Henri Barkey Flirting with Disaster: Turkey, Iraq and the U.S.

March 26, 2003

I am delighted to be here and thank you for inviting me. It is actually particularly difficult because, especially the topic Im going to address today is changing constantly. As I was ready to give this talk this morning I was giving something from the Turkish newspapers, about the Turkish Chief of the General Staff making a rather dramatic announcement, which actually fits and doesnt fit with what Im going to say, as you will see in a minute. Anything I say cannot be used against me in the future. We political scientists, we are only right 10% of the time and when events are moving this fast, 2% will be wonderful. I titled my lecture "Flirting with Disaster," only because the way things are moving in terms of Turkish/American relations, there is no question that a major disaster was in the making. What was very interesting is that, Turkey, in a matter of three weeks, managed to alienate both the European Union and the United States at the same time. This is rather an unusual feat given the fact that the United States has been rather dramatically pro-Turkish in the last six years. So, why, what happened? As I look at the scene in Washington, there is no question that the mood with respect to Turkey has never been this bad. People in the administration, on the Hill, and within the bureaucracy are amazingly angry at Turkey they feel betrayed and let down. This will have many consequences, but clearly everything boils down to one very simple vote in the Turkish Parliament. On March 1 the Turkish Parliament, by a very narrow margin, rejected the governments proposal to allow American troops to be based in Turkey. Opening a second front against Saddam Hussein, the so-called northern front. What is amazing about this is that everybody expected the vote to go through. If three or four members of parliament had acted differently we would have forgotten about it, this crisis we are dealing with could have been avoided. That would have been the end of the story and the end of the discussion and we would have a northern front today

Barkey: Flirting with Disaster: Turkey, Iraq and the U.S.

with respect to Iraq. The shock waves, in fact, also had to do with three weeks later a resolution was passed through the Turkish Parliament, which allowed the United States over-flight rights. This resolution was pushed by the government and passed by parliament but, as far as the U.S. was concerned, it was too little, too late. Why? Because nobody, in the U.S., really ever questioned the fact that the United States would have access to Turkeys air space. What were the U.S. assumptions and negotiations with Turkey? What were Turkish assumptions? What were Turkish concerns? The U.S. went into this with the assumption that Turkey was an erstwhile ally. No one questioned whether or not Turkey would pass this resolution. Why? The Turks will come through because the United States is an important alley of Turkey and that Turkey, at this junction in its history does not want alienate the United States. The costs would be too high. So, the United States Government went into this with the assumption that it would get not just over-flight rights, but the whole thing. The only question was how much the United States would have to pay and how many troops? If you look at the recent U.S./Turkish relations, theyve never been this good. In fact, starting towards the midpoint of the second Clinton Administration, you see a slow, but progressive amelioration of Turkish/American relations. There are major issues, which divide the United States and Turkey, policy differences, what are human rights, Iraq, and democratization. But on the larger issues, whether it was getting Turkey into the European Union, against European resistance, the United States pushed very, very hard to open the door. Not to make Turkey a member, but to open the door and give Turkey a chance. On the issue of the PKK, Turkey faced a major uprising by the PKK, the Kurdish Workers Party, which lasted essentially from 1984 to 1999. The United States was steadfast in supporting Turkey on this issue where the Europeans were a little bit less supportive. In 2001, when the Turkish economy tanked, as a result of a minor fight between the Prime Minister and the President when they threw books at each other in a National Security Council meeting. Again, it was the United States that engineered the $31.5 billion IMF package over two years. The largest such
Barkey: Flirting with Disaster: Turkey, Iraq and the U.S.

