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Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II
Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II
Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II
Audiobook17 hours

Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II

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General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army during World War II, faced the daunting task not only of overseeing two theaters of a global conflict but also of selecting the best generals to carry out American grand strategy. Marshall and His Generals is the first and only book to focus entirely on that selection process and the performances, both stellar and disappointing, that followed from it.

Stephen Taaffe explores how and why Marshall selected the Army's commanders. Among Marshall's chief criteria were character (including "unselfish and devoted purpose"), education, (whether at West Point, Fort Leavenworth, or the Army War College), and striking a balance between experience and relative youth in a war that required both wisdom and great physical stamina. As the war unfolded, Marshall also factored into his calculations the combat leadership his generals demonstrated and the opinions of his theater commanders.

Delving deeper than other studies, this path-breaking work produces a seamless analysis of Marshall's selection process of operational-level commanders. Taaffe also critiques the performance of these generals during the war and reveals the extent to which their actions served as stepping stones to advancement.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateOct 24, 2017
ISBN9781541483682
Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II

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Rating: 4.214285714285714 out of 5 stars
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  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    Absolutely perfectly written! Tons of information regarding less famous generals.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    Besides working as a "tour d'horizon" of the conduct of the American ground war in World War II, one receives a good sense of just how the U.S. soldiers who held the higher command positions in World War II received those positions and, on occasion, lost them. Beyond professional achievement, much of this boiled down to a man's relationship with George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower or Douglas MacArthur, which is the only thing that explains the survival of Courtney Hodges as the commander of the U.S. 1st Army in the ETO, as the evidence seems clear that he should have been withdrawn after the Huertgen Woods campaign, if for no other reason but ill-health, but his friendship with Marshall, Eisenhower and Omar Bradley kept Hodges in the saddle. Besides that Taaffe also deals with the now unheralded influence of Lesley McNair who, for all his genius in creating the combat structure of the U.S. Army's ground forces, seemed to over-esteem organizational ability over character and force of will, and whose recommendations for operational command (such as Lloyd Fredendall and John Lucas) are justly regarded as failures. It's the collection of these personal relationships, for good or ill, that make this book valuable.If there is a particular revelation for me in this book it is that of the career of Jacob Devers, who eventually parleyed a staff slot in the backwater of Italy into command of the U.S. 6th Army Group; much to the annoyance of Eisenhower, Bradley and Patton. Besides demonstrating a certain mastery of bureaucratic politics, Devers' fine performance also brings into question just how essential some of the standard heroes of the U.S. war effort in ETO were; as they say, the graveyards are filled with indispensable men.I have very little to mark this book down for, but two points come to mind. One is that it's not clear Taaffe really appreciates the concept of operational warfare, or at least he doesn't explicitly makes judgements of achievement on that basis. Two, Taaffe also doesn't spend much time talking about what a limited base that the U.S. Army had to draw from in terms of its field commanders, which would be part of the explanation of why some individuals who deserved relief, if only for health reasons, were allowed to remain in combat positions. Then again, Taaffe does remind readers of why this was less of a concern than it might be, as the U.S. Army was not depending on individual virtuosity on the field of battle to win the war.