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    Vietnam Studies - The Role Of Military Intelligence 1965-1967 [Illustrated Edition]
    Vietnam Studies - The Role Of Military Intelligence 1965-1967 [Illustrated Edition]
    Vietnam Studies - The Role Of Military Intelligence 1965-1967 [Illustrated Edition]
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    Vietnam Studies - The Role Of Military Intelligence 1965-1967 [Illustrated Edition]

    By Major General Joseph A. McChristian

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    [Includes 13 charts, and 46 illustrations]
    This book forms part of the “Vietnam Studies” series produced by various senior commanders who had served in the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War; each officer was chosen for their knowledge of the number of specialized subjects that were covered by the series.
    The challenge facing the General McChristian in 1965 was exceptionally daunting, as deputy head of General Westmoreland’s Intelligence section his orders were clear he was told that he must "Find the enemy!". A daunting task in a country filled with insurgents, uniformed enemy using other countries to move toward their targets, double agents, spies and a South Vietnamese Intelligence service to be integrated into his plans. As he himself put it: “I knew that finding the enemy was only part of the challenge. Our soldiers would have to fix and fight him. They would need to know enemy strength, capabilities, and vulnerabilities as well as information on the weather and terrain. Such intelligence had to be timely, accurate, adequate, and usable. It was to be my job to build an organization to meet that challenge.”
    It is remarkable that he achieved a good measure of success in his task in only two years in a country with so many endemic issues, and even more so that he was able to distil his story and of his department in to this detailed but very readable exposition of the Intelligence services in Vietnam.
    A complex and engaging study of a very difficult job done well.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherNormanby Press
    Release dateAug 15, 2014
    ISBN9781782893653
    Vietnam Studies - The Role Of Military Intelligence 1965-1967 [Illustrated Edition]

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      Book preview

      Vietnam Studies - The Role Of Military Intelligence 1965-1967 [Illustrated Edition] - Major General Joseph A. McChristian

       This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

      To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books –

      Or on Facebook

      Text originally published in 1975 under the same title.

      © Pickle Partners Publishing 2013, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

      Publisher’s Note

      Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

      We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

      VIETNAM STUDIES

      The Role of Military Intelligence 1965-1967

      by

      Major General Joseph A. McChristian

      TABLE OF CONTENTS

      Contents

      TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

      Charts 7

      Illustrations 7

      Foreword 9

      Preface 11

      CHAPTER I — Introduction 12

      The Challenge 12

      Intelligence Philosophy 14

      Evolution of the Military Assistance Command Intelligence Organization 18

      CHAPTER II — Combined Intelligence 24

      The Combined Intelligence Concept 24

      The Military Intelligence Detachment Exchange Program 26

      The Combined Interrogation System 27

      Combined Document Exploitation 31

      Combined Materiel Exploitation 36

      The Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam 39

      The Sector Intelligence Support Program 53

      The Combined Intelligence Staff 58

      CHAPTER III — Combat Intelligence 77

      Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance 78

      Operations 85

      Exploitation Division 89

      Operation Cedar Falls 91

      CHAPTER IV — Intelligence Production 98

      Development and Publication of the Military Assistance Command Order of Battle Summary 100

      Development and Publication of Infiltration Statistics 101

      Publication of Enemy Tactics Studies 102

      Aerial Rice Survey of IV Corps Tactical Zone 103

      The Combined Intelligence Center Imagery Interpretation Photo Study Program 104

      CHAPTER V — Counterintelligence 106

      Developing the Counterintelligence Effort 106

      Counterintelligence Operations 106

      Security of Military Information 108

      Communications Security 111

      CHAPTER VI — Intelligence Support 113

      Management 113

      Plans and Training 117

      Weather 118

      CHAPTER VII — Summary 119

      REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 121

      Appendix A — J-2, MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, STAFF OFFICERS, SEPTEMBER 1965-MARCH 1967 122

      Appendix B — J-2, MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, STAFF, MAY 1967 123