package ever put together by the IMF. So, again the argument was, Turkey would not want to alienate us. I have to credit the new Turkish Government; they did try to pass this resolution through parliament. Ninety percent of the population was against it. But where the United States went wrong, is that it set deadline, after deadline, after deadline on the issue of the second front. As the U.S. kept pushing the deadlines, we also created the impression that the deadlines were not serious. The only thing the U.S. assumed was that the military would back us and, because for a long time, Turkish and American military had been talking, had been planning, had been preparing, and had been having these conversations. The U.S. made a mistake we didnt realize that the military had other priorities; this was not necessarily its number one priority. What were the Turkish positions and what were Turkish concerns? Now, from the prospective of just the operation, Turkey and a new government, which was facing really sever opposition within the country. The Turkish government because of its composition, because it is a pro-Islamist party, was very sensitive, naturally, to this issue. You could see that the Turks were really pushing the negotiations always to the 59th minute of the 11th hour to extract the greatest number of concessions. The Turks are convinced, that in the first Gulf War in 1991, Turkey lost a great deal as a result of sanctions after the war that hampered the trade and, therefore, the Turkish economy suffered terribly. There is no question that this is true but the Turks exaggerate the amount of losses that they suffered during that period. But this time, they were going to make sure, in advance, that these losses would somehow be compensated since last time they were not. But the most important issue for Turkey obviously was a question of the Kurds, and northern Iraq. And if you look at it through an American prospective, we wanted the northern front. We wanted the northern front not just because we wanted to squeeze Saddam from two sides, but also because we wanted to get to northern Iraq before the Turks and before the Kurds in Iraq went through two major cities. The Turks are very worried that the Kurds in northern Iraq will either go for independence or if they end up in a federation within the borders of Iraq, that the cities of Mosul and Kirkut will fall into Kurdish hands. These are two cities that are rich with oil, especially Kirkut. If Kirkut and Mosul become
Barkey: Flirting with Disaster: Turkey, Iraq and the U.S.

part of the Iraqi federation, the Kurds rich in Iraq and, therefore, that will allow them to seek independence. The Kurdish federation or Kurdish independence in Iraq would also become a beacon for Turkish Kurds. The government was more concerned about the financial costs of the war because, after all, governments really get voted in and out, especially this government, on economic records. They were more concerned about getting the best deal they could economically. The military was more interested in getting guarantees about northern Iraq and especially about Turkish troops moving into northern Iraq with American troops. The Turkomans are a minority in Iraq that speaks Turkish. This is a minority that the Turks only recently discovered. They always knew that they existed, but they decided that they were important now. Why? Because it allows the Turkish military, to have a constituency a group of people whose fate they are worried about and would like to protect and support. Fair enough. Because bare in mind that Saddam Hussein has many times massacred the Turkomans and Turkish governments in the past have never even privately complained to Saddam about this. But the Turkoman issue works actually both ways. It is an issue that the Turkish government and the military can now use domestically as an excuse to enter northern Iraq. It has become a very potent issue because it has been talked and talked and talked about. Every day when you turn on Turkish television, you will find some Turkoman representative talking about his peoples suffering. But the problem with the Turkomans is that there are great disputes as to their numbers. The CIA fact book or other NGOs estimate the Turkoman population to be 400,000 to 600,000. In fact, when I talked to Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, they themselves say about 600,000, which is on the high side of what Western estimates are. Turkish estimates are anywhere around 2 million and, if you ask the Turkoman representatives of Iraq, they will say 5 million. This was actually a very valid reason, for both the Turks and also for the U.S. to be involved in northern Iraq. So much has been said about the Turkomans, that it is now very, very difficult for the Turks to ignore the Turkoman leadership in Iraq, which is mostly Turkish appointed leadership. This leadership is entrepreneurial. This is their moment. This is the moment when there is chaos; when there is a war. This is a
Barkey: Flirting with Disaster: Turkey, Iraq and the U.S.

