(Joseph Peter Sison v. COMELEC, G.R. No.

134096, March 3, 1999) Facts: It appears that while the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board of Canvassers but before the winning candidates were proclaimed, petitioner commenced suit before the COMELEC by filing a petition seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a failure of elections. The said petition was supposedly filed pursuant to Section 63 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended) on the ground of "massive and orchestrated fraud and acts analogous thereto which occurred after the voting and during the preparation of election returns and in the custody or canvass thereof, which resulted in a failure to elect."4 While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon City, including the winning candidate for the post of vice mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the petition before it on the ground (1) that the allegations therein were not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) the grounds recited were not among the pre-proclamation issues set forth in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166 Issue: WON the grounds are valid? Ruling: Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof such election result in a failure to elect on account of force majuere, violence, terrorism , fraud, or other analogous causes. We have painstakingly examined petitioner's petition before the COMELEC but found nothing therein that could support an action for declaration of failure of elections. He never alleged at all that elections were either not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of failure to elect stood as a bare conclusion bereft of any substantive support to describe just exactly how the failure to elect came about. (Garay v. COMELEC, 261 SCRA 222) Facts: After the results of the 1995 elections were canvassed in 73 precincts in the Municipality of Matnog Province of Sorsogon. Said results excluded the votes from precinct 30A Brgy Culasi where armed men forcibly took the ballot box together with the election returns, other election papers, documents and/or paraphernalia. COMELEC set aside the results of a special election and declared the winner on the basis of tally board and certificate of votes in the regular elections. Issue: WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion Held: COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion when it decided to set aside and annul the special election it had earlier called and conducted because of failure of election. While it is true that the respondent Commission has the power to annul special elections or declare a failure of special elections where it is shown that no voting had taken place or the election therein resulted in a failure to elect; and the votes not cast would affect the results of the election,9 nonetheless, in the instant case, the June 17, 1995 electoral exercise was not a failed election, as voting had taken place and the election did not result in a failure to elect. In other words, the people spoke freely and honestly in a

contest voluntarily participated in by both parties herein. Hence, the popular will as clearly expressed in the votes cast and counted should prevail over dubious election documents of a previous failed election in the same precinct. Since the validity and binding force of this special election has not been put at issue and since for all it is worth, such electoral exercise, both in the casting and canvassing of votes, was conducted regularly and peacefully, then this Court's duty is to resolve the issue "in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority" as expressed in such special election, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the unquestioned choice of the majority. (Matalam v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 733) Facts: Petitioner Norodin M. Matalarn and Private Respondent Zacaria A. Candao were both candidates for Governor of the Province of Maguindanao in the May 8, 1995 elections. During the canvass of the election returns in the municipalities of Datu Piang and Maganoy, both in the Province of Maguindanao, Petitioner Matalarn challenged before the respective Municipal Boards of Canvassers ("MBC") the authenticity of the election returns in said towns. Because the MBC merely noted his objections, petitioner reiterated the same before the Provincial Board of Canvassers ("PBC"). In those two municipalities, petitioner was credited with only 3,641 votes, while private respondent received 44,654 votes. It is the contention of petitioner that the exclusion of the results is enough to overhaul the lead of Candao. Because the Provincial Board of Canvassers rejected the pleas of petitioner and included the challenged certificates of canvass for Datu Piang and Maganoy in the provincial canvass, petitioner filed the above-mentioned petitions before the Comelec. During pendency of petition, PBC proclaimed Candao as governor of Maguindanao but it was nullified because it was not authorized by comelec. Issue: whether the questioned election returns for the municipalities of Maganoy and Datu Piang could be the proper subjects of a pre-proclamation controversy and, corollarily, whether said returns should be excluded from the canvass. Held: IN SUCH CONTROVERSY, THE COMELEC IS RESTRICTED TO AN EXAMINATION OF THE ELECTION RETURNS.- In a pre-proclamation controversy, the Comelec, as a rule, is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities. Indeed, in the recent case of Loong vs. Comelec, the Court, through Mr. Justice Regino Hermosisima, Jr., declared that "the prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction xxx is that as long as the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers cannot look he ' vond or behind them to verify allegations ofirregularities in the casting or the counting of votes. " Justifying the circumscribed scope of pre-proclamation controversies, Loong cited the earlier ruling of the Court in Dipatuan vs. Comelec and held that in a pre-proclamation controversy, Comelec is not to look beyond or behind election returns which are on their face regular and authentic returns. A party seeking to raise issues resolution of which would compel or necessitate COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which appcar, prima facie regular on their face, has his proper remedy in a regular election protest. Section 243 of the same Code enumerates the issues that may be raised in a preproclamation controversy, to wit: "SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre -proclamation controversy. The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a preproclamation controversy:

