, Dr. Yeghia Djerejian (Hunchag) was elected MP in Beirut and Shahe Barsoumian (Dashnak) secured the Metn seat.25 The Ramgavar party boycotted the 1992 elections and was critical of the DashnakHunchag joint list and their alliance with PM Rashid Solh, in Beirut, because it refused to take sides with the Lebanese groups. The position of the Ramgavars stemmed from their conviction that the Lebanese crisis was not over yet and that the Armenian united position from 1975 until 1991 (the policy of positive neutrality) should be maintained to preserve the community.26 According to Karnig Megerditchian, a member of the Dashnak partys Central Committee (CC), the Dashnak supported and imposed Djerejian because we wanted to form an Armenian bloc inside parliament to better protect Armenian communal rights and concerns.27 However, the Ramgavars argued that there was no Armenian bloc but a Dashnak bloc that subordinated the Armenian Evangelical candidate, Dr. Demirjian, who agreed to comply with Dashnak directives. From a Ramgavar perspective, Armenian candidates to the 1992 elections were not real representatives of the community.28 The Ramgavar stance could be refuted because traditionally the Dashnak had nominated only one party member and the remaining non-Dashnak candidates were chosen from the various Armenian groups in order to form a representative Armenian bloc in parliament. In October 1992, after the new parliament was sworn in, Raq Hariri, the well known Sunni philanthropist, formed a new cabinet comprised of 30 ministers in which he included two Armenians, Barsoumian (Dashnak) and Hagop Demirdjian (Armenian General Benevolent Union, AGBU, member and a well-known friend of Hariri). Remarkably, while the Dashnaks fostered an Armenian bloc, they were unable to control the pro-Hariri Demirdjian who did not attend bloc meetings and preferred to follow Hariris directives. Moreover, Hariri also coordinated with the Syrian authorities as he formed a government. It was the beginning of a new style adopted by Hariri, who apparently sought to weaken the Armenian bloc and impose his governments political agenda on everyone. Hariri appeased Armenian independency tendencies to create a new base of support within the community. In the bureaucracy, according to the Taif agreement and the prepared list by PM Hariri, in 1993, the so-called 218 rst category appointive positions in state institutions were to be divided equally between Christians and Muslims. Armenians were to be allocated between 9.4 and 10.9 per cent of these valuable appointments, on the basis of the number of the Armenian MPs out of the 13 per cent quota attributed to minorities.29 Apparently, the 9.4 per cent gure was adopted by the government, which resulted in four civil servants, and another four positions in the equivalent public institutions. With respect to the diplomatic corps, the Armenian share produced three ambassadors, for a grand total of 11 rst category appointive public posts.30 Notwithstanding these theoretical assessments, recent statistics revealed that only ve rst category civil servant positions were allocated to Armenians: one of the four Vice Presidents of the Central Bank (Dr. Harout Samuelian, neutral but supported by the Dashnak), the head of the General Inspectorate (Jean Belian, Dashnak, currently vacant however), the Director

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General of the Central Statistical Oce (Maral Gidanian, Dashnak), the Director General of the Ministry of Environment (Berj Hajetian, neutral), Lebanons Ambassador to Kazakhestan (Vazken Kavlakian, Dashnak). Clearly the Dashnak party played a pivotal role in the negotiations with successive governments to secure these appointments, and demonstrated strength and greater inuence when compared to the Hunchags and Ramgavars. Nevertheless, Armenian representations were not fully granted due to internal power struggles between Christians and Muslims over control of key positions in state institutions. At the second category and lower level posts, it seems that the Armenians were worse o, barely allocated a handful of civil servant posts. This was either due to indierence or, more likely, specic choices, concerned all Armenians. In general, the latter favoured self-employment and private sector careers rather than government service, which drew a mild rebuke from President Elias Hraoui on 28 November 1993. Indeed, on the occasion of the seventy-fth anniversary of the Homenetmen (Armenian General Athletic Union) sport club, aliated with the Dashnak party, Hraoui, who was invited to deliver the keynote address, stressed the constructive role of the Armenians in Lebanon. Yet, he also declared: state institutions, including the army, police and internal security forces are open for you to apply and join.31 He reiterated that there was no state policy to marginalize the Armenians and discriminate against them, and that the state was ready to further embrace the community because its members demonstrated loyalty to the unity and integrity of Lebanon.32 These laudatory declarations notwithstanding, post-Taif governments marginalized the Armenian community for a variety of reasons. The rst reason was that the Armenian parties lacked unied strategies and were unable to inuence the major decision makers in Lebanon such as the Prime Minister and Speaker of the House as well as the Syrian authorities. Secondly, a change in the communitys demographic situation caused by massive emigration to America, Europe and elsewhere, meant that the vote was no longer weighty. In fact, the sheer number of voters, which secured Armenian key privileges, fell in the 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2005 elections when there was extremely low turnout. In 2000, for example, the Metn constituency indicated 19,666 Armenian Apostolic eligible electors while only 5,412 actually cast ballots. Likewise, out of 5,603 Armenian Catholic eligible voters, only 1,147 voted. These dramatic drops 27.5 and 20.5 per cent respectively represented a dilemma for the single most important parliamentary seat, in the Metn, which encompassed the Bourj-Hamoud bastion. The situation was no better elsewhere, including the third Beirut constituency where two Armenian Apostolic and one Armenian Catholic seats faced similar results. Out of 29,777 Armenian Apostolic eligible voters, a mere 6,841 voted (23.0 per cent), and out of 1,996 Armenian Catholic eligible voters, only 519 (18.2 per cent) cast ballots.33 Inevitably, a negative image emerged, supported by such low participation levels. Indeed, while these gures demonstrated a lack of interest by the Armenian public in political participation, it was more reasonable to conclude that a signicant percentage of the Armenian electorate was no longer living in the country. The third reason for the communitys marginalization was the crisis between party leaders and younger Armenians. Apparently, while all three parties were able to substantially count on the loyalty of Armenian families in parliamentary elections,

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics

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doubts surfaced as to their intrinsic capabilities to deliver similar numbers in the future. In this regard, the 7 July 2009 parliamentary elections would be a testing ground for the ability of the Armenian parties to mobilize and win Armenian votes. If the 1992 parliamentary elections were characterized, in the Armenian political camp, by a continuous Dashnak hegemony, the 1996, 2000 and 2005 elections were profoundly inuenced by the Hariri factor, along with the political intervention of Syria in Lebanese politics under the pretext of protecting the new power-sharing arrangements ushered in by the Taif. The 1992 DashnakHunchag cooperation froze in 1995 after the latter, like the Ramgavars, perceived a rare window of opportunity to voice independent concerns. Up to that point Hunchags and Ramgavars were unable to challenge the Dashnak party, even if an entirely new factor prompted them to seek change. Indeed, the nascent Republic of Armenia, which earned its independence in 1991, played a growing role in Lebanon through its ambassador, Yervant Melkonian. To weaken the Dashnak party, which was not on particularly good terms with Armenias President Levon Ter-Petrossian, Melkonian courted Hunchags and Ramgavars.34 In the words of Dr. Djerejian: Armenian political leaders should be broadminded and should try to form a coalition list, where all political currents, groupings and worthy non-partisan personalities should be included to represent the Armenian community at its best in the parliament for the benet of Lebanon and the Armenian community. Otherwise, the confrontation would spread on many fronts and would create new dissent.35 This was telling but not entirely surprising, and like most Lebanese groups, Armenian representatives trekked to Damascus to meet with Syrian Vice President, Abdul Halim Khaddam, as well as General Ghazi Kanaan, head of the Syrian intelligence network in Lebanon, to explain their political positions and seek Syrian support to realize communal and personal interests.36 In the words of the Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Paul Salem, everyone used and was used by the Syrians.37 According to Megerditcian, the Syrians imposed both on Hariri and the Dashnak to accept a coalition list in which the three Armenian parties would be fairly represented.38 Consequently, an Armenian coalition list emerged for the 1996 elections, masterfully orchestrated by Hariri. It comprised Babikian, H. Demirjian, Tchoukhadarian and Dr. Djerejian. The Dashnak candidate, Dr. Sebouh Hovnanian was elected in the Metn constituency and the pro-Dashnak George Kassardji was elected in the Zahle district of the Bekaa. Importantly, the Dashnak party maintained its traditional leadership role and led the winning coalition list (Dashnak, Hunchag, Ramgavae/AGBU) in Beirut, while it sided with the Syrian supported lists of the government. From a Dashnak perspective, an Armenian bloc survived but without Hagop Demirjian and Dr. Djerejian. Both were elected with Dashnak support but remained loyal to Hariri and did not participate in the blocs meetings. According to Megerditchian, cooperation and alliance between the Dashnak and Hariri to run the elections with a joint list stemmed from a general consensus to stand with the government and support his policies related to Beirut but concerning Armenian communal concerns, Armenian MPs would enjoy political independence to make