      Appendix C — MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, 1967 124

      Appendix D — MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT COMMANDERS, MID-1965-MID-1967 125

      Appendix E — REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES MILITARY DIVISION INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT AIRBORNE-MARINE BRIGADE 126

      Appendix F — COMPATIBILITY OF J-2, JOINT GENERAL STAFF, AND J-2, MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND 127

      Appendix G — SUMMARY OF BRIEFING ON VIET CONG TAXATION 128

      Appendix G-1 - FINANCE AND ECONOMIC SECTION 128

      Appendix G-2  - IMPACT OF VIET CONG TAXES 129

      Appendix H — REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION 131

      Appendix I — INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE, 2D AIR DIVISION, JUNE 1963 132

      Appendix J — INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE, NAVAL FORCES, VIETNAM 133

      Glossary 134

      Charts

      1—Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, Staff Organization, July 1965

      2—J-2 Staff Organization, October 1965

      3—Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, Staff Organization, May 1967

      4—525th Military Intelligence Group

      5—Organization, Combined Military Interrogation Center, May 1967

      6—Organization, Combined Document Exploitation Center, May 1967

      7—Organization, Combined Materiel Exploitation Center

      8—Organization, Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam

      9—Sector Combined Intelligence Operations

      10—Flow Chart, Combined Intelligence Staff

      11—Organization, Combined Intelligence Staff

      12—Data Base Input (CICV)

      13—Joint Air-Ground Operations System

      Illustrations

      Major General Joseph A McChristian

      Returnees Were Separated From Prisoners

      Returnees Were Normally Interrogated in an Informal Setting

      A Qualified US Interrogator Who Cannot Speak Vietnamese Questions a Source With the Help of a Vietnamese WAC Interpreter

      Interrogators Received Training by Sitting in on Interrogations

      Inner Compound at CMIC

      CDEC Translators

      Materiel of Interest to the General Supply and Equipment Section of CMEC Was Screened in Detail

      Tactical Scale Studies Were Used in Planning Operations

      American and Vietnamese Intelligence Specialists Examine a Captured Enemy Rocket Launcher

      Imagery Interpreter Removes Photocopy Produced by the Itek Variable-Width Viewer With Printer

      Police Field Force Formation at the National Police Compound in Saigon

      US Operational Unit Commander Briefs Vietnamese Police Officer

      Screening Center Is Established With Photographs and Blacklist of Known Viet Cong

      Search Team in Operation With Scout Dog and US Security Element

      Scout Dog With Handler Searching Exterior of Dwelling

      Search Team at House With US Security Element on Lookout

      Police Field Force Scout Dog Handler and Searcher

      Search Element With US Security Guard Leaving a Dwelling After Search

      Police Field Force Entering House To Conduct Search

      Screening Area Was Established at a Central Location Within the Hamlet

      Screening Center in Operation

      Vietnamese and US Officers Checking Identification of a Detainee

      Police Field Force Reviewing Photograph Album

      Vietnamese Police Officer Checking Identification of a Suspect

      Additional Checks of Identification Papers by Vietnamese

      Police Officials at Screening Center

      Police Field Force Checking Hamlet Inhabitants Against Photographs of Viet Cong Suspects

      US Representative From Combined Intelligence Staff Conferring With US Officer in Charge of the Cordon and Search Operation

      Detainee Being Questioned by Police Field Force Personnel

      Vietnamese Officer in Charge Instructing New Officer on Procedures of the Screening Center

      US Civic Action Officer Giving Treats to the Children

      Viet Cong Suspect Being Questioned by Vietnamese Police Officers of the Combined Intelligence Staff

      Two Suspects Are Detained

      Nha Be Desk Team

      Vietnamese Clerk Is Taught Procedures for Completing Automatic Data Processing System Forms

      Vietnamese Chief of the Combined Intelligence Staff Conferring With Deputy From the Office of the Special Assistant, US Embassy