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; (b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code; (c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates." Stressing that the said enumeration is restrictive and exclusive, the Court in Sanchez vs. Commission on Elections17 held that: "The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to issues enumerated under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in preproclamation controversy, is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (Sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (Sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (Sec. 236), which are the only instances where a preproclamation recount may be resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez' petition must fail."18 Agbayani vs. COMELEC Facts: The petitioner is questioning the Order issued by the respondent Commission on Elections on December 13, 1988, dismissing his preproclamation cases against private respondent Rafael M. Colet and its Resolution dated February 23, 1989, denying his motion for reconsideration, The grounds for the dismissal were: a) that the petitioner had abandoned the said cases with his filing of an election protest on October 5, 1988; and b) that the pre-proclamation controversy was no longer viable because the private respondent had already been proclaimed Governor of Pangasinan. Issue: WON the winning candidate makes the pre-proclamation controversy no longer viable? Held: (2)On the second ground, the rule is indeed that the proclamation of the winning candidate makes the pre-proclamation controversy no longer viable, as the issues raised therein may be more closely examined and better resolved in an election protest. However, this is true only where the proclamation is based on a complete canvass, as we have held in a number of cases.3 Where it is claimed that certain returns should have been omitted because they were manufactured and other returns cannot be included because they have been irretrievably lost (thus raising the question of whether a special election should be called in the precincts affected), the pre-proclamation controversy should still be continued despite the proclamation of the supposed winner. Indeed, the COMELEC may in such preproclamation proceedings determine if the proclamation should be annulled. To contend that the pre-proclamation controversy should be dismissed on the simplistic justification that the private respondent is already in office is to beg the

question. The pre-proclamation controversy was introduced in our election laws precisely to discontinue the practice of hastening the proclamation and delaying the protest, to defeat the truly expressed will of the electorate. We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a proclamation may be challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed office. Lazatin vs. HRET Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the elections of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes, private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. But since the MBC did not rule on his objections, he brought his case to the COMELEC. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May_ 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC resolution before this Court in a petition. In a decision the Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's Proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "HRET") an election protest, docketed as Case No. 46. Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground that it had been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET ruled that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioner has come to this Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest filed by private respondent. Issue: WON HRET has jurisdiction over the election contest Held: The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it. Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself. Kho vs. COMELEC

Facts: On May 30, 1995, petitioner Kho, a losing candidate in the 1995 gubernatorial elections in Masbate, filed an election protest1 against private respondent Espinosa to set aside the proclamation of the latter as the Provincial Governor of Masbate and to declare him instead the winner in the elections. Private respondent Espinosa, on the other hand, argued that the five (5) day period of filing an answer is not jurisdictional because the answer in not an initiatory pleading and the time of its filing can be extended either through motion or motu propio. He added that the COMELEC, in admitting the answer with counter-protest, committed no error as it is allowed to suspend its rules in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of matters before it. According to him, the order of the COMELEC dated July 26, 1995 admitting his counter-protest is not subjected to a timely motion for reconsideration by petitioner Kho, thus it became final and executory and can no longer be disturb. Held: We find the petition meritorius. It is clear from the records that private respondent Espinosa filed his answer with counter protest way beyond the reglementary period of five (5) days provided for by law. It must be pointed out that Espinosa received the COMELEC summons and the Pettition of Protest of Kho on June 6, 1995. Under Section 1, Rule 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the answer must be filed within five (5) days from service of summons and a copy of the petition. Private respondent Espinosa, therefore, had until June 11, 1995 within which to file his answer. In violation however of the aforesaid rules, Espinosa filed his answer with counter-protest only on June 15, 1995, obviously beyond the five (5) mandatory period. It should be stressed that under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the protestee may incorporate in his answer a counterprotest.16 It has been said that a counter-protest is tantamount to a counterclaim in a civil action and may be presented as a part of the answer within the time he is required to answer the protest, unless a motion for extension is granted, in which it must be filed before the expiration of the extended time.17 Apparently, the counter-protest of Espinosa was incorporated in his answer. And as what was revealed, this answer with counter-protest was filed only on June 15, 1995, which was obviously late for four (4) days. It appears that Espinosa did not file a motion for extension of time within which to file his answer with counter-protest. In the absence thereof, there is no basis then for the COMELEC First Division to admit the belatedly filed answer with counter-protest. People vs. Fuentes Facts: The defendant, who was a special agent of the Philippine Constabulary, contends that he stopped his automobile in front of the municipal building of Pilar for the purpose of delivering to Major Agdamag a revolver that the defendant had taken that day from one Tomas de Martin, who had no license therefor; that he did not know there was a polling place near where he parked his motor car; that he was sixty-three meters from the electoral college when the revolver was taken from him by Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Secretary of the Interior. The evidence shows, however, that the defendant was only ten or twelve meters from the polling place when he was found standing near his automobile with a revolver in his belt, and that the municipal building could not be seen from the polling place; that the defendant was at the time employed as a chauffeur by a senator for that district, and that he had been sent to Pontevedra, a municipality adjoining Pilar. Held: WON good faith is a defense Held: CARRYING OF ARMS WITHIN POLLING PLACES; INTENT OF DEFENDANT, IMMATERIAL.-The defendant, a chauffeur and special agent of the Philippine Constabulary, was prosecuted and convicted for a violation of section 416 of the Election Law, for having carried a revolver within fifty meters of a polling place. Conviction sustained. The intent of the defendant in carrying said revolver within the prohibited distance from the polling place is immaterial.