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their own decisions irrespective of Hariris political agenda.39 As a matter of fact, Megerditchian reiterated, when Hraoui, in accordance with the constitution, engaged parliamentarians to settle on a Prime Minister, the Armenian bloc made its own choice independently of Hariri.40 From the aforementioned, it seemed that the Syrians and Hariri wanted to weaken the inuence of the Dashnak in Lebanese politics in general and the Armenian community in particular, presumably to interfere in communal aairs and impose their political views. Hariris toleration of the Armenian bloc apparently hinged on Syrian policies, as well as growing intraArmenian divisions, all to better contain alienated Armenians. This situation grew in complexity in the aftermath of the 1998 presidential elections that saw Emile Lahoud ll this weak but critical post. Displeased with the imposed candidate, Hariri refused to form a government, and after the compulsory consultations Lahoud turned to Dr. Salim Hoss to assume the premiership. Arthur Nazarian was appointed Minister of Environment in the Hoss government then comprised of 18 Ministers.41 For the next two years, Hariri and Lahoud delineated their respective positions, forcing everyone, including the Armenian parties, to either side with the government or with Hariri. The latter prepared for the 2000 elections as he plotted an anticipated comeback. In the pre-election period, the Armenian parties were divided over policy alternatives and were unable to resist Hariris determination to create a base of support within the community. In 1999 and 2000, as part of an election campaign to boost his image among the Armenians, Hariri inaugurated humanitarian oces in the Armenian neighbourhoods and dispensed aid to needy families. These oces maintained ties with aid recipients and sought their votes in the upcoming elections. To reach more Armenian voters, Hariri also introduced a 15-minute news service in Armenian on his own Al-Mustaqbal (Future) television network, which left its mark.42 Apparently, Hariris powerful campaign aimed to prevent the formation of the Armenian bloc to disperse the political power of the community. The Dashnak party, stemmed from its traditional leadership role in the community, and with signicant new attempts to address unity, proposed to the Hunchag and Ramgavar parties to create an Armenian United Front to safeguard communal interests. From a Dashnak perspective, the Armenian United Front aimed to form an Armenian bloc, nominate an Armenian candidate for the Protestant seat in Beirut and choose Armenian candidates to stand for election.43 For reasons that are still not entirely clear, Hariri not only disregarded the traditional Dashnak role in the community but also proceeded to unilaterally choose the Armenian candidates. He believed that non-Dashnak political groups should also be independently represented in parliament eager to serve in a Hariri government.44 Hariri was the rst Sunni PM who intervened in Armenian intra-communal aairs to propagate his policy. According to recent statistics the Dashnak party represented 85 per cent of the Armenians whereas both the Hunchags and Ramgavars represented 15 per cent.45 Hariris stance motivated Hunchag and Ramgavar potential candidates to contest Dashnak power. Internal Hunchag and Ramgavar splits further served Hariris objectives, as the premier consolidated his power base. It was around this time that the Hunchag Central Council dissolved its Lebanese Administrative Body headed by Sebouh Kalpakian who insisted on unconditional cooperation with Hariri and proposed Dr. Djerejians candidacy. Both Kalpakian and Djerejian were detached from the party, while the Central Council appointed a new Administrative Body to

Armenian Political Parties and Lebanese Politics

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protect Armenian communal interests. Similarly, Ramgavar partys Regional Council of Lebanon disagreed with its own Central Councils decision to nominate Hagop Kasarjian, and resigned in Toto. The partys Central Council then appointed a new Regional Council that supported Kasarjians nomination.46 Hence, the Ramgavars along with a faction of the Hunchags joined Hariri without even negotiating their political agenda with him. They accepted that Dr. Djerejian and Kasarjian would be included on Hariris list, which consolidated candidates that were as far as possible from Dashnak obligations to unite in a bloc. As far as the Dashnaks were concerned, it became evident that the party could only join on Hariris conditions, namely, renouncing the candidacy of an Armenian for the Protestant seat and abandoning the very idea of an Armenian parliamentary bloc. According to Avedis Dakessian, the leader of the Ramgavar party, had the Dashnaks abandoned their demand for the Protestant seat, Hariri would have included them in his list.47 However, Garo Hovanessian, a Dashnak CC member in 2000 and a prominent intellectual, argued that the main disagreement with Hariri was over maintaining the Armenian bloc, and that the issue of the Protestant seat was only a negotiating chip on the table to reach a compromise with Hariri. Hovanessian further claried: the party was ready to abandon the Protestant seat in return for securing the Armenian bloc in parliament.48 This may well have been the case, but Hariri was unable to submit to Dashnak demands because he was pressured by the Syrians not to do so.49 Notwithstanding these complexities, Hariri was able to play the aspiring Armenian parties against each other because he preferred not to work with strong allies. His provocative policies evoked disappointment, and stimulated a strong reaction from the Dashnaks who categorically rejected his conditions, preferring to adopt go-it-alone policies that insisted Armenians chose their own representatives. They argued that Armenian MPs should not be subordinate to non-Armenian politicians because they would lose their Armenianness and whatever power they have to inuence state policies. Negotiations to close these gaps between the Dashnak and Hariri failed, but in order to prevent further divisions in the Armenian community Catholicos Aram I of Cilicia urged Armenian candidates to pursue the interests of the Armenian community and Lebanon and keep away from pursuing personal and partisan interests. He also expressed concern about the unity of the Armenian community and cautioned that the community should be kept tight and protected from all those who had been trying to divide and weaken it, with an indirect reference to Hariri.50 Both Dashnak and Hunchag parties mobilized the Armenian community to obtain the majority of the Armenian votes, but the Hoss government list in which their candidates ran lost the 2000 elections. For the rst time in decades the Dashnak communal hegemony was defeated as Hariri imposed his will on a large segment of Lebanese political circles. In addition to Kasarjian and Dr. Djerejian, Serj Toursarkisian and Jean Oghasabian were elected as Armenian MPs in Beirut, which literally meant that their political allegiance was to Hariri rather than the parties to which they belonged.51 The Dashnaks who allied with the Phalange party and Michel Murr, a strong Dashnak ally since the 1960s, won in Zahle and Metn constituencies where Kassardji and Dr. Hovnanian secured seats.52 Although the Dashnaks lost in Beirut, it would be wrong to conclude that the partys dominant role ceased within the Armenian community. Indeed, the disappointed electorate

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stood with its leadership because the party competed with Hariri for the sake of Armenian communal interests. It must also be noted that Armenian parliamentarians who won in Beirut received rather limited votes, perhaps gathering a handful of Armenian ballots, but were elected by non-Armenian votes, mainly Kurd and Muslim Sunni. Hence, one can argue that the Beirut Armenian MPs did not represent Armenian political opinion nor were they the real representatives of the community. Indeed, Kasarjian, being elected by Lebanese-Kurdish votes, ignored Armenian critics who accused him of selling himself to Hariri. Further, the 2000 elections demonstrated the collective political weakness of the Armenian community, contrary to the 1970s when Armenian leaders displayed stronger unied political stances and reached useful compromises. With ineective representatives, the Armenians also lost considerable political inuence as the communitys traditional leaders were in abeyance. In addition to the marginalization of the community in parliament, Armenian political rights were also violated in the executive branch. For example, in October 2000 there was only one Armenian Minister, Hovnanian, in the 30-member cabinet formed by Hariri. While that was a profound violation of the Taif agreement that granted two ministerial posts to the Armenians in any cabinet comprised of 28 or more ministers to keep the ethnic balance in the government, pro-Hariri MPs were impotent to secure the legal second ministerial portfolio. More generally, the 2000 elections demonstrated the weakness of the political system in general and the limitations of the post-Taif power-sharing arrangements, to produce a fair representation. Pro-Hariri Armenian MPs, who enjoyed a poor support base, did not protest against this violation and did not voice any doubts. Apparently, their position stemmed from personal interests and loyalty to Hariri as they preferred to be alienated from the Armenian community rather than antagonize the powerful premier. Strong political protest came from the Dashnak CC that ordered Minister Hovnanian to boycott cabinet meetings until Armenian rights were restored. Likewise, religious authorities along with non-Armenian deputies also supported the Dashnak partys position, as many advocated fair representation of the community in the cabinet.53 Against growing pressure and to appease dissent, President Lahoud and PM Hariri conceded on 29 November 2000 the constitutional right of the Armenian community to secure a second Minister. Hence, Minister Hovnanian returned to his cabinet post while Armenians waited for a second appointment. It never came, and observers opined that Lahoud and Hariri were not in a hurry, perhaps to prevent pro-Syrian Alawis from making a similar demand for a portfolio. Though no linkages existed constitutionally between the two positions, the Syrian military presence in Lebanon carried a great deal of weight, and Armenians were once again victimized. Lahoud and Hariri understood that satisfying Alawi demands would also mean satisfying Syria but that was at a time when Hariri was still struggling with a conceptual framework that dened his ties with Damascus. Yet, as Syria gradually sought to undermine Hariris political standing and bolster Lahoud instead, the Armenian parties were once again confronted with fresh political choices.