moment they will get something it is in their interest to get the Turks involved and this when one of the great dangers. Other issues that concern the Turks are the issues of refugees. Last time in 1991, there were about 500,000 refugees that landed on the Turkish borders, which created both a humanitarian catastrophe, and also political problems for Turkey. Also very importantly for the Turks there are still between 4,000 to 5,000 PKK fighters who left Turkey, who are now in the area between the Iranian border and the Iraqi/Kurdistan side, waiting for things to happen. And what the Turkish military worries about is that these people will take advantage of the chaos and maybe start striking at Turkish forces again, which is, a valid concern. The picture was actually much more complicated. When you look at the vote itself, there is no question the government wanted to pass this vote. But, they also wanted to show the rest of the world, and especially their own public that this is a democratic party where there is dissent, where people can vote against the government and nothing will happen. The day of the vote, on March 1st, they took a straw poll, they realized that 50 people would be voting against them, from their own ranks, and this was acceptable because it gave them a margin of approximately 45 to 50 to win the vote. This was a desirable outcome because they could turn around state not everybody in the governing party is in favor, we are a democratic party, the government insisted that there would be no party vote. In Turkey when you say party vote, every man votes the party on the penalty of not death, but something close to that, he has to vote for the party. But it becomes a little bit more complicated in the sense that there is also another game going on between this government and the military. We have to understand that this is a government that came to power with a huge majority in Parliament, although initially it could not elect its leader as a Member of Parliament and now it has. It is also a pro-Islamist government. A party whose predecessors and many of its leaders have either been prosecuted or in the case of Erdogan were actually imprisoned. This is a party who the military did not want to see in power. This is also a party that, not only the military does not trust, but also the civilian establishment does not either. But most importantly, this is a party that has been arguing that it is in the process of a major conversion. That it is no longer an
Barkey: Flirting with Disaster: Turkey, Iraq and the U.S.

Islamist party, which I think is true. That, in fact, it wants to be and claims to be a Center/Right party. I dont think it has gotten there yet. The process of becoming a Center/Right party and the very fact of seeing these people in government, makes the military very nervous. So, when you look at the decision whether or not American troops should be based in Turkey, the military wanted that. The military understood that in order to be able to get what it wants in northern Iraq, it needed to cooperate with the United States. It would not allow the party in power or the government, which it dislikes intensely, to put part of the decision on them. What do I mean by this? The government knowing that this is a very unpopular decision wanted cover. They wanted the military to support the governments motion in Parliament. We wanted the American military to come in and open the northern front. They didnt. In fact, the day before the Parliamentary vote, there was a National Security Council meeting where information is transferred from the Military High Command to the Civilians and that is where they have discussions of issues and the military suggests what its preferences were. The day before the vote, there was a meeting and the communiqu that was issued after the meeting, said absolutely nothing on the impending vote. People assumed that the military was not in favor. Now, it is also true that the military was ambivalent about this, the military was not happy about the war in northern Iraq because of the potential problems that northern Iraq could create for it. So, the militarys position was, this is a democracy, you believe in civilian rule. You keep criticizing the role of the military its a tough choice you make it. It is a political decision; all decisions are political. This is not a decision that the military should have taken. The militarys position on northern Iraq and the Kurdish question verges on paranoia unfortunately. When it comes to the Kurdish question because they see the Kurds as a fundamental threat to Turkeys territorial integrity and the composition of Turkey, theyre willing to go to no end to block any movement in northern Iraq because of the potential repercussions in Turkey. So, part of the problem also resides in the militarys lack of trust for the United States. They, for many, many years, we have told the Turks that we do not believe in an

Barkey: Flirting with Disaster: Turkey, Iraq and the U.S.