      Combined Intelligence Staff Communications Section—

      Di An Desk Team

      Task Organization for II Field Force, Vietnam, for Operation CEDAR FALLS

      Task Organizations for CEDAR FALLS Were Deployed Within Striking Distance of the Iron Triangle

      While the 11th Armored Cavalry Drove West, the 1st Division and 173d Brigade Were Airlifted Into Landing Zones

      Anvil or Blocking Force for CEDAR FALLS

      Hammer or Striking Force for CEDAR FALLS

      Prisoner of War Collection Point for the 1st Infantry Division

      All Civilians in the CEDAR FALLS Area of Operations Were Detained

      Foreword

      The United States Army has met an unusually complex challenge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other services, the Army has fought in support of a national policy of assisting an emerging nation to develop governmental processes of its own choosing, free of outside coercion. In addition to the usual problems of waging armed conflict, the assignment in Southeast Asia has required superimposing the immensely sophisticated tasks of a modern army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapting them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These involved helping to fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing with the frustrations of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting conventional campaigns against well-trained and determined regular units.

      It is still necessary for the Army to continue to prepare for other challenges that may lie ahead. While cognizant that history never repeats itself exactly and that no army ever profited from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, the Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its experience, its shortcomings no less than its achievements.

      Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whereby some of the more salient aspects of that experience can be made available now. At the request of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of senior officers who served in important posts in Vietnam and who still carry a heavy burden of day-to-day responsibilities has prepared a series of monographs. These studies should be of great value in helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at the same time contributing to the historical record and providing the American public with an interim report on the performance of men and officers who have responded, as others have through our history, to exacting and trying demands.

      The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was accomplished while the war in Vietnam was at its peak, and the monographs frequently refer to events of the past as if they were taking place in the present.

      All monographs in the series are based primarily on official records, with additional material from published and unpublished secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key participants, and from the personal experience of the author. To facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography have been omitted from the published version; a fully documented account with bibliography is filed with the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

      Major General Joseph A. McChristian is particularly well qualified to write of the role of military intelligence in Vietnam from 1965 through 1967. During that period he served on the staff of General William C. Westmoreland as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

      General McChristian's background in military intelligence is one of long and distinguished service. After World War II he served as Third U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence under General George S. Patton, as Third Army Deputy G-2, and as Deputy Director of Intelligence, U.S. Forces, Austria. In 1948 he was assigned to the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army General Staff. In 1949, during the Greek-Communist War, General McChristian became a member of the first joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in Athens and, later, from June 1956 through May 1960, he served as U.S. Army Attaché to Greece. From January 1962 through February 1963 General McChristian was assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, where he was Chief of the Western Division of Foreign Intelligence. From April 1963 through June 1965 he served as U.S. Army, Pacific, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence at Fort Shafter, Hawaii; from there he went to Vietnam. In August 1968 he became Chief of Army Intelligence. General McChristian retired from active duty in 1971.

      Washington, D. C.15 December 1973

      VERNE L. BOWERS

      Major General, USA The Adjutant General

      Preface

      As General Westmoreland's intelligence officer from 13 July 1965 until 1 June 1967, I am happy to report on the role and development of military intelligence in the Republic of Vietnam during that period. I do so with respect and admiration for the Vietnamese, Koreans, Australians, and Americans who made up that great intelligence team.

      Many members of that team assisted me in the preparation of this account. I know they, as 1, feel a warm sense of satisfaction in passing on to you some of the knowledge we gained.

      The story that follows is mine. I am solely responsible for its content. It is not a complete history; such an undertaking is beyond the purpose and scope of this monograph. My purpose is to record the development and the role of intelligence in Vietnam, not only for students of intelligence but also for planners and decision makers who depend upon intelligence in order to arrive at sound decisions. I have limited the scope of my account to a discussion of some of the major intelligence activities developed in support of the mission of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, with consideration of why and how we developed what we did plus lessons learned along the way.