Hariris victory in the 2000 elections, and his reappointment as PM, meant that the Syrian leadership in Damascus was deed by a much stronger political actor not

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entirely under its control. Bashar al-Asad assumed the Syrian presidency on 10 June 2000 a few days after his fathers death. Bashar adopted the foreign policy script for Lebanon to manage the Syrian occupation following the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000. He also ensured that his countrys dominant role in Lebanese politics continued.54 After the 2000 Israeli withdrawal, anti-Syrian sentiment increased signicantly, particularly among the Christians, as leading Maronite politicians wished to enhance Lebanese sovereignty and remain independent from all foreign inuences. Hariri, who apparently had become weary of Syrian intervention in Lebanese internal aairs, sought new policies with the help of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as the United States and France, with which countries he had established good relations without Syrias consent. Before long, his search for independence meant that he would antagonize Syria, which cherished its presence in Lebanon. Relations between Hariri and Bashar further deteriorated in the autumn of 2004 when the Syrian leadership supported the extension of Lahouds term as President of the Republic in deance of Lebanese constitutional provisions. Needless to say, opposition to this constitutional manoeuvre rallied anti-Syrian politicians, as international criticism of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon increased. However, at Syrias urging, the Lebanese parliament amended the constitution in September 2004 and extended Lahouds term in oce for three years. Syrias stance prompted the UN Security Council to adopt resolution 1559 (2 September 2004), calling upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon, disarm all Lebanese and nonLebanese militias and support the extension of the control of the government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory.55 Carsten Wieland, the author of Syria at Bay, argued that resolution 1559 was the result of a divergence of American and French interests in Lebanon. France was interested in Lebanese sovereignty and democratization, which would also restore its historical role in the country, whereas the United States aimed at weakening Syria and had no further stakes there.56 Irrespective of American and French interests, resolution 1559 triggered a dramatic sequence of events and divided the Lebanese people between supporters of resolution 1559 and those who opposed it, on the basis that it facilitated western intervention in internal Lebanese aairs. Hariri, who was frustrated over Lahouds extension, submitted his resignation. He was replaced by Omar Karami, who formed a 19-member cabinet in which Alain Tabourian (pro-Dashnak) became Minister of State. After his resignation, Hariri planned to join the anti-Syrian opposition bloc in parliament. On 14 February 2005, as he was apparently to side with the opposition, Hariri was assassinated in the heart of Beirut.57 The anti-Syrian opposition considered the Syrian regime and its Lebanese acolytes responsible for the murder and declared the independence intifada (uprising) or the Cedar revolution. A series of spontaneous anti-Syrian demonstrations in the streets of Beirut forced Karami to resign on 28 February, while a carefully organized counterdemonstration was called for by Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbullah, and pro-government forces championed Damascus. The 8 March gathering was allegedly attended by an estimated half a million people, whose leaders rejected resolution 1559, as demonstrators vented their anger against the United States and France. They also demanded a transparent investigation to reveal and punish Hariris assassins while

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participants expressed gratitude to Syria for its long-standing political support and help in stabilizing Lebanon after 1976 along with its support of the resistance leading up to 2000.58 These sentiments notwithstanding, the Syrian army had already started its gradual withdrawal from Lebanon on 7 March, ostensibly to full its international obligations as enunciated in the Security Councils resolution. As anti-Syrian sentiments grew in Beirut an estimated 1 million Lebanese gathered in the heart of the city on 14 March 2005, where politicians demanded the complete and nal withdrawal of the Syrian army and the dismantlement of the latters intelligence network in Lebanon. The participants in this rally also demanded international investigation of Hariris assassination and the unity of all Lebanese.59 The March 8 and 14 Forces, as they came to be known, illustrated the sharp polarization of the Lebanese over common domestic and foreign policy goals. Although the conict between the two rival camps was at rst political and not sectarian in nature, further dissent and hatred took precedence between the Muslim Shiia and Sunni communities. While the initial impact of these political developments on the Armenian parties was marginal, as they did not take a clear position towards the March 8 and 14 Forces, many Armenians participated in both rallies. True to their established legacies, the Armenian parties vowed that internal disputes between Lebanese parties could only be solved by dialogue and reconciliation. To break the political impasses, the moderate Sunni politician from Tripoli, Najib Mikati, formed a 14-member cabinet on 15 April, in which Tabourian was assigned the telecommunications, youth and sport ministry. In fact, this new interim governments main task was to organize democratic and transparent elections, and end political turmoil. On 7 May, following Syrias complete withdrawal on 25 April and on the verge of the parliamentary elections, General Michel Aoun, a former commander of the army who would eventually become the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), returned to Lebanon from his forced exile in France. Aoun had escaped in 1990, when Syria attacked and occupied the presidential palace in Baabda, and ousted their opponent.60 Aoun, who promised institutional reforms in the Lebanese system, declared that he returned after the country had become sovereign and independent and that the victory achieved by the 14 March uprising belongs to the Lebanese people.61 Aoun, who undoubtedly contributed to the independence intifada and was known as a determined politician, would eventually disagree with the leadership of the March 14 Forces but, at the time, banked on the publics anti-Syrian positions. Aouns disagreement apparently stemmed from political issues related to leadership and representation in the Christian community. Like other parties, the Dashnak CC leaders welcomed Aoun and sought his cooperation, ostensibly to enhance the Christian representation throughout the institutions of the state because the 2000 election law marginalized the Christians and violated their political rights. In hindsight, leading religious gures Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, Catholicos Aram I and a large number of Christian politicians all criticized the 2000 election law. As parliamentary elections approached in 2005, a Dashnak delegation met Saad Hariri, Raq Hariris son and the leader of the Future Movement, who would lead a coalition in the three constituencies of Beirut. Discussions with Saad Hariri focused on a fair and genuine representation of the Armenian community based on democratic principles. However, he disregarded calls for a more solidly supported

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Armenian representation, as the Dashnak party was left out of his coalition on the ground that it did not participate in the anti-Syrian and anti-Lahoud 14 March rally.62 Further, like his father, Saad Hariri too did not favour the idea of a Dashnak headed Armenian bloc in parliament.63 On the other hand, the initial cooperation between the Dshnak party and General Aouns FPM quickly transformed into political alliance. On 29 May both boycotted the elections in the Beirut constituencies to protest against alleged Christian marginalization. Only Aoun, as Christian leader, strongly condemned the governments unfair policy that violated Armenian political rights. Not surprisingly, the four incumbent pro-Hariri MPs mentioned above won uncontested seats reserved to the Armenian community, which meant that both Hunchag and Ramgavar parties were now part of the 14 March Forces and accepted their political agenda. Once again, this division translated into an isolation of the Dashnaks, even if the latter enjoyed greater popularity and inuence among Armenians. Still, from an ideological perspective, it was dicult to comprehend how the Hunchag Marxist-oriented party could join pro-western and rightist groups, like the Phalange and the Lebanese Forces, of the March 14 coalition. From a Hunchag perspective, Their participation in the Beirut elections contributed to the newly being built structure of Lebanon. They did not intend to support one Lebanese group against the other. Their participation stemmed from their belief in a free, sovereign, democratic and united Lebanon.64 If the results were poor in Beirut, in the Metn elections on 12 June the Dashnak candidate, Pakradounian, won due to the successful political alliance with Aoun and traditional ally Murr. Similarly, in the Zahleh district, in Bekaa, the incumbent MP Kassardji was re-elected with Dashnak support, but unlike Pakradounian, who became a member of Aouns Reform and Change parliamentary bloc, stayed neutral. After the 2005 elections, Fouad Seniora, who vowed to continue the martyred Hariris political agenda, formed a 24-member cabinet in which the pro-Hariri Oghasabian was assigned the portfolio of Minister of State for Administrative Development. Aoun and the Dashnak party refused to join on the ground that Christians were marginalized even if other political reasons precluded participation. When asked about the policy of the Dashnak party in the aftermath of the 2005 elections, Pakradounian reiterated that from then on we were part of the antigovernment opposition, which was unique in Lebanese-Armenian annals.65 For the rst time since the late 1940s the Dashnak party adopted an anti-government stance to express its displeasure, and to defend its interpretations of Armenian communal interests. From a Dashnak perspective, the policy of the party to join the antigovernment opposition stemmed from its conviction to protect the security of Lebanon and the Armenian community. It is unacceptable, said Pakradounian, to trust other communities to make our political decisions. Joining coalitions became acceptable, he stressed provided that we do not lose our political freedom.66 The party maintained the Armenian bloc with two deputies, a policy that was considered crucial for the protection of Armenian rights in the Lebanese confessional power sharing system. Contrary to their policy of positive neutrality that was adopted in