independent Kurdistan. That we dont believe in dissecting Iraq into its component parts, that we believe that Kurds should be part of Iraq. Now, where do we go from here? The issue thats at hand now is, and the reason why I called my lecture "Flirting with Disaster", is because the Turkish military has said that no matter what happens, it was going to move into northern Iraq. The last thing the United States wanted is for the Turkish military to move into northern Iraq because the tensions between Iraqi Kurds and the Turkish military. The northern front was designed in part to avert this kind of outcome, and until this morning, the Turkish military insisted on its right to move in, irrespective of our wishes. If you notice that on Sunday, President Bush, in unusually strong terms told, said to Turks, you cannot roll in there. Prime Minister Blair said the same thing. The Secretary of State, Colin Powell, said the same thing. I have rarely seen so many senior voices using such a strong language, essentially, against the Turks, because it was new fear that this would involve a major fight between the Turks and the Kurds. Theres way in which you can argue that the Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, especially the KDP, has become very emotional about the Turks. A Turkish/Kurdish fight would very quickly turn, Congress, especially, against Turkey in an open way and would do a lot of damage to the Turkish/American relationship. The Turks announced that they will not go in, at least for now, at least for the time being, it removes one major source of concern. We still dont know what can happen in northern Iraq. What the Turks do not want to see, for example, is for the Kurds to take the cities of Mosul of Kirkut. 50,000 ethnic Kurds who are in Kurdish regions now from Kirkut with their bags packed who are waiting for the cities, for Kirkut to be reclaimed by American forces so they could go back and reclaim their houses from the Arabs, that Saddam put in their places. Now, if you see a column of refugees going towards Kirkut, what will you do, if you were the Turkish military? Will you intervene? Now, Kirkut is fairly south compared to the Turkish border. So, it would not be an easy operation. It would involve crossing American lines as well. So it creates an enormous number of complications. Now the hope is that somehow the two Kurdish groups will be able to contain their own refugees and their own demands that are coming from
Barkey: Flirting with Disaster: Turkey, Iraq and the U.S.

their own public, which are actually not insignificant. But there are many reasons why things can still go wrong in northern Iraq. I mean we have all the makings of a very flammable situation. In terms of U.S./Turkish relations, the war has been going on now for a week and most of you are watching the news reports may conclude that things are not going very well, at least not as well as we thought they would be going at least as well as we had been promised they would be going. But, theres no question that if Saddams resistance turns out to be much stiffer than we expected, the absence of the second front will weigh very heavily in the minds of Congress, because if people conclude that all we needed was one more division, and if that division is still in Fort Hood today, it is because the Turks delayed and delayed and delayed and we couldnt even make the decision to send them to Kuwait. So, there are many areas here of potential problems. Let me end on a couple of hopeful notes. What is actually very sad about the present situation now is that the Turkish government that came to power after the November 3 elections, although pro-Islamist, is actually the first time Turkey has had a government that has essentially, said all the things weve wanted the Turks to say and do. What did they talk about? They talked about democracy. They talked about joining the European Union. These are two issues we have been pushing the Turks very strong on. Yes, the Turks in the past have talked about democracy and theyve talked about the European Union, but the truth of the matter is that it was always half-hearted. When Turks made changes in their constitution or introduced reforms on torture, it is because they were forced to do it. This is the first time a Turkish Government has come to power and said, we want to do these things because we want to, because its good for Turkey, its good for the people of Turkey, irrespective of ethnical or religious concerns. Now, you can argue that this is rhetoric, but it is a different rhetoric. This is our renaissance. Now for an Islamist leader to use the word renaissance in Turkey is actually quite, revealing to me. Now, you can argue, and I think it is legitimate, that that commitment to Europe is because they understand that the process of joining Europe or the process of candidacy is going to make Turkey democratic. In the process, we put the military in a very tight cage, which means
Barkey: Flirting with Disaster: Turkey, Iraq and the U.S.

that the military will not be able to intervene as it has in the past every 10 years or so and change governments when it feels like doing. The process of the European candidacy will generally make Turkey democratic. Now, this process has now suffered a blow and I would venture to say that if there is any fighting in northern Iraq, this process will suffer a much larger blow and may even be reversed. That if this immediate Iraq crisis is resolved, that there are not too many American causalities, the fact of the northern front is not a major issue. If we succeed in defeating Saddam as fast as we hoped to do and the Turks dont go into northern Iraq, I think within a year or so, this will be essentially forgotten and if the government in Turkey does manage to proceed along its reformed track, I think relations will continue to improve and I think thats the best hope we have for the future. Thank you

Copyright 2003 The Middle East Center at the University of Utah

Barkey: Flirting with Disaster: Turkey, Iraq and the U.S.