      First, I will identify the challenge. Second, I will address developing the organization. Third, I will discuss United States-South Vietnamese combined military intelligence activities. And then, in turn, I will cover intelligence operations, intelligence production, counterintelligence, and intelligence support activities. My last chapter will summarize lessons we learned.

      The task of writing this monograph was greatly facilitated by the following dedicated professionals who served with me in Vietnam and who subsequently provided input, suggestions, and advice in its preparation. I thank them for their invaluable assistance and loyalty, and I remember each with admiration and respect: Colonel Frank L. Scofield, U.S. Air Force; Colonel William H. Crosson, U.S. Army; Colonel Robert E. McMahon, U.S. Army; Colonel Glenn E. Muggelberg, U.S. Army; Colonel John T. Little, U.S. Army; Colonel Robert F. Robens, U.S. Army; Colonel John J. Morgan, U.S. Army; Colonel Frank L. Schaf, Jr., U.S. Army; Colonel Robert Churley, U.S. Marine Corps; Colonel Ralph T. Hunt, U.S. Army; Colonel. Jerry Dismuke, U.S. Air Force; Colonel C. M. Smith, U.S. Air Force; Colonel Donald T. Ketcham, U.S. Army; Colonel Stone W. Quillian, U.S. Marine Corps; Colonel Gains B. Hawkins, U.S. Army; Colonel Ralph H. Groover, Jr., U.S. Army; Colonel Walter R. Pierce, Jr., U.S. Army; Colonel Silas E. Chumley, U.S. Army; Colonel Coleman Noahson, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel Autmer Ackley, Jr., U.S. Army; Major James D. Strachan, U.S. Army; Major James E. Crouch, U.S. Army; Sergeant Major Vince LeBlanc, U.S. Army; Master Sergeant Clyde F. Jepson, who, serving as my enlisted aide, conscientiously and loyally saw to it that in all matters relating to subsistence, quarters, health, sanitation, uniforms, and equipment I never had a worry; Colonel Gains B. Hawkins and Lieutenant Colonel Lyle K. Alexander for their assistance in assembling information and drafting this report; and Mrs. Helen Worden for her cheerful help in editing and typing my final draft

      Washington, D. C. 15 December 1973

      JOSEPH A. McCHRISTIAN

      Major General, U.S. Army, Retired

      CHAPTER I — Introduction

      The Challenge

      Find the enemy! With these words General Harold K. Johnson, then chief of the staff of the Army, wished me well as I left Washington to become General William C. Westmoreland's assistant chief of staff for intelligence in the Republic of Vietnam. Combat intelligence was not new to me. I knew that finding the enemy was only part of the challenge. Our soldiers would have to fix and fight him. They would need to know enemy strength, capabilities, and vulnerabilities as well as information on the weather and terrain. Such intelligence had to be timely, accurate, adequate, and usable. It was to be my job to build an organization to meet that challenge.

      After a series of briefings in Washington and goodbyes in Fort Shafter, Hawaii, I was on my way to serve my country in a third war, albeit in an advisory role, or so I thought. I had just completed two years as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army, Pacific. During those two years I had traveled from Singapore to Korea visiting United States and allied intelligence activities, including those in South Vietnam. On my last visit there I had presented a study to General Westmoreland and his intelligence staff on my concept for the Army intelligence organization. From Saigon I had gone to Bangkok and presented a similar briefing. I was familiar with the situation in Southeast Asia. I knew that the Viet Cong had better intelligence than we; however, I knew there was much more information available to us if we had the resources and organization to acquire it. The counterinsurgency in Vietnam had unusual intelligence potential in that many enemy military and political organizations were relatively stationary and had assigned areas of operations. We could focus our intelligence efforts on those areas if we knew their locations. During my flight from Honolulu to Saigon I wrote two questions in my notebook: Where can I normally expect to find the enemy? and Where can I normally not expect to find the enemy? During that flight I wrote scores of answers to each question-every possibility that occurred to me. Later in Saigon we were to refine and reduce the answers to a few elements on which timely and adequate information was available. This became the basis for the pattern analysis technique methodology which permitted us

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