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1975, the Armenian parties reached signicant new levels, as Hunchags and Ramgavars sided with the March 14 Forces while Dashnaks inclined towards the anti-government opposition coalition, mainly the March 8 Forces. In either case, preferences required that additional commitments be made as Armenians engaged with internal Lebanese politics. At the communal level, the unity of the Armenian parties was also shaken. Indeed, both Hunchags and Ramgavars failed to participate in the Dashnak 16 June 2005 protest in the Armenian quarter of Bourj Hamoud, when Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Prime Minister of Turkey, visited Lebanon.67 The rally was organized because Turkey refused to recognize as genocide the massacres committed by Ottoman authorities against the Armenians during the First World War. Within this context, it is important to stress that the Lebanese parliament recognized the Armenian genocide in May 2000 and expressed solidarity with the Armenian community.68 By February 2006, Aoun reached a mutual understanding with Hizbullah, which created political tensions and divisions within the Christian community. Several Christian leaders criticized Aoun as they considered Hizbullah to be a pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian military organization with a regional political agenda.69 Hence, Aouns agreement with Hizbullah was unacceptable to the Christians in general, although from a Hizbullah perspective it contributed to unity and mutual understandings between the Lebanese to rebuild the broken state.70 Though Syria and Iran supported resistance movements like Hizbullah and Hamas against Israel, and stood with the Palestinians as long as a just peace was not reached between them and Israel, many felt that the Hizbullah-led Lebanese resistance had a separate objective and should not be confused with regional ones. Contrary to many Christian politicians who categorically refused to keep Lebanon a battleground between Hizbullah and Israel, Aoun, for his part, stressed that a common understanding with Hizbullah over national issues like the resistance in the south and the presidency would better protect Christian interests. Equally important was his expectation that such support be reciprocated, to elect him President of the Republic in September 2007. Where he erred was in underestimating domestic tensions between Sunnis and the Shiia that threatened the domestic peace in the country. It is important to stress that after the 2005 Hariri assassination the two communities became even more estranged, with Sunnis blaming Hizbullahs proSyrian policy as detrimental to Lebanon. The Sunni community arguably held Syria politically and morally accountable for Hariris assassination because its military and intelligence network had been in control of Lebanon for 30 years. To ease inter-communal tensions and resolve the conicting issues, on 2 March 2006 Nabih Berri, the Speaker of parliament, invited representatives of leading Lebanese communities to engage in a national dialogue. Pakradounian, Dr. Djerejian and Kasarjian represented the Armenian community and joined the debates that covered a slew of super-sensitive issues: the status of the Palestinian arms outside the refugees camps in Lebanon, the investigation into the 2005 Hariri assassination, political reform, the stalemate over presidential elections, relations with Syria, the return of Lebanese territory in the south still under Israeli occupation (the Shebaa Farms and the Kfarshouba Hills), and Hizbullahs weapons. Not surprisingly, these concerns caused further tensions, as national dialogue quickly became bogged down.71 Concerning the role of the Armenian parties in resolving

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these conicting issues, Pakradounian argued that their participation in the national dialogue was symbolic and that the Armenian parties were unable to take a stance in regard to the conicting domestic issues because they were politically divided and did not adopt a common agenda.72 In the event, dialogue sessions were suddenly halted with the 12 July 2006 start of the HisbullahIsrael war as Lebanon entered a period of political uncertainty. The feared polarization between the March 8 and 14 Forces solidied as all factions adopted incontrovertible positions. The Armenian community strongly condemned the Israeli attacks against Lebanon and the Lebanese. The Dashnak CC provided shelter and food for thousands of internally displaced persons who were welcomed into the Armenian neighbourhood of Bourj Hamoud. Further, on 24 July representatives of the three Armenian parties met and issued the following communique: The Armenian political parties address the Armenian community of Lebanon to recognize its collective responsibility for protecting and supporting their brethren for the sake of rebuilding Lebanon and the common responsibility and role of the Armenian nation.73 To illustrate pan-Armenian support to Lebanon, the Republic of Armenia sent 7.5 tons of humanitarian aid that was delivered via Aleppo airport in Syria. A joint Armenian committee was also established that included all Armenian relief organizations in Lebanon, to pinpoint the central role and collective responsibility of the community towards Lebanon.74 On 11 August the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1701 that stopped the war, and called for the deployment of peacekeeping troops to southern Lebanon to join the 1978 stationed United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. The larger force known as UNIFIL II intended to upgrade UNIFIL I and monitor the cessation of hostilities between Hizbullah and Israel. UNIFIL II was also geared up to assist the Lebanese army to deploy in the south from where it was expelled by Palestinian, Syrian, Israeli and Hizbullah forces. Importantly, Resolution 1701 provided strong international support to Lebanons government, to bolster and spread its control over the country. In addition to a number of Western countries, Turkey also pledged 681 peacekeeping soldiers to join a new ceiling of a 15,000-strong force.75 Armenians were alarmed by Turkeys participation in UNIFIL II peacekeeping because Ankara denied genocide. To mobilize diplomatic support against the deployment, a Dashnak delegation visited the Cypriot and French embassies in Beirut to voice their concerns. Documents clarifying military ties between Turkey and Israel were submitted to both ambassadors to demonstrate that Turkey could not play a neutral peacekeeping role in Lebanon as long as it remained an Israeli ally.76 Further, at the domestic level, Dashnak ocials communicated with parliamentarians, and asked the UN Secretary General, Ko Annan, to reconsider the case and take a political stance.77 Within this context, Pakradounian reiterated that the Dashnak did not understand why the government was keen for the Turks to come, while the proHariri Kasarjian accepted the facts on the ground and declared: Even though we are Armenian and we have protested, we are Lebanese after all. We did what we have to do but the Lebanese government has taken a decision and so has the international community.78

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Kasarjians pragmatic and conciliatory stance was not an obstacle to prevent inter-party cooperation. Indeed, on 24 August the three Armenian parties, irrespective of their political disagreements, adopted a unied stance and in a communique rejected the presence of Turkish peacekeepers in Lebanon.79 To further express their frustrations and secure the sympathy of the Lebanese government the Dashnak mobilized youth groups and organized mass rallies to pressure Beirut. Indeed, in addition to rallies that were held in Bourj Hamoud and in front of the UNs Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia (ESCWA) headquarters, a major rally was held on 12 October 2006 at Beiruts Martyrs Square, which honours six Lebanese nationalists hanged by the Ottoman authorities during the First World War. The demonstration attracted the attention of the international as well as Turkish media, perhaps because its location, Martyrs Square, conveyed a powerful political message. It certainly raised dormant concerns, including how Turks committed violence against the Lebanese in general, and why they were not qualied to join a peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. An overhead placard carried by a participant spoke volumes as it read: placing Turkish troops in southern Lebanon is an insult to the collective memory of Lebanon.80 It was important to stress that the 12 October rally was organized after the Lebanese government, in early September, ignored Armenian demands to exclude Turkish peacekeepers. The anti-Turkish position of the Armenian community stemmed from two concerns. Firstly, Armenians sought to attract the attention of the international community to their cause recognition of the genocide and, secondly, as one of the seven major Lebanese communities, they refused to be marginalized by the government. They peacefully reminded Beirut that, according to power-sharing agreements, major decisions taken by the government should not be against the interests of the major Lebanese groups. From a Turkish perspective, Turkeys parliament approved sending soldiers to monitor the ceasere between Hizbullah and Israel in southern Lebanon despite public opposition in the streets of Ankara after Erdogan vowed that troops will be withdrawn if asked to disarm Hizbullah.81 As NATOs only Muslim state, Turkey was careful neither to lose Israels friendship, nor antagonize its co-religionists. Ankara valued its close ties with several Arab states, and Israel saw its participation in the peacekeeping force as a chance to raise its international prole as it strived to join the European Union and reassert Turkish inuence in the region.82 Towards that end, and to demonstrate goodwill in its role as a robust peacekeeper, in June 2008 Turkey donated $20 million to the city of Sidon in southern Lebanon for the construction of a new hospital and rehabilitation centre specialized in treating patients suering from burns and war injuries. Serdar Kilic, the Turkish ambassador to Lebanon, described the donation as a gift from the Turkish government which sought to help the Lebanese people in any way possible.83 As alluded to above, the 2006 HizbullahIsrael war interrupted the national dialogue, but Speaker Berri rekindled the exercise on 6 November 2006. Once again participants resumed their consultations, all to prevent fresh inter-communal violence. Once again, these meetings failed to establish a national unity government to address all the contested issues, and on 11 November the ve Shiia Ministers representing both Hizbullah and Berris Amal Movement resigned under the pretext that they were not given enough time to study a draft resolution which proposed to

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establish an international tribunal to investigate and try the Hariri assassination. These resignations did not prevent the government from ratifying the international tribunal and sending it to the UN. Hence, the anti-government opposition which Aouns FPM and the Dashnak had already joined considered the governments decisions illegitimate. It was an epochal declaration as anti-government elements set up a mass rally in Riad el-Solh Square in downtown Beirut that was quickly transformed into a permanent sit-in complete with fully equipped tents.84 The Dashnak participated in the sit-in and vowed not to leave Riad el-Solh Square until Armenian demands of fair representation were fullled. The anti-government opposition also vowed not to end the sit-in until the formation of a national unity government that would protect the interests of the Lebanese communities. Sadly, the daily demonstrations that followed paralyzed the country, eroded whatever economy was left, and plunged Lebanon into an 18-month-long political crisis. Dejected and immobilized, both sides welcomed a Qatari mediation, which culminated in a fresh accord in Doha on 21 May 2008. Divisions within the Christian community in general and the Armenians in particular prevented consensus in two by-elections to replace assassinated MPs Walid Edo of the Future Movement and Pierre Gemayel, son of Amin Gemayel. Both MPs belonged to the March 14 Forces. By-elections were held on 5 August 2007 and in the Metn stronghold MP Michel Murr and the Dashnak party supported the FPM-aliated Reform and Change parliamentary blocs candidate Camille Khoury against Amin Gemayel, the leader of the Phalange party and a former President of the Republic. Gemayels nomination could be traced to the patriarchal nature of leadership in Lebanese politics as family-run efs pass along public posts among family members. With Murrs signicant support, the FPM candidate secured a substantial number of roughly 32,000 Armenian voters out of the 162,950 registered voters in the Metn electorate.85 In his election campaigns and in order to mobilize thousands of Christian supporters Gemayel built on anti-Syrian feelings and declared that the Metn will never be a suburb of Damascus, warning that a vote for Aouns candidate, Khoury, was a vote for the return of Syrian tutelage.86 Friction between Gemayel and Aoun, two Maronite leaders, increased after Aoun rejected a compromise and decided that his Dashnak allies, with Murrs formidable machine, would jointly contest the Metn seat. A full mobilization ensued. Tension erupted into sporadic clashes in Bourj Hamoud between Amin Gemayel supporters and Aouns sympathizers, though Dashnaks denied that clashes of a political nature occurred in the Armenian neighbourhood.87 The Dashnak party and MP Murr decided to support Khoury when hope for a consensus candidate between Maronite politicians was lost. Being on the side of the anti-government opposition the Dashnak had no choice but to support Khoury because the partys alliance with Murr and the FPM secured the 2005 victory (limited as it was). Further, the Dashnak considered that Aoun gave the Armenians their rights whereas Raq Hariri took their rights out of their hands.88 In his address to a FPM rally on 4 August 2007 Pakradounian justied the preference by stressing that Armenians were here because they were free and faithful and rejected marginalization, oppression and injustice.89 It was apparent from Pakradounians statement that the Dashnak were linking these elections with the results of previous elections, all of which stemmed from the 2000 electoral law that denied the party specic manoeuvring capabilities.

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In the Beirut second constituency, March 14 candidate Mohammad al-Amin Itani won with 22,988 votes out of 27,100 cast ballots.90 His victory was considered a conrmation of parliamentary majority leader MP Saad Hariris inuence in the district rather than an election battle between the government and opposition coalition, as in the Metn by-election. Nevertheless, Auon considered Camille Khourys victory with 39,534 votes over Amin Gemayel who got 39,116 votes a national victory by the anti-government opposition.91 Gemayel and his supporters blamed the loss on Armenians as the Dashnak immersed itself in an intra-Maronite struggle. In a moment of utter frustration, Gemayel lost his temper, and accused the Dashnak of committing irregularities by rigging votes at the polling stations in Bourj Hamoud. From Gemayels perspective, Khoury won by a margin of 418 Armenian votes, while receiving about 34 per cent of Maronite votes. Hence, he reasoned, Khoury could not be considered a representative of the Metn Maronites. Evidently, Gemayel gathered 56.3 per cent of the Maronite votes, and gained in most of the Metn, except in the Armenian quarter of Bourj Hamoud. It seemed that about 7,000 of 9,000 Armenians there voted for Khoury.92 Although the Dashnak, for the rst time, mobilized less than 80 per cent of Armenian voters, 27.9 per cent of eligible voters went to the polls compared to 26 per cent in 2000. It is also important to underscore that 7 or 8 per cent of Dashnak supporters and independent Armenians voted for Gemayel and did not follow party lines.93 Most of these Dashnak supporters were mobilized by the FLAM, the separatist organization created in May 2007 by former Dashnak party members who had become estranged over political disagreements regarding leadership positions. The FLAM, headed by former Lebanese Army General Nareg Aprahamian, was nanced and supported by Saad Hariris Future Movement. It sided with the March 14 Forces in the 2007 byelections and while it established headquarters in Bourj Hamoud, its radio programmes in Armenian were broadcast from a station in west Beirut. The Dashnak ignored FLAMs potential political threat, and minimized its importance as an independent group, concluding that it was unlikely that the modest radio station would seriously aect the 2009 elections. FLAM recently opened another oce in Anjar, an Armenian village in the Bekaa, to mobilize support for the March 14 Forces and articulate Armenian interests that dier from Dashnak policies.94 FLAM did not enjoy enough support in the Armenian community. Indeed, in a gathering organized by the latter, on 1 February 2009, to protest against violence committed by Dashnak members against a founding member of the organization, only 50 followers attended.95 The 2007 Metn by-election had a negative impact on the Christians who supported Amin Gemayel as it unleashed a series of criticisms. Indeed, the Armenian support for the FPM prompted opportunistic politician Gabriel Murr (a brother of Michel Murr), to label the Armenians as intruders, not Christians and not Lebanese. He questioned their Lebanese identity and urged Armenians to reform the Dashnak and change the way it dealt with elections.96 In the multi-ethnic Lebanese society Gabriel Murr apparently wanted to appeal to communal and ethnic impulses that were often an eective way of mobilizing support and winning elections. Though such statements illustrated anger, they also displayed irrationality, racism and manifestations of hatred towards the Armenian community. From a Dashnak perspective, Gabriel Murrs statements threaten[ed] the civil peace and risk[ed]

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instigating sectarian strife between Lebanese communities.97 Although both Gemayel and Murr explained that their problem was not with the Armenian community per se, but with the leadership of the Dashnak, their statements angered and disappointed many Armenians. Gemayel visited the Armenian Catholicos Aram I in the latters Bikfaya Summer residence, ironically in Gemayels ancestral efdom, and stressed his rm political, economic, social and cultural bonds with the Armenian community, concluding that the community was dear to his heart.98 Still, as Gemayel assured Armenians of their long and shared alliance, he insisted that future ties with the Dashnak would hinge on more democratic choices. Some neutral Armenians also criticized the participation of the Dashnak in the 2007 by-elections on the side of the anti-government opposition. According to critics, The shortsighted Dashnak leadership could have avoided taking sides with Aouns FPM and Hizbullah against Gemayel at a very critical moment of Lebanese history when a number of signicant Christian politicians, like Gemayels son, were assassinated.99 Contrary to the policy of positive neutrality adopted in the 1970s, the unwise strategy of the Dashnak increased feelings of hatred and inspired hostility against the Armenian community. The Armenians could avoid taking sides with Lebanese parties by adopting a neutral policy. Gemayels remarks were dwelt on by Speaker Berri and Ghaleb Abou Zeinab, Hizbullah politburo member, as allegedly demonstrating the Phalange partys inherent racism. Berri stressed that sectarian speech was shameful and represented a threat to Lebanons future, conrming at the same time that Armenians in Lebanon did not need to prove their nationalist credentials and their rm roots in this country.100 Abou Zeinab, for his part, reiterated that no one had the right to question the national identity of any Lebanese, indicating that Armenians belonged in and were loyalty to Lebanon.101 Hizbullah also rejected political racism against the Armenians and advocated instead national unity between all Lebanese sects. In relation to the adopted policy of the Armenians in the Metn by-election, Hizbullah stressed: The Armenians deserve the right to make their own political choices because they are not an isolated group as some would like to portray them to be. Every political party has the right to choose a political path, this is democracy.102 The strength of the Dashnak coalitions with the FPM and Michel Murr proved would be tested in upcoming elections. Still, party ocials were quick to point out that the coalition with the FPM was not part of a broader battle against the March 14 Forces and was unrelated to the Beirut polls as Hovig Mekhitarian, the general secretary of the Dashnak, declared.103 Contrary to his anti-Armenian declarations, Gemayel should have recognized that his assassinated son, Pierre, was elected in 2005 with Armenian votes. Likewise, the 2007 Metn by-election could also be considered a political message to Saad Hariri and the March 14 Forces, ostensibly to update unjust rules that froze the Dashnak out of the previous victories. Therefore, while it may be wrong to argue, as many Christian politicians and commentators have, that the Dashnaks committed a fatal mistake, Armenians were far more valuable voters than heretofore assumed. It remained to be determined whether siding with the Syrian-backed anti-government opposition, led by Hizbullah and the

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Amal Movement in the 2007 by-elections, lost the Armenian neutrality, even if party ocials were persuaded that the role of the community had improved sharply. There was an assumption that Maronites would need Armenian votes at every election henceforth and that, consequently, Armenian political parties would demand support in exchange for political and socio-economic privileges. Arguably, the opposite was also accurate, especially with dwindling demographics. As Lebanon emerged from its opposition-induced 2008 crisis, the Armenian community played a constructive role in the Qatari mediation which culminated in the May 2008 Doha Accord. This agreement ended an 18-month feud that unfolded into deadly sectarian ghting on 7 May 2008 when Hizbullah and Amal militiamen opened re on fellow Lebanese. Although Armenian representatives participated in the Doha negotiations, the credit for restoring Armenian political rights should be attributed to both the Dashnak MP Pakradounian and Aoun, who negotiated skilfully with the representatives of the March 14 Forces and allocated ve Christian seats in Beiruts rst constituency, where the Armenian vote may be a deciding factor in the 2009 elections.104 According to voter registers there are 15,059 Orthodox and 4,837 Catholic Armenian voters in the Beirut rst constituency.105 In Doha, Pakradounian, who was chosen as a member of the election law drafting committee, emphasized the importance of the new electoral law that enabled Armenians to be fairly represented in parliament. The Dashnak attributed Pakradounians success to the small Armenian bloc to illustrate the eectiveness of having a bloc in parliament. Contrary to the 2005 divisions, Beirut was divided into three new constituencies that would enable Christians in general and Armenians in particular to elect their own genuine representatives.106 In addition, in order to ease the political tension and erce sectarian rivalries between the Lebanese parties in the second constituency of Beirut, the participants of the Doha Accord agreed to concede to the Future Movement one Sunni and one Armenian MP, to Hizbullah one Shiia MP and to the Dashnak one Armenian MP.107 Consequently, pro-Hariri Sebouh Kalpakian and pro-Dashnak Arthur Nazarian won the Armenian seats in this constituency prior to the 2009 June elections. From a Dashnak perspective, the partys policy to compromise one of the two Armenian seats in the Beirut second constituency preserved the unity of Beirut and served the national interests of Lebanon.108 At Doha, a new electoral law was also adopted, based on the 1960 qada (smaller district) preference for better representation.109 As a corollary to the agreement, Doha also facilitated the election of a new president, Michel Suleiman, on 25 May 2008. This was followed by the formation of a 30-member national unity government in which the Armenian community was represented by two Ministers, pro-Dashnak Tabourian and the pro-Hariri Oghassabian. As the date of the June 2009 elections approached, the tension between FLAM and the Dashnak escalated. On 27 January 2009 a founding member of FLAM, Hrag Okian was shot by a Dashnak gunman, under the pretext of provocative anti-Dashnak statements, and taken to hospital. FLAM and the Hunchag and Ramhavar parties condemned the violent act that aimed to suppress freedom of expression and political opinion.110 Although the incident caused fears among many Armenians that intracommunal violence, similar to that of 1958, could be triggered, all the parties practised self-control and restraint. FLAM also advocated dialogue rather than violence between the Armenian parties to address their political dierences peacefully.111

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Participation of the anti-government opposition in the newly formed national unity government after the Doha agreement lessened political tensions in the country but did not end major disagreements over several issues, including Hizbullahs illegal weapons. In the new cabinet, a cohabitation phenomenon prevailed until the next parliamentary elections in June 2009, when a new power sharing government may well be established. Currently, in addition to FLAM, the Hunchag and Ramgavar parties continue their alliances with the Future Movement and March 14 Forces whereas the Dashnak that joined Aouns Reform and Change bloc sides with the opposition. Yet, contrary to its 1992 stance, refusing to support Rashid Solhs government, the Ramgavar party aligned with the Future Movement after 2000, which eectively meant that the Armenian political parties abandoned their 1975 policy of positive neutrality and participated actively in Lebanese politics. According to Karardjian the party owed its access in parliament to R. Hariri. Kasardjian also stressed that the Ramgavar party was in permanent political alliance with the Future Movement and the March 14 Forces to prove that Armenian society could develop by following free and liberal principles.112 A similar stance was also illustrated by Oghasabian, who wished the March 14 Forces to win the June elections and that his nomination to one of the Armenian seats in Beirut would be determined by S. Hariri.113 The above statements indicate that the Armenian parties abandoned their least-interference policy in Lebanese internal issues, apparently being aware of looming dangers that would alienate them from certain political groups. On the other hand, after the Taif accord and from 1996, the Armenian bloc became smaller as a representative from each of the Hunchag and Ramgavar parties supported the Future Movement and won seats in parliament. From their perspective, joining Hariris Future Movement did not threaten the Armenian community and was the best means to rescue Lebanon from its crisis.114 From a Dashnak perspective, Pakradounian reiterated that during the civil war the Armenian community adopted a policy of positive neutrality, and refused to take sides. In the post-Taif peaceful period, however, neutrality had not been a necessity because the Dashnak party had its viewpoint in relation to Lebanese politics, he declared. We, i.e. the Dashnaks, were committed to our choices and alliances, he stressed, so that Lebanon and the Armenians would not be threatened.115 From both perspectives it is reasonable to assume that irrespective of their political choices, the Armenian parties acknowledged that when their policies and alliances would threaten the security of the Armenian community they were ready to abandon their allies. Hence, it seemed that neutrality was a political choice about a collective future, and to maintain peaceful relations Armenian leaders were vigilant. A united Armenian position and political agenda was unlikely to emerge from the inter-party meetings initiated by party leaderships as long as they were entrenched in non-Armenian blocs. The Armenian parties, irrespective of their alliances, supported the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon, because they felt protected by the rule of law and the state. Still, after the Metn by-election and the Doha agreement, and in light of the positions of some inuential gures in the upper echelons of the Phalange party and the Lebanese Forces, the Armenian parties face a number of important challenges. Firstly, to adopt a united political agenda that would support Christian political rights because only in that context would the Armenians be able to prevent

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infringements of their rights and privileges. Provided that Christians within the March 14 Forces assure the Armenians that they would respect their freedom, democratic choices, political rights and participation in the decision-making process. In addition, Dashnak leaders insist that other Christian parties should acknowledge its role within the Armenian community rather than criticizing it and holding it responsible for political failures and losses in general elections but praising it when they achieved victory. Presumably, if Christian parties within the March 14 Forces gained the trust of the Armenian community; the Armenian political parties could well adopt a neutral policy, as they did in 1975. This would allow them to bridge dierences between the Lebanese groups by dialogue to encourage domestic tranquillity. Secondly, the Hunchag and Ramgavar parties may have to acknowledge that the rights of the Armenian community would not be protected and promoted without the creation of a strong Armenian bloc. Although the pro-Hariri Oghasabian acknowledged the importance of an Armenian bloc, he related its creation to clear political principles that should be acceptable to the Armenian parties without clarifying the nature of those principles.116 Within this context, the Dashnak declared that the aim of running the June 2009 elections would be the creation of the Armenian bloc.117 If we succeed in fullling our goal, Pakradounian declared, we will call the Armenian bloc the 22 November independence bloc, attributing it symbolism from Lebanons independence day in November 1943 to illustrate Armenians commitment to national unity, peace and security.118 Pakradounian also stressed that the creation of this bloc did not prevent the Armenian parties from maintaining their alliances.119 However, only by voting as a bloc can the Armenia parties maintain control and inuence in the policy process, which promotes sectarianism and communal rights. From a Dashnak perspective, FLAM, Hunchag and Ramgavar parties that remained subordinated to Saad Hariris political agenda would be unable to defend Armenian rights. However, Dashnak subordination to Hizbullah and the Aoun-led opposition did not promise that the party would be able to distance itself from controversial domestic policy not in favour of the Armenians. Hence, the Armenian parties may like to reconsider their political choices and cooperate after the June 2009 general elections to enhance Armenian privileges. The recent division within the Ramgavar party between Kasarjians supporters and an opposition group headed by Nar Khachadourian did not inspire optimism. Contrary to Kasarjians faction, Khachadourian supported the creation of an Armenian bloc that would represent all the Armenian parties.120 The recent position of the Ramgavar party, declared by Kasarjian in December 2008, to remain committed and loyal to the political agenda of martyr Raq Hariri whose support enabled the party to win a seat in parliament, did not inspire optimism.121 In addition, the Hunchag partys policy to coordinate with the Future Movement hindered the prospects of compromise with the Dashnaks. Within this context, the leader of the Hunchag party, Sarkis Chapoutian, who failed to prevent Dr. Djerejians faction from nominating the pro-Hariri Sebouh Kalpakian to the June elections, resigned from his post and Dr. Mardig Jamgotchian was elected leader.122 Similarly, the armed clash on 27 January 2009 in Bourj Hamoud between some supporters of the Dashnak party and FLAM demonstrated intolerance and deep political divisions between the Armenians.123 Contrary to the Dashnaks, the Hunchags and

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Ramgavars seemed weak, internally fragmented and unable to make their own decisions independently of the March 14 Forces. On the other hand, being the strongest Armenian party, it was likely that the Dashnaks would be called upon to play a pivotal role, as they did in 1975, to address the controversies between the Armenian parties by giving the Hunchags and Ramgavars a greater say in Armenian communal concerns. In this way the Dashnak in cooperation with the Hunchag and Ramgavar parties may prevent the marginalization of the Armenian community and negotiate Armenian rights with the various Lebanese parties from a strong position. The 1 December 2008 visit of representatives of the Dashnak CC to Syria, and their meeting with President Bashar al-Asad apparently demonstrates the leading role of the party at the start of the 2009 election campaign.124 In addition, the visits of party ocials in January 2009 to the USA and Canada to mobilize the Lebanese Armenian diaspora to visit Lebanon and participate in the June 2009 elections demonstrated the ability of the party to wage a broad international campaign that aimed to protect the rights of the Armenians of Lebanon.125 From Pakradounians statement, that the Dashnak party would try to create a strong Armenian bloc in 2009,126 one may reasonably assume that the party started to mobilize support to its political agenda given the inuence of the Syrians on their allies in Lebanon. The results of the upcoming elections may well determine whether the ability of the Dashnak to form coalition lists in the Beirut constituencies, the Metn and the Bekaa will be successful. Further, the Dashnak partys Lebanese policy was carefully engineered so as not to support the anti-Syrian groups of the March 14 Forces in order not to endanger the interests of the Armenians in Syria, which enjoyed the trust and support of the regime. If party candidates succeed as they did until 1972, the Dashnak would resume its traditional leading role, but if not the party might lose political capital. To further strengthen its negotiating position and shape policy, the Dashnak, despite its poor relations with the Phalange party since 2007, met with Sami Gemayel, younger son of Amin Gemayel, and discussed the prospects of cooperation in the Metn and Beirut. To create a strong Armenian bloc the Dashnak embarked on an open door and pragmatic policy with some politicians of the March 14 Forces but without antagonizing its strategic ally Aoun. The party needed the support of the Phalange in Beirut and probably in the Bekaa to guarantee victory to its candidates. Although there was no progress in the negotiations with the Dashnaks, Sami Gemayel tried to mend fences with the party because what united the two parties, he declared, was big and was related to a history of cooperation, common values and respect of pluralism in Lebanon. Hence Gemayel stressed that a strategic alliance with the Dashnak should be established, because the Phalange was more concerned to improve their relations with the Armenians than any other party in Lebanon.127 Concerning the Future Movement, the mediation of Michel Murr managed to bring Mekhitarian and Saad Hariri together on 10 March 2009 to address the issue of Armenian representation in the Beirut constituencies.128 Both leaders tried to nd common ground between their parties to resume cooperation over policy programmes, as they did from 1992 to 1996. The policy of the Dashnak to establish the Armenian bloc and enhance Armenian political rights required that the Dashnak leadership would open communication channels with the Future Movement regardless of Rak Hariris policy of marginalization of the Armenian

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community. Likewise, Saad Hariri should also recognize that by excluding the Dashnaks from his domestic policy and by only supporting the FLAM and the Hunchag and Ramgavar parties he could not satisfy Armenian demands and enjoy the full support of the community in the future. In addition to its alliance with the opposition, if the Dashnak partys pragmatic policy succeeds with the March 14 Forces, it could create an Armenian bloc comprised of four or ve MPs. In addition to the two challenges alluded to above, a third challenge that confronted the Armenian parties was to play a more active role in Lebanese politics by further joining state institutions like the army, the bureaucracy and the police to work through those structures to enhance Armenian privileges. Rather than ask for more representatives and posts from what they were accorded earlier, the parties may want to exercise political pressure on key decision makers in the government to ll vacant Armenian posts, to improve and protect the communitys identity and political and socio-economic rights. The legacy of the genocide and the fear of losing their Armenian identity should not become obstacles to further integration into Lebanese society, especially if Armenian votes add decisive value, particularly within Christian constituencies. Armenians were able to protect their identity and culture, established good relations with all the groups and demonstrated loyalty to the state of Lebanon. Although the Armenian parties were too far apart on policy issues due to their alliances, nothing would prevent them, in the post-election period, from revising their choices to lessen the polarization against the community. Presumably, adopting a policy of positive neutrality could better serve Armenian communal interests and rebuild the damaged bridges with the various Lebanese groups. Currently, unlike the policy of FLAM, Hunchag and Ramgavar parties which declared their alliances with the March 14 Forces, the Dashnak party was trying to reach pre-election coalitions with Michel Murr, the Phalange and Saad Hariris Future Movement to lessen the polarization against the Armenians. This may not happen in the foreseeable future. The Dashnak conrmed that it would keep its political alliance with Aoun and also vote for Murr in the Metn provided that he would refrain from including in his coalition list with the Phalange an Armenian candidate from the ruling majority.129 In fact, the Dashnaks successfully manoeuvred and Pakradounian was uncontested in his election to the Metn. Notes
1. H. Bedoyan, The Policies Pursued by the Armenian Political Leadership in Lebanese Internal Politics (19431970), Panorama, 7th year, No.30 (1983), p.32. Also see A. Boudjikanian, Les Armeniens aux Etats Unis, Hannon, Vol.XXI (198992), pp.516. 2. Bedoyan, The Policies Pursued, p.32. 3. H. Bedoyan, The Social, Political and Religious Structure of the Armenian Community in Lebanon, The Armenian Review, Vol.XXXII (June 1979), p.120. 4. N. Migliorino, (Re)Constructing Armenia in Lebanon and Syria, Ethno-Cultural Diversity and the State in the Aftermath of a Refugee Crisis (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), p.55. 5. Bedoyan, The Social, Political, p.120. 6. Bedoyan, The Policies Pursued, p. 38. 7. Migliorino, (Re)Constructing Armenia, p.56. 8. Ibid., p.57. 9. Bedoyan, The Social, Political, p.127.

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10. Migliorino, (Re)Constructing Armenia, p.61. 11. Ibid., p.152. 12. V. Jerejian, Hayoutian Yev Lipanani Hamar [For Armenians and Lebanon] (Beirut: Aztag publications, 2000), p.28. 13. Personal interview with B. Aghbashian, 7 July 2005. 14. See O. Geukjian, The Policy of Positive Neutrality of the Armenian Political Parties in Lebanon During the Civil War, 197590: A Critical Analysis, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.43, No.1 (Jan. 2007), pp.6573. 15. Interview with K. Babikian, in S.H. Varjabedian, Hayere Lipanani Metch [Armenians in Lebanon], Vol.4 (USA: Rosekeer Press, 1983), pp.4267. 16. Ibid., pp.4267. 17. Aztag, 23 Oct. 1975, p.1. 18. The Bekerki Committee was comprised of Rene Mouawad, Michel Saseen, Nasri Al-Maalouf, Boutros Harb, George Saadeh and Khatchig Babikian. 19. R. Avsharian, The Taif Accord and the Armenians of Lebanon, paper presented at a conference organized by Haigazian University on The Armenians of Lebanon: Past and Present, Beirut, 1215 Sept. 2005. 20. Ibid. 21. Personal interview with MP H. Pakradounian, 25 Sept. 2008. 22. Quoted in Aztag Newsletter, No.1, Jan. 2009, p.7. 23. Z. Messerlian, Armenian Participation in the Lebanese Legislative Elections during the Presidency of Elias Hraoui (19891998), Part I, Haigazian Armenological Review, Vol.27 (2007), p.314. 24. Ibid., p.318. 25. Ibid., p.331. In 1992, in addition to Yeghia Djerejian, Khatchig Babikian, Souren Khanamirian, Hagop Joukhadarian (Arm. Catholic) and Dr. Nourijan Demirdjian (Protestant) were elected in Beirut. 26. Messerlian, Armenian Participation, Part I, pp.3267. 27. Personal interview with K. Megerditchian, 12 Sept. 2008. 28. Messerlian, Armenian Participation, Part I, p.327. 29. Taif agreement and documents provided by the Armenian parliamentarians oce in Bourj Hamoud. 30. Ibid. 31. Aztag, special issue, Jan. 1994, p.92. 32. Ibid. 33. K. Fighali, Alintikhabat Alniabiah Al-Lubnania 2005: Mouashirat Ouanataej [Lebanese Parliamentary Elections 2005: Implications and Results] (Lebanon: Mukhtarat, 2005), pp.1721. 34. Z. Messerlian, Armenian Participation in the Lebanese Legislative Elections during the Presidency of Elias Hraoui (19891998), Part II, Haigazian Armenological Review, Vol.28 (2008), pp.33947. 35. Ibid., p.345. 36. Ibid., pp.34147. 37. P. Salem, The Future of Lebanon, Foreign Aairs, Vol.85, No.6 (2006), p.21. 38. Personal interview with Megerditchian, 12 Sept. 2008. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 1999, pp.423. 42. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2001, pp.423. 43. Ibid., p.43. 44. Personal interview with H. Havatian, 9 Sept. 2008. 45. Al-akhbar, 5 March 2009, p.3. From a Hunchag perspective, the Dashnaks may represent 60% of the Armenians but not 85%. 46. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2001, p.44. 47. Personal interview with A. Dakessian, 19 Nov. 2008. 48. Personal interview with G. Hovanessian, 10 Jan. 2009. 49. Personal interview with A. Dakessian, 19 Nov. 2008. 50. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2001, p.44. 51. Migliorino, (Re)Constructing Armenia, pp.1889. It is important to note that the DashnakHunchak list called the Armenian United Front that lost the elections was comprised of Apraham Dedeyan

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(Arm. Evang.), Mihran Seferian (Hunchag), Hagop Pakradounian (Dashnak), Arthur Nazarian (AGBU), and Stephan Abajian (Arm. Catholic). Interview with H. Pakradounian, Monday Morning, 20 Aug. 2007. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2001, pp.489. F. Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashars Trial by Fire (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p.107. Quoted in ibid., pp.21314. C. Wieland, Syria at Bay, Secularism, Islamism and Pax Americana (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), p.131. Ibid., p.131. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2006, pp.2312. Ararat, special issue, 1 Jan. 2006, pp.345. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2006, pp.2334. In 1990 Aoun had been heading the interim military government which rejected to recognize the Taif agreement and refused to leave the Baabda palace where he resided so that the newly elected President, Elias Hraoui, would not take his seat. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2006, p.235. Migliorino, (Re)Constructing Armenia, p.188. Commenting on Armenian representation, on 15 May 2005 the AFP said that the Dashnak party, which enjoys broad Armenian popular support, was left out of Saad Hariris coalition. Personal interview with H. Havatian, 7 Oct. 2008. Ararat, special issue, 1 Jan. 2006, p.40. Interview with Hagop Pakradounian, Monday Morning, 20 Aug. 2007. Aztag Newsletter, No.1, Jan 2009, p.7. Personal interview with Megerditchian, 12 Sept. 2008. Also, see Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2006, p.274. I. Azzi, Armenians Protest Turkish UNIFIL Role, The Daily Star, 13 Oct. 2006, p.2. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2007, pp.2023. An-nahar, 19 Feb. 2009, p.13. Editorial, The Daily Star, 15 Aug. 2006, p.1. Personal interview with Pakradounian, 25 Sept. 2008. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2007, pp.21718. Ibid., p.218. The Daily Star, 10 July 2007, p.4. Turks lean towards sending troops for UNIFIL, The Daily Star, 29 Aug. 2006, p.5. Azzi, Armenians Protest, p.2. Turkish peacekeepers arrive for mission in south, The Daily Star, 21 Oct. 2006, p.2. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2007, p.260. Azzi, Armenians Protest, p.2. In this context, a statement that circulated at the protest read: Any participant force in the UNIFIL should be welcomed by the whole Lebanese Society . . . Turkey continues to lead a hostile foreign policy in the region, especially with its immediate neighbors and still occupies northern Cyprus, continues to blockade Armenia, and refuses to recognize and apologize for the 1915 Armenian genocide it has perpetrated. See same source, p.2. The Daily Star, 7 Oct. 2006, p.2. The Daily Star, 6 Oct. 2006, p.2. M. Zaatari, Turkey donates 20$ million for Sidon hospital, The Daily Star, 27 June 2008, p.3. Aztag, special issue, 1 Jan. 2007, p.198. The Daily Star, 26 July 2007, p.2. The Daily Star, 4 Aug. 2007, p.1. The Daily Star, 3 Aug. 2007, p.1. Quoted in The Daily Star, 7 March 2009, p.2. Ibid. The Daily Star, 7 Aug. 2007, p.1. An-nahar, 7 Aug. 2007, pp.12. The Daily Star, 7 Aug. 2007, p.1. The Daily Star, 10 Aug. 2007, p.3. As-sar, 5 March 2009, p.3.

52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94.

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95. Al-Mustakbal, 2 Feb. 2009, p.8. 96. The Daily Star, 7 Aug. 2007, p.3. 97. The Daily Star, 8 Aug. 2007, p.3. In relation to the statements of G. Murr, an Armenian resident in Bourj Hamoud said that we feel that the Maronites do not like us, they called us intruders, like we are not Christians just because we are a dierent sect. Aoun does not look at people like Sunni, Shiite, Maronite, he is patriotic. Ibid. 98. H.M. Bathish, Gemayel tries to make peace with the Armenians, The Daily Star, 9 Aug. 2007, p.1. 99. Quoted in the Newsletter published by FLAM, 3 Aug. 2007, p.19. 100. The Daily Star, 8 Aug. 2007, p.1. 101. Bathish, Gemayel Tries, p.1. 102. Ibid. 103. The Daily Star, 8 Aug. 2007, p.3. 104. An-nahar, 22 May 2008, pp.1 and 12. The rst constituency of Beirut includes the areas of Ashraeh, Rmeil and Saifeh. The ve seats in this constituency are distributed as follows: one Armenian Orthodox, one Armenian Catholic, one Maronite, one Catholic and one Orthodox. 105. Alakhbar, 5 March 2009, p.3. 106. The rst constituency includes: Achraeh, Rmeil and Sai. The second constituency includes: Bashoura, Medawar and Marfaa. The third constituency includes: Mina al-Hosn, Ain al-Mreiseh, Mazraa, Mosseitbeh, Ras Beirut, Zokaka al-Blat. 107. Aztag, 9 Feb. 2009, pp.1 and 10. 108. Aztag, 6 Feb. 2009, p.2. 109. For details about the new electoral law ratied by the Lebanese parliament on 29 Sept. 2008, see 2009 Parliamentary Elections: Law, Constituencies and Electors on Board and Let the Race Begin, The Monthly, No.76 (Nov. 2008), pp.413. This article has no author. 110. Ararad, 29 Jan. 2009, p.1, and An-nahar, 28 Jan. 2009, p.7. 111. Al-Mustakbal, 2 Feb. 2009, p.8. 112. An-nahar, 16 March 2009, p.5. 113. Interview with J. Oghasabian, in Al Afkar, No.1385 (2009), p.19. 114. As-sar, 3 Nov. 2007, p.5. 115. Ibid. 116. Ararad, 28 Feb. 2009, p.2. 117. Aztag, 6 Feb. 2009, p.2. 118. Aztag, 5 Feb. 2009, p.4. 119. Ibid. 120. Addiyar, 5 March 2009, p.5. 121. An-nahar, 19 Dec. 2008. 122. As-sar, 5 March 2009, p.3. 123. An-nahar, 28 Jan. 2009, p.7. 124. Aztag, 2 Dec. 2008, p.1. 125. Aztag, Monthly Newsletter, No.1, Jan. 2009, pp.1013. 126. Personal interview with Pakradounian, 25 Sept. 2008, 127. Addiyar, 7 March 2009, p.7. 128. Addiyar, 11 March 2009, pp.1 and 7. 129. Al-akhbar, 9 March 2009, p